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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. MIGRATION POLICY IN
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"Russia and the Moslem World."*

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labor migration; adaptation and
integration of migrants; labor market;
foreign labor force (IRS); quotas.*

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*Abstract. This review analyzes the most essential features of the
state migration policy of modern Russia. The attention is focused on the
religious factor, ethnopolitics, regulation of external labor migration;
adaptation and integration of Moslem migrants.*

Introduction

In the modern world, migration processes have acquired an unprecedented scale. Migration has become one of the key factors in social processes. In the Russian Federation, migration is determined by global trends: natural population decline, lack of labor, uneven economic development of regions. The above factors are complemented by Russia's participation in integration associations in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, the growth of the Moslem part of the population and the formation of Moslem enclaves raise concerns among Russians.

In the structure of external migration, the priority belongs to labor migration. Most of those who come to work are Moslems. Demographic trends make it possible to predict a significant increase in the presence of Moslems and a change in the ethno-religious composition of the population of Russian regions. The problem of adaptation of migrants requires an integrated approach, for which religious and public organizations are not always ready. The educational influence of the Russian Moslem clergy could contribute to the inculturation of Moslem migrants. At the same time, the ineffectiveness of adaptation and inculturation leads to an increase in interethnic and interreligious tensions.

The article by DSc(Philosophy) Tatyana Pronina, Pushkin Leningrad State University, Sankt-Peterburg, [6] “Migration in modern Russia and the religious factor*” is based on the analysis of materials from surveys and interviews conducted in the regions of the Russian Federation in 2016–2020.

The migration flow to Russia increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union due to the deterioration of the political and economic situation in the former republics of the USSR. In dynamics 2017–2019 there is again an increase in migration to the Russian Federation. In 2019, 19.5 million people were

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

registered in Russia for migration. About 5.5 million people arrived for the purpose of employment. This figure may actually be 1.5–2 times higher. The share of CIS citizens among the arriving foreigners has remained unchanged for a number of years - about 85 per cent, of which 40 per cent come from the states of Central Asia, mainly - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. At least 9.8 million foreign citizens stay constantly on the territory, which is about 7 per cent of the population.

However, if we take into account those who stay in the Russian Federation at a time, taking into account illegal labor migrants too, then the number may increase to 10 million. At the same time, Russia's own Moslem population is about 20 million people. In total, there are about 30 million Moslems in the country. This is more than 20 per cent of the population. In the future, significant changes may occur in the ethno-religious composition of the Russian population. Migration thus becomes not only a demographic factor, but also plays an important role in political processes.

The largest external migration in the Russian Federation is labor migration. Basically, it is of a “circular,” temporary nature. Tax payments of foreign workers bring significant income to the state: In 2018, it was 45 billion rubles. According to experts, Russia has a double benefit from migration: migrants create material benefits, make migration payments, pay taxes in Russia itself, increasing its GDP, and through money transfers they stabilize the situation in the regions closest to Russia. The main centers of attraction for external migration in the Russian Federation are the Central and Northwestern Federal Districts. More than half (57 per cent) of all foreign citizens who entered the Russian Federation for the purpose of employment are registered in 4 regions - Moscow and St. Petersburg, Moscow and Leningrad regions. These regions are dynamically developing, with the greatest attraction of investments, various objects are being actively built here, there are many markets, and a developed service sector. The main sectors of employment of foreign

migrants are construction (34 per cent), services (13 per cent), manufacturing (10 per cent), agriculture (7 per cent).

Studies show that the attitude of Russians towards migrants is now showing a tendency to deteriorate. Local residents are often inclined to blame newcomers for existing socio-economic problems. According to a survey conducted by employees of the Center for Religious and Ethnopolitical Research, Leningrad State University named after A.S. Pushkin in one of the central regions of Russia in 2016, only 20 per cent of respondents believe that the presence of migrants is useful for the country and the region, 26.6 per cent answered that they should not be in the country, 17.2 per cent expressed their dislike for migrants, 35.9 per cent answered that they did not care. Among the reasons for hostile attitudes, the following were named: aggressive behavior – 64.1 per cent, disregard for local traditions and norms of behavior – 39.3 per cent, criminal activity – 35.3 per cent, violations of public order – 32.5 per cent, they are dangerous – 21 per cent, they occupy jobs of Russians – 19.4 per cent. To the question: “What actions should the authorities take in relation to migrants?” the majority spoke in favor of restrictive measures: 60 per cent of respondents answered that it is necessary to restrict the inflow of migrants and control illegal migration, 14 per cent believe that it is necessary to limit the types of acceptable work and the amount of remuneration for migrants, only 7 per cent spoke out that the legal norms of entry and accommodation should be facilitated.

Negative sentiments prevail in the attitude of Russians towards migrants. According to the results of a monitoring study conducted by the sociological center “Megapolis” in 2014 through a telephone survey of 1,000 Petersburgers, 46.4 per cent answered that citizens coming to the city for temporary work from the former Soviet republics and the North Caucasus create problems.

The adaptation and integration of migrants in Russia has its own peculiarities. Since the main migration flow is circular in nature, most of the migrants are not focused on integration at all.

For them, an acceptable option is the level of adaptation that allows them to survive in the country and earn money: a minimum knowledge of the Russian language, sufficient for communication in everyday life. There was no talk of any cultural integration. Migrants often have a negative perception of many norms and traditions of the country of arrival. Sociologists see the reason for this in a high degree of enclavization, when visitors have no reason and no need to communicate with the local population.

Experts' opinions differ on the question of whether there are ethnoreligious enclaves in Russia. As a rule, representatives of official state bodies believe that there are none. Indeed, if we keep in mind enclaves similar to those formed on the outskirts or in the suburbs of large cities in France, Germany, Belgium, then there are no such ones in Russia yet. The reason for this is the low scale of immigration. Labor migration is of temporary nature – according to statistics, only about 20 per cent of visitors want to stay in Russia. There are also few representatives of the second generation of immigrants who were born in the country of arrival. However, some researchers believe that enclaves in Russian cities in Moscow and St. Petersburg exist (T. Protasenko, I. Beloborodov). Visitors, the researchers note, live separately, according to their own laws and rules that are unclear to Russians. Citizens are afraid of such “enclaves”, believing that they cannot feel safe next to them. In ten years, the “enclaves” will become unmanageable from the outside, their population will grow. As a result, they will begin to change the cultural background, way of life and traditions. This is a common practice for cities where the share of migrants exceeds 10–12 per cent percent, and in Moscow today there are more than 20 per cent of migrants.

According to T. Pronina, there are already prerequisites for the formation of “parallel societies” reflecting the process of enclavization in Russian cities. The main one is a long stay on the territory of the Russian Federation – about 6 months or more – of

a significant number of migrants. After leaving, they are replaced by new employees who often settle in the same places – as a result, their concentration can be significant.

In Moscow, the areas of compact residence of migrants are the outskirts of the city. The situation is similar in St. Petersburg – here migrants also settle in areas with low rent for housing, near places of work. There are similar areas in other cities: Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Ufa, Orenburg. In the absence or lack of adaptation mechanisms, segregation of such communities occurs. The number of migrants in the Russian countryside is also increasing. For example, in the Astrakhan and Volgograd regions, migrants make up a significant share in agricultural activities related to seasonal harvesting of melons and vegetables. This situation is evaluated in a polar way: from “ban it, it will lead to conflicts”, to “they will save a dying Russian village”. Experts admit that the village cannot do without migrants.

The majority of labor migrants in Russia are Moslems. However, the intensity of their religiosity, according to the researcher, differs significantly in generations. In an interview with the author of the article, it is recorded that immigrants from Central Asia who came to St. Petersburg 15–20 years ago are less religious than young relatives who come to them today, who are very religious. Under the influence of the latter, older relatives also become more religious. Expert interviews with leaders of Moslem communities and national centers indicate that the religiosity of migrants often differs from the Islam that is traditional for a particular region of Russia, has an intense character, reveals the features of election, visitors are guided by the authority of leaders who were their mentors at home. All this complicates their inculturation. There is also such a trend: in some regions, imams who received religious education abroad in the 1990s and 2000s are easier to build communication with migrants. As a result, there is a displacement of authentic members from the community, the separation of communities along ethnic lines. According to the forecast of political scientist

Abdulla Rinat Mukhametov, the indigenous Moslem population of Russia will itself become a minority on its territory in relation to the Central Asian majority (yesterday's migrants).

Public councils for interaction with religious organizations and centralized religious organizations can coordinate efforts to adapt migrants. But a small number of migrants are covered by the activities of public and state structures. Migrants most often did not even hear about public national organizations. But many of them visit mosques and prayer rooms. However, here we can still talk about great potential, but not about significant real achievements. Work with migrants is limited to holding meetings with the invitation of employees of the Federal Migration Service, who explain how to issue a registration and a patent, warn about the inadmissibility of offenses, etc. In their sermons, the imams talk about the need to comply with Russian laws, respect for local residents and representatives of all nationalities and religions.

According to T. Pronina, the inefficiency of religious organizations in the adaptation of migrants is associated, among other things, with objective reasons. It is the Moslem migrants, most of whom are located in large Russian cities, who, due to the lack of mosques and prayer houses, find themselves outside the sphere of influence of representatives of the Russian Moslem clergy. Whereas the educational influence of the clergy, focused on the cultivation of the all-Russian identity, could become an effective way of adaptation and prevent the trends of segregation of migrant communities.

In the article "Formation and institutionalization of state migration policy", DSc(Political Science) V. Zorin (Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation) and PhD(Political Science) M. Burda (Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation) [1] analyze the features that influence the formation of migration policy in modern Russia. The authors provide statistical data, expert assessments, ratings and legal acts.

The researchers note that the topic of external migration is one of the most acute and relevant in the socio-political space. At the same time, the understanding of external migration at the level of experts and society often differs. The expert community is currently generally positive about the mechanisms of external migration in the context of solving certain problems in the Russian labor market and the difficult demographic situation. In turn, part of the Russian society is conservative about external migration and associates the increase in the level of domestic crime, the spread of drugs and terrorist risks with migration. Opinion polls show that two-thirds of Russians support restrictive measures of the Russian government aimed at limiting the influx of visitors. For example, in 2019, the Levada Center received the following results: – 72 per cent of respondents supported the need to limit the influx of migrant workers; – 63 per cent of respondents noted: – “The presence of migrants in our city / region is excessive”; – 64 per cent of respondents said: “My relatives and friends are ready to do the work that migrants are currently doing.”

The authors consider the model of modern Russian migration policy, when the latest version of the Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025 was adopted. They note that the new migration concept approved by President Vladimir Putin is the result of reworking and improving, taking into account the changing political situation, the mechanisms laid down in the Migration Policy Concept of 2012. This approach made it possible to evolutionarily reform the mechanisms of state management in the migration sphere. During the implementation of the previous migration concept, the authorities introduced new aspects into the migration legislation, among them:

- differentiation of the rules for temporary employment of foreign citizens on the territory of the Russian Federation;
- improving, including regulatory and legal, mechanisms for countering illegal migration and its organization;

- adjustment of Russian regulatory legal acts, in terms of clarifying the procedure for their application to foreign citizens who are in the Russian Federation, within the framework of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation.

The possibility to carry out temporary labor activity in Russia on the basis of a patent since January 2015 has allowed the Russian migration system to differentiate external labor migration not only by qualitative criteria – general procedure, qualified specialist, highly qualified specialist, but also by the “country” criterion. Currently, three “country” criteria are expressed. The maximum level of preferences applies to migrant workers from the EAEU member States (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), for whom a single labor market has been formed throughout the Union. The second level of admission includes migrants from the CIS member states that are not members of the EAEU – Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine, which have been subject to the rules of the institute of “patenting” since 2015. The third level includes all other states, migrants from which, when carrying out temporary work in Russia, need to issue a permit to attract foreign labor and a work permit. The implementation of the three-level system made it possible to abandon the mechanism of quota attraction of foreign labor, which had the potential for corruption offenses, and also did not always meet the current needs and needs of the Russian labor market in foreign labor, and in this regard was criticized by the business community and public organizations.

Migration, as a complex phenomenon, depends on the interaction of the political, economic, social and humanitarian aspects of the policy implemented by the state. The model of migration management implemented within the framework of the Russian migration system, formed by state authorities, with the active participation of civil society institutions, allows achieving a balance between the political, economic and demographic interests of the state, on the one hand, and ensuring

national security, protecting the rights of the local population and legal migrants, on the other.

Leading Russian experts in the field of migration consider it necessary to adjust the existing migration system in terms of improving approaches to attracting migrants not only for temporary work in Russia, but also their subsequent integration into Russian society as its new full-fledged members. However, according to the Doctor of Political Sciences Mikhailova N. (Peoples Friendship University of Russia), PhDs (Political Sciences) Burda M. (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration) and Grishin O. (Peoples Friendship University of Russia) [5] (article “State migration policy of Russia: actual issues of external labor migration”) the political regimes of the Central Asian republics see external migration to the Russian Federation in a different paradigm. Migration of their citizens to work in Russia is considered in these states as a mechanism that allows minimizing domestic political risks associated with a low standard of living and unemployment. The researchers also note that remittances of migrant workers to the countries of origin continue to be a significant aspect of the economic stability of the states – migration donors. In addition, labor migrants themselves often do not consider Russia as a new place of residence.

The authors emphasize that the indication in the migration card of the purpose of entry into the Russian Federation “work” does not give the right to carry out temporary labor activity to foreign citizens from the CIS member states. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, only about 36per cent receive the necessary documents – patents and work permits. It is obvious that a certain part of migrants who have not issued documents carry out temporary labor activities illegally. A significant part of migrants become illegal immigrants unintentionally and, in some cases, this has the following set of reasons:

- a low level of Russian language proficiency does not allow a migrant to study the requirements of Russian migration legislation even in the country of departure. The migrant is guided by information from social networks and acquaintances, and these data are often unreliable and erroneous;

- after entering the territory of the Russian Federation, a migrant is given 30 days to file an application for a patent, while he must register for migration, receive the necessary medical certificate, a certificate of knowledge of the Russian language. Often, in order to speed up such a procedure, a migrant turns for help to intermediaries (diasporas, non-profit organizations and dubious legal advice), who sometimes are engaged in outright fraud;

- an unscrupulous employer offers a migrant to register without the necessary permits, and after 30 days, when the migrant can no longer apply for a patent, actually transfers the migrant to an illegal position and gets the opportunity to manipulate such an employee, including without paying him wages.

The existing high migration attractiveness of Russia for immigrants from the post-Soviet states is due to the existing features of Russian migration legislation, which promotes the development of preferential relations with the CIS countries and thus cultivates the dependence of the Russian labor market of foreign labor on the influx of external labor resources from several donor states.

The Russian migration system differentiates external labor migration in two planes. The migration legislation identifies categories of highly qualified and qualified specialists, and also implements various procedures for obtaining permits for potential labor migrants regarding their state of departure. Russian legislation includes migrants from the EAEU states to the first group, for which a single labor market has been formed throughout the Union. The second group includes migrants from the CIS member states that are not members of the EAEU, for whom the procedure for obtaining permits in the form of a patent

for temporary employment is provided. The third group includes migrants from all other States. For this group, the process of carrying out temporary labor activity in Russia is the most difficult and requires, in addition to obtaining a work permit, obtaining a permit to attract foreign labor.

According to PhD (Hist.) V. Komarovskiy [2], the Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for 2019–2025 did not reflect duly the transformation of the migration policy of the main host countries, emphasizing the role of labor migration in increasing economic competitiveness. The system of regulating the inflow and use of foreign labor in Russia includes three categories of labor migrants: two of them are visa-free: citizens of the EAEU member states, equated to the national labor force, immigrants from other CIS countries (work on the basis of a patent), and the visa flow of labor migrants from third countries.

Migration regulation is determined by the socio-economic needs of the host country in certain categories of migrants, the intensity of their influx, the need to either stimulate or limit it in a certain period. For the European Union today, the tasks of limiting the influx of migrants, countering illegal migration and strengthening the external borders of the EU are coming to the fore. At the same time, the new Concept charges Russia with a task of improving the regulatory and legal regulation of the influx of foreigners, facilitating the resettlement of compatriots, attracting and adapting in-demand categories of labor migrants from visa countries.

The adoption of the new Concept of Migration Policy makes significant adjustments to the country's migration policy, shifts its focus to the voluntary resettlement of compatriots, improving the current migration legislation and strengthening the fight against its violations. With any trend of development of the socio-economic situation, an increase or decrease in the need for FLW, the analysis and forecast of the dynamics of supply and demand for it in the domestic labor market becomes an

increasingly urgent problem for the further development of the country and the prevention of negative phenomena.

In the article “Role and place of external labor migration in the structure of foreign labor” V. Komarovskiy [3] examines the role of labor migrants from the post-Soviet countries in the economic support of Russian households. Along with the introduction into scientific circulation of previously unused data from a sample survey conducted by Rosstat in 2019, the author identifies the specifics of the sectorial distribution of contingents of immigrants from post-Soviet countries.

Due to historical conditions, immigrants from the CIS countries, who make up the majority of labor migrants, are of interest from the point of view of understanding the dynamics of entry and adaptation in Russian conditions. The share of people who have lived in Russia for more than 5 years and adapted to it is on average 83 per cent. The largest number of external migrants settled in Russia is accounted for by Ukrainians (25 per cent), Kazakhs (22 per cent) and Uzbeks (15 per cent).

Consideration of the problems of labor migration involves an analysis of the interaction of visiting workers with employers. However, insufficient attention is paid to this defining aspect of the relationship. Apparently, a significant proportion of employers hiring foreigners did not come into the view of the sample statistical observation in 2019. Data on the conclusion of employment contracts are not officially published and are not even partially provided by employers.

The vast majority of employers belong to small and individual entrepreneurs. At the same time, the total number of entrepreneurs who hired foreigners was an insignificant share of entrepreneurs – members of households (15.5 per cent), whose main business area is trade, repair of motor vehicles, etc. (39 per cent), construction (17 per cent), manufacturing (12 per cent). Due to the limited use of the FLW, the number of foreigners employed by this category of employers was relatively small – 466.6 thousand people, of which immigrants from the CIS

countries accounted for 429.8 thousand (92.1 per cent). Almost two-thirds of foreign workers (60 per cent) were from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Ukraine.

The author concludes that the concentration of a significant share of migrant workers in a certain range of industries providing services to households (population) mainly includes construction and repair, agricultural work and transport services. Employment in other sectors is much less widespread, which correlates with the professional and qualification structure of migrant workers. There are also national preferences for employment in certain sectors.

Comparing the results obtained with the data of official migration statistics allows us to get a clearer understanding of the real demand and supply of foreign labor services from the CIS countries in the domestic labor market, creates an opportunity to prepare a forecast of the need for their services and develop planned indicators.

In the article “Rossiya i SNG: dinamika migracionnyh potokov” (Russia and the CIS: dynamics of migration flows) [4] V. Komarovskiy notes that over the past 5–6 years there took place a significant redistribution of external migration flows to Russia. First of all, this concerns labor migration – the supply of foreign labor from visa countries, especially European ones, has significantly decreased, the number of labor migrants from the post-Soviet countries (the CIS and the EAEU) has stabilized.

As follows from the statistics, the crossing of the Russian border by citizens of visa-free countries has a lot in common, although there are also a number of national features. These features relate not only to the scale of entry, but also to the preferred purposes of entry, its intensity. For countries such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and Belarus, the “private” nature of most entries to Russia remains predominant.

The annual maximum indicators are inherent in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which, in comparison with the data on the total

number of labor migrants from these countries, allows us to consider this phenomenon as an indicator of the maximum demand for FLW in Russia during this period, satisfied by the supply of labor from these countries. Kyrgyzstan also acts as a significant supplier of FLW for the domestic labor market (2019 – 58 per cent of all entries).

The inter-country dynamics of entries is of considerable interest. According to the border service of the FSB, in 2019, 199.4 thousand citizens of Kazakhstan who entered Russia indicated the purpose of the visit as “work”, and according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, only 136.2 thousand people who came for the same purpose were initially registered.

Uzbekistan has been the largest supplier of FLW to the Russian labor market for many years, and with a high degree of probability, the importance of the Russian labor market for the citizens of Uzbekistan will remain for a long time. In total, 2.1 million citizens of Uzbekistan registered for migration in order to get a job in 2019, and this figure is steadily growing from year to year.

Tajikistan ranks second in the number of labor migrants to Russia after Uzbekistan. As for the structure of migration flows of citizens of Tajikistan, in comparison with Uzbekistan, the share of applicants for work among migrants to Russia in 2019 was much higher – 82 per cent against 57 per cent, although this figure is more than twice lower in number (875.1 thousand people).

The nature of migration from Kyrgyzstan has its own peculiarities, although the country is a member of the EAEU and has a visa-free regime for cross-border movement with Russia. For Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the indicators of 2019 are comparable in terms of the share of people entering for work (58 per cent and 57 per cent, respectively), as well as in terms of the share of private trips (28 per cent and 32 per cent). The volume and intensity of the entry of immigrants from Azerbaijan attract

attention with their constancy. It seems that, first of all, it is a well-established trade in agricultural products.

Turkmenistan, due to the political course of its leadership, differs significantly in terms of the scale of migration exchange with Russia from all the CIS countries. The visa regime of Turkmenistan plays a significant role for all countries, including the Russian Federation. The presence of Turkmen workers in Russia is increasing through quota mechanisms for accepting visa migrants. First of all, they are employed in Turkish construction companies. 4.8 thousand people were registered for migration, and they indicated work as the purpose of entry. In 2019, the first places were taken by the business motive of crossing the border (29 per cent) and tourism (26 per cent).

The analysis of the features of the entry of citizens from ten post-Soviet republics to Russia over the past decade allows us to draw a number of conclusions

- Statistics on the entry and registration of migrants in Russia for the period under review gives an idea of the national migration trajectories of citizens of the post-Soviet countries.

- National contingents of migrants have their own national and regional characteristics related to the historical past, socio-economic and political situation of the donor country.

- The nature of the trajectories along which the number of entries to Russia has been distributed over the past decade, their relatively stable cyclicity gives us the right to speak about a high degree of interdependence of the mechanisms of interaction with Russian partners, primarily in the labor market.

- The results obtained indicate that the countries considered can be divided into two types of interaction: (1) based on the provision of a demanded workforce and (2) focused on achieving a whole range of private goals and objectives (from moving to permanent residence to meeting various business interests).

- Depending on the size of the donor countries, the availability of a free labor force focused on labor migration,

the contribution to meeting the needs of the host country, the occupation of certain free niches in its labor market is determined.

- The different intensity of entries from individual countries is determined by the timing of achieving the set goals (primarily, united by the concept of “private”). Longer-term goals, such as work and study, significantly affect the length of stay and the frequency of migrants crossing the border.

- Differentiation of approaches to the analysis of the duration of stay deepens the understanding of the mechanisms and motivations for crossing the Russian border.

The main task of the migration policy of any host country is to meet the needs of the economy in foreign labor and protect domestic workers from unfair competition. Supranational associations also face the problem of forming a single labor market (the EAEU and the EU).

It is obvious that without an objective understanding of the dynamics and structure of the goals and objectives pursued by foreign citizens in our country, it is hardly possible to talk about a balanced migration policy, about an effective system of selection and screening of in-demand and redundant categories of foreigners.

Conclusion

Migration processes in the modern world do not diminish their relevance in the global political agenda. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia becomes one of the largest actors in migration processes with its own special migration system. Revealing the changes in the Russian migration legislation, which made it possible to build a modern migration system, the authors also consider the specifics of state management of migration processes in modern Russia and give suggestions for its improvement. Over the post-Soviet period, Russia has become a recipient country of migration flows along with the United States,

Germany and a number of other states of high migration attractiveness. Modern Russian experts note the peculiarities of not only the implemented state migration policy, but also the formed migration regime, the main task of which is to attract foreign citizens to ensure their national and economic interests.

The migration attractiveness of Russia in the post-Soviet space requires the Russian authorities to develop new approaches in the field of adaptation and integration of external migrants. The formed conditions for adaptation and integration of migrants are important for the effective implementation of not only migration, but also national policy. In this regard, the importance of interaction between government bodies, both at the federal level (the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs) and at the regional level (administrations of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation) with civil society institutions, is growing.

In Russia there are councils for interaction with religious organizations, centralized religious organizations, public ethnic communities that can coordinate efforts to adapt migrants. Moslem migrants, most of whom stay in large Russian cities, due to the lack of mosques and prayer houses, find themselves outside the sphere of influence of representatives of the Russian Moslem clergy. Whereas the educational influence of the clergy, focused on the cultivation of an all-Russian identity, could contribute to adaptation and hinder the tendencies of segregation of migrant communities.

At present, the issues of adaptation and integration of foreign citizens in Russia do not have an appropriate regulatory legal framework, and this fact hinders the implementation of the interaction mechanism enshrined in the Concept of Migration Policy. At the same time, the updated Concept, according to the researchers, meets modern migration challenges and allows us to counteract migration risks.

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2021.04.001. KSENIA ATAMALI. INTRA-ISLAMIC CONTRADICTIONS IN THE UMMAH OF CRIMEA AND ETHNOPOLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE CONTEXT OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE // *Condensed abstract was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Crimean Tatars, deportation of Crimean Tatars, Turkish elite, Muslims, Turkey, Arab East, ethnopolitical mobilization, Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, political subjectivity, symbolic politics, Neo-Ottomanism.

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1. Bibishev Dzhemil Sh. Intra-Islamic Contradictions in the Muslim Ummah of Crimea as a Factor of External Influence of Foreign Clerical Centers* // *Pozitivnyj Opyt Regulirovaniya*

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

Etnosocialnyh i Etnokulturnyh Processov v Regionah Rossijskoj Federacii, Kazan, 2020. P. 15–19.

2. Grigoryan D.K., Kondratenko E.N., Faraponova T.K. *Ethnopolitical Mobilization of Crimea Tatars in the Context of Interests of the Turkish Elite* // Gosudarstvennoe i Municipalnoe Upravlenie. Uchenye Zapiski*, 2020, 2. P. 178–182.

D.Sh. Bibishev [1], former Deputy Mufti of Crimea and a religious analyst, examines intra-Islamic contradictions that emerged at the start of the revival of Islam in Crimea in the 1990s, following mass return of the Crimean Tatar people from the places of deportation. In their homeland, the Crimean Tatars found themselves separated from their religious roots due to the almost 50-year exile under the regime of state atheism. The issue of revival of religion and the study of history and culture, inseparable from Islamic traditions, was especially relevant. In the beginning the repatriates had no own financial, religious and human resources, making the construction of mosques and the revival of Islamic institutions in Crimea impossible. Therefore, the Crimean Muslims turned towards Muslim states, primarily Turkey and the Arab East, which were eager to respond to requests for help. This resulted in an unspoken rivalry between the Turkish and Arab clerical centres. In the end, different religious doctrines contributed to revival of the Ummah of Crimea, but in no way helped revive the model of Islam that is traditional for the Crimean Tatars.

The author notes that over time three main ideologically different and competing religious structures have been formed within the Muslim community of Crimea: traditional 'Crimean Islam', orthodox fundamental Islam and politically-orientated Islam. The Religious Administration of Muslims of Crimea (RAMC) that takes guidance from the state and public religious centres in Turkey falls into the first category; Muslim Salafi

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

communities adhering to the pro-Arab model of Islam are qualified as fundamentalist; and the representatives of the religious and political party Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) are focused on building a Muslim model of society. These religious organizations and movements had confrontational relations and no communication. Each institution rejected ideologies they classified as “non-traditional” for Crimea. Muslim leaders believe that this led to radicalization of part of Muslims and departure from the traditions of tolerant Sunni Islam. The existing administration of the Ummah of Crimea faced heavy competition from parallel spiritual administrations and centres on the basis of “independent” Muslim communities.

The author points to the fact that the clash of interests between the RAMC and various Islamic movements gave rise to conflicts in the Muslim community of Crimea. Clashes took place mainly over the control of Crimean mosques. For instance, in 2007–2008 there were some clashes between the RAMC and the representatives of the Ahbash movement – alumni of the Kiev Islamic University under the Religious Administration of Muslims of Ukraine (RAMU), headed by Mufti of Muslims of Ukraine Sheikh Ahmad Tamim. Similar incidents occurred in 2008–2009 in several Crimean mosques following the RAMC statement about the expansion of influence of the HT party members on the Crimean mosques.

The author concludes that the conflicts were said to have been fuelled by almost ineffective RAMC propaganda, which can be explained by the RAMC dependence on foreign Muslim states and funds. Moreover, the lack of a standard of Islamic education in Crimea consistent with local traditions resulted in a divided Muslim Ummah. Following the change in the political and legal status of Crimea, the activities of a part of the Muslim Ummah conflicted with the legislation of the Russian Federation; representatives of religious groups banned in Russia were prosecuted. Since 2014 Islamic education has been provided in accordance with the system of spiritual education adopted in

Russia, i.e. Crimean Tatars now study at the Russian Islamic University in Kazan. Thus, the period of intra-Islamic Contradictions in Crimea has ended.

D.K. Grigoryan, E.N. Kondratenko and T.K. Faraponova [2] from the Department of Political Science and Ethnopolitics of the South-Russia Institute of Management (branch of Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration) consider the main factors of the ethnopolitical mobilization of the Crimean Tatars and the role of the Turkish elite in this process. The authors note that the term “ethnopolitical mobilization” was coined in the 1970s, when the German sociologist K. Deutsch conceptualized “social mobilization”, singling out the ethnic factor as an important aspect. Deutsch lists social and economic modernization, national self-determination and political democracy as factors that give rise to a mobilized state of ethnicity. Researcher Milton Esman defined ethnopolitical mobilization as a process by which an ethnic community becomes politically active, i.e. ready to defend its resources, demand public benefits, and formulate its own policy. Historian and ethnologist M.N. Guboglo believes that mobilized ethnicity has a common political purpose. Ethnopolitical mobilization includes social mobilization, politicization and identification of ethnicity.

The authors note that the development of society is impossible without ethnopolitical mobilization. In Russia, this process is most intensive in the republics and, in particular, in the Republic of Crimea due to its multi-ethnicity. The Turkish political elite, among others, seeks to influence ethnopolitical mobilization in Crimea due to shared history and social, cultural and economic ties. By expanding its influence on the strategically important peninsula, Turkey is strengthening its own positions in the Black Sea region.

There are a number of factors for ethnopolitical mobilization of the Crimean Tatars. The first factor is the cohesion of the ethnic group and the formation of an ethnopolitical coalition. The Turkish elite keeps reminding the

Crimean Tatars that the Crimean Khanate was once under the protectorate of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey will always protect their interests. The second factor is the recognition of an ethnos as a political subject, which started in 1991 with the establishing of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people. The Mejlis sought the autonomy of Crimea within Ukraine, but opposed its integration into Russia. The Turkish elite widely supports the Mejlis, which is recognized as an extremist organization and was outlawed by Russia in 2016. After that, an interregional public movement of the Crimean Tatar people “Qırım” (“Crimea”) was formed, which was recognized by the regional authorities as the legal representative of the Crimean Tatar people.

The authors point out that social and economic factors play a significant role, for they include a decline in production, unemployment, increase in inequality, etc. When certain ethnic groups fail to get access to economic benefits, the protest potential of ethnicity surges. Unemployment makes ethnic groups fight for their rights at the political level, and ethnic protest could escalate into an interethnic conflict. In the 1990s there was practically no infrastructure in Crimea, and complicated social and economic situation triggered consolidation of ethnic interests of the Crimean Tatars, encouraging them to fight for their rights by establishing the Mejlis.

The social and cultural factors (historical memory, religion, ideology, law and other cultural characteristics of a particular ethnic group) are an integral part of ethno-political mobilization. It is with the help of cultural values that ethnic mobilization begins. First, historical memory and religious norms help explain some special mission of a particular ethnic group, and an idea of the chosenness of ethnicity takes root. This idea unites the ethnic group, and with the addition of the political aspect it evolves into a fully-fledged ideology. Then, the most active individuals become political subjects, voicing the interests of their nation. Thus, this process becomes ethno-political mobilization.

The authors note that the Turkish elite makes use of the social and cultural factor within the framework of the ideology of Neo-Ottomanism aiming at expanding Turkish influence within the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. Neo-Ottomanism is based on Pan-Turkism, which implies the unification of all Turkic peoples. Crimean Tatars are Turkic ethnic group and share history with the Turks, giving the Turkish elite ample opportunities to influence the Crimean Tatars. The Turkish elite also fosters anti-Russian and nationalist sentiments in Crimea.

The authors emphasize the importance of symbolic politics. A political symbol is a sign of some kind that fulfils a communicative function by establishing a connection between the authorities and individuals. With the help of political symbols, those in power influence society, consolidate it and manipulate public consciousness. A political symbol can be a flag, anthem, slogan, memorable date, a particular individual, etc.

Political symbolism performs a number of essential functions:

- Integrative function, i.e. blurring the boundaries between social groups and the ruling elite, facilitating social mobilization;
- Regulatory function, i.e. influencing political behaviour of people in order to stabilize or destabilize the situation.

The authors note that national and ethnic symbols can become political. For example, one of the ethnic symbols of the Crimean Tatars is the historical fact of deportation, and nationalist and separatist movements build on this fact (May 18 was established as the “Day of Remembrance of the victims of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars”). Since the integration of Crimea into Russia, new holidays and memorable dates have appeared, e.g. “Day of Reunification of Crimea with Russia” is a holiday celebrated on March 18. The Russian political elite supports the Crimean Tatar identity and strives to erase the fact of deportation from the national memory of the Crimean Tatars.

The authors note that national movements sometimes even create new symbols to make sure there is no deficit of ethnic

symbols. Although national and ethnic symbols can influence shaping of ethnic and national consciousness, their transformation is rather difficult. Also, artificially created symbols are often unable to replace deep-rooted symbolism.

The authors conclude that today the level of ethnopolitical mobilization of the Crimean Tatars is quite high. Crimean Tatars are integrating into Russian society, but at the same time they retain their identity and are a political subject. Turkey influences the Crimean Tatars at the cultural and ideological level, seeking to increase interethnic conflict in Crimea, and thereby expand Turkish sphere of influence. By providing assistance to the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, the Turkish elite destabilizes political situation in Crimea. This, in turn, may destabilize domestic political situation in Russia, thus facilitating Turkey to enhance its own status in the Black Sea region.

SVETLANA AKKIEVA. CONFLICTOGENIC FACTORS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN KABARDINO-BALKARIA // Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."

Keywords: the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, public organizations, funeral rites, COVID-19, extremism, repatriation, land disputes, celebration of the accession of Balkaria to Russia.

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Abstract. The Kabardino-Balkarian Republic (KBR) has civil society institutions that have become active actors in public life. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a significant change in the way of holding annual history and culture related festivities and mourning ceremonies, which were taking place online via social networks.

The Circassian public organizations consider repatriation of the descendants of the Muhajirs to the North Caucasus, assistance in their return and adaptation as one of the most important objectives. In Kabardino-Balkaria vast support is given to repatriates from Syria. In 2020, the Circassian public organizations provided material assistance to Syrian repatriates; many of them are engaged in business, trade, etc., but the pandemic has led to a decline in their income. The International Circassian Association (ICA) works to create a positive image of Kabardino-Balkaria and Russia among representatives of the Circassian diaspora abroad, encourages children of muhajirs travel to the Republic for recreation, taking them on sightseeing tours.

In 2020, Balkar public organizations and activists once again raised the issue of establishing a Remembrance Day of the accession of Balkaria to Russia, but to date there is no official celebrations. With no official Remembrance Day, the Balkars find themselves in a position of inequality in relation to other peoples of Russia.

The religious situation in Kabardino-Balkaria in 2020 remained stable, with the Spiritual Administration of Muslims (SAM) of Kabardino-Balkaria revisiting the issue of reforming funeral rites aimed at banning costly commemoration, the reform that has been protracted for 16 years.

Also, there is a complex land problem in Kabardino-Balkaria. It is aggravated by the fact that the collective farmers (kolkhozniks) in the KBR have not received plots of land; the land is leased from large tenants, which gives rise to conflicts.

The author of the article notes that authorities of Kabardino-Balkaria, given the multi-ethnic character of the Republic, pay particular attention to the formation of civil society institutions as one of the most important actors. The government of Kabardino-Balkaria includes the Ministry for Interaction with Civil Society Institutions and Ethnic Affairs, a special department that deals exclusively with the issues of interethnic relations. In addition, there is the Government Commission on Interethnic and Interfaith Relations in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, an advisory body, which was established to provide recommendations for devising and implementing state policy in the field of interethnic and interfaith relations in the Republic [1]. Also, Commissions on interethnic and interfaith relations have been established and now operate in all administrative and city districts. The meetings of the commissions are held at least twice a year and as needed.

For many years, the Kabardino-Balkarian Cultural Foundation has been addressing issues of interethnic relations. Moreover, the Public Chamber of the KBR, headed by Kh. Berdov, is also dealing with the interethnic related problems. An Inter-commission Working Group, which is supposed to harmonize interethnic and interfaith relations in the Republic, has been established as part of the forth Public Chamber of the KBR (formed in November 2018). It comprises 15 members of the Chamber, who represent different ethnic and confessional groups in the population of the KBR [2].

The author states that at the end of 2020 there were over 40 non-governmental organizations of ethno cultural orientation in Kabardino-Balkaria [3], which were actively involved in the public life of the Republic. To a certain extent, the state also financially supports their activities. In 2020, 20.3 million roubles were allocated to 38 non-profit organizations, including those of an ethnocultural orientation. There were several Kabardino-Balkarian organizations among them: the Kabardino-Balkarian regional public movement for strengthening civil unity and

harmonization of interethnic relations “Our Republic” (400.25 thousand roubles); the Union of public associations “International Circassian Association for the Unity of the Circassian People and the Development of Ties of the Circassian Diaspora with the Historical Homeland” (410 thousand roubles); the Kabardino-Balkarian regional public organization to assist repatriates “Perit” (Avangard) (320.88 thousand roubles); the Kabardino-Balkarian regional public organization to promote the development of Circassian young people “Circassian Renaissance” (80 thousand roubles), the Kabardino-Balkarian public fund of culture (1166.582 thousand roubles); the regional branch of the “Union of Armenians of Russia” (270 thousand roubles); and the Tersko-Malkinsky District Cossack society (500 thousand roubles) [4].

Since 1992, the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Caucasian War is annually held in Kabardino-Balkaria on May 21. However, in 2020 the Circassian Day of Mourning was celebrated online due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The leaders of the Republic and heads of public organizations laid flowers near the “Tree of Life” memorial, the place of annual memorial service. On May 21, President of the International Circassian Association (ICA) Hauti Sokhrokov informed TASS that all planned events took place online via videoconferences, online lessons and various meetings. Circassians from Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Israel, Europe and many other regions of Russia took part in these activities [5]. Circassian activists and young people created and posted on social media a number of thematic videos and encouraged residents of Kabardino-Balkaria and other regions of the North Caucasus to remember the victims of the war while staying at home. On May 20, Arsen Kanokov, Member of the Federation Council from Kabardino-Balkaria and former Head of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic from 2005 to 2013, gave a speech dedicated to the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Caucasian War. In his speech he noted that the nation had “dwindled in numbers” and became divided, and although the

people had been scattered throughout 40 countries as a result of the cataclysms of the 18th – early 20th centuries, they retained their language, culture and traditions. Kanokov pointed out that the diaspora had adopted and absorbed all the best features of their neighbours. He also emphasized the importance of an unbiased and honest discussion on the issue of the Caucasian War and its consequences, as well as the repatriation related issues, which to date had not been properly addressed [6].

The author singles out activists, who draw public attention to relevant problems of repatriation, cultural integration and preservation of the native language, i.e. Madina Khakuasheva, PhD in Philology; Ramazan Tlemeshok, a leading employee of the Institute for Humanities Research of KBSC RAS and Chairman of the Adyghe Khase of Adyghea; and Abubekir Murzakanov, Head of the Adyghe Heku Circassia. Since the COVID-19 pandemic affected all countries of residence of the Circassians, in 2020 the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Caucasian War was held online. The Federation of Caucasian Organizations of Turkey (KAFFED) made a statement demanding the recognition of the genocide of the Circassians by all states and, in particular, Russia and the countries of residence of the Circassian people. As noted by Asker Sokht, Chairman of the Adyghe Khase of Krasnodar Krai, all public organizations maintain this position [6].

The author moves on to discuss the 2011 outbreak of hostilities in Syria that forced many citizens to flee the country; some of them, the descendants of the Muhajirs, have settled in Kabardino-Balkaria. In 2015 alone, the Republic received more than two thousand people [7].

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kabardino-Balkaria, a total of 2,302 refugees from Syria received permits for legal stay and residence in the Republic from 2012 to 2020. Of these, 495 people received a temporary residence permit, 834 people were granted a residence permit, and 306 people had the right to apply for Russian citizenship [8]. In the 2018/2019

academic year, there were 138 students from among repatriates from Syria at Kabardino-Balkarian State University (KBSU) and 11 students studied at the Agrarian University. The authorities of the Republic are consistently working on the social and cultural adaptation of students [9]. More than 170 Syrian children attend schools and kindergartens in the Republic. The authorities, businessmen from among the Circassians and even concerned citizens provided all kinds of assistance to the repatriates and helped their swift integration into society. The purchase of over 80 houses in different localities of the Republic for the repatriates was funded from extrabudgetary resources [10]. Migrants have since adapted, many started their own businesses in trade and public catering, which provided them a source of income. However, many of them had to shut down their businesses due to restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Activists from the “Aid to Syrian Compatriots” group and the “Perit” public organization helped the Syrian repatriates by providing them with 170 food packages; the KBSU students also received 33 food packages. Compatriots living in Moscow and abroad have also helped Syrian repatriates by raising \$ 1,200. In order to help refugees, a charity event has been organized by the head of the KBR with the participation of local entrepreneurs. The “Perit” organization provides assistance in obtaining documents needed to apply for residence permit [8]. The International Circassian Association (ICA) carries out significant work assisting repatriates from Syria and the foreign Circassian diaspora in general. Within the framework of the “Kabardino-Balkaria and Compatriots: People-to-People Diplomacy Removing the Boundaries” project [11], in 2019, 38 children from Syria spent their vacation in a Nalchik holiday house; 80 schoolchildren from Turkey, Jordan and Israel were to have spent their vacation in the KBR, but the trip was cancelled due to the pandemic. According to ICA President Kh. Sokhrokov, the practice of children from different countries spending vacation together meets the objectives of the project and contributes to building a positive

image of Kabardino-Balkaria and Russia in general among compatriots abroad [12]. Soon after Adygea in 2019, Kabardino-Balkaria approved the program aimed at encouraging compatriots living abroad to resettle to the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic (July 31, 2019) [13]. The program scheduled for the period 2019–2022 aims to attract 200 compatriots (50 qualified specialists and scientists and 150 members of their families). For these purposes 1,748,400 and 991,000 roubles are allocated from the state and regional budgets, respectively [13].

The author notes that for a long time, Balkars and Balkar public organizations have been working to establish a memorable date for accession of Balkaria to Russia. Once again, the issue of establishing a holiday – the Day of the Balkar people joining the Russian Empire – was discussed during a regular meeting of Balkar activists held in Nalchik on January 9. Announced through social networks, the event was attended by deputies of the Parliament of the KBR, heads of a number of Balkar localities and active citizens. The people gathered once again stated that without approved date for celebration, the Balkar people remain in a position of inequality in relation to other peoples of Russia.

The author points out that the Balkar people were displaced from 1944 to 1957. Throughout these years neither history of the Balkars was studied nor were they mentioned in any historical writings. In 1957, the 400th anniversary of the accession of Kabarda to Russia was celebrated in Kabardino-Balkaria, with the Balkars joining the Kabardians for celebrations. The joint festivities made it look as if the Balkars had become part of Russia at the same time as the Kabardians. It was not until 2007 that the Balkars held a celebration marking the 180th anniversary of the accession of the Balkar people to Russia [14]. In January 1827, the Balkar and Digor princes (*knyazs*) submitted a petition to the Russian emperor requesting accession to Russia. In 2012, the Balkars celebrated the 185th anniversary of this event [15], and five years later there were festivities in honour of the 190th anniversary [16]. In 2017, the archival service of the Republic

organized an exhibition in honour of the 190th and 460th anniversaries of the accession of Balkaria and Kabarda to Russia, respectively [17]. Since early 1990s, the accession of Kabarda to Russia has been deemed as a military and political alliance between Kabarda and Russia [18].

In January 2018, a group of Balkar activists appealed to Yuri Kokov, the head of the KBR at that time, requesting to officially set the date for celebration of accession of Balkaria to the Russian Empire. Kokov ordered a working group to be formed, but since then the matter has been under review. However, receiving no response from the authorities of the Republic, the Balkar activists appealed to the federal authorities. According to Dalkhat Baidiev, a member of the Parliament of the KBR, a corresponding decree must be issued on the matter. He also notes that, in fact, the Balkars have been celebrating this memorable date for over 15 years and are now requesting merely its official recognition. Baidiev believes that celebration of the accession of the Balkars to Russia used to be held against the wishes of the authorities of the Republic, but now an understanding at the level of the Government of the KBR has been achieved [19].

The author notes that the day of the revival of the Balkar people and the restoration of the Balkar statehood is celebrated on March 28. On this day in 1957, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, the Balkar people were allowed to return to their historical homeland after 13 years of deportation to Central Asia. The decree thus restored the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1994, this date was commemorated after Valery Kokov, the then President of Kabardino-Balkaria, signed a corresponding decree [20]. In 2020, Kazbek Kokov, the President of Kabardino-Balkaria, announced on Instagram that the celebrations would be postponed due to the coronavirus outbreak. He congratulated the Balkar people and noted that this holiday represents the restoration of historical truth and justice, the steadfastness and eternal value of unity, friendship and brotherhood of the peoples

of Kabardino-Balkaria. Residents of the Republic left numerous comments, showing their gratitude and support [21].

Religious situation

The author notes that in January 2020, Muftiate of Kabardino-Balkaria again spoke out against the pompous mourning ceremonies, still prevalent in the Republic. Back in 2004, the Religious Administration of Muslims of Kabardino-Balkaria (RAMKB) adopted an order “On Regularisation of the Funeral Rite in Kabardino-Balkaria”, which prohibited financially burdensome commemorations, but to no avail. Despite the ban, people continue to draw up lists of mourners who have made donations and to give of alms (*sadaqah*) according to these lists. It should be noted that it is primarily practiced in the Kabardian villages. The practice of serving meals to the mourners and distributing food bags also continues. The RAMKB has banned commemorations on the third, seventh, fortieth and fifty-second days after death, as well as commemorations marking six months and a year from the death. People nonetheless hold fast to the traditions, even though sometimes they have to take loans in order to foot the bills for expensive funeral rites. Imams are working to cease these traditions, some of them even refuse to take part in funeral ceremonies, but it seems impossible to turn the tide [22].

The COVID-19 pandemic has made significant changes in the funeral services. At first, not realizing the danger, people did not wear masks while visiting the house of the one deceased, thus leading to an increased incidence of diseases. Islamic personalities of Kabardino-Balkaria and law enforcement agencies worked together to increase awareness of the dangers of coronavirus and rules of conduct while in public places. At last realizing the danger, people reduced their visits to the families of the deceased, shifting to expressing condolences via phone calls and visiting relatives after the funeral. However, the decision of

the Council of Ulama of the Religious Administration of Muslims of Russia (RAMR) [23] to allow the cremation of those who died from coronavirus in the North Caucasus was virtually ignored [24]. People have complained about the prohibitions on traditional elements of the funeral rite imposed by the WHO and Rospotrebnadzor, as well as the requirement to bury the dead without ablution and a shroud. On social media they express their concern that rash policies and unnecessary prohibitions are aggravating low spirits of those of the older generation, who are not as afraid of dying as of being buried without the rituals under Muslim custom.

Prevention of extremism and terrorism

Since early 2000s, attacks by various religious extremists and terrorists have been reported in Kabardino-Balkaria. To date, the largest attack took place on October 13, 2005, when the security forces of Nalchik were set upon by armed fighters. As a result of the attack, 35 law enforcement officers and 15 civilians were killed, and 129 security officers and 66 civilians were injured. During the fighting in the city 95 militants were killed. From 2006 to 2008 the situation in terms of number of extremist and terrorist attacks remained relatively quiet; from 2009 to 2013 the Republic became one of the hotspots in the region. In 2014–2018, largely facilitated by counter-extremism measures and the efficient work of law enforcement agencies, the situation was back to normal; although some attacks were still reported, their frequency decreased significantly.

In March 2020, the security forces of Kabardino-Balkaria discovered that a terrorist attack was being planned. The three alleged militants were killed in a shootout that followed an attempt to apprehend the suspects near the village of Kremenchug-Konstantinovskoye in the Baksansky District [25]. Two of them, residents of the Dygulubgey village, were previously convicted of illegal trafficking in explosives and

explosive devices. That special operation was the first in the Baksansky region since February 2019.

According to law enforcement officers, on July 22, four members of ISIL were killed in the Chegemsky region during the course of an attempted arrest; the fighters had been planning a terrorist attack. In a camp equipped for a lengthy stay near the village of Lechinkai, armed people opened fire at the demand to surrender and were killed by the security forces [26].

The author praises measures taken by law enforcement agencies that have significantly contributed to the decrease of terrorist activities since 2014; the criminal underground in the Republic has been virtually eliminated. The lingering threat of extremist and terrorist attacks calls for constant improvement of work with regard to the evolving situation. In this connection Kabardino-Balkaria has adopted a programme on prevention of terrorism and extremism that is scheduled to continue from 2021 until 2025. Chairman of the Government of Kabardino-Balkaria A. Musukov signed a corresponding Government Resolution No. 288-PP on the State Program of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic for Prevention of Terrorism and Extremism in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic of December 16, 2020 [27]. Programming practices of solving the problem will ensure implementation and monitoring of consistent, coherent, purposeful and proactive measures aimed at preventing terrorism and extremism.

The author points to the fact that land issue is one of the most complex issues in Kabardino-Balkaria. For instance, members of the Petrov collective farm (*kolkhoz*) went to a rally in an attempt to defend the farm. According to the protesters, raiders under the guise of investors were trying to seize 13.5 thousand hectares of farmland in the villages of Yekaterinogradskaya and Priblizhnaya in the Prokhladnensky District. Since appeals to the municipal authorities did not help, people pleaded with President of Kabardino-Balkaria Kazbek Kokov and the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic to protect the collective

farm from land fraud, referring to the 49-year ban on the sale of agricultural land in the KBR imposed by Valery Kokov, first President of Kabardino-Balkaria [28]. Chairman of the collective farm A. Degtyarenko claimed that since 2016 the collective farm had been facing financial difficulties due to drought and had not received any subsidies. Under these circumstances, the funds were used to pay wages, foot utility bills, purchase diesel and seeds and repay the loan to avoid penalties. The money was also used to pay for leasing, gas and electricity. Having examined all the transactions, the investigators confirmed that the funds were not misused, but pointed out that taxes were priority. The management of the farm had hoped that the inclusion of the collective farm in the investment program would all the problems plaguing it, but instead faced even bigger challenges after the alleged investor had deceived them. Putting their trust in the investor, the collective farmers approved the foundation of LLC “Agrocomplex Ekaterinogradskiy” with 100 percent share of the collective farm in August 2019. The enterprise was supposed to sublease 7,033 hectares for a five-year term for the purposes of investment programmes for livestock. After signing the agreement the chairman of the collective farm discovered that his copy of the agreement was essentially different from the one for which the villagers had voted. In the copy he received, the rights for the entire 13.5 thousand hectares of the collective farm land were transferred to the research and production complex LLC “Novoye Vremya” (established in February 2020) for a 42-year term [29]. The chairman of the collective farm sought the assistance of law enforcement agencies [30]; litigation is still ongoing.

The author emphasizes that the case of “Agrocomplex Ekaterinogradskiy” has not only an economic but also a political background [31]. According to Boris Pashtov, the leader of the Communists of Kabardino-Balkaria and member of the Parliament of the KBR, the Petrovs collective farm and “Lenintsy” are the only two collective farms in the Republic. The Petrovs collective farm employs mainly Russians. Losing a source

of income, people seek to leave the Republic, which leads to a change in ethnic composition of the population of the region and undermines its consolidation. In addition, small farms are significantly more sustainable than agricultural holdings and adequately create jobs for the rural population. Regional branches of the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia advocate the return of the land to collective farmers and are ready to provide assistance in the matter [32].

For many years residents of the Sovkhoznoye village have been bringing up the issue of land. The land is leased by several owners and over two thousand hectares of unregistered land is being cultivated without bidding, it is unknown who manages it. The villagers request that the land be divided into plots and auctioned and the locals be allowed to participate.

The author concludes that in September 2020, the land issue was discussed at the meeting of the Association of Victims of Political Repression in Nalchik. Head of the Association M. Shakhmurzov stated that the land seized by large landowners following the reorganization of collective and state farms, should be returned to the residents of Kabardino-Balkaria. Head of the Council of Elders of the Balkar People I. Sabanchiev also noted that there is a need for a conference on the land issue [33].

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ZAID ABDULAGATOV. EXTREMES OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE SYSTEM OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN (CONTINUED IN 1, 2022) // Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."

Keywords: extremity of consciousness, Islamic educational institutions, Daghestan, Russia, fundamentalism, extremism, secondary school.

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Abstract. The author, basing on sociological surveys of different years, showed the extremes of the religious consciousness of Moslems who studied in Islamic educational institutions of the Republic of Daghestan. The statistics of Islamic education in the republic are shown. The factors that strengthen the role of religious worldview in the socialization of Daghestan youth are revealed. The issues discussed are considered from the standpoint of the interests of the secular state in solving the problems of social stability, the formation of a secular legal culture, countering religious extremism and terrorism.

Introduction

The issues of extremism and terrorism still remain problematic for the Russian state. In the North Caucasus region, these negative phenomena are predominantly religious, more precisely, Islamic in nature. In 2020, more than 20 participants of terrorist cells were neutralized on the territory of the North Caucasus Federal District, more than 70 of their accomplices were detained, as well as 480 citizens who were wanted. More than 100 objects of the bandit underground infrastructure were discovered and destroyed.¹

A very important statistic of extremism, which is little talked about, takes place in connection with the financing of extremist activities. The significance of such statistics is due to the emphasis on the factor of support for extremism and terrorism by part of the Moslem population. The accomplices of extremists invest money in this business, and not small money, which refutes, at least partially, the widespread explanation of extremism as ordinary banditry, the desire to earn money, poverty of the population. The financing of religious extremism is an activity aimed at achieving Islamic goals. Based on Rosfinmonitoring data, Rossiyskaya Gazeta provides a list of organizations and individuals in respect of which there is information about their involvement in extremist activities or terrorism by laundering proceeds from crime and financing

terrorism. Since the end of 2013, the author has analyzed a number of Lists of this kind.² From the entire list, five subjects of the Russian Federation, the most significant in terms of Islamic activity, were analyzed: Daghestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Tatarstan. A significant excess of the number of those included in the List from Daghestan in 2013–2016 is striking – 32.6 per cent, almost a third of the Russian list.

The statistics of extremism after 2016 do not give grounds to believe that the extremist activity of Daghestanis has declined. Rather, it has changed the forms of its manifestation. Thus, according to Rosfinmonitoring, Daghestanis in one of the lists of those involved in extremist activities and terrorism, published in January 2017, turned out to be 25.3 per cent,³ at the end of 2018 – 24.1 per cent.⁴ In the list published in early 2019, there were 38.3 per cent⁵ of them. These are mostly people under 30 years of age, i.e. young people.

The total number of Daghestanis included in the List in the analyzed lists of 2013–2016 turned out to be almost twice as many as in the other republics combined (CR, IR, CBD, RT). In percentage terms, this ratio is 32.6 per cent: 16.6 per cent. In Tatarstan, separately, this indicator turned out to be equal to 1.1 per cent.

The recent decline in terrorism indicators should not be misleading. It is possible to talk about a decrease in the indicators of extremism and terrorism only in relative assessments of the development of events. The Syrian conflict, linked to the activities of ISIS,⁶ has become an outlet for the North Caucasus suffering from violence caused by extremists and terrorists. According to the head of the FSB A. Bortnikov, in Syria, only according to confirmed data, more than 4 thousand Daghestanis fought on the side of the Islamic State and other detachments.⁷ Ethnologist A. Yarlykapov believes that there were at least 5 thousand of them.⁸ This is the “tip of the iceberg” in terms of the radical Salafist consciousness of Daghestan Islam.

Modern extremism and terrorism have begun to work more in the information field. Young people, especially of school age, become the object of their interests.

The author proceeds from the fact that it is wrong to link the origins of Islamic extremism in the North Caucasus, in particular in Daghestan, exclusively with external influence, unambiguously identifying the external religious factor with manifestations of radical Salafism. Firstly, Salafist ideas, leaders-carriers of these ideas, their followers have taken place in the history of Daghestan since the XVIII century.⁹ Secondly, Islamic extremism and terrorism can also take place in the so-called traditional, not identifying itself with radical Salafism, or even just with extremism, Islam, Not every Salafism leads to extremism, not every traditionalism is moderation in religious consciousness and behavior.

A well-known leader of radical religious and political Islam, Bagautdin Magomed, on May 27, 1997, in response to a question about the recognition of the madhhabs, said: "We recognize the founding imams of the madhhabs as great scientists." When asked about his belonging to one of the madhhabs,¹⁰ he replied: "Since I grew up in Shafi'i madhhab, I belong to Shafi'i, but we try not to violate other madhhabs."¹⁰ The researchers noticed that in the military events in Chechnya in the 90s of the last century, "Wahhabis" and "traditional" Sufis turned out to be shoulder to shoulder.¹¹ In one's time, the Mufti of the CR, A.D. Shamaev, the Minister of the Interior of the RD, A. Magomedtagirov, and not only them, stated that recruitment to the "Wahhabis" takes place mainly in Tariqa, Sufi mosques. This work is conducted predominantly with young people.

The main question underlying Islamic extremism is to what extent a Moslem is able to peacefully adapt to the existing conditions of life, confessional and secular.

The author proceeds from the fact that Islam has played and plays a positive role in regulating the morality of a Moslem, the public life of Daghestanis, and their social behavior. At the

same time, there is no reason to consider objective the assessment of some Moslems, especially Islamic leaders and representatives of power structures, that “there is no extremism in Islam,” or that it takes place exclusively in individual Islamic movements. Upbringing and education in Islamic educational institutions (IEI), as well as Islamic consciousness in general, would be more consistent with objective phenomena in Islam, the interests of Islam itself, society and the state, if it were based on the following principles:

a) Islam, like all world religions, involves goodness, tolerance, harmony.

b) As in other complex phenomena of the human spirit, in Islam there were, there are at present and are possible in the future such components of it that harmed both Islam itself and society and the state. They are connected both with complex objective historical processes in which the Islamic consciousness turned out to be, and subjective.

The object of this study were students and scholars of Islamic educational institutions of Daghestan. The purpose of the study was to identify the extremes of the Islamic consciousness of students in Islamic Educational Institutions of the Republic. The extremes of Islamic consciousness were understood as its extremes, manifested within the framework of the law, which could have their undesirable, from the point of view of the interests of the state and society, development in the direction of the practice of violent extremism and terrorism.

Contexts of the formation of the Islamic educational process in Daghestan

The processes of formation of the religious educational system in post-Soviet Russia had their own contexts of ideological, political, legal and other nature. The state ideology regarding religion has changed, a number of laws have been adopted defining the place of religion, religious education and

upbringing in society. Social institutions have emerged that actively implement religious interest in the educational system of the state. In the North Caucasian republics with Moslem population, religious education and upbringing, along with secular education, have become the two main trajectories of socialization of young people.

1. The Law of the Russian Federation “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” eliminated the article on the separation of schools from churches (religious organizations) in the Law of the USSR of October 1, 1990 No. 1689-I “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations”.¹² The Law of the Russian Federation “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” refers to the possibility of religious organizations “at the request of parents or persons replacing them, with the consent of children,” the administration of secular educational institutions, local governments, to provide “a religious organization with the opportunity to teach children religion outside the educational program.”¹³ In 2003 by the order of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation “Provision by state and municipal educational institutions of religious organizations with the opportunity to teach children religion outside the framework of educational programs”, religious organizations received access to the school.¹⁴

2. In Russia, the balance in the promotion of ideas of religious and secular worldviews in society has been disrupted. The ideology of “United Russia” is the ideology of “Russian conservatism”, as the party stated at its 11th congress, held on November 21, 2009.¹⁵ Russian conservatism, like conservatism in general, places a strong emphasis on the revival of religious traditions. And this is often done contrary to the secular interests of society. Thus, at the initiative of religious leaders, the activities of such a secular and educational organization as the society “Knowledge” were closed, which in the new conditions could continue to work on popularization and dissemination of scientific knowledge. The reason is plausible: the popularization

of modern natural science knowledge comes into conflict with traditional religions, for example, on the theory of evolution, or the history of the origin of the Earth. The activities of the society “Knowledge” would contribute to strengthening the secular foundations of public life. The authorities did not listen to the opinion of scientists and intellectuals on the necessity of restoration “Knowledge” society. This gave an advantage to religious educational institutions in the formation of a religious worldview among young people.

3. The state policy of modern Russia in the field of education from the very beginning said that the school is obliged to provide only “educational services”. Although in the latest editions of the law the problem of education is raised, the definition of this concept is given,¹⁶ the question of its content in the practice of school education remains problematic and debatable. Of the 15 chapters and 111 articles of the law, there is not one where the issues of education would be considered separately, specifically. The school is not legally responsible for the upbringing of children: “Taking care of children and their upbringing is an equal right and duty of parents.”¹⁷ The recognition of ideological diversity (Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), the impossibility of state ideology in the field of education (Article 13, paragraph 2), the exclusivity of the rights of parents in the upbringing of children (Article 38, paragraph 2) pose difficult problems for secondary schools. Of course, the teachers are not completely removed from the issues of educational work with children. But they are detached from the main issues of education related to the choice between secular and religious worldviews. In fact, more than 40 thousand teachers of the Republic of Daghestan, who have almost daily contact with more than 400 thousand students of secondary schools, cannot carry out educational work in this ideological sense. According to the survey, 31.0 per cent of teachers consider educational work at school to be useless due to external factors such as the mosque, Islamic education and

upbringing in mosque schools, at home, systematic educational work of religious leaders in secondary schools, Islamic upbringing in the family, etc. Another 20.3 per cent of respondents indicate that the school does not have clear guidelines for educational work. “The school, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is not obliged to upbringing” – 14.2 per cent, “The school does not know how to bring various ideological attitudes – religious, secular – to uniform, generally accepted norms” – 6.3 per cent.” The current situation creates favorable conditions for strengthening the role of religious education and upbringing. In a number of settlements of the RD, in particular in Gimry, Balakhani, Gubden, Gurbuki, facts were revealed when children stop attending secondary schools, but necessarily receive religious education.¹⁸

This is one of the main reasons for the lack of a proper role of secondary schools in the prevention of extremism and terrorism. It is also a favorable context for strengthening religious socialization in society.

4. To start with, the religious leaders of Russia initiated optional lessons on teaching “religious cultures” in secular schools. Later, in 2012, the school introduced compulsory lessons on the program “Fundamentals of religious cultures and secular ethics”.

5. The presence of religion in the secular educational system has not been limited by school education. On September 1, 2014, the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation on the approval of the federal state educational standard of higher education for the training of highly qualified personnel (postgraduate studies) in the direction of “theology” came into force in Russia. The intellectual society of Russia, represented by ten academicians, including Nobel Prize laureates V.L. Ginzburg and Zh.I. Alferov, opposed the inclusion of the specialty “theology” in the list of scientific specialties of the Higher Attestation Commission (HAC). The letter raised the issue of the impossibility of introducing the compulsory subject

“Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture” in Russian schools, since it is not a culturological subject.¹⁹ Naturally, the same applies to the “Fundamentals of Islamic Culture”.

6. The diversity of Islamic socialization trajectories in the regions forms intra-confessional conflicts. They become problematic both for the confessions themselves and for the secular state, which has been and is taking place in the republics of Daghestan, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia since the second half of the 80s of the last century due to conflicts between representatives of Sufism and “Wahhabism”.

In this situation, the state position in solving the problem of Islamic socialization was expressed in the choice of “traditional” for the region “true” Islam. Such trend in the Republic of Daghestan among the dominant Sunni trends was Sufism (an ascetic-mystical trend in Islam - tasavvuf). As a result, the official system of Islamic education in the republic turned out to be subordinate to the “Sufi” Muftiate of the RD. This is despite the fact that the Salafi opposition to Sufism in the republic has repeatedly and acutely raised the issue of their rights to their independent republican organization, to Salafi-oriented educational institutions. In particular, the Association of Moslem Theologians of Daghestan “Haya” (AMTD “Haya”) in its address to the President of the Republic of Daghestan²⁰ expressed its intentions to achieve the right to organize its own system of Islamic education in the Republic. These appeals were unsuccessful. This circumstance deprived Salafi-minded Moslems of the RD of receiving the desired education. Nevertheless, this kind of education is carried out at home in some schools attached to mosques. It is uncontrolled by the state.

7. The changed situation in the Islamic priorities of the state should, in accordance with political attitudes, lead to a coordinated, peaceful coexistence of religious and secular educational systems in a secular state. Nevertheless, this coexistence is not an identity, but a dialectical unity that presupposes the existence of opposites. According to the

philosophical principles of dialectics, one of the opposites in the unity of opposites is decisive, dominant. There is no dualism of essence. The opposites of the secular and religious are given by some experts, not without reason, a large-scale domestic, and even global, intercivilizational character. Thus, Metropolitan Kirill, now Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, argues that the main conflict of Russian modernity, especially in the North Caucasus is a conflict between secular and religious. In his opinion, there is a conflict process going on, the essence of which is “a global clash between two models of civilization – secular and religious... The shadow of this conflict has recently fallen on the North Caucasus...”²¹ Metropolitan Kirill sees the resolution of the conflict in the North Caucasus in the fact that the peoples professing Islam could obey the norms of Sharia, and not the all-Russian laws. This confessional point of view finds wider expression in the statement about the unjustified monopoly of secular humanism and liberalism on the philosophical justification of the most significant public decisions.

Metropolitan Kirill's point of view was adopted by the interreligious forum in November 2000 in Moscow, where the leaders of the main Russian confessions gathered at the same table. In fact, a program document was adopted, where the spiritual leaders of Russia affirm the need for the exclusivity of the priorities of religious values in public life and the state legal space. Naturally, these general attitudes are transferred to the Russian educational system. The point of view common to the confessional circles of Russia is that in Russia it is necessary to fight against the “monopoly of atheistic views in the public education system.”²² At the same time, the natural-scientific, atheistic, and secular are identified.

It must be admitted that religious leaders have fairly objectively assessed both the current political situation and their interests and opportunities in the educational system of Russia.

Excerpts on the history of Islamic education in Daghestan: the reasons for the priority of Islamic values

The first madrasah in Daghestan appeared at the end of the 11th century in the village of Tsakhur. Prof. G.SH. Kaimarazov²³ writes about this with reference to A.N. Genko. At the same time, A.N. Genko refers to the author of the XIII century Zakaria al-Qazvini. The famous orientalist A.R. Shikhsaidov also indicated the appearance of scribes in Tsakhur as the most important event in the spread of Islam in Daghestan, And in his opinion, the first madrasah in Tsakhur appeared in the 9th century.²⁴ The almost millennial development of Islamic education in Daghestan confirms the idea that for Daghestanis, Islamic culture is a vital component of their ethnic cultures. The level of Daghestanis' involvement in Islamic culture through the educational system can be understood according to I.Y. Krachkovsky's assessment: "Daghestanis, even outside their homeland, wherever the fate threw them, turned out to be universally recognized authorities for representatives of the entire Moslem world as a whole."²⁵

According to historians, in the 19th century there were many people in Daghestan who studied Islam in maktabas, madrasahs, individually. P.K. Uslar's quote is very convincing in this sense: "If the people's education is judged by the proportionality of the number of schools with the mass of the population, the Daghestani highlanders in this respect outstripped even many enlightened European nations. The teaching is available to every mountain boy. In every village there will be one or two people who teach children to read and write for a piece of bread; at each mosque there are schools where those who want to study can continue their studies. ...they study from the age of 8 to the age of 30 or more, the transition from one school to another, more famous for the scholarship of the teacher."²⁶ At the next stage, a madrasah graduate could continue

his studies with a Moslem scholar – alim. In a sense, for a Daghestani, it was the highest Moslem education of the time.

Another, perhaps the most common form of Islamic education is homeschooling, the main purpose of which was to teach children to read the Quran.²⁷ It can be said that it is thanks to this form of education in the conditions of the rigid atheistic ideology of the Soviet period of Russian history that not only Islamic educational traditions, but also the traditions of the Islamic faith have been preserved. Teaching Islam at home could not be controlled by the state to the extent that it was organized in the form of maktabas, madrasahs. Some small groups of Daghestani Moslems were able to preserve rich libraries of Islamic literature, practicing both self-education and learning from compatriots more advanced in Islamic education. The manuscript fund of the Department of Oriental Studies of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the DFRC currently counts about 6,000 Arab and Turkic manuscripts of Islamic content. Arabic-language literature of the past centuries is still widely distributed in the personal libraries of Daghestanis.

These circumstances preserved Islamic thought and subsequently made it possible to quickly restore the system of Islamic education in post-Soviet Daghestan.

The researchers tried to find out the reasons for such a high interest of Daghestanis in the Arabic language, in Arabic culture. Academician G.G. Gamzatov sees this interest in the fact that the process of mastering Arabic is a reflection of the spiritual need of the mountain population for knowledge and familiarization with the achievements of world civilization. Indeed, Arabic was, along with Iranian and Turkish, and even surpassing them, one of the most attractive, elegant languages that paved the way to the values of a developed civilization. It is well known that in the Middle Ages the Arab East was famous for its achievements in various fields of science: philosophy, astronomy, logic, mathematics, geography, medicine, chemistry, etc.

Director of the Institute of Language and Literature of the DFRC at the Russian Academy of Sciences A.T. Akamov expressed a different point of view: "The ethnic and linguistic diversity of Daghestan probably contributed to the widespread spread of the Arabic language as a means of communication accessible to a significant part of the population, in particular the clergy."²⁸ Knowledge of the Arabic language became an obligatory element of every educated Moslem.

Indeed, the Arabic language was a kind of guide of not only religious ideas to Daghestan. Without replacing local languages in everyday life, it has at the same time become the main language of literature, science, education, office work, assembly materials, private and official correspondence. It was also a means of interethnic communication for more than 30 indigenous nationalities living in this territory. All this largely determined the high role of Moslem educational networks in the life of Daghestan society.

Nevertheless, such an answer to the question of the reasons for the development of Moslem education in pre-revolutionary Daghestan remains incomplete. In modern Daghestan, the Russian language has a firm position. It is not only the language of interethnic communication, but also has opened wide opportunities for Daghestanis to access world science and culture. At the same time, a huge craving for Islamic education, for Islamic culture, far surpassing other subjects of the Russian Federation, persists in Daghestan.

The reasons for the interest of the population of Daghestan in Islamic education are mainly of a religiously sacred, religious, ideological nature. The main reason for the interest in Islamic education, according to a survey among Daghestanis studying in foreign Islamic educational institutions, is the possibility of "rapid and high-quality mastering of the Arabic language."²⁹ Almost 60 per cent of respondents say this. It is fair to assume that this interest is not related to the need to satisfy secular cultural values. This assumption is confirmed in the results of a

survey conducted by the author in 2019.³⁰ As it turned out, the relative majority of students in grades 10–11 of comprehensive schools in the Republic of Dagestan are inclined to join the eastern (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, etc.) culture – 39.6 per cent. The western culture (USA, France, Italy, etc.) is of interest only for 5.4 per cent. Both west and east – 27.5 per cent. Similar results were obtained in the course of opinion polls among schoolchildren, students of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions of the RD in 2018 by the senior researcher of the Department of Sociology of the Institute of IAE DSC RAS M.A. Rasulov.³¹

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2021.04.002. ELENA DMITRIEVA. GEOSTRATEGY OF THE CASPIAN STATES // *Condensed abstract was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Caspian region, resources, security, challenges, legal status of the Caspian Sea, national interests, geopolitical interests.

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1. Sidorov S.A. The Caspian Region in the System of International Relations* // *"Pravo i Gosudarstvo: Teoriya i Praktika"*. 2021. 4 (196), P. 162–165.

2. Pushkareva V.V. The Caspian Region in Modern Politics: Problems of Regional Cooperation* // *"Bulletin of Udmurt University. Sociology. Political Science. International relations"*. 2021. Vol. 5, 2, P. 211–220.

The author of the article (1) believes that the situation prevailing today in the Caspian region is complex and requires sustained attention from the Russian authorities. Geopolitical rivalry has been spurred by entirely diverging interests of countries of the Caspian Sea region, growing importance of energy resources, strengthening of the political influence of the

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

US and the EU, economic presence of China, collapse of the USSR and emergence of new independent states in the region. Due to a number of its features, the Caspian region is strategically important and geopolitically significant not only for Russia, but also for the US, China, Turkey and the EU countries.

The fast-growing Asian market with China at the helm might also find the resources of the Caspian Sea area attractive. The 1991 parade of sovereignties changed the balance of power and increased the number of the Caspian Sea states. At present, apart from Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also have access to the sea. As the successor to the USSR and as a regional power in the Caspian region, Russia is working to maintain its influence on the emerging security system. On the one hand, a substantial regional market for goods and technologies can provide significant compensation for financial losses connected with sanctions against Russia; on the other hand, enhancing relations between five countries in the Caspian Sea region can set new milestones for growth within the framework of the policy for economic diversification adopted by Russia.

Analyzing the processes in the Caspian region, the author is of the view that the Caspian region includes only coastal territories comparable in size to the sea itself. Thus, the region includes most of Azerbaijan, the Caspian territories of Russia (Daghestan, Kalmykia and Astrakhan Oblast), Western Kazakhstan and virtually all of Turkmenistan and Northern Iran. It should be noted that the 2011 events subsequently led to a major change in the Arab world. In Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, the constitutional order was overthrown and pro-American governments were established, with the features of “managed chaos” with a tinge of religious extremism retaining. In Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Bahrain, the policy shifted in favour of the US. Therefore, being aware of the strategic importance of the Caspian region, the US works to establish a unified naval force with the Caspian Sea states in pursuit of a priority position in the world and advantageous foreign policy

balance of power. For example, the US Caspian Guard Initiative was designed to safeguard pipeline projects in cooperation with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, as well as to prevent and, if necessary, respond to terrorist activities, nuclear proliferation and human trafficking.

The author of the article draws attention to the US strategic security concept in 2013, where strengthening the role of NATO in the Caspian Sea region is among the priorities. According to the US, NATO could be involved in addressing new challenges and threats to security in the region, potentially posed by the Iranian nuclear program. In recent years, the US and its NATO allies have been working to establish their military presence in the Caspian Sea area by obtaining the consent of the countries in the region. Such plans go against the interests of Russia.

The author notes that the EU countries are particularly interested in the potential of the Caspian region. Making the Caspian Sea resources part of the EU energy supply system is in line with the plans to diversify oil and gas imports. The EU policy in the Caspian region was initially shaped with regard to transport and energy projects, which were supposed to contribute to development of the East–West transit corridor. Programmes such as TACIS, TRACECA and INOGATE involve integration of the transport systems of the former Soviet republics with similar international systems.

The author emphasizes that both Russia and Iran are concerned about the activities of the aforementioned external players in the Caspian region, since they are actively working to oust Russia from the coast of the Caspian Sea and destabilize the situation in the region. Russia is facing new regional challenges in the Caspian Sea area, i.e. an upsurge in crimes committed at sea (poaching, drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling) and increased threat of terrorist attacks.

At the same time, the author points to the fact that there is no clear strategy to counter existing and new security threats in the region, agreed among the Caspian Sea countries. All the

coastal countries, with the exception of Turkmenistan, have supported Russia's initiative to form the CASFOR naval forces, named by analogy with the BLACKSEAFOR in the Black Sea. The issues related to its creation have not yet been resolved, since even those countries that welcomed the initiative fear an increase in influence of Russia within this structure.

Russia has also proposed the creation of the Caspian Economic Cooperation Organization (CECO), since at present there is no international association, which would include the "Caspian Five" countries. Once more, this initiative was met with reservations by the Caspian Sea countries. Although in terms of strengthening regional security in the Caspian Sea, CECO is probably the only solution, Turkmenistan objected the idea, while Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan did not endorse it for a number of reasons. The actions of extra-regional actors in the region also indicate the need for such an organization, e.g. the US, the EU and China are actively promoting their economic and geopolitical interests in the region by fomenting contradictions between the Caspian Sea countries and thereby undermining credibility and security in the region.

The author concludes that the interest of world politics in the Caspian region is expected to only grow every year. It will remain the focus of geopolitical strategies of both regional and non-regional powers, with each side seeking benefit by trying to influence the policy of the Caspian Sea countries. The growing militarization of the region is an alarming development, since the Caspian Sea area may soon turn into one of the most unstable regions in the world. The ongoing confrontation between the US and Iran is a source of particular tension.

There is still no international legal framework for cooperation between the coastal states in the Caspian region. Countries of the "Caspian Five" should step up their efforts to create a regional organization dealing with security and cooperation in the Caspian Sea. The "Caspian Five" countries should pool efforts to achieve unanimous recognition of the

Caspian Sea as a unique inland body of water, obtain legal status for the sea and ensure its exclusive use by the coastal states.

The author of the article V.V. Pushkareva (2) believes that the lack of cooperation and inability to create a reliable mechanism to protect regional interests present a major challenge for the countries of the Caspian region. The author notes that now the Caspian Sea zone is controlled by five states, while before the collapse of the USSR only two countries – the USSR and Iran – had access to the sea. The “Caspian Five” countries are Iran; Russia, a successor of the USSR; and three former Soviet republics – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The “Caspian region” concept in a political sense emerged after the collapse of the bipolar system and the USSR. It was coined in the US State Department, but later the countries in the region started using it too.

The author points to the fact that there is no unified view on the question of the structure of the Caspian region. Initially, the Caspian Sea area was considered important due to the second largest energy reserves after the Persian Gulf zone. Recently, however, the growing military-political aspect of the Caspian Sea region has come to the fore in terms of global politics. This is evidenced by Russia’s successful use of the Caspian Sea to launch missiles at militants in Syria and ongoing militarization of the region.

The author analyzes the development of cooperation and close interaction between the countries in the region and identifies a complex set of internal and external factors.

Discussing internal economic factors, the author notes that the “Caspian Five” countries are now facing economic challenges, especially after the fall in oil prices; there is a need for investments and loans, modernization of production and new environment-friendly technologies for oil and gas production. Possessing large reserves of energy raw materials, the coastal countries have sought to benefit from the interests of their neighbour states or cooperation with non-regional countries, such

as China, Turkey or the EU. International oil companies took advantage of the weakness of the post-Soviet states, and today most of the Caspian oil belongs to foreign investors. They set the transit routes of the produced oil, allowing the political factor to dominate over economic expediency. For example, Azerbaijan would prefer to fill its pipelines with Turkmen oil, while for Turkmenistan it is more profitable to export most of the extracted raw materials to China.

The Caspian Sea is home to about 120 species and subspecies of fish; moreover, it is the world's gene pool of sturgeon species, the catch here accounts for about 90 per cent of world's sturgeon landings. For comparison, one kg of oil costs only 50 cents, while one kg of black beluga caviar costs about one thousand dollars (one kg of golden caviar of albino beluga costs \$44.000). It is a very important resource, but at present hydrocarbon extraction comes first. The Caspian Sea states have not yet established uniform rules for fishing and joint control over the sturgeon catch, which also gives rise to disagreements in the region. Thus, Iran opposes the construction of a pipeline by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the southern part of the Caspian Sea since it would severely damage the environment. Instead, Iran suggested using its infrastructure, i.e. pipelines and terminals for transit of gas to world markets and oil refineries. Most of the aspects of trade, economic, investment, energy and transport development of the Caspian Sea region are of a cross-border nature and cannot be successfully addressed by individual states.

As for political factors, the author believes that the regional competition over hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea prompts the coastal states to build up their naval potential with external support. In particular, the US cooperates with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and Turkey is working closely with Azerbaijan. The situation is further aggravated by military interests of two major regional powers, Iran and Turkey, which are on opposite sides of the confrontation with the US.

After the collapse of the USSR, the post-Soviet political elite tended to weaken ties with Russia; nationalism combined with the revival of religious values prevailed in the newly formed states; the Russian-speaking population did not fit into clannishness, which was gaining momentum. At present, the Soviet past is still being criticized, the Cyrillic alphabet has been replaced by the Latin alphabet, and Soviet education diplomas are not recognized.

The diverse ethnic composition of the Caspian Sea region often causes interethnic confrontations, e.g. the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is extremely complex. Also, in the atmosphere of growing competition between the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups stepped up their activities in the region, contributing to the spread of extremist religious movements. The population of three countries of the Caspian region – Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan – is predominantly Turkic-speaking. In addition, there are many Turkic-speaking Diasporas in Russia and Iran. In this regard, the so-called Turkic factor plays an important role in the developments in the Caspian region. Viewing itself as the center of the Turkic world, neighbouring Turkey is working to enhance its presence in the region. Turkey has created a vast network of educational institutions in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia, the educational standards of which are against the established secular paradigm.

The author also discusses external factors affecting regional stability. Located in the centre of Eurasia, the Caspian region connects Europe with Asian regions via transit transport corridor. As a result, economic and geopolitical interests of the world's leading countries are interwoven here. The US, EU, China and Turkey are most active players in the region. Claiming the role of a global leader, the US seeks to control the economies of the post-Soviet countries and the extraction and transit of hydrocarbons; all the activities of the US are therefore aimed at weakening historical ties between the Caspian states and Russia. The US also

hampers the activities of China in the region, trying to clash the interests of China and Russia. The author nevertheless believes that so far China is the most successful extra-regional player in the Caspian region in comparison with other countries. Among the Caspian states, China gives priority to Kazakhstan as the richest state in terms of raw materials, purchasing oil primarily from this country. China also enjoys beneficial gas supplies from Turkmenistan, investing heavily in the production of gas, which is transported through the West–East gas pipeline, the longest energy pipeline in China. China is Turkmenistan’s largest foreign trade partner.

The author notes that Chinese companies continue to invest in Iran, profiting from US sanctions on the Iranian nuclear deal, because European companies do not want to cooperate with Iran because of the sanctions imposed by the United States. In terms of geopolitics, the Caspian Sea fits in the Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by China. Thus, the Trans–Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is advantageous for China, since it bypasses the territory of Russia and therefore strengthens energy cooperation between China and the Caspian states.

The Caspian Sea is the only sea not covered by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, since it is viewed as inland waters and belongs to the coastal states. In practice, the legal status of the Caspian Sea as a lake means that the five states have agreed to solve any problems without the involvement of external countries. At the military level, this means that the water area of the Caspian Sea can only be used by the naval forces of those states that have access to the sea. This makes the Caspian Sea an area free from the presence of NATO, as well as from China, which is building up its military forces. Since the Caspian region adjoins the Caucasus on one side, and Central Asia on the other, there are numerous threats and causes of destabilization, from terrorist activities to NATO attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries in this region. Thus, cooperation it

the military sphere is as important as the division of maritime zones.

The external political situation in the Caspian region is complex. The possible “colour revolutions” in a domino sequence are posing a serious threat to national security of all the Caspian states. The destabilization of the situation in one of the countries would trigger political instability in all the Caspian Sea countries.

The author analyzes the complex political situation in Iran, where there is a threat of developments similar to those in Syria or Iraq. Should this happen, the situation in neighbouring Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan would automatically escalate. By posing a threat to Azerbaijan, radical Islamists might also jeopardize the situation in the North Caucasus region of Russia and infiltrate areas with Muslim population.

The author concludes that current situation in the Caspian Sea area and lack of regional cooperation is a source of serious concern for the security in the region. Under the pretext of “combating international terrorism”, the US and NATO are stepping up their efforts to establish their military and political control over strategically most important regions of the world, including the Caspian region. The growing influence of global powers; covert and open struggles for the control over energy resources and transit; national policies aimed at fuelling discord; severing of traditional ties and lack of a mechanism for coordinating cooperation between the “Caspian Five” countries allow extra-regional players to control overall developments in the region.

2021.04.003. VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL ASIA // *Condensed abstract was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Central Asia; Shanghai Forum; SCO; UN; Russia; China; Afghanistan; security; terrorism; extremism; drug trafficking; globalization; regionalization; integration; the political elite of Central Asian countries; CSTO; ASEAN.

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1. Malysheva D.B. *Shanhajskaya organizaciya sotrudnichestva i problemy bezopasnosti v Azii // Rossiya i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, 2020. – 4 (49). – P. 25–36.*

2. Azemkulova A.SH. *Integraciya – vazhnejshee uslovie obespecheniya bezopasnosti stran Centralnoy Azii i rol politicheskoy elity // Vestnik Diplomaticeskoy akademii MID Kirgizii im. Kazy Dikambaev, 2020. – 13. – P. 19–24.*

The article of Dina Malysheva, DSc(Political Sciences), IMEMO RAS, [1] defines the main directions of activity of the SCO in the field of maintaining regional and international security. The role of this organization in the fight against terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking is analyzed.

SCO (2001) is an intergovernmental international organization formed on the basis of the Shanghai Forum (Shanghai Five) consisting of four Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Tajikistan) and transcontinental Russia. Uzbekistan joined the five participants of the forum, which then played a prominent role in creating the SCO agenda in the field of maintaining regional stability. There was the trend towards its

expansion at the expense of the leading countries of Asia in the organization. In 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding between the SCO and ASEAN was signed in Jakarta. The document identified areas of cooperation such as combating terrorism, drug and weapon smuggling as strategic. In 2017, India and Pakistan became full participants of the SCO; Afghanistan, Iran and Mongolia remained in observer status, while Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey and Sri Lanka were partners in the SCO dialogue. Turkmenistan, CIS, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), UN had guest status in the SCO.

Thus, the SCO – taking into account the population of the member states, their military-political potential – has every reason to turn into an influential organization, the participants of which face similar challenges in the field of security. This circumstance determines the SCO's important role in maintaining peace and stability in the Asian region.

The participation of Central Asian and South Asian states in the SCO, according to the author, with a favorable development of events, could create an atmosphere of complementarity in the SCO, stimulate intraregional cooperation, help ward off the terrorist threat, interact in the field of energy security, when the Central Asian states rich in hydrocarbon resources (mainly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) become an attractive market for the power-hungry countries of South Asia.

In strengthening security in the Asian geopolitical space, the SCO pays special attention to resolving borderline problems. While border issues with China have largely been resolved, they are still relevant between the Central Asian states themselves up to now. This phenomenon, which has a destructive effect on interstate relations in the region, is due to the fact that in Soviet times, borders were not clearly defined between the allied Central Asian republics, and their delimitation in the post-Soviet period, when these states became independent, was delayed. Theoretically, the SCO could mediate border disputes in post-Soviet Central Asia. However, in its framework, in addition to the

border problem with China, it was possible to complete only the process of delimiting the former state border of the USSR. And the border issues that existed in Central Asia between the five states of the region remained unresolved. At the same time, the SCO, according to some experts, is unlikely to be able to assume the mediation function, because Russia enjoys much greater confidence of the parties involved in border disputes in the region (in particular, between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan): for it, border uncertainty is a destabilizing factor that aggravates relations between the states of Central Asia.

Statements adopted on the basis the results of the meeting on November 10, 2020 in the form of a videoconference of the SCO Council of Heads of State chaired by Russia are aimed at maintaining security: on cooperation in countering the spread of terrorist, separatist and extremist ideology, including on the Internet; cooperation in the field of international information security; on countering drug threats. The SCO countries, despite growing tensions in various parts of the world, have been able to achieve relative stability, largely due to effective security cooperation within the Organization. Especially successful, the researcher emphasizes, should be recognized the experience of the SCO in the field of countering terrorism, Islamist extremism and drug trafficking. SCO participants proceed from the fact that terrorism, as an international phenomenon, is difficult to resist alone. This is a common threat to the economic, political and social security of all members of the international community, including members states of the Organization.

Almost all the states of post-Soviet Central Asia suffered from the destructive activities of religious extremist groups, among which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan gained the greatest fame, which was eventually forced out into Afghanistan, as well as the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami). Islamist and terrorist associations (Al-Qaida, etc.) established in Afghanistan since the Taliban rule have been destabilizing the socio-political situation not only in Afghanistan itself, but also in

China, Central Asia, and other Asian states. In recent years, the Islamist terrorist “international” has been replenished in the Asian region at the expense of immigrants from the Middle East – participants of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist structure partially defeated in Syria and Iraq. It is trying to extend its influence not only to Central and South Asia, but also to South-East Asia, where Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and a number of other ASEAN countries have become victims of terrorist activity of Islamist groups.

The SCO, acting as the leading multilateral structure to combat terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking, used a specially created Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) to counter them. Within the framework of this SCO unit, military exercises are being conducted, and information is being exchanged regarding terrorist groups penetrating the region. Extradition of criminals suspected of committing terrorist acts is also provided. In addition to the anti-terrorist struggle, RATS SCO is involved in activities to counter unconventional security threats – human and drug trafficking, cyber threats, etc. In 2019–2020, RATS played a coordinating role in the organization of a number of specific measures to ensure regional security. Anti-terrorist command and staff exercises “Peace Mission” are regularly conducted, and the border operation “Solidarity – 2019–2021” was carried out. In December 2019, representatives of the competent authorities of India, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan took part in a joint anti-terrorist exercise of the SCO member countries to identify and suppress the use of the Internet for terrorist, separatist and extremist purposes – Xiamen – 2019.” RATS SCO has intensified its cooperation with international organizations. In 2018, a “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation and Coordination” was signed between the RATS, the Anti-Terrorism Center of the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (RATS CIS) and the Secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). According to the

document, the parties inform each other about challenges and threats of a terrorist and extremist nature, ongoing and planned anti-terrorist and anti-extremist activities. Russia assumes a huge share of responsibility for maintaining security within the RATS. So, the Russian Federation, together with Saudi Arabia, will finance a UN project to prevent illegal trafficking in small arms by terrorists in Central Asian countries. Especially in this region in 2020–2021 the RATS expects to implement the first stage of the UN project to prevent and suppress the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons and their illegal supply to terrorists.

A special place in the activities of the SCO is occupied by the fight against illicit drug trafficking. In order to create an effective system for joint fight against the drug threat, the SCO is currently working on the prospects for the realization of the project to create the SCO Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe. Using a flexible institutional framework of cooperation, the SCO covers a wide range of anti-drug policies, conducting joint operational-search actions and implementing a set of preventive, medical and rehabilitation measures. In this regard, the international anti-terrorist operations “Web,” organized by the SCO (2019–2020), gained particular significance. In the field of combating the drug threat, the SCO works closely with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UN unit dealing with the problems of drug trafficking, weapons, and international terrorism. In 2019, with the support of the Russian chairmanship of the SCO in New York, an event was held on the problem of narcoterrorism. It was stated that the funds received from the sale of drugs were used to feed the destructive activities of terrorist organizations. This is especially relevant for Asian countries. Given the emergence of in addition to land routes for the sea transportation of drugs from the countries of the “opium golden triangle” (Thailand, Myanmar, Laos), which undermines the security of India and China, the SCO considers it long-range to increase cooperation with ASEAN in the fight against the drug threat.

The SCO's priority is to deter drug trafficking from Afghanistan. In general, the Afghan problem remains in the focus of attention of the SCO. The interaction of the Organization's participants was carried out for a long time mainly within the framework of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group (CG). However, it has not achieved effective results during its existence.

The researcher notes in this regard the important role that Uzbekistan plays in the Afghan problem. This is due, firstly, to the fact that in the north of Afghanistan there are many ethnic Uzbeks, and Uzbek speakers are the third largest (about 11 per cent) after the Pashtun and Dari language group of Afghanistan. Secondly, it was the representatives of Uzbekistan who led the SCO leadership for many years, and therefore had the opportunity to determine the Organization's agenda on resolving the Afghan crisis, including through the one established by Uzbekistan in 2018 SCO People's Diplomacy Center.

The Uzbek side was not limited to the SCO formats solving the Afghan problem, supporting the Contact Group "6 + 2" functioning within the UN to resolve the situation in Afghanistan (with the participation of Iran, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan + Russia and the USA). Since the early 1990s, Uzbekistan has consistently expressed political initiatives to achieve peace in this country, and has provided its territory for organizing inter-Afghan negotiations between the official leadership of Afghanistan and the Taliban. Uzbekistan also sets itself the task of more active involvement of Afghanistan into regional trade and economic processes, contribution to the socio-economic recovery of this republic within the framework of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. Such an approach supported the main principle of the foreign policy strategy of the republic – the preservation of the maximum "centrality" from all world centers of power.

The diplomatic efforts undertaken by the SCO to withdraw Afghanistan from the prolonged military-political and economic crisis have not yet yielded tangible results. The situation in

Afghanistan continues to be alarming, as it poses potential risks in the form of exports of instability and the transfer of terrorist activity to neighbouring states in Central and South Asia. The growing presence of the Islamic State in the Afghan conflict zone gives rise to concern for Afghanistan's neighbors. In addition to the Afghan problem, the SCO is faced with the task of developing a strategy to solve other knots of contradictions in Asia – Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani, given that the parties of these political confrontations are full members of the Organization.

The SCO, the researcher notes, judging by its official documents (the SCO Charter, the SCO Development Strategy until 2025, etc.), avoids being considered a military-political organization. There is also opposition (mainly from China) to the transformation of the SCO into an association that takes on an integration function and creates supranational governing bodies. As a result, the SCO reacts mainly at the declarative level to many of the problems created by the tasks of ensuring regional security. Preference is given to solving these problems at the level of bilateral interstate contacts, rather than within the framework of the SCO or its structures. In practice, in solving many problems, SCO participants are guided by national interests and development strategies. At the same time, the expansion of the Organization at the expense of new Members did not provide determination in the immediate and constructive solution of emerging problems.

There is a reason to hope, the author believes, that the coronavirus pandemic that affected the SCO countries, which set the Organization's participants the task of adapting to new realities, will force them to develop actively a collective response to the challenges of biological security. One of the options for such an answer may be combination, within the framework of the new international center, of the Russian experience, which has managed to organize effective work to combat COVID-19, with the epidemiological and pharmaceutical achievements of China and India.

A.Sh. Azemkulova, PhD(Political Science), BSU, [2] notes that the leaders of the Central Asian states are making efforts to promote in their policies the ideas of integration of the Central Asian states in order to achieve security and stable development. The development of the modern world is determined by two trends – globalization and regionalization, which lead to the development of regional integration. In this sense, regional integration appears to be the form and way in which the world community responds to global challenges and threats. The current threats, such as religious extremism, international terrorism, international drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, environmental threats, cannot be overcome by any country in the world. Therefore, the desire for regional integration is peculiar to all regions and states of the world, integration processes around the world have a significant definitive influence on foreign policy. The interaction of economies, languages, political actions, cultures directs states not to clash with each other, but to cooperation as a dialogue of civilizations. States are trying to solve the problem of international security through integration processes.

The region of Central Asia is also in desperate need of development of integration processes, where after the collapse of the Soviet Union, new independent states appeared on the world map: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan. Despite the community of history, traditions and customs that have developed over the centuries, there are both internal contradictions and threats to the world order among the states of the region. First of all, these are conflict potentials of nearby Afghanistan and the Ferghana Valley, the socio-economic problems of the countries of the region, and the political interests of the leading states of the world. Due to the fact that Central Asia is in the center of Eurasia, these threats pose danger to national security not only for every country in the region, but also for other parts of the world. The ideas of regional integration in the Central Asian region are therefore

relevant. The political elite of the Central Asian States realizes these problems. Central Asian leadership elites began the integration process as early as the 1990s. An example of this is the creation of structures such as the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) and the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO).

Presidents I. Karimov and N. Nazarbayev concluded an “Agreement on a common economic space,” in 1994 in Tashkent, later supported by the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In 1997, the Declaration of Alma-Ata was signed to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, which was then implemented in the form of a treaty (Semipalatinsk, 2006). More than 160 multilateral cooperation documents were signed within the framework of CAES and more than 50 projects in the field of economics were adopted. At the initiative of political leaders, an agreement was concluded among the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on joint actions to combat terrorism, political and religious extremism, transnational organized crime and other threats to the stability and security of the parties. Attempts have also been made to promote the military and political integration of the Central Asian states. In 1994, the leaders of three states: the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, the Kyrgyz Republic A. Akaev, the Republic of Uzbekistan I. Karimov signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation. In 1995, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the organization and formation of a collective peacekeeping Central Asian battalion under the auspices of the UN.

But at that time, the author notes, not all Central Asian states took part in integration processes. So, there was a civil war in Tajikistan, and it was busy solving its internal problems. The leader of Turkmenistan chose the policy of “permanent neutrality”, without wishing to integrate, pursuing his national interests. Thus, the first attempts at integration in the region did

not lead to the creation of a single integrated space. There were a number of reasons for this, including different levels of economic and social development of the countries of the region, political reforms, the claims of countries to expand their zones of influence beyond their own borders, the struggle for regional leadership, and ethnocultural conflicts. However, integration has been a constant focus of the political activities of the Central Asian leadership elite. Great attention was paid to regional security issues at the summit of the heads of state of Central Asia in Tashkent in 2000, where a wide range of issues were considered to ensure peace and stability in the region. As a result, at this summit, the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a treaty on joint actions to combat terrorism, political and religious extremism, transnational organized crime and other threats, which was a “Defense Union” that defended the sovereignty and security of Central Asian states.

Closer political integration to ensure regional security has become possible with the participation of Russia, China and Western countries in the framework of major international regional organizations CSTO and SCO. The most important tasks of the CSTO are: military-political integration of the participating countries, strengthening their military-technical cooperation, improving interaction between them, joint training of military personnel and specialists. The SCO currently unites 8 states of the planet and 4 observer countries. An important area in the SCO’s activities, along with economic, political, scientific and cultural interaction, is the solution of security problems on the Eurasian continent. Today, all the presidents of the Central Asian States speak about the importance of regional security integration.

In the Concept of Kazakhstan's foreign policy for 2014–2020, the main priority is the development of political stability, economically stable and safe Central Asia, the reduction of conflict potential, the settlement of all differences among the

states of the region. The National Development Strategy of Kyrgyzstan for 2018–2040 plans to participate in global projects within the framework of the SCO, the EAEU, in bilateral cooperation with neighboring states. The Concept of Foreign Policy of Tajikistan gives priority to the further expansion of friendly coexistence of the peoples of Central Asia. In the strategy of Uzbekistan's policy until 2021, it is planned to create a belt of security, stability and neighborliness around it, and to resolve border disputes. The leader of Turkmenistan, in order to achieve regional security, also considers the countries of Central Asia a priority of its foreign policy. According to the researcher, in view of the events caused by globalization, major socio-economic and geopolitical changes in the world, the countries of Central Asia need to intensify their efforts in integration processes in order to strengthen regional stability and security, since only integration gives an opportunity to provide a collective response to modern threats and challenges.

The ancestors of the current ruling Al-Khalifa family in Bahrain were of Bedouin descent and came from the Bani Utba (Utub) tribe, originally dislocated in Central Arabia. In 1782, the Bani Utba tribe moved to the islands of Bahrain. In 1783, representatives of the Al-Khalifa family expelled the Persians from the country and became the ruling dynasty.

Since then, the Sunni Al-Khalifa dynasty has ruled the Shiite majority (Shiites make up 55–60 per cent of the population of Bahrain)⁴. At the same time, Shia are discriminated by the authorities. Shiites are perceived as a threat to the stability of the regime. Shiites are not employed by Bahrain's security agencies, such as the Bahraini Defense Forces, the National Guard, the police, which is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Agency. The Government recruits foreign mercenaries into these services. Naturally, members of the ruling dynasty occupy the most important command capacities⁵. Nevertheless, the Sunnis of Bahrain have always had a higher social status⁶ than the Shiites.

The situation of Shia rights in Bahrain has not changed since the events of the Arab Spring. In 2011, protests began in the country, the participants of which (most of them Shiites) demanded democratic reforms, as well as an end to discrimination against the Shiite population. Later there were demands for the resignation of Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa⁷, who at that time held office of prime minister. At the same time, the Shiite Al-Wifak⁸ movement did not put forward radical demands, but only was in favor of a change of government and that it was elected, and not appointed, by the king. Shia protesters also complained that the Bahraini authorities, in their opinion, were trying to change the confessional composition of the Bahraini population by granting citizenship to Sunni foreigners⁹. Demonstrations resulted in clashes with the police. The Bahraini government ultimately put down the protests with military force. The military from Saudi Arabia and police from

the UAE¹⁰, whom the king of Bahrain invited, took part in the suppression of protest activity in Bahrain¹¹.

July 2, 2011 at the suggestion of the heir to the throne Salman bin Hamad there was opened a “national dialogue” to develop a consensus on the situation in the country. 15 days after its start Al-Wifak refused to participate in the dialogue, considering it unpromising. The participants in the “national dialogue” developed recommendations for amending the Constitution, expanding the powers of parliament. In May 2012, these amendments were published, but the opposition rejected them. The opposition advocated the formation of a government consisting of deputies of parliament. According to the plan of the opposition forces, the head of the faction, who occupied the majority of seats in parliament, was supposed to become prime minister. However, such a suggestion undermined the established longstanding order. If these demands had been accepted, the ruling family would have lost its monopoly on power¹².

Subsequently, the “national dialogue” was resumed several times and interrupted in 2013–2014¹³. Ultimately, this government initiative was not successful. In November 2014, Bahrain held parliamentary elections. Al-Wifak boycotted them, hoping to intensify the protest movement, but by that time it had significantly weakened¹⁴.

In 2014, three Shiites were found guilty of a bomb attack that had killed police officers. The accused denied any implication in the crime and reported torture¹⁵. In 2017, they were executed.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran condemned these executions. At the same time, Ayatollah Ali Eslami, a member of the Iranian Assembly of Experts, said that “the real organizers [of executions] are Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and the United Arab Emirates.” And Hossein Amir-Abdollahyan, a former ambassador to Bahrain who is associated with the Al-Cods battalion (special forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps¹⁶), recalled that Iran only “provided spiritual support to [Bahrain] in the uprising.”¹⁷

In 2016, the court handed down a decision to dissolve the main Shiite opposition group of Bahrain, Al-Wifak. The Manama Administrative Court also decreed to seize the funds of the party found guilty of “harboring terrorism.” The Court stated that Al-Wifak had called for violence and had facilitated demonstrations and sit-ins that could have led to stirring of “interfaith hatred.”¹⁸

In 2016, a group of UN human rights experts expressed deep concern about the “systematic persecution” of the Shia population and religious leaders. Among the violations of rights was the deprivation of citizenship practiced by the Bahraini authorities¹⁹.

Thus, the International Commission on Human Rights sharply criticized the decision of the Bahraini authorities to deprive Ayatollah Isa Kassim²⁰, one of the country's leading clergy, of his citizenship. In June 2016, Bahraini authorities accused Kassim of trying to divide Bahraini society, enkindling interfaith enmity and encouraging young people to violate the Constitution²¹.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei also condemned the decision of Bahraini leaders to deprive one of the Shiite leaders of citizenship. “This is glaring stupidity and madness. When he could still address the people of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa Kassim... he would advise you to refrain from radical and armed actions” Khamenei said in his speech on state television²².

Khamenei also emphasized that “the attack on Sheikh Isa Kassim means removing all obstacles that prevent the heroic Bahraini youth from attacking the regime.”²³ In May 2017, Bahrain security forces broke into Sheikh Kassim's residence in the village of Diraz²⁴ and arrested everyone in the house. It's said that at least five people were killed in the raid and more than 280 arrested. The assault on the Sheikh's house occurred a few days after a Bahraini court sentenced Sheikh Kassim to one year in prison on charges of “money laundering” and illegal fundraising²⁵. The court ordered the confiscation of his property in the amount of three million Bahraini dinars (about \$8 million US dollars). Kassim was also ordered to pay a fine of 100 thousand Bahraini dinars (about 265 thousand dollars).

Events around the Shiite spiritual leader led to protests among Shiites²⁶. According to Shia Rights Watch, although the Shia protests were peaceful and the demonstrators were not armed, the authorities brutally put them down. At the same time, due to restrictions on movement, ambulances could not enter the city, and hospitals were ordered not to provide assistance to wounded protesters²⁷.

In 2017, a Bahrain court sentenced 19 people to long prison terms on charges of spying for Iran and conspiracy to overthrow the regime. Eight people got life sentences, 10 were sentenced to 15 years in prison, and two were sentenced to 10 years in prison for espionage and inciting religious discord in society²⁸.

The court also deprived fifteen people of Bahraini citizenship. The court found them guilty of transmitting information to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese Hizbullah²⁹, as well as of receiving “material support” from these two organizations³⁰.

In 2017, Bahrain’s supreme court upheld life sentences to three opposition leaders, including a prominent opposition politician and preacher Sheikh Salman, who was arrested on charges of spying for Qatar. Salman was the head of the Al-Wifak party.

A senior Bahraini Shiite clergyman has been jailed since late 2014 and sentenced to nine years in prison for that the Manama regime described as “insulting” government officials, sedition fomenting with his protests against the authorities during the 2011 uprising and trying to overthrow the regime with the assistance of foreign powers (this was a hint at Iran).

On November 1, 2017, Sheikh Salman and his two assistants were charged with “espionage on behalf of a foreign state... with a view of carrying out subversive acts against Bahrain and damaging its national interests.”³¹

Salman was also accused of “revealing the secrets of defense to a foreign state and disseminating information that could harm the status and reputation of Bahrain.”³²

Sheikh Salman denies all accusations, saying that he was only seeking for reforms in the country by peaceful means³³.

In 2014, another politician, Al-Wifak parliamentary speaker Khalil al-Marzouq³⁴, was accused of terrorism instigation.

Iran is closely following developments in Bahrain. Iranian media covered the situation with Shia pilgrims from Bahrain who could not leave Iran due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, Bahrain resumed flights by Gulf Air to bring Bahrainis home. Since 2016, there have been no direct flights between Bahrain and Iran. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Sudan cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in January 2016 after a scandal caused by an attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. The attack on the embassy, in turn, was a reaction to the execution of the Shiite theologian Nimra al-Nimra³⁵ in Saudi Arabia.

Since 2016, relations between Bahrain and Iran have not improved. In March 2017, Bahrain authorities announced the revelation of a “terrorist cell” associated with Iran. The arrested persons were suspected of involvement in the bomb explosion on a police bus in February 2017 and in a conspiracy to kill high-ranking officials³⁶.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the conclusion of an agreement in September 2020 on the normalization of relations between Bahrain and Israel³⁷. This document is a part of the “Abraham Agreements”³⁸ signed through US mediation.

It should be noted that Bahrain is one of the main allies of the United States. Bahrain and the United States signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement in October 1991, which gives the US military access to Bahrain’s facilities. The kingdom is the base of the 5th Fleet of the US Navy³⁹.

At the same time, Bahrain expressed “strong condemnation” of Israel’s actions on the Temple Mount, May 7, 2021, in the month of Ramadan revered by Muslims, saying that Israel should take measures to prevent attacks by security forces on believers during this holy month⁴⁰.

Bahrain’s Shia protest activity is low. A few demonstrations took place in Bahrain in February 2021 on the 10th anniversary of the events of the Arab Spring⁴¹.

The tenth anniversary of the Bahraini democratic movement against the despotic Al-Khalifa regime was celebrated in Qom⁴², Iran, in February 2021. Leader of the movement, Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim⁴³ spoke at the ceremony. It is believed that this event will make the Bahraini authorities be even more wary of the Shiites and Iran.

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The Shia of Bahrain continue being subject to persecution by the authorities. Repression of the spiritual and political leaders of the Shia causes discontent among this part of the Bahraini population. However, this does not lead to mass protests by Shiites, as it was in 2011–2012, and all centers of protest are suppressed. Bahrain's relationship with the largest Shiite power – Iran has not also improved since the break of diplomatic relations between the countries in 2016.

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NIKITA KUKLIN. ISLAMIC VECTOR IN INDONESIA'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY: A HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE // *Article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: Indonesia; Pancha Sila; Sukarno; Islam Nusantara; diplomacy.

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rticle one*

Abstract. Indonesian foreign policy in the Islamic direction is often viewed from the standpoint of the religiosity of the elites and their solidarity with the “brothers in faith”, however, the history of the development of Indonesian statehood and the peculiarities of Indonesian Islam show that the Islamic vector has long been identified by the elites with the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist discourse and only at the present stage began to acquire the features of the discourse of political Islam.

Indonesia today is the largest Moslem state by population (about 225 million people), but does not officially position itself as a Moslem state, in accordance with the model of religious balance enshrined in Pancha Sila, the official ideology and philosophy of the country, developed by the first president of the country, Sukarno (1945–1968). Pancha Sila proclaims the principles of social justice and collective community,¹ traditional for the peoples of Indonesia. Even to this day, Pancha Sila acts as a unifying instrument, consolidating territorial integrity, linguistic and national Indonesian identity and the rule of religious balance. All these components are extremely important for the unique Indonesian model of statehood.² Sukarno, and then the subsequent presidents, made a significant contribution to the unification of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society.

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A well-thought-out policy in this direction has led to the formation of a special Indonesian mentality of tolerance, where interfaith friendship is valued above all, and statements about the superiority of a particular religion are condemned and regarded as radicalism and an encroachment on the foundations of statehood. In addition to 87.2 per cent of Sunni Moslems, 6.9 per cent of Protestants, 2.9 per cent of Catholics, 1.7 per cent of Hindus, 0.7 per cent of Buddhists and 0.05 per cent of Confucians live in the country, not counting atheists and representatives of any other faiths.³ Islam is mostly spread on the islands of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Lombok, Sumba and Molucca. On islands such as Bali or Papua, Hinduism and Christianity are widespread, respectively.⁴

The Moslem community of Indonesia is heterogeneous, as it has its own peculiarities of internal development. In this regard, it is important to pay attention to the specifics of Indonesian Islam. Its main feature concerns the division of Indonesian Islam into traditionalist (Adat) and modernist (Sharia). Speaking about traditionalists we mean supporters of the Adat (syncretic version of Islam under the influence of Javanese elements of ethnic culture, pre-Islamic Pagan and Hindu beliefs) “Nusantara Islam”, and modernists, on the contrary, are zealots of the Sharia way of life, rejection of Javanese elements of culture and spiritual life of the pre-Islamic period.⁵ At the same time, the followers of these movements equally follow the Shafi’i madhhab. Despite the dominance of Javanese traditionalists in politics, modernist Moslems, as well as Christians and Hindus, are also widely represented in politics.⁶

The main currents of Islam in the country are represented by the world’s largest (each counts 30 million members) Moslem organizations “Nahdatul Ulama” (for traditionalists) and “Muhammadiyah” (for modernists), which are very influential and form, along with state institutions, a certain system of social governance. For example, Nahdatul Ulama carries out educational activities through a network of more than 6830 Islamic boarding

schools (pesantren) throughout the country. The organization also owns 44 universities and many research centers in the fields of economics, Islamic finance, agriculture, social policy and family planning.⁷ The organization finances Moslem communities in the United States, Taiwan and Europe, while helping refugees from the Middle East. No fewer institutions belong to Muhammadiyah.

Since the proclamation of the country's independence in 1945, Moslem organizations and parties have been active in the political field and have contributed to the development of the Moslem community as one of the political forces. At different times, they took opposite positions in relation to the state system, from the adoption of a model of social and religious balance to the requirements of Islamization of domestic and foreign policy.⁸ However, the first presidents Sukarno, and then Suharto (1968-1998), initially took a cautious position on this issue and for a long time did not allow Indonesian diplomacy to use Islam as a basis for foreign policy. The growing influence of Islamic parties and organizations after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the politicization of the Islamic issue in the world after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the USA again actualized the so called Islamic vector in Indonesia's foreign policy, in which Indonesia secretly views itself as a "leader of non-Arab Moslems" and gradually introduces Islamic discourse into foreign policy.

On the other hand, the high degree of collectivism in Indonesian society and broad public attention to political issues makes it dangerous to "flirt" with political Islam and external information guides, which would give ground for strengthening the political platform of conservative parties and movements seeking to Islamize the country and abolish the ideology of Pancha Sila.⁹ The complexity of this political model, as well as its strong connection with the religious sphere, can often mislead a researcher who is not familiar with country specifics in regard of the motives and foundations of Indonesian diplomacy in the Islamic direction. Hence, it seems logical to consider the role of Islam in foreign policy, depending on external and internal

challenges at various stages of the formation of modern Indonesian statehood.

Features of the implementation of the Islamic vector under President Sukarno (1945–1968)

President Sukarno's foresight was determined not only by his inner view of the structure of Indonesian society and the balance of socio-political forces. The key foreign policy idea of Sukarno was the policy of neutrality as an attempt to protect the young states of the Southeast Asian region from the processes of the Cold War and involvement of Indonesia in the global confrontation within one camp or another. And immediately after the declaration of independence, Indonesia outlined its principled positions in foreign policy. The existence of its own model of state construction allowed Sukarno to protect the country and the region to some extent from the export of ideologies from the outside, rather strengthening the development of nationalist tendencies of the countries of the region, beneficial for nation-building, the prosperity of the elites and the contentment of the people with a high level of stability.¹⁰

In 1948, the Prime Minister of Indonesia, M. Hatta (1948–1950), delivered a speech entitled “Maneuvering between two stones”, which outlined Indonesia's position in the Cold War. Thus, M. Hatta put forward the thesis that, in conducting its foreign policy, Indonesia should be guided only by its own interests, and not by the interests of superpowers.

The doctrine proposed by Hatta was called the “Doctrine of Active Independence” and still serves as the basis of Indonesian foreign policy. By “independence” it was meant that Indonesia intends to independently determine its own position in relation to world problems without pressure and influence from outside, while “activity” assumed Indonesia's participation in constructive efforts that will help build and maintain peaceful relations with all states.¹¹ Indonesia played a truly outstanding

role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, adopting in 1955 The Bandung Conference of 29 Asian and African States, which allowed Sukarno to isolate the region from the processes of the Cold War and lay the foundation for Indonesia's regional leadership and its active and independent foreign policy.

Such a significant position of Indonesia put Sukarno on a par with other leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Josip Broz Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah. Sukarno, in turn, relied on the image of a revolutionary and liberator both inside the country and in foreign affairs. He saw the struggle against world imperialism and colonialism through the transfer of Indonesia's experience to other liberated countries as an important challenge for himself. In the future, Sukarno's anti-colonial rhetoric was developed within the framework of the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Sukarno has expressed support for the Arab people, insisting on the obvious position of the newly formed Israel as a conductor of the neocolonial interests of the United States.

Sukarno spoke about the unity of Moslems and solidarity, but his initial motivation was the anti-imperialist nature of Indonesia's actions, which is confirmed by Sukarno's similar refusal to support Taiwan's independence in favor of the newly formed PRC, where there was no question of religious solidarity at all.

Such a need for statements of religious solidarity was required by Sukarno for the internal agenda as a means to attract the attention of the above-mentioned Moslem organizations, since even in the period preceding official independence, Indonesians were known in the Middle East through interaction with such centers of Islam as the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as through the participation of many Indonesians in the study programs of Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

Indonesians living in Arab countries also played their role during the War of Independence, persuading the League of Arab States (LAS) to come out in support of Indonesia's independence

at the UN, based on the unity of religion and a sense of brotherhood of the Arab peoples and the people of Indonesia. In 1946, the Egyptian diplomat and the first Secretary General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha (1945–1952), supported the release of an official statement in support of Indonesia, and in 1947, with his own submission, the Consul General of Egypt in Bombay, Muhammad Abdul Munim, visited the rebellious capital of the Indonesian rebels in the city of Yogyakarta.¹²

However, the internal difficult political situation and Sukarno's fears of strengthening the Islamic bloc did not allow the president to openly use Islamic rhetoric, and at the same time, in a dialogue with the Arab League, Sukarno did not abandon Moslem solidarity.

Later, even before Sukarno lost power as a result of the military suppression of the pro-communist coup of September 30, 1965, the president continued to follow his anti-colonial rhetoric in the Israeli direction, refraining from pro-Islamic positions in his statements. It also follows from this that Sukarno linked the religious theme with domestic politics. The subsequent formation of Malaysia and the declaration of it the country of Islamic basis as the dominant of its development convinced Sukarno to focus even more on the development of unifying concepts, such as: NASAKOM (an acronym based on the Indonesian words NASionalisme (Nationalism), Agama (Religion) and KOMunisme (Communism)), or NEKOLIM (neocolonialism, colonialism and imperialism). There developed a public demand for practical actions to overcome the economic crisis and the consequences of the policy of abstract acronyms of Sukarno, which allowed the military in the person of General Suharto to seize power and remove Sukarno.

The Islamic Trend in President Suharto's Foreign Policy (1968–1998)

During the era of Suharto's New Order regime (1968–1998), Indonesia continued the same policy in regard of the Middle East,

while the United States, due to Suharto's reorientation towards economic relations with the Western Bloc, was no longer considered a potential enemy, but the need to maintain neutrality allowed Suharto to maneuver in issues related to Islam and the Arab world as a whole. Despite the support of religious organizations for the subsequent persecution of communists, Suharto also limited these forces, reducing the number of Islamic parties (as well as parties of other ideologies), identifying as the main force for the development of the state – the military and officials within the framework of the Pancha Sila.

At the same time, Indonesia's reaction to the 1973 oil crisis is indicative. At that time, the Indonesian authorities stated that Indonesia's support of Arab countries against Israel was based on justice (*dasar keadilan*), which is the principle of the country's foreign policy, and religious solidarity only complements this decision.

Indonesia supported the use of the oil embargo by Arab countries as an instrument of foreign policy, but at the same time hoped that the conflict would be resolved in the near future. The Indonesian authorities also stated that the use of oil as a weapon in the short term would harm the United States, Europe and Japan and help the struggle of the Arabs: "However, if the embargo is used for a long period of time, developing countries will suffer, because economic relations with developed countries are necessary for the growth of developing countries."¹³

Suharto's position on Palestine was also based on anti-colonial rhetoric. Thus, on November 30, 1987, Suharto again announced Indonesian support for Palestine in its struggle to achieve its inalienable rights. He also stated that "... as a nation proud of its heritage of struggle against colonial subjugation and for national independence, we in Indonesia have always considered the struggle of the Palestinians a sacred cause, as our own struggle as part of an irreversible global movement against colonial domination and foreigners."¹⁴

He also stated that the Middle East conflict can be resolved only if the Palestinian people are granted their own independent state, and Israel unconditionally withdraws from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem. Earlier in 1975, the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Suharto Adam Malik (1966–1978) discussed the possibility of opening a PLO representative office in Jakarta, but faced opposition from the military. The latter feared two factors at the same time: the first was the PLO's ties with Islamic radical groups, the second was their good relations with the international communist movement and left-wing radicals. Fears were also caused by the general growth of Islamic discourse, since in the 1971 General Elections, the results of voting among Indonesians abroad showed a high level of support for the Indonesian Moslem Party and the Nahdatul Ulama organization.

Thus, even on the basis of this fact, we can speak about the growing at that time Islamic lobby, to which Suharto was increasingly forced to listen at the end of his reign, as evidenced by his uncertainty about the Yugoslav conflict and the issue of assistance to Moslems in Bosnia (1992), since Indonesia took a position of support for the Moslem population, while not in a hurry to use its potential and position in the OIC and in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Indonesia expressed solidarity over the plight of Bosnian Moslems, along with other Moslem countries, but Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (1988–1999) noted that “support does not necessarily mean sending Indonesian peacekeepers.”¹⁵

Thus, Suharto further codified permissible and unacceptable diplomatic actions related to those areas of foreign policy where Islam could serve as the basis for any argument.

The Reformation period and the growing influence of Islamic parties (1998–2004)

After the overthrow of Suharto in 1998, as a result of a nationwide crisis, previously suppressed elites from the

democratic (nationalist) and religious spectrum came to power. Having founded new political parties, they joined the process of democratization of the country, once again relying on the original principles and foundations of statehood. Democratization was carried out through the consistent introduction of new principles in domestic and foreign policy. They mainly concerned the response to the current needs of society in the framework of overcoming the Asian financial crisis of 1998 and the political power of the military regime, but at the same time they took into account the need to return to the old principles of the Sukarno times. The short term of the administration of Abdurahman Wahid (1999–2001), the religious leader of Nahdatul Ulam, who was noted for being the first to bring Islamic parties out of the shadows, is interesting for a thoughtful policy of appeasement and dialogue inside the country and an unusual style of diplomacy outside. A test of strength for the diplomatic system of the Wahid administration was the well-known rapprochement with Israel.

After Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres invited Wahid to witness the opening of the Peres Peace Center in 1994, he made several trips to Israel and became increasingly known for his defense of Israel. In August 2000, he met Peres again when he visited him incognito in Jakarta before the planned visit of Yasser Arafat.

He told both politicians about his vision of Jerusalem as the joint capital of Israel and an independent Palestinian state and publicly urged Arafat not to immediately reject the offer made by Ehud Barak at Camp David in July 2000.¹⁶ Wahid also called on Moslem communities to compromise with Israel, arguing, as a theologian, that from a religious point of view, both Jews and Moslems have no obstacles to peaceful life and the search for consensus.

However, the activities of Abdurrahman Wahid in the Israeli direction met with resistance from both the parliament and society. For example, numerous street demonstrations at the

civilian level and the threat of a parliamentary boycott by lawmakers forced Akbar Tanjung, the Speaker of Parliament, to announce that the Israeli delegation would not attend the conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Jakarta in 2000. Popular agitation was also fueled by Israeli-Palestinian tensions of that period.

Soon, Wahid's inconsistent policy, despite his many achievements, led to his removal, and the choice was made in favor of the leader of the Democratic Struggle Party of Indonesia – Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004).

Megawati's need to respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, a series of terrorist attacks in Bali in 2002 and the growth of radical Islamism in the rebellious separatist province of Aceh influenced Megawati's desire to form Indonesia's position on issues of Islam and developing Islamophobia. The difficulty of Indonesia expressing its position was the President's fears of provoking a violent reaction from radical groups and giving them an additional resource for propaganda outside Indonesia. The growing influence of terrorist groups within the country, as well as the emergence of fundamentalist groups of independent (from the Ministry of Religious Affairs or large organizations) preachers also turned any statement of the authorities into a potential propaganda tool. Based on this situation, Indonesia has put forward the main thesis that terrorism is mainly related to economic and social reasons that radicals use for their own benefit. Indonesia also condemned the issue of Islamophobia, urging not to compare all Moslems with individual Islamists.¹⁷ At the same time, Megawati focused on bilateral cooperation and the role of international organizations in the fight against terrorism, without affecting the capabilities of religious forces and the potential of interfaith dialogue.

Despite the growing influence of Islamic political forces and parties, the reformation did not bring serious changes in the leadership's position on the use of Islamic discourse in foreign

policy. But the international situation and growth have led to a greater interest in this issue in the information space, as well as among the people and politicians.

The current state of the Islamic Trend in Indonesia's foreign policy (2014–2020)

Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), Indonesia's experience in economic development, political reforms and the fight against Islamist terrorism allowed the country to talk about the problems faced by the Moslem world. In his speech in Saudi Arabia, President Yudhoyono addressed many issues, among which was Islamophobia. He argued that Moslems should respond to the challenges of modernity by embracing "technology, modernity and culture of progressive experience."¹⁸ The President also noted that Islam is not only a religion of peace, but also of progress, thus calling, on the one hand, for the revival of Islam, on the other, he asked his Moslem brothers to accept globalization, turn to non-Moslems and cooperate in the fight against terrorism.¹⁹

This position of Yudhoyono was definitely no less innovative than the position of Gus Dura (honorary address to the president – *ed.*) on the recognition of Israel. For the first time, Indonesia started talking globally about Islam and approached the issue from a new perspective, more reflecting Indonesia's traditional syncretism. These actions can be viewed in different ways: Firstly, they were aimed at the world Moslem community in an attempt to influence its ideas and actions. Since that period, Indonesia has been promoting the idea that there are many interpretations of Islam, and it is necessary to combat the tendency to reduce the entire Islamic tradition to radical currents. According to Yudhoyono, Islam, modernity and democracy can coexist, which is important for the consolidation of political forces within their own country.²⁰

Secondly, such statements were certainly addressed to the internal audience in order to promote a modern, democratic, tolerant discourse in order to weaken the influence of extremists and radical groups.

Thirdly, such speeches are aimed at the Western audience, in particular, the term of President Yudhoyono's tenure coincided with the peak of American efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East under President George W. Bush. President George W. Bush, as well as President Barack Obama's call for a new start in the USA relations with the Moslem world. The skillful diplomacy of the Yudhoyono period contributed to the perception of Indonesia as a Western-style democratic country. The factor of "moderate" Islam and the corresponding image of the country as the antipode of the "formidable" Middle East contributed to the growth of Indonesia's popularity in the West as an alternative for the development of the Islamic world.

Despite the decline in the USA interest in Indonesia, under D. Trump, the last visit of Secretary of State M. Pompeo (October 2020) made it clear that the USA has remembered the image of a moderate Indonesia and continues to evaluate the country within the framework set by Yudhoyono. President Joko Widodo's election campaign in 2014 again contained numerous references to the doctrine of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy, as well as the need to support the Palestinian people and calls for Indonesia to promote a "middle" version of Islam. Joko Widodo also mentioned interreligious dialogue as a platform for promoting Indonesian "soft power", but it has always been on the periphery of Indonesian politics. Hence, it is possible that the limitations of the principle of external balance in the Islamic direction will also impose their limits on the use of interreligious dialogue as a tool of foreign policy.

Public opinion on issues related to the problems of the Moslem world can restrain Indonesia's foreign policy. When the United States moved its Israeli embassy to Jerusalem, the square in front of the American Embassy in Indonesia became the site of

mass street protests.²¹ In addition, Indonesia appealed against Australia's statement in December 2018 about its plan to follow the example of the United States and postponed the signing of a free trade agreement with Australia until Canberra announced its support for a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Indonesia has traditionally supported the independence of Palestine, but in the era of Sukarno and Suharto, diplomats justified this position by anti-colonialism and secular values, not religion. Today, when Indonesian society is increasingly exposed to populist tendencies, Indonesia seeks to use Islamic rhetoric, but continues to do so with extreme caution. Indonesia has repeatedly offered its services to help resolve the differences between the PLO and HAMAS, but did not proceed from religious motives of solidarity, but from the old position that the main lesson of its own battle for independence is that unity is the main and necessary prerequisite for independence.²²

The Islamic factor thus manifests itself in Indonesia's modern foreign policy in two main forms. Firstly, this is expressed in the desire for closer relations with the Moslem world. This desire is primarily caused by the wish to strengthen economic ties with the rich states of the Persian Gulf, and partly by the wish to win the respect of the world Ummah as a non-Arab Moslem force. In any case, at this stage, greater interest in strengthening relations with Islamic countries is related more to the expected economic benefits than to the problem of Islam as a common faith and the problems it faces in today's globalizing world.

Secondly, the Islamic factor is reflected in the policy regarding conflicts in which Moslems become victims, since Islam prescribes solidarity between Moslems. Traditionally, this impulse has been manifested mainly in Indonesia's policy towards the Middle East, especially in support of Palestinian independence, opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, opposition to the 2003 Iraq war and condemnation of the use of force by Israel against Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip.

It also influenced Indonesia's policy regarding the persecution of the Rohingya and Uighurs in Myanmar and the PRC, respectively. At the same time, issues of support for co-religionists face political pragmatism – the need to preserve the unity of ASEAN and beneficial economic relations with China, necessary for the implementation of infrastructure projects. On the other hand, Indonesia's neutrality allows for the manifestation of a tough position where national interests or values important to the Indonesian people are affected, among which Islam occupies not the last place. For example, as Chairman of the UN Security Council in 2019–2020 Indonesia fundamentally sought to draw the organization's attention to the Rohingya problem and the Middle East settlement, identifying the UN as an important tool in solving the problems of the Ummah.²³

Another innovation of Indonesian diplomacy was the introduction of issues of the rights of Moslem workers from Southeast Asia in the Middle East to the platform of the UN Security Council and the OIC. Earlier, on October 29, 2018, an Indonesian citizen, Tuti Tursilavati, was executed in Saudi Arabia for murder as a result of self-defense during harassment.²⁴ The court did not take into account the attacks on the girl herself, and her execution was carried out without any notification to the Indonesian authorities, which was not the first case. Such a harsh policy of the KSA towards Indonesian migrants is directly related to the dispute between the two centers of Islam for leadership in the Ummah, which provokes the parties to such steps. Indonesia strives for wide coverage of such cases, often from the standpoint of “protecting Moslems in Moslem countries.”

Conclusion

Thus, we can conclude that the Islamic factor in Indonesia's foreign policy does not play such an obvious role as it may seem due to the large number of Moslem population and the attention

paid by the Government to these issues. A significant role in shaping the views of the people and the Indonesian elite is played by the prehistory of the development of Islam in the Malay Archipelago, the high role of Adat types of Islam and original approaches to understanding religion, among which there is syncretism. The national ideology – the philosophy of Pancha Sila – is also aimed at implementing the principle of equality, tolerance and balance in society, which keeps Indonesia's multi-confessional and multi-ethnic society from disintegrating, and imposes its own restrictions on the use of Islamic principles and foundations in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the world's largest Moslem organizations and the spiritual ties of Indonesian Moslems around the world have always helped Indonesia not only in solving problems of interreligious dialogue, but also in realizing important diplomatic goals, for example, during the War of Independence (1945–1949).

Political Islam in Indonesia has also passed a long way from supporting the Islamic way of development of the country at the initial stages of the formation of the Indonesian state to supporting the Pancha Sila and unity of Indonesia today. Since the beginning of the new century, the main task of the government has become the need for an almost instant response to the growth of radicalism and the appearance of terrorists on the territory of the country. At the same time, Indonesia could not but condemn both the growing Islamophobia and the actions of Western countries, partly based on this trend. As a result, this led to Indonesia's desire to conceptualize the Islamic space, to identify its positions based on the identity and ideology of tolerance, moderation and syncretism in relation to globalization. Indonesia could no longer rely on the secular or anti-colonial rhetoric of the Sukarno and Suharto periods.

Thus, Indonesia has declared itself as a center of non-Arab Moslems and a kind of “alternative” to Middle Eastern approaches and views on the development of the Ummah. It also manifested itself in the need to internationalize the “spiritual

resource” of Indonesia, the inclusion of organizations and theologians in international discourse. Indonesia is still cautiously approaching the implementation of the Islamic agenda due to concerns about the domestic political situation in terms of providing a platform for both conservative religious forces and radicals, with whom, however, a steady struggle is being waged, including by force. Indonesia also strongly advocates the suppression and destruction of terrorist groups and is one of the most successful countries in this area.

It is obvious that the stability of Indonesia's foreign policy and its moderation will continue in the future, even if military or religious-oriented forces come to power. Indonesia here resembles the competitive factional model of US decision-making, when all factions, regardless of their victory or defeat in the elections, retain a certain resource of influence on the general political vector of the country's development. Indonesia will also continue to conceptually approach the broadcasting of its views on the Ummah in the global field, using the crises and problems of modern society as motivators and factors for the effective work of its own soft power, as well as ways to increase authority among Moslems.

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ANDREI BELINSKY. “GAME OF THRONES”. LEBANESE CLANS AND STATE IN GERMANY // *rticle was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: Lebanese clans, Mkhamalli, West Germany, organized crime.

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bstract. In the article it is analyzed the process of criminalization of Lebanese clans arrived in Germany in the early 1980s. It is noted that it was caused by a number of reasons, including the marginal situation of Lebanese immigrants, the lack of attention of the authorities to integration problems, specifics of mentality, etc. Starting with petit thefts and street drug trafficking, the clans gradually began to create their own economic structures, which included both

legal business and criminal activities (extortions, robbery, money laundering, etc.). At the end of the article, it is concluded that an effective fight against clan crime involves a set of measures that include not only police operations, but also the fight against the “business” of clans and work with their individual members.

Dual power

Provocative both by its design and its way the burglary of the Berlin Bode Museum which was carried out in 2017, could easily become the basis of the script for Hollywood thriller film or enter criminalistics textbooks as an illustrative example. On the night of March 27, 2017, three men dressed in black got off the Hackesher-Markt station and moved towards the museum along the railway tracks. At the railway embankment, an accomplice was waiting for them, who helped them climb into the museum window. The target of the criminals was the one hundred kilo gold coin “Big Maple Leaf”, the cost of which experts estimated at approximately 3.75 million euros¹. Bulletproof glass was broken by an ax, a coin was transported to the car using ropes and wheel barrow, after which its was lost without a trace².

The policemen investigating the case eventually got on the track of four members of the Lebanese clan Remmo, known in the crime rings of Berlin, who had already got in the crosshairs of German law enforcement agencies.

The robbery of the world-known museum was not just a famous crime, but an indicator that in many large German cities, along with traditional state institutions, informal structures are being formed that not only challenge existing laws, but also claim to impose their rules in those neighborhoods and areas which are under their control. This refers not only to the Salafi community, which activities have long been the subject of the most close monitoring by the German special services, but also Kurdish, Turkish and Lebanese clans. The latter have been for a long time for mainstream society “off scene”, but a number of high profile

crimes, including the Bode Museum robbery mentioned above, brought immigrants from Beirut to the top news charts in Germany, albeit with negative connotations.

Gradually, both in state structures and in society, the awareness comes that they deal not with small criminal gangs, but with rather strong clan structures, whose criminal activities (drug trafficking, money laundering, robberies) cause not only serious economic damage, but also questions the viability of the Basic Law of Germany. How did yesterday's refugees from Lebanon manage to turn into "kings" of the underworld of Germany?

Constant wanderers

The history of many Lebanese clans goes back to Asia Minor, which, according to some researchers, is their ancestral home. It was here where on the plateaus of Eastern Anatolia, for example, the famous Mkhamalli clan originated, which includes several thousand people. The uprising of the Kurds in 1925, who opposed the national policy pursued by the iron hand of M.K. Atatürk, violated the traditional way of life of Mkhamalli. Although members of the clan did not participate in the uprising directly, adhering to a neutral position in the conflict between Ankara and supporters of independent Kurdistan, the hostilities did not pay no attention to them. Economic devastation, reluctance to be attacked or repressed prompted Mkhamalli to migrate. Like the ancient Egyptians who fled from the wrath of Pharaoh from Egypt, many Kurds were forced to leave their historical homeland and go into exile. Among the immigrants there were representatives of the Mkhamalli clan, who found refuge in Lebanon, which became the "promised land" for thousands of refugees from all over the Middle East³. Subsequently, these "pioneers" were joined by their many relatives and tribesmen. However, unlike Armenians, who, thanks to the patronage of local Christians, quickly received Lebanese citizenship, and along with

that the opportunity to occupy the most promising niches of the economy, the new inhabitants of the country were deprived of such privileges, that could not affect both their situation and their attitude to state institutions. "Because of the blockade on the part of Christians, of course, they did not receive citizenship. Until 1994, when a decree was issued granting citizenship, Sunnis managed to naturalize only 10per cent of this group."⁴

The 1975 civil war in Lebanon between Christian and Muslim communities, which killed tens of thousands of people, caused a surge of migration from the country, including western Europe. Among those who left the country in search of happiness were the famous clans Mkhmalli, Remmo, Al-Zein, who moved to Germany, which had long become a magnet for migrants from Southern Europe, Yugoslavia and Turkey⁵. The new homeland did not welcome Lebanese too much, just initially granting a temporary residence permit, which effectively blocked access to the legal labor market and hindered the integration of the community into German society. However, this circumstance in no way prevented the natives of a small Middle Eastern country from taking roots in Berlin, Duisburg, Hamburg, bringing their relatives and building their semi-underground economic "empire" step by step.

The "long road to the West" of Lebanese clans described above is not only a prelude to the main part of the article, but also largely provides the key to understanding why they found themselves on the other side of the law.

First, the nomadic way of life and constant movements from one region to another, as a result of wars, persecution, or an unfavourable economic situation, led Lebanese people to treat the state and its structures as something alien that had nothing to do with them. This was especially evident during the civil war in Lebanon, when Mkhmalli was alternately supported, now by Muslim, now by left-wing parties, depending on the interests of the clan. The result was an open disregard for both current laws

and the cultural traditions of the host country, especially when it came to states with cultures and religions alien to them⁶.

Secondly, constant armed conflicts and clashes between the participants, victims or witnesses were representatives of the Lebanese clans, leave their (usually negative) mark on the worldview and behavior of the representatives of the clans. The use or threat of force, aggression against opponents is a characteristic of behavior for many people from crisis, unstable regions (Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, etc.)

Thirdly, despite the mass exodus of tens of thousands of refugees from Lebanon, the traditional clan structure has not only not weakened, but has also intensified. Its increase was due to both the influx of “fresh blood” in the person of relatives from the Middle East, and the fact that in an unfamiliar environment, it was the clan that gave protection and support to its members.

Finally, the weak integration of clans into the economy and society (lack of citizenship and access to the legal labour market)⁷ has determined the marginal position of Lebanese clans and, as a result, the tendency of their members to crime and illegal activities. “Of course, they fought, stole, trafficked drugs. If you don't have money and you don't go stealing, what will you do if you want to eat?⁸” (Jamal Al Zayn, Justice of the Peace, representative of the Al Zayn clan). “According to the President of the Federal Criminal Police Department of Germany, Holger Münch, the German authorities made a mistake in the past when in the 1980–1990s Arab families arrived from Turkey in Germany and were able to turn into criminal clans. As a reason for this, he cited the fact that migrants without the prospect of obtaining citizenship or a residence permit settled in certain places, lived separately and were criminalized without sufficient consequences for themselves.⁹” In fact, the German state was the victim of its ambiguous migration policy, based on the reception of refugees from the Middle East and Africa on the one hand, and on the other on the rejection of their integration. And soon the authorities had to reap the benefits of their short views.

The publicist R. Ghadban, who had long lived in Lebanon, told in detail in his book “Clans, Underestimated Threat,” about how in practice there was a process of involving migrants from Lebanon in criminal life in the 1980s: “In the beginning they went to supermarkets and shops and took everything they wanted. [...]. At first, the organization acted in trio: an observer, a distracter, a performer. Soon, cohesive gangs arose from them, who carried out more complex actions.¹⁰” Subsequently, powerful structures combining criminal activity and legal business were created of these gangs. And it was the clan structure that became the core around which all the financial activities of yesterday’s refugees from Lebanon were built.

Backstage. How Lebanese clans are arranged

Lifting the curtain of secrecy over how Lebanese clans are actually arranged and functioning is difficult not only for an outside observer, but also for the special services and the police, which have a branched staff of informers and the latest surveillance tools.

The reason for the “opacity” of clans for law enforcement agencies is explained not only by the peculiarities of their structure (the inability to get into the clan for an outsider, marriages only between relatives), but also by the stringent security measures aimed at protecting against the “all-seeing eye” of the state. The same R. Ghadban describes in his book an episode that fully conveys this desire to keep any information about the clan a secret. “In Hessian Frankfurt, I was invited to a demonstration of solidarity against the expulsion of members of the Mkhamalli clan. Of course, there were a lot of Mkhamalli in the hall. I made notes of clan relationships. It’s a usual practice if you want to imagine the position of the group. Suddenly, a young man sprang from his seat and accused me of the will to give away the internal affairs of the clan. His neighbors began to stroke him down, perhaps they explained to him that I had

received information from the head of the clan, anyway he calmed down¹¹.”

To some extent, reports of law enforcement agencies in Germany, investigations of journalists, and sometimes honest evidence of clan members themselves help shed light on the situation inside Lebanese families.

The traditional Lebanese clan consists of several thousand people who, despite the geographical dispersion (Germany, the countries of Western Europe, Lebanon), are closely connected by family ties¹². In turn, clans are divided into families in which the patriarchal-archaic way still exists. “There is a strict understanding of roles in clans that concerns both the relationship of the sexes and the hierarchy¹³.”

Fathers are at the head of the clan or family who, along with leadership, act as justices of the peace, as well as educate young people. The latter is given special attention, since the younger generation must follow accepted customs and traditions. From early childhood, a cult of strength, masculinity, the need to protect the honor of the family, which should be defended by all possible means, has been implanted in young people. At the same time, the “pain threshold” is quite low and one side glance or carelessly spoken word is enough to start a conflict. This circumstance often leads to very aggressive behavior of members of Lebanese clans towards both rivals and servants of the German Themis. The influence and power of their clan is usually emphasized by demonstration of luxury goods (expensive cars) or organization of impressive public events (weddings, birthdays), which can be attended by several hundred guests. Women are given the traditional, for Muslim families, role of the guardian of the hearth and bearer of the clan which effectively excludes their participation in all important issues within the clan¹⁴.

The high numbers, close blood-related ties and willingness to use force against the opponent ultimately helped the immigrants from Lebanon to take a worthy place under the

criminal sun of Berlin, squeezing out biker gangs and the Albanian mafia after brief but bloody wars¹⁵.

“Monopoly” with a Lebanese accent

In the early 1930s at the height of the Great Depression, Pennsylvania unemployed Charles Darrow patented the board game Monopoly, which conquered the United States and then the rest of the world with the speed of the telegraph. The board game gave anyone the opportunity to feel like a manager or banker for a while, to develop strategic thinking, logic and intuition.

The financial business empire Organized by Lebanese clans in large cities of Germany can be easily compared with Monopoly. There is everything: the development of entrepreneurship, the fight against competitors, millions of dollars, risk. However, there are two circumstances that distinguish the American Monopoly from the Lebanese one. Realistic and often criminal nature.

The business model of the Mkhamalli, Remmo and Miri clans is based on a close interweaving of legal business, “gray schemes” and outright criminal activity, including drug trafficking, extortion and reprisals of all unwelcomed.

The official top of this iceberg, called the “clan economy,” is a network of hookah bars, vegetable and fruit shops, and eateries, designed once again to demonstrate to the authorities the legality and transparency of the entrepreneurial activities of immigrants from a small Middle Eastern country. However, behind the showcase of this decency there is a completely different world, living according to its unwritten laws. The house-checks belonging to the influential Al-Zain clan demonstrated the luxury and wealth of Lebanese families, albeit inferior to the treasures of Arab sheikhs, but still contrasting with the modest status of poor migrants from the Middle East. “From the record of a search of a grand-uncle, an unemployed recipient of the Hartz IV allowance:” A Rolex watch was found in the sleeping room in the original box. 2795 euros were found in the pocket of the accused’s

jeans. “Another 3,800 euros were found under the fitted sheets.¹⁶” In addition, law enforcement officers confiscated Porsche 996 car from a clan representative. Such paintings can be observed with an incredibly regular basis in German media reports.

The sources of income of Lebanese families are as diverse as the methods by which they increase their welfare. The high profitability of shisha bars is not only due to the popularity of such institutions among young people, but also to the “marketing” strategy of their owners. In 2018, authorities discovered in Zolingen an underground factory producing tobacco for hookahs. With a cost price of 5-10 euros per kilogram, it was afterwards sold in bars at a price of 50–70 euros¹⁷.

However, the basis for the well-being of Lebanese clans is still criminal activity - drug trafficking, intimidation, fraud, etc. In the early 1980s immigrants from Beirut came onto the radar of the Berlin opposition because of distribution of drugs. And in the early 1990s after a short but cruel war with the Albanian Osmani clan, they captured most of the market. “In Mkhmalli's collective memory, the conflict with the Albanians in Berlin got the features of the myth of victory and the beginning of their rule.¹⁸”

Over time, other criminal “crafts” were added to the drug trade, which contributed to the enrichment of Arab and Kurdish families. Along with robberies and thefts, which have already become the landmark of the clans, they included extortion and call for large sums of money for “protection.” The most common scheme of intimidation by Lebanese clans is as follows. After buying a car or household appliances, the seller received a call from the buyer demanding compensation for the allegedly existing damage. In case of refusal, he received threats of physical violence, which forced hundreds of people to transfer money regularly, including abroad, to Lebanon. Having passed the “cleansing” through local banks, the money of the clans returns to Germany, where they are invested in real estate and legal business.

The influence of the clans extended even to such an area as show business. The story of the famous German rapper Bushido

(Anis Mohammed Youssef Ferchichi), who for almost 14 years collaborated with the Abu Shaker clan, which received half of the singer's income¹⁹ for his patronage, received great resonance in the media and among the public. However, in 2018, the “romance” between the famous musical performer and the criminal world ended, which resulted in mutual reproaches, which were soon followed by threats from Abu Shaker. Another Lebanese clan – Remmo saved “Bushido” from reprisal.

The real power of government structures

The strength and danger of Lebanese clans are best shown by figures of police statistics. From 2016 to 2018, in one federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, representatives of clans committed about 14,000 different delicts and crimes²⁰.

“We overslept”²¹ – the Minister of the Interior of the North Rhine - Westphalia H. Rail had to admit. Indeed, the State's long-standing policy towards Lebanese clans, which was based on an inaccurate evaluation of the situation, was not particularly successful. Searches, arrests and criminal cases – the usual tools used in the fight against criminal gangs, turned out to be ineffective in the conflict with Remmo, Miri and Al-Zain. “Investigators report: Children already make fun of the police, because they were taught not to show them any respect. Wives ridicule them because they know the evidence.²²” Even the prospect of imprisonment could not prevent the criminal activities of clans. “The mother whose sons ended up in prison said goodbye with the last words:” Prison makes a man.²³“

In this situation, both the law enforcement system of Germany and political parties require a new strategy for immigrants from Lebanon, which should go beyond the traditional police operations and include measures against the clan system itself, and not only individual (albeit very influential) members.

This primarily concerns the economic basement of Arab and Kurdish families. A special police report on the activities of clans in Germany noted that one of the main fears of members of the clan, along with fall, is the loss of money or economic resources²⁴. That is why the main blow must be launched on the business of Lebanese families, depriving them of the support that allows them to feel confident in a foreign country.

In addition, great attention should be paid to work with young people, on which the situation in the migrant quarters of Essen, Duisburg, Berlin will depend. There is no doubt that, this task is much more difficult than the fight against the illegal “business” of clans, since the younger generation is connected with their family with a strong “umbilical”, and the authority of state bodies (school, social departments) is extremely low.

However, only this trine of measures – police operations, the fight against economic crimes, and work with young people – will be able to snatch the roots that Lebanese clans put down in the 1980s in Germany.

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3. It should be noted that Lebanon gave refuge to Armenians, Palestinians, Druze, and in recent years – Syrians. This circumstance led to a rather mixed ethno-confessional composition of the country, and as a result – numerous conflicts.
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5. The route of Lebanese clans arriving in Europe is also very notable. The initial goal of the refugees from Lebanon was Tempelhof Airport in East Berlin, from where they moved to the western part of the city to get to Germany.
6. However, a number of researchers note that following the norms of religion within clans is quite selective and is determined by clan interests.

7. Both the clumsy legislation of Germany and reluctance of the German authorities to deal with the problem of migrants contributed to this.
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12. As it was noted above, marriages within the clan contributed to the strengthening of blood-related ties, and group cohesion.
13. Polizei Nordrhein Westfalen. Arabische Familienclans – Historie. Analyse. Ansätze zur Bekämpfung. 2020. P. 9.
14. Within clans, as in many Muslim families, the so-called honor killings (Ehrenmord – German) are quite common, which give members of the clan the right to take the life of a wife or sister for betrayal or deviations from the norms.
15. It is noteworthy that outside the clan, young Kurds and Arabs had almost no friends. During the conversation with representatives of Lebanese clans in the mid-1990s almost all teenagers were surprised to respond to the question of the presence of acquaintances among classmates, neighbors, etc. This explains the hostility of Lebanese clans towards the world around them and the cruelty to strangers. Ghadban R. Arabische Clans. Unterschätzte Gefahr. Ullstein Buchverlage GmbH, Berlin. 2018. P. 146.
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19. The cooperation of clans with representatives of show business was due not only to financial considerations, but also to the desire to increase their image and authority in a certain part of society.
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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

2021.04.004. ELENA DMITRIEVA. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN MODERN RUSSIA. *Condensed abstract*

Keywords: Islamic finance, Islamic banking, Islamic business, Islamic law, halal industry, 'Islamic banking window', secular legislation, economic development, entrepreneurship.

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The author of the article S.B. Ramazanova (1) defines the key concepts associated with the functioning of the Islamic financial system. Financial institutions are those companies that adhere to the Islamic financial model, which comprises a set of methods, mechanisms and tools that allows them to carry out their financial activities without violating the basic principles of

Sharia. Islamic financial system includes Islamic banks, financial companies, insurance companies (*takaful*), funds, “Sharia compliant” bonds (*sukuk*) and regulatory bodies. Islamic financial institutions strictly comply with Sharia law.

The author notes that the principles of market regulation and functions of money are what make the difference between Islamic and traditional finances. Traditional banking is based on the principles of market economy, which eventually results in speculative behaviour, derivative transactions, financial pyramids, speculations, usurious interest, unregulated and unrestrained profit maximization, etc. These unethical practices negatively affect social, political and economic well-being of society. Islamic economics imposes a ban on usury, monopolization of the market, speculations, as well as trade in goods and services, prohibited in Islam. All this, in turn, makes it possible to establish a just and stable economic system.

The theory of the formation of a perfect Islamic capital market was largely developed in the mid-1950s. It was not until the 1970s that Islamic financial institutions were founded; Dubai Islamic Bank in the UAE and Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia were established in 1974–1975. Islamic financial institutions have spread widely throughout the world over time and have been operating for over 50 years.

The researcher believes that in such a short period of time, Islamic financial institutions were unable not only to replace traditional finance, but also failed to become a serious competitor. However, in some states (for example, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Malaysia) Islamic financial institutions have occupied significant niche in the national financial system. In non-Muslim countries, Islamic financial institutions occupy rather small niche. Of all the advantages of Islamic banking, two are especially attractive: reduced risks that imply enhanced financial stability; and the social component of the Islamic model, based on the principles of charity, financial support of people and social justice.

The author of the article draws attention to the fact that a number of developing countries are beginning to take leading positions. Thus, the Next Eleven (the list of eleven countries with potentially world's largest economies, drawn up after the global crisis of 2007–2008) includes seven states with a predominance of the Muslim population: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. The interest of world investors in these countries indicates the growing role of Islamic financial institutions in the world economy. Also, major political and economic changes are taking place in other countries, contributing to the strengthening of Islamic institutions. Thus, Pakistan and Afghanistan have announced a gradual transition from secular to religious bases for building a society; and in Iran all banking, apart from Islamic one, has been officially banned for more than 40 years.

Political influence of the Islamic factor in the CIS member states – Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – is steadily increasing. These states have passed laws allowing and encouraging the development of all types of Islamic financial institutions, including Islamic banks. Since these countries are member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia is obliged to take into account the provisions of the legislation of other members of the Commonwealth in accordance with the Treaty; this would lead to a revision of the role of Islamic financial structures in Russia. Speaking of the development of Islamic financial institutions, Russia has an interest in the experience of Muslim countries with secular legislation, where religion is separated from the state and has no significant effect on business processes, e.g. Turkey.

In Turkey, more than 98 per cent of the population is Muslim, but the legal system prohibits the very existence and state support of any structures, founded on the Islamic operational principles. The “secularity” of the state used to be so steadfast that any steps for the development of Islamic financial structures were strongly opposed by the authorities, and in

particular by military structures. It was not until 1983 that the first shoots of Islamic finance were allowed to grow. However, the established Islamic financial structures had to operate in the regions, receiving no support in the capital. Islamic financial institutions in Turkey were called “non-bank financial institutions” until the late 20th century. Nowadays, the attitude towards Islamic financial institutions in Turkey is changing. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly declared his support for the Islamic financial model and emphasised the need to stimulate the consistent development of the Islamic financial sector. As a result, a large state-owned bank Ziraat Bank has opened its branch (“Islamic banking window”) in Ankara. The Islamic finance industry is currently receiving extended support.

Among non-Muslim countries, Great Britain is leading in terms of the amount capital of Islamic financial institutions. Islamic Bank of Britain, the first fully Islamic bank in Europe, was established in 2004. Known as Al Rayan Bank since December 2014, today it offers a full range of Sharia compliant financial service products. In this country, traditional banks are also allowed to open special branches (“Islamic banking windows”).

The author believes that it is Islamic financial markets that are in a relatively strong position and have the potential to withstand negative global financial trends. More and more Arab countries tend to develop investment projects in compliance with the principles of Islamic finance. Therefore, it is essential for Russia to take steps to create Islamic financial structures focused not only on internal needs of the Muslim community, but mainly aimed at attracting foreign investments from countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. With the encouragement from Russia, Middle Eastern countries may provide major investments as donors, since these states have a substantial amount of liquidity that they cannot invest domestically. Sharia compliant international investments – long-term, transparent and fair – can make a significant social impact in Russia.

Having analyzed the situation, the author considers using Sharia compliant debit cards by traditional banks in Russia as promising. It would benefit the banks, since customers themselves refuse interest on card accounts. The client also could request that interest accrued in accordance with Russian law be transferred to charitable purposes. Some Russian banks have already introduced Islamic financial product services and the principles of Islamic banking into practice. Thus, in 2017, Sberbank of Russia issued a halal debit card and implemented several partnership projects. Moreover, the first debit card for Russian Muslims was issued in Bashkiria back in 2010. Today, debit cards for Muslims were also issued by Moscow Industrial Bank, International Credit Bank and Sovcombank. Halal cards have nothing to do with usury, do not accrue interest for the use of funds by the bank, and there are no fines and penalties. Special cards are offered for Hajj pilgrims who are planning to travel to Mecca.

Issuing cards for Muslims is not the only possible Sharia compliant activity. According to the author, Russian banks can also begin to offer some Sharia compliant products by opening special branches, “Islamic banking windows”. S. Ramazanova proposes to initiate the development of Islamic financial institutions in those territories where Islamic financial organization already exist, e.g. in Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Dagestan and Chechnya. Changing regional legislation in these regions is not going to pose a problem, particularly in Chechnya. Islamic norms are especially strong there, for example, people refuse to manufacture, market and even consume alcohol.

In Russia, there is a large number of Muslims, which means there is a demand for Islamic financial services. The author considers the development of “Islamic banking windows” in Russia a step in the right direction, although it entails a number of problems. First, it is hard to adjust systems of accounting and control for fundamentally different products; and second, it is difficult to separate “halal” and “usurious” money, which is

important for Muslim clients. In addition, a complex system of separation within one structure is fraught with difficulties related both to accountability and work of regulatory authorities. To overcome challenges identified above, “Islamic banking window” of a traditional bank may be limited to opening accounts and settlement accounts, as it is practiced in the “Amal” financial house in Moscow, the “La Riba Finance” company in Makhachkala, etc. Specialists from Russian Association of Experts in Islamic Finance have developed another scheme for opening “Islamic banking windows”, which implies defining all Sharia elements in terms used in traditional finance. It is assumed that familiar terminology will help legislators, tax professionals and accountants understand Islamic principles and suggest ways to put them to practice. In order to introduce “Islamic banking windows” in Russia it is also necessary to adjust Russian legislation. Changes in legislation should apply only to new organizational and legal forms concerning “Islamic banking windows” and should not affect legislative framework for the functioning of traditional financial institutions.

In conclusion, the author notes that the successful functioning of Islamic financial institutions in Russia depends on the creation of a single financial regulatory and supervisory centre. Integration of Islamic and traditional financial systems is also needed. In addition, Islamic financial system requires accounting standards. At present, Islamic institutions lack specialists capable of analyzing and managing financial portfolios, as well as developing Sharia compliant innovative products.

In his article H.A. Youssef (2) analyzes the financial mechanisms of Islamic business, an important component of the Islamic financial system. At present, an Islamic business model is in development in Russia, and the one currently functioning barely differs from the traditional business model of Russian entrepreneurship. Only a few Sharia compliant elements and

principles, types and forms of entrepreneurship are implemented mainly in the regions with a large Muslim population.

In Russia, the halal product industry is the most active segment of Islamic business that has been growing steadily for 20 years. After Western sanctions were imposed against Russia, many entrepreneurs saw the potential of exports to Muslim countries.

The author believes that Tatarstan is holding a leading position in the halal industry in Russia, being the first to register a system of voluntary certification of halal products and services with Rosstandart in 2009. In 9 years, the Halal Standards Committee of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Tatarstan certified more than 200 enterprises. Also, a technical committee for standardization of halal services and goods has been operating in Tatarstan since 2017. At present, certificates are issued by the International Center for Halal Standardization and Certification of Russia Muftis Council.

As a rule, the Islamic finance market is inseparable from the halal market, since Islamic investments can only be made in projects that do not violate the injunctions of Islam. According to the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the sectoral breakdown of Islamic finance is as follows: Islamic banking – 76 per cent, securities market (*sukuk*) – 19.5 per cent, investment funds – 3.2 per cent, insurance (*takaful*) – 1.3 per cent. The assets of Islamic financial companies in Russia stand at one billion roubles. At the same time, the volume of transactions has amounted to about 20 billion roubles over the past decade.

The author notes that the first Islamic finance operations in Russia were carried out by Badr-Forte International Commercial Bank, Itil Takaful Company and Unit Investment Fund for Muslims 'BCS – Halal Fund' in the mid-1990s. However, it was not until 2010 that the possibility of using Islamic financing instruments in Russia was actively considered. In Tatarstan, a pilot project in the area of Islamic finance has been launched, comprising investment, leasing and insurance companies; a

financial house; Islamic Business and Finance Development Fund (IBFD Fund); Islamic financial bank, etc.

It should be noted that the Islamic banking sector is the most mature segment of the Islamic finance industry in Russia. For example, Ak Bars Bank has made transactions in accordance with the principles of Islamic finance.

The author believes that at the moment, there are no large federal programmes for funding Islamic business, despite its huge potential for ensuring economic growth and well-being of Russian citizens. At the federal level, Islamic business is being provided mainly with legal, estate, information and consulting support. The State Duma Committee on Financial Market and the Bank of Russia have endorsed the Concept of the Islamic Financial Model. Thus, an expert group of the State Duma introduced eight legislative amendments from 2015 to early 2016.

In 2017, under the auspices of the International Association of Islamic Finance (IAIF), branches of the International Association of Islamic Business (IAIB) were opened in the Muslim regions of Russia; the IAIB contributed to the translation of all Sharia standards into Russian. Students of a number of Russian universities gained the opportunity to take special courses on Islamic finance and study Islamic economics.

The author concludes that mechanisms and tools to support Islamic business in Russia are still in development. The researcher notes the lack of federal programmes for funding Islamic business and uneven character of its support, as well as underdevelopment of Islamic financial mechanisms through partnership banking. In Russia, the financial mechanisms of Islamic business are gradually taking shape on the basis of state-level financial methods, instruments and levers aimed at implementing social, economic and investment functions. The State should play a key role in the establishment of mechanisms for the development of Islamic business, since it is the State that sets policy.

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