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ALEXEY MILLER, OLGA MALINOVA,
DMITRY EFREMENKO, ALEXANDR VORONOVICI

**Political Use of the Past
in Russia and Abroad**

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Preface

For more than ten years by now researchers, associated with the Political Studies Department of the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION) of Russian Academy of Sciences have been studying various aspects of memory politics and political use of the past in Russia and some neighboring countries. During these years we have established special research center for studies of cultural memory and symbolic politics at European University at Saint-Petersburg (Alexey Miller), yearbook for research of symbolic politics (Olga Malinova), and implemented a big research project about methodological aspects of research of memory politics in Russia and Eastern Europe, funded by Russian Science Foundation (project no. 17-18-01589-).

Among many journals which published our research, special place belongs to “Russia in Global Affairs”. Our first texts, published in this journal, date back to 2008, and we continue our collaboration till today. We are grateful to the editors of the journal for their kind permission to republish these texts in a collective volume. These texts, being put together, constitute a sort of dotted line, which reflects the changes in our methodological approaches, changes in choice of research topics, changes in our understanding of dramatic changes which happened in memory politics during the last decade. This collection allows people, who take interest in Russian memory politics, but are not fluent in Russian, to get an insight into the topic with the help of authors, who belong to the leading and internationally recognized experts in the field of Russian memory studies.

Alexey Miller

A. Miller

The Undying Echo of the Past¹

(2008)

The break-up of the Soviet Union took place amidst ranting about the slide of the last empire into history. It would seem perfectly clear some twenty years ago that the empire, as an outdated and backward form of political organization, was giving way to the nation-state. Explanations suggested that empires collapsed because of an inability to change, adjust themselves to modern requirements and withstand pressures from national liberation movements, which ostensibly embodied progress and justice.

Today, the historical role of empires is undergoing a profound revision involving both positive and derogatory assessments, and – more importantly – appreciation of their place in the historical process.

Empires as Incubators of Modern States

Let us start by saying that there is no commonly accepted definition of ‘empire’. Researchers who try to describe this phenomenon stress the heterogeneity of empires, the inequitable relations between the center and the periphery, specific structuring of the ‘empires’ territory that resembles a wheel without a rim, which

¹ Source: Miller A. The Undying Echo of the Past // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2008. – Vol. 6, N. 3. – P. 149–165.

implies a connection of all the provinces with the center and weak – if any – connections among the provinces themselves.

Extensive attention is typically paid to the correlation between direct and indirect rule over the periphery, with scholars stressing that empires more frequently employ indirect rule with a reliance on local leaders. Also, they underline the role of empires as major actors in international – or more correctly, inter-imperial – relations, and their ability to mobilize resources for involvement in such games, as these features constitute the key objective for them and the criterion of their efficiency.

The commonly used approach of regarding the Roman Empire as the model and assessing all other empires through a comparison with it and thereby revealing their deficiencies is now fading into the past. Historians are discarding the view of empire as a pre-modern form of political organization that is giving place to the nation-state.

Putting the modern state in opposition to the traditional empire has some rationale of course. The state was not conceived as a universal structure but, rather, as something separate from society. At the same time, the state – or, more precisely, a regular police state – would most typically be based on direct rule and control, unlike the empires that would operate indirect forms of rule and control. It is a common belief that the current system of taxation, monopoly over military mobilization, stable bureaucracy, gradual replacement of the elites by virtue of birth with elites by virtue of education, and the modern understanding of the rule of law – all of these things were not typical of empires and constitute the features of the modern state¹.

Paradoxically, the modern state was born out of the heart of the empire and is – in many ways – a reaction to the problems emerging in the context of imperial contentions, above all military ones. Far from all pre-modern empires coped with the task of state-building, but some of them – Britain, France and Prussia-Germany – succeeded in it and did not stop being empires because of it. This trio and their competitors seeking to catch up with them – Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Spain – each tried in its own way to tap an acceptable

¹ Mann M. *The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results* // *States in History* / Ed. by Hall S.A. – Oxford : Blackwell, 1986. – P. 113.

combination of traditional imperial mechanisms with the forms and methods of rule of the modern state.

Historians have considerably readjusted their ideas about modernization as a process repeating the stages and forms of development of leading Western nations and have shown that the paths leading to modernity could be very different. Unsuccessful modernization could mean a collapse, like the one that absorbed Rzeczpospolita (Poland) as a result of the partitions in the 18th century. The Ottoman Empire was too late to restructure itself and was already doomed in the 19th century. It outlived Rzeczpospolita for so long only due to a lucrative geopolitical situation. Practically all empires in the 19th century differed from the classical type of empires. They saw the essence of their existence in “progress” rather than in self-maintenance or self-reproduction. And they all went through a crisis of adjustment to new methods of administration and forms of political organization. This was a genuine crisis – a story with a yet unknown finale.

At the beginning of the 21st century, we are evidencing a dynamic situation in historiography. The post-colonial discourse, in which the ‘empire’ was an abusive notion, is still wielding a strong impact, including in Eastern Europe, but its one-sidedness has become quite obvious. Let us not forget, though, that the one-sided approach was in many ways a reaction on the part of the post-colonial school to the apologetics of the empires and the hiding of the dark sides of their history.

In their efforts to legitimize themselves, empires experienced as much falsity and hypocrisy as the nation-state. They, too, claimed of being the carriers of freedom and progress. They, too, positioned themselves as the guarantors of peace. As it often happens, those claims were partly true and partly not. History provides abundant grounds for defending imperialist and nationalist ideas. And transition periods, when empires or nation-states would assert themselves, would usually hit the common man the hardest.

A statement by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler that unlike the empire, the nation-state has occupied too much place in the concepts of European history since the end of the 18th century would

sound quite justified fewer than ten years ago¹. Today, however, claims about the key role of empires in history and the view of them as a complex and ambiguous phenomenon having both a deplorable and beneficial legacy, look quite respectable.

Relations between the empire and the nation-state constitute one of the paradoxes as the project of building nation-states that seek cultural and language homogeneity was born out of the empire. France, a hallmark for the nation-state, used to be the core of an empire. More than that, it had its own record of suppressing local languages and cultures within its continental hexagon in favor of the dominating language and culture of Ile-de-France². This project was formulated by Napoleon I who considered the hexagon inherited from previous monarchs as a foundation for the future pan-European empire.

Similar projects to build nation-states in the heart of an empire can be also seen in the British Isles and in Spain, although they had specific aspects. Most continental empires, too, unveil a number of similar traits, although the formation of the core inside them around which a nation could be built was a somewhat knottier task.

In the Romanov Dynasty's Russian Empire, the project of building a nation comprising the Velikoruss (Great Russians, or ethnic Russians), the Maloruss (Ukrainians), the Beloruss (Belarusians) and the Finno-Ugric peoples of the Volga area took shape in the 1830s through the 1860s.

The Habsburg Empire had no Austrian-nation project for a number of reasons, but the 1867 agreement to set up a Dual Monarchy gave an impulse to the intense implementation of the plan to build a Hungarian national state in the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary.

The achievements scored by empires facilitated the formation of nations. In other words, it was not the nation-states that created empires – it was the empires that created nation-states. It is not accidental that the Spanish project witnessed a deep crisis in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries – the situation arose from the loss of Spain's imperial

¹ Stoler A.L., Cooper F. *Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda // Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World.* – Berkeley ; Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1997. – P. 22.

² Weber E. *Peasants into Frenchmen : The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914.* – Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 1992.

status. The same reasons lie behind the failure of the British and the French projects in the second half of the last century. The formation of the Russian nation also went through severe crises as the result of World War I, the 1917 revolution, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Thus, one can talk about two different paradigms for the formation of nation-states. The initial Western European project was implemented in the center of empires and was not aimed at their destruction. France and Britain set up models for building modern nation-states. Construction of nations in the core of empires largely suppressed the peripheral projects of nation-building, which re-emerged with redoubled strength in the 20th century – in Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and other regions (the Brittany and Provence projects in France never “fired” again).

In Eastern Europe, the projects relying on empires saw fewer achievements at the beginning of the 20th century since the regional countries had lost World War I. Instead, peripheral national construction projects that tore apart the empire structure were implemented there. Unlike projects conceived in the imperial center, these suggested a stronger accent on ethnic motives. In many ways, they not only rejected the empires but were the fruits of imperial policies. For instance, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia got independence before the Great War through a compromise achieved among the Christian empires concerning control over the outskirts of the shrinking Ottoman Empire. As for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, they surfaced (for shorter or longer periods of time) as a result of contentions between the empires during World War I and support for peripheral nationalism in the opposite camp. These contentions washed away former restrictions on playing the trump card of nationalism in fighting with each other that the empires, which had partitioned Poland, had adhered to. Thus the empires were not only the backgrounds for or obstacles to building nations and nation-states; they actually took part in it.

The evolution of empires and assimilation of new methods of rule and control over the population had many other aspects as well. The empires transformed and stopped resembling their traditional

models. The direction of their evolution changed dramatically after World War II.

During the previous two centuries, empires sought to replace the indirect forms of rule, which the U.S. political scientist Charles Tilly has classified as their generic feature, with direct rule and control methods being the characteristic of a modern state¹. In the 20th century, indirect control over the periphery moved to the foreground again. The “people’s democracies” of Eastern Europe were not parts of the Soviet Union – they were definitely parts of the “Kremlin’s empire.”

This form of government was far from new. Michael Doyle, the author of an important theoretic work on empires, believes that Athens played the role of an imperial center in the union of Greek poleis². While the latter were formally independent, Athens could control their external and, to a certain degree, internal policies quite efficiently. The cases where ancient Athens, Communist-era Moscow, or today’s Washington have had to resort to direct military interventions for keeping their control signaled the failure of regular policies of indirect control rather than the manifestation of their might. In this sense, the Soviet Union was really an anachronism and its disintegration as an empire employing the direct rule over its periphery was quite logical.

In recent years, historians have given increasingly more attention to the notion of ‘imperial power’³. It is broader and more flexible than the notion of ‘empire,’ and embraces various instances of inequitable relations between the center and periphery regions – either formally included in the empire or retaining formal independence. Incidentally, the word ‘imperium’ initially had the meaning of sovereign power over a territory. It is quite fruitful in this light to compare the problems of Russia’s post-imperial development with countries that have a tradition of an imperial metropolitan nation and the relevant interpretations of sovereignty.

¹ Tilly Ch. How Empires End // After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building : The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires / Ed. by Barkey K., Hagen M. von. – Boulder, CO, 1997. – P.3.

² Doyle M. Empires. – Ithaca ; N.Y., 1986.

³ Lieven D. Empire : The Russian Empire and Its Rivals. – Yale University Press, 2000.

The very fact that Russia was an empire in the past does not explain the complexities it has been going through in the course of modernization and democratization. Simultaneously, parting with the imperial past, which creates new opportunities for the solution to these tasks, does not provide a guarantee of success. Nor does Russia's imperial role fix its image of either a guilty party or a benefactor in relations with its neighbors.

The Soviet Union as an Empire

The Soviet Union ceased to exist more than a decade and a half ago, but serious attempts to revisit the experience of Soviet ethnicity have been few in number so far. Quite possibly, the distance we have covered since then is still too small, and too great a portion of the Soviet legacy still remains part of everyday life.

One of the major achievements of historiography in the analysis of the first decades of the 20th century was overcoming the hypnogenic image of the year 1917 as a pivot that ushered in a "different history". The fruitfulness of this approach was demonstrated by Peter Holquist in an article discussing the mechanisms of control over public moods by the Bolshevik regime¹. Holquist showed the irrelevance of comparing 1920 to 1913; as this comparison presupposes that the cardinal breakup of 1917 is the only landmark event lying between the two years. A rise of attention toward public moods and the swelling of the agencies set up to monitor them were not at all the specific products of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, they took place in all the participant countries of World War I immediately after its outbreak.

Holquist's approach can be applied to many other aspects of Russian history at the beginning of the 20th century, and it also enables one to see the degree to which modern tendencies of the latest imperial period were embodied in Soviet policy, albeit in different forms.

¹ Holquist P. "Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work" : Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context // The Journal of Modern History. – 1997. – Vol. 69, N 3. – P. 415–450.

Paradoxically enough, foreign – and especially émigré – historiographies tend to draw no basic differences between the Romanov empire and the Soviet Union in what concerns the interpretations of imperial problems and national issue. Historians have mostly come to a consensus suggesting that World War I gave a powerful push to the ethnic factor in Central and Eastern Europe and the Bolsheviks naturally had to deal with that legacy, as well as with the results of national liberation movement activity on the outskirts of the empire during the final phase of the war and in the first years of peace.

Nor should there be any doubt that many experts, whom the Soviets invited to design their ethnic policy, had matured as professionals before the revolution of 1917. The role of these experts on ethnography was recently highlighted by Francine Hirsch in the book called “Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union”¹. Although this book contains some really valuable information, it has a conceptual weakness that vividly illustrates the current tendency to overstate the role of the Romanov legacy in Soviet policy.

In discussing the “evolutional” understanding of a nation by the “imperial ethnographers” and their political patrons, the Soviet Union’s likeness with other modernizing empires, and the absence of elements of “positive discrimination” of formally subordinate nationalities in Soviet policy of the 1920s, Hirsch argues with Terry Martin, who describes the Soviet Union as a new type of empire and underlines a radical breakup of Soviet-era ethnic policy with that of the Romanov empire.

Martin’s position looks much more convincing since he shows more than anyone else the marked difference in the Bolsheviks’ ethnic policy with the Romanov policy. In his book “The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939”², Martin traces the evolution of the Soviet government’s policy from the

¹ Hirsh F. *Empire of Nations : Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Culture and Society after Socialism)*. – Ithaca ; London : Cornell University Press, 2005.

² Martin T. *The Affirmative Action Empire : Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*. – Ithaca ; London : Cornell University Press, 2001.

early 1920s through the early 1930s, relying on a variety of sources. This decade included the rise of the Soviet Union and the period of the so-called korenizatsiya (nativization) policy [a gradual removal of the Russian language from state and public life through its replacement with native languages and through a resettlement of ethnic Russians from the newly formed national republics – Ed.].

Martin offers a scrupulous analysis of “how it was done” combined with the theoretic discussion of “what it was like.” He singles out four major ideological prerequisites that underlay the Soviet ethnic policy. By the time the Bolsheviks seized power, they had reached a consensus on the dangers of nationalism as an ideology having a huge mobilizing power, one that could form a supra-class society in a struggle for national ideas. The experience of the Civil War further convinced them that nationalism was a major competitor to their own ideology addressed to social classes.

Hence there came a simple conclusion – formulated by Georgy Pyatakov – that nationalism must be declared an enemy and resolutely fought against. Yet Lenin and Stalin proposed a completely different tactic. They surmised that if the Soviet government provides for some ethnic forms of state and public life; i.e. partly meets the requirements of nationalism, it would be able to split the supra-class unity of national movements, neutralize the attractiveness of nationalistic slogans, and thereby create better conditions for manifestations of class contentions and acceptance of the Bolshevik ideology. Importantly, this policy format highlighted the basically new, non-imperialist nature of the political entity that arose out of the ruins of the Tsarist Empire. The Bolsheviks believed – quite foresightedly – that the very label of ‘empire’ might have highly deplorable consequences for Soviet power at the beginning of the 20th century.

Furthermore, Martin analyzes the Bolsheviks’ modernization concept. They believed that nations emerge in the course of capitalist development and are transitory historical phenomena. Also, they looked at national consciousness as an inescapable phase of human society’s development, which all people must overcome as they move along the path to internationalism. A future merger of nations is possible only through the total liberation of suppressed peoples.

The Austrian-Hungarian experience and the intensity of nationalistic movements after the collapse of the Russian empire convinced the Bolsheviks that national consolidation is inevitable under socialism, too. In his attempts to prove the unavoidable Ukrainization and Belarusization of cities with a predominantly Russian population in those two Soviet republics, Stalin pointed to Hungary, where the German-speaking population dominated the cities in the 19th century, but eventually gave way to the Hungarians. On the eastern outskirts of Russia, where nationalism was much weaker, “national construction” was declared to be a part of socialist modernization and was widely seen as a positive part of the program rather than a concession.

The third prerequisite of the Bolshevik approach was the conviction that the nationalism of non-Russian peoples was a reaction to their suppression by the tsarist regime and a result of the mistrust toward ethnic Russians. Lenin insisted on the importance of differentiating between nationalism of the oppressors and nationalism of the oppressed. This presumption led to a conclusion – quite natural for the anti-colonial discourse – that the “chauvinism of the Great Russians” was far more dangerous than the nationalism of the oppressed peoples. Stalin made an adjustment to this principle, saying that the nationalism of the Georgians and some other nations also suppressed and exploited smaller peoples. He always combined his attacks against the chauvinism of the Great Russians with a mention of the dangers, albeit smaller ones, that came from smaller local nationalisms.

The fourth factor of Soviet ethnic policy was that it is closely related to foreign policy. Following Nikolai Skrypnik, a Ukrainian Bolshevik, Martin speaks of the ‘Piedmont principle’ of the Soviet ethnic policy, which manifests itself in a patronizing attitude toward people who had become separated by the western state border of the Soviet Union at that time – Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Jews and Finns. Such a policy was meant to win over the hearts of their compatriots on the other side of the border and secure opportunities for Moscow to influence its western neighbors. Similarly, calls for rebellions among the suppressed peoples of the East were accompanied by references to the positive Soviet policy toward the nationalities of the Soviet East.

As the Soviet government set up territorial entities according to the ethnic principle, it denied the Austrian-Marxist principle of an individual cultural autonomy – and simultaneously put up obstacles against the assimilation of dispersed ethnic groups. Instead, a vertical ethnic-territorial system was built to the level of ethnic districts, rural municipalities and even collective farms. As a result, a huge pyramid of ethnic Soviets (councils) on thousands of ethnic territories emerged already in the mid-1920s.

Martin indicates that this policy did not envision a genuine federalization. Although the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the USSR were federations in form, real power was always concentrated in the center. Soviet federalism did not imply devolution, i.e. the delegating of political and economic power to federation constituents.

Another important factor of this policy was the closure of the eastern peripheral territories for agricultural colonization by ethnic Russians, which had been actively developed before 1917. In the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia as well, ethnic Russians were in many cases forced to leave under the slogans of “decolonization.”

On the whole, Martin proposes branding Soviet ethnic policy as the “internationalist nationalism” or “affirmative action;” i.e. positive discrimination that was applied to the formerly oppressed sections of the population. In essence, the Bolsheviks took the lead in solving ethnic issues that are typical of all stages of the development of national movements. They fostered the ethnic elites where they had never existed before or where they had been too weak. They disseminated and supported in masses of people the various forms of ethnic culture and identity where the problem was high on the agenda. They helped territorialize ethnicities and created ethnic territorial entities of various levels. Finally, they solved the tasks inside those entities that would be typical of the arising or already existing nation-states; they promoted new ethnic elites and imposed new official languages. Neutrality toward ethnic issues, the hallmark of Bolshevik policies before the revolution, was rejected, as emphasis was placed on “affirmative action” up to an overt hostility even to a voluntary assimilation.

The policy of affirmative action or positive discrimination of non-Russians would inevitably mean infringements on the rights of

ethnic Russians and their readiness to make sacrifices for the interests of other ethnic groups. This showed up during the delimitation of territories; that is, the drawing of borders between the Soviet republics (of which the eastern border of Belarus is glaring evidence). It is also reflected in the denial of the right of Russians to have autonomies in the parts of other Union republics where they lived in compact communities (ethnic Russians received it in a few republics only in 1926). Nor could they have proportional representation in the agencies of power of autonomous republics. Moreover, Russian culture was castigated as that of capitalists and landlords; the imperial culture of the oppressors.

The proposal to define the Soviet Union as an “affirmative action empire” is an attempt to find a new term for denoting a specific and hitherto unknown type of political organization. This highly centralized state that sought to interfere with all spheres of life and that made use of extreme forms of violence was formally structured as a federation of sovereign nations. It came into being as a successor to the Russian Empire and seized back the bulk of the peripheral provinces of the former empire, but then it embarked on strengthening non-Russian ethnic groups and creating them in places where they had barely ever existed.

According to Martin, the notion of the “affirmative action empire” is meant to stress the novelty of Soviet ethnic policy as compared to colonialism and imperialism of the past, on the one hand, and the difference that the Soviet Union had with the empires of the New Time, including the Romanov empire.

The pan-Russian nation project, which was the pillar of Russian nationalism in the Romanov empire, was simply cast away; many of its achievements were conscientiously dismantled, and the Ukrainian and Belarusian ethnic groups got the institutional status of separate nations with their own territories.

In Russia itself, the research of Soviet ethnic policy is just making its first steps, and it appears that only one of its pages – the tragic deportations – has been studied in detail. The role of the ethnic factor in the repressions requires special scrutiny. That the factor played an important role is not in any doubt, and in some cases the Stalinist terror took the form of genocide. For instance, more than 110,000 Poles

out of a total number of 130,000 who were arrested in Leningrad in 1937 (and they were arrested just because they were Poles) were shot within several months after their incarceration. Incidentally, Polish champions of “historical policy” who insist on listing the execution of Polish officers in Katyn, Mednoye and other places in 1940 as an act of genocide – which is an extremely questionable qualification of that crime – pay far less attention to the unquestionable genocide of the Poles in 1937.

The ethnic factor played a substantial role in the history of collectivization and the famines of 1932 and 1933, which is intensively discussed these days. Historians are having a serious debate on its significance in high-rank decision-making in Moscow in those years. Unfortunately, the works of some Russian authors trying to join in the discussion are typical “paid services” and fall short of standing up to professional criticism.

Meanwhile, a scrupulous analysis and profound public recognition of the repressiveness of the Russian Empire and, in an incomparably greater measure, of the Soviet Empire, including as concerns their ethnic policies, is extremely important for Russia and for relations with its neighbors.

The Policy of the Past

Today’s mindset and the historical memory of ethnic Russians has (or had until recently) a peculiarity that makes it drastically different from the mentality and historical memory of neighboring nations, both those living in independent states and inside Russia. Hungarian philosopher Istvan Bibo wrote that Eastern Europeans have a collective existential fear of the real or imaginary death of an entire ethnos through the loss of state sovereignty, assimilation, deportation, or genocide¹.

Initially, that fear was caused by the Turks, then by the Germans, and in some cases by the Poles, and later by Russia. The perception of

¹ Bibo I. *The Distress of East European Small States // Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination* / ed. by K. Nagy. – Boulder : Social Science Monographs, 1991.

Germany as an immediate threat vanished after World War II, while apprehensions about Turkey had dispelled much earlier. This existential fear, which had been born out of hundreds of years of unpredictable and often catastrophic development, concentrated around the Soviet Union for the past half a century and shifted over to Russia after 1991.

As for the Russians, the motive of ethnic victimization was not typical of them until fairly recently. They have always had the feeling that they were victims of repressions on the part of the state machinery, which they did not consider as something ethnically alien to them. The phenomenon described by Bibo is not psychologically close to the Russians and therefore they do not understand it. Collective existential fears can hardly be named among the properties of a healthy psyche. It is not worthwhile for us to breed the mentality of a besieged fortress or the atmosphere of fear for the very existence of the Russian nation – and this is what some of our publicists have been doing so actively in recent years.

There are forces in many neighboring states that quite purposefully seek to turn history into a weapon for political struggle (in Poland these forces invented the term ‘historical policy’ to denote the tendency). They try to glue the “guilty” labels to certain countries – Russia in the first place – in international relations and to position themselves as innocent “victims” in a bid to gain certain moral advantages. They call for Russia’s repentance and reparations for real and fictitious sins and they describe Russia as an incurably vicious imperial nation and paint it in the grim colors of an institutionalized and hostile alien. The proponents of “historical policy” still eye our country as a handy instrument to shape their national identity. They also find this instrument efficient in fighting their political opponents and marginalizing some other groups of the population, especially ethnic Russian minorities wherever they exist.

We will never make agreements with those who employ “historical policies” for self-serving ends, but contrary to what many of our publicists and politicians claim, this does not mean that the recognition of our own historical sins and their public denunciation “will play into the hands of Russia’s enemies.” The thing is that a multitude of people in those countries do not have any intention to turn history into an instrument of political strife. They remember the

traumas of the past but they are ready for reconciliation. Nothing is more offensive for them in contacts with the Russians than a lack of knowledge and understanding of the dark pages of the past on the part of Russians.

The inability to discern the fears of neighbors and to understand how serious their reasons are cannot be called a virtue, especially if a nation dramatically needs a critical reassessment of its own history and relations with other nations. This explains to a large degree the crisis of understanding and trust, characteristic of the relations between today's Russia and its neighbors. Each side will have to go along its part of the road toward untangling the knot. The Russians will have to look more profoundly at the repressiveness of empires, to which they are successors in both the positive and negative sense. Our neighbors will have to realize that the Russians, too, were victimized by empires that had been built with reliance on their strength, tolerance and talent and, second, that besides traumas and tragedies the empires had other sides as well.

In Russia itself, an acute struggle is going on around the interpretation of history, and the topics heard in public discussions include the existence of ostensibly perpetual Russian properties. For instance, the long imperial tradition is described as a property of the Russian government that recurs along with despotism. Russia's history is then featured as an absolutely unique and practically irremovable chain of reincarnations of this despotic power. The country revolves along a vicious circle and the possibility of breaking it either looks impossible or inseparable from radical fighting with the state and a revolution that erases the old system from the face of the Earth. This tradition can be traced to the Bolshevist outlook on history and its version is still alive in the milieu identifying themselves as liberals. The only difference is that the Bolshevist version of history portrayed the October 1917 revolution as a rupturing of the vicious circle, while the liberal one portrays it as its continuation and expansion. On the contrary, the proponents of the empire treat the same features as a prerequisite for reverting to the "correct path." "Russia can only exist as an empire, or it cannot exist at all," or: "the Russian nation is tormented by the senselessness of its existence in the absence of an imperial mission," they claim.

Other typical motives of this debate – the binary opposition between the bad state and the good intelligentsia (or vice versa), the bad nationalists and the good central government (or vice versa) and so on – are also closely linked to it.

Another frequent issue is the willingness to “straighten out” Russian history. Maria Todorova, who mentions the traditional and continuing tendency to “normalize” history and the desire to consider it as a unique one which rejects the application of Western-European categories, makes a keen observation that the polemic has a political content, apart from the scientific one¹.

The current tendency to “normalize” Russian history deserves attention in as much as it implies dismantling of the tendentious and degenerating “uniqueness” theory. At the same time, methodologically well-conceived research that accentuates the specificity of Russian history in one way or another makes up an absolutely legitimate part of historiography regardless of whether it is authored by Russian or foreign historians.

Todorova draws a comparison between the current debates on Russian history and the recent debates on a special German path (Sonderweg). The approach that treated the country’s history as a deviation from the European model of development remained quite topical until Germany embedded itself in pan-European organizations. Now the same special features are viewed as a version of European history. The accent is made on the common traits and Germany’s historical development is thus “normalized.” The same mechanism applies to Russia – the problem of its historical uniqueness will remain topical (or rather, politically topical) until it gets a place in European and international organizations.

This is a correct and exceptionally timely observation, as we are seeing a change in the political context and the influence of the factor on the scientific discourse of Russia’s history. There is a great risk of getting mired in counterproductive discussions about the frontiers of the European model of historical development. References to the history of

¹ Todorova M. Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul? A Contribution to the Debate between Nathaniel Knight and Adeeb Khalid // *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*. – 2000. – Vol. 1, N 4. – P. 717–727.

one region or another or one nation or another as “European” or “non-European” are unscrupulously used today inside the EU itself and along its periphery when it comes to discussing whether the region or nation deserves to be a member of a united Europe. A discussion that aims to broaden our perspective on the European model of history (or actually multiple and very different models) is quite useful, yet it brings forth a new conflict between history and politics. The rise of a historical myth about the unity of Europe, which serves the European Community today, seems quite apparent.

There are other and more dangerous traps on the way to “normalizing” Russian history.

Like it was in the case of Germany, normalization can be achieved by the biased highlighting of some aspects and scripts of history and blurring out others, which means that “normalization” becomes as much a victim in the name of politics as the “uniqueness” theory. The normalization of Germany history – in the normal German discourse at least – does not imply a rejection of the recognition of the exceptionality of Nazi crimes. It regards the Nazi period as a breakdown and not as a logical result of the centuries-long German history – in contrast to what German liberals would say in the 1950s and the 1960s. In Russia, there is a tendency today to interpret the terror of the 1920s–1950s as a norm; an unavoidable byproduct of a speedy modernization in a backward agrarian country, not as a deviation. This logic eliminates the necessity for any moral assessments of the horrible events of the past.

Professional history arose in the early 19th century as part of nation-building ventures and it remains the same in many aspects today. That is why the Russian authorities, which are apparently concerned with the problems of national consolidation, give so much attention to history textbooks and, generally, to society’s historical memory. Yet a question arises: How is it actually done? There is an obvious tendency toward construing “a glorious past” – an inalienable part of any national historical narrative, no doubt. Yet the problem is whom are we trying to bring up – a soldier or a citizen? As a civil community, a nation is formed not only by the memory of glorious deeds, but also by the recognition of the mistakes and crimes of the past.

Building an awareness of Russia's tragedies of the 20th century may be fruitful and help recognize the value of individual rights and freedoms, as well as the value of the national community and of an individual's life. It remains unclear in this context whether the visit that Vladimir Putin made last year to the Buta testing range on the outskirts of Moscow, where thousands of innocent people were executed in the 1930s, marked the start of a tradition where the president would participate in the commemoration of the victims of Bolshevik terror or whether it was a single episode in the election campaign. State policy in the field of society's historical consciousness is still unclear.

Generally speaking, history does not provide clear answers to the problems of modern life; nor does it predestine the future development. Yet it sets before us many important questions worth thinking about. How can one learn to respect the state without falling into servility or piousness? Or how can one master social and civic activity and overcome carnivorous individualism bred by Soviet Communism and the post-Communist era of wild capitalism? Or how does one combine tolerance and activity in a country where the tolerant are often inactive and the active are intolerant? There are no simple answers to these questions, but even considering them through the prism of history could be very useful.

A. Miller

A Nation-State or a State-Nation?¹

(2008)

U.S. political scientist Alfred Stepan published an article² soon after Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution in which he analyzed the opportunities for a policy of national construction in Ukraine. Although Stepan had never studied Ukraine before the article, he is an acclaimed expert in authoritarian regimes and models of their democratization.

Stepan's analysis of the political situation in Ukraine rests on the opposition between two models. One of them is the very familiar 'nation-state.' An alternative model – the 'state-nation' – has been developed by Stepan in cooperation with his long-time co-author Juan Linz and Indian political scientist Yogendra Yadav, using materials on Belgium, India and Spain³.

The policy goal of the nation-state is to impose a powerful united identity of society as a community of members in a nation and citizens in a state. To this end, the government conducts a homogenizing assimilation policy in education, culture and language. In electoral policies, autonomy-minded parties are not considered to be coalition partners, while separatist parties are outlawed or marginalized.

¹ Miller A. A Nation-State or a State-Nation? // *Russia in Global Affairs*. – 2008 – Vol. 6, N 4. – P. 127–138.

² Stepan A. Ukraine: Improbable Democratic 'Nation-State' But Possible Democratic 'State-Nation'? // *Post Soviet Affairs*. – 2005. – Vol. 21, N 4. – P. 279–308.

³ Stepan A., Linz J.J., Yadav Y. *Crafting State-Nations*. – Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press, 2011.

Portugal, France, Sweden and Japan provide bold examples of this model. This policy proceeds smoothly if the state mobilizes only one group as a carrier of cultural identity that has political representation. This group sees itself as the only nation in the state.

If a country has two or more mobilized groups of this kind – as was the case in Spain after General Franco’s death, in Canada during the creation of its federation in 1867, in Belgium in the middle of the 20th century, or in India when it gained independence – democratic leaders have to choose between the exclusion of nationalistic groups and their integration in society. All these four countries eventually chose a model that can be accurately described as a ‘state-nation’ rather than the ‘nation-state.’ They chose to recognize more than one cultural – and even ethnic – identity and give it institutional support. Multiple and complementary identities would rise up in each country. For this, they would set up asymmetric federations, introduce the practice of ‘consociative’ democracy, and have more than one official language. Autonomy-minded parties were allowed to form governments in some of the provinces and sometimes join coalitions to form central governments. This model pursues the goal of breeding institutional and political loyalty to the state among different “nations” living in the state, although polity does not match the differing cultural demoses.

Countries that have recently gained independence can choose a persistent and energetic but simultaneously peaceful and democratic strategy of building a nation-state if the policies and cultural demoses match, the political elite is united in accepting these policies, and the international situation is not hostile to the implementation of this strategy. However, Ukraine’s situation did not meet a single of these criteria when it became independent.

Stepan underlines a basic geopolitical difference between Ukraine and the countries that he and his colleagues analyzed in the format of the state-nation model; i.e., India, Belgium, Canada and Spain. None of them had a neighbor posing a real irredentist threat, while Ukraine faces a potential threat from Russia. This assessment should be specified: Stepan spoke of a potential irredentist threat in 2005 and admitted that neither Russia nor Ukrainian citizens of Russian origin would take it seriously at the time.

Stepan drew up a number of oppositions as he compared the nation-state model to the state-nation one:

– Commitment to a single “cultural civilizational tradition” versus commitment to more than one such tradition; the latter case should not block the opportunities for self-identification with a common state;

– An assimilatory cultural policy versus the recognition and support of more than one cultural identity;

– A unitary state or monoethnic federation versus a federative and often asymmetric system reflecting cultural heterogeneity.

Stepan said in his other works that a presidential republic is more characteristic of nation-states, while a parliamentary republic is more typical of state-nations.¹

The general theoretic maxima Stepan formulated suggests that the aggressive policies of a nation-state, are dangerous for social stability and the prospects of democratic development if the nation concerned has more than one mobilized ethnic group. He admits that the state-nation principle, if applied in Ukraine, would involve making Russian a second official language. Countries like Belgium, India and Switzerland have more than one official language. Stepan said that Ukraine would have more chances to create a democratic political society if it did not pursue the aggressive strategy of imposing the nation-state model.

He made a stipulation, however, when he said that a soft course toward building a nation-state can ease the emergence of multiple and complementary identities that are vital for state-nations and for democracy in multi-ethnic societies. According to Stepan, Ukraine could be an example of such a situation.

Stepan offered a number of arguments to back up this postulation. He said that the preferred language of communication is not necessarily a mark of ethnic identity in Ukraine, since people who identify themselves as Ukrainians outnumber those who only speak Ukrainian by a factor of two. According to research, 98 percent of

¹ Stepan A. Comparative Theory and Political Practice: Do We Need a “State-Nation” Model as Well as a “Nation-State” Model? // Government and Opposition. – 2008. – Vol. 43, N 1. – . 1– 25.

people identifying themselves as Ukrainians – regardless of the language they speak – would like their children to speak fluent Ukrainian. The percentage of people calling themselves Russians and who would like their children to be fluent Ukrainian speakers is also very high – 91 percent in Kyiv and 96 percent in Lviv¹.

Since the vast majority of Russophone citizens want their children to have a good command of Ukrainian, the state can conduct a policy of imposing the language on non-speakers – in the nation-state spirit – without causing tensions between Russian and Ukrainian speakers. Stepan also indicated that only five percent of respondents in Donetsk (in Eastern Ukraine) and one percent respondents in Lviv (in Western Ukraine) said in 2005 that it would make sense to split Ukraine into two or more countries. At the same time, Russia, a potential irredentist attraction, was waging a bloody war in the Caucasus and this considerably reduced its attractiveness.

Ukrainian policies: Changing the model

A total of three years have passed since the publication of Stepan's article. Let us take a look at how the situation in Ukraine has been developing since then and to what degree his forecasts have materialized.

The period from 2005–2007 was quite turbulent in the political sense. It saw a scheduled parliamentary election in 2006 and an early election in 2007. Both elections showed that the electoral base of all the political parties without exception remains strictly bound to one or another macro-region.

The government of Yulia Tymoshenko, which was formed in the follow-up to the 2004 presidential election, was dismissed some six months later. It did not include politicians whom the East and South of the country could perceive as their representatives, and the Yuri Yekhanurov cabinet that came to replace it did not include them either. In turn, the government formed by Victor Yanukovich after the 2006

¹ Litvinenko A., Yakimenko Yu. Russkoyazychnye grazhdane Ukrainy = Russian-Speaking Citizens of Ukraine // Zerkalo nedeli. – 2008. – N. 18 (697).

parliamentary election did not have any representatives from Western Ukraine. The talk about a possible coalition between the Regions Party and a part of the pro-presidential Our Ukraine was short-lived.

Like the Tymoshenko cabinet, the Yanukovich government gradually found itself drawn into a bitter conflict with Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko, which paved the way for the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament and early elections in 2007. This conflict was accompanied by a de facto crushing of the Constitution Court that lost the ability to claim an independent role for itself. All the parties to the conflict made a ploy of their “petted” courts of various jurisdictions, thus further undermining the reputation of the judiciary.

Ukraine started 2008 with a new cabinet with Tymoshenko at the helm. The new government soon jumped into a conflict with the weakening president. All leading political forces were unanimous in their sentiment that the Constitution needed to be revised, but all of them had their own vision of both the mechanism of revision and the new model of constitutional power.

Before the Verkhovna Rada, or the Ukrainian parliament, was dissolved in the summer and fall of 2007, the authorities mostly conducted a moderate policy along the nation-state model, the chances of which Stepan had assessed as fairly high. Cautious steps were taken in the East and South to make decisions in the state-nation vein, as a number of regions and municipalities made Russian an official language. However, on the presidential administration’s initiative, these decisions were challenged in court and not endorsed by state agencies.

Ukrainization efforts in the areas of culture and language intensified sharply during the 2007 political crisis. The government plans to change the entire higher education system over to Ukrainian in three years, and the authorities have enacted a law mandating that all distribution copies of foreign movies must be dubbed into Ukrainian. Along the same lines is a Yushchenko statement on the dangers emanated by the Russian-speaking mass media – this foreshadows further cuts in Russian-language programs on Ukrainian television.

The topic of the Holodomor – the famine of 1932 and 1933 – as a genocide spearheaded at the Ukrainian people has been fanned sharply. At the very least, this makes Russians living in Ukraine uncomfortable,

since talk about genocidal motives goes hand in hand with assertions that migrants from Russia took the place of indigenous Ukrainians who were exterminated. Add to this the people's bitter reaction – everywhere except for Halychyna (Western Ukraine) – to efforts to idolize the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), along with its notorious commander Roman Shukhevich, and Stepan Bandera, the chieftain of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).

An unexpected surge in efforts in late 2007 to bring Ukraine into NATO played a highly provocative role in both domestic policy and in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Moscow responded to this in the spring of 2008 with statements that stirred up irredentist elements in its policy toward Ukraine in general and the Crimea in particular. The claims have so far come from nonofficial “spokespeople” for the Russian political establishment – Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and State Duma Deputy Konstantin Zatulin. However, statements of concern over the position of ethnic Russians in Ukraine have come from the Russian Foreign Ministry, too.

The threat of irredentism, which Stepan described as hypothetical in 2005, is now taking increasingly clearer contours. Moscow's activity has so far been reticent in this area, but now it seems to be willing to generate controllable tensions in the Crimea so as to amplify doubts among the leaders of many NATO countries about the feasibility of granting NATO membership to Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the Russian-Georgian conflict and the reaction it produced in some sections of the Ukrainian leadership may lead to an escalation of all the above-mentioned conflicts and Moscow may find itself bogged down even deeper in Ukraine's domestic policy problems.

The prospects for a Russian party

One of the most crucial issues of modern Ukrainian policy is the nature of identity, or rather the identities of people living in the eastern and southern regions. The crux of the matter is that any discussion of the Eastern Ukrainian identity includes both people who consider themselves to be Ukrainians by birth, but who use the Russian language to communicate, and those who associate themselves with the Russian

nation (the 2001 census showed that 17 percent of the country's population, or 8.3 million people, belong to this category).

Nobody knows what might happen if Ukrainian policy continues to develop along the nation-state course. It is quite possible that a sizable part of Russophone Ukrainians will accept it with a larger or smaller degree of enthusiasm.

But has state policy in the area of language not stepped over the boundary beyond, which Ukrainization begins to play a mobilizing role for the more than eight million people who consider themselves to be Russians? The important thing for them is not the change to Ukrainian identity, but the loss of living comfortably in case they maintain their Russian identity.

Opinion polls taken at the beginning of 2005 showed that only 17 percent of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine believed that the Orange Revolution would bring anything good for them, as against 58 percent of ethnic Ukrainians¹. Without the risk of making too big of a mistake, one can state that ethnic Russians proceeded from the assumption that relations with Russia would deteriorate further and Ukrainization would intensify.

It is difficult to forecast how the mood among Ukrainian citizens who are ethnic Russians will change now that many of their past apprehensions have been proven true and Russia has begun to play the irredentist card.

Grave problems in the Ukrainian economy will most likely continue to spread in the mid-term, as the country will have to live through a sharp rise in energy prices, the financial loan crises, a steep rise in inflation, endless postponing of structural reforms and their further deferment amid conditions of political instability and preparations for yet another election. The economic situation in Ukraine in 2008 resembles the spring and summer in Russia in 1998.

The permanently growing gap between Ukraine and Russia in terms of people's incomes will soon have a dangerous impact on the political situation in Ukraine. Add to this the removal of the factor that repelled the Ukrainians with Russian identity – the war in Chechnya – and the reduction of military service in Russia to twelve months.

¹ Litvinenko A., Yakimenko Yu. Op. cit.

In spring 2007, on the eve of another deterioration of the political crisis which occurred in the wake of the dissolution of parliament and the ensuing upswing in nationalistic policies, the Razumkov Opinion Research Center in Kyiv did some important research that unveils the moods that existed at the time among Russian-speaking Ukrainians and other specific population groups¹.

The researchers singled out four groups:

- ‘The Russians’ – i.e., Ukrainian citizens who are ethnic Russians and who speak Russian as their native language, associate themselves with the Russian cultural tradition and use Russian in everyday communication;

- ‘The Ukrainians’ – i.e., Ukrainian citizens who are ethnic Ukrainians and who speak Ukrainian as their native language, associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition and use their native language in everyday communication;

- ‘Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ – i.e., people ascribing themselves to the Ukrainian ethnos; and bilingual Ukrainians – i.e. ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian as their native language;

- ‘Bilingual Ukrainians of the Ukrainian cultural tradition’ – i.e., people who say that they are ethnic Ukrainians, speak Ukrainian as their native language and belong to the Ukrainian cultural tradition.

The authors of the research say quite correctly that this approach reveals clearly that the so-called ‘Russian-speaking citizens’ are not an “imagined community” – in the sense implied by Benedict Anderson² – they are a real group sharing a common identity. As an ‘imagined community’, they exist only in the minds of researchers.

The last three categories of respondents – i.e., ethnic Ukrainians who use Russian in everyday communication – gave practically identical answers to the question on whether they regard themselves to be Ukrainian patriots. Among those polled, 37 to 42 percent gave an assured “yes” answer, 41 to 45 percent said “probably yes,” 6 to 11 percent offered a “probably no” answer, 3 percent or less gave a definitive “no,” and 6 to 7 percent were undecided. In all, 80 percent of

¹ Litvinenko A., Yakimenko Yu. Op. cit.

² Anderson B.R. *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Revised and extended ed.). – London : Verso. 1991.

the respondents in this group offered positive answers, which almost equals the number of positive answers among ‘the Ukrainians’.

The responses of ‘the Russians’ produced a different picture, as only 20.4 percent of them gave an assured “yes” and 29 percent answered “probably yes.” This means that less than half of the respondents viewed themselves as patriots. A total of 14 percent of the Russians said overtly they did not consider themselves to be patriots of Ukraine, 27 percent said “probably no,” and 9 percent declined to give any answer.

The difference is still greater in terms of expectations for the development of the language and cultural situation. A mere four percent of ‘Russians’ think that Ukrainian should be the only official language in the country. Another 13 percent would be satisfied if Russian were made an official language in some regions, and 70 percent said it must be the second official language. Furthermore, 10 percent of the respondents believe that Russian should be the only official language in Ukraine. ‘The Ukrainians’ produced a practically mirror-like picture. ‘The Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ were very close to ‘the Russians’ in that aspect, as 49 percent of the respondents in those groups said they were in favor of two official languages. A difference could be seen in the group of Russian-speakers who have a command of Ukrainian, as only 20 percent of them showed a readiness to give Russian the status of the second official language.

When asked the question “Which cultural tradition should prevail in Ukraine?” a mere six percent of ‘Russians’ were prepared to reconcile themselves to the absolute dominance of Ukrainian culture. Another 50 percent agreed that different cultural traditions would prevail in different regions, and 24 percent said the Russian tradition would prevail. In the groups who speak Ukrainian, a majority of respondents invariably agree to the dominance of Ukrainian culture, although they make up the absolute majority (59 percent) only among ‘Ukrainians.’

Remarkably, in answering a question about the most preferable definition of the Ukrainian nation, most people in all groups preferred “a civil nation embracing all Ukrainian citizens” (‘the Russians’ and ‘Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ showed 43 percent and 42 percent respectively, and other groups, 35 percent each). However, the

aggregate number of all other answers accentuating – in some way or another – the ethnic character of the nation was bigger in the ‘Ukrainian’ groups than the percentage of answers accentuating the civil principle.

On the whole, this data confirms that ‘Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ would like to see the Russian language and culture have an equal status with Ukrainian, but they are ready to tolerate nation-state policies, while the ‘Russians’ resolutely reject such policies. It would be quite logical to suppose that a feeling of discomfort and the potential for irredentist mobilization has grown in the latter group over the past twelve months.

Let us also pinpoint an evident disillusionment with the policies of the Regions Party among those voters who attach significance to the status of the Russian language and culture. The party has not been persistent enough in implementing its own promises in this area and it is now losing electoral support. Thus, a niche emerges for a new political force that may position itself as a Russian party. As ‘the Russians’ make up 17 percent of Ukraine’s population, a party like that can hope that they could form a faction in the Verkhovna Rada even if the parliamentary qualification barrier is higher than the current three percent.

The potential for instability

The intensification of nation-state policy in Ukraine and Russia’s moves to exploit the irredentist theme have heightened the risks in relations between the two countries over the three years that have passed since the publication of Stepan’s article. Chronologically, the whipping-up of nation-state policies by Kyiv preceded the intensification of the irredentist factor in Russia’s policy, greased the conditions for it and partially served as its trigger (which, however, does not pardon Russia).

President Victor Yushchenko emanates the strongest destabilizing impulses, as all the steps described above were initiated either by him personally or by the small parties he still relies on.

Yushchenko is the main promulgator of the ‘memory revitalization policy.’ He goes as far as to press the Rada to adopt a version of the law on the Holodomor that would include criminal responsibility for denying that the Holodomor was genocide. He tries to launch the discussion of the topic at international organizations – the UN, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Yushchenko personally initiated an application to NATO for getting the Membership Action Plan (MAP), and he ardently tried to push it through at home and abroad on the eve of the NATO summit in Bucharest. In the wake of the August war in Georgia, the topic of the external (Russian) threat may move center stage in Ukrainian policy.

Yushchenko does not have a majority in parliament and he rules with the aid of decrees, many of which run counter to the Constitution. As a person who has squandered his popularity and who is struggling to stay in power, he was behind all of the destabilizing moves in the institutional sector. The list includes – over the past twelve months alone – the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament, an attempt to steamroll his own version of the new Constitution (one that vastly broadens the presidential powers) by way of a referendum and bypassing parliament, a discrediting of the Constitution Court that still does not have a full panel of judges, and permanent incursions into areas of governmental prerogatives.

It may look that the two largest political forces – the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYT) and the Regions Party (RP) – show an understanding of the mechanisms that Stepan and his co-authors highlighted in the state-nation model. Both advocate the parliamentary (or parliamentary/presidential) republic. However, whereas the RP speaks against the buildup of a rapport with NATO, the BYT does not show any special activity in the field and does not emphasize the problems of the Holodomor or the Insurgent Army. The RP objects to the Insurgent Army’s rehabilitation and to the politicizing of the 1930s famine. Neither force has engaged in nation-state rhetoric so far. The RP supports the idea of a sizable expansion of the powers of regions, and it has even called for federalization during past crises, which the Orange forces regard as a manifestation of separatism. Still, there is

every reason to believe that the idea of a federation has situational rather than fundamental importance for the Regions Party.

All of this testifies to a realistic possibility for reformatting the entire Ukrainian political scene that would help put a brake on the dangerous tendencies of 2007, yet the tough political standoff and the deep political mistrust existing between various political forces increase the chances for the further deepening of the political crisis, and the international situation is conducive to this.

Another important destabilizing factor is the specific career of Yushchenko's main opponent, Yulia Tymoshenko. It is impossible for anyone to guarantee that she will observe democratic methods of policymaking if she gets full power. Such apprehensions were validated once again in March 2008 when the BYT succeeded in removing Kyiv Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky from office with glaring encroachments on democratic procedures. The BYT has a general tactic of undermining the positions of mayors of the largest cities if they are not its allies.

Meanwhile, Stepan says that when chances are weak for federalization due to the irredentist factor, Ukraine could use the experience of Scandinavian countries where the absence of federation is made up for by very broad rights for municipalities. However, the new mayoral election in Kyiv that reinstated Chernovetsky in office dealt a painful blow to the BYT.

The RP's democratic conduct is also a cause for doubt. Strictly speaking, Ukraine does not have any major political force that could guarantee its commitment to democracy today.

All political forces struggling around mechanisms for adopting a new Constitution and establishing its principles are mostly driven by political considerations at the moment. Remarkably, debates on the preferable form of state structure ignore the question of a possible type of federation, and neither BYT nor RP talk about state-nation motives when discussing the advantages of a parliamentary republic.

Thus we can see that many of Stepan's forecasts and warnings have come true over the three years that have elapsed since the publication of his article. However, two important notes should be added to his analysis.

First, Stepan did not take enough account of the heterogeneity of the population in Ukraine's eastern and southern regions as regards their self-identity (although compared to other researchers, he paid more attention to the differences in positions of the 'Russian-speaking Ukrainians' and 'Russians').

Second, it has proven difficult to remain moderate in the Ukrainization policy. Stepan recommended a moderate policy in the nation-state spirit as he described a possible successful strategy for Ukraine. He believed that the construction of a nation-state is impossible, while the choice of a state-nation model is compounded by foreign policy factors. This political construct worked fairly well in conditions of a relatively centralized system during the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, but it turned out to be rather fragile. Amid an escalating struggle for power, Yushchenko's weakening presidential power sacrificed this moderate course.

If the political mobilization of Ukraine's ethnic Russians evolves into the emergence of a Russian party, Kyiv will face a difficult problem: meeting demands to increase the status of the Russian language and other measures in the state-nation vein will highly impede the process of the soft Ukrainization of Russian-speaking Ukrainians that has been going on quite successfully until now. On the other hand, continued Ukrainization in the nation-state mode will increase the feeling of discomfort among more than eight million Russians, thus facilitating the growth of irredentism. The situation brings two problems to the foreground.

First, how and when will the crisis of power be eliminated and which configuration of political forces will arise in its wake? There is no doubt that the nation-state policy will be maintained, but it is not clear whether the new ruling coalition will continue to intensify it or if they will try to revert to the previous moderate course. For the time being, there seems to be little chance that Ukraine will see an early end to the political crisis.

Second, will it be possible to revert to the previous policies by the time the crisis ends? Or has the political breakdown of 2007 and 2008 launched processes that will write off Stepan's strategy as a missed opportunity? No one can answer these questions with assuredness today.

A. Miller

Russia: Politics and History.

*The Ruinous Consequences of History Politics for the Country
and Its Relations with Neighbors¹*

(2010)

Scientists use a variety of terms to describe the link between professional historiography and collective memory with politics. Each country would use its specific set of terms; in Russia, we mostly use the phrases ‘politicization of history’ and ‘politics of memory.’ The term ‘history politics’ is a recent addition that is becoming increasingly popular nowadays. This article attempts to pin down the difference in these notions and addresses the situation in Russia.

Defining the notions

Politicization of history is inevitable and persistent. It starts at the individual level: any historian doing research finds himself conditioned – to a greater or lesser extent – by the contemporary situation, his own political views, and national, religious and social identification. In a certain sense, this association is the source of constant development and rewriting of history, because new times and situations, along with

¹ Source: Miller A. Russia: Politics and History. The Ruinous Consequences of History Politics for the Country and Its Relations with Neighbors // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2010. – Vol. 8, N 2. – P. 110–124.

personal experience, encourage historians to seek new insights. Politicization of history also involves groups of historians who are similarly influenced by political factors. Consider, for example, the context of national historiographies, which has been decisive for historians from the time of Leopold von Ranke and which has not lost significance today. We often say that certain groups of historians have political preferences that determine their methodological approaches, hence such terms as ‘liberal historians,’ ‘conservative historians,’ ‘Marxist historians,’ etc.

The acknowledgement of the fact that incumbent circumstances and political preferences affect historians is the starting point for working out mechanisms to reduce this influence – through reflection and self-control, lucid presentation of alternative points of view and regard for professional criticism.

History cannot claim the status of an objective science or the ability to ascertain the truth. But it is a norm in history to seek objectivity, which implies discussing different opinions. The historical professional norm suggests the use of verifiable argument that is open for check of its source and criticism of the author’s premises and values.

Politicization of history is more than just an impact of the political environment on professional historians. It is also seen in the public’s habit to look for historians’ opinions on current issues in history readings. Some history authors seem eager to indulge the readers on this account, even though this does not bode well for their reputation.

Politicization of history is also manifest in the use of “historical” arguments by politicians in their attempts to sound convincing – the practice that is also persistent and is unlikely to be ever eradicated. At the same time, the use of historical arguments in democratic societies has long made politicians an easy target for criticism, both from their political opponents and professional historians.

Politics of memory deals with public practices and norms related to the regulation of collective memory. It involves commemoration measures (building monuments and museums, celebrating – nationwide or locally – anniversaries of significant events of the past, etc.), highlighting certain episodes in history while ignoring or marginalizing

others, and paying pensions to the veterans of certain events while denying such payments to veterans of other events.

The government directly influences the politics of memory and historical research by regulating access to archives, setting standards of historical education (for example, the minimal set of topics and facts a student is supposed to know), and practicing priority funding of scientific research and publications on history problems. Politics of memory is as inevitable as politicization of history: there is no society, not even among the tribal ones, that would not regulate this sphere of public life. In democratic societies, pluralism in the politics of memory is sustained owing to the activity of parliamentary opposition and independent public and professional associations, which defend ideas that differ from those of the ruling party.

The politics of memory is inseparably linked with the ‘politics of forgetting,’ which tends to overlook certain events of recent history that society regards as particularly painful and contentious. Such “supplanting” forgetfulness was demonstrated by Germany’s attitude towards the Nazi past during the first 15 to 20 years after World War II and France’s attitude to collaborationism under the Vichy government. It was clearly seen in the public opinion of the civil war in Spain after the fall of the Franco regime. Over time, such forgetfulness tends to be replaced by an increased interest of historians and society in forgotten topics.

Forgetfulness can be “denying” when the key public forces avoid admitting or discussing certain shameful or criminal events of the past. Japan presents a graphic example as it avoids talking about the crimes committed by the Japanese during World War II; similarly, modern Russia mostly keeps silent on the conduct of Soviet soldiers in occupied Germany.

There is also “understanding” forgetfulness, which shifts public attention away from an event or process after a discussion of responsibility. Modern Germany is aware of its Nazi past, and neither denies it nor suppresses its memory; and since it admits responsibility, it may address the formerly taboo topic of the hardships German civilians suffered during and after World War II.

The politics of memory can be open for influence and dialogue between various public quarters and historians, and it can be productive

in healing the wounds of the past and overcoming the internal or ethnic conflicts. Yet it can also generate new conflicts and create distorted images of the past.

Politicization of history and collective memory have long become the subject of research. Today we are witnessing a vigorous growth of the politics of memory and politicization of history. Furthermore, new processes are taking place which clearly need a scrupulous analysis and, conceivably, a special term to describe them. I suggest the term ‘history politics’ which, for lack of a better phrase, I borrowed from Polish historians¹. I believe this term has an important advantage: it correctly defines the relationship between politics that functions as the subject, and history that acts as a descriptive attribute. The term underlines that this is clearly a political phenomenon which should be studied – first and foremost – as part of politics. This sets it apart from ‘politicization of history’ and ‘politics of memory’ as defined above.

The origins of history politics

In 2004, a group of Polish historians declared that the country needed to work out and pursue its own version of politics with regard to history. The term they used – polityka historyczna – was borrowed from the German Geschichtspolitik, which appeared in the early 1980s². At that time, the newly elected Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Christian Democratic Party, who had a degree in History, used history issues to cement his political success. He appointed professional historian Michael St rmer his political advisor and called for making a “moral-political” turn. An important element of this turn was to assert a

¹ Polityka historyczna: historycy — politycy — prasa = Historical Politics: Historians – Politicians – Press / Ed. by L. Cichocka, A. Panecka. – Warszawa : Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego, 2005; Cichocki M. Władza i pamięć : o politycznej funkcji historii = Power and Memory: On the Political Function of History. – Kraków : O rodek Myśli Politycznej, 2005.

² See: Introduction: Historical Politics: Eastern European Convolutions in the 21st Century // The Convolutions of Historical Politics / Miller A., Lipman M. (eds.). – N.Y. ; Budapest : CEU Press, 2012. – P. 1–21.

positive character of German patriotism. Kohl believed it should not be exclusively based on the recognition of Germany's guilt for the crimes of the Third Reich. This suggested an adjustment of the treatment of Germany's responsibility for the Nazi crimes, which had been adopted by the Social Democrats while they were in office in the 1960s through the 1970s.

Historians Ernst Nolte, Michael St rmer and their associates who promoted this idea in 1986-1987, initiated the famous Historikerstreit, a dispute between historians over the reasons behind the emergence of Nazism and the measure of its responsibility for World War II. In the course of the dispute, Kohl and his allies from among German historians encountered a tough enough rebuff that halted Geschichtspolitik before it was able to gain momentum. A majority of German historians took a tough stance against Nolte as they took his publications as part of history politics. Geschichtspolitik has become a standard term in the German vocabulary to denote "an interpretation of history by political motives, and an attempt to convince the public that this interpretation is the correct one".

Polish supporters of history politics also insisted on asserting "healthy patriotism" with the help of history, and resisting the "distortions" of Polish history inside and outside the country. Admittedly, they acted honestly when they decided to borrow the notion of history politics to name their program, since it conveniently described its objective. Unlike Germany, the history politics concept took firm root in Poland, and since 2004 it has been the subject of heated debates and analysis.

History politics manifestations have become typical for almost all East-European countries in the past decade, although its supporters are not ready to admit they are acting in this vein. In a bid to legitimize history politics, its advocates would argue that there is nothing markedly new in it, that it has been routine practice with all nations, and that the situation where the government has no clear and vigorous history politics is not normal. My disagreement with the advocates of history politics is that I regard it a recent phenomenon that differs markedly from "usual" politicization of history and politics of memory.

The nature and mechanisms of history politics

As often happens with new phenomena, the gist of history politics is difficult to grasp or give it an accurate definition, because its mechanisms and objectives are deliberately concealed, as a rule. History politics is especially prominent in post-Communist societies. This is partially due to increased public interest in history and the “white spots” inherited from the Communist censorship. The heritage of the previous regime is also important at the level of intellectual habits and reflexes, and the available historiography.

Essentially, history politics is characteristic of post-Communist societies that freed themselves of the rigid forms of authoritarian ideological control. Strictly speaking, history politics would only apply to democratic, or more or less pluralistic societies, which proclaim the freedom of expression. It is in these conditions that politics emerges – as a competition between various political actors, parties and opinions. In the Soviet-type authoritarian regimes, the state’s interference in historical studies and politics of memory stemmed from the official presumption of ideological monopoly, censorship and administrative control over professional historiography. “Dissident” historians were berated at the Communist party meetings, and those who stuck to their views were ousted from their profession.

These mechanisms change in societies that claim to be democratic. Unlike the former Communist system in which one political party represented the state, the ruling party in a democracy no longer identifies with the state. The public sphere becomes pluralistic, and the state is unable to control it, let alone repress it. Pluralism finds its way into education, and each teacher of history – in line with the education standards – must have a free hand in selecting textbooks and interpreting the events and processes as laid in the curriculum. All historians must have equal access to archives in accordance with the law, not by the authorities’ decisions. The funding of schools and research does not give the right to the ruling party to dictate the content of teaching or research, because the money comes from the national budget, not the party’s coffers. The budget is the taxpayers’ money, therefore the ruling party cannot lay a claim to ideological monopoly.

It is these new conditions – which the state observes or pretends to observe – that provide for assertion of certain interpretations of historical events as dominant. In other words, using administrative and financial resources of the state, the ruling party performs the ideological indoctrination of society with regard to historical consciousness and collective memory. (This primarily concerns controversial historical events or processes that arouse public debate.)

In my opinion, in understanding the phenomenon of history politics, it is not so much the subject of propaganda that is important, as how it is done or what methods this propaganda uses.

Modern history politics is unable to return to the Soviet-era methods and impose a single opinion, even though its advocates would wish it. They need to invent new methods of regulating historical outlooks and interfering into the politics of memory, as well as new strategies to legitimize this interference.

What are the new mechanisms? Poland and Ukraine, for example, have set up Institutes of National Remembrance, and similar organizations have been formed in other countries.

Another example of the institutionalization of history politics is establishing museums under direct patronage of certain political forces that completely ignore the positions of their opponents. For example, the Warsaw Uprising Museum was set up under the patronage of the Kaczynski brothers; Hungary's right wing set up the "House of Terror" in Budapest, while Ukraine's former President Yushchenko patronized the opening of the "Museum of Soviet Occupation" and a standard exhibition on Holodomor at regional museums.

History politics is manifest in legislation too, when parliaments adopt laws that fix a certain interpretation of historical events as the only correct one. There are bills, proposed or even passed, that envision criminal punishment for those who challenge the prescribed interpretation, and this happens not only in Eastern Europe.¹

¹ See recent research of "history laws": Koposov N. *Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia*. – Cambridge : Cambridge university press, 2018; *Law and Memory : Towards Legal Governance of History* / Ed. by U. Belavusau, A. Gliszczynska-Grabias. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Ideological justification

Ideological justification for history politics is based on four postulates.

First, history and memory are presented as an arena of political struggle against external and internal foes. Hence a conclusion is thrust upon historians: they no longer have to regard the principles of professional ethics as a norm of trade, and, as rank-and-file fighters on the ideological front, they must be supervised by more “experienced” and “patriotic” people.

Second, the claim that “all nations do it” is used as an excuse for the obvious breach of the democratic principles of the functioning of social sciences. This manifests itself in the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of expression, ousting of unwelcome opinions to the mass media sidelines, and changing the principles of funding. For example, the distribution of research grants is no longer controlled by the scientific community; instead, the government allocates money for projects implemented on its direct political order.

Third, it is taken for granted that the external foe keeps asserting an interpretation of historical events that is harmful to the nation. It is the duty of historians therefore to jointly confront the danger, generally by defending the contrary argument, that is, by saying “no” to each of their “yes,” and visa versa.

The same happens to relations with the outside world: the supporters of history politics on both sides of the border enter heated debates. Since neither side tries to convince or understand the opponent, such discussions only mount tensions.

Fourth, the allegedly poor condition of patriotism and teaching of history at schools serves as a pretext to widely exploit history politics. The proponents of history politics use these arguments in their calls to suspend pluralism of opinion in textbooks. In actual fact, national interests are just a cover, as there is always a party / political aspect to the true objectives. The “genuinely patriotic” version of history invariably turns out to be advantageous to certain political forces. In reality history politics is a tool to campaign for the electorate and remove competitors within or outside of the framework of lustration laws.

How it is done in Russia

In a public lecture on history politics in Poland, Ukraine and Russia that I gave in April 2008, I endeavored to formulate its specifics and draw public attention to this phenomenon. Noting that history politics in Russia was less manifest than in the neighboring countries, I expressed an apprehension that that was only because Russians are slow to harness the horse. I claimed then that the consequences of a vigorous history politics, if implemented, would be far more destructive due to the specifics of Russia's political structure. Regrettably, my apprehensions came true.

History politics showed the first serious signs in Russia several years ago, when a team of "historians" published the so-called Filippov's history book, which is actually a set of textbooks on the 20th century history. The first product in the series – teacher's book on Russia's newest history was released in 2007¹; it was followed by History of Russia, 1945–2007², and a user's guide on 1900–1945 events³. The textbook on this period is due to come out shortly.

The authors of the textbook state that the main task of teaching history is bringing up true patriots. In actual fact, Filippov and his co-authors promote the brand of patriotism which is understood as loyalty not so much to the nation, as to the authorities whose faults are largely explained by a hostile international environment and the necessity of mobilization. Essentially, it is the discourse of today's ruling elite, which addresses the past and is remarkably similar to the Soviet post-Stalin narrative, with the exclusion of Communist rhetoric.

The last chapter in Filippov's textbook is devoted to sovereign democracy. This notion is presented not as an element of ideology of the Russian ruling political party, but is used as an objective description

¹ Filippov A. V. Noveishaia Istoria Rossii. 1945–2006. Kniga dlia uchitelia. = The Modern History of Russia. 1945–2006 : A Teacher's Book. – Moscow : Prosveshenie, 2007.

² Istoriia Rossii, 1945–2007 : 11 klass = History of Russia, 1945–2007 : 11th Class / Ed. by. A. Danilov. – Moscow : Prosveshenie, 2008.

³ Istoriia Rossii, 1900–1945: Kniga dlia uchitelia = History of Russia. 1900–1945 : A Teacher's Book / Ed. by A. Danilov, A. Filippov. – Moscow : Prosveshenie, 2008.

of the incumbent political regime which, as the textbook claims, ensured the country's successful development in the past decade. Danilov's textbook is based on the same premise. This is remarkably consonant with what Andrzej Friszke wrote about a similar situation in Poland: "If we deal with a narrative which the central authorities edit, being guided by their own ideological/political interests, we have indoctrination... Today, indoctrination that is taking place in Poland is truly insolent. A veritable war for memory is underway".

In the past two to three years, Russia has shown the tendency for regulating issues of history by means of legislation, which is so characteristic of history politics. In the winter of 2009, Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu, one of the leaders of the ruling United Russia party, was the first to broach the necessity to adopt a law threatening criminal prosecution for "incorrect" remarks about the history of World War II and the Soviet Union's role in it¹. As of now, two bills pursuant to this idea have been submitted to the Russian parliament.

In the summer of 2009, the public learned (accidentally, it seems) about a directive by academician Valery Tishkov, deputy academician-secretary of the history and philology department of the Russian Academy of Sciences². The document offered the directors of RAS institutes to compile a list of historical/cultural falsifications with the names of "the individuals and organizations responsible for disseminating them." The information was to be supplied within three days. It is not difficult to imagine what Pandora's Box this directive has opened, and what practice of snitching and squaring it can revive.

Another example of history politics, Russian version, is President Medvedev's decree, dated May 2009. It sets up a commission under the President of the Russian Federation to counteract attempts to falsify

¹ Shoigu predlozhit ugovovno karat` otriczayushhix pobedu SSSR v Otechestvennoj vojne = Shoigu Proposed Criminalizing Those Who Deny the Victory in the Patriotic War // NEWSru.com. – 2009. – 24 February. – Mode of access: <http://www.newsru.com/russia/24feb2009/srokvavov.html>

² Ob azhiotazhe vokrug pis`ma Otdeleniya istoriko-filogicheskix nauk RAN "o fal`sifikaciyax istorii" = About Agiotage Around the Letter of the Department of Historical and Philological Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences "On Falsifications of History" // Polit.ru. – 2009. – 3 July. – Mode of access: <http://www.polit.ru/dossie/2009/07/03/petrov.html>

history to Russia's detriment. The decree raised a wave of criticism from professional historians and public at large. However, the number of negative opinions in the mass media decreased dramatically fairly soon. This may be explained by a flagging interest, but we cannot rule out that the Kremlin muzzled the press. Either way is bad. If the mass media were told to keep silent, it means the authorities do not wish to hear criticism and are determined to bring public historical consciousness under political control. If the public is gradually losing interest in this issue, assuming that the decree would have no serious consequences, it is being very naïve. The decree has legal force and will be implemented. The accidental or intentional "signals" that already reach us give us an idea of what the consequences might be.

Statements made by active supporters of the decree to set up the commission – particularly by Pavel Danilin and Alexander Dyukov – warrant interesting conclusions. Danilin authored the texts on sovereign democracy which were included in Filippov's textbook. Danilin expounds the ideas of history politics activists with appealing sincerity: "It is the amateurs who have won contracts with publishers and have large print runs of their books, which review the events of the Stalin era, World War II and the end of the tsar's epoch at a much higher level than professionals can afford. These amateurs and enthusiasts are Russia's main heritage. They do not spare themselves in defending historical memory and in fighting against falsifications... The official historians... lean towards revisionist positions."¹

Danilin's article undoubtedly calls for looking for the main "falsifiers" within the country, and fighting them relentlessly. "The revisionists have raised their heads and speak through the main mass media as if under Goebbels." In his view, the newly established commission to fight the falsifiers of history should be not a scientific or academic, but a political body, whose main objective is political work, not research.

¹ Danilin P. Kak reagirovat' na komissiyu po bor'be s fal'sifikatsiyami: bez znaka voprosa = How to Respond to the Counter Falsification Commission: No Question Mark. – 2009 – 24 May. – Mode of access: <http://www.yarcenter.ru/articles/politics/braces/kak-reagirovat-na-komissiyu-po-borbes-falsifikatsiyami-bez-znaka-voprosa-20996/>

Alexander Dyukov, a young man with a degree in History, recently set up the Historical Memory Foundation and published a series of books on topical historical issues. One of his books is devoted to the attitude of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to Jews, and looks quite decent. The only surprising fact it contains a large amount of materials from the Federal Security Service archives, which Dyukov said were published for the first time. Professional historians know how difficult it is to get access to the FSB archives and obtain new materials there.

The title of another book, which Dyukov compiled and edited together with Igor Pykhalov, speaks for itself: “Great Slandered War II. We Have Nothing to Repent For!”. The foreword to the book graphically illustrates the authors’ style which they borrowed from the worst works written in the “history politics genre” by Russia’s immediate neighbors: “Our enemies – external and internal – encroach on the most sacred – the people’s memory of the Great Patriotic War. They are trying to deprive us of the Great Victory. Echoing Goebbels’ propaganda, the pseudo historians try to convince us that the Victory was allegedly won at a too expensive price, that it turned into the enslavement of Eastern Europe, that Red Army soldiers allegedly “raped Germany,” and that almost all Soviet citizens who endured Nazi occupation were exiled to Siberia. This book is a rebuff to the slanderers, a refutation of the dirtiest, most mendacious myths about the Great Patriotic War, disseminated by Russia’s foes.”¹ At the same time, the authors claim that the documents of the FSB central archive “show that the Soviet authorities conducted an extremely moderate and merciful policy towards the Nazi collaborators.”

The above statements by the two Russian activists of history politics reveal its key factor: it ruins room for dialogue in society on history problems. This dialogue is crucial for effective existence of history in a social environment; in Russia, it is being substituted with the dispute between “patriots and traitors,” where the “traitors” must – ideally – be deprived of the freedom of speech.

Dyukov expresses hope that representatives of the Historical Memory Foundation will be directly involved in the Commission’s

¹ Dyukov A., Pykhalov I. *Velikaya obolgannaya voina=Great Slandered War.* – Moscow : Eksmo, 2009.

activities and that they are ready to take over the leading role in servicing history politics, and ensure that the project inspired and financed by the government be implemented.

This is but another evidence of how history politics changes the principles of relations between the authorities and science. Until recently, the money allocated by the state for research, including in history, was distributed through foundations that operated on the basis of the research community's expert estimates. This is the way it should be done. But now historical research has become a sort of a contract for spin doctors, it is the authorities who decide on its funding, not the scientific community.

Dyukov's position is also noteworthy in what regards foreign experience in combating falsifications, which Russia could borrow. Specifically, Dyukov and his associates believe Russia should look at the Latvian Commission of Historians set up in 1998. The key tasks of this body are to provide theses for the officials' "occupation rhetoric" and raise the issue of "crimes against humanity in Latvia during the Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940–1991)" in the international arena. Latvia also has a government commission for "assessing the number of victims of the Soviet totalitarian Communist occupation regime and determining places of their mass burial; collecting information about reprisals and mass deportations; and calculating the damage done to the Latvian state and its residents." All of it should be used as a basis for advancing official financial claims to Russia.

Dyukov also cites the example of the Estonian parliament which set up a government commission in 1993 to "investigate the policy of reprisals by the Soviet occupation forces." The "White Book" listing "the losses suffered by the Estonian people from the Soviet occupation," which was compiled by the commission and published in 2003¹, served as groundwork for a large-scale anti-Russia propaganda and the demand that it "reimburse the damage caused by the occupation." Another commission set up under the Estonian president – the Estonian International Commission for Investigation of Crimes

¹ Virak V. The White Book: A Summary with Observations // Estonian World Review. – 2006. – 14 July. – Mode of access: <https://www.eesti.ca/the-white-book-a-summary-with-observations-12/article13724>

Against Humanity – ended its work in early 2009; reports said it might be used as a basis to create an Estonian Institute of National Remembrance.

The “Institutes of National Remembrance” are specific historical-ideological agencies, functioning in East-European countries on state budgets. The Polish Institute of National Remembrance, set up by parliament in 1998, became the first such agency. In the 1990s, Lithuania set up a body along similar lines: the Genocide and Resistance Research Center. The center is a department under the Cabinet; its director is approved by the Seimas (parliament) upon the prime minister’s proposal.

In Ukraine, the Institute of National Remembrance was launched in May 2006. It actively cooperates with “historians” from the Security Service and the Ukraine-3000 Foundation, headed by Yekaterina Yushchenko, the wife of the former Ukrainian leader. Characteristically, the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance recently announced that it was impossible to cooperate with Russian historians for ideological reasons (the administration of the Institute of National Remembrance resented the fact that Russian historians view the 1930 famine as a common tragedy of all Soviet people, not Ukraine’s tragedy only).

“All of these organizations are funded from the state budget and have a solid potential,” Dyukov said.

Essentially, the recently established Russian commission for combating falsifications of history is an instrument of history politics similar to the institutions acting in the neighboring countries. There are several obvious structural and functional differences, though.

First, unlike in Poland, for example, Russian security services are direct successors of the Soviet KGB. As a result, KGB archives were never retrieved from under control of secret services. This resembles the situation in Ukraine where the Institute of National Remembrance acts under the patronage of the Ukrainian Security Council, which provides the institute with archive documents whenever it deems necessary. Consequently, neither Russia nor Ukraine can adopt an effective law on lustration.

The experience of Poland and other countries where such laws do exist shows that lustration gives a wealth of opportunities for reprisals

against political opponents on the part of those who are in government. The fact that security service archives were taken from under their control immediately after the collapse of the Communist regimes in no way interferes with this practice. In Russia and Ukraine, lustration cannot be implemented at all because the authenticity and completeness of the archival documents are questionable, to put it mildly.

The composition of the Russian commission for combating attempts to falsify history, which includes several secret service officers, clearly shows that the authorities are keen to keep the status quo in what concerns access to archives. The Russian law on declassification of documents upon the expiry of the 30-year period does not work. The law stipulates that researchers are granted access to these documents after this period, and that only individual documents can remain classified upon special decisions. Instead, it is common practice in Russia to declassify every particular document upon decision by a specific departmental commission. This practice will definitely persist, and access to documents will only be granted to “selected” researchers working “on order.”

Second, research and publishing functions in Russia have been distributed among a limited number of organizations and centers. These organizations are political, rather than academic.

Thus, Russia has been clearly displaying all the key elements of history politics in the past two years.

First, there is an attempt to impose upon schools one and the only textbook on history – edited by a political center.

Second, special politically biased institutions have been set up to engage in historical research and control the archives and the publishing business.

Third, Russia is making an attempt to legally regulate interpretations of history.

Finally, it uses the methods to legitimize and give ideological support to the above practices that are typical of history politics. As in a majority of East-European countries, the arrow of history politics is pointed at society. Indeed, if the neighbors’ history politics moves evoke a justified indignation and contempt in Russia, the advocates and masterminds of the Russian brand of history politics can hardly hope that the results of their efforts will be treated otherwise by the neighbors.

Having embarked, like its neighbors, upon the road of history politics, Russia only contributes to intensifying the atmosphere of the “dialogue of the deaf” which increasingly characterizes the discussion of issues of the recent past. The “mirror” response, when “yes” from one side is invariably followed by “no” on the other side, is hardly effective in fighting history politics pursued by other states. There are quite a few historians and public figures in all neighboring countries who resolutely criticize their authorities’ historical policies. A reasonable and worthy way to resist history politics in neighboring countries is not by paying them back in kind, but by developing a dialogue with the opponents to history politics in those countries.

The ruinous consequences of history politics in Russia may be much tougher than in other countries: the weaker pluralism and democracy, the fewer opportunities society and the guild of historians have to resist history politics. In post-Soviet Russia, historical science has made tangible progress. Russian historians have overcome much of the methodological lag and established contacts with foreign colleagues. Diversity of opinions is now perceived as a norm in the academic community. Confrontation has given way to dialogue among both professional historians and amateurs. If interference of politics in history continues to develop at such a fast rate and in the same vein as in the past two or three years, Russia will suffer a major setback. This country has repeatedly demonstrated that it can bring foreign ideas to absurdity.

* * *

This article was written in 2009; since then important political developments of early 2010 have significantly changed the situation. The new President of Ukraine, Victor Yanukovich, has abandoned the aggressive line in history politics, which was promoted by his predecessor, and stopped insisting on the genocidal character of the Ukrainian famine. President Medvedev reacted adequately, visiting the Memorial to the Holodomor Victims of 1932–33 in Kyiv. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk met with Vladimir Putin in Katyn to jointly commemorate the victims of the Stalinist terror. One can hope that

Russia's leadership and the leading politicians in some of the neighboring countries decided that the confrontational history politics should be abandoned. The speed with which the situation is changing is the best proof that history politics is a matter of political choice and can be avoided regardless of how complicated and painful the relations between different nations were in the past.

A. Miller

The Labyrinths of Historical Policy¹

(2011)

The relationship between history and politics in Russia has changed radically over the past 25 years since the beginning of perestroika. One change began in 2009–2010, although its consequences are not yet evident, and affected the principles of the Russian version of ‘historical policy,’ i.e. the use of specially selected elements of the past for political purposes. This is something that has become popular in many post-Communist countries. These principles started taking shape in the first part of the 2000s. In Russia, the change in the discourse concerning the interpretation of history is linked to the country’s emergence into an era of broader social and political transformation, during which the post-Soviet political agenda, which was largely restorative after a total collapse, will give way to something different.

From the fervor of perestroika to the disillusionment of the 1990s

It is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future that public attention towards history in Russia will be anywhere near the level that was typical of the perestroika era. At that time new trends had a clear

¹ Source: Miller A. The Labyrinths of Historical Policy // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2011. – Vol. 9, N 2. – P. 61–74.

political relevance, such as the discovery of missing pages in history concerning the crimes of the Communist regime – above all, Stalinism – and the widespread popularity of such terms as ‘empire’ and ‘totalitarianism’ in reference to the Soviet Union, the use of which had been banned. Even perestroika’s idiomatic language was largely borrowed from historians’ vocabulary, i.e. the use of such phrases as “opting for a historical path,” “historic alternatives,” etc. The public began to crave all things historical. The situation was generally very unhealthy and showed signs of fervor. It was a period when demand definitely outweighed quality supply.

The second half of the 1990s, which was marked by shocks resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and when life for the majority of Russians became very difficult, saw a noticeable drop in public interest towards history. The so-called trial of the Communist Party in 1992 revealed a profound split in society over the perception of its own past¹. The Soviet Union’s victory in World War II was the sole element of collective memory that evoked an emotional response across various social groups. Russian politicians sensed this and did not make many references to history in their key speeches. Boris Yeltsin, who remained a staunch proponent of anti-Communist rhetoric until the end of his presidency, no longer sought to make this position the only legitimate one. In the second half of the 1990s, the authorities stopped exploiting the subject of history for political goals and left history for the historians.

In contrast, the 1990s and the 2000s were very good years for historians. The “archive revolution” defined this period, when many documents were made accessible for the first time and a considerable number were published. Russian historians started active cooperation with their foreign counterparts – mostly Americans and Western Europeans – in studying the events of the 20th century. Dozens of

¹ Materialy dela o proverke konstitucionnosti ukazov Prezidenta RF, kasayuschihsia dejatelnosti KPSS i KP RSFSR, a takzhe o proverke konstitucionnosti KPSS i KP RSFR. = Case Materials on the Verification of the Constitutionality of Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation Relating to the Activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR, As Well As On the Verification of the Constitutionality of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR : 6 vols. – Moscow : Spark, 1996–1998.

scholarly books on the Soviet period were published, even though society paid far less attention to them than in the perestroika era. Overall, the Russian media did not cope with the job of focusing the public's attention on new historical research. More precisely, it did not set this objective for itself.

Hundreds of monuments to the victims of political repression were erected at the time, most often at sites of mass executions or at Gulag camps. Yet these monuments did not occupy a central place in public consciousness, as they were located on the outskirts of urban areas, or even in hard-to-reach places. No national rituals for commemorating the victims of the Soviet regime ever materialized. The criminal nature of the Soviet state was fixed neither in juridical nor official political documents.

This period saw an assessment of 20th-century history, reflected – with distinct, but not principal differences – in the wide range of school textbooks published in those years¹. These textbooks assessed the Soviet regime as totalitarian and mentioned many of its crimes. However, this was not to diminish in any way the achievements of the Soviet era or the heroism of the Soviet people at work or on the frontlines. The nationalization of history was evident as well. In Russia's case, this meant that there was no information about those regions of the Soviet Union that had gained independence in 1991. However, unlike other former Soviet republics, such nationalization was not accompanied by a radical revision of the pantheon of outstanding personalities. Rather, the pantheon was replenished with figures from the “White camp” (the anti-Bolshevik forces that were forced to emigrate after 1920 – Ed.), and the transfer of their remains to Russia. Attempts to expand the national “list of glorious people” with the names of those who had collaborated with Nazi Germany proved unsuccessful, but their all-out demonization gave way to “discussions,

¹ See: *Istoriia Rossii: 20 – nachalo 21 veka = History of Russia: 20 – Beginning of 21 Century / Zagladin N., Kozlenko S., Minakov S, Pewtsov Yu. – 8th edition. – Moscow : Russkoe Slovo, 2008; Otechestvennaya istoria. 20 – nachalo 21 veka. = National History. 20 – Beginning of 21 Century / ed. by A. Tchubarian. – Moscow ; Prosvetshenie, 2006; Levandovskii A., Schetinov Yu., Mironenko S. Istoriia Rossii: 20 – nachalo 21 veka = History of Russia: 20 – Beginning of 21 Century. – Moscow : Prosvetshenie, 2009.*

with a shade of understanding.” This distinguished Russia from its Western neighbors, above all, the Baltic countries and Ukraine, where wartime collaborators were portrayed as fighters against Soviet occupation.

2003–2008: The escalation of historical policy

Former Russian President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin employed a “reconciliatory comprehensive approach” to history at the beginning of his first presidential term when he resolved the legal problem of state symbols. In order to establish the tricolor Russian flag, he joined a coalition with the liberals and democrats in 2000, ignoring protests from the Communist party. A year later, however, he teamed up with the Communists to reinstate – despite liberal protests – a slightly-revised version of the Soviet national anthem. It looked as if the main idea was to accept the past in its entirety as “a common heritage.”

The result was not a synthesis, but a construct full of controversies, based on the principle of ignoring problems and disregarding responsibility. Attempts to use past events as symbols of reunification proved extremely awkward. This was graphically manifested by the introduction of a new national holiday, the Day of National Unity, in 2005. The “negation” part of the plan worked well – to replace a date linked with the 1917 October Revolution, which was viewed by the authorities as irrelevant. But the “positive” message of national unity failed, the new holiday, became, instead, the day of manifestations by extreme nationalists.

There was growing concern in Moscow over the intensification of East European historical policies targeted at Russia in the 2000s. There were many international incidents during celebrations of the anniversary of the victory in World War II (especially in 2005), when some former Communist countries refused to send delegations to festivities in Moscow. Subsequently, Russia started drafting a response. The government’s first reaction was fairly traditional – tightening the screws inside the country, “rebuffing slanderers abroad,” and setting up similar institutions to the ones that other countries use to badmouth Russia.

In Russia there was talk of setting up an Institute of National Remembrance modeled after similar institutions in neighboring countries. As early as 2003 Putin said at a meeting with historians at Moscow's Rumyantsev Library that "concentration on negative facts," which was justified while the old system was being dismantled, should be replaced by the pathos of creativity and instilling pride in one's own history. "We need to get rid of the gibberish and scum that have accumulated over these past years," he said¹.

The period from 2003 to 2006 can be described as a covert phase in the elaboration of Russia's historical policy. Conflicts with Poland, where the very notion of historical policy came into being, became the catalyst for the process. Relations between Moscow and Warsaw, troubled by a tragic past, deteriorated in 2004 due to Poland's active involvement in Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Moreover, Russian-Polish relations grew into a full-blown crisis in 2005 after the election of Lech Kaczynski as president, a proponent of a tough anti-Russian policy. Moscow scaled back cooperation with Warsaw over the Katyn massacre, which had become a token element of historical policy in both countries. Moscow displayed a tough reaction to any gesture that had an anti-Russian tint in relations with Ukraine and the Baltic countries.

In 2006, a team of textbook authors, led by Alexander Filippov and Alexander Danilov, were given the task of writing a fundamentally new set of Russian history textbooks. The first products in the series, a teacher's book on Russia's contemporary history, a textbook titled "Russian History: 1945–2007"² and a user's guide for the period from 1900–1945³, were published in 2008.

Alexander Danilov's own summary of the concept of the textbooks contained the following significant statements:

¹ O nedopustimosti politizacii uchebnikov po istorii Rossii zayavil Prezident Vladimir Putin v xode vstrechi s ucheny`mi-istorikami v Rossijskoj gosudarstvennoj biblioteke = President Putin Warned Not to Politicize Russian History Textbooks During a Meeting With Scientists at the Russian State Library // Kremlin.ru. – 2003. – 27 Nov. – Mode of access: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/29821>

² Istoriia Rossii, 1900–1945: 11 klass = History of Russia, 1900–1945: 11th Class / Ed. by A. Danilov. – Moscow : Prosveshenie, 2008.

³ Istoriia Rossii, 1900–1945 : kniga dlia uchitelia = History of Russia. 1900–1945 : A Teacher's Book. / Ed. by A. Danilov, A. Filippov. – Moscow : Prosveshenie, 2008.

“The main cause of the ‘Great Terror’ was resistance to Stalin’s policy of rapid modernization and Stalin’s fear that he might lose control over the country.”

“There was no organized famine in the rural areas of the Soviet Union.”

“In talking about victims of repression, it would be correct to devise a formula that would include only those who were sentenced to capital punishment or were executed.”

“It should be emphasized that the Red Army’s campaign in September 1939 concerned the liberation of territories transferred to Poland under the 1920 Treaty of Riga; in other words, it meant the liberation of part of the homeland.”

“Although there is no justification for the massacre of Polish prisoners of war at Katyn, it should be noted that from Stalin’s point of view the executions went far beyond the problem of political rationality, and were a response to the deaths of thousands of Red Army soldiers held in Polish captivity after the war of 1920.”

These quotes convey that many postulations (e.g. on 1939, the Katyn massacre or the famine) were motivated by the historical policies of neighboring countries and worded in the same propaganda-tainted mode of politicized history.

The authors said their textbooks were based on renouncing totalitarianism as a non-scientific tool borrowed from the Cold War era and on an analysis of the Soviet period from the viewpoint of modernization theory. Essentially, the textbook’s content concerns the discourse of today’s ruling elite, which addresses the past and is remarkably similar to the post-Stalin, Soviet narrative, with the exclusion of Communist rhetoric. Such talk suggests that the crimes committed during the Soviet era were unavoidable because Russia was surrounded by enemies and was going through a wartime mobilization. Furthermore, these crimes were kind of justified by the success of modernization, without which Russia’s victory in World War II would have been impossible.

The use of administrative levers to successfully introduce the new textbook as the “correct one” became a classical attribute of historical policy. The Russian government has not hesitated to use legislation to regulate the problems of history, which is typical of such

an approach. In the winter of 2009, Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu, one of the leaders of the ruling United Russia party, was the first to speak out about the need to pass a law threatening criminal prosecution for “incorrect” remarks about World War II and the Soviet Union’s role in that war¹. Two bills pursuant to this idea were soon submitted to the Russian parliament.

In May 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree to set up a presidential commission on historical falsification². This was the culmination of the historical policy that had gained momentum since 2003. The document not only fueled a wave of criticism from professional historians and the public at large, but also signaled the start of an aggressive propaganda campaign from those who harbored overt hostility towards scholars and historians.

Instead of creating an Institute of National Remembrance according to the Ukrainian or Polish model, Russia opted for a solution that was more technologically successful. It used the efforts of formally independent public organizations that could be assigned relevant tasks and given archival materials lucrative for the customer. In essence, this was a modification of the familiar technology for media leaks, in which case leaked information is not necessarily false, but can be manipulated. Historical research loses its scholarly nature and turns into a political-technological contract; decisions on financing and assessing works are made by the political authorities, not by the professional community.

¹ V Rossii mozhet byt` ustanovlena ugolovnaya otvetstvennost` za otricanie pobedy` SSSR v Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojne = Criminal Liability May Be Established in Russia for Denying the Victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War // Novaya Gazeta. – 2009. – 24 February. – Mode of access: <https://novyagazeta.ru/news/2009/02/24/44015-v-rossii-mozhet-byt-ustanovlena-ugolovnaya-otvetstvennost-za-otritsanie-pobedy-sssr-v-velikoy-otechestvennoy-vojne>

² Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 15 maya 2009 g. N 549 “O Komissii pri Prezidente Rossijskoj Federacii po protivodejstviyu popy`tkam fal`sifikacii istorii v ushherb interesam Rossii” = Decree of the President of Russian Federation of 15 May, 2009 “On the Commission Under the President of Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests” // Rossiiskaya Gazeta. – 2009. – 20 May. – Mode of access: <https://rg.ru/2009/05/20/komissia-dok.html>

Thus, all the key elements of historical policy can easily be found in Russian practices of the 2000s. First, there was an attempt to introduce a standardized history textbook edited by the political center. Second, there were specialized politically engaged institutions that combined the tasks of organizing historical research with control over archives and publications. Third, an attempt was made to regulate interpretations of history through legislation. Finally, all of these practices were supported by methods of legitimization and ideological support typical of all of the above-mentioned practices.

Historical policy was targeted at people inside Russia. Although some organizational solutions were quite original, Russian historical policy, in spirit and style, was in line with that of its neighbors. This was fraught with serious consequences for Russian international relations, since the promoters of an anti-Russian historical policy in post-Communist countries expected exactly such reactions from Moscow. The political atmosphere inside Russia was becoming quite depressing.

2009–2011: Contradictory trends

Poland contributed to the strengthening of Russia's historical policy, but events in Poland also had a contradictory impact on this policy. After Donald Tusk was elected prime minister in autumn 2007 (Tusk is the leader of Poland's Civic Platform party and a political opponent of the Kaczynski brothers' policy), a cautious dialogue began between Moscow and Tusk's political camp. This dialogue encompassed many issues including historical ones. In July 2008, Anatoly Torkunov, director of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and a co-chairman of the Russian-Polish Commission on Difficult Issues that had been recently set up, published an article called "The Paradoxes and Dangers of Historical Policy" in the Russian newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*¹. Torkunov posited a

¹ Torkunov A. O paradokсах i opasnostyah "istoricheskoy politiki" = The Paradoxes and Dangers of "Historical Politics" // *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. – 2008. – 18 July. – Mode of access: http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2008-07-18/7_istpolitika.html

public opposition to the line embodied in Danilov and Filippov's textbook.

Vladimir Putin became Donald Tusk's partner in this cautious and timid political dialogue. He visited Westerplatte, the symbol of the Polish Army's resistance to Nazi occupation, together with other European leaders on September 1, 2009, the 60th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. This was a significant event for bilateral relations, as September 1 is directly related to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939.

On the eve of Putin's visit, the Russian media launched a full-scale "preliminary bombardment" in the spirit of historical policy and tried to depict Poland as a country that had to share responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Naturally, the Molotov-Ribbentrop theme was widely exploited on the eve of the anniversary in historical policy discussions in Russia's neighboring countries as well.

Amid these events, Putin offered an unexpectedly constructive approach in an article titled "Pages of History: A Pretext for Reciprocal Claims or a Basis for Reconciliation and Partnership?" that was published by *Gazeta Wyborcza*¹, one of Poland's leading newspapers, on the eve of his visit to Poland. Putin made a reconciliatory speech at Westerplatte in which he unequivocally denounced the Soviet-German treaty of 1939. Russian opponents of historical policy cautiously welcomed Putin's speech, while outspoken policy proponents condemned it as a senseless concession to the Poles, who ostensibly do not have the ability to appreciate such gestures. The Kaczynski camp also rushed to take steps towards fueling the tensions and restoring the confrontational atmosphere that had begun to settle down. All of this clearly showed that the advocates of a confrontational historical policy in both Russia and Poland actually played into each other's hands, using the provocative statements of their opponents to legitimize their own policies.

¹ "Gazeta Wyborcza": "Vladimir Putin: 'Stranitsyi istorii – povod dlya vzaimnyih pretenziy ili osnova dlya primireniya i partnerstva?'" = "Gazeta Wyborcza": "Vladimir Putin: 'Pages of History – A Pretext for Reciprocal Claims or a Basis for Reconciliation and Partnership?'" // [Archive.premier.gov.ru](http://archive.premier.gov.ru). – 2009. – 31 August. – Mode of access: <http://archive.premier.gov.ru/premier/press/world/4807/>

The events of the spring of 2010 had a strong impact on the general situation. The Russian government increased its revision of historical policy after the Russian and Polish prime ministers attended a joint ceremony to honor Polish officers who were murdered at Katyn and, subsequently, after Polish President Lech Kaczynski was killed in a plane crash near Smolensk three days later. The Russian authorities weathered the tragedy with dignity and opted for acceleration in meeting Warsaw halfway. The Kremlin ignored incendiary statements by some Polish media claiming that Russia should bear complete responsibility for the crash. Instead, Russia said it was ready to take further steps towards normalizing relations regarding the most painful issues of their common history.

Donald Tusk and his supporters were persistent in their commitment to reconcile with Russia, even though they have had to pay a large political price. Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (PiS) party made the “betrayal of Polish dignity and interests” their main point in criticizing the government. It is quite obvious that PiS will put Lech Kaczynski’s “murder” and Russia’s responsibility for “genocide in Katyn” at the top of its agenda in the run-up to parliamentary elections this fall – a campaign that is likely to be nasty. The word “genocide,” which in reference to Katyn is questionable even for many Polish historians, has once again proven its efficiency as an instrument of historical policy. The power of the emotions it arouses blocks any rational reasoning.

The Moscow-Warsaw dialogue embraced people on both sides of the debate who wanted to ease tensions, while historical policy advocates sought to push the discussions back into verbal bickering. Both Russia and Poland (and probably the majority of other countries too) have distinct groups consistently targeted towards reconciliation, as well as no less coherent communities that want an escalation in confrontation. Both camps are seeking to win over the majority of people who have no clear position. The success of those who want reconciliation largely depends on whether their partners across the border are ready to ignore provocations, pushing them to the periphery of the public sphere and collective consciousness. Although tensions have not disappeared, they are no longer a decisive factor on the political agenda.

Withdrawing from a confrontation caused by historical policy is a long and difficult process with inevitable setbacks, like any recovery from a severe illness. In the early stages the proponents of reconciliation often have to face a difficult challenge: how to minimize the damage inflicted by attacks from their competitors who are betting on a confrontational historical policy while keeping the trust of their foreign partners. The conduct of Civic Platform representatives in 2010 and 2011 can be seen as a good example of such maneuvering. Moreover, the simple logic of political struggle appears to be an important factor in reconciliation: once politicians start the reconciliation process, they find it difficult to stop since they would have to acknowledge then that their political opponents were right. That is why proponents of reconciliation will abide by it strategically, even if they conduct various political maneuvers.

Russian-Ukrainian relations changed considerably in 2010. Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich and his team sought to remove the elements of historical policy that Russia found especially irritating. Moscow was also ready to ease tensions. Although there was no political rapprochement with the Baltic countries, the principle of “avoiding extra tensions” was extrapolated there as well. For the most part, the media simply ignored provocative acts on the part of Russia’s neighbors. It was the same case in relations with Moldova, although the historical policy intensified sharply in that country in 2010, along with a surge in internal political strife.

Some politicians in Russia started making statements in 2010 that contrasted sharply with the government’s historical policy of the previous years. After Polish President Lech Kaczynski’s death, Dmitry Medvedev and an influential part of the establishment started using anti-Stalinist gestures and rhetoric. Notable events took place in public life too. Alexander Danilov was not elected director of the Institute of Russian History, part of the Academy of Sciences, and there was an avalanche of public criticism after Alexander Vdovin and Alexander Barsenkov published a textbook endorsed by the Department of History at Moscow State University¹. The authors were accused of

¹ Barsenkov A.S., Vdovin A.V. *Istoriia Rossii. 1917–2009.* = History of Russia. 1917–2009. – 3rd ed. – Moscow : Aspekt Press, 2010.

“a tendentious outlook and interpretation of history in the spirit of radical nationalism.” Sergei Karpov, the dean of the Department of History, had to apologize. This was probably the first time the opponents of the former historical policy went on the offensive, rather than remaining defensive.

There was a remarkable reaction among those who quite recently supported the idea of setting up a commission on historical falsifications and demanded that “the disciples of Dr Goebbels” among Russian historians “be straightened out.” These commentators wrote about the freedom of historical interpretations and in less official publications complained about an “attack on Russian scientists” organized by the “non-Russian liberal mafia.” This scandal greatly damaged the image of the Department of History at Moscow State University and Karpov personally. This is perhaps the main lesson that was learned. This will hopefully make the directors of scientific and educational institutions pay more attention to what their Academic Councils approve for publication either out of simple neglect, through an ill-perceived solidarity with fellow researchers, or out of sympathy for their disgraceful texts.

It is difficult to assess the role of different factors in the reorientation of rhetoric and – potentially – of the government’s policies that occurred in 2010. One can only list them without trying to define their significance. In the foreign policy sphere, the “reset” in Russian-U.S. relations luckily coincided with the arrival of political leaders in Poland and Ukraine who want to normalize relations with Russia. The easing of tensions offered a chance to abandon verbal wars over historical issues and Moscow clutched at this opportunity, together with Warsaw and Kiev. Concerns about improving Russia’s image abroad have forced the authorities to admit that attempts “to normalize Stalinism” are seen by Russia’s foreign policy partners as scandalous and are used by politicians and the media, who are driven by anti-Russian sentiments.

A few events that took place in early 2011 can be seen as attempts to establish cooperation between a public that finds it necessary to give a clear derogatory political and legal assessment to the wrongdoings committed by the Communist regime, and that part of the establishment ready to make that theme an element of its policy.

Some of the members of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civic Society and Human Rights, led by Mikhail Fedotov and Sergei Karaganov, and the Memorial human rights group, have drafted proposals to implement a national state-public program for commemoration of victims of the totalitarian regime and work towards national reconciliation. Along with erecting monuments, opening museums and research centers, and appointing national commemorative dates, the authors have suggested holding a competition for a new history textbook and called on the government to support academic research in this field. The project also specifies important political and legal steps, such as juridical assessment and political condemnation of the crimes committed by the Communist regime. Furthermore, the project presupposes a ban on the denial and/or justification of these crimes.

The authors of the project wanted to write their own anti-Communist views into the president's political agenda. The preamble of their brainchild mentions, among other things, the task of modernization and fantastical ideas about the consolidation of CIS countries. The somewhat awkward preamble and a number of inaccurately formulated practical proposals have made the draft an easy target for criticism from its opponents.

The crystallization of positions

The future of the document remains unclear. Through the irony of politics, Medvedev handed the program to Chief of the Presidential Administration Staff, Sergei Naryshkin, who is also head of Medvedev's commission on historical falsification, and instructed him to analyze "the important proposals." Yet some things can already be stated. The draft has marked a transition in the public debate on history to a new quality level, where there are two opposing positions that are stringently formulated and politically anchored.

One position suggests that the condemnation of crimes committed by the Communist regime should be reduced. First of all, it should not overshadow the achievements of the regime, which include, in addition to the victory in World War II, industrialization, space

research, successes in atomic energy, the eradication of illiteracy, etc. Second, the recognition of the crimes of Communism will weaken Russia's foreign policy positions and may result in unpredictably large compensation payments to the victims of repression and their descendents. Finally, the implementation of the program is allegedly untimely, as it will split society and lead to a "civil war." The latter argument is based on the conviction that today, almost a hundred years after the Bolshevik revolution and more than fifty years after Stalin's death, which marked an end to mass repression, it is still useful to abide by the tactics of "superseding oblivion."

Those who support this position are diverse and include Communists, who are ready to wave Stalin's portraits at public rallies, and those who support a strong state, who do not love Stalin, but detest his critics even more. It was in precisely this vein that historical policy developed in 2003–2009. It progressed under the motto of a struggle against libels of the past and sought to understate the scale of repressions (Danilov's proposal to rank only those who were executed as victims) or to present them in a relativist way (on the principle "others had sins too.")

In many ways this was an attempt to rehabilitate the Communist-era discourse on the balance of Soviet achievements and faults, carried out in terms of the personality cult more typical of Brezhnev's era rather than Khrushchev's, but without defending Communism as an ideology. These ideas find support among those who are frustrated and look back to Stalin with nostalgia for an era of a great power, friendship among peoples and social security. These people are unhappy with the social disparity, corrupt government and other problems in today's Russia.

The other side posits that society and politics should make the condemnation of Communist crimes an integral part of the political discourse about the past and a key element in the government's political legitimization. Unless the remembrance of crimes and their victims is limited to self-identification with the victims – the simplest and most dangerous path – and if memory raises the issue of national responsibility for past sins, it may serve as an important lever in revamping social relations.

Russian liberals have traditionally criticized historical policy the most for its efforts to make Stalinism acceptable. At the same time,

opponents of the efforts to rehabilitate the national memory portray them as a conspiracy of liberals. Although such attempts may prove successful in the tactical sense, they deliberately distort reality. The liberals are not the only group who want to strongly condemn the crimes of Communism.

“Russian History: the Twentieth Century” (edited by Andrei Zubov)¹, a strongly anti-Communist book, was published recently. It became a bestseller and has produced a widespread public response. The book was written on the basis of religious – and partly conservative – positions, but shows no signs of the liberal ideological platform. Another major project, “History of Stalinism,” launched in 2008 by the ROSSPEN publishing house and the Boris Yeltsin Foundation, currently includes 50 volumes reflecting a wide range of opinions². In addition, more than 800 commemorative sites (museums, monuments, memorial plaques, etc.) dedicated to those who were killed in political repressions and erected across Russia mostly through local initiatives, show that the problem concerns not only “liberals who live in downtown Moscow.”

This policy can lean on a broad coalition of forces that are far apart on many other issues. The Russian Orthodox Church, particularly under the leadership of Patriarch Kirill, has been persistently anti-Stalinist and anti-Communist. When discussions of the draft program for commemorating the victims of political repressions were underway, the Russian Orthodox Church strongly supported its main idea – the political and legal assessment of the crimes committed by the Bolshevik regime.

It turned out that many people in the establishment have strong anti-Communist sentiment, although they are not consonant with liberal viewpoints. There are also people who are ready to support this policy out of momentary tactical considerations. For instance, in January 2011 a group of United Russia party officials said they were in favor of

¹ Istoriiia Rossii. XX vek = History of Russia. XX Century / Ed. by A. Zubov. – M. : AST, 2009.

² Mode of access: <https://rosspen.su/katalog/istoriya-stalinizma/>

burying Lenin's body¹. The party is ready to support the anti-Communist memorial policy by and large if it brings political rewards.

Given this situation, the memorial policy may become an important element in the overall political agenda and an important distinctive element of Medvedev's positioning in the upcoming presidential campaign. Most importantly, it may help tap new ideas for legitimizing and transforming the incumbent regime, whose ideology has obviously become tattered. The condemnation of illegitimate repression and the Bolshevik class-based terror falls perfectly in line with the idea of a state ruled by law, democratization and political nation-building – a slogan that Medvedev has put at the center of his platform.

It is difficult to predict where this discussion will lead. The opponents of condemnation of the Communist regime's crimes have mobilized to put the polemics back on the track of habitual historical policy – personalized attacks against opponents, purported distortions of their position and complaining about high treason. There is a chance, however, that efforts to defile the discussion will fail. It seems that both supporters of an anti-Communist memorial policy and its opponents have enough people ready for an essential dialogue.

Naturally, one cannot help but notice the absence of a traditional groundwork for public discussion in Russia, which David Art has analyzed using Germany and Austria². He highlighted the significance of printed media as the arena where different viewpoints confront each other and where shifts in public consciousness regarding collective memory and norms of politically correct speech are fixed. Russia does not have a single printed medium that might play the role of this kind of moderator. Attempts continue to give this role to the Internet and that is where the main action is taking place. In this sense further progress on memorial policy is of special interest to researchers, as this is one of the first instances of an Internet-based process.

¹ "Edinaya Rossiya": Telo Lenina pora vyinosit iz Mavzoleya = "Edinaya Rossiya": It's Time to Take Lenin's Body Out of the Mausoleum // RBC. – 2011. – 20 January. – Mode of access: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/20/01/2011/5703e27e9a79473c0df19492>

² Art D. *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*. – Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Russia has escaped the outburst of historical policy that seemed inevitable in 2009. Today one can hardly expect that the tendency – whose culmination came with the creation of Medvedev’s commission on historical falsification and the Filippov-Danilov textbook – would successfully regain its previous power, audacity and confidence. It is equally obvious, however, that the heated public debate over the memorial policy will continue to gain momentum.

This will likely become an important, if not decisive, ideological element in reformatting the entire social and political sphere – something that is practically inevitable twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and because the related emotions and images are gradually disappearing from most peoples’ short-term memories. It is impossible to figure out, however, the historical myth that might appear in place of what has been the focal point of polemics over the past two decades.

A. Miller

A Challenge from the Past.

*Historical Policy: Eastern European Convolutions in the 21st Century*¹
(2011)

In the early 1980s, the new West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had a doctorate degree in history, made the revisiting of some key interpretations of the recent past a crucial element of his “moral and political pivot” policy. This policy line, effectuated under the motto of consolidating German patriotism, was aimed at fortifying his victory over the Social Democrats in official historical discourse. As the polemics stepped up, which grew into the famous *Historikerstreit*, or the “battle of historians,” shortly after that, opponents labeled the policy as *Geschichtspolitik*.

In 2004, a group of Polish historians politically close to the Kaczynski brothers’ Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) party said *polityka historyczna* (historical policy) was important for Poland. They made a conscientious choice as they translated the notion of *Geschichtspolitik* literally, although it had a derogatory label in Germany, while Kohl’s supporters never used it for self-identification. It was then that the broad use of history for political purposes, so typical of Eastern European countries in the early 2000s, got its name. Soon afterwards, the notion of historical policy spread across Polish borders to neighboring countries.

¹ Source: Miller A. A Challenge from the Past. *Historical Policy: Eastern European Convolutions in the 21st Century* // *Russia in Global Affairs*. – 2011. – Vol. 9, N 4. – P. 154–170.

The phenomenon we are dealing with is an individual case of the politicization of history that has transformed into a global tendency. Each individual element of the political interpretation of history in Eastern Europe over the past decade most likely has parallels in other parts of the globe as well. Moreover, each Eastern European nation has its own specificity in this sense. At the same time, intertwining all the elements of politicizing history in a single region is quite unique. The intensity with which neighboring countries have borrowed the techniques and forms of this policy from one another over the past decade has not been matched; neither has the establishment of a mechanism to escalate the politicization of history in interstate relations or inside each particular country. Thus, why do we not manipulate the notion of historical policy and use it as a term in our research to denote the regional specificity of politicizing history in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 21st century?

After communism, after the empire

Firstly, it would make sense to note some specific features the region inherited from the decades of Communist domination. The description of recent history, above all the period between the two World Wars and during World War II, was subjected to harsh censorship in all Communist countries. That was the result of a struggle with the enemies of the regime and, partly, of a desire to refine the history of the Communist movement. Although the Communists as such were not involved in the Holocaust, they would typically not talk about the extermination of the Jews – mostly for ideological “anti-Zionist” considerations, and often avoided the touchy aspects of participation by the local population in these crimes. Taboos were also imposed on prewar and wartime ethnic conflicts, as these issues were deemed out-of-place in the “fraternity of peoples of the Socialism camp.”

Still, the existence of large blank spots, which should rather be referred to as the “minefields” of collective memory in many cases, a surge in nationalistic emotions during the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and subsequently the Soviet Union, cannot explain the sharp

intensification in historical policy in the 2000s. By the beginning of the 21st century, researchers were looking at many previous taboos and the mass media were paying particular attention as well. New national narratives were embedded in official discourse and school textbooks. Old monuments had mostly been pulled down, to be replaced by new ones reflecting national pride, or at least as far as their authors could understand the notion.

Among the changes that occurred after the collapse of Communism, the new status of history and historians in society stands out. Strictly speaking, the notion of historical politics as such is worth applying only to societies that are democratic, or at least pluralistic, since the latter demonstrate some degree of commitment to democratic values, including freedom of speech. It is precisely these conditions that give rise to politics as a competition among different actors, parties and viewpoints. In Soviet-style authoritarian societies, the authorities meddled with the study of history and memory policies, proceeding from the official presumption of ideological monopoly, the mechanisms of omnipresent censorship, and administrative control over professional historiography. Dissenting historians were subjected to harsh reprimands at party meetings, and persistent dissidents were fired from their jobs.

All these mechanisms undergo transformation in a society that claims to be democratic. Unlike the former Communist party-state system, a group or a party holding power at a given moment is no longer synonymous with the state. The public sphere becomes pluralistic and the government can no longer aspire to have full control, even more so repressive control. A new set of norms is endorsed at the official level. School education becomes pluralistic, since history teachers are free to choose textbooks and interpret historical events and processes. As a rule, legislation protects schools from the influence of political parties.

Historical scholars are entitled to independence and intellectual freedom. State funds allocated for historical research are distributed on the basis of expert decisions made by the community of professional historians. State financing of education and research does not presuppose the right of the group or party in power at a given moment to dictate the content of education or research programs. That funding

does not come from party funds, but is provided by the state budget, that is through public taxes. The political force holding power cannot lay claims to an ideological monopoly. Access to the archives is supposed to be universal and regulated by laws, not by administrative decisions.

The former system of strict party control over the historical science, historical publications and history as a school subject was demolished right after the collapse of the Communist regimes. One might say that the 1990s became a kind of transitional period in many Eastern European countries when historians were left free. Politicians did not have the time or the opportunity to interfere. Moreover, they still had to master all the diversity of methods of historical policy.

Naturally, not all post-Communist societies managed to transform themselves into genuine democracies. More-or-less steady democratic systems took shape only in countries that were quick candidates for NATO and EU membership, and which were later admitted to those organizations. Other post-Communist countries, which remained on the sidelines of EU expansion, demonstrated various forms of political plurality and soft authoritarianism that largely relied on a social contract with the population, rather than on repression. The facade democracy practiced by the elites of those countries for domestic and international legitimization raised the costs of repressive policies. Even in the most authoritarian countries of the region, the current situation is marked by a greater degree of freedom than during Communist rule.

Eastern European countries are no longer subject to official censorship; nor is there state control over publishing houses, or a single, ideological power monopoly. The government does not steer the activity of professional historians and research institutions, and it does not have monopoly over the channels of financing. It is also important that the state does not risk making open claims about the restoration of a system regulating scientific research, even if it wants to do so (the legacy of the previous regime that manifests itself in intellectual habits and reflexes is found in all Eastern European countries). The Internet is something the government cannot control and it has acquired new significance everywhere. In other words, even though historical policy in Eastern Europe is rooted in many ways in the legacy of the old

Communist period, it represents a new set of practices concerning the political utilization of history typical only of pluralistic non-Communist societies. It is quite another thing that the makeup of political regimes and civic society there stands in marked contrast to developed democracies in the West.

This factor deserves a detailed discussion. Interpretations of the very nature of the phenomenon we call ‘historical policy’ usually put all the emphasis on the Communist legacy. In other words, current political manipulations of history are interpreted as the legacy of past abuses, as a consequence of lingering habits formed previously, or as a natural evolution of the countries that have freed themselves from Moscow’s imperial domination. The latter ostensibly presupposes focusing efforts on the consolidation of ethnic self-identity. However, such interpretations diminish the novelty of the phenomenon.

Furthermore, it is exactly the political nature of historical policy as a phenomenon that makes researchers pay more attention to the actors, institutions and methods of this policy, rather than diverse interpretations of the past in its format. These issues have usually escaped the attention of scholars so far.

Multiform post-communism

The post-Communist and/or imperial legacy has been viewed as a universal rationale for the forms that the politicization of history acquired in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. However, this leaves out a crucial circumstance – the marked diversity of the nature of political plurality across Eastern European countries.

Firstly, some Eastern European countries are seeing a split along cultural and/or ethnic lines. Importantly, in some countries (such as Ukraine) this split is the center of political life, while in others it has been driven to the political periphery (in Estonia and Latvia, where a considerable number of ethnic Russians are still banished from official politics). Moldova combines the two options: the split between “Romanianists” and “Moldovanists” has penetrated the very core of the political sector, while the Transnistria (Pridnestrovie) region stands apart from it. In other words, the overall “post-imperialism” or “post-

colonialism” should not overshadow the considerable differences in the character of challenges that Eastern European countries run into as they seek to build their collective identities.

Secondly, Poland, Hungary, and other post-Communist nations that are members of the EU are relatively full-fledged democracies, although there is still room for improvement. This democratic stability is bolstered, among other things, by a powerful external factor in the form of influences wielded by EU institutions. Ukraine and Moldova have pluralistic systems, where the outcome of elections is not always predetermined by the people holding the reins of power when the votes are counted. Still, democratic institutions are underdeveloped and highly unstable in this region. Russia has an authoritarian regime, in which political struggle is neither explicit nor conventional, and is replaced by what can be called “the struggle between the Kremlin’s towers.” Nonetheless, Russians enjoy considerable freedom of speech. Belarus has been demonstrating a considerable similarity with tough authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. All these differences naturally leave imprints on the historical policy in different countries.

Diversity of actors

The issue of who the active operators and/or actors are is crucial for analyzing historical policy. Furthermore, a multitude of works devoted to the problem known as the “politics of history,” the “politics of memory,” or “political wars around history” overlook that issue in practical terms.

The field is crowded with all kinds of players: political leaders, political parties, new specialized institutions (such as the Institutions of National Remembrance, and a number of museums established under the patronage of particular parties over the past twenty years), traditional research organizations like the Academy of Sciences, various non-governmental organizations (from the Memorial human rights center to Alexander Dyukov’s Historical Memory foundation), associations (including associations bringing together the victims of repressions and their descendants), the mass media (especially those that view historical problems as indispensable highlights), and

politically active ethnic communities. The champions of historical policy from the milieu of professional historians deserve a special remark. There is a wide variety of people among their ranks, ranging from profoundly committed enthusiasts to career professionals, who will service any political client in exchange for positions and remunerations. It would be interesting to trace the role of the generational factor in this. Especially amazing is the new type of young people who bear a strong resemblance to Soviet-era Young Communist League functionaries. These personalities are strikingly similar in different nations (Piotr Gontarczyk, Sławomir Cenckiewicz and Paweł Zyzak in Poland; Volodymyr Vyatrovych and Ruslan Zabily in Ukraine; Alexander Dyukov and Pavel Danilin in Russia; and the list continues).

Furthermore, there needs to be a detailed study of the fight against historical policy. We can see perfectly well that professional historians in some countries – for instance, in Poland – put up organized resistance to these practices, sometimes through the mass media. On some occasions historical policy bumps into resistance in the form of covert sabotage from traditional scientific organizations, especially the Academies of Sciences. For example, one can recall that employees of the Russian Academy of Sciences were extremely reluctant to expose the “falsifiers of history,” even after a notorious presidential commission was set up for that purpose. A vote in the historical / philological department of the Academy against Dr. Alexander Danilov, who edited the ill-famed “Danilov-Filippov textbook,” as director of the Institute of Russian History, falls into the same category.

By way of citing more examples from Russia’s reality, one should stress the crucial role public opinion – and especially some Internet publications – plays in opposing historical policy. Generally speaking, the Internet is gradually turning into an arena and instrument to spread historical policy. This calls for in-depth consideration, since the ways this medium functions and the styles of statements made on the Internet have a specificity of their own.

In general, the situation in Eastern Europe is different because attempts by politicians to interfere in education and the public functioning of history have not met with strong resistance from society. This becomes especially clear if one compares the situation with that in

Britain, where active debates on how to teach history at schools have been going for more than twenty years. Moreover, the problems of national identity and state interests occupy an important place in those debates.

Active participation by politicians in these debates is seen in the criticism of school history curricula, which emphasize the history of everyday life rather than the ‘glorious victories’ of the British Army and Navy. One can regularly hear concerns over the failure of history lessons to play a large enough role in the patriotic upbringing of the youth and the shaping of national identity. The main opponents in these debates are organizations like the National Council for School Curriculum and Assessment and the National Association of Head Teachers, which are prepared to resolutely defend their interests. As a consequence, politicians are unable to impose an agenda of their own, to say nothing of dictating certain decisions. They are compelled instead to take part in professional debates and to abide by their rules if politicians want to win voters over to their side. In other words, politicians have to discuss the tricky and ambivalent issues of teaching history as an asset of public heritage, without primitive political slogans or persecution of those who think differently.

Borrowings

Diverse political conditions in Eastern European countries raise an important question for researchers: What mutations do the institutions and methods of historical policy undergo when spreading across borders? The instances of mutation are myriad. The Institute of National Remembrance, set up by Poland relying on the experience of Joachim Gauck’s commission in Germany, has seen changes in its legal status in the context of inter-party political struggle. In Ukraine, however, such an institute turned into a self-mockery: instead of steering the study of the Communist Security Services’ archives, it was transformed into a subdivision of Ukraine’s Security Service. In Russia, the idea of setting up an institute of this kind fueled some different institutional decisions, one of which was the notorious presidential commission for “fighting the falsifications of history.”

Another institutional idea consistently borrowed from country to country was the formation of commissions to investigate the crimes of totalitarian regimes, which mostly engaged in compiling lists of Soviet crimes. The scale of the crimes was often assessed in dozens of billions of U.S. dollars, which the commissions proposed getting in compensation. These commissions functioned for many years in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Moldova's acting president Mihai Ghimpu formed the body in 2010. It was given the unambiguous task of producing the report in six months' time, on the eve of the presidential election. The purely practical nature of this initiative was never concealed.

One more example of the institutional dimension of historical policy and intensive cross-border borrowings is the creation of museums under the patronage of certain political forces. Any alternative positions on what such museums would display are ignored outright. Take for instance the Warsaw Uprising Museum, founded by the Kaczynski brothers; the House of Terror in Budapest, set up by Hungarian right-wing groups; or the Museum of Soviet Occupation in Ukraine (including the standard design exhibition of the Holodomor, the man-made famine in Ukraine in the 1932–1933), established under the patronage of former president Victor Yushchenko. Historical narrative in general and museum exhibitions in particular often focus on martyrology, or the image of an enemy, which most typically is tailored on an association with contemporary political forces inside and outside the country. Quite often these are museums of invasion and/or genocide. Almost all post-Communist countries except Russia see a political task for themselves in showing off titular nations as victims of 20th-century genocide. When the epidemic of manipulating the notion of genocide reached Russia during the August 2008 war in Georgia, it produced a brief, but very intensive, splash, which was manifested in attempts to describe the Georgian Army's attack on South Ossetia in terms of genocide.

It is noteworthy that Warsaw's municipal authorities have recently rejected the Museum of Communism project endorsed by the Kaczynskis' Law and Justice party. The municipality is controlled by the Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) party that has assimilated a moderate line towards historical policy recently.

Historical policy manifests itself at the legislative level, too, when national parliaments pass laws establishing an interpretation of events as the only correct one. Sometimes these bills – and even the laws after endorsement – stipulate criminal punishments for those who call these interpretations into question. This practice is not only typical of Eastern Europe. Similar legislative acts exist in France and Turkey. Their authors will typically refer to Holocaust denial laws adopted in some Western countries. Such references are conscientiously plotted manipulations, since Holocaust denial laws prosecute the refutation of the very fact, rather than attempting to make interpretations.

Methods

The methods of historical policy are in many ways clear from what we said earlier. One can divide them into five groups. Obviously, the classification proposed below is rather conventional, since all the methods listed are closely intertwined.

First, the setting up of specialized institutes which are used to impose certain interpretations of past events beneficial for a political force. The problem of financing presents a special interest in this sense. If a party has its own financial resources that it allocates for research it finds necessary or deems correct in historical orientation, it has the right to do so, just like all other regular sponsors do. This sponsorship must be transparent and subject to common regulations. However, the principles of transparency are frequently disregarded and – most importantly – Eastern European countries often use money from federal budgets controlled by political forces holding the levers of power. A dubious, and often illegal, use of finances – and especially budget money – is a characteristic feature of historical policy.

Second, there is political interference in the mass media. This is by no means a specific feature of Eastern European, since such practices take place in countries like France, Japan and Turkey. However, Eastern Europe offers a marked difference. In some cases such interference is fraught with serious troubles for politicians, while in other cases it constitutes an undeclared norm. The latter case applies to practically all Eastern European countries. Although instances of

outright censorship in the form of deleting sections from books and movies are rare, widely used methods include marginalizing opponents, and blocking access to television and the most widely read papers.

Third, archives are manipulated, partially by labeling many state archival materials as classified documents, although the law states that researches should have access to them. Priority, or sometimes exclusive, access to archival documents is given only to historians who lean towards one or another political force. Materials are retailored for publication and independent experts do not have an opportunity to verify them.

Fourth, new measures are devised and used to control the work of historians. In addition to moral pressures on opponents, an entire system emerges of official and non-official bonuses for historians close to certain political parties. In some cases, this presupposes privileged salaries and status; for instance, for the staff members of Institutes of National Remembrance. While on the government payroll, researchers at these institutes enjoy much larger salaries than their counterparts at regular research institutes or universities. Part of this special status is a much higher level of “discipline” and risk of losing one’s privileges. In other cases, people with a merit record in terms of historical policy can expect to receive support in getting key posts at academic institutions.

Fifth, there are instances of political interference in the content of textbooks and curricula, up to overt encroachments on the law. This was exactly the case with a chapter on ‘sovereign democracy’ in the Danilov-Filippov textbook that portrayed an element of the ruling party’s ideology as an objective and even scientifically grounded concept.

The aspect all these methods have in common is the use of state administrative and financial resources in the field of history and historical policy to serve the interests of the ruling party.

Ideological grounding

Political manipulations with history in the new conditions demand a new ideological grounding. The ideological foundations of historical policy reveal stark similarities in all Eastern European countries and are based on four principal postulations.

In the first place, history and memory (remembrance) are regarded primarily as an arena of political fighting with enemies, both domestic and external. This leads to the conclusion that “history is too important to be left to the care of historians.” This in turn means that historians need to be placed under the control of people more sophisticated in political issues. Historians as such do not have the right to refer to the principles of professional ethics in order to claim independence from politics.

Secondly, there is an assertion that “everyone is doing it.” Thus an attempt is made to justify in the public eye an obvious infringement on the principles accepted in democratic societies of how social science functions. The true and imaginary instances of manipulations in the sphere of historical consciousness and collective memory in other countries are invariably cited to substantiate the thesis that the politicization of history is an “unavoidable evil,” not as something of which the nation should be apprehensive.

Thirdly, there is a belief that historians have a duty to put up “solidarity resistance” to interpretations of history that are detrimental to the homeland and are used by external enemies. It is only natural that polemics with opponents at home gives way to personal assaults, accusations of complicity with the enemy, or attempts to pass the opponent off as an alien. As a consequence, any room for dialogue about the problems of history inside the country is destroyed and – let us reiterate – the productive instruments of public discussion of the past as an asset of common heritage are broken, too.

The mechanism for destroying the space for dialogue is applied to relations with the outside world, as well. The adepts of historical policy on both sides of the border initiate a heated war of words with each other. They sometimes conduct this war under the motto of a “dialogue of national historiographies.” A standoff like this usually boils down to defending opposing arguments. What it suggests sounds like “We’ll say ‘no’ to each ‘yes’ on their part, and vice versa.” Since neither side wants to convince or understand the other, these discussions only aggravate the conflict and eventually serve as a means of legitimizing the adepts of historical policy inside each country. This, in essence, replicates a characteristic feature of Soviet propaganda, where increased brainwashing inside the country became the main

technique of responding to the “malicious ideological designs of the enemy.” In the past no one in the West except for postgraduate students with bizarre tastes would read Soviet critiques of “bourgeois historiography.” Nor does anyone today in the Baltic States read the rancorous tirades of Russian champions of historical policy, which they spearhead at coeval Baltic fighters with Soviet totalitarianism.

The aftermath of this approach is highly destructive both for professional historians and for public morals. It breeds a conviction in society that craving for objectivity in historical research and assessments is little more than a facet of naivety, or a hypocritical camouflage for ethnic or political partiality. Double standards in the assessment of political personalities and events are used excessively, and discussions are sidetracked about the essence of genuinely historical issues. Those who allegedly conduct discussion in the format of historical policy are, in fact, engaged in imitating it, as they address their own target audiences instead of addressing opponents in reality.

Ukrainian historian Georgy Kasyanov, who conducted a brilliant survey of the Holodomor as a specific form of cultural reality, listed the following generic features of the discourse: ethnic exclusiveness; confrontational orientation; elements of xenophobia; preponderance of ideological forms over scientific ones; accentuating the martyr’s mission of the own nation; imparting a sacred nature to ethnic torments; equating the nation to a human body; the domination of moralistic rhetoric; and a justificatory pathos that relegates the main responsibility for the harm sustained to external factors, primarily to Russian communism¹. All the nine signs of the syndrome inevitably show up in discourses molded in the format of historical policy in all Eastern European countries.

Fourthly, the justification of historical policy is made under the pretext of an allegedly pitiful state of patriotism and the inconsistent teaching of history at schools. The same cunning explanations stand behind proposals to jettison (provisionally) the plurality of views from textbooks and concepts, so that “our children could at least learn the

¹ Kasianov G. Razrytaya mogila : golod 1932–1933 godov v ukrainskoi istoriografii, politike i massovom soznanii = An Open Grave : the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukrainian Historiography, Politics, and Mass Consciousness // Ab Imperio. – 2004. – N 3. – P. 237–269.

basics.” Regarding “the basics,” priority is given to fostering patriotism, not the critical civic stance. Naturally, patriotism is to be fostered with the aid of the historical narrative that highlights the moments of a nation’s glory and sufferings, and carefully erases the guilt of some of its members.

Internal political objectives

In reality, however, concern for public interests will typically disguise the sheer party-oriented goals of historical policy. The “truly patriotic” version of history is unfailingly lucrative for a definite political force. Take Poland, for example, where the supporters of historical policy used it as an instrument in fighting with contenders over the Kaczynski brothers’ right to be considered the sole genuine successors to the Solidarity movement. In Ukraine, the interpretations of the history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the famine of 1932–1933 voiced by Victor Yushchenko provided support for him in the struggle with the opposition and helped (in the opinion of the authors of this policy) to install a concept of the Ukrainian nation that matched the ideas espoused by the former president and his political associates. As for Russia, the historical policy conducted from 2007–2009 overtly served the objectives of ‘sovereign democracy’ that was (or maybe still is) an element of the United Russia party’s political program.

Historical policy is instrumental in struggling for votes and eliminating competitors on the basis of lustration laws or in the absence of such laws. This partly results from the sterilizing of meaningful agendas, in which case the desire for votes appeals to interpreting the past, rather than resolving the acute problems of contemporary development. This also works the other way, when the real life situation throws in a convenient theme for a campaign from a different sector. In this case, historical policy is shelved immediately, such as what happened in Poland after Lech Kaczynski’s death in a plane crash near Smolensk.

It is a persistent fact that the intensification of historical policy in the early 21st century is mostly linked to the activities of right-wing

parties. Right-wingers are active players in the field of nationalism and patriotism, where they take on the role of “defenders of the homeland.” They often invoke alarmist motives of a threat to national sovereignty, dignity, and traditional national values. The subjects of “historical injustice” and “genocide” are devised in such a way that the role of victim is assigned exclusively to their own ethnic group or nationality, while demands for repentance are regulated to external forces. Today’s liberals are more inclined to raise the problem of historical responsibility of their own group, and it is much more fruitful for fostering public morality and for relations with neighboring countries. This does not mean that liberals or left-wingers refrain from implementing some methods of historical policy, especially in modeling the public discourse about the past. However, on the whole, right-wing forces tend to use historical policy instruments on a much larger scale.

Foreign policy objectives

As a rule, historical policy plays a less important role in foreign relations, although its supporters will usually claim the opposite. If deep splits emerge along political, cultural, or linguistic lines due to discord within official quarters, then internal political tasks almost certainly become historical policy priorities, even in cases where the debates and manipulations formally focus on relations with the outside world. At the same time one should not underestimate or – and this happens quite often – oversimplify the role the external context plays in Eastern Europe. The foreign policy factor has never exerted an influence in one dimension only. Research mostly brings out the post-imperial dimension of the situation, i.e. the tensions between Russia, on the one hand, and the former Soviet republics or Warsaw Pact countries, on the other. Although this aspect is self-evident, it will hardly help understand the dynamics of current developments, as it does not explain in any way the sharp increase in historical policy in 2003–2004, and its noticeable decline in 2009 and 2010.

Eastern European countries found themselves in a previously unknown situation in 2003 and 2004, when the war in Iraq jolted the

unity of the West and the world, prodded on by Donald Rumsfeld, started speaking about Old and New Europe. The “smaller” Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – were always concerned by what they believed to be insufficient guarantees of security they had received from the West, while joining NATO and the EU. These apprehensions intensified after the NATO and U.S.-led invasion of Iraq had exposed deep divisions between Washington and its leading European allies. In these conditions, actively exploiting the theme of victims of Soviet totalitarianism and of betrayal on the part of the liberal West on the eve of World War II was addressed precisely to Western public opinion, since it mirrored the willingness of “smaller” countries to ensure security guarantees from leading Western powers.

Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 also raised the stakes in Eastern Europe. This was the time when historical policy sharply intensified and received its name.

There is hardly any doubt that the new U.S. administration in 2009, and the ensuing changes in the course and rhetoric in U.S.–Russian relations, strongly influenced the situation. The Obama administration made it absolutely clear to the New Europe that it had no interest in a further growth in tensions in those countries’ relations with Moscow. The change facilitated steps towards a “détente” in some cases, and this applies to efforts undertaken by Moscow and the Polish government led by Donald Tusk since 2008. This in turn prompted the Russian authorities to make serious adjustments in their own approach to historical issues.

At the same time, warmer relations between Moscow and the major European powers, which have been interpreted as a return to Realpolitik, are yet another reason for using historical policy as far as the Baltic States are concerned. It is worth noting that, contrary to Poland where certain political forces proved ready to supplement the “resetting” of relations between Washington and Moscow with a “détente” between Warsaw and Moscow, the leaders of the Baltic States have kept up the previous line – in spite of U.S. recommendations to lower passions. A fear that their interests may turn into a subject for bargaining compels smaller Eastern European countries to continue employing historical policy as an instrument of influencing public opinion in the West.

One can presume that the 2012 presidential election in the U.S. will become a landmark for historical policy in Eastern Europe regardless of who wins in the White House. The Obama administration's policy will either be reaffirmed and détente – including in the field of historical policy – will continue, or we will see a new surge of this policy. In any case, the annals of historical policy are far from exhausted.

It is difficult to predict the future of historical policy today. The intensity of “historical wars in Europe” has decreased since 2009, but the process could still be reversed. First of all, it is not at all clear how long the resetting of relations between Moscow and Washington will last. Secondly, it is becoming increasingly obvious that there is a crisis in European integration. This has already ignited a growth in nationalistic economic sentiment all across Europe. In time, this may call into question achievements made in historical reconciliation and the surmounting of past divisions, which underlies the European Union. It is still very likely that history will be used as a tool for political disputes among EU member-states and in conflicts with immigrant communities inside European countries. Eastern Europe beyond the EU continues to be quite unstable – politically, economically, and even with respect to borders and the countries per se. Given this situation, reverting to extremely aggressive, conflict-prone and destructive methods of historical policy is still a realistic threat.

O. Malinova

A Workable Past.

*Symbolic Politics in Post-Soviet Russia*¹

(2012)

As major pillars of collective identity, conventional conceptions of the past play an important role in modern political communities. Public history – distinguished from professional history as official interpretations of past events addressed to a broad public – is a central element of symbolic politics, which is targeted at building collective solidarity and forming an idea of ‘We’ in society. This aspect of symbolic politics is relevant for constructing all kinds of group identities, but it is particularly crucial in nation-building. Therefore it is not accidental that modern historiography is largely centered on writing histories of nation-states.

Symbolic policy: A case for Russia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union all the newly independent states faced the problem of building national identities within new boundaries. In Russia’s case this task was complicated by several factors. First, uncertainty flourished about the geopolitical and cultural boundaries of the macro-political community that constituted the new

¹ Source: Malinova O. A Workable Past. Symbolic Politics in Post-Soviet Russia // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2012. – Vol. 10, N 4. – P. 84–94.

Russian state. Second, the Soviet tradition of institutionalizing ethnicity inhibited an understanding of identity for this macro-political community as a nation. Efforts to form national solidarity based on ethnic and confessional principles raised concern about “violating the rights of nationalities” that formed the “multinational” Russian state. Third, in the new international environment, an interpretation of ‘significant others,’ against which the new Russian identity was defined, also became controversial. Unlike most post-Communist countries, Russia found it difficult to find ‘significant others’ who could be blamed for the troubles and hardships that Russians were experiencing. Fourth, the federal structure of post-Soviet Russia had far fewer resources for shaping a uniform identity than other “national” post-Soviet states. All of this meant that self-identification with the new Russian state was not easy from the very beginning. Of course, a variety of symbolic traditional resources could be used to shape the new Russian identity, but this legacy was overburdened by dramatic conflicts. In particular, there were no “ready” versions of a historical narrative that could be used as a foundation for the new national identity, while attempts to reinterpret the collective past caused heated debate. Finally, an ideological rift in the 1990s slowed the emergence of new models of collective identity that would help solidarity overcome political distinctions. Thus, the formation of a new macro-political identity in post-Soviet Russia followed a rather contradictory and intricate path.

This article discusses a particular aspect of this multifaceted problem – political references to the past in the context of symbolic politics aimed at (re)constructing the national idea of ‘We’ in Russian society. A reconsideration of the major narratives of the collective past is an important element in nation-building and it suggests a choice between different options for interpretation and evaluation. Many scholars consider the unpreparedness of the Russian political and intellectual elites to make such a choice to be the central problem of Russian political identity today¹. This issue is closely related to the

¹ Drobizheva L.M. *Protsessy grazhdanskoi integratsii v poliethnichnom rossijskom obschestve (Tendentsii i problemy) = Processes of Civil Integration in Poliethnic Russian Society (Trends and Problems) // Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost’*. – 2008. – N 2. – P. 74; Kaspé I., Kaspé S. *Pole bitvy – strana. Nation-*

continuing uncertainty over the crucial questions “Who/what are ‘We’?” and “Who belongs to ‘Us’?”.

Political references to history in the context of establishing national identity are an important aspect of symbolic politics. Our understanding of the term follows Pierre Bourdieu’s concept in which symbolic politics is considered as a political activity aimed at producing and promoting certain modes of interpreting social reality and ensuring the dominance of these methods¹.

The state is not the only player in the symbolic political arena, but it occupies a special position. The federal government is able to impose certain interpretations of social reality on society by using administrative resources (implementing educational standards) and legal measures (citizenship laws); by assigning a special status to particular symbols (establishing public holidays, official symbols, state awards, etc.); and by representing society on the global stage. Consequently, public statements by official representatives who speak “for the state” and make decisions acquire special significance and serve as reference points for other participants in political discourse. It should be mentioned that official symbolic policy might be inconsistent and context-dependent: those who speak “for the state” do not always rely on systemic interpretations of social reality and frequently have to react to current conflicts. In spite of the powerful resources that the state has at its disposal, the dominant official interpretations of social reality that it promotes are not predetermined: even in totalitarian and authoritarian societies where certain normative principles are imposed by force, there are still opportunities for escape, such as “roguish adaptation” and “double thinking”².

Symbolic politics takes place in the public sector, i.e. in the virtual space where socially significant issues are discussed, public opinion is formed, and collective identities are (re)defined. In other words, this is a sector where different interpretations of social reality

building i nashi nationbildery = Nation as Battlefield. Nation-Building and Our Nation-Builders // Neprikosnovennyi zapas. – 2006. – N 6 (50). – P. 15–32.

¹ Bourdieu P. Language & Symbolic Power. – Cambridge: Polity, 1992.

² Levada Y. Chelovek lukavyi : dvoemyslie po-rossijski // Levada Y. Ot mnenij k ponimaniju. Sotsiologicheskie ocherki 1993–2000. – Moscow : Moskovskaia shkola politicheskikh issledovanij, 2000. – P. 508–529.

compete. The configuration of institutions and practices of a particular public sector determine both the opportunities and strategies of those who shape symbolic politics.

This article traces several tendencies in post-Soviet Russia in the political use of the past in official symbolic politics. I analyze State of the Nation addresses by Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev, as well as several complementary texts. As official strategic documents covering approximately the same range of political issues, annual State of the Nation addresses are particularly helpful for studying shifts in the official presentation of and justification for a political course. The documents for this study are relevant because they reflect major trends in using (or not using) the past to legitimize power.

***Representing the collective past:
State of the Nation addresses, 1994–2010***

All Russian presidential addresses refer to the national past for a variety of reasons. The greatest number – 46 references to various events, processes, phenomena, and figures in Russian history – were found in six addresses by Boris Yeltsin; 22 references were uncovered in eight addresses by Vladimir Putin; and 15 were noted in three addresses by Dmitry Medvedev. Although Yeltsin’s addresses were typically twice as long (or more) as those of his two successors, the main reason for his numerous references to the past is that he consistently represented himself as a political leader who changed the course of Russian history: “The major job of my life is finished. Russia will never regain its past – Russia will always move only forward. And I shall not stand in the way of this natural flow of history.¹”

It seems that Yeltsin had a special and intimate attitude towards history, while the approaches of Putin and Medvedev are not as emotional. Yet the most significant differences between the addresses concern particular references to the past and its interpretation.


¹ Yeltsin B.N. Zajavlenie Borisa Yeltsina = Statement by Boris Yeltsin. – 1999. – 31 December. – Mode of access: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24080>.

Presidential addresses have included references to historical figures, mostly from culture and science, since 1999, when Yeltsin quoted Alexander Solzhenitsyn about the need “to save the people,” suggesting that this could become Russia’s “national idea.” Putin referred to the philosopher Ivan Ilyin (twice), the scholar Dmitry Likhachev (three times), and Solzhenitsyn (again in the context of “saving the people”). Dmitry Medvedev mentioned Pyotr Stolypin, Boris Chicherin, Vassily Leontyev, Nikolai Nekrasov, Anton Chekhov, Yuri Gagarin, and Anna Akhmatova. Analysis shows that there is an obvious tendency to appeal to modern (and even recent) history rather than to reinterpret a previous era.

References are not uniform with regard to historical periods (see Table 1); specific events, processes, and phenomena are mentioned more in the Soviet (28%) and post-Soviet (20%) periods. Only five percent of references relate to the pre-Soviet period.

Politicians refer to the past for different reasons in discussions of political strategy. The most important goals are to demonstrate continuity between the past and the present (legitimization by tradition) and to highlight differences between the present and the past for the benefit of either the former (to underscore present achievements) or the latter (usually to justify the need for change or to explain the reasons behind current difficulties and failures).

Table 1. References to events, processes, phenomena, and figures in Russian history in State of the Nation addresses, 1994-2010



Note: The length of presidential addresses vary: Yeltsin made the longest addresses (from approximately 12,600 words in 1996 when Yeltsin was ill, to almost 21,000 words in 1999). Putin delivered the shortest addresses (about 5,000 words; an exception was a concluding address in 1999, which contained about 8,000 words). Medvedev’s addresses ranged from 7,000 to 9,800 words.

Boris Yeltsin

The theme of continuity/discontinuity of tradition prevails in references to the past in Yeltsin's addresses. Specifically, the reforms started under his leadership were portrayed as the restoration of continuity in national history that was interrupted during Soviet rule: "The totalitarian ideology... which dominated for decades, has collapsed. Instead, an awareness of a natural historical and cultural continuity is coming" (1994).

Yeltsin's addresses often describe the present in a more positive light than the past (16 out of 46 references are critical). "Now as never before Russians have broader opportunities to share the original values of Russian and world culture" (1995).

Yeltsin's critical assessments mostly concerned the Soviet legacy and he blamed this legacy for the "super-strict mobilization model of development," the "stagnant economic system," and the "annihilation of civil society, nascent democracy, and private property" (1996). In addressing the recent Soviet past, Yeltsin wanted to justify his own policy, explaining the dire need for radical and traumatic reforms as the result of "problems that Russia had inherited from the past" (1996). In this way Yeltsin wanted to share the responsibility for unpopular reforms with the Soviet leadership. This is the main reason for the large number of critical assessments in referring to reforms during the Khrushchev era and perestroika.

But the root of many problems today lies in pre-Soviet history: "Tsarist Russia, overwhelmed by the burden of its own historical problems, failed to enter the path towards democracy." This fact determined "the radicalism of the Russian revolutionary process" and finally resulted in the break with historical tradition (1996).

The new political tasks were conceived of as a change of tradition rather than continuity. At the end of the 1990s Russia was represented not as a common denominator of previous historical experience, but as a new Russia. The ruling elite in the 1990s (un)consciously interrupted tradition by rejecting the previous era's values and objectives.

There were relatively few positive moments in the national past that Yeltsin mentioned in his addresses. Yeltsin pointed out Russia's

ability to overcome difficulties, the great potential of its people, the country's ability to preserve its best qualities (through diligence and talent) in spite of overwhelming odds (1996), and Russia's immunity to pessimism (1999). Only once, in 1996, were democratic principles recognized as part of Russian historical heritage: "The traditions of people's rule is an innate part of the Russian people" (1996).

Although Yeltsin mentioned Russia's pre-revolutionary history more often than Putin and Medvedev did, his appeals to restore historical and cultural continuity were not supported by references to concrete elements of Russia's historical heritage, which modern Russia should rely on. The tendency to use the past by contrasting it with the present clearly prevailed over a desire to firmly establish a political course steeped in national history.

Vladimir Putin

Putin continued to develop the topic of continuity and change. Remarkably, in his first address Putin said: "Today, when we go forward, it is more important to look to the future than to remember the past" (2000). A year later, however, he turned to history to authenticate stability, the key principle of his political course, incorporating it in the historical context "... revolution is usually followed by counter-revolution, reforms – by counter-reforms... But... this cycle is over, there will be no more revolutions nor counter-revolutions" (2001). Thus Putin also represented his course as a new path, one that was not typical of the Russian historical tradition. Whereas for Yeltsin the Soviet period was the main point of reference in the context of legitimizing the political course (totalitarianism and perestroika as "a failed reform"), for Putin it was the 1990s (see Table 1). He contrasted his policy of "stability" to the radicalism of the previous decade.

Remarkably, Putin's references to the 1990s changed with time. In his 2004 address, along with a critical assessment of the 1990s, Putin defined this period as the beginning of a long and difficult process, a stage of "dismantling the former economic system." In 2005, Putin stepped up his attacks and directly targeted the authorities ("groups of oligarchs... served exclusively their own corporate interests" (2005)),

instead of the problems society faced, as was the case in his 2004 address.

Therefore, on the one hand Putin confirmed the continuity of the political course and his commitment to the ideals of the 1990s. On the other hand, he insisted that Russia should take another path from that of the previous decade and emphasized the difference in the methods used to implement the task.

Putin's addresses during his second term also reveal a change in his attitude towards the Soviet past. In 2000, Putin was ready to adopt several Soviet state symbols, including "the old national anthem" (although with new lyrics) and the Soviet flag for the military. However, in his 2005 address, Putin made a sensational statement and said the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the century" (which contrasted with Yeltsin's repeated sharp interpretations). This statement should be looked at as a shift in the interpretation of the imperial past, which had become especially evident by the mid-2000s.

In the same address, delivered just two weeks before the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, Putin presented the meaning of the victory in broad humanistic terms. He defined the Soviet Union's victory as "the day civilization triumphed over fascism," and described the Red Army as "soldiers of freedom." This interpretation could be viewed as a further development of the thesis announced a few minutes earlier concerning Russia's commitment to European values: "For many centuries the values of freedom, human rights, justice, and democracy, achieved through much suffering by European culture, were a key point of value reference for our society" (2005).

Since the mid-2000s, the topic of World War II has played a key role in Russia's symbolic politics with regard to foreign countries and it has turned into an object of competing interpretations.

The addresses of all three presidents frequently mention World War II. The context of these references is different: in some cases the references are related to current political and social problems, such as fighting extremist organizations (in 1995), providing pensions to veterans (in 1995), maintaining the armed forces (2006), or the patriotic education of the young generation (2010). In the other cases references to World War II are embodied with a special symbolic meaning, like in

the 2005 address quoted above. Remarkably, Medvedev also contributed to the symbolic use of the war theme, interpreting it as a pledge of success for Russia's modernization: "We are of the same blood with those who won the victory, so we all are their heirs; that is why I believe in the new Russia" (2009)).

In eight of Putin's addresses there are seven more references to history as a continuing tradition. What aspects of tradition were significant for the legitimization of Putin's political course?

First, the idea of a "strong state" as the basis for Russia's past and future greatness. In his 2003 address, Putin spoke of Russia's ability as a heroic deed to "maintain the state in a vast space, a unique community of people and – at the same time – [preserve] the country's powerful position in the world." However, in the public discourse, Russia's vast territory is interpreted both as a sign of greatness and as a source of problems, particularly as a factor determining the costly mobilization economic development model. By referring to Russia's "continued reproduction of itself as a strong state" (2003), Putin was clearly legitimizing his course for "strengthening the state" through national historical tradition.

Second, the idea of unity as a principle that limits political competition. The main goal of Putin's symbolic policy was a call for "consolidation." In his first State of the Nation address, Putin, speaking about Russia's unity ("fastened by patriotism, cultural traditions, and a shared historical memory that is peculiar to the people") specified his position: "In spite of many views, opinions, and a diversity of party platforms, we have always had common values" (2000). Putin reiterated this position in 2008: "Political parties must be aware of their great responsibility for... unity of the nation and stability of the development of our country. However heated political battles may get ... they are never worth bringing the country to the brink of chaos."

Dmitry Medvedev

Although Medvedev did not refer to the past very much in his addresses, the times he did do so appear to be more significant, since he rarely defined 'Us' against the 'Others' (by which Russians usually

mean the West). The second specific feature of his approach to the past is a critical assessment of tradition. In fact, Medvedev proclaimed a selective approach to tradition. In his 2009 article “*Russia, Forward!*” Medvedev explicitly stated that “not all traditions are useful” and some of them should be “gotten rid of resolutely”¹. He also provided examples of wrong traditions that were successfully eliminated: “Serfdom and widespread illiteracy once seemed irresistible. But they were overcome.” The same interpretation of tradition is present in Medvedev’s presidential addresses. In 2008, he expressed regret that “over centuries the cult of the state and the pseudo-wisdom of the executive dominated in Russia. An individual, his rights and freedoms, his personal interests and problems were perceived, at best, as a means of, and, at worst, as an obstacle to strengthening the state’s power.”

Like his predecessors, Medvedev appealed to a “thousand-year history” to legitimize his most difficult and important decisions. In his 2008 address, speaking about society’s “understanding” of the government’s move towards war with Georgia and the first phase of the economic crisis he concluded: “It could not be otherwise with a people with a thousand-year history who mastered and civilized a huge territory... created a unique culture and a powerful economic and military potential.” Medvedev’s statement is remarkably reminiscent of Putin’s phrase about “maintaining the state in the extensive space” quoted above.

Medvedev sought to legitimize his political course by comparing it to the (recent) past. In 2009, he presented a modernization policy as “the first in Russia’s historical experience of modernization based on the values and institutions of democracy.” In this context the main point of reference was Soviet modernization, which Medvedev assessed positively: “at the expense of enormous effort an agrarian, practically illiterate country turned into one of the most influential industrial powers of the time.” On the other hand, Medvedev criticized it for being incomplete: “in conditions of a closed society and a totalitarian political regime, these positions could not be preserved.”

¹ Rossiya, vperyod! Stat’ya Dmitriya Medvedeva = Russia, Forward! The Article by Dmitry Medvedev. – 2009. – 10 September. – Mode of access: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413>

Medvedev made the same argument earlier in Russia, *Forward!*, in which he discusses not only the Soviet experience, but also the modernization course set by Peter the Great. Remarkably, the experience of the 2000s also became a matter of mild criticism: proclaiming the government's modernization policy in September 2009, Medvedev stated that the results of the previous policy were not satisfactory, as the decisions "only reproduced the current model without developing it. They do not change the established order of life. They preserve the wrong habits." Thus, justifying current policy by contrasting the present to the past may be considered a stable element of policy statements by all Russian presidents.

Lack of historical narrative

The collective past is used in presidential addresses to both firmly establish the present political course in the national tradition and to justify it through a critical reassessment of previous experience. The critique is aimed mostly at concrete events and processes in the recent past, whereas positive references to history are mostly of a general character and concern "centuries-long people's traditions," "Russia's thousand years of history," "our great culture," etc.

The lack of a symbolic repertoire in presidential addresses is partly explained by a mismatch between the idea about the past that dominated the minds of the elite and the public consciousness, and the present tasks of symbolic politics. As Vyacheslav Morozov aptly noted, in the early 1990s Russia did not have a "historical narrative that would work as an alternative to the imperial narrative and could provide a basis for its self-identification as a nation state"¹. The situation has not changed much since then: it is no accident that the public does not typically have a favorable view of past events. A survey by the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology in 2007 reveals that the number of historical figures and historical events that stir pride in

¹ Morozov V. *Rossia i Drugie : identichnost' i granitsy politicheskogo soobshchestva* = *Russia and Others : Identity and the Boundaries of Political Community* // *Novoe Literaturnoe obozrenie*. – Moscow, 2009. – P. 580.

Russians is extremely limited. Only four items from the list received the support of more than half of the respondents: 67 percent said that they are proud of the Soviet Union's victory in World War II; 61 percent are pleased with the postwar restoration of the country's economy; 56 percent take pride in great Russian poets, writers, and composers; and 54 percent are happy with the success of the Soviet space industry. These figures are indicative of the deficiency of the official symbolic policy which follows public perceptions of meaningful elements of the collective past, instead of creating new perspectives for interpreting the collective past, present, and future.

Of course the development of narrative(s) of a national past is primarily the task of professional historians. But the political elite should also do its part by introducing symbols of the past in the public discourse and taking part in reinterpreting them. It is clear that developing a symbolic repertoire to positively assess the national past was not a priority for those who prepared the annual presidential addresses. Although the speechwriters were aware of the significance of publicly using the past as a rhetorical method of dealing with history, they obviously preferred to confine themselves to those symbols of the national past that seemed undisputable. Yet the list of symbols is quite short for a transforming society with a long experience of an "unpredictable past." Why the ruling class has avoided an official evaluation of the disputed issues is a subject for a separate, more detailed analysis of post-Soviet symbolic politics.

Such an approach to using the past for political pursuits has at least two empirically evident implications. First, in criticizing the past and refusing to expand the inventory to reassess the problem pages of national history, the ruling elite actually reproduces the cultural algorithm of "the break with tradition," which has been typical of Russia since the 18th century. Second, there is a limited inventory of historical symbols available that could work as pillars for a positive national identity. Therefore the Soviet Union's victory in World War II becomes the central historical symbol that is loaded (and overloaded) with new meanings.

A. Miller

The Invention of Tradition.

*The St. George Ribbon and Other Symbols
in the Context of Historical Policy*¹

(2012)

The ribbon of St. George

The Ribbon of St. George, which was re-invented by the Moscow-based news agency RIA Novosti in 2005², is an example of a political symbol closely tied to historical policy.

A number of sensitive political problems accompanied the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in 2005. In the 2000s, the Russian authorities began emphasizing the Soviet victory in World War II, which remains the only historical myth invoking similar, if not identical, emotions among the majority of Russians. Russia deemed it essential for international politics to re-assert the role of the Soviet Union (and Russia as its successor) in the victory over Nazi Germany. Tellingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin invited more than fifty world leaders to attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow.

¹ Source: Miller A. The Invention of Tradition. The St. George Ribbon and Other Symbols in the Context of Historical Policy // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2012. – Vol. 10, N 2. – P. 64–73.

² V Moskve nachnetsya aktsiya “Povyazhi Georgievskuyu lentochku” = In Moscow, the Campaign “Tie the St. George Ribbon” Will be Launched // RIA Novosti. – 2005. – 14 April. – Mode of access: <https://ria.ru/20050414/39666047.html>

At the same time, the hammer of historical policy pounded out Russia's 'Victory myth' in a number of neighboring countries. The former Soviet Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – interpret the events of May 1945 as the start of a new Soviet occupation. The idea that Baltic leaders would visit Moscow for the Victory Day festivities fueled heated political debates and scandals among the Baltic governments and Moscow. As a result, only Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga attended the festivities in Moscow. In Poland, there was political debate over President Alexander Kwasniewski's trip to Russia, while Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who had just gained power through the Orange Revolution, found a polite excuse not to attend.

Given these circumstances, the introduction of the Ribbon of St. George was a successful political move. Prior to the 1917 revolution, the ribbon, which would be given a second life during World War II, had been part of two awards issued to soldiers and non-commissioned officers for valor in the battlefield – the Cross of St. George and the Order of Glory. The St. George's ribbon, with its origins in pre-revolutionary Russia, was not associated with the Socialist past, unlike the Red Banner or other Soviet-era symbols of victory. The ribbon modernized the symbolism of Victory Day and focused attention on the heroism of soldiers, which constituted an indisputable part of the military myth and was deemed acceptable by a much broader spectrum of Russians than the traditional Victory Day symbols tied to the Soviet past.

RIA Novosti staff writers borrowed from two sources when they came up with the St. George's ribbon. Different colored ribbons have been widely used in the past as a convenient and unobtrusive method to rally support during various public and political campaigns. The British have worn poppies since 1920 in remembrance of those killed in World War I and, subsequently, in World War II.

For the British, the poppy is a commemorative symbol that no political elites have ever questioned. The following episode is quite illustrative in this sense: a conflict broke out between the English Football Association and FIFA in the fall of 2011 when England was poised to play a control game. The match was scheduled for the day when the British mark the end of World War I by pinning a red poppy

flower to their coats. The English team wanted to appear on the field with poppies attached to their jerseys, however the FIFA authorities would not allow this, citing regulations that ban political statements on a uniform during a game. A solution was found eventually: the English team entered the field wearing brassards on their arms to which poppies were attached. Deserving special attention in this story is the role of British Prime Minister David Cameron, who claimed that the poppy is a symbol of national consolidation in remembrance of the dead and in caring for veterans.

Cameron must have been quite sincere in believing that the notion ‘political’ is applied only to objects that refer to inter-party struggle. Indeed, poppies do not refer to internal political struggle at all, since all British politicians wear them while laying wreaths during the main annual remembrance ceremony in London. This does not eliminate the symbol’s political nature, though, and any one of the numerous lecturers on political theory, who have lost their jobs in the past year as a result of Tory education reform, could explain this to the prime minister. Rather, the fact testifies to the success of the symbol. It is noteworthy that even separatist parties in Scotland and Wales do not question this political symbol.

It seems the main difference between the St. George’s ribbon and Britain’s remembrance poppy is that the British buy the flower to provide financial support to veterans’ shelters. In 2007, a total of £25 million was raised through poppy sales at a cost of £1 per flower. By contrast, the ribbons are handed out for free in Russia. A statute on the ribbons cunningly states that the ribbons should not be used as political symbols, yet their political nature is much more obvious than that of the British poppies. Already in 2006 the public distribution campaign of the ribbons had turned into a political action campaign under the auspices of the central and regional authorities. For example, the St. Petersburg city budget has spent eight million rubles annually for this purpose since 2008.

The Russian Foreign Ministry conducted the distribution campaign in 2012, and, prior to that, its representations abroad handed out ribbons. Tellingly, immediately after its recent appearance the St. George’s ribbon began to be used in countries neighboring Russia as a symbol of support for the “Russian world” [the worldwide

community of people who recognize their close connections with the Russian language, worldview, history, and culture – Ed.]. Since communist symbols are vehemently rejected in these countries, the “non-communist” nature of the St. George’s ribbon was particularly appropriate and the symbol became popular with the local pro-Russian public. In Ukraine, pro-Russian movements have competed for the past several years to make the longest or the widest ribbon. Records were set in Simferopol, where a 50-meter-long ribbon was unfolded in 2009¹, and in Sevastopol, where a ribbon 300 meters long was made². The Moldovan capital Chisinau took over the lead in May 2011 when a ribbon stretching 360 meters was unveiled.

Activists from Ukraine’s radical nationalistic Vilnost (Freedom) movement, driven by anti-Russian sentiment, tore ribbons from World War II veterans who had gone to lay flowers at monuments to Soviet soldiers in Lviv³. In Latvia, nationalists compiled lists of the license plates of cars displaying St. George’s ribbons and said “data on the fifth column would be handed over to the security agencies.”⁴ Sources indicate that the Estonian authorities instructed the mass media covertly to hush up distribution of the ribbons.

Thus, like any successfully devised symbol, the St. George’s ribbon conveys a number of meanings in countries neighboring Russia. It is a reaction to “historical revisionism,” which challenges the myth of the Great Patriotic War. Now that many communist images have disappeared, the ribbon offers a way to demonstrate solidarity with

¹ Samaya bolshaya v mire Georgievskaya lentochka sdelana v Simferopole = World’s Biggest St George Ribbon Made in Simferopol // RIA Novosti. – 2009. – 8 May. – Mode of access: <https://ria.ru/20090508/170381613.html>

² Po tsentralnoy ulitse Sevastopolya pronesli georgievskuyu lentu dlinoy 300 metrov = On the Central Street of Sevastopol Carried St. George Ribbon 300 Meters Long // NEWSru.com. – 2010. – 7 May. – Mode of access: <https://www.newsru.com/world/07may2010/lenta.html>

³ Lvovskie natsionalisti otmetili Den pobedy = Lviv Nationalists Celebrated Victory Day // Kommersant. – 2011. – 10 May. – Mode of access: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1637359>

⁴ Natsionalisti Latvii prizyvayut “neloyalnykh zhyteley” uhat v RF = Latvian Nationalists Urge “Disloyal Residents” to Leave for Russia // RIA Novosti. – 2010. – 1 Mar. – Mode of access: <https://ria.ru/20100301/211452015.html>

Russia. Finally, it serves as a means of political self-identification in a specific political environment.

However, the symbol has a few problems, including its close connection with the Russian government; i.e. when the popularity of the government falls, the attractiveness of the symbol will also wane. While the communists were practically the only force to criticize the St. George's ribbon when it was first unveiled, now more and more criticism is coming from the liberal opposition, which says the symbol is turning into a governmental instrument. Defenders of the ribbon have set up their own website and say they are protecting the symbol from profanation that turns the action into kitsch.

A curious situation has taken shape in recent months with the introduction of the white ribbon on the Russian political stage as an anti-Putin symbol. The ribbon's designers clearly drew their inspiration from the success of the St. George's ribbon. Simultaneously, government leaders who have become the main targets of criticism leveled by the protest movement are using the St. George's ribbon more and more actively. Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev wore the ribbons at the Victory Day parade in 2012, and Putin had a ribbon pinned to the lapel of his jacket when he introduced Medvedev to the State Duma as the future prime minister. It is not at all clear yet how people sporting a white ribbon will resolve the problem of its similarity to the St. George's ribbon. Some will certainly ascribe the latter to regime-fostered symbols, yet other opinions are possible as well. Recently, I saw a young woman walking down a Moscow boulevard who had a white ribbon woven into one plait of her hair and a St. George's ribbon in the other. The first case shows a renunciation of a tarnished state symbol, while the second may indicate a readiness to argue with the authorities over the right to the symbol.

Above all, the seven years since the institution of the St. George's ribbon have shown the success of a skillfully plotted political symbol that in many ways is attractive because it refers to historical symbols and collective memory. Secondly, this is the story of the gradual imposition of the first non-communist symbol of World War II in Russia, which has acquired an additional meaning of Russian identity and/or friendliness towards Russia in the former Soviet republics. Also, this is an instructive story of how a close association

with a political regime that is losing popularity can undermine the attractiveness of a national symbol.

The Ukrainian famine and the candle of memory

The candle, as a symbol of remembrance and one related to Christian symbology, has had a rich tradition in many countries. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed a decree on November 26, 1998 declaring the fourth Saturday of each November as a day of commemoration for the victims of the Ukrainian famine in 1932–1933. The first action was held in 2003 and was conceived of as a nationwide remembrance for those who had died in the famine. Participants set candles and lamps on monuments to famine victims and lit candles on the windowsills of their homes.

The Holodomor, the man-made famine in Ukraine in 1932–1933, is still a touchy political issue in that country. Some Ukrainian emigrants believe the famine should be viewed as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Ukrainians gradually began to believe this notion, however, the authorities did not play up the genocide theme until 2005, when President Viktor Yushchenko made it a key element of his historical policy. He wanted the international community to recognize the Ukrainian famine as a deliberate act of genocide. Inside the country, Yushchenko made every effort to officially establish this interpretation of the famine. In 2006, the Ukrainian parliament, under pressure from Yushchenko's faction, adopted a law on the Holodomor that qualified the famine as genocide and declared any denial of this 'fact' as immoral and unlawful. Moreover, Yushchenko and the parliamentarians representing his faction would later submit a number of bills making it a criminal offense to deny the famine as an act of genocide, punishable for up to three years in jail. Subsequently, there was an intense propaganda campaign in Ukraine and commemorative books containing the victims' names were published quickly. Yushchenko and his political associates worked hard to legitimize the groundless claim that seven to ten million people had died during the famine, thus implying that more people died in the famine than in the Holocaust.

The official campaign concerning the Holodomor culminated in 2008, the 75th anniversary of the famine. An important part of the propaganda efforts was a 1.5-meter long candle that burned continuously and resembled a sheaf of spikes. The candle, made of beeswax collected from across Ukraine and weighing 200 kilograms, traveled around the globe as part of an action called “Ukraine Remembers, the World Recognizes,” the aim of which was to get government and parliaments of various countries to recognize the Holodomor as an act of genocide. In all, the candle traveled to 33 countries, which corresponds to 1933, the year when the greatest number of people died during the famine. The gigantic candle was taken around Ukrainian cities with instructions from the presidential administration to the local authorities on how to hold the ‘welcoming ceremonies’ for the candle¹.

On November 22, 2008, a memorial complex was opened during a lavish ceremony near the Kiev Pechersk Lavra, or Caves Monastery. The central element of the memorial is the Candle of Remembrance, a 32-meter-tall concrete chapel. The opening was timed to an international forum that commemorated the Ukrainian genocide in 1932–1933 called “Ukraine Remembers, the World Recognizes.” The giant candle became an exhibit in the memorial’s museum.

The candle was a central symbol in Yushchenko’s appeal to the global Ukrainian community and the international community at large on the occasion of the anniversary. Yushchenko said: “I am addressing you on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the most tragic event in the history of the Ukrainian people – the Holodomor of 1932 and 1933. [...] The truth about this genocide, purposely committed by the Stalin regime on the blessed soil of Ukraine, has found its way to broad daylight. [...] Ukraine is able to speak in a loud voice about an attempt on the life of an entire nation committed back in the 1930s only after it has shaken off the yoke of communist totalitarianism. [...] I would like to express profound gratitude for humanism and solidarity with the millions of innocent victims of the genocide. [...] We are not speaking

¹ Ivahnenko V. Ukraina skorbit o zhertvah golodomora = Ukraine Mourns for the Victims of the Holodomor // Radio Svoboda. – 2008. – 22 November. – Mode of access: <https://www.svoboda.org/a/474123.html>

about things that the world could have done 75 years ago had it known the whole truth. We are speaking about what the world might do today as a sign of respect for the dead and for those who survived the perils of the Holodomor. On November 22, millions of candles will be lit by people in Kiev in memory of their fellow Ukrainians tortured to death in the famine. They will merge with the candle's inextinguishable flame that has traveled to 33 countries and all over Ukraine, and thus has imbued the fire burning in the hearts of caring representatives of various countries and peoples."¹

This was how the historical policy pursued during Yushchenko's presidency made the candle the central symbol of the Holodomor as a specific cultural and political reality, or rather turned it into a symbol of symbols. Lighting candles on the day of commemorating the famine was an event loaded with political meaning and was transformed from a symbol of remembrance into a symbol of support for interpreting the events as genocide. Similar to the situation with the Ribbon of St. George, overt exploitation of the candle symbol as an instrument of historical policy has dealt a blow to its ethical attractiveness.

The Smolensk cross

Poland has a centuries-long tradition of using the Christian cross as a political symbol. The first conflict related to the politicized use of the cross in the post-communist era occurred on October 20, 1997 when two Polish MPs representing the Solidarity Electoral Action party, fresh from winning an election, but not the majority in parliament, hung a cross over the entrance to the parliament's session hall. This was an arbitrary act, since the Sejm, as the parliament of a secular state, had not passed any decisions to that effect. Moreover, the Solidarity deputies knew that they would not have an opportunity to form a majority in support of their action. Yet their strategy proved successful. Those who opposed religious symbols in the parliament did not initiate

¹ Kasianov G. Dance macabre : golod 1932–1933 rokiv u politycy, masovii svidomosti ta istoriografii (1980-ti – pochatok 2000-h) = Dance Macabre: the Famine of 1932–1933 in Politics, Mass Consciousness and Historiography (1980s – early 2000s). – Kyiv : Institut istorii Ukrainy : Nash Chas, 2010.

debates on the issue, and the cross was not removed. It was only after the 2011 parliamentary election that Janusz Palikot, whose Palikot's Movement party surprisingly came in third in the election with a blatant anti-church program, promised to start a discussion on whether the cross was appropriate for the parliament. Moreover, Palikot promised to begin hearings on the issue at the Constitution Court. The church hierarchy was quick to react. During the celebrations of the 33rd anniversary of Karol Wojtyła's election as Pope John Paul II, an announcement was made that the Roman Catholic Church would organize a tour of the pope's cross around Polish cities. This tour was a response to what the church found to be negative treatment by some politicians of Christian symbols and values.

Against this background, the so-called Smolensk Cross played a central role as a Polish symbol in 2010–2011. A jet carrying Polish President Lech Kaczyński and other top members of the Polish government crashed on April 10, 2010 outside Russia's Smolensk, killing everyone on board. In the days of mourning after the tragedy, an ad-hoc wooden cross was set up near the presidential palace in Warsaw by a Polish scout organization. Mourners flocked to this cross to pray, lay flowers, or light candles to honor the victims. When the official mourning period was over, the police attempted to move the cross from the square in front of the presidential palace to nearby St. Anne's Church, but they encountered fierce resistance from allies of the Kaczyński brothers and the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) Party. These groups quickly organized a "movement of the defenders of the Cross" that insisted on keeping it near the presidential palace. The groups even refused to hand the cross over to the scout organization. The Smolensk Cross changed from an object of mourning into a political symbol.

The crash occurred shortly before a scheduled presidential election in Poland, in which Kaczyński and Bronisław Komorowski, the speaker of the parliament, were expected to have taken part. Komorowski took up the presidential duties after Kaczyński's death in accordance with the constitution. After this transfer of power, Lech Kaczyński's brother Jarosław became Komorowski's main political opponent. Jarosław Kaczyński and his Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Party tried to gain the maximum political advantages from this situation.

They were partly assisted in this by Polish church officials, since the party positions itself as the main defender of the “religious foundations of Polish society.” For instance, Jaroslaw Kaczynski said: “The Cross was present in the halls of all the sessions of Polish parliaments, and that is very important for us. The crucifix is our value and tradition, and those who want to destroy it are actually seeking to destroy our society and our people. We must put up firm resistance to them.” The church’s stance made it possible to bury Lech Kaczynski in Krakow’s Wawel Cathedral alongside Polish kings. The Kaczynski brothers’ supporters have conscientiously construed a cult around the deceased president as a political instrument.

In the summer of 2010, after Komorowski was elected president, the presidential administration decided to relocate the Smolensk Cross to St. Anne’s Church. In explaining their position, Komorowski and his supporters said the territory surrounding the presidential palace should be neutral and free, including from religious symbols. The administration proposed installing a commemorative plaque on a wall of the palace instead of the cross.

However, in view of parliamentary elections slated for the fall of 2011, the “Defend the Smolensk Cross” slogan was again turned into an important political tool as a symbol of a “true president” in the presidential palace, now occupied by Komorowski. The supporters of the cross rejected the idea of a commemorative plaque and demanded the construction of a full-scale monument in front of the palace. Jaroslaw Kaczynski took part in a rally on September 10, 2010 near the palace and warned that he would file a lawsuit against the Warsaw municipal authorities after they had put up barriers impeding access to the cross. The “Defenders of the Cross” movement drew support from a considerable number of Catholic bishops, including the archbishops of Gdansk and Przemysl. The Smolensk Cross also fitted perfectly into the foreign policy rhetoric of the Kaczynski party. The cross underscored the Kaczynski brothers’ policy of holding up the victims of the Katyn massacre as martyrs, along with their anti-Russian mindset and skepticism towards the post-Christian EU.

Yet the opponents of keeping the cross on the square mobilized as well. Young Poles, driven by anti-Kaczynski and anti-bishopric sentiments, organized through Facebook and staged a thousands-strong

meeting in the Krakowskie Przedmiescie Street in Warsaw to demand that the cross be relocated. Participants in the action apparently mocked the fans of the cross, as they carried slogans like ‘Remove the Palace – It Blocks the Cross!’” Later many of the protesters voted for Palikot, who had promised to remove the cross.

The defenders only scaled back their activity after Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc lost the parliamentary election. The cross was removed in November 2011, after the cross’s defenders had stopped guarding it around the clock. At first, it was moved to a chapel in the presidential palace, and then to St. Anne’s Church. The cross is no longer used as a political symbol, although one cannot rule out that it will be taken out of the church some day and will be carried at the head of a demonstration once again.

* * *

All of these recent symbols have several common features: firstly, their success in many ways hinges on the use of a potent historical tradition, which is true of the Ribbon of St. George, not to mention the candle and the cross; secondly, allusions to martyrology are a crucial element of their emotional impact; and thirdly, the proponents of symbols invariably reject their political nature. Finally, and most importantly, the clearer the connection is between a symbol and a certain political force, the more limited is its impact on those who do not support that force. All the cases we have analyzed above demonstrate that intensive use of symbols by specific political forces ultimately undermines their legitimacy.

O. Malinova
“Spiritual Bonds” as State Ideology.
*Opportunities and Limitations*¹
(2014)

Article 13 of the Russian constitution contains a clause banning any state or compulsory ideology. The authors of the constitution had hoped such a clause would prevent a repeat of the Soviet indoctrination experience. In the last two decades, however, questions have been raised repeatedly about whether the Russian government’s ideological practices have gone too far. At the same time some have called for taking another look at this constitutional provision (which cannot be changed through the amendment process). Both views reflect a discord between commitment to the document and actual practice.

Does a state need an ideology? If not, how can it compensate for a “shortage of spiritual bonds?” Or if it does, how should the state develop and use this ideology? The notion of “ideology” is ambiguous, and the diversity of its manifestations adds no clarity to ongoing speculation.

If we understand ideology *as collectively shared ideas of social order and a strategy to maintain or change it*, which make government decisions legitimate, then modern politics certainly needs ideologies. Government decision-making in the modern era requires public explanations or justification. In fact, in the modern era it was the

¹ Source: Malinova O. “Spiritual Bonds” as State Ideology. Opportunities and Limitations // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2014. –Vol. 12, N4. – P. 155–162.

development of power-sharing institutions – the parliament and the press – as key channels of this public communication that gave impetus to the emergence of classical “isms” normally associated with the word “ideology.” That is, the political elite, including its ruling segment, cannot but appeal to certain established and recognizable systems of meanings. The quality of the latter, including the degree of their consistency, depends upon a combination of many factors.

Pro-government politicians unquestionably have more leverage to thrust upon society the systems of meanings they share, and this opens up many opportunities for “unfair competition.” Consequently, the claim that “a state should not have an ideology” can hardly be serious in the sense that official statements should not lean upon a certain system of values and notions (which always has its supporters and critics).

There is also an obvious “abuse-of-power potential” to weaken opponents’ competitive opportunities as far as limiting ideological pluralism with a ban on publically stating certain ideas. This would make the above constitutional article a warning not to cross the red line: the ruling elite has no right to use state instruments of coercion to impose their ideas or forbid people from expressing different opinions.

Yet our arguments over ideology are not limited to legitimate forms of governance. In fact, they have to do with the problem of inconsistency between the format of public demands for “systems of meanings” and opportunities to meet these demands.

After “Big Ideologies”

The era of ideological pluralism in post-Soviet Russia coincided with the end of “big ideologies.” Incomplete (“molecular” or “mini”) ideologies addressing a limited range of problems and having no global vision ambitions characteristic of classical “isms” became increasingly important in determining political divides in a majority of democratic countries due to social, political, and technological reasons.

Yet this does not mean that the big “isms” disappear without a trace; in any case, they serve as a starting point. However, when society is structured like a layer cake and mass communication technologies

tend to take almost as much care of “the wrapper” of information as of its content, you can hardly expect the appearance of systemic or integral worldviews.

“Old” and “new” ideologies can interact if their traditions are maintained. In Russia in the late 1980s-early 1990s, however, “isms” were built from scratch, with Marxism-Leninism remaining the only “old” ideology. In fact, it needed adjusting too because of changes in the context. New ideologies were largely invented by adapting the modern Western experience, and, to a lesser extent, by selective reconstruction of domestic intellectual traditions. In both cases the end product depended on the capabilities of the post-Soviet elite, which regrettably was integrated into the world intellectual space far worse than Russian intellectuals before the Bolshevik Revolution. The post-Soviet elite had a poor knowledge of Russian history and, unexpected as it may seem of people with a Soviet background, was poorly prepared for ideological creativity.

On top of that, the configuration of the political system designed in 1993 did little to motivate political elites towards ideological work. The fact that the relationship between the articulation of public ideas and access to government jobs (especially implementing the proposed course) has been steadily weakening over the past two decades could not but impact the quality of “supply” of these ideas. The generation of meanings relies heavily on new projects in spin doctoring, and few politicians succeed in laying out long-term strategies in their public speeches.

At the same time, the scope of changes experienced by society has generated the demand for ideologies/worldviews. They were required to not only support the “technical” program of reforms (there was no shortage of this kind of proposed ideas), but also deliver cultural and emotionally acceptable meaningful frameworks to imagine society standing behind the new Russian state. I believe the inconsistency of “products” presented on the “market of ideas” with this mass demand largely caused what Putin called a “lack of spiritual bonds” in his state-of-the-nation address to the Federal Assembly in 2012.

Russia does not lack “good ideas.” But there is an obvious gap between the normative understanding of ideology based on the Soviet experience – that is, as an instrument of integration – and post-Soviet

ideological practices. The cacophony of rival mini-ideologies sharply contrasts with reminiscences about the “complete and consolidated” system of beliefs that used to be supported by a ramified state and Party propaganda network.

Calls for inventing a “state” or “national” ideology to consolidate a society torn apart by discord are clearly nostalgic for the lost utopia. At the same time, viewing any manifestation of government symbolic policy as a “return of official ideology” indicates a persistent fear of centralized indoctrination. In any case, the government is viewed as the key player in this field.

To what extent did the ruling elite’s ideological initiatives provide reasons for such hopes or apprehensions? The topic of “state ideology” was first raised in 1996, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin suggested working out a “national idea” after several years of demonstrative ideological “neutrality.”

The issue was not raised for the sake of a formal solution. The government took on the role of initiator and organizer of public discussion, which, however, did not yield the expected accord. The zero-sum principle practiced by rival political groups prevailed over calls for unity. Given the previous Soviet experience, the stakes seemed to be too high to compromise over principles.

Admittedly, when the media were actively using the frame of ideological confrontation between “the Democrats” and “the Communists,” the head of state did not show much enthusiasm about accord. While refusing to fully share the Democrats’ guidelines, he did not miss the chance to criticize their opponents.

Caught in the conflict-ridden pluralism of the 1990s, the Russian political class was unable to cope with the production of meanings capable of consolidating a macro-political society. In the 2000s, a course was taken towards reaching “consensus at the top level” by restricting pluralism in the “heart” of the public sphere. Simultaneously, the authorities attempted to introduce a sort of “incomplete” ideology integrating parts of different discourses.

The strategy proved to be quite successful for “freezing” symbolic conflicts and consolidating “Putin’s majority” around a set of amorphous ideas, symbols, and gestures that allowed for various interpretations. At the same time, it effectively blocked the emergence

of influential alternative programs capable of consistently structuring public discussions.

The discourse of the pro-Kremlin political elite focused on several key concepts: “a strong state” (2000), “sovereign democracy” (2005), “modernization” (2009), etc., which different actors used in different ways. During Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, the established set of meanings indicated a trend towards “specialization” in its use and further development. However, the Kremlin left unchanged the general guideline for reanimating the hegemony discourse, which integrated ideas popular with society.

Putin’s new course

This strategy was successful because of weak competition from alternative systems of meanings. Clearly this condition was secured by not only symbolic, but also administrative means. It was also backed up by society’s political apathy. However, the protest movement from December 2011 through March 2012 changed the situation: the inarticulate yet clearly visible street opposition undermined the hegemony of government discourse. During the presidential election campaign, Vladimir Putin’s headquarters had to experiment with different approaches to cast their candidate in the volatile ideological frame of reference.

Eventually, the Kremlin selected a modified version of a “unification” strategy envisioning consolidation of Putin’s “patriotic” majority against a “pro-Western” minority. Yet at some point – and a content analysis of Putin’s election articles shows it graphically – the people in power contemplated a version of an “away game” of meanings. The first publications released before the initial mass rally in support of the “key candidate” referred numerous times to “others” in Russia. It was not typical at all of Putin’s rhetoric (because criticizing “others” amounted to recognizing them as real political opponents).

Subsequent publications barely mentioned “others” at home, but the number of references to “others” outside of Russia sharply increased. Therefore, the opposition between Putin and his opponents was cast in the spirit of “patriotic” rhetoric, which offered a convenient

opportunity to avoid discussion of meaningful opinions about the government's policy.

Reinforcing this line, Putin presented the election results at a meeting with his supporters on Manezh Square on March 4, 2012, as a victory over his enemies who only had "one objective in mind: to ruin Russia's statehood and usurp power."

At first it was not clear if exploiting the idea of alliance between "others" inside and outside of Russia was a tactical maneuver (incidentally, it was not new, because it had been used repeatedly since the "color revolutions" of the mid-2000s) or a long-term strategy. It seemed that the degree of Russia's integration in the world economy inhibited the promotion of the "hostile West" topic, because its excessive use delegitimized the Russian elite, deeply involved in international cooperation.

Nevertheless, the first moves of the new government included a crackdown on mass protests (tougher penalties for violations of the law on demonstrations, reinstatement of criminal prosecution for slander, and possible blocking of websites), countermeasures against "external influence" (the law on foreign agents for certain non-government organizations and a ban on the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens), and protection of the Kremlin's understanding of public morals (the law banning homosexual propaganda and harsher penalties for insulting the rights of religious believers).

The campaign to "nationalize the elite" launched in the autumn of 2012 had an obviously "patriotic" undertone, too. Regardless of how effective the new rules were, banning high-placed officials, parliamentarians, and state-run companies' executives from having bank accounts and assets abroad, they were certainly a landmark in terms of the economy: "patriotism" was becoming almost the key principle of legitimizing the elite amid mounting anti-Western rhetoric.

Is this ideological turn accidental? Of course, ideology could be viewed as a veil according to Karl Marx's "false consciousness" theory¹. This veil hides the true intentions of politicians; and in this

¹ Engels F. Letter to F. Mehring // Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels : Selected Works : in Two Vol. – Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949. – Vol. 2. – P. 451.

case the change in ideology has roots in the struggle for material interests. But if we assume that the ideological/symbolic element of the political process has a logic of its own, we have to acknowledge that at the beginning of his third term in office Putin found it necessary to design a more consistent “ideology” to mobilize a “majority” against a “minority.” This might just be the case, as some analysts have begun to talk of “Putinism” emerging before our eyes.

A set of symbolic resources for a new ideology was selected during the first year of Putin’s new presidential term. It certainly has a conservative element if it is understood as a wish to lean on “traditional values” (the proposal to create a standard history textbook for schools) and religion (the law protecting the feelings of religious believers). At a Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin called for “avoiding a vulgar, primitive understanding of secularism.” The problem is that in the Russian context it is not easy to identify a “tradition” that could be used as a reference point, while heavy reliance on orthodoxy in a secular and multi-confessional state is fraught with negative consequences.

Putin’s new ideology has an element of populism suggesting a formal appeal to Demos and democratic principles. Declarations proclaiming the priority of interests of a patriotic majority over the minority critical of the government, or speculations about international norms being non-democratic can serve as examples. As an auxiliary tool, this element lends democratic respectability to the authorities’ actions.

“*Patriotism*” and *imperial nationalism* have been crucial ingredients of the state-supported system of beliefs from the very beginning, as they assert the importance of keeping Russia’s status of a great power for the well-being of its citizens at present and in future. Patriotic rhetoric relies on broadly shared feelings, and appeals to the protection of habitual practices. Thus it can serve as a convenient instrument for mobilization. But because of the pluralism of lifestyles in present-day societies, this “ism” is a shaky foundation for demarcating political boundaries, because one can hardly impose on others a certain way of understanding patriotism as universally-acknowledged without resorting to symbolic violence (which is

happening as part of the securitization technology, to be considered below).

Finally, *anti-Westernism* actually makes up the core of Putin's new ideology, leaning on a well-rooted repertoire of stereotypes. It is easily mobilized and has a good consolidating effect. Admittedly, this resource, if used repeatedly, makes parts of the ideological "equation" much simpler. For example, it rids the government of the inconvenient necessity of demonstrating its commitment to democratic values (even in the spirit of "sovereign democracy"), or allows for using isolationism as a defense against the West's "soft power." Also, anti-Westernism helps finalize a body of "traditional values" which are easier to define as being different from others, rather than by proving their real historical continuity.

The above system of meanings can hardly be viewed as a full-fledged ideology offering a coherent worldview. Rather, it is a fragmented ad hoc construct based on available symbols and primarily intended for consolidating Putin's new majority. However, several elements can appeal to the international audience as well: for example, Putin's statement at the Valdai forum about "whole regions of the world which cannot live according to universal templates" amid the Syrian crisis was certainly meant to evoke a positive response.

However, after the incorporation of Crimea, Russia itself became a violator of international order (it is not accidental that the Kosovo case, which Moscow formerly criticized, now is viewed as a precedent – "We were not the first to do it"). It is hard to say yet whether Russia will be able to find an ideological construct that would combine revisionism with conservative protection of the order and whether it will meet the pragmatic task of justifying its own foreign policy.

The Ukrainian crisis and the incorporation of Crimea have adjusted the symbolic resources used to build the new Putin ideology. There is a growing demand for patriotic rhetoric, while the obvious reluctance of Western partners to heed Russia's arguments and the "war of sanctions" started by the West create fertile ground for the rise of anti-Western sentiment. At the same time, in the conditions of real confrontation with external "others" the modality of patriotic ideas is changing: what earlier had a shade of alarmism is now presented as a

pressing challenge, to which Russia gives a proper response, thus affirming its independence.

Securitization of ideology

In any case, the ruling elite's ideology now has a clearer outline, with stronger odds that state resources will be used to impose it as obligatory amid the mounting foreign policy crisis. Some signs of this scenario are already visible in frenzied propaganda on television, plans to launch lessons in patriotism at educational institutions, and calls to stigmatize dissenters as "national traitors."

Is the return of Soviet indoctrination practices on a new ideological basis possible? I do not think so. Indoctrination is not possible without a doctrine. It requires canonical texts ("landmark" political speeches are not up to the role: they depend on a rapidly changing context and are constantly "re-written" by the orator's new actions) and a hierarchy of people to interpret them. But a mini-ideology, unfit for indoctrination, can serve as an instrument of symbolic violence, if securitized; i.e. tied to the fundamental value of security and presented as a condition for the survival of a political community.

Regrettably, securitized "spiritual bonds" can prove too destructive a weapon: an amorphous ideology open to arbitrary interpretations can become a dangerous instrument for settling political scores. Eventually, it may lead to its symbolic devaluation: the weapon will no longer be effective. Sadly, even the fruitless attempts to reanimate Soviet ideological practices will leave behind grave consequences resembling a "scorched field" of depreciated values.

Modern political communities need ideologies to discuss social problems, identify options, and guide citizens through the labyrinth of politics. The ruling elite has to engage in generating meanings; the more serious it is about this task the better. But in the 21st century it is no good yielding to the temptation of establishing a state or compulsory ideology, even if it seems that this ideology is needed or that such a possibility exists. Not only is the attempt doomed to failure, but also it is counter-productive to designing "spiritual bonds."

A. Miller

Historical memory policy¹

(2014)

Active patriotism is a key element of a nation's human capital. Fostering active patriotism requires a consistent policy of memory, including an integral concept of Russia's past that would meet the strategic task of developing society and the state. The past twenty years have seen inefficient and inconsistent efforts to pursue such a policy. The result has been a semi-Soviet individual with almost no links with or emotional feelings for the history of his country and with no knowledge of it. World War II remains the only basic element of the memory policy; however, its emotional impact cannot but decrease with years. An active, consistent and competent policy of memory is needed. Attempts to do without ideology and without a policy of memory have led to disastrous results as regards the moral state of society. Like the state, society has lost its development vector. Instead of creative diversity, there is a destructive chaos in people's minds.

Core elements of Russia's collective historical memory

History of Russia narrated as a sequence of only horrors and failures or, on the contrary, as a continuous string of victories and

¹ Source: Miller A. Historical Memory Policy // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2014. – Vol. 12, N 1. – P. 177–189.

successes is equally unproductive for forming the individual and collective identity. Historical narrative cannot be flat and reduced to an answer to the question “What should we be proud of?” It also needs to pose the question “What should we be ashamed of?” and give an answer to it. There should be a tragic dimension in it; otherwise emotional involvement will not be achieved.

What elements of historical narrative are crucial and acceptable to all?

First of all, these are Russia’s origins – the rise of Novgorod and Kiev as equal centers of power. This factor suggested the openness of Russian lands to various influences (Northern Europe, Southern Europe – Byzantium, the Steppe) and their ability for synthesis. The acceptance of Christianity from Byzantium was a factor that involved Russia into European traditions, rather than put it in opposition to Europe.

The invasion of Russia by Batu Khan was a catastrophe that changed the vector of its development. The power of the Golden Horde was shaken off as a result of the consolidation of Russian forces.

The consolidation by Ivan III of Russian lands around Moscow and the formation of a strong center of power as a European tradition was crucial for the emergence of Russia’s statehood.

The reign of Ivan IV was the first fall into unproductive authoritarianism, when the authorities used terror as a means of mobilization. It was followed by the defeat in the Livonian War and the Time of Troubles as a consequence. The end of the Time of Troubles was achieved after society united and divisions in the elites and society as a whole were overcome.

Peter the Great’s rule was the culmination of a long process of borrowing European experience for the development of the army, the system of state governance, and culture. The achievements of that period were due to an ability to create positive motivation for the elites, without falling into total terror.

The years 1812–1815 stood not only for the Patriotic War I but also for Alexander I’s role in the creation of a coalition of major European dynasties and the subsequent Concert of great powers which brought Europe decades of peace. Alexander I did not humiliate France and defended the Napoleonic Code from European reactionaries.

In other words, during that period Russia was a definitely positive force in Europe, and not only in military terms.

The 18th-19th centuries saw a successful social and economic development of Russia, the creation of an army that was competitive at the European level, of the first generation of industry in the Urals. Russia developed largely by borrowing foreign expertise and talent – the ability to assimilate foreign experience.

The economy of the late 19th-early 20th century showed a huge growth potential: the beginning of coal mining in the Donbass-Krivoy Rog coal basin; the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway; Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin's reform of land ownership and resettlement program; the creation of scientific and cultural elites of the European level; plans to introduce universal primary education.

The formation of the Russian Empire as a universal form of existence of the great power at the time deserves special attention. The choice was not whether or not the country should be an empire but whether it should be a center or a periphery. Russia assimilated the notions of empire and nation simultaneously, and these notions were not in conflict with each other.

The narrative about the Empire has two major elements:

Rivalry between great powers was rational and largely ordinary. The imperial expansion was an element of this rivalry, and imperial excesses which should be denounced, were a norm then. This rivalry should not be described as an inescapable confrontation between Russia and an unequivocally hostile "West." Some challenges came from Europe, but it was also there that Russia found allies to combat these challenges.

The formation within the Empire of the Russian nation that was ethnically open and included different groups, not only ethnic Russians. The creation of the national/imperial culture through joint efforts of people from different ethnic groups.

Russia's history between the 1860s and 1917 was full of great achievements: the Great Reforms; the abolition of serfdom, which emancipated the people and opened the way for building a modern nation; the rise of local self-government, the establishment of the legal system; the growth of civic activity, especially at the grassroots level. The system of classical gymnasiums, founded by Alexander II and developed under Alexander III, was a major factor behind Russia's

economic growth and dramatic improvement of the quality of the nation's human capital. The main breakthrough in primary education took place during the reign of Nicholas II, when the country came close to introducing universal education and laid the foundations for the eradication of illiteracy. On the eve of World War I, more than 60% of recruits were literate. Under Nicholas II, the government doubled spending on education every 5 years.

World War I was a test which Russia failed to stand as it was in a transition period of its comprehensive transformation. By 1917, despite military setbacks of 1915, Russia stood to win the war as part of the Entente.

In 1917, all social institutions collapsed due to internal factors. All groups of society were to blame for the revolutionary chaos which swept across the country. The monarchy lost touch with the reality and did not react to obvious challenges. The elites sought to tear down the monarchy, irresponsibly believing that they would be able to control further changes. Revolutionary counter-elites wanted to mobilize the destructive protest potential of the masses, in which they fairly well succeeded. Soldiers deserted en masse and served as a catalyst for the revolutionary chaos and violence.

The Soviet period, beginning with the Civil War, has to be described primarily as a tragedy – fratricide, moral decadence and cultural decline (the exodus and destruction of the educated classes and the clergy). Sustainable development with spectacular vistas was ruined by revolutionary impatience, bad management and lumpen attitude to property.

The Soviet state neglected its role of serving the people and viewed them as expendable. This policy culminated in the destruction of millions of the most talented, hard working and energetic people during massive repressions, other operations of the NKVD in the 1930s, wartime and postwar deportations. Russians must remember about the horrible victims of the 20th century, honor their memory and set up monuments to them. At the same time, we should not tear down monuments to the “Reds” if these are not monuments to active participants in the Red Terror.

Speaking of the Soviet period in Russian history, we will continue to take pride in the heroism of people during World War II

and the achievements of scientists and workers who often had to work in extremely difficult conditions. We should be proud of individual exploits of people who in the face of the repressive regime defended their beliefs, dignity and faith, who preserved and created culture, and who saved the lives of their relatives, friends and complete strangers.

World War II is the core of collective historical memory of the 20th century. It can serve as an anchor for restoring other episodes in Russian history, which were “thrown out” in Soviet times, for example, World War I (the Second Patriotic War). Emphasis should be placed on heroism, self-sacrifice and patriotism. It is time to finally get rid of the Soviet formula, according to which the Victory of 1945 justified the crimes of the communist regime in the interwar period.

The post-Stalin period of Soviet history was marked by the end of the systemic terror, ease of control over communication and information. Yet it continued to reject private property as an economic institution. This period saw failures of reform, stagnation, psychological alienation of people from the common cause, formation of non-productive individualism, and eventual economic exhaustion of the country in the conditions of the Cold War and the arms race.

The breakup of the Soviet Union should be presented as a profound crisis and tragedy for millions, and at the same time a new window of opportunity. History shows that all countries that emerged in the core of empires went through a difficult transition period after their disintegration; however, if they did not slip into revanchism, over a historically short period of time they found themselves well ahead of the former provinces of the empire in terms of social and economic development. Russia is already confirming this historical trend. It is important that this tendency be further developed and implemented not only and not so much with reliance on natural resources as, first of all, on consideration for the man, the creation of a rule-of-law state, innovative economic development, new patriotism, democratic development, and stability of the political sphere.

The policy of memory in the mass media

It is worth taking into account the newest trends – young people read far less and in a different way. Visual methods of presenting information are ever more important. The ratios of TV, cinema, and Internet influences are changing dynamically, and this dynamics varies considerably by age and social groups.

Saying that the mass media today make an insufficient contribution to the policy of memory is just not enough; quite often their function is overtly destructive. On TV one sees formats of addressing history issues that are almost always inadequate. The worst harm is caused by “talk show duels” as a verbal clash of two gladiator journalists, while the television audience is invited to send SMS messages to vote for either side to decide who is right and who is wrong. The very understanding of history as a subject for a decent discussion by people adhering to different viewpoints is ruined; history begins to be regarded as a battlefield; the simpler, quite often more radical arguments gain the upper hand.

There is a need for a special weekly history program with an experienced, professional host with a university degree in history. History and memory issues should be discussed without SMS voting or picking a winner. Such a program must be aired on a central television channel in prime time. The target audience should be everyone, but teachers in particular. It is worth tapping the experience of the BBC in making historical documentaries – a charismatic host, several professional historians offering brief comments within the range of their competence, and meaningful and diversified video footage.

Cinema is a very special memory policy tool. Its mission is to provide strong, emotional images of the nation's past. This requires films of great artistic merit made by outstanding directors. Opinion surveys after the screening of *Katyn*, by Andrzej Wajda, on the RTR television channel showed a shift in public opinion by tens of percentage points¹. Consequently, the state should finance not casual

¹ O tragedii v Katyni i otnosheniyah s Polshey = About the Tragedy in Katyn and Relations with Poland // Levada-Center. – 2011. – 21 April. – Mode of access: <https://www.levada.ru/2011/04/21/o-tragedii-v-katyni-i-otnosheniyah-s-polshej-3/>

projects, but keep a renewable fund, with no spending deadlines set – in other words, to wait for decent applications and projects, without having to distribute everything here and now. The films should be shown on TV in prime time.

The task of the World Wide Web is to help school history teachers. On the Internet one should be able to find not only teaching aids, maps, etc. There should be created special compilations of clips from feature films and documentaries that would help arrange for discussions with students over moral and emotional aspects of various themes, including dramatic, tragic episodes of the national history, in particular, 20th century history. One of the main problems of teaching history at school is not that of memorizing facts and figures, but the lack of students' emotional involvement.

In printed media we have no format for history discussions on the national scale. In the meantime, it is these discussions that leave a lasting trace in the public mind. It necessary to have two or three periodicals with large circulations to maintain a long discussion over this or that major history issue, the way it was done in Germany, France and Poland for discussing various events of the 1930s and 1940s.

The mass media fail to play the role of a navigator in the ocean of history literature. To a certain extent the task of drawing attention to good history books may be accomplished in the program Our History. The key history books and magazines must be easily available or free (which is still better) for Internet users – teachers and school and university students.

Symbols and commemorations

The existing set of historical symbols and characters is scanty and mostly accidental. The St. George Ribbon project is the sole major success due to several factors:

- indirect involvement of the state;
- non-Communist symbol, but a well familiar one since the Soviet era;
- history roots going far deeper than 1917;

- unmistakably Russian (non-aggressive) nature of this symbol, which is of particular importance for success in the post-Soviet space;
- harmony with foreign symbol policy traditions (Britain's red remembrance poppies worn in memory of World War I victims, ribbons as a token of support for public movements).

Unfortunately, the success of this project is being wasted. The universality of this symbol should be actualized and the St. George Ribbon made a symbol of commemoration of all those who gave their lives for the home country on all battlefields, and not just in World War II.

Russia has no calendar of commemorations and national and local political dates. The list of memorable dates must be expanded to include four or five permanent dates and the corresponding ceremonies featuring the country's top officials.

The memories of World War I are weak, so an introduction of a National Day of Remembrance for Those Who Died for the Motherland, with representatives of all political forces and confessions taking part in a common ceremony (conf. Britain's Cenotaph), would assert the idea of common history. The ceremony, including a procession from the Cathedral of Christ the Savior to the Eternal Flame in the Alexander Gardens should be shown on TV. It is also important to create a special memorial in Moscow.

It is also advisable that a Day of Remembrance for the Victims of 20th-century Political Cataclysms (Civil War, repression, collectivization, deportations, etc.) be instituted. It will be more general than the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Political Repression, which should be left intact. A common day of memory will be essentially correct; in the 20th century many people in the USSR were physically or morally killed. A common day of memory will encompass practically everybody, not just those who suffered in 1937–1938, but all groups that fell victim to political repression at different stages, from the dispossessed wealthy peasants (kulaks), repressed clergymen of various religions and confessions and expelled nobles and dissidents to ethnic groups who suffered from special operations and deportations by the NKVD secret police. There is to be a special museum and memorial in Moscow, where an annual ceremony would be held with the president taking part.

Lastly, a decision is to be made what National Unity Day is all about and a proper ceremony created with the center at the monument to Minin and Pozharsky in Red Square. Today, National Unity Day is a symbol of missed initiative in the policy of memory; the nationalist Russian March is the most significant event. Possibly, this date should be renamed to the Day of Memory of 20th Century Victims and People's Unity – especially as National Unity Day today is linked (in a very unclear way, though) with the end of the Time of Troubles / civil war.

An effective implementation of the policy of memory requires modernization of institutional support, including the opening of archives, the establishment of an Institute of Russian 20th Century History, and other measures.

The archives are now not commissions for declassifying documents, but commissions for classifying them. In other words, it is crucial to enforce compliance with the law saying that everything older than 30 years (or at least 50 years to ensure the whole Stalinist period should be encompassed) must be open to researchers (it might be a possibility of considering preferences for Russian historians for 3–5 years). The commission is to be empowered to classify certain things. The commission may be given a 2–3-year deadline. Everything that has not been classified is to stay open. Also, a certain limit may be set – no more than 10–15 percent of the documents can be classified. This would foment interest towards history and have a very positive response inside and outside the country.

The Museum of Modern History of Russia in Moscow requires revision and reorganization – its present exposition is an outrageous sample of Soviet and post-Soviet eclecticism. The museum's Tsarist prison showcase, dating back to the Soviet era, still produces a far greater impression than the GULAG-related showcase.

True, the problem is partially being addressed within the framework of the president's federal targeted program On the Commemoration of Victims of Political Repression and a parallel, inter-related program of the Moscow government. But it is very important that a monument to victims in Moscow be built. Such monuments have already been built in Kiev, Astana and in other capitals. But not in Moscow (!).

History in school

The hours reserved for history in the school curriculum have shrunk significantly in recent years. The concentric system of instruction that was introduced in the early 1990s makes the situation still worse. The entire history curriculum lasts from the fifth to the ninth year. In the tenth and eleventh years it is to be reviewed again with deeper analysis of theory and individual problems. As a result, the students and teachers have to literally gallop through the first cycle, which leaves no chance for discussing any fundamental issues.

The linear system of history instruction in school should be restored. In that case the 10th and 11th years will be devoted to the history of the 20th century and early 21st century. The most complex and sensitive themes will be raised in high school, when students are already prepared to perceive them adequately.

The tragedy of the 20th century is to be shown as an era of terrible losses, including an incredible waste of human resources and repressions against and deportations of small ethnic groups, which had an impact on inter-ethnic relations that remains relevant today. It is important to bring to students' minds that everybody suffered, and that the Russians suffered no less than any other people.

The hours spent on history classes may be increased through integration with the studies of social science. In practice many sections of the social science course (in particular, such chapters as Human Being and Activity, Cognition, and Society), in particular, those taught in the fifth through eighth year lack clarity of the subject. Shaping school students' legal mentality and ideas of the most important legal terms and notions should proceed at history classes, in combination with explanations when and in what social environment this or that legal term or principle emerged. From that standpoint, studying Magna Carta, the ideas of Hobbes and Locke, the Bill of Rights, the U.S. Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is far more useful than discussion of specific legal norms. Instruction in the history of philosophy, sociology and political science must be pegged to the history curriculum as closely.

Certain parts of the social science course should be dropped and a number of historical, legal and politological themes studied at high

school history classes. It is expedient to re-orient the social science course towards modern times. It would be reasonable to end the history curriculum with the last days of the 20th century, while the events that have not become history yet should be studied at social science classes, conducted in a fundamentally different fashion, such as discussions, disputes and seminars.

A major role should be given to local history, with the focus made not on ethnic specifics, but on the history of successful creative efforts by local businessmen, sponsors and city mayors of the pre-revolutionary era – many of them take credit for the merits that are still in sight in cities (public buildings, innovations in urban infrastructures) and that may be shown to school students going on excursions and sight-seeing tours. The regional component of education in the autonomous republics should be harmonized with the national narrative.

A deeper and qualitatively different process of instruction in history would markedly raise the requirements the teacher is expected to meet.

It is necessary to revise the programs, first and foremost, those for universal history, in favor of more generalized and problem-targeted presentation of the content. Any talk of abandoning the plurality of manuals must be stopped. If the purpose of a unified history manual is to ensure a single interpretation of key aspects of history and to harmonize the mainstream course and the regional component, such a measure would be redundant.

Ordering schools to strictly abide by interpretations found in the manuals of certain authors and publishers would be fundamentally wrong. The choice of a manual should be left to the discretion of the teacher and a methodological association. The teacher must have the right to use any manual that has undergone proper scrutiny and bears the clearance mark. This evidence of official authorization would merely testify that the manual contains no historical mistakes, distortions, calls for violence or insulting remarks regarding this or that ethnic group, and that the presentation of the content and the methodology agrees with the age of students the manual is addressed to. All these issues may be successfully coped with at the level of

expert examination, and not through the introduction of a “unified” manual.

At the same time it is essential to fundamentally increase the role of special teaching aids available through the Internet, including audio-visual ones (such as selected clips from feature films and documentaries and documentary footage supplied with commentaries by specialists), which will help the teacher achieve the key task of school students’ emotional involvement and ability to empathize. (It is still erroneously believed that this task should be addressed mostly at literature classes).

Prime objectives

The policy of memory pursued during the 1990s–2000s was ineffective for a variety of reasons. The Russian authorities’ approach to historical memory problems lacked a coherent strategy and consistency. The lack of understanding as to what tasks should be addressed within the framework of the memory policy was largely due to the failure to resolve fundamental issues pertaining to the country’s future and the controversy of the identity model proposed by the authorities. Over the years, no mechanisms were created for conducting an efficient memory policy, which would meet the new social conditions in the country. There is no mass media infrastructure in Russia to implement this policy. Over the last 20 years, the memory policy was reduced to resorting to a very scanty set of symbols, events and figures of the past in a bid to mobilize national solidarity and resolve other tasks. In some cases, the state lost the initiative in the memory policy, which is especially evident in the case of the newly established National Unity Day which has for several years now been marked by nationalist Russian Marches. Historical memory gradually fragmented, as its group (including ethnic) variants developed in isolation from – or even in confrontation with – the general narrative. History teaching and the status of historical knowledge in society steadily degraded. Perhaps, the most important thing was the failure to create a concept of continuous Russian history and to bridge its pre- and post-revolutionary periods. The entire historical identity rests on

the memory of World War II. This is absolutely not enough and unfair. Russia has a difficult yet great history, full of major achievements, brilliant victories and large-scale tragedies. They need to be brought back into people's minds so that they feel responsible successors to previous generations.

The main tasks of the memory policy are proposed to be as follows:

- forming a coherent and constructive national identity, intended to help bridge the gap in historical traditions and overcome ethnic disunity and acute economic inequality;

- fostering active patriotism, not only intended to motivate people to defend their homeland against foreign threats but also to renew their country and environment here and now and to engage in civil and entrepreneurial activities;

- legitimizing an evolutionary path of development and reformist values, and de-legitimizing social, political, religious and ethnic radicalism. However depressing the current situation may be, Russia can no longer afford a revolution;

- developing and strengthening various levels of identity: family, kin, native place, its nature, and the whole of Russia;

- legitimizing private property and business activity;

- establishing democratic values and ideas of the rule of law in public and individual consciousness, which have not yet become dominant in contemporary Russia.

These objectives can be achieved only if the state pursues a policy of memory that:

- rests on long-term, strategic development goals;

- unites society to the fullest possible extent (complete accord is an unattainable and unproductive goal);

- is coherent and consistent. (Today efforts to pursue a policy of memory are reduced to sporadic activities marking some historical dates.);

- enjoys wide support among educated classes, including creative elites and teachers, which would let the state not only and not so much "dictate" history to society as play an indirect stimulating role in the policy of memory;

- is open to constructive discussion as a common heritage (historical memory should be a “public affair,” *res publica*; today it is a battlefield);

- rests on a well thought-out media structure and the latest trends in the development of the information space, including the increasing importance of the Internet and visual forms of communication;

- is not in open conflict with history as a field of scientific knowledge. Actually, individual and collective memory, on the one hand, and history, on the other hand, are inevitably in conflict. The very nature of these approaches to the past is different. This state of affairs should be considered a norm. Memory is inevitably selective. In the strategic perspective, however, one cannot build an efficient policy of memory that would be in confrontation with historical knowledge;

- provides a prominent place to local and group histories in the general history (in case of a collision between the general history and group, especially ethnic, history, if there are irreconcilable differences between them or if group history is not reflected in the general history, group history always wins);

- proposes role models applicable in real daily life.

The policy of memory should be conducted by both the state (mainly indirectly) and the intellectual elite which now largely keeps aloof from this duty, crucial for any society. This accusation does not apply to small groups of the elite that have been engaged in this work, albeit often from opposite positions. There should be an intensive dialogue between these groups, which would broaden the scope of accord and help deepen people’s knowledge of their history – even though it is impossible to achieve complete accord. We should not even set such a goal.

* * *

Every nation deserves great history, but not every nation has one. Russia does have great history. In the last 600 years, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to mobilize for successful defense against external threats: the liberation from the Mongols, the rebuff of the Polish invasion, the defeat of Napoleon and Hitler. Russians and

other peoples of Russia showed their valor in the struggle for independence and sovereignty. Russians are a winner nation. Russia was the only one of the peripheral empires in Europe that in the 19th century joined the ranks of great powers despite its relative economic lag. Russia showed its ability to develop vast areas and achieve success in economic development. Russia rid itself of communism without outside help.

These points are acceptable to all but for orthodox communists and radical nationalists. They meet the interests and views of the authorities, the Church, reasonable liberals and reasonable nationalists. Within the framework of this “general line” any pluralism and discussion is possible; an attitude is fostered that treats the past as a common, public affair, *res publica*.

History should serve as a source of inspiration for creative efforts and cooperation among countries and various public groups in addressing development issues, as well as a warning against repeating mistakes of the past – revolutionary impatience, lack of consideration for the man, and discord between the state and part of society. The main values that must be established with the help of history are an ability to succeed through continued and constructive efforts, an ability to create individual success stories, sovereignty, recognition of the state’s value by all major sectors of society and recognition of the man’s value by the state, respect for various segments of society by the ruling elite, and an ability of social forces for dialogue.

A. Miller

A Year of Frustrated Hopes.

*Adjusting Historical Policy in Russia*¹

(2014)

Exactly one year ago *Politeia* magazine published my article on the role of expert communities in shaping historical memory policy in Russia². At that time I believed that professional historians and non-governmental organizations addressing these issues would be able, irrespective of their political convictions, to work with the authorities on matters pertaining to memory politics in Russia.

In particular, I wrote about history textbooks in secondary schools, the central issue of memory policy over the past few years. In 2013, when the Russian authorities revised yet again the teaching of history in schools, they acted through the para-governmental Russian Historical Society. At the same time the organizers of a discussion about a “unified historical and cultural standard” emphasized repeatedly the need for an open, nationwide discussion and took into account a considerable portion of public criticism. Most importantly, the participants decided to organize a contest to prepare several history

¹ Source: Miller A. A Year of Frustrated Hopes. *Adjusting Historical Policy in Russia // Russia in Global Affairs*. – 2014. – Vol. 12, N 4. – P. 163–171.

² Miller A.I. Rol' ehkspertnykh soobshhestv v politike pamjati v Rossii = Role of Expert Communities in the Politics of Memory in Russia // *Politeia*. – 2013 – N 4 (71). – P. 114–126.

textbooks based on a new standard instead of publishing the originally planned standardized textbook.

On November 23, 2013, the Civic Forum held a round table discussion on historical memory and teaching history that largely focused on how to best compete in the contest with projects prepared under the auspices of the Russian Historical Society on order from the government. Potential authors of contesting projects were named and discussions were held about how to attract independent historians to the jury commission. Naturally, the opinion was expressed that the state's participation in the contest and cooperation with the authorities on this issue in general made no sense, but at that point such an opinion did not prevail. With no illusions about the state's willingness to cooperate, a majority of participants agreed that once the authorities left the window of opportunities open for such cooperation, it should be used at least to see what would happen next.

The authorities kept sending "luring signals." In January 2014, at a meeting with the authors of a standard history textbook, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that work on creating a series of textbooks must be fully transparent. "There should be no place for monopolism," he said¹.

Another sphere where interaction between the authorities and society looked quite encouraging was a project to preserve the memory of the victims of political repressions. Drafting a relevant program under the aegis of the Presidential Council for Human Rights and the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy took several years. Officials, representatives of the liberal wing of the political establishment, Memorial (an international historical, educational, human rights, and charitable society), and the Russian Orthodox Church cooperated rather fruitfully. In short, this interaction proceeded beyond the customary division lines in Russian society. As a result of concerted efforts, a comprehensive program was drawn up and agreed on between various state agencies, and it seemed the government was poised to officially adopt the program. In June 2013, the RIA Novosti news agency even

¹ Vstrecha s avtorami koncepcii novogo uchebnika istorii = Meeting With the Authors of the Concept of a New History Textbook. – 2014. – 16 January. – Mode of access: <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20071>

organized a presentation of a federal program to preserve the memory of the victims of political repression¹. Alexander Protasevich, Advisor to the Minister of Culture, participated in the program. Protasevich had an impressive work record in that sphere as Minister of Culture, Youth Policies, and Mass Communications of Perm Territory – a region renowned for its labor camp museum Perm-36. Protasevich was to supervise work on the program on behalf of the Culture Ministry.

In January 2014, a Facebook group emerged called Historians of Russia – Problems of Self-Organization. The group launched a debate about ways to organize professional communities, which indicated, among other things, that in the opinion of many historians the Russian Historical Society, organized under the aegis of the government, had failed to cope with its mission. However, when I came up with the initiative that an association should be established to provide historians with a collective say in discussing critical memory policy issues different from that of the state-controlled Russian Historical Society, a majority did not support my position. Many argued that the focus should be placed on purely professional matters, such as expert analysis, fighting plagiarism, etc.

Simultaneously, efforts were launched independently from the Facebook activities to create a Free Historical Society (FHS). All of its participants welcomed the idea of founding an organization that would be actively involved in discussing the teaching of history and memory politics issues. Opinion was divided between the minority, which understood the Free Historical Society's tasks as similar to those of Memorial and expected that the FHS would be able to freely express its opinion on current issues of memory politics, and the majority, which argued that the FHS should be more reserved and neutral in its public statements².

These initiatives were certainly generated during a brief period in 2013 when there seemed to be promising prospects for a relatively open

¹ «Istoricheskaya pamyat – osnova natsionalnoy identichnosti» = « Historical Memory As the Basis of National Identity» // Republic. – 2013. – 3 July. – Mode of access: <https://republic.ru/posts/1/958165>

² V Rossii sozdano Vol'noe istoricheskoe obshchestvo = Free Historical Society Created in Russia // Polit.ru. – 2014. – 28 February. – Mode of access: <http://polit.ru/news/2014/02/28/vio/>

and constructive dialogue over memory policy issues. When I was writing this article in September 2014 the cautious hopes of autumn 2013 had vanished. I will attempt to analyze the events and circumstances that have created a situation in which the emerging formats of dialogue and cooperation in addressing historical memory-related matters have collapsed. Today historical memory policy is facing its deepest crisis of the post-Soviet era.

Dissent as national treason

The crisis in Ukraine was the key factor behind changes in Russia in 2014. The Ukrainian issue gradually evolved into a confrontation between Russia and the United States and the European Union. It is worth reviewing how the crisis originated and evolved since it has a direct bearing on the topic under consideration.

On November 21, 2013 the Nikolai Azarov government announced that it was suspending preparations for an association agreement between Ukraine and the EU. Protests against that decision lasted until the end of November in Kiev's Independence Square (Maidan), eventually losing strength. On November 30, the standoff heated up after the police attacked several hundred demonstrators who had remained in the city center. The protests quickly became more radical and protesters seized public buildings in Kiev. The confrontation turned violent after a number of laws were adopted on January 16 tightening accountability for unauthorized public demonstrations. The first deaths were reported on January 22. The violence escalated drastically on February 18–20 when snipers killed more than 70 people in Kiev. On February 21, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and the opposition reached an agreement to end all violence and institute government reform. The agreement was formalized with the participation of the French, German, and Polish foreign ministers and made in the presence of Russian presidential representative Vladimir Lukin. However, the deal fell apart within a day. Yanukovich fled Kiev on February 22; the Crimean events began in late February, resulting in the March 16 referendum and subsequent reunification of Crimea with Russia. Thus the happenings at the end of

February and the beginning of March ushered in an outright confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine.

The date of the Crimean referendum changed twice within a week. The wording of the questions was reconsidered and reformulated several times, indicating that Russia's actions were largely improvised and the situation was perceived as highly risky. The sharp tightening of control over the public sphere was presented as a way to consolidate society in the face of an external threat. The "fifth column" rhetoric in Putin's triumphant address to the Federal Assembly on Crimea's accession to Russia¹ was a landmark in the transformation of the social atmosphere in contemporary Russia. The "fifth column" rhetoric transformed dissent into an act of national treason. A large segment of society quickly interpreted that message not just as a temporary precaution in a critical situation, but as a new policy course the government was prepared to fill with corresponding content. These changes have fully manifested themselves in memory politics.

In January 2014 a high-profile debate occurred over a poll the TV channel *Dozhd'* conducted on the 70th anniversary of the end of the Siege of Leningrad. The question was: "Should Leningrad have been surrendered in order to save thousands of lives?" The question remained on the *Dozhd'* website for about three hours, after which the editor-in-chief removed it. The *Dozhd'* affair should not be regarded as a turning point in the authorities' historical memory policies. Rather, the ill-worded question was used as a long-awaited pretext for ousting the channel from cable networks. Remarkably, *Diletant* magazine, which actually conducted the poll, managed to get away with it.

The watershed moment came in the spring of 2014 when the authorities made a series of consistent moves that fundamentally changed the memory policy situation in Russia. On March 4, information was made public that the University of International Relations (MGIMO) was about to fire one of its senior lecturers, Andrei Zubov, for publishing an article in the daily *Vedomosti*, in which he

¹ Ahmerov V. Vneocherednoe poslanie Vladimira Putina Federal'nomu sobraniyu = Vladimir Putin's Extraordinary Address to the Federal Assembly // Ulpressa. – 2014. – 18 March. – Mode of access: <https://ulpressa.ru/2014/03/18/segodnya-v-15-00-pryamoy-efir-otchet-pavla-degtyarya-i-ekaterinyi-ubyi-pered-zso-a-takzhe-poslanie-vladimira-putina-federalnomu-sobraniyu/>

claimed that the takeover of Crimea was not very different from Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938¹. Public calls for his dismissal followed, and although the official decision was repeatedly postponed for various legal reasons, the MGIMO administration said in summer 2014 that it would not renew Zubov's contract.

This story has two important sides: first, aware of how scandalous the incident looked, the MGIMO administration sought to avoid a demonstrative dismissal at all costs, but the damage to its reputation was no longer taken into account. Those behind the decision saw it as intimidation, as a warning that the costs of oppositional statements had soared. Second, the mass media were flooded with publications in support of Zubov's dismissal. In recent months we have witnessed how the mechanism launched in the spring of 2014 is being fine-tuned and expanding. This can be seen in the witchhunt of rock musician Andrei Makarevich (unprecedented in scale in post-Soviet Russia), in which a "public initiative" plays the key role.

It is quite clear that in Zubov's case it was his opposition that entailed punishment and not a light-minded judgment of a historical event. In his reply to Zubov published in the *Izvestia* newspaper, political scientist Andranik Migranyan made several preposterous claims from the viewpoint of any competent historian. Migranyan stated, for instance, that if Hitler had stopped in 1938, he would have gone down in history as a great German politician². Migranyan got away with this, although Hitler's record by 1938 had already included *Mein Kampf* and the Nuremberg laws.

History as a series of subversions

At the beginning of April 2014, the Center for Political Information published a report on the problems of teaching history at

¹ Zubov A. Eto uzhe bylo = It Happened Before // *Vedomosti*. – 2014. – 1 March. – Mode of access: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2014/03/01/andrej-zubov-eto-uzhe-bylo>

² Migranjan A. Nashi Peredonovy = Our Peredonovs // *Izvestija*. – 2014. – 3 April. – Mode of access: <http://izvestia.ru/news/568603>

Russian educational institutions¹ that offered a sample of discursive strategies, as well as a set of notions and terms now considered suitable for use in historical memory politics. Stylistically, the report was close to the incriminating pamphlets of the late 1940s and early 1950s in which history was presented as a battlefield and as acts of ideological sabotage by the West.

Here is a quote that is quite indicative of the authors' style and lexicon:

“The results of an analysis of the educational books used in teaching Russian history make it possible to conclude that most interpretations of historical events surreptitiously induce in students the thought of our country's imminent collapse, which would allegedly allow “oppressed peoples” to achieve independence. In other words, history as an academic discipline has lost its function to raise morale. Rejecting the scientific postulates of the objective nature of the Russian state-civilization and the artificial division of Russia's multi-ethnic population into the ‘oppressor Slavs’ and ‘enslaved’ peoples, as well as removing positive examples from the common historical heritage and simultaneously glorifying doubtful personalities upset the reproduction of values traditional for Russian society.”² The report called for concerted efforts by “governmental agencies and the patriotically oriented scientific community” to consolidate the nation.

It is clear that such an interpretation provides no room for dialogue with opponents and no chance to make a critical analysis of the tragedy that afflicted Russia in the 20th century. At the same time it postulates “traditional values” and the self-sufficiency of Russia as a “state-civilization.” A new stage in official historical policy is becoming clearer: it focuses on “civilizational self-sufficiency,” purely positive heroes and episodes of national history, and the interpretation of the morale-shaping function of history in line with Benckendorf's maxim: “Russia had a glittering past, its present is more than excellent,

¹ O problemah prepodavaniya istorii v rossiyskikh uchebnyih zavedeniyah = On the Problems of Teaching History in Russian Educational Institutions // Centr Politicheskoi Informacii. – 2014. – 7 March. – Mode of access: <http://polit-info.ru/Reports/>

² Ibid.

and, as for the future, it surpasses everything the human mind can fancy.”¹

In August 2014, Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, made an equally ostentatious statement. He expressed hope that the “unified concept of a school history textbook would help young people overcome the ‘syndrome of historical masochism’ cultivated at schools in the 1990s.”² This statement clearly reflects Patriarch Kirill’s attitude towards the problem of historical memory, which is markedly different from that of his predecessor, Alexy II, who believed that the misfortunes Russia experienced in the last century were punishment for the murder of the royal family. Alexy II maintained that Russia still needed to reflect on the experience of the 20th century and repent for its sins. Kirill is certain that Russia has atoned for its sins³; hence the speculations about a “syndrome of historical masochism.”

Adjusting legislation

Now let us return to the spring of 2014. Russia’s largest political party United Russia has repeatedly suggested drafting laws regulating public statements about the past since 2009 – when the notorious presidential Commission for Counteracting Attempts at the Falsification of History was created – but those initiatives have become mired in various stages of the legislative process. At last, the initiatives were given the green light in the spring of 2014. A bill submitted for

¹ Zhikharev M.I. Dokladnaja zapiska potomstvu o Petre Jakovleviche Chaadaeve = Memorandum to the Posterity on Peter Jakovlevich Chaadaev // Russkoe obshhestvo 1830-kh godov: Ljudi i idei. – Moscow : Izdatelstvo moskovskogo universiteta, 1989. – P. 48–119.

² Patriarh Kirill : edinyiy uchebnik istorii pomozhet preodolet “istoricheskij mazohizm” = Patriarch Kirill : Unified History Textbook Will Help to End “Historical Masochism” // TASS. – 2014. – 30 August. – Mode of access: <http://itar-tass.com/obschestvo/1410442>

³ Suslov M.D. Proshloe i budushhee v istoricheskom voobrazhenii sovremennoj Russkoj pravoslavnoj cerkvi = Past and Future in the Historical Imagination of the Modern Russian Orthodox Church // Proshlyj vek. – M. : INION RAN, 2013. – P. 133–157.

debate by State Duma Deputy Irina Yarovaya from United Russia and which complements the Criminal Code with a new Article 354.1 (Rehabilitation of Nazism) was adopted in its first reading on April 4; in the second and third readings on April 23; approved by the Federation Council on April 29; and on May 5, that is, just one month after the beginning of the procedure, President Putin signed the bill into law. The new article establishes criminal responsibility for “spreading knowingly fraudulent information about the activity of the Soviet Union during World War II;” that is, it uses the same formula in which dissidents were sent to labor camps during the Soviet era¹.

At about the same time, the prominent museum Perm-36 faced the risk of closure. The museum, established at a former prison camp, has had many visitors over the past several years. Negotiations between the museum’s founders and regional authorities over the principles of public-private partnership had proceeded well enough up to a point when, in the spring of 2014, the regional administration made a decision that paralyzed the museum’s operation. In this case, just as with Zubov’s dismissal, the signal came from the top tiers of power².

Lastly, in May 2014 Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky said the adoption of the program to preserve the memory of victims of political repression was inexpedient. He made an official statement on this matter in June³. The reaction to this statement from Sergei Parkhomenko, one of the organizers of the public initiative “The Last Address,” was quite telling: “In reality this is the correct march of events: we should stop pinning hopes on this ‘bagwash’ and this false

¹ Vol’noe istoricheskoe obshchestvo vystupilo protiv zakona o «reabilitacii nacizma» = Free Historical Society Opposed the Law on “Rehabilitation of Nazism” // Polit.ru. – 2014. – 28 April. – Mode of access: https://polit.ru/news/2014/04/28/vio_against_zapreta_na_istor_poisk/

² Zajavlenie Koordinacionnogo soveta Grazhdanskogo foruma ES-Rossija o sokhranении muzeja «Perm’-36» = Statement of the Coordination Council of the EU-Russia Civil Forum on the Saving of the “Perm’-36” Museum. – 2014. – 15 August. – Mode of access: <http://www.president-sovet.ru/news/6819/>

³ Sokhranenie pamjati o zhertvakh GULAGa mogut priznat’ formal’nost’ju, vedushhejj k neopravdannym bjudzhetnym tratam = Preserving the Memory of the Victims of the Gulag Can Be Recognized as “Formality”, Leading to Unjustified Budget Spending // NEWSru.com. – 2014. – 27 June. – Mode of access: <http://www.newsru.com/russia/27jun2014/gulag.html>

and treacherous state – with all of its programs, hypocritical intentions, and arrogant ministerial decisions. We should push ahead with this business on our own. Because only we have the strength. This is the reason why nobody and nothing will ever be able to substitute such ideas and projects as ‘The Last Address.’ We should develop this idea by all means.”¹

“The Last Address” project, which places memorial plaques on buildings whose residents were arrested during the Stalin era, is a useful and noble initiative, indeed. But I find it rather hard to agree with Parkhomenko that the current march of events is correct. Preparations for the federal program were not easy, but this framework made it possible to establish cooperation and understanding among different political and social forces, including federal institutions and the Russian Orthodox Church. So it is utterly regrettable that in the spring of 2014 all these efforts ended with the disruption of the federal program, the closure of the Perm-36 museum by the local authorities, the Patriarch’s speculations about “historical masochism,” and the stoical declaration by “irreconcilable liberal” Sergei Parkhomenko that “it’s even better this way!”

In the spring of 2014 the authorities broke several taboos that had previously been strictly observed: people were fired from their jobs for their opinions; the “fifth column” and “national traitor” discourse was legitimated; and a special law was enacted under which making certain statements about the past was made a criminal offense. The chance was lost for a dialogue over historical memory issues based on mutual respect that had surfaced in 2013. At the end of May, a group of historians echoed Parkhomenko’s response with a call for colleagues to boycott the history textbook competition². Most of the founders of the Free Historical Society refused to support the appeal. At the same time, in May 2014, before the program for perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression was cancelled, I urged the Free Historical Society to present its own draft history textbook, but the proposal

¹ Sergey Parhomenko // Facebook.com. – 2014. – 25 June. – Mode of access: <https://www.facebook.com/serguei.parkhomenko/posts/10204005487726969>

² Obrashhenie k istorikam — avtoram shkol’nykh uchebnikov = Appeal to Historians – Authors of School’s Textbooks // Polit.ru. – 2014. – 22 May. – Mode of access: <http://polit.ru/article/2014/05/22/history/>

received no support. Incidentally, two weeks later, after Medinsky had made his decision regarding the federal program, I would have not made such a proposal.

Currently, the Free Historical Society is discussing the possibility of drafting an alternative history textbook for publication on the Internet. In other words, instead of an inclusive federal program encompassing various segments of society we have only “The Last Address” program left; and instead of an open contest of textbooks, the only possibility is a “standard” textbook proclaiming Russia’s civilizational self-sufficiency, and alternative draft books on the Internet.

Anti-liberal mobilization

Internationally we are entering a period of confrontational historical policy¹. This direction is quite evident in Medinsky’s recent initiative for unveiling a monument in Krakow commemorating Red Army soldiers who died in Polish captivity in the early 1920s. The underlying aim is to obtain an argument against a Polish initiative for erecting a monument in Katyn².

The bad news continues: in March 2014, Memorial held a workshop on “The Authorities and Society in the Struggle for Russia’s Past: Independent Historians and the Authorities’ Modern Historical Policy.” Regrettably, the wording of the issue runs counter to reality. In this dispute society is by and large on the side of the authorities.

This kind of situation is not uniquely Russian. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was the first to demonstrate the possibility of

¹ Miller A. Vvedenie: Istoricheskaja politika v Vostochnoj Evrope nachala XXI v. = Introduction: Historical Politics in Eastern Europe at the Beginning of the XXI Century // Istoricheskaja politika v XXI veke / Miller A., Lipman M. (eds.). – Moscow : Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012. – P. 7–32.

² Rosjanie chc pomnika w Krakowie. Prof. Kunert: To niewła ciwe na mogliach naje d ców = Russians Want a Monument in Krakow. Professor Kunert: This is Inappropriate in the Graves of Invaders // Dziennik.pl. – 2014. – 8 October. – Mode of access: <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/wydarzenia/artykuly/471874,rosjanie-chca-w-krakowie-pomnika-zameczonych-w-polskich-bozach-jest-odpowiedz-prof-andrzeja-kunerta.html>

mobilizing an anti-liberal civil society while relying on historical memory policy. A considerable number of Hungarians support Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Importantly, this is the support of a consolidated civil society based on a broad grassroots initiative.

Historical memory plays a considerable role in the increasingly active position of pro-Orbán civil society. Trianon museums have cropped up all over Hungary as local initiatives. References to the Treaty of Trianon – the separation of Hungarians by European politicians after World War I – have become an important component of Hungarian historical memory policy. It conveniently resonates with tensions in relations between Orbán's Hungary and the EU bureaucracy. The rehabilitation of Miklós Horthy as a strong leader who fell victim to Hitler is another significant feature of the same policy. And the high point is a new Nazi occupation memorial in central Budapest which symbolizes a new interpretation of Hungary's place as a victim in World War II. It is noteworthy that Russian politicians, who have paid so much attention to the glorification of Nazism in the Baltic states and Ukraine, have not criticized these new manifestations of Hungarian historical policy.

It is quite possible that in the historical perspective 2014 will be perceived as the beginning of the long process of mobilizing civil society on a platform that will be not only anti-liberal, but also nationalist.

A. Miller

Memory Control.

*Historical Policy in Post-Communist Europe*¹

(2016)

The world order established in Yalta and Potsdam is gone. We are witnessing global changes that are clearly fundamental but hard to predict. Political transformations are accompanied by major shifts in collective memory. While after World War II most Frenchmen and Germans thought that the Red Army had played the main role in defeating the Nazis, now many of them believe it was the United States². The most pompous parade marking the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II took place in 2015 in Beijing, not in Moscow. Conflicts over the interpretation of the past have become so acute worldwide that a new term, ‘memory wars,’ has come into use.

In the post-war period, processes in non-communist “Western” and communist “Eastern” Europe were isolated from each other, and this was one of the key factors of historical policy. In the 1960s–1990s, Western European countries gradually came to consensus over the past, which was based on the recognition of the Holocaust as the central –

¹ Source: Miller A. Memory Control. Historical Policy in Post-Communist Europe // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2016. – Vol. 14, N 3. – P. 120–131.

² Kto pobedil fashizm? Otvetyi frantsuzov v mae 1945, v 1994 i 2004 godah = Who Defeated Fascism? French Responses in May 1945, 1994 and 2004 // Politicus.ru. – 2014. – 23 June. – Mode of access: <https://politikus.ru/articles/politics/22418-cto-pobedil-fashizm.html>

and unique – event of the 20th century. This consensus was intended to emphasize the common responsibility of all Europeans for the dark chapters in their past. It was a long and hard way to go. When in 1970 German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt before the Ghetto Heroes Monument in Warsaw, he was criticized. In the 1980s, Austria split over the Kurt Waldheim case which marked a transition from describing Austria solely as a victim of Hitler’s aggression to discussing its responsibility for Nazi crimes. France had its “moment of truth” in 1995 when President Jacques Chirac, addressing the audience at the *Vélodrome d’Hiver* Stadium, spoke of his country’s responsibility for the deportation of Jews to extermination camps during the Holocaust (the *Velodrome d’Hiver* was the place where a majority of the victims were held after the July 16–17, 1942 roundup of Jews in Paris). The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, designed by Peter Eisenman and built near Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate, became the apotheosis of this trend.

Of course, own sufferings of Western Europeans occupied a significant part of their collective memory, but admission of responsibility for the dark days of their past was selective. In fact, one can hardly see as much unanimity among Europeans on their role in colonialism and slave trade as they showed with regard to the Holocaust.

And yet the Holocaust consensus was very important for keeping this part of Europe clear of any national historical narrative where the titular nation would be the main victim. It made it impossible to demand preferences by citing past sufferings. The focus was on Europe’s own responsibility and measures that had to be taken in order to avoid new crimes similar to the Holocaust.

In part, the “old” EU countries could reach this consensus because of their political and economic successes in the closing decades of the 20th century. When their future seemed cloudless and the European Union’s global leadership indisputable, Europeans could easily admit the need to repent for their past sins.

New historical narratives and reevaluation of the past

After the collapse of socialism, Eastern European countries could build their narratives as they saw fit. The GDR was the only exception as it was absorbed by the Federative Republic of Germany and had to adopt its narrative. Almost all history teachers in the former GDR were dismissed, and the concept that blamed Nazi crimes on capitalism and declared communists the main victims of the Nazi regime was buried in oblivion.

It is important to remember that the majority of Eastern European Jews were not killed by Zyklon B at the extermination camps but were shot dead in ditches, beaten to death in the street or burned alive. Local residents were actively involved in these executions and sometimes carried them out on their own without the Nazis.

However, these facts are not the principal part of the new historical narratives created in the post-communist countries. Instead, they portray the titular nation as the main victim, placing emphasis on its suffering under the communist oppression imposed by Moscow. Yevgeny Finkel has put it this way: former communist countries are in “search of lost genocide.”¹ In fact, if you enter the Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius, do not expect to see any exhibits telling of the Holocaust (even though there is much to be told about the Holocaust in Lithuania). Instead, it highlights the Lithuanian genocide during the Soviet occupation. This scheme is also used by the “occupation museums” in other Baltic republics which claim that their titular nations (Estonians and Latvians) were the victims of genocide. The Lontsky Street Prison Memorial Museum in Lwow makes no mention of the fact that this is where a massive pogrom of Jews started, subsequently taking thousands of their lives in July 1941. The House of Terror in Budapest has its biggest room devoted entirely to GULAG, paying only marginal attention to the Holocaust.

¹ Finkel E. V poiskah «poteryannyih genotsidov»: istoricheskaya politika i mezhdunarodnaya politika v Vostochnoy Evrope posle 1989 g. = In Search of the “Lost Genocides”: Historical Politics and International Politics in Eastern Europe after 1989 // Istoricheskaja politika v XXI veke / Miller A., Lipman M. (eds.). – Moscow : Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012. – P. 292–327.

In addition to museums, Eastern European countries have created a number of other structures that are in stark contrast to Western European ones. The Polish Institute of National Remembrance (INR) is a good example. It was created in 1998 on the basis of the Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, the very name of which clearly points to its main purpose. It is generally believed that it was modeled on the German commission headed by Joachim Gauck, which was tasked with keeping the former GDR's Stasi records and making them available to researchers and general public. However, there is little similarity between the two. Apart from overseeing security services' archives, the INR also investigates communist crimes (and has 26 prosecutors to do the job) and conducts lustration reviews (since 2006). Historians from INR research departments have the status of civil servants and get much higher salaries than their colleagues in the Academy of Sciences or universities. The INR is a key player on the market of specialized and popular printed material on history with more than 600 volumes of documents and three magazines published under its supervision. This largely explains why it is so difficult for "outsiders" to get access to the archives overseen by the INR. Its employees simply view them as unwanted competitors.

In 2015, the Law and Justice Party won legislative elections and got full control of the parliament and government, thus giving the INR a chance to fulfill its Orwell potential. "Our sacrificial nation is portrayed [by opponents] as a nation of criminals, and we need to go on the offensive in historical policy in order to fight back these malicious attacks," said historian Jan Zaryn, who has recently been elected to the Polish Senate¹. His view is shared by historian Andrzej Nowak, the newly appointed historical policy adviser to the president.

The term 'historical policy' got firmly established in the Polish discourse in 2004 when several intellectuals called for working out and actively advancing a patriotic "historical policy." Borrowed from the German language, this term has not only lost the negative connotation it originally had in Germany from the 1980s, but it has also become the

¹ Szycht A. Senator Jan aryn: "Przeprowadzimy ofensyw historyczn " = Senator Jan aryn: "We Will Conduct a Historical Offensive!" // Prawy.pl. – 2015. – 26 October. – Mode of access: <https://prawy.pl/11096-senator-jan-zaryn-przeprowadzimy-ofensywe-historyczna/>

banner for an aggressive-instrumental approach to the past. Like in many post-communist countries, in Poland the past has become a weapon to fight with on the domestic and international political fronts. The term ‘historical policy’ now used in Eastern Europe in most cases conveys the Polish interpretation.

The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR) was founded by a government resolution of May 31, 2006 to make suggestions on how to “restore unbiased and fair history of the Ukrainian people” and “promote the antiquity of the Ukrainian nation and its language” as well as determine “areas and methods for restoring historical truth and justice in studying the history of Ukraine.”¹ It is quite logical that a leading role in the Institute has been played since its foundation by Vladimir Vyatrovich, who became known in 2006 after the publication of his book, in which he claimed that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) had saved Jews from the Nazis during the war². His other book was equally controversial as it attempted to prove that the massacre of Poles by UPA in Volhynia was part of “the second Polish-Ukrainian war of 1942–1947” where Ukrainians were victims rather than the perpetrators³.

In 2014, Vyatrovich, appointed UINR director, drafted four new laws intended to regulate the historical policy in Ukraine. In April 2015, these laws were hastily pushed through the parliament⁴.

In 2008, Western European historians and some of their colleagues from post-communist countries issued an appeal saying:

“History must not be a slave to contemporary politics nor can it be written on the command of competing memoir writers. In a free

¹ Pro zatverdzhennya Polozhennya pro Ukrayins'kyy Instytut nat-sionalnoyy pam'yati = On the Approval of the Regulations on the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance. – 2006. – Mode of access: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/927-2006-%D0%BF>

² V'yatrovich V. 2006. Stavlennya OUN do Evreyiv: formuvannya pozitsiyi na tli katastrofi = Attitude of the OUN to Jews: the Formation of a Position against the Background of a Catastrophe. – Lviv : Ms, 2006.

³ V'yatrovich V. Druga polsko-ukrayinska viyna: 1942–1947 = Polish-Ukrainian War II. 1942–1947. – Kiyiv : Vydavnychyy dim “Kyyevo-Mohylyans'ka akademiya”, 2011.

⁴ Himka J.-P. Legislating Historical Truth : Ukraine’s Laws of 9 April 2015 // Ab Imperio. – 2015. – April 21. – Mode of access: <http://net.abimperio.net/node/3442>

state, no political authority has the right to define historical truth and to restrain the freedom of the historian with the threat of penal sanctions”.

“We call on historians to marshal their forces within each of their countries and to create structures similar to our own, and, for the time being, to individually sign the present appeal, to put a stop to this movement towards laws aimed at controlling history memory”.

“We ask government authorities to recognize that, while they are responsible for the maintenance of the collective memory, they must not establish, by law and for the past, an official truth whose legal application can carry serious consequences for the profession of history and for intellectual liberty in general”.

“In a democracy, liberty for history is liberty for all”.¹

Known as *Appel de Blois*, it came as a response to the inclination of Western European parliaments to give legislative interpretations of historical events. This practice was started by the Gayssot Law adopted in France in 1990, which introduced criminal penalty for negation of crimes against humanity imputed to Nazi officials at the Nuremberg trials, primarily the Holocaust. While Western Europe realized the danger posed by such laws (as borne out by *Appel de Blois*), all Eastern European countries passed their own “memory laws” and only one of them, adopted in Romania, prohibited the glorification of Romanian WWII criminals. The rest shamelessly use the Gayssot Law to justify numerous acts that criminalize not the denial of crimes committed by their nationals but objections to certain interpretations of their sufferings.

In many post-communist countries some of those who fought against the communist regime had been involved in the Holocaust and mass killings of people belonging to other ethnic groups. However, this is not an obstacle to eulogizing them as new national heroes. For example, Ukraine has erected dozens of monuments to nationalist leader Stepan Bandera. In November of last year, the municipal authorities in Uman, the main pilgrimage site for Hasidic Jews, allowed the unveiling of a monument to 18th century Cossack rebellion leaders Ivan Gonta and Maksym Zalizniak, who became infamous for the

¹ L'appel de Blois. – 2008. – Mode of access: https://www.lph-asso.fr/index1307.html?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=14&lang=en

so-called massacre of Uman during which thousands of Jews were killed.

Over the entire period of its independence Ukraine has been a battlefield in the “war of monuments” involving representatives of different political trends. It reached its peak in 2014 when monuments to Vladimir Lenin were demolished countrywide. The first monument was torn down by supporters of the Svoboda (Freedom) Party in Kiev in December 2013. Inspired by their success, they marched along the streets of Kiev on January 1, 2014 in a torch rally, bringing together more than 10,000 people. These events marked a fundamental change in the nature of *Maidan* protests, making it practically impossible to speak in public without shouting the slogan taken from the Bandera movement: “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” And although Maidan protesters made attempts to “reset” the meaning of this slogan, radical neo-Nazi nationalism clearly won the battle for the symbolic nature of the movement.

Confrontation over monuments is engulfing other Eastern European countries too. In 2012, a monument to Latvian SS battalions was unveiled in Bauska. In Estonia, a monument to an Estonian soldier wearing a *Waffen-SS* helmet was erected and removed three times in 2002, 2004, and 2005. It was last removed at night as the authorities rightfully thought that their decision would hardly be welcomed by people. They explained the removal by considerations of national security (apparently, at the strong insistence of EU officials). At the same time, in 2007 Estonian authorities initiated the relocation of the monument to Soviet soldiers who had died during the liberation of Tallinn in 1944. The decision spurred mass protests among Russian-speaking residents of the country.

The “export of guilt” has swept the entire Eastern Europe, standing in glaring contrast to the previous European memory culture which gradually taught people to think of their own responsibility. Even in Hungary, which was an official Nazi ally, a stone statue of an angel, a symbol of Hungary, unveiled in 2014, stands at the edge of Budapest’s Freedom Square looking innocent while an eagle, obviously crafted to depict predatory Germany, dives towards him with extended claws.

Western vs. Eastern memory culture

Over the past twenty-five years hitherto isolated memory cultures of Western and Eastern Europe have begun to interact. Eastern Europe's historical policy, which focused on the suffering of its own people, confronted the West with reproaches for betraying small nations "kidnapped" by communist Moscow. This motive was clearly stated in the late 1970s by Milan Kundera in his essay *A Kidnapped West*, where he told the American and Western European public about the Central Europe concept¹.

After regaining independence from Moscow, Eastern European elites sought – quite rationally (in political terms) – to prevent a new deal between leading Western countries and Russia that could harm their own interests. They tried hard to raise the cost of such a deal for Western European leaders by pursuing a certain historical policy and forging alliances with various political forces in the EU. This policy, which was carried out most persistently by the Baltic States², was supported by well-known maverick presidents Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel as well as Western European politicians and public figures from among former Maoists and Trotskyites who were drifting towards the right end of the political spectrum, ranging from the foreign ministers of key EU countries, including Joschka Fischer and Bernard Kouchner, to intellectuals such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Andre Glucksmann.

Western Europe's memory culture in the 1990s reflected the confidence of the "old" EU countries in their own success and the growing influence of the European Union. This world outlook made it quite easy for them to focus on rethinking their own sins. Portraying oneself as a victim was not popular in those societies. But the situation

¹ Miller A. Tema Tsentralnoj Evropyi : istoriya, sovremennyye diskursyi i mesto v nih Rossii = The Theme of Central Europe : History, Contemporary Discourses and Russia's Place in Them // *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*. – 2001. – N 6. – Mode of access: <https://magazines.gorky.media/nlo/2001/6/tema-czentranoj-evropy-istoriya-sovremennyye-diskursyi-i-mesto-v-nih-rossii.html>

² Astrov A. Istoricheskaya politika i «ontologicheskaya ozabochnost» malyih tsentralnoevropeyskih gosudarstv (na primere Estonii) = The Politics of History and the "Ontological Anxiety" of Small States in Central and Eastern Europe (The Case of Estonia) // *Istoricheskaja politika v XXI veke* / Miller A., Lipman M. (eds.). – Moscow : *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*, 2012. – P. 184–213.

was different in the east of Europe. Existential fears haunted East European elites throughout the 20th century¹, and their admission to NATO and the EU made little difference. On the contrary, in the early 2000s in the wake of the split between Washington, on the one hand, and Berlin and Paris, on the other, over the Iraq crisis, new NATO members experienced an acute feeling of “ontological concern.”²

Russia as a source of threat became a key element of new narratives. This topic is deeply rooted in the European tradition. Iver Neumann believes that the perception of Russia as a “barbarian at the gate” has dominated the European thought for the last three centuries, occasionally yielding to the view of Russia as “an eternal apprentice” (but most often the two perceptions blended). Key elements of this discourse changed very little after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. “There is no use talking about the end of an East/West divide in European history after the end of the Cold War. The question is not whether the East will be used in the forging of new European identities, but how this is being done,” Neumann rightfully pointed out in 1999.³

In the 21st century, the interaction of the Western and Eastern European memory cultures has led to a radical transformation of the European historical policy as a whole. The Eastern European model, which focused on the suffering of its nations and the existential threat has prevailed over the Western European one dominated by the feeling of one’s own guilt and responsibility. In part, this happened because Western European elites for various reasons did not consider it necessary to stand up to new EU members over historical policy issues. Another reason is that self-confidence and faith in the success of the EU as an integration project have been shaken in the “old Europe” over the past ten years. As a result, Eastern Europe’s collective memory and identity-building mechanisms have prevailed in Western Europe’s understanding of the growing tensions between Russia and its neighbors.

¹ Bibo I. *The Distress of East European Small States // Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination* / ed. by K. Nagy. – Boulder : Social Science Monographs, 1991.

² Astrov A. *Op. cit.*

³ Neumann I. *Uses of the Other. “The East” in European Identity Formation.* – Manchester University Press. 1999.

In 2009, the EU's new approaches to the past culminated in the European Parliament's resolution that proclaimed August 23, the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as Day of Remembrance for Victims of Totalitarian Regimes. True, the initial focus on two totalitarian regimes and their acts of genocides was slightly toned down in the European Parliament's resolution as Western European countries insisted that, first, the document acknowledge the unique nature of the Holocaust and, second, and this is very important, that both totalitarian (Nazism and Communism) and authoritarian regimes be treated as criminal¹. But the tendency was set and three months later it was followed up in the Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which did not mention authoritarian regimes but focused entirely on the condemnation of totalitarian regimes². These documents do not equate Communism to Nazism, but this parallel is clearly implied in the Eastern European historical policy since the abovementioned documents do not expressly forbid such interpretation.

In this new coordinate system Eastern Europe may as well claim a leading role since it knows about the "sufferings" and "the barbarian at the gate" much more than Western Europe and keeps reminding it who the main victim is and who "owes" whom in the EU.

The campaign to promote Timothy Snyder's two latest books *Bloodlands* and *Black Earth* is an excellent example of how this approach is intentionally inculcated into the minds of Europeans³. Both books received negative response from professional historians. They believe the books contain no new facts but brim with factual mistakes and biased interpretations. However, they got positive coverage in mass

¹ European Parliament Resolution of 2 April 2009 on European Conscience and Totalitarianism // Official Journal of the European Union. – 2009. – 27.05. – Mode of access: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:137E:0025:0027:EN:PDF>

² Resolution on Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century // Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Eighteenth Annual Session. – Vilnius, 2009. – 29 June – 3 July. – Mode of access: <https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-documents/annual-sessions/2009-vilnius/declaration-6/261-2009-vilnius-declaration-eng/file>

³ Snyder T. *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin*. – New York : Basic Books, 2010; Snyder T. *Black Earth : The Holocaust as History and Warning*. – New York : Tim Duggan Books, 2015.

media which portray Snyder as a guru, even though his professional reputation has been tarnished. But this is his choice. What is important about these two books is their underlying motive—only two totalitarian regimes, and no one else, are fully responsible for all the horrors that occurred between the wars and during World War II. To substantiate his postulate, Snyder manipulates numerous facts. For example, he claims that the Holocaust happened across Eastern Europe by the same scenario even though he is well aware of Jeffrey Kopstein’s work which convincingly proves otherwise¹. In his book about the participation of the local population in the extermination of Jews in 1941–1942, which is based on the analysis of events in several hundred cities and towns, Kopstein shows that all the places where Jews were killed on the initiative of their neighbors are located west of the Soviet Union’s border that existed in 1939. But neither the facts cited by Kopstein nor his explanations interest Snyder, because they disagree with his position.

As the abovementioned tendency gains momentum, one cannot help wondering if the European historical policy focusing entirely on the issue of totalitarianism is ready to sacrifice the main achievement of the previous period, that is, the feeling of common responsibility. The striking difference in the attitude towards refugees in the western and eastern parts of the EU prompts a firm conclusion that different memory cultures are one of the key reasons for this divergence. Eastern Europe’s reaction clearly reveals its unwillingness to give up the role of the main victim (with all the dividends it is entitled to) and deeply rooted existential nationalist fears. In Western Europe, collective memory of common responsibility for the Holocaust makes people treat the issue of refugees differently. In Germany, many view them as a chance for some sort of “redemption.”

Naturally, collective memory covers a much wider range of political differences in the east and west of the EU. The perception of democracy as unconditional dominance of the majority, as in Orban’s Hungary five years ago and in Poland after the victory of the Law and

¹ Kopstein J.S., Wittenberg J. *Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Shadow of the Holocaust.* – Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 2018.

Justice Party in 2015, is largely rooted in the national historical narratives that originated in Eastern Europe.

How could it happen that the notion of *Geschichtspolitik*, coined for discussing certain techniques for politicizing history, was revived with a positive meaning as an ideology which glorifies one's own past as the main method of building identity and which claims that discussing one's own nation's sins is tantamount to aiding the enemy? How could *polityka historyczna* turn into an ideological standard for historical policy in Eastern Europe?

Manipulative use of history becomes one of the central issues in today's political language. When the Nord Stream gas pipeline is described as a new Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Putin is portrayed as the Hitler of the 21st century, this devalues people's memory and paralyzes their ability to conduct a substantive political discussion, thus providing a powerful instrument for propaganda and indoctrination.

We are in a situation where historians' discourse is guided by the logic of political negotiations rather than academic rules. An academic discussion is essentially a dialogue where one should present his arguments and substantiate them in order to be understood. On the contrary, the purpose of political negotiations is to achieve an advantageous position and realize one's own political interests. Presentation of arguments will only spoil things in this case.

Ten years ago, in the wake of the EU's massive eastward expansion, the magazine *Transit* asked intellectuals in different countries if they thought that consensus about the past could provide the basis for the consolidation of the rapidly enlarging European Union¹. I was the only respondent who was unambiguously skeptical about this. Today it has become quite obvious that the historical memory policy and, in broader terms, memory culture are not the glue but a dissolvent that erodes the EU's integrity.

¹ Was hält Europa zusammen? = What holds Europe together? // *Transit: Europäische Revue*. – Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Neue Kritik. – 2004. – N 28. – Mode of access: <https://www.iwm.at/transit-online/was-halt-europa-zusammen-2/>

I intentionally did not touch on Russia and its historical policy in this article. First of all, Russia is not Europe, meaning that no one in our country believes any longer that it can become integrated into European structures in the foreseeable future or pursue a policy based on such hopes. This is our fundamental difference from all the countries that lie between Russia and the EU.

Another important difference is that Russia does not build its identity as a victimized nation, which is good. But instead, our historical conscience and memory policy are underlain by a besieged fortress mentality, which is not so good.

Second, the question of how the evolution of the historical policy in Europe impacts Russia's practices deserves to be discussed separately. Certain forms, methods and sometimes rhetoric techniques have been borrowed. Our historical policy has many elements that can be found in Eastern Europe. In 2014, the Duma passed the Yarovaya Law¹, which contains all the negative aspects of Eastern European memory laws. Like Eastern European countries, we have "securitized" our historical memory, that is, we look at discussions on history and collective identity through the lens of national security threats. Russian authorities openly interfere in the teaching of history, giving it an ideological slant. There is a network of organizations in the country which are formally independent from the government but which actually pursue its historical policy.

And yet, Russia's approaches towards the historical policy may be quite creative. The Immortal Regiment and the St. George ribbon are perhaps the most vivid and successful examples. They sprang up as public initiatives but unfortunately are falling into the stifling grip of the government authorities now.

In 2014–2015, several public associations (including the Free Historical Society) were set up and initiatives were launched, which has

¹ Federalnyiy zakon ot 5 maya 2014 g. N 128-FZ "O vnesenii izmeneniy v otdelnyie zakonodatelnyie aktyi Rossiyskoy Federatsii" = Federal Law of May 5, 2014 N 128-FZ "On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation" // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. – 2014. – 7 May. – Mode of access: <http://www.rg.ru/2014/05/07/reabilitacia-dok.html>

proved the ability of professional historians to organize and oppose negative tendencies in historical policy. The program commemorating the victims of political repressions, sent into oblivion in 2014, seemed to have partly revived in 2015.

At any rate, in order to analyze all these contradictory tendencies, it is important to understand the processes that are taking place in Europe's historical policy and cherish no illusions.

A. Voronovici, D. Efremenko

Politics of Memory, Kiev Style.

*Ukrainian Identity Strategies in the Context of European Integration*¹

(2017)

French philosopher and historian of religion Ernest Renan in his speech at the Sorbonne in 1882 defined a nation as follows: “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form.”²

Undoubtedly, two components of a nation are closely interconnected, and the *political management* of the rich legacy of memory provides an important stimulus for life. Nowadays, such management is increasingly often described by the term ‘*politics of memory*.’ It can be considered as a functioning system of interactions and communications between different actors with regard to political uses of the past. In other words, the politics of memory is one of the key instruments for shaping macro-political identity of a community.

¹ Source: Voronovich A., Yefremenko D. Politics of Memory, Kiev Style. Ukrainian Identity Strategies in the Context of European Integration // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2017. – Vol. 15, N 4. – P. 184–197.

² Renan E. Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ? = What is a Nation? – Paris : Mille et une nuits, 1997. – P. 7.

A complex system of interactions and communications occurring as part of the politics of memory cannot be reduced to a linear process of nation-building, using different practices of commemoration, the teaching of history or the presentation of historical events in the media. Things are much more complex as the parties involved often have opposite aspirations and may be driven not only by the idea of national consolidation but also by much more mundane objectives of strengthening a concrete sociopolitical order or, on the contrary, undermining it. External factors also play a role through a positive or negative attitude towards the macro-political identity of a community.

It must be said that the main driving force in a country's politics of memory is the interests, aspirations and actions of internal agents seeking to advance a certain interpretation of history. But at some point external actors may start playing a greater role if they can significantly influence the politics of memory in that country. More and more often politics of memory becomes the subject of interstate interaction, and supranational bodies (in the European Union in the first place) are beginning to work out their own policy on these issues.

Diverging Paths of European Politics of Memory

Issues concerning the politics of memory have often been discussed in the *Russia in Global Affairs* journal, particularly in the articles contributed by Alexei Miller and Olga Malinova. This discussion is likely to go on since the politics of memory in certain communities can be a factor of internal and international conflicts. The politics of memory can be used to incite conflicts or plan post-conflict settlement. Strictly speaking, in post-war Western Europe the politics of memory played a major role in assessing the tragic experience of World War II and Nazi crimes, and building a consolidating historical narrative on that basis.

German scholar Aleida Assmann showed convincingly that the Holocaust became the basic element of the European politics of

memory¹. It is based on the understanding of the Holocaust as the main European tragedy of the 20th century and on the recognition of all European nations' collective guilt and responsibility for that tragedy. The collective responsibility of Europeans stemmed from the understanding that the Holocaust was carried out by Nazi Germany and its collaborators but that it also involved the population of the occupied countries. The Holocaust became the binding thread for the European historical narrative in the twentieth century. The key role of the Holocaust in Europe's politics of memory was institutionalized in such bodies as the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, the World Holocaust Forum, and others. The Holocaust was gradually turning into a key element of the politics of memory in Western Europe in the 1970s–1980s and became an inalienable part of European commemorative practices in the early 2000s.

The recognition of the Holocaust as a central element of the European politics of memory coincided in time with the admission of many former socialist Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union. The commemoration of the Holocaust essentially became one of the main requirements for the new EU members to meet in order to prove that they belong to the “European family” and adhere to the “European values.” However, this politics of memory vexed the political elites of Central and Eastern European countries. One of the reasons was that local actors, who had been linked to Nazi Germany and involved in the Holocaust, spearheaded anti-Soviet resistance after the war and are now loudly acclaimed as national heroes, especially in the Baltic States. Having become full members of the EU, these countries only superficially accepted the European policy of memory agenda focused on the Holocaust.

They started advancing their own politics of memory, which presented them as victims of Communism and, to a lesser extent, of Nazism. Aided and supported by some leading Western European politicians and intellectuals, the new members of united Europe have made great progress in this respect. By drifting away from the central

¹ Assmann A. *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit – Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik = The Long Shadow of the Past – Remembrance Culture and Historical Politics.* – Munich : C.H. Beck Publishers, 2006.

meaning of the European responsibility for the genocide of Jews and by emphasizing self-victimization and shifting responsibility to external totalitarian forces, they laid the foundation for new conflicts and even “memory wars.”

Declarations adopted by the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in 2009 can be interpreted as a victory of the new edition of the politics of memory¹. Both resolutions mentioned the unique nature of the Holocaust and did not conspicuously equate Communism to Nazism, but a change of emphasis was already obvious.

We can speak of more long-term effects of this shift in the European politics of memory. The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 essentially ruined all hopes that a consensus on the past could become a factor facilitating its further consolidation. As Alexei Miller has rightfully observed, “the politics of memory, or in broader terms the culture of memory, is not the glue but the dissolvent which is eroding the EU’s unity.”² The disuniting role of the politics of memory could be ignored only until the European Union itself was regarded as a unique example of a successful integration project, but no more. Brexit has made a major realignment of forces in the EU inevitable, with “a Europe of different speeds” being the most likely scenario even though Jean-Claude Juncker and other European officials claim otherwise. This is where the politics of memory may become an effective instrument of divergence.

¹ European Parliament Resolution of 2 April 2009 on European Conscience and Totalitarianism // Official Journal of the European Union. – 2009. – 27.05. – Mode of access: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:137E:0025:0027:EN:PDF>;

Resolution on Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century // Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Eighteenth Annual Session. – Vilnius, 2009. – 29 June – 3 July. – Mode of access: <https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-documents/annual-sessions/2009-vilnius/declaration-6/261-2009-vilnius-declaration-eng/file>

² Miller A. Politika pamyati v postkommunisticheskoy Evrope i ee vozdeistvie na evropeiskuyu kulturu pamyati = Politics of Memory in Post-Communist Europe and its Influence on European Memory Culture // Politeia. – 2016. – N 1. – P. 111–121.

But there is more to it. When extended to post-Soviet countries, all Central and Eastern European mechanisms of collective memory, which have taken over the European politics of memory, generate tension by conflicting with both the macro-political identity Russia is building and the identities dating back to Soviet times. The Ukraine crisis, especially the separation of Crimea and the proclamation of “people’s republics” in the east of Ukraine, cannot be understood without taking into account this clash of identities. The scenarios of further developments in the territories controlled by Kiev should also be considered in the context of this conflict of identities, which only seems to have been quashed.

Ukrainian Historical Narratives

There are two main historical narratives competing with each other in independent Ukraine. Academically, both are based on the interpretation of Ukraine’s history proposed by Mikhail Grushevsky and his followers. But modern interpretations are reversive, tend to adapt historical facts to the realities of post-Soviet Ukraine (“Ukrainization” of Kievan Rus’ history is only one of the examples), and emphasize Ukraine’s uniqueness even when it was part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.

A more radical narrative can be described as nationalistic. It reflects the teleological movement of the Ukrainian people to its own statehood and is based on the glorification of persons who fought for its independence and development. It also emphasizes the status of the Ukrainian people as a victim of external forces, especially Russia and the Soviet Union. Naturally, this approach vilifies the Soviet period in the history of Ukraine and praises those who resisted it, with the glory of heroes bestowed upon OUN-UPA nationalists as anti-Soviet fighters for the Ukrainian state. However, their role in the Holocaust and anti-Polish campaigns is largely hushed up or even denied. It should be noted that this approach is actively supported by the Ukrainian diaspora which plays a significant role in Ukraine’s political history.

Its opponents also appeal to numerous elements of the national narrative, especially when it comes to the history of the country in the

20th century. They do not assess the Soviet period as negatively as their vis-à-vis do. For example, the Holodomor occupies an important place in their interpretation, but it is not portrayed as the genocide of the Ukrainian people. They also oppose radical nationalism and appeal to the nostalgia for the Soviet past among part of the population. Former President Leonid Kuchma's book with the eloquent title *Ukraine is not Russia*¹ conveys the quintessence of their approach.

Differences in the culture of memory undoubtedly have a regional dimension which remained even after 2014. But a simplified division into the west and the east should be replaced with a more nuanced political, geographical and sociocultural landscape.

“Ukraine is Europe” as the Leitmotif of the Politics of Memory

Different versions of Ukraine's politics of memory have always made, in different proportions and forms, attempts to distance the country from Russia and set it on the historically “destined” European path (even though the radical nationalistic version tends to mistrust the European West). The Ukrainian politics of memory received a truly powerful impetus towards “Europeanization” after the Orange Revolution when the policy of European integration became one of Kiev's priority objectives. Subsequently, even political forces or leaders who came to power with pro-Russian slogans or who were generally viewed as loyal to Moscow continued to steer the country towards Europe.

The European Union, in turn, tried to support as much as possible European aspirations in Ukraine, Moldova, and other post-Soviet countries. In 2009, Brussels launched the Eastern Partnership program designed to establish closer cooperation with the member states and gradually harmonize their norms and values with European ones. The program was expected to step up institutional reforms started in those countries in order to adapt them to European standards of democracy, political management and market economy. The signing of

¹Kuchma L. *Ukraina – ne Rossija = Ukraine is not Russia*. – Moscow : Vremya, 2003.

association agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and the introduction of visa-free travel regimes was a sort of interim culmination of this policy. The question is whether Brussels' decisions were prompted by the real successes of those countries or by their geopolitical confrontation with Russia. Ukraine's and Moldova's achievements in promoting democracy, building a free market economy, implementing social programs, and developing infrastructure draw strong criticism. However, European integration was not reduced entirely to the implementation (and often imitation) of political and economic reforms. One of Brussels' unspoken requirements for post-Soviet aspirants was the adoption of the European politics of memory. Compliance with these requirements gave an admission pass to the "European family."

The governments that replaced one another after the Orange Revolution had to play by the rules accepted in the European politics of memory. But they could also use the European politics of memory for their own purposes. The gradual emergence of two opposing trends in the European politics of memory gave Ukraine room for maneuver. Both the authorities and the opposition tried to use the key tenets of the European politics of memory for fighting their political opponents.

During Victor Yushchenko's presidency, Ukraine's politics of memory was clearly underlain by the nationalist narrative, with the Ukrainian diaspora playing a much greater role than before. Key elements of Yushchenko's policy were glorification of OUN-UPA nationalists, with a focus on the sacrificial narrative of Ukrainian history in Soviet times and on the Holodomor as the genocide of the Ukrainian people. The European politics of memory, which at that time was underpinned by the notion of pan-European responsibility, created certain problems for Yushchenko's agenda.

Yushchenko's attempts to glorify OUN-UPA fighters and his large-scale national and international campaign to recognize the Holodomor as genocide met with a controversial reaction in the world. Both aspects of his policy ran counter to the European precept of pan-European responsibility. Attempts to recognize the Holodomor as genocide, with the number of casualties exceeding those of the Holocaust, called into question the unique nature of the latter in European history and concurred with the search by many other Eastern

European countries for their own “genocide.” The glorification of OUN-UPA fighters, notoriously known for their role in the Holocaust, denied the responsibility of the local population for the tragedy. Paradoxically, key elements of the politics of memory pursued by pro-Western President Yushchenko contradicted the European politics of memory at that time. This aroused resentment in Europe as a whole and in individual countries in particular. No wonder, Ukraine’s relations with Israel became quite strained.

Yushchenko did not ignore the Holocaust. On the contrary, he used it quite actively to advance his own policy. In 2006, when the international community marked the 65th anniversary of the Babi Yar massacre, during which the Nazi and their local collaborators had executed more than 30,000 Jews, Kiev hosted a Holocaust remembrance forum where Yushchenko stressed the importance of that tragedy not only for the Jews but also for all ethnic groups living in Ukraine. He omitted the participation of Ukrainians in the Holocaust, mentioning only the role of his compatriots who had helped save the Jews. This approach was also quite manifest in the subsequent Holocaust commemorative events attended by Yushchenko and other representatives of official Kiev. A year later, when the next anniversary of the Babi Yar tragedy was marked, Yushchenko laid flowers at the monument to OUN fighters who had been killed there too. He also made numerous attempts to portray the Holodomor as the “Ukrainian Holocaust.” In declarations and regulatory documents concerning the Holodomor, these two tragedies were often mentioned together. The Holocaust was used as an example and an argument for recognizing the Holodomor as an act of genocide and imposing criminal penalties for refusal to do so. Yushchenko tried to use the symbolic significance of the Holocaust to justify and fortify his own policy. He used the commemoration of the Holocaust for utilitarian purposes both in order to reinforce his argument about the “genocidal” nature of the Holodomor and to placate his Western partners angered by some of his decisions concerning the politics of memory. Yushchenko denied the very fact of OUN-UPA fighters’ participation in the anti-Jewish violence, which, however, could hardly convince his opponents both inside and outside the country.

On the whole, his policy fitted into the concept, quite popular in Eastern Europe, which equated the victims of the two totalitarian regimes – Nazism and Communism – and relieved his own nation of all responsibility for those crimes. Such radical policy mobilized those sections of society which did not share his views. To some extent, Yushchenko's politics of memory helped his opponents win the following presidential election.

Victor Yanukovich's victory in 2010 was viewed by many observers as the triumph of pro-Russian forces and the related narrative of Ukrainian history. In fact, the new Ukrainian leadership was much more open to cooperation with Russia in various areas, including those concerning the politics of memory. For example, in 2010, Presidents Medvedev and Yanukovich together laid flowers at the monument to the victims of the Holodomor. Two years prior, Medvedev had refused to go to Kiev to attend a similar event at the invitation of then President Yushchenko. Nevertheless, Ukraine continued to drift towards Europe until November 2013 when Kiev unexpectedly decided to suspend the negotiations on an association agreement with the EU, which precipitated mass riots now known as the Euromaidan.

Contrary to Yushchenko's policy, the new Ukrainian authorities sought to promote the culture of memory that offered a more positive look at the Soviet period and Russian-Ukrainian relations over several centuries of common history. At the same time, they showed a negative attitude towards radical Ukrainian nationalism in the twentieth century. And yet, the concept of national history prevailed in politics and education. Being predominantly a technocrat, Yanukovich had no clearly defined politics of memory, which was largely confined to the revision of some of his predecessor's decisions and abolition of some of the regulatory acts that glorified nationalist leaders Shukhevich and Bandera.

Speaking of the influence of the European politics of memory at that time, two aspects are worth mentioning. The first one concerns the introduction of new textbooks in schools by Minister of Education Dmitry Tabachnik, whose appointment and activities drew a lot of public attention. Tabachnik is known in Ukraine for his pro-Russian views. In a major article published in 2010, he suggested that the work on new textbooks should focus on "the humanitarian, anthropocentric

approach to history.” The only significant reference to the “European tradition” materialized in the decision to exclude the last decade in the history of the country from textbooks.

Another important step was the establishment of Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2011 by the Ukrainian parliament’s resolution passed on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Babi Yar tragedy. However, it suggested marking the Day on January 27, that is, when International Holocaust Remembrance Day is observed, a date not in any way related to the Babi Yar massacre. But the explanatory notes to the draft resolution did not even mention January 27 although it clearly had an international connotation. Interestingly, the draft was proposed by a lawmaker from the Communist Party. Apparently, it was an attempt by political forces opposing the rehabilitation of the OUN-UPA to establish a commemorative day which they could use against their ideological opponents.

After Euromaidan: Separation of Memory and Responsibility

Anti-communist motives in Ukraine’s politics of memory have become relevant again in the present-day political landscape, which has changed drastically. Following the Euromaidan, Yanukovich’s flight, and events in Crimea and Donbass, the new Ukrainian leadership thought it could reap some benefit from reformatting the symbolic space and fanning the flames of the “memory war.” In April 2015 the Ukrainian parliament hurriedly passed a package of four laws: “On the Denunciation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes,” “On the Commemoration of the Victory over Nazism in World War II,” “On the Legal Status and the Honoring of the Fighters for the Freedom of Ukraine in the 20th Century,” and “On Access to the Archives of the Repressive Bodies of the Communist Totalitarian Regime.” These documents launched the official process of “decommunization” in Ukrainian society. Some supporters of the new regime explained the adoption of the laws by security needs, because the Soviet past was regarded as a national security issue. Obviously, this interpretation stemmed from the ideological confrontation with Russia and those Ukrainians who were skeptical about Kiev’s new

policy. But there is no doubt that these laws reflect the dramatic rise of nationalist ideas and their increased influence on the Ukrainian ruling circles after the Euromaidan.

Ukraine's Institute of National Memory played a key role in the development of these laws. The institute, modeled on similar bodies in other post-socialist countries, has in recent years adopted a number of controversial decisions and declarations. The institute is headed by Vladimir Vyatrovich, known, among other things, for denying the OUN-UPA's role in the Holocaust. In one of his books he claimed that the OUN-UPA had actually saved Jews from the Nazi, not helped to exterminate them¹.

The first of the abovementioned laws, "On the Denunciation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes," was fully in line with the policy of self-victimization. Its preamble linked the law to six decisions of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the European Parliament in a bid to legitimize it as part of the pan-European trend. The Ukrainian parliament's move has far-reaching goals and envisages a wide range of measures from banning "totalitarian symbols" to dismantling monuments to Soviet leaders and renaming cities, towns and settlements. Nazism mentioned in the law is no more than just a suitable backdrop and an argument for criminalizing Communism by equating two types of totalitarianism. Clearly, this is a strategy designed to suppress an alternative historical memory. The latest European tendencies in the politics of memory provided a convenient basis for justifying such methods of solving domestic political problems. In addition, the dramatic deterioration of Russian-European relations after 2014 gave Eastern European countries more room for maneuver in their politics of memory. The European Union closes its eyes to campaigns and decisions which previously were viewed as detrimental to relations with Russia.

The Law "On the Commemoration of the Victory over Nazism in World War II" places emphasis on the term 'World War II' and excludes the "Great Patriotic War" wording used before. By so doing

¹ Vyatrovich V.M. *Stavlennya OUN do evreiv: formuvannya pozitsii na tli katastrofi = Attitude of the OUN to Jews: the Formation of a Position against the Background of a Catastrophe.* – Lviv : Ms, 2006.

the Ukrainian parliament tried to obliterate the culture of memory connected with the “Great Patriotic War” narrative which bound Ukraine with other former Soviet republics, primarily Russia, through joint struggle against Nazism, starting from 1941 but omitting prior events. Instead, the parliament proposed alternative wording, “World War II,” in which Ukraine is portrayed as a victim of the two totalitarian regimes starting from 1939. The law ignores the fact that Ukrainian territories were consolidated into one republic, firstly, as a result of the events of 1941–1945, and secondly, due to the decisions adopted by one of the “totalitarian regimes.” An important novelty in the law, which reflects a collision between two interpretations of that period, is that it establishes Remembrance and Reconciliation Day on May 8 and at the same time proclaims May 9 as Victory Day over Nazism in World War II (Victory Day). The decision to mark May 8 as Remembrance and Reconciliation Day was not accidental. On this day many European countries mark the end of World War II even though the UN resolutions cited in the Ukrainian law mention both dates, May 8 and May 9, as suitable for commemorative events. However, Ukraine is trying to get rid of the previous pattern in commemorating the end of the war under the pretext of following “European moral and cultural values.”

And yet, this is largely a half-measure. Ukrainian leaders apparently were aware of how strong the tradition was and did not dare ban Victory Day completely and replace it with the “European” alternative. They are trying to put a different meaning into this date as one can see from its full official name. Some were clearly dissatisfied with the changes as insufficient. In 2017, the Institute of National Memory proposed a new version of the law on state holidays and commemorative days. Transferring a day-off from May 9 to May 8 was one of the major changes. Vyatrovich said this decision should stress “the European tradition of concluding World War II.” However, in this particular case, observance of the “European tradition” underscores the division of Ukrainian society as borne out by constant clashes between different groups of people occurring these days.

And yet, one cannot say that the “Great Patriotic War” narrative is a taboo among Ukrainian leaders. They often refer to its elements as part of the ideological struggle over the armed conflict in the east of

Ukraine, trying to fill them with a new meaning and use their symbolic power. Sometimes events are presented as a new stage in the “heroic fight of the Ukrainian people” against invaders, including the World War II period, using well recognizable constructs and symbols such as “our Stalingrad.” The leaders of the breakaway republics also actively use the “Great Patriotic War” narrative for commemorating the armed conflict. For example, they carry the photographs of killed separatist military commanders during the Immortal Regiment march on May 9 as part of this trend.

Going back to the European politics of memory, it is necessary to say that its other element focused on the Holocaust continues to influence Ukraine’s politics of memory after the Euromaidan. On the whole, its influence has decreased, but the commemoration of the Holocaust remains part of the repertoire obligatory for members of the “European family.” This allows Eastern European regimes to use the Holocaust as an “inexpensive” (compared to structural reforms) way to improve their image in the eyes of their Western partners. The commemoration of the Holocaust becomes largely a ritual when the Ukrainian authorities make public declarations, organize events marking Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27, unveil new monuments, and inaugurate new museums. However, as a rule, none of these activities requires the recognition of their own people’s guilt for the Holocaust as a central element of the pan-European responsibility in the politics of memory. The Ukrainian Law “On the Legal Status and the Honoring of the Fighters for the Freedom of Ukraine in the 20th Century” has essentially excluded many local actors from the list of possible perpetrators of the anti-Jewish violence. So although the Ukrainian authorities have been actively exploiting the Holocaust theme lately, primarily for foreign policy purposes, they have not suffered any significant political losses on the domestic front, which they would if the role of local residents in the genocide of Jews would be assessed comprehensively and unbiasedly. Responsibility for the Holocaust is placed entirely on external forces, the Nazi, and sometimes even the Soviet Union.

This narrative dilutes the Jewish tragedy in the overall tragedy of the country as a victim of external “totalitarian” forces.

The post-Maidan version of Ukraine's politics of memory, coupled with other steps undertaken by official Kiev in the field of education, and language and information policies, will have long-term consequences for the future of Ukraine and its relations with the European Union, Russia, and other countries. In terms of importance, they will be comparable with any of the possible scenarios of the conflict in the east of the country (or, hopefully, its resolution). But one cannot be separated from the other. The conflict itself, its events and participants are already becoming the object of the politics of memory both in the territories controlled by Kiev and in the breakaway "people's republics" in Donbass.

It is necessary to understand that macro-political identity emerging on this basis will inevitably be ethnocentric, with the dominant historical narrative promoting the complex of a victimized ethnos and the ban on topics that may imply the recognition of one's own guilt and responsibility for the past and present tragedies. The nationalist narrative in the politics of memory amid constantly stoked tension over the "Russian threat" makes resentment the main motive of Kiev's policy with regard to Moscow.

In the political turmoil of recent years, the Ukrainian authorities have been harshly cracking down on the alternative historical memory kept by millions of people in the country. However, even after the loss of Crimea and part of Donbass Ukraine cannot be considered a consolidated nation with one identity and a common view on history as borne out by numerous public opinion polls. Regional differences remain, and attempts to erase them quickly may produce the opposite result. Depending on how aggressively the Ukrainian political elite cultivates ethnocentric identity and how drastically the central authorities overhaul their language and regional policies, a combination of these factors may exacerbate social, ethnic and political tension. In the long term, Ukraine may end up as a "problem country" not only for Russia but also for other neighboring countries and the European Union.

A. Miller

**The Russian Revolution of 1917:
History, Memory, and Politics**

(2018)¹

The Revolution of October 1917 in Russia is considered to be a key moment of the 20th century. Now that events linked with the Revolution's 100th anniversary are coming to an end, we can analyse the experience of 1917 in the context of both historians' professional discussion and commemoration policy towards the Revolution.

The Revolution and Russia's commemoration policy

Russia's ruling elites began to distance themselves from the legacy of the Revolution as early as the 1990s, when Moscow's Red Square stopped hosting official parades. On 7 November 1996, October Revolution Day was renamed the Day of Accord and Reconciliation. This focused public attention on overcoming the consequences of discord and the Civil War. It should be noted that no attempts were made at that time to turn the February Revolution into a new 'foundation myth' to portray it as an entirely positive event and to link the genealogy of a post-Soviet and democratic Russia to it. In 2004, the

¹ Source: Miller A. The Russian Revolution of 1917: History, Memory, and Politics / Valdai Discussion Club. – 2018. – January. – (Valdai Papers ; N 81). – Mode of access: <https://valdaiclub.com/files/16936/>

7 November holiday was abolished completely with top state officials virtually ignoring the Revolution in their public speeches.

In short, the official position on the Revolution's 100th anniversary implied that this event should be marked, but not celebrated. In December 2016, i.e. less than two months before the 100th anniversary of the February Revolution, President Vladimir Putin signed instructions on preparing for and holding events dedicated to the Revolution's 100th anniversary. These extremely brief instructions were purely technical. The state merely stipulated funding anniversary events, primarily academic conferences and museum exhibitions. Russian authorities decided not to organize commemorative events and delegated this role to the Russian Historical Society. This decision considerably downplayed the status of the Revolution's 100th anniversary. It should be noted that the executive order on preparations for the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War was signed in 2013, and that President Vladimir Putin personally chaired meetings of the organizing committee to prepare for this anniversary¹. This exemplifies a substantial difference in the authorities' attitude towards both key commemorative dates.

The instructions mentioned the 'Revolution of 1917 in Russia' and used no epithets. President Vladimir Putin never used the phrase 'Great Russian Revolution', coined during discussions at the Russian Historical Society and within the academic establishment.

In an effort to find an acceptable formula for commemorating the Revolution's 100th anniversary, the authorities initially reinstated the Boris Yeltsin's 'reconciliation and accord' formula renounced by them in 2004. This exact formula was used in President Vladimir Putin's address to the Federal Assembly that noted the need to once again address the causes of the revolutions in Russia and their very essence². It also stated that we need learn the lessons of history for the sake of reconciliation, for strengthening the public, political and civil accord

¹ Zasedanie Rossiyskogo organizatsionnogo komiteta «Pobeda» = Meeting of the Russian Organizing Committee "Victory" // Kremlin.ru. – 2013. – 12 July. – Mode of access: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18714>

² Poslanie Prezidenta Federalnomu Sobraniyu = Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly // Kremlin.ru. – 2016. – 1 December. – Mode of access: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53379>

that we have managed to achieve today. Apart from exhibitions, conferences, roundtable discussions, publishing and educational projects, the action plan called for installing and unveiling the Reconciliation Monument on 4 November 2017 in Kerch. The authorities essentially skirted around the issue of formulating an official position on the Revolution, and instead facilitated open public discussions dealing with the causes, consequences and the essence of the revolutionary events.

Apart from the authorities, Communist forces are an important player in the field of commemoration policy. They remain a ‘mnemonic actor’, to use the professional lingo of scholars, in the legacy of the Revolution. According to the logic of the Soviet historical narrative, October 1917 served as a fundamental myth for the state of workers and peasants. The Soviet government created and maintained a powerful infrastructure for upholding the collective memory of this myth. On the whole, modern communists carry on the Soviet tradition in their interpretation of the events of 1917. In their opinion, the February Bourgeois Democratic Revolution triggered the country’s disintegration, and the October Revolution saved the country and opened up prospects for a brighter Communist future of the Soviet people. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation became the country’s sole political force that intended to celebrate this date in line with the party narrative: ‘The October Revolution is a moment of national glory’. Today, the Communists are focusing on what they assert is the October Revolution’s key role in saving and strengthening the state, rather than on its class significance.

The legacy of the Soviet narrative of the October Revolution is much broader and persistent than one may think. The perception of pre-revolutionary Russia as a backward and illiterate country riddled by social contradictions is a part of this narrative. Hence, there is an idea that the October Revolution paved the way for national modernization. Even after denouncing methods and many of the results of Soviet-era modernization, our contemporaries often stick to the Soviet narrative while discussing the pre-revolution Russia. Opinion polls show that over 40 percent of respondents still view the October Revolution

positively¹. While analysing these statistics, one should keep in mind that basically everyone in modern Russia owes their existence to some extent to the Revolution. Those who ‘deny’ the Revolution also deny themselves to a certain extent, and this presents a major psychological obstacle.

Apart from the Communists, non-systemic political forces, including the Other Russia, a descendant of the National Bolshevik Party, are claiming the October Revolution’s legacy for themselves. It should be noted that some leftist forces do not associate themselves with the October Revolution, and dwell on ‘missed opportunities’ instead. In their opinion, a government consisting of non-Bolshevik leftists, primarily Socialist Revolutionaries, which became the most popular party in Russia on the eve of elections to the Constituent Assembly (1917), could have taken better advantage of opportunities offered by the Revolution .

The Russian Orthodox Church, which is another important mnemonic actor in this context, perceives 1917 as a year that triggered a national tragedy, when the people’s sufferings merged with the disintegration of the state and the persecution of the clergy. At the same time, the year 1917 witnessed the 1st Local Council since the 17th century, in addition to the reinstatement of the patriarchy.

The Russian Orthodox Church ranks among the most influential actors in the sphere of commemoration and memory, as highlighted by the scale of the ‘Russia – My History’ historical parks that have been established under its auspices. The Russian Orthodox Church has its own stance on critical assessments of lessons of the past and does not deny the need for such assessments. But its framework for assessing the past differs considerably from that of the liberal opposition, and the Memorial society (Russian NGO focusing on human rights. – Ed.) in particular. We can assume that the voice of the Russian Orthodox Church on these issues will become more influential in the near future. The liberal framework for assessing the past is built primarily around the crimes of the Communist regime and the issue of the Russian government’s ‘despotic nature’ in the pre-revolutionary past.

¹ Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya = October Revolution // Levada-Centr. – 2017. – 5 April. – Mode of access: <https://www.levada.ru/2017/04/05/oktyabrskaya-revoljutsiya-2/>

The Russian Orthodox Church's framework for assessing the past includes the crimes of the Bolsheviks, as well as the Russian Empire's revolutionary and liberal traditions that, according to this interpretation, undermined the state and paved the way for a destructive revolutionary crisis.

The public positions of liberal commentators, who consider the February Revolution as a missed opportunity for the country's democratic development, are less influential, but are quite prominent. Another public stance that has been expressed on the occasion of the Revolution's anniversary is to predict another, inevitable revolution in Russia, instead of interpreting the Revolution per se.

On the whole, Russia has taken a **fragmented, conflicted approach to commemorating** the October 1917 Revolution. As such, the decision of the government to refrain from formulating an official position on the Revolution seems to be the most constructive and pragmatic policy, especially given the importance of retaining broad public support ahead of the presidential election. At the same time, President Putin speaking in less official settings has repeatedly expressed his views on the legitimacy of revolution as a tool for resolving social and political problems; this legitimacy is the focal point of an ideological conflict around the events of 1917. Giving a speech at the Valdai Discussion Club annual meeting, he said,

Revolution is always the result of an accountability deficit in both those who would like to conserve, to freeze in place the outdated order of things that clearly needs to be changed, and those who aspire to speed the changes up, resorting to civil conflict and destructive resistance.

Today, as we turn to the lessons of a century ago, namely, the Russian Revolution of 1917, we see how ambiguous its results were, how closely the negative and, we must acknowledge, the positive consequences of those events are intertwined. Let us ask ourselves: was it not possible to follow an evolutionary path rather than go through a revolution? Could we not have evolved by way of gradual and consistent forward movement rather than at a cost of destroying our statehood and the ruthless fracturing of millions of human lives.

However, the largely utopian social model and ideology, which the newly formed state tried to implement initially following the

1917 revolution, was a powerful driver of transformations across the globe (this is quite clear and must also be acknowledged), caused a major revaluation of development models, and gave rise to rivalry and competition, the benefits of which, I would say, were mostly reaped by the West.

I am referring not only to the geopolitical victories following the Cold War. Many Western achievements of the 20th century were in answer to the challenge posed by the Soviet Union. I am talking about raising living standards, forming a strong middle class, reforming the labour market and the social sphere, promoting education, guaranteeing human rights, including the rights of minorities and women, overcoming racial segregation, which, as you may recall, was a shameful practice in many countries, including the United States, a few short decades ago¹.

Putin perceives the Revolution as a ‘destructive conflict’ that led to the ‘ruthless fracturing of millions of human lives’, and he believes there was an evolutionary alternative. He sees the Revolution’s positive effects in the West, where states have learned the Revolution’s lessons and managed to avoid the destructive consequences that befell Russia.

Moreover, it is remarkable that the Reconciliation Monument, later renamed the Unity Monument, was never unveiled in Kerch last year in the run-up to the Revolution’s 100th anniversary. The monument was never completed, because of the protests of local residents as the authorities had failed to consult them on the monument’s construction. However, in 2017, President Putin took part in unveiling the monument to victims of political repressions in Moscow’s Sakharov Prospekt, and the monument to Emperor Alexander III in Crimea.

The Revolution and historians

The revolution is likewise a controversial issue among professional historians. Their debates reveal several key interconnected

¹ Zasedanie Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba “Valdai” = Meeting of the “Valdai” Discussion Club // Kremlin.ru. – 2017. – 19 October. – Mode of access: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882>

themes: First, the roots of the Revolution. A related issue is the status of Russia in the early 20th century and trends in its development. Third, breaks and continuities between the pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. Fourth, the meaning of the February Revolution and viability of the ‘democratic scenario’. Fifth, the revolution’s timeframe. Finally, historians, like politicians, debate whether a revolution is an efficient tool of modernization.

As far as causes of a revolution are concerned, there are ‘monocausal’ interpretations, which state that a single factor is deemed principal and decisive. These include conspiracy theories that are popular among radical nationalists and socioeconomic determinism theories inherited from the Soviet tradition. Both varieties are considered to be marginal at present.

Historians are increasingly focusing on subjective factors such as public sentiments and perceptions that screen reality and, in a sense, become more real than reality itself, as well as mechanisms that are used to manipulate these sentiments and perceptions. More and more often, historians are attempting to construct concepts that cover the multiplicity of factors conducive to revolution. In this case, the subjective factors and the behaviour of mobilized elite groups are sometimes taken as the decisive factor, and sometimes as a peculiar addendum to the old socioeconomic determinism concept.

Thus, professional historical knowledge tends to complicate the understanding of the causes of the Revolution, and decisive factors at its different stages. Moreover, the number of specialists who prioritize subjective factors, particularly at the Revolution’s early stage, is growing.

Indicatively, Russian historians pay scant attention to the empire’s ethnic problems as a revolutionary factor, while historical narratives in the former republics attach much, if not decisive, importance to this factor.

“Comrade Kerensky”, a 2017 book by Boris Kolonitsky¹, is an important scholarly effort to elucidate the revolution. It describes how

¹ Kolonitskii B.I. “Tovarisch Kerenskii”. Antimonarkhicheskaia revoliutsia i formirovanie kulta “vozhdia naroda”. = “Comrade Kerensky.” The Anti-Monarchy Revolution and Images of the “Leader of the people”. – Moscow : Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2017.

Kerensky's personality cult as the leader of the Revolution began taking shape immediately in the wake of the February events. This is a very important thesis indeed as it points to the fact that the leader's personality cult was planned and consciously launched as the monarchy was falling to pieces and the 'liberal democratic' February stage was ushering in. Hence, it was not Stalin, nor even Lenin, who invented the personality cult. It is important to aware that Kerensky and his underlings used this technique to fill the post-monarchy vacuum in the political consciousness of the masses. Even at that stage, it was naive to hope for Russia's smooth democratic development.

Research into the contemporaneous socioeconomic situation is of importance to understand the role of the February events. Particularly the writings by Leonid Borodkin show that the collapse began at the turn of 1917 and assumed catastrophic proportions after February¹. Before 1917, wage growth followed price growth and offset it for the most part. The revolution triggered a politically motivated surge in wages and, as a consequence, runaway inflation. If we take 100 for the price index in 1913, it was 294 in January 1917 and 1,545 in December of the same year. The scale of the disaster is clearly revealed by the following figures: Given the rising cost of living, average real income was 278 rubles in 1916, 220 rubles in 1917, and 27 rubles in 1918. However, there were no food coupons until the end of 1916, while all other European belligerents began rationing food back in 1915. The collapse of the government structures was partly compensated by the strength and stability of municipalities in major cities, which had been growing stronger after the 1870 reforms. The wiping out of the municipalities by the Soviets and deserters in the autumn 1917 plunged the country into socioeconomic disaster.

The Revolution, while opening the doors to a corridor with some fundamentally new opportunities and circumstances, simultaneously shut the doors to other corridors that the country could have entered if there were no revolution, or if the revolution were

¹ Borodkin L. Realnaia zarplata i snabzhenie naseleniia gorodov Rossii v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny: kogda nachalsia obval? = Real Wages and Supplies for the Population of Russian Cities During the First World War: When Did the Collapse Begin? // Goroda imperii v gody voiny i revoliutsii / Miller A. (ed.). – Moscow : Nestor-Istoria, 2017.

less destructive. In the early 20th century, Russia had a chance to become a leading world power on a .rm basis. It was in the early 1900s that Russia built up capacity in all areas, making it possible to hope for development to accelerate rapidly within the next few decades, or what we now call an *economic miracle*. This implies industrial growth, transformation of agriculture, infrastructure development, and innovative science and engineering. In the education area, one is impressed by the sheer numbers of universities and university students, while the strides made in primary education support the contention that shortly before the World War I the country was close to introducing universal primary education. Moreover, this was not the outcome of an endless cycle of attempts and failures, as the imperial period in the Russian history is often depicted, but resulted from accumulated qualitative changes induced by gradual transformations carried out over a long period, transformations that culminated in the Stolypin reforms. It is worth mentioning that their potential was far from exhausted after the assassination of Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin. Full coverage of these processes can be found in the book “Twenty Years before the Great War: Russian Modernization under Witte and Stolypin” by Mikhail Davydov¹. It is a matter of fact that there were certain crises, but these were pains of progress.

Until the autumn of 1916, the country coped well with the challenges presented by the war. The early war years, for all their problems and setbacks, particularly the retreat in 1915, confirmed the high capacity of the Russian economy. By 1916, the country managed to dramatically increase ammunition production and practically reached parity with Germany on this score. As for arms production and food supplies, Russia’s wartime economy was demonstrating a considerable safety margin and growth potential. It was the Revolution that doomed Russia to defeat in the war, and stripped it of a unique chance to join the club of leading world economies in terms of both its weight and innovative potential.

¹ Davydov M.A. Dvadsat’ let do velikoi voiny. Rossiiskaia modernizatsia Vitte-Stolypina. = Twenty Years before the Great War. Russian Modernization under Witte and Stolypin. – Sankt-Petersburg : Aleteia, 2016.

It is of no difficulty to find certain elements of continuity between the Russian Empire and the USSR. And this is not surprising because the new state sprung up in the same geographic space and used economic, intellectual and demographic resources inherited from the Russian Empire. But it is hard to imagine a more enormous disruption of continuity than the one brought about by the October Revolution. It changed the entire system of legal and economic relations by destroying private ownership, pulling down the existing mechanisms of industrial development, and ultimately subjecting the peasantry back to serfdom. The October events and the Civil War exterminated or expelled the educated strata and the national intellectual elite. The Soviet Union pursued a fundamentally different nationalities policy than the Russian Empire. For a long time, the Bolsheviks saw the bearers of the pre-revolutionary Russian nationalism as their main enemy, and not without reason. The Soviet nation-building policy was based on rejecting the former triune Russian nation project and on institutionalizing and localizing ethnicity. This created an immense pyramid of more than 10,000 ethnic entities from ethnic *kolkhozes* to the supposedly sovereign Soviet republics.

To understand the dynamics of these truly revolutionary processes, it would be logical to consider the Revolution as including the Soviet localization policy, collectivization, industrialization, and the political terror in the 1930s, rather than cramming it into the 1917–1922 timeframe, as suggested by the Russian Historical Society.

If we accept the proposed assessment of Russia's pre-war socioeconomic development potential as offering a chance for stable innovative growth at rates exceeding world indices, we will be justified in evaluating revolutionary modernization as a very costly mobilization effort with patently more limited and unstable results.

It is also essential to remember that the Civil War undermined the demographic model that made it possible to predict that Russia's population would exceed 300 million in the early 20th century, with the subsequent collectivization and industrialization dealing it the final blow. Obviously, this model would change anyway following urbanization process, but this would have happened much later and 'smoother'.

To sum up, it would be true to say the Revolution's anniversary was fruitful. There was a free and lively public discussion of events that happened one hundred years ago. We failed to reach a consensus, but this was not to be hoped for from the very beginning. The important point is that the debates did not cause additional tension or alienation within the society. Professional historians have made much headway in studying the Revolution, and we can only hope that their output will not wane after the anniversary. There are reasons to believe that this will not happen as we have seen the start of several lively discussions on newly formulated research issues. For example, active debates are certain to be sparked of by Yuri Slezkine's book "The House of Government"¹, which he described at the Valdai Discussion Club annual meeting. It looks at the Bolsheviks as a millenarian sect that sought a radical transformation of the world. There is an active debate on "Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia", a recent book by Dominic Lieven², who also took part in the Club's annual meeting.

In 2016, Leonid Yuzefovich was awarded the Grand Book prize for his documentary novel "The Winter Road"³, the story of one of the last episodes of the Civil War in Yakutia between 1922 and 1923, White General Pepelyaev and Red anarchist Commander Strode. They deserve this account because both behaved decently amid the savageness reigning in the society and the army, refusing to kill prisoners and wounded combatants, refraining from torture, etc. We know of people who were unwilling to take side in the Civil War, withdrew from the struggle, and helped the Reds before the Whites, and vice versa. One of these people was poet Maximillian Voloshin. But the Yuzefovich's book is about the active participants in the fray. And they

¹ Slezkine Yu. *The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution*. – Princeton, NJ ; Oxford, UK : Princeton University Press, 2017.

² Lieven D. *Towards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia*. – London : Penguin, 2016.

³ Juzefovich L.A. *Zimniaia doroga. General A.N. Pepelyaev i anarhist I.Ja.Strod v Yakutii. 1922–1923. = The Winter Road. General A.N. Pepelyaev and the Anarchist I.Ya. Strode in Yakutia. 1922–1923*. – oscar : AST, 2015.

are worthy of this account because they stick to the moral norms and conventional restrictions, which the majority casts off in a civil war. This seems to be the first book of its kind in Russian literature, a book that shows the path to reconciliation, which we will have to tread for a long time to come. The point is not that we need to find out, which side was right or wrong in the revolutionary conflict. Rather, we must accept that remaining humane is much more important than being red or white.

D. Efremenko

From Heaven to Earth.

*European Identity and Historical Memory*¹

(2019)

When continued success gives way to a string of failures, self-confident triumphalism easily surrenders to pessimism and uncertainty. Such sentiment may overpower both large communities and institutional structures that looked omnipotent until recently. Today this is precisely what is happening to united Europe and its population of half a billion. Ivan Krastev came up with a remarkably graphic description of this feeling: “The disintegration train has left Brussels station ... It will doom the continent to disarray and global irrelevance”².

The European Union and the countries that join and leave it have a variety of internal and external challenges to contend with in the field of security, the economy, culture, identity, and democracy. Although of different origin, these challenges may overlap to bring about quite unexpected synergetic effects. Many onlookers have pointed to the unpreparedness of Europeans to provide a proper response to these challenges³, but answers will have to be found at some point. And it

¹ Source: Yefremenko D. From Heaven to Earth. *European Identity and Historical Memory // Russia in Global Affairs*. – 2019. – Vol. 17, N 3. – P. 64–84.

² Krastev I. *After Europe*. – Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. – P. 2.

³ Foa R., Mounk Y. The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect // *Journal of Democracy*. – 2016. – Vol. 27, N 3. – P. 5–17; *Global Revolt and Global Order. The Revolutionary Situation in Condition of the World and What to*

would be wrong to say that all of the future answers are doomed to turn out wrong. It is quite appropriate here to recall Patmos, by Friedrich Hölderlin:

*“But where there is danger,
A rescuing element grows as well.”*¹

In all likelihood the salvation of and a new start for the European project will come from an unexpected place, possibly even from those who today are called populists and Eurosceptics. De Gaulle’s slogan *Europe of Nations*², which modern critics of the Brussels bureaucracy have brought into the limelight, however hazy it may sound, is quite good for making an orderly retreat and regrouping forces without wasting the achievements of European integration, which are of world significance. For the Europeans (in the widest sense, including Russians, who have politically reoriented themselves to an alternative project of Greater Eurasia), it is essential to thoroughly and impartially review the entire accumulated experience of European integration. Of special significance are efforts to form a supranational identity and to look back for this purpose on the historical past of European countries and peoples.

The emergence of nation states is linked inseparably with the shaping of a special perception of the historical past by the citizens or a majority of residents in the territory where a nation is growing and maturing. The memory of the past becomes an integral part of the macropolitical identity of the emerging community. But how does this work in relation to supranational associations? Can memory politics – in other words, the politically motivated use of the historical past – produce an effective instrument of implementing an integration project,

Do About It / Barabanov O., Bordachev T., Lukyanov F., Sushentsov A., Suslov D., Timofeev I. – 2017. – Valдай Discussion Club Report, February. – Mode of access: <https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/valdai-club-report-global-revolt-and-global-order/>;
Youngs R., Manney S. Recession and Renewal in European Democracy // Carnegie Europe. – 2018. – Mode of access: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/02/26/recession-and-renewal-in-european-democracy-pub-75601>

¹ Hölderlin F. *Hyperion and Selected Poems* / Ed. by E. L. Santer. – New York : Continuum, 2002. – P. 248.

² Crespy A., Verschuere N. From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration : An Interdisciplinary Perspective // *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. – 2009. – Vol. 10, N 3. – P. 377–393.

implying the delegation of a considerable share of national sovereignty to the supranational level? In this article, the author considers the conceptual aspects of this group of problems, as well as the actual dynamics of memory politics within the European Union.

Constructing United Europe's Collective Memory

As is known, Maurice Halbwachs's works constitute the basis of all modern collective memory studies. As he developed and critically reviewed Emil Durkheim's ideas of individualism and collectivism, Halbwachs identified the dependence of individual memories on the social group to which the given individual belongs and on the individual's status within this group. Halbwachs maintains that memory is not just socially determined, but it is a process reflecting the constantly changing representations of the past. Society (social group) establishes a framework of individual memories, which may undergo considerable aberrations depending on the perception of the past within the corresponding group. The collective memory of the past does not coincide with history, while the need for a written history emerges precisely the moment social memory fades away or falls apart, when the social group that maintained that memory begins to leave the stage¹ (Halbwachs, 1992). Historians and specialists on memory studies have repeatedly discussed this contrast of history and collective memory from different viewpoints, with the obvious sociologism of Halbwachs's postulate and the general vagueness of the term 'memory' being the main target of criticism².

It is quite obvious though that the mechanisms of how the collective memory works which Halbwachs focused on are of tremendous importance to forming an individual identity and the identity of a larger community (group). However, in such a supranational association as the European Union the question arises

¹ Halbwachs M. On Collective Memory. – Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1992.

² Safronova Y. Tret' a volna Memory Studies: dvadtsat' tri goda protiv shersti = The Third Wave of Memory Studies: Going Against the Grain for Twenty-Three Years // Politicheskaya nauka. – 2018. – N 3. – P. 12–27.

whether collective European memory is possible in principle¹. Indeed, where is the group that is capable of creating an integral framework of collective European memory? This group (if it exists in reality) lacks a common language or a common nation state. The very localization of this group in space and time is a great problem.

There is no doubt that from the moment the European Coal and Steel Community was established (1951) and until now a certain group, which with a certain degree of abstraction can be called Eurocratic, was steadily consolidating itself. In the early 1990s Joseph Brodsky described the characteristic features, origin, and effects of the emergence of Eurocracy with acid sarcasm, which by no means sounds outdated at the end of the second decade of the 21st century². This is a group of people whose professional activity or whose close relatives are closely related to maintaining the operation of European integration institutions and the implementation of many EU projects in a variety of sectors. The Eurocratic group is socially stratified. It incorporates petty clerks and members of the transnational financial, economic, and political elite, who have many ties with representatives of such elites at the level of nation states. The group's composition, influence, resource base, and social and symbolic capital remained steadily on the ascent for decades. There is no doubt that strong affiliation with Eurocracy promotes group identity, which should be called Eurocratic too, but which serves as a natural basis for enhancing a wider identity, associated with the idea of a United Europe.

By and large, as empirical studies by Eurobarometer indicate, the readiness for self-identification with Europe (to a smaller extent, with the European Union) is characteristic of most EU member-states, but this identity is purely subsidiary in relation to national identities³. Moreover, the national elites display far greater awareness of their

¹ Namer G. Une mémoire collective européenne est-elle possible? = Is European Collective Memory Possible? // *Revue suisse de sociologie*. – 1993. – Vol. 19, N 1. – P. 25–32.

² Brodsky J. What the Moon Sees // *Yale Review*. – 1992. – Vol. 80, N 3. – P. 18–22.

³ *European Identity in the Context of National Identity. Questions of Identity in Sixteen European Countries in the Wake of the Financial Crisis* / Ed. By B. Westle and P. Segatti. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.

“Europeanism” than mass groups¹. In general, for an overwhelming majority of EU countries affiliation with the European Union and the norms, rules, advantages, and drawbacks it implies are a fact of life that is widely acknowledged but interpreted differently². Self-identification exclusively with Europe is characteristic of a tiny minority of Europeans³.

By virtue of their calling and professional duties the representatives of the Eurocratic group can make a tangible contribution to pro-European memory politics. Whatever influence Eurocrats have, though, there is no reason to believe that this group is capable of forming a supranational framework of collective memory that might take the place of national historical narratives. There is no evidence for this theory in modern Europe. At the same time, no other social group capable of coping with this task is anywhere in sight on the European horizon.

Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action might serve as an alternative to the search for a bearer of collective memory for one or another social group. Social communication and public discourses take center stage here, with the key role assigned to the European public sphere. Habermas maintains that the European public sphere is not a new social group for which its affiliation with Europe is primary, but rather communication between the EU countries’ civil societies on critically important socio-political issues that forms a common European discourse and makes possible the emergence of a sense of communion. Such communication is extremely important for shaping European institutions and legitimating the decisions they make. It is beyond doubt that the problem of historical memory plays an important role in this communicative process⁴.

¹ Deriglazova L. Russia and the European Union in Eulerian Circles of “Europe” // *Russia in Global Affairs*. – 2018. – Vol. 16, N 4. – P. 8–30

² Outhwaite W. *Contemporary Europe*. – London ; New York : Routledge, 2017.

³ Cotta M. *Evropejskaya identichnost’: Vyzovy sovremennosti = European Identity: Challenges of Modernity // Identichnost’: lichnost’, obshchestvo, politika / Semenenko I. (ed.). – Moscow : Ves’ mir, 2017. – P. 184–193.*

⁴ *The European Public Sphere and the Media : Europe in Crisis / Ed. by Triandafyllidou A., Wodak R., Krzyzanowski M. – London : Palgrave Macmillan,*

The degree of influence of the European public sphere in the final count was destined to manifest itself as a significant political process for a united Europe. In 2003, when protests against the war in Iraq swept the leading EU countries, with Germany and France opposing the U.S. invasion, it seemed that supranational communication among civil societies was becoming a major political force. It was then that Jaques Derrida and Jurgen Habermas published their article “Our Renewal after the War: Europe’s Second Birth” to proclaim the unequivocal appearance of the supranational public sphere on the EU’s political scene, while the communication of civil society actors on the issues of Europe’s past, present, and future was proclaimed the main source of common European identity. Derrida and Habermas formulated an approach towards the interpretation of historical heritage as a mechanism for constructing European identity. In their opinion it is essential to intentionally select the individual components useful for bolstering Europe’s unity¹.

In considering European identity as a social construct Derrida and Habermas made a tangible contribution to the discussion of the main strategies of forming this identity². One of them implies reliance on common history and socio-cultural basics of the identity being construed. The followers of this viewpoint proceed from the universalities of European culture and focus on the spatial and temporal dimensions of European identity. The other strategy of European identity is formed on the basis of a combination of purely political principles. The advocates of this approach as a rule associate European

2009; Risse T. *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. – London : Cornell University Press, 2010.

¹ Derrida J., Habermas J. *Unsere Erneuerung. Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas = Our Renewal. After the War: The Rebirth of Europe.* // *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. – 2003. – 31 May. – Mode of access: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/habermas-und-derrida-nach-dem-krieg-die-wiedergeburt-europas-1103893.html>

² Kumar K. *The Idea of Europe : Cultural Legacies, Transnational Imaginings and the Nation-State // Europe without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age / Berezin M., Schain M. (eds.)*. – London : John Hopkins University Press, 2003. – P. 33–63; Fligstein N. *Euro-Clash. The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008; *European Identity / Ed. by J. Checkel, P. Katzenstein*. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2009.

identity and EU identity as resting upon common institutions and political and legal principles.

The historical and cultural aspects of the idea of a united Europe drew the attention of philosophers and political thinkers long before the emergence of the first institutions and mechanisms of interstate integration on the European subcontinent. As B. Stráth points out, starting from the Middle Ages the image of the European community was created by means of isolation from the rest of the world, from the “others,” while Christianity turned out the most powerful integrating factor¹. In 1464, the Treaty on the Establishment of Peace Throughout Christendom, proposed by King George of Podbrady, interpreted affiliation with Christianity as a reason for creating a league of European rulers and forming common European institutions². However, the Reformation and religious wars caused a rupture of this bond. In the discourse of the Enlightenment, the term ‘Europe’ served as a neutral name for a common whole. Enlightenment philosophers proclaimed Western Europe the cradle of civilization and coined the term ‘Eastern Europe’ for its other half. This conceptual change of the map of Europe moved the backward, “barbaric” lands from the North to the East. The ambiguity of this is quite obvious: Eastern Europe was paradoxically included in the continent and placed outside its bounds.

Nevertheless, the image of the “other,” “external” is central to the culturalist version of European identity. It is impossible to imagine Europe without non-Europe. However, with the beginning of European integration the political dynamics were increasingly ahead of the well-established ideas of the historical and cultural basics of European identity. The increasing relativization of Europe’s historical and cultural bounds, related to dynamic processes within European culture and, in particular, to the political changes at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, brings to the forefront the interpretation of European identity as the political identity of the European Union.

¹ Stráth B. A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of a Concept. // *European Journal of Social Theory*. – 2002. – Vol. 5, N 4. – P. 387–401.

² Treaty on the Establishment of Peace throughout Christendom // *The Universal Peace Organization of King George of Bohemia: A Fifteenth Century Plan for World Peace 1462 / 1464* / Vaněček V. (ed.). – Prague : Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1964.

As a rule, social groups are determined on the basis of a set of ideas the members of these groups are capable of perceiving positively. Such ideas may be expressed directly through modes of interaction and communication, or indirectly, by means of common symbols, codes, or signs. The group's members feel that they have something to share, which forms an "imagined community"¹. As far as the European Union is concerned, the point at issue is an interpretation of European identity as a special political identity, which is a result of and at the same time a prerequisite for interstate integration. At the same time, cultural diversity is an integral characteristic of the European Union, but this or that form of its selection and synthesis of the historical narrative on the basis of this selection are fraught with conflicts and, in the final count, weakening of integration impulses. However, the actual state of affairs in the European Union over the past quarter of a century indicates that the factor of historical memory is too important for leading political actors to stop using it of their own accord.

The role of the Holocaust in the EU's memory politics

Achieved at the end of the 19th century, the consolidation of European nations on the basis of an awareness of racial, ethnic, and religious identity, had another side to it: the cultivation of ideas of ethnic superiority, chauvinism, and racism. The tragedies of two world wars were the result. The memory of these tragedies makes the task of constructing European identity particularly complex, because it is necessary to identify everything that is capable of uniting current EU members and potential newcomers and eliminate everything that can split them.

Until the beginning of the early 2000s, memory politics had contributed to shaping European identity on the basis of political principles. That policy's key theme was the collective memory of the Holocaust. Its main task was to analyze the tragic experience of World War II and the Nazi crimes. On the basis of an awareness of the

¹ Anderson B. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* – Revised Edition. – London ; New York : Verso, 2006.

collective guilt and responsibility of European peoples (including the population of the territories the Nazis had occupied) for the Holocaust, it became possible to form a consolidating historical narrative¹. The Holocaust should have become the bond that would keep the common European historical narrative of the 20th century as an integral whole.

Alas, this did not happen. The European Union's eastward expansion in 2004 entailed a string of political compromises. An integral European historical narrative, in which the Holocaust plays the central role, eventually became one of its victims. In 2004, the EU saw an influx of new members whose historical memory was greatly different from the European one². When a number of post-Communist countries joined the EU, an alternative version of memory politics markedly gained strength. That version put the emphasis on crimes committed by the totalitarian regimes against the people of these countries and played down the role of local forces in acts of genocide. The political elites of Central and Eastern European countries pressed for their own version of memory politics, obviously determined to underscore their equality in relations with the European Union's old-timers. Moreover, in their attempts to consolidate their equal status the elites and other mnemonic actors of Central and Eastern European countries have been consciously pushing for the transformation of approaches to the memory politics of the EU³. As a result, some kind of mnemonical crossbreed is emerging, which Aleida Assman in the "New Discontent with Memorial Culture" presents as an ellipse with two focal points. One of the centers is the Holocaust and the other is the GULAG and mass terror during the Communist era. But glaring

¹ Assman A. *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik.* = *The Long Shadow of the Past. Memory Culture and History Policy.* – München : C.H. Beck, 2006.

² Assman A. *Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur. Eine Intervention.* = *The New Discomfort at the Memory Culture. An Intervention.* – München : C.H. Beck, 2013.

³ Closa Montero C. *Politics of Memory: What Is the Role for the EU? / European Parliament. Europe 70 Years after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.* – Vilnius : Margi Raštai, 2009. – P. 111–131; Mälksoo M. *The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective Memory of Europe // European Journal of International Relations.* – 2009. – Vol. 15, N 4. – P. 653–680.

asymmetry remains between these historical events, which continues to split Europe¹.

It goes without saying that the vision of European memory politics dynamics as a special ideological battle between “old” and “new” Europe is somewhat vulgarized. Alongside the general intention of portraying the given country in the newest version of European policy as a victim, and not the executioner or henchman, the efforts of Central and Eastern European elites stemmed from rather specific, in some cases situative, factors determined by the national political context. For instance, in formulating their own version of history memory politics, the political elites of Estonia were keen to provide a mnemonic basis not only for their efforts to secure rapid accession to NATO and the European Union, but also for their own policy towards the rights of the Russian-speaking population. This is not characteristic of all Baltic countries, but it is a specific action targeted at insulting the historical memory of a large share of non-Estonians. By and large the national framework of mobilization of historical memory remains the main one in Central and European countries². However, moving the interpretations of historical events related to the national political agenda in these countries to the sphere of a pan-European discussion of the past inevitably transforms the approaches to memory politics at the national level. Moreover, these approaches begin to exert considerable influence on international relations outside the European Union.

European supranational identity: Trial by politics

There are plenty of reasons to assert that in the countries of old Europe the supranational framework failed to gain the dominating positions. The failure of the European constitutional process, launched at the EU summit in December 2001, can be considered a landmark event in this sense. The drafting of an EU Constitution and preparations

¹ Assman A. Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur. Eine Intervention. = The New Discomfort at the Memory Culture. An Intervention. – München : C.H. Beck, 2013.

² Clarke D. Communism and Memory Politics in the European Union // Central Europe. – 2014. – Vol. 12, N 1. – P. 99–114.

for the beginning of its ratification by parliaments or through national referendums in the most dramatic way transferred the debate over European identity from a purely academic dimension to the track of political struggle.

The European constitutional process was largely unprecedented, because the issue on the agenda was creation of a constitution for a space that lacked such prerequisites as territorial unity, a common language, and an integral civil society. As the drafting of the EU constitution continued, heated debate flared up over its preamble, which raised the issue of European identity¹. The most acute polemics revolved around what eventually was completely omitted from the final version – mention of united Europe's Christian roots². The decision to avoid this issue, which drew criticism from the Vatican and those EU countries where conservative Catholicism is still very strong, demonstrated the common internal contradiction of the discussion about European identity. The allusion made in the preamble to the cultural, religious, and humanist inheritance of Europe was an attempt to create a fictitious cultural basis for the European Union's political identity³. However, reasons of political expediency forced members of the constitutional convention to do so in the most abstract way.

The EU's constitutional process had certain chances of giving a fresh impetus to forming a pan-European identity and, respectively, to the development of a pan-European culture of historical memory. In any case, until 2005 there had existed enough grounds for making certain analogies with the constitutional processes in the countries that suffered a loss in World War II. In West Germany and Italy new constitutions contributed to the most radical departure from the previous interpretations of national identity, in which cultural and political identity are close to the maximum extent, if not identical,

¹ Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. – 2004. – Mode of access: https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe_en.pdf

² Bogdandy A. The European Constitution and European Identity: Text and Subtext of the Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe // *International Journal of Constitutional Law*. – 2005. – Vol. 3, N 2/3. – P. 295–315.

³ Cerutti F. *Constitution and Political Identity in Europe : Postnational Constitutionalisation in the Enlarged Europe: Foundations, Procedures, Prospects / Liebert F. (ed.)*. – Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2005. – P. 172–190.

because the core of the nation state is found in the pyramidal structure of power and the assimilation of previous cultures under the aegis of national culture. The constitutions of Italy and Germany are the brightest examples of the priority of political identity, based on the values of liberal democracy and clear guarantees of civil rights and freedoms. It is these political principles and values that serve as the basis of new “constitutional patriotism,” which is expected to ensure patriotism’s tight link with civil freedoms and the constitution¹.

Criticism of the EU draft constitution from the liberal positions of “constitutional patriotism” was focused on explaining the origin of political values and corresponding institutions through Europe’s cultural and historical heritage. Formulated in the constitutional preamble, this intention was criticized as a potentially dangerous historicist or culturalist delusion. From the standpoint of “constitutional patriotism,” common history and culture are not the main determinants of political identity². Also, critical arguments in the spirit of European “constitutional patriotism” were aimed at preventing accusations of attempts to create a European super-nation and weaken the role of the nation state. At the political level it is EU countries that continue to play the key role, and this prevents the EU’s conversion into a real federation.

Admittedly, the process of ratifying the EU Constitution produced discouraging results. The referendums in France (May 29, 2005) and the Netherlands (June 1, 2005) manifested the reluctance of a majority of those who cast their ballots in these key EU countries to support the EU Constitution. It would be right to say that the European community a la Habermas, which seemingly demonstrated its strength in 2003, suffered a defeat in the decisive battle two years later. Although the EU signed a new treaty on reforming the system of governing the European Union at a summit in Lisbon in 2007, the failure of the constitutional project was the gravest political and psychological blow to the process of European integration. Whereas before 2005 European integration had been regarded as an indisputable

¹ Sternberger D. Verfassungspatriotismus = Constitutional Patriotism / Verfassungspatriotismus / Sternberger D. (ed.). – Frankfurt a. M. : Insel Verlag, 1990. – P. 3–12.

² Cerutti M. Op. cit.

success story, after the failure of the EU Constitution a string of setbacks followed (the financial crisis of 2008, the Greek debt crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, Catalan separatism, and the growing strength of right-wing and left-wing populists and Eurosceptics). These provided enough arguments to say that the European Union experienced a systemic crisis.

From common historical narrative to mnemonic divergence

The failure of the European Constitution was a serious incentive for EU organizations (in the first place, the European Commission and European Parliament) to step up activity in the spheres of identity and historical memory. Besides, as stated above, the European Union's expansion in 2004 resulted in the fundamental transformation of approaches to memory politics. In 2007–2013 the EU launched the Europe for Citizens program with the aim of securing the active involvement of citizens and NGOs in the promotion of European integration. One of the program's main tasks was formulated as the promotion of a sense of European identity on the basis of common values, history, and culture for the purpose of uniting people in different parts of Europe for the sake of studying the lessons of the past and building a future. Among the concrete guidelines for the program's implementation, special attention was paid to "active European remembrance." In particular, there were plans to sponsor projects for supporting the memory of concentration camps, deportations, and repression during the period of National Socialism and the era of Stalinism. The program unequivocally accommodated the doctrines of the EU's Eastern European newcomers in the field of memory politics. The gist of the arguments in favor of the planned costs was this: without remembering the crimes of totalitarian regimes, it is impossible to properly assess the meaning of such principles of European integration as freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights, as well as to take an active part in European processes.

Against this background, the European Parliament's resolution recognizing the Holocaust as a unique historical reference point¹ looked like nothing else than an attempt to compensate for the heavy bias towards memory politics formulated by the countries of New Europe. Four years later the European Parliament adopted a new resolution in favor of complementing the commemoration of the Holocaust with a Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes². The proposed date was August 23, the day the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. This was an obvious attempt to press for the version of memory politics Poland and the Baltic countries had campaigned for first and foremost. Also, that resolution was the indisputable contribution to the resumed geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West, triggered by the EU's program of Eastern Partnership (2008).

It should be noted that the 2009 resolution contained glaring logical contradictions. On the one hand, the resolution rightly stated that it was not possible to achieve "fully objective interpretations of historical facts" and proclaimed that no political agency or political party had a monopoly on interpreting history even if it relied on a majority in parliament. On the other hand, the resolution contained a categorical statement that "Europe will not be united unless it is able to form a common view of its history, recognizes Nazism, Stalinism, and fascist and Communist regimes as a common legacy and brings about an honest and thorough debate on their crimes in the past century." Nazism was described as "the dominant historical experience of Western Europe," whereas Central and Eastern European countries have experienced both Communism and Nazism³. As a matter of fact, while declaring that it was impossible to produce a unified

¹ European Parliament Resolution. European Parliament Resolution on Remembrance of the Holocaust, Anti-Semitism and Racism. // Official Journal of the European Union. – 2005. – 13.10. – Mode of access: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0f49ead9-3e2a-409f-bb75-57533d6d9034/language-sl/format-PDF/source-117939623>

² European Parliament Resolution. European Parliament Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism. // Official Journal of the European Union. – 2009. – 27 May. – Mode of access: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:137E:0025:0027:EN:PDF>

³ Ibid.

interpretation of history, the authors of the resolution at once began to address the task of ideological demarcation of “right” and “wrong” interpretations of history.

One way or another, by gradually departing from the recognition of the key role of common European responsibility for the Holocaust and enhancing the policy of self-victimization and transfer of responsibility onto “external” totalitarian forces, the initiators of the alternative version of memory politics are laying the basis for new conflicts and even “wars of memory.” The basis for the conflict remains firstly because there are two historical memory frameworks (the “uniqueness of the Holocaust” vs. “Communism as an evil equal to Nazism”), and attempts to reconcile them eventually end in failure. These frameworks indicate that in forming different versions of European memory politics, a very sketchy and teleological vision of history remains, which implies a contrast between Europe’s “dark past” in the 20th century and the “bright today” of the European Union, which appears almost as an embodiment of Fukuyama’s “end of history”¹. Adhering to such a viewpoint inevitably overlooks other, very important components of the European historical heritage, such as imperialism and colonialism. It is still more important that the “dark past” is lent the status of a negative “EU origin myth,” which paves the way for the ideological instrumentalization and moralization of the past and eases the incentives to a critical study of stereotypes and “holy cows” of one’s own national history.

At the same time, at the level of many of the EU’s nation states, specific historical and political factors make it difficult to accept the equalization of the Nazi-Communism parallel. In particular, this is clearly seen in countries where left-of-center forces have been and remain influential political actors and the role of local Communist parties was not confined to the role of “the Kremlin’s agents of influence.” In Spain, for instance, the condemnation of Communism is perceived through the lens of a modern vision of the tragic experience of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s and as a condemnation of the

¹ Prutsch M. European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives / European Parliament. Directorate General for Internal Policies. Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies. – Brussels, 2013. – Mode of access: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/540364/IPOL_STU%282015%29540364_EN.pdf

loser party, which according to many Spaniards deserves sympathy. In such countries as Croatia and Slovakia, on the contrary, problems emerge due to the unconditional condemnation of Nazism, because it was the Third Reich that sponsored the emergence of client states that, despite the complicity of the Pavelić and Tiso regimes in crimes against humanity, are associated by many Croats and Slovaks with modern history's first experience of building a nation state.

Conclusion

The case of the European Union is extremely important and indicative for studying the entire set of memory politics problems and its links with political and cultural identity. Firstly, this is an extraordinary case, because from the standpoint of the depth and diversity of integration processes, the European Union has no equals among other economic and political supranational associations. Also, the EU's case is extraordinary because it is highly likely that the current crisis could bring about a U-turn and return part of the powers to the level of national governments and parliaments, as well as the recognition of political, social, and economic disproportions between countries through the transition to a model of multi-speed integration¹. The scale of the European project is favorable for the creation of a supranational identity, even more so, since at the early stages of Euro-integration the creation of a united Europe began to be linked at the official level with such matters as identity, common heritage, and cultural proximity². However, despite the systemic work in building a

¹ Piris J.-C. The Future of Europe. Towards a Two-Speed EU? – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012; Fossum J. Democracy and Differentiation in Europe // Journal of European Public Policy. – 2015. – Vol. 22, N 6. – P. 799–815; Leruth B., Lord C. Differentiated Integration in the European Union: A Concept, a Process, a System or a Theory? // Journal of European Public Policy. – 2015. – Vol. 22, N 6. – P. 754–763; Martinico G. A Multi-Speed EU? An Institutional and Legal Assessment. – Rome : Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2015.

² Declaration on European Identity. Document on The European Identity published by the Nine Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1973, – Copenhagen. – Mode of access: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/declaration_on_european_identity_copenhagen_14_december_1973-en-02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html

supranational identity of a united Europe, this identity remains auxiliary in relation to the identities pertaining to the nation state, a common language, culture, and historical heritage. Representatives of very different communities and social groups are prepared to declare their European identity as an auxiliary one. At the same time, the importance of public communication concerning the most important aspects of European identity and Europe's past and future are hard to overestimate, because it can and does exert strong influence on the making of political decisions, including those concerning memory politics.

In the European Union major actors capable of forming a memory politics strategy and influence its implementation operate both at the national and supranational levels. The EU's political governance institutions are actors that make a very important contribution to pro-European memory politics. In their official documents, Brussels and Strasbourg determine common strategies and concrete actions concerning memory politics. EU institutions have significant resources and instruments at their disposal to implement measures capable of using the historical past for political purposes. However, while further actions will remain relatively autonomous, determining the basic political position of the EU's supranational agencies is related to achieving a balance of interests and approaches of affiliated member-states. The transformation of a European memory politics strategy is very indicative in this respect: whereas before the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU the recognition of the unique role of the Holocaust tragedy was the basis of memory politics, after the expansion of the EU in 2004 a fundamental turn took place and the crimes of National Socialism began to be equalized with the crimes of the Communist regimes. Lastly, the "modified" version of common European memory politics has also begun to be used ever more actively for geopolitical purposes to create a new mental frontier that is expected to divide the European geographic and cultural space once again, forcing Russia out, but retaining all other post-Soviet countries included in the Eastern Partnership program.

In the process of regaining its well-familiar role of a significant "other" on the billboard of European memory politics, Russia lacked the opportunity to exert considerable influence on the transformation of

that policy. Certain warnings from Russian intellectuals, a professional dialogue (in particular, within the framework of commissions where Russian historians discussed complex issues of the past with historians from Germany, Poland, Latvia, and some other EU countries), and the activity of State Duma and Federation Council members on the platform of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe were unable to act as a counterbalance to the systemic work that was conducted within EU agencies and in the public space of united Europe. It would rather be appropriate to say that the turn in the European memory politics had a strong influence on memory politics in Russia¹.

It goes without saying that the version of European memory politics that attaches the key role to the Holocaust tragedy and the vision of Nazism as the absolute evil is quite comparable with Russia's modern memory politics, in which the Great Victory over Hitler's Germany is the central element of the semantic structure of the country's past². The alternative version of European memory politics, in which Nazism and Communism are interpreted as identical twins (the latter portrayed as a totalitarian ideology imposed from outside by the Soviet Union, and repressive practice) makes illusory the outlook for a rapprochement of models of the political interpretation of history.

However deep the current political divides between Moscow and Brussels can be, the historical narratives, in which the liberation of Auschwitz and the linkup on the Elbe are the most important symbolic benchmarks, retain their place as the basis for a dialogue on a joint future. If one of the parties keeps pressing with growing intensity for a narrative revolving around the joint parade by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in Brest as the main symbol, the hard-going dialogue dies down and instead one hears two monologues, as neither speaker is interested in listening to and hearing each other.

In the current circumstances, Central European and Eastern European elites and the new cohorts of Eurocracy are keen to preserve

¹ Miller A. Memory Control. Historical Policy in Post-Communist Europe // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2016. – Vol. 14, N 3. – P. 162–176.

² Malinova O. Political Uses of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Soviet Russia from Yeltsin to Putin // War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus / Fedor J., Kangaspuro M., Lassila, J. et al. (eds.). – Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – P. 43–70.

the vector of the EU's memory politics aimed not so much at forming a supranational identity of united Europe as at adjusting the tragic experience of the 20th century history to the political targets of these forces. The counterarguments of this sort of memory politics in the final count are aimed at ruining the ideas of Europe's civilizational unity, of which Russian history and culture are an integral part. And they will stop no one. Changing the vector is possible, but this will most probably happen in the context of a wider transformation of the European project, reconsideration of its tasks, and the establishment of a considerably new balance between national and supranational.

A. Miller

Admonishing the Doubting Flock.

Review of Francis Fukuyama's Book

*"Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment"*¹

(2019)

Fukuyama F. Identity. The demand for dignity and the politics of resentment. – New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018. 240 p.

Almost twenty years ago Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper published an article that became a classic². Here is what the authors said at the beginning of the article: "The argument of this article is that the social sciences and humanities have surrendered to the word 'identity'; that this has both intellectual and political costs; and that we can do better. 'Identity,' we argue, tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)..."

"'Soft' constructivism allows putative 'identities' to proliferate. But as they proliferate, the term loses its analytical purchase. If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere... 'Identity' is a key term in the vernacular idiom of contemporary politics, and social analysis must take account of this fact. But this does not require us to use 'identity' as a category

¹ Source: Miller A. Admonishing the Doubting Flock. Review of Francis Fukuyama's Book "Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment" // *Russia in Global Affairs*. – 2019. – Vol. 17, N 3. – P. 204–208.

² Brubaker R., Cooper F. Beyond "Identity" // *Theory and Society*. – 2000. – Vol. 29, N 1. – P. 1–47.

of analysis or to conceptualize ‘identities’ as something that all people have, seek, construct, and negotiate. Conceptualizing all affinities and affiliations, all forms of belonging, all experiences of commonality, connectedness, and cohesion, all self-understanding and self-identification in the idiom of ‘identity’ saddles us with a blunt, flat, undifferentiated vocabulary.”

There are several reasons why this quote is important for evaluating Francis Fukuyama’s book “Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment”¹. First of all, it clearly shows that “identity politics” was quite trendy at the beginning of the century, and the notion of ‘identity’ was so much abused in social sciences that Brubaker and Cooper had to remind everyone that it did not explain much but rather needed some clarification itself.

Secondly, having found out that this article, its admonitions and questions were ignored in Fukuyama’s book, we can say with confidence that this is not a scholarly text but a piece of writing intended for a broad audience. Its genre can be compared in the Russian context with Yekaterina Shulman’s or Valery Solovei’s essays. For this reason we shall give up the idea of writing a critical scholarly review of this book as inappropriate.

In a nutshell, Fukuyama’s argument is as follows:

“Individuals throughout human history have found themselves at odds with their societies. But only in modern times has the view taken hold that the authentic inner self is intrinsically valuable, and the outer society systematically wrong and unfair in its valuation of the former. It is not the inner self that has to be made to conform to society’s rules, but society itself that needs to change.

“... what was to become the modern concept of identity emerged only as societies started to modernize a few hundred years ago. While it originated in Europe, it has subsequently spread and taken root in virtually all societies around the globe.

“... The modern concept of identity unites three different phenomena. The first is thymos, a universal aspect of human personality that craves recognition. The second is the distinction

¹ Fukuyama F. Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. – New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.

between the inner and the outer self, and the raising of the moral valuation of the inner self over outer society. This emerged only in early modern Europe. The third is an evolving concept of dignity, in which recognition is due not just to a narrow class of people, but to everyone. The broadening and universalization of dignity turns the private quest for self into a political project. In Western political thought, this shift took place in the generation after Rousseau, through the philosophers Immanuel Kant and particularly Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

“...Contemporary identity politics is driven by the quest for equal recognition by groups that have been marginalized by their societies. But that desire for equal recognition can easily slide over into a demand for recognition of the group’s superiority. This is a large part of the story of nationalism and national identity...

“...The impulses evident in the early stages of the Arab Spring and in the color revolutions point to what is the moral core of modern liberal democracy. Such regimes are based on the twin principles of freedom and equality.

“...Modern liberal democracies promise and largely deliver a minimal degree of equal respect...”

Fukuyama backs his theses with a variety of examples from different parts of the world, the essence of which is usually stated in one or two phrases, thus clearly indicating the author’s superficial understanding of the processes unfolding there. It is important, though, that all of them should cite examples of identity politics. Here is a typical example of such “analysis”: “A person living in Barcelona who suddenly realizes her real identity is Catalan rather than Spanish is simply excavating a lower layer of social identity that has been laid down beneath the one nearer to the surface.” (Trust me; this is all the author can say on the matter!)

History is of no importance. In other words, it is seen as a “completely clear” and purely Western-centric one-way movement: “While it originated in Europe, it has subsequently spread and taken root in virtually all societies around the globe”. The concept of modernization, with its shameless Western centrism and triumphalism of liberal democracy, has now been complemented with “identity history,” which Fukuyama views as a function of modernization. Some

fifty years ago, even the advocates of the theory of modernization had to admit that it was not working in its original form because it failed to take into account the sociocultural peculiarities of different societies. But for Fukuyama one explanation fits all: “This is what drove Americans to protest during the civil rights movement, South Africans to stand up against apartheid, Mohamed Bouazizi to immolate himself, and other protesters to risk their lives in Yangon, Burma, or in the Maidan or Tahrir Square, or in countless other confrontations over the centuries.”

History, the end of which Fukuyama predicted some time ago with a big commercial success, has simply been negated by suggesting that interaction mechanisms concerning “identity” do not change over centuries. “Hans’s personal story was characterized by the nineteenth-century social theorist Ferdinand Tönnies as the shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, or from (village) community to (urban) society. It was experienced by millions of Europeans during the nineteenth century and is now happening in rapidly industrializing societies such as China and Vietnam.” Let’s forget the fact that the *Gemeinschaft* concept is quite applicable to Greek polis and even medieval cities. But can one really say that the movement of people from rural areas to cities in the contemporary world with its television and the Internet proceeds in the same way it did in 19th century Europe when it went through the process of alphabetization (eradication of illiteracy)?

It is no wonder that to Fukuyama the main authority among the researchers of nationalism is Ernest Gellner, an extremely schematic radical modernist who sincerely believed that there was correct civic nationalism in Western countries and incorrect, ethnic nationalism in other parts of the world. Fukuyama himself seems to believe this. In fact, the history of ideas is portrayed in his book in a very old-fashioned manner as a story telling about how a certain idea traveled through centuries from one bright mind to another, even brighter one, and makes a meaningful observation that Luther, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel understood dignity differently.

The book should be judged by the law of the genre, that is, by trying to understand what exactly the politically motivated public intellectual wants to tell his readers and why. And what kind of

readers? The text is addressed to people who believe in liberal democracy but who have become hesitant under the impression of recent events. Fukuyama considers many examples where things do not go the way they should. In his opinion, the reason for this is that the principles of liberal democracy have been buried in oblivion or because backward tribes and “populists” have failed to understand these principles. The most painful and difficult questions about how well liberal democracy has adapted to the new conditions and where it has lost the ability for critical reflection have been left out.

When giving his political recommendations in the end, Fukuyama has to admit that they cannot be implemented in practice. So, his conclusion sounds like admonition to the flock that is living through hard times:

“We can imagine better places to be in, which take account of our societies’ increasing diversity, yet present a vision for how that diversity will still serve common ends and support rather than undermine liberal democracy. Identity is the theme that underlies many political phenomena today, from new populist nationalist movements, to Islamist fighters, to the controversies taking place on university campuses. We will not escape from thinking about ourselves and our society in identity terms. But we need to remember that the identities dwelling deep inside us are neither fixed nor necessarily given to us by our accidents of birth. Identity can be used to divide, but it can and has also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present.”

As is often the case with sermons, this conclusion sounds quite trivial and absolutely “unscientific,” but nothing can prevent those wishing to believe in it.

A. Miller

Russia and Europe in Memory Wars¹

(2020)

Summary

The West European consensus on a “cosmopolitan” approach to memory politics, dominant until the beginning of the 21st century, has gradually been replaced by a more antagonistic approach to memory, typical of the countries of Eastern Europe. Also Russian memory politics have been primarily reactive and opportunistic, with Russia picking up on and adopting many regrettable elements of history politics found in Eastern Europe. By early 2009 several key elements of “historical politics” were evident in Russian practices: (1) the attempt to introduce a standardized history textbook sanctioned by the state; (2) specialized politically engaged institutions that combined organizing historical research with control over archives and publications; and (3) the attempt to regulate interpretations of history through legislation. The year 2012 saw the creation of two huge NGOs directly controlled by the Kremlin – the Russian Historical Society, and the Russian Military Historical Society. In 2014, the State Duma passed the “Yarovaya Law” featuring all the negative aspects of Eastern European memory laws. Also Russia, following East European countries, has “securitized” memory politics, viewing discussions on history and

¹ Source: Miller A. *Russia and Europe in Memory Wars*. – Oslo : Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2020. – (NUPI Working Paper; 887).

collective identity through the lens of national security threats. How did all this come about? Is there a way out of this situation? In order to answer these questions, this NUPI Report enquires into the dynamics of memory politics in Europe, and then takes a closer look at Russian memory politics.

Memory politics in Europe

In the immediate post-war period, memory politics in non-Communist Western and Communist Eastern Europe were kept isolated from each other. Then, from the 1960s and until the 1990s, Western European countries gradually established a kind of consensus on the past, based on recognition of the Holocaust as the central event of the 20th century, unprecedented in history. This consensus sought to emphasize the common responsibility of *all* Europeans for the dark chapters of the past century, vital to the attempt at keeping the Western part of Europe almost clear of any historical narrative that singled out any given nation. This also made it impossible to demand preferential treatment with reference to past sufferings. The focus was on the responsibility of all Europe, and on measures necessary to avoid new crimes and atrocities like the Holocaust. The approach was normative; it can be described as a *cosmopolitan and unified memory regime*¹. Discussion of the past was meant to bring consensus through dialog. In international relations, this approach called for the development of a common narrative of the past. In a certain sense, collective memory was seen as a space where the *political*, with its inherent conflicts, could be overcome.

In part, the “old” EU countries were able to reach this consensus because of their political and economic successes in the closing decades of the 20th century. With their future looking bright, and the global leadership of the EU, at least in “soft” power and in the economic

¹ Bernhard M.H., Kubik J. Twenty Years After Communism : The Politics of Memory and Commemoration. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014; Cento Bull A., Hansen H.L. On agonistic memory // Memory Studies. – 2016. – Vol. 9, N 4. – P. 390–404.

sphere, Europeans could now more readily admit the need to repent for their past sins.

After the collapse of socialism, the Eastern European countries were free to build their narratives as they saw fit. (The exception was the GDR, which was absorbed by the German Federal Republic and had to adapt its narratives.) Over the past 25 years, the previously isolated memory cultures of Western and Eastern Europe have begun to interact. Eastern Europe's history politics, which focused on the suffering of its own peoples, came to reproach the West for betraying small nations that had been "kidnapped" by the Communist regime in Moscow.

Russia as a source of threat became a key element of the new narratives. This had roots in the Cold War period – but, even more importantly, it is deeply rooted in the European cultural tradition. The perception of Russia as a "barbarian at the gate" has dominated European thinking for the past three centuries, occasionally interspersed with the view of Russia as "an eternal apprentice" (but the two perceptions were generally blended). Even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, key elements of this discourse changed very little. "There is no use talking about the end of an East/West divide in European history after the end of the Cold War. The question is not whether the East will be used in the forging of new European identities, but how this is being done," as Iver Neumann rightly noted¹.

In the 21st century, the interaction of the Western and Eastern European memory cultures has led to a radical transformation of the European memory regime as a whole. The Eastern European model, with its focus on the sufferings of its nations and the existential threat, has prevailed over the Western European one dominated by critical patriotism and feelings of one's own responsibility. In part, this has come about because Western European elites, for various reasons, did not consider it necessary to confront the new EU members over issues of historical policy. Another reason is that the prevailing self-confidence and faith in the success of the EU as an integration project have been shaken in the "old Europe" over the past ten years. As a result, the collective memory and identity-building mechanisms

¹ Neumann I. *Uses of the Other. "The East" in European Identity Formation.* – Manchester University Press, 1999. – P. 207.

characteristic of Eastern Europe have prevailed in Western European understandings of the growing tensions between Russia and its neighbors. As put by Ferenc Laczó, a Hungarian scholar based in the Netherlands: “Through the canonization of the theory of twin – Nazi and Soviet – totalitarianisms in particular, CEE representatives and their allies have managed to dethrone the anti-fascist consensus that was so characteristic of the Western European mainstream until the early 21st century and reshape the European Union’s understanding of the recent past. As a consequence of European enlargement and the “CEE factor,” there is currently ambiguity and much oscillation at the heart of the European Union’s historical policy. Official declarations assert the uniqueness of fascist crimes and more particularly, the Holocaust, while they simultaneously equate the totalitarian evils of Nazism and Soviet communism”.¹

It was not only the narrative that underwent change: the very understanding of the nature of collective memory was also challenged and altered. The German perspective which took shape in the late 1980s and has since become normative in many other countries (including Russia in the 1990s) put the focus on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (the struggle to overcome the past) and *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit* (reappraising the past). The term *Geschichtspolitik*, coined during the West German *Historikerstreit* of the late 1980s, had negative connotations and stressed that the domain of collective memory should be free from intervention on the part of politicians. Upon joining the EU in 2004, most of the new members openly proclaimed a new approach to memory politics. They reconceptualized the term *historical politics* as a positive concept, reflecting the political nature of the domain of collective memory².

¹ Laczó F. Revisionism Instead of Reinvention // New Eastern Europe. – 2019. – December 18. –Mode of access: <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/12/18/revisionism-instead-of-reinvention/>

² Polityka historyczna: historycy – politycy – prasa = Historical Politics: Historians – Politicians – Press / Ed. by L. Cichocka, A. Panecka. – Warszawa : Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego, 2004; Cichocki M.A. Władza i pami : o politycznej funkcji historii = Power and Memory: On the Political Function of History. – Kraków : O rodek My li Politycznej, 2005; Kosiewski P. Pami i polityka zagraniczna = Memory and Foreign Policy. – Warszawa : Fund im. Stefana Batorego, 2006.

Ivan Krastev and Steven Holmes argue that, while waiting to be allowed into the EU fold, the East European countries merely pretended to accept the “cosmopolitan” consensus of Western Europe. However, since 2004, the impact of East European countries has become an important factor within the EU.¹ The “cosmopolitan” approach to memory was gradually replaced by an “antagonistic” approach, typical of Poland, the Baltic states and recently also Ukraine and Moldova. From being the space where the *political* had to be overcome, memory became a space for *memory politics* or *political use of memory*². Memory was securitized with a focus on the Constitutive, Dangerous Other – that is, totalitarianism, and its current embodiment in the Russian Federation. As is clear from the Resolution adopted by the European Parliament on September 19, 2019, this external threat has been now directly linked to the internal threat of “all kinds of populism” alleged to exist, due largely to support from Moscow³ (*European Parliament* 2019).

Memory politics in Russia

The initial trend in Russian politics of memory in late 1980s and in early 1990s was towards recognition of Soviet crimes against Soviet subjects and neighbors. Gorbachev made public the original text of the Molotov– Ribbentrop Pact, including the secret protocols, and declared them a criminal act. In 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR recognized the annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 as occupation and condemned it. The Katyn extermination of Polish officers was also recognized as a Soviet crime. Russians saw themselves as the victims of the Communist rule, together with people of other nationalities.

¹ Krastev I., Holmes S. Imitation and Its Discontents // *Journal of Democracy*. – 2018. – Vol. 29, N 3. – P. 117–128.

² Entangled Memory: Toward a Third Wave in Memory Studies / Feindt G., Krawatzek F., Mehler D., Pestel F., Trimcev R. // *History and Theory*. – 2014. – Vol. 53, N 1. – P. 24–44.

³ European Parliament Resolution of 19 September 2019 on the Importance of European Remembrance for the Future of Europe. – Mode of access: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0021_EN.html

Thus, the recognition and condemnation of Soviet-era crimes was not seen in Russia as the beginning of a long story of one-sided penitence “German style,” but as the way to mutual rapprochement and common sorrow with other peoples who had also suffered from the crimes of the Communist regime. Moreover, Russians wanted to see the collapse of the Communist rule as their victory, not as their defeat in the Cold War. The assessment of 20th century history forged in this period was reflected – with some distinct but not major differences – in school textbooks. These described the Soviet regime as totalitarian and mentioned many of its crimes – without belittling in any way the achievements of the Soviet era or “the heroism of the Soviet people at work or on the frontlines.”

Russians soon discovered that their neighbors tended to conflate Communist rule with Russian rule, seeing the Soviet Union as the reembodyment of the Russian Empire, and with post-Soviet Russia as the main threat to their security. The pro-Western sector of the Russian public argued that those unfortunate misperceptions would fade away as soon as the new states began to feel secure, having joined NATO and the EU. Russian nationalists reactivated their attempts to present Communism as the work of anti-Russian forces and Russians as its main victims. But this approach failed to gain much support in the 1990s. After Yeltsin’s attempt to put the CPSU on trial in 1992/93 was met with public indifference the first President of Russia practically left history to the historians. Russian officials very rarely referred to historical issues in their public speeches¹.

Until the early 2000s Russia had no state or non-government institutions that dealt with memory politics, except Memorial, which enjoyed modest support from the state in commemorations of the victims of political repressions. Memorial managed to install the Solovki Stone to commemorate victims of Stalinist terror in front of the KGB building in Lubyanka Square in Moscow, and approximately 800 memorials and memorial signs were created around the country to mark places of Soviet-era executions and mass burials, many with the help of

¹ Malinova O.Yu. Tema proshlogo v ritorike prezidentov Rossii = Theme of the Past in the Rhetoric of Presidents of Russia // Pro et contra. – 2011. – N 3/4. – P. 106–122.

local Memorial organizations. Probably the biggest player in the field of memory politics in the 1990s was the Russian office of the Open Society Institute, which funded the preparation of textbooks, translations of Western books, and local research in history.

From the very beginning, the presidency of Vladimir Putin was marked by state activism in the politics of memory. First, Putin solved the central issue of state symbols, which had remained a bone of contention since 1991. He began by establishing the tricolor as the official flag of Russia, with support of the liberal wing of the State Duma and against vigorous opposition of Communists. Thereafter, he switched sides in order to reinstate the old Soviet anthem (with new lyrics) as the state anthem of Russia¹.

In 2003 Putin met with a group of historians to discuss the need to put end to the period of hyper-critical representation of the Soviet past². However, no practical steps were taken regarding memory politics before 2004. The Kremlin became much more active after the first Maidan in Kiev in 2004, and after the Moscow-hostile Law and Justice Party of the Kaczynski brothers won the parliamentary and then the presidential elections in Poland in 2005. There were proposals to establish an Institute of National Remembrance, similar to that in Poland³. Instead, the authorities opted for an alternative organizational solution: they created a range of NGOs that came to play a leading role in developing memory wars, focusing on the issues problematic for the neighbors—mainly participation in the Holocaust, but also other instances of collaboration with Nazi Germany. The most visible among those NGOs is the foundation “Historical Memory,” fully operational since 2008. It has now published over 60 books, and in 2017 it

¹ Miller A. Vvedenie : Istoricheskaja politika v Vostochnoj Evrope nachala XXI v. = Introduction : Historical Politics in Eastern Europe at the Beginning of the XXI Century // Istoricheskaja politika v XXI veke / Miller A., Lipman M. (eds.). – Moscow : Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012. – P. 7–32.

² Vladimir Putin vstretilsya s ucheny`mi-istorikami = Vladimir Putin Met with Historians // Kremlin.ru. – 2003. – 27 November. – Mode of access: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/29822>

³ Shwed V. Institut istoricheskoy pamyati = Institute of Historical Memory // Hrono.ru. – 2008. – 8 January. – Mode of access: http://www.hrono.ru/statii/2008/shwed_pam.php

launched its own Journal of Russian and East-European Historical Studies.

In 2004/05 the Presidential Administration initiated the preparation of a new school textbook, intended as a “response” to the memory politics of Russia’s neighbors. This new textbook discarded the official position of the late 1980s – early 1990s, and re-interpreted Soviet–German relations in 1939, Katyn and the famine of 1932–33 in a way which was a clear reaction to the challenge posed by memory politics in Poland, the Baltic states, and Ukraine. The textbook repudiated the scientific value of the concept of totalitarianism and rejected Ukrainian claims that the famine of 1932–33 was genocide, as well as attempts to interpret as genocide the Katyn shootings of the Polish officers and Soviet deportations from the Baltic states.

Interestingly, the same Presidential Administration also funded the preparation of a strongly anti-Communist textbook. Initially the project was to be developed under the patronage of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. But, having seen the draft and being appalled at its low quality, Solzhenitsyn withdrew. Plans for a textbook were dropped; the resulting book was issued as a collective monograph¹. The logical conclusion here is that the Kremlin was totally opportunistic in its views on memory politics – it was prepared to use a strategy of negation or a narrative condemning Communist crimes, depending on political expediency.

The escalation of anti-Russian motives in the memory politics of the Baltic states, the Law and Justice party in Poland, and the administration of Victor Yuschenko in Ukraine became particularly apparent in connection with celebrations of the anniversary of the end of World War II in 2005, when some former Communist countries refused to send delegations to the May 9 commemoration in Moscow. All the countries of Eastern Europe undertook a simple and rather fraudulent operation of “excluding” Communism from their national history as being “totally alien” to national tradition. That entailed the total export of responsibility to Russia and the rejection of any achievements of the Communist period. In Russia such a move was

¹ Istoriiia Rossii. XX vek = History of Russia. XX Century / Ed. by A. Zubov. – M. : AST, 2009.

impossible, because of the central place in the national historical mythology accorded to “Victory” in World War II – which lacks analogies in any neighboring countries, except Belarus and south-eastern Ukraine. Russian reactions to the boycott of the May 9 celebrations in Moscow became very aggressive. The press was full of angry articles about Poland and the Baltic states, and demonstrations were organized in front of their embassies in Moscow. With Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, and the Russian–Georgian military conflict in 2008, it was obvious that memory politics in Russia were set to intensify.

Indeed, in May 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree establishing a presidential commission on fighting historical falsification¹. This decision was accompanied by a press campaign which described discussions about the Soviet role in WWII as a clash between patriots and traitors, in which the “traitors” would have to be silenced and punished. Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu, one of the leaders of the ruling United Russia Party, was the first to speak out about the need to pass a law threatening criminal prosecution for “incorrect” remarks about World War II and the Soviet Union’s role in that war. Two bills pursuant to this idea were soon submitted to the Russian parliament². Thus, by early 2009 several key elements of “historical politics” were evident in Russian practices. First, there was the attempt to introduce a standardized history textbook sanctioned by the state. Second, there were specialized politically engaged institutions that combined the tasks of organizing historical research with control over archives and publications. And third, an attempt was made to regulate interpretations of history through legislation.

¹ Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 15 maya 2009 g. N 549 “O Komissii pri Prezidente Rossijskoj Federacii po protivodejstviyu popyt`kam fal’sifikacii istorii v ushherb interesam Rossii” = Decree of the President of Russian Federation of 15 May, 2009 “On the Commission Under the President of Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests” // Rossiiskaya Gazeta. – 2009. – 20 May. – Mode of access: <https://rg.ru/2009/05/20/komissia-dok.html>

² Shoigu predlozhit ugolovno karat` otriczayushhix pobedu SSSR v Otechestvennoj vojne = Shoigu Proposed Criminalizing Those Who Deny the Victory in the Patriotic War // NEWSru.com. – 2009. – 24 February. – Mode of access: <http://www.newsru.com/russia/24feb2009/srozkavov.html>

However, later in 2009, the international context changed. After the Civic Platform won the parliamentary elections in Poland, Russian Prime Minister Putin became, ex officio, the main partner for Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in developing political dialog. The Russian political leadership reacted immediately to the new circumstances by retailoring its memory politics. Putin visited Westerplatte, the symbol of the Polish Army's resistance to Nazi invasion, together with European leaders on September 1, 2009, the 60th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. This was a significant event for bilateral relations, as September links in with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (signed in late August 1939) and the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17 that year. Putin offered an unexpectedly constructive approach in an article titled “Pages of History: A Pretext for Reciprocal Claims or a Basis for Reconciliation and Partnership?”, published in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Poland's leading newspaper, on the eve of his visit to Poland¹. Further, he gave a reconciliatory speech at Westerplatte, unequivocally denouncing the Soviet–German treaty of 1939 but insisting that it was only a small part of a larger picture in which responsibility for appeasement lay also with the leading Western powers. Also constructive was the speech held by Tusk, who stated that in 1945 the Soviet soldiers had saved Europe from Nazism, but could not bring freedom as they were not free themselves.

In October 2009, speaking on his official video-blog, President Medvedev condemned the logic according to which “numerous victims could be justified with some superior state goals.” He said that “repressions can't be justified [...] We pay much attention to the fight against falsification of our history. But for some strange reason we think that it concerns only the attempts to revise the results of the Great Patriotic War. But no less important is to prevent acquittal of those who killed their own people”².

¹ “Gazeta Wyborcza”: “Vladimir Putin: ‘Stranitsyi istorii – povod dlya vzaimnyih pretenziy ili osnova dlya primireniya i partnerstva?’” = “Gazeta Wyborcza”: “Vladimir Putin: ‘Pages of History – A Pretext for Reciprocal Claims or a Basis for Reconciliation and Partnership?’” // [archive.premier.gov.ru](http://archive.premier.gov.ru/premier/press/world/4807/). – 2009. – 31 August. – Mode of access: <http://archive.premier.gov.ru/premier/press/world/4807/>

² Pamyat` o nacional'ny`x tragediyax tak zhe svyashhenna, kak pamyat` o pobedax = Memory of National Tragedies is As Sacred As the Memory of Victories //

These words clearly signaled the wish of Medvedev to change the line of history politics which sought to normalize Stalinism. On April 7, 2010, Tusk and Putin met in Katyn to commemorate the Polish officers who had been shot there in 1940. Putin called this event a “crime of a totalitarian regime,” and fell on his knees at the monument to the Polish officers¹.

Russian–Ukrainian relations also changed considerably in 2010. The new Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich and his team sought to remove the elements of history politics that Russia found especially irritating. Also Moscow was ready to ease tensions. On May 17–18, 2010, soon after the inauguration of Yanukovich as President of Ukraine, Medvedev paid an official visit to Kiev. Both presidents visited the memorial to the victims of the 1932–1933 famine. This was the same memorial whose opening, during the presidency of Victor Yushenko, Medvedev had refused to visit, responding to the invitation with angry comments².

Although there was no political rapprochement with the Baltic countries, the principle of “avoiding extra tensions” was extrapolated to apply there as well. The Russian media simply tended to ignore provocative acts on the part of Russia’s neighbors. This was also the case in relations with Moldova, although the historical politics intensified sharply in that country in 2010, along with a surge in internal political strife. The “reset” in Russia–USA relations, proclaimed in 2009, did not set in motion the politics of reconciliation between Russia and its Western neighbors, but it created a favorable climate for consolidation of this trend.

However, the famed “reset” was not to last long. Tensions, mounting since 2012, in 2014 brought Russia into sharp confrontation with the West in general. It is not difficult to trace the relevant changes

Videoblog Dmitriya Medvedeva. – 2009. – 30 October. – Mode of access: <http://blog.kremlin.ru/post/35/transcript>

¹ Miller A. Vvedenie : Istoricheskaja politika v Vostochnoj Evrope nachala XXI v. = Introduction : Historical Politics in Eastern Europe at the Beginning of the XXI Century // Istoricheskaja politika v XXI veke / Miller A., Lipman M. (eds.). – Moscow : Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012. – P. 7–32.

² Medvedev otvetil za golodomor = Medvedev Gave Response for Holodomor // Gazeta.ru. – 2008. – 14 November. – Mode of access: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2008/11/14_kz_2882819.shtml

in Russian memory politics. When the Russian government initiated a program of patriotic education in 2005, the funding for this program went to two ministries – the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Mass Communications. The new edition of this program in 2011 funneled the money to several special government agencies which had been created since 2005. However, there were still practically no government-linked NGOs which could participate in such activities¹. Then things changed dramatically. In 2012, two huge NGOs were created, directly controlled by the Kremlin – the Russian Historical Society headed by then-Chair of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin, and the Russian Military-Historical Society under the guidance of Vladimir Medinski, then Minister of Culture. With the crisis in relations with the West escalating in 2014, the Kremlin halted the program of commemoration of victims of Communist repressions, which had been approved in 2013. In 2014, the State Duma passed the “Yarovaya Law”² with all the negative aspects of Eastern European memory laws. Russia has now “securitized” its memory politics: it views discussions on history and collective identity through the lens of national security threats. The authorities openly interfere in the teaching of history, giving it an ideological slant.

Russia’s recent memory politics have been primarily reactive, and in these reactions Russia has demonstrated its ability to pick up and adopt many regrettable elements of history politics in Eastern Europe. Still, it is important to stress two important features which make Russian memory politics very different from those of the neighbors. First of all, Russia is not “Europe”: very few Russians today believe that their country can become integrated into European structures in the foreseeable future or can pursue a policy based on such hopes. This is a fundamental difference from all the countries that lie between Russia

¹ Bürger P. State Programs, Institutions and Memory in Russia // Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia / Brusis M., Ahrens J., Wessel M. S. (eds.). – London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. – P. 172–192.

² Federalnyi zakon ot 5 maya 2014 g. N 128-FZ “O vnesenii izmeneniy v otdelnyie zakonodatelnyie aktyi Rossiyskoy Federatsii” = Federal Law of May 5, 2014 N 128-FZ “On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. – 2014. – 7 May. – Mode of access: <http://www.rg.ru/2014/05/07/reabilitacia-dok.html>

and the EU: they have either made their way into the EU and are now trying to shape EU politics of memory, or are tailoring their own politics of memory in context of their claims to become part of the EU. Another important difference is that Russia has never constructed an identity of itself as a victimized nation. Rather, Russian historical conscience and memory policy are underlain by a “besieged fortress” mentality, rooted, inter alia, in various Soviet intellectual practices of the Cold War era.

Russia has returned to its role of the Constitutive Other in European identity formation – and we find this reflected also in European memory politics. There is no reason to believe this will change in near future.

Any reasons for hope?

The new era of antagonistic memory politics will often descend into memory wars, and that will determine the atmosphere for years to come. In some intellectual quarters in Europe there is growing concern with this state of affairs. Acknowledging that there is no return to the “cosmopolitan” approach to memory politics, Bull and Hansen (2016) argue that there must be an alternative to the “antagonistic” approach. They see this alternative in an “agonistic” understanding of memory politics, located in the middle of a scale ranging from transnationalizing cosmopolitan memory on the one hand, to antagonistic memory on the other, the latter being favored by national populists who always put their own nation first. This agonistic approach tries to overcome the deadlock between the antagonistic and cosmopolitan models of memory. While accepting the political nature of this public sphere, it aims at promoting the idea of mutually respectful dialog between various actors and their perceptions of the past¹. If this new approach can gain momentum in Europe, a window of opportunity will open also for Europe–Russia relations. Of course, that would take time. But the hope is there...

¹ Bull A.C., Hansen H.L. On Agonistic Memory // Memory Studies. – 2016. – Vol. 9, N 4. – P. 390–404.

A. Miller

You are only Victims, We are Only Perpetrators?¹

(2020)

Once the dominant approach to engagement with the past and, in particular, World War II, Western Europe's promotion of dialogue and, through dialogue, reconciliation between neighbors has been overtaken by Eastern Europe's memory wars. This new normal reimagines memory politics as a zero-sum confrontation between political rivals and their irreconcilable visions of the past, but, in practice, it is a negative-sum game in which all lose.

In Russia, the revision of the constitution has become a struggle for history. One of the amendments on which Russians will vote at some point this year declares the right and obligation of the state to “protect the historical truth,” and, one dares say, the establishment of a Russian equivalent of the ‘institutes of national remembrance’ found in Eastern Europe does not seem far behind. All this is part of the so-called memory wars that have made it increasingly difficult for Europe to have a proper conversation about the past and, in particular, World War II.

¹ This article was first published in German in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 21.02.2020 (Mode of access: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/gedenk-kultur-europa-russland-und-der-kritische-patriotismus-16643896.html>), reprinted in Russian and short English versions by Carnegie.ru.

The latest escalation in the memory wars came in September 2019, when the European Parliament passed a resolution criticizing various countries, of which only Russia was identified by name, for transgressing in their engagement with the past. Russia, the resolution said, should repent for the responsibility of Soviet totalitarianism – shared with Nazi totalitarianism – for the outbreak of the Second World War and, by extension, all its horrors, the Holocaust included. More than 500 members of the European Parliament voted in favor of the resolution, an overwhelming majority.

2020's first symbolically significant date was January 27, the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, whose concentration camp remains the symbol of the Holocaust. A January 23 joint statement by European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament presidents Ursula von der Leyen, Charles Michel, and David Sassoli marking the occasion read: "Seventy-five years ago, Allied Forces liberated the Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau. They ended the most abhorrent crime in European history, the planned annihilation of the Jews in Europe." No mention was made of the fact that it was specifically the Red Army that ended that "most abhorrent crime."

Those who acknowledged the Red Army's role in the episode nevertheless made sure to point out that Auschwitz was liberated by the troops of the First Ukrainian Front, the not-so-subtle implication being that the deed was done by Ukrainians. This, even though it is well known that the Red Army's fronts were named after the directions in which they were to advance, not after the places where they were formed.

Such incidents speak to the view that the Red Army can only have done wrong as well as the tendency to nationalize the Second World War's heroes and victims yet Sovietize, or Russify, its perpetrators. Thus, in the context of Auschwitz's liberation, nationality – specifically, that of the Red Army's Ukrainian soldiers – matters, while in the context of the real and imagined transgressions of the Red Army or the crimes of Stalinism, the perpetrators are 'Soviets,' 'communists,' or 'Russians.' If that upsets Russians, so be it – they've been up to no good in recent years and so deserve it, the thinking goes.

However, Russians are not the only ones with something to lose from the way in which history has been used politically over the past 15 years. All those who take part in the memory wars suffer in the process.

The late 1980s and 1990s saw European state after European state publicly admit complicity in the Holocaust, an event with a central and unique place in the pan-European historical narrative. Such an approach to memory assumed the predominance of ‘critical patriotism,’ which involves confronting the shameful chapters of a nation’s history and precludes the emergence of a narrative focused exclusively on national traumas or triumphs. It also assumed, among other things, a desire to engage in dialogue, through which differences are overcome, or at least minimized, and the truth about the past discovered.

During that time, the term *Geschichtspolitik* was coined in Germany to describe and condemn politicians’ self-serving interventions in history and collective memory. In the 2000s, the concept reemerged, and was given a positive meaning, in Poland as *polityka historyczna*. *Polityka historyczna* leaves no room for dialogue or the search for shared interpretations of the past – or that for the historical truth. In such a conflict, the warring sides either falsify history or cherry-pick facts that work to their advantage, framing these facts as the most salient, if not the only ones of importance, in the debate in question.

Eastern Europe’s approach to engagement with the past – where one’s nation is declared the greatest victim of all and all blame for the darkest chapters of its history is assigned to others – has prevailed over the approach that Western Europe labored to develop from the 1960s on. At the heart of today’s narrative is a legend of two totalitarianisms, from which all the twentieth century’s evils are said to have followed.

That is why in contemporary Poland Jan Gross, the author of the book about Jedwabne and other book about Polish anti-Semitism during and immediately after WWII is target to defamation campaign, as well as another historian of Holocaust Jan Grabowski, who is accused of overstatement of the number of the Jews killed by the Poles during the German occupation. That is why Ruta Vanagaite, who wrote a book about the scale of Lithuanian participation in Holocaust and robbery of the Jewish property was practically expelled from Lithuania. Hence the

passage of laws all over Eastern Europe regulating speech about the past. Unlike Holocaust denial laws, such measures protect national heroes from ‘slander,’ that is, charges of involvement in the Holocaust. To be sure, many national heroes died resisting Soviet rule. But that is no reason to forgive or forget their collaboration with the Nazis.

In the Second World War, the heroic was all too often inextricable from the criminal. Yet if the role of Russians is overwhelmingly associated with the criminal, all other nationalities are generally thought to have acted more heroically than criminally. Indeed, little attention is paid to the transgressions of interwar authoritarian regimes, some of which were, in fact, allied with Hitler.

Hungary’s was one such regime. Budapest’s new mayor, however, is busy planning the erection of a memorial to female victims of wartime rape – above all, he says, to those who suffered at the hands of the soldiers of the Red Army. But there is no such memorial in Hungary to those killed by Hungarian soldiers on the eastern front. Nor is there such a memorial in Germany, just as there is no memorial to the 3.5 million Soviet prisoners of war who died in German captivity or the hundreds of thousands of Soviet forced laborers who perished during the war.

Today, it is impossible to voice the view – held by distinguished historians Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick – that *comparing* Stalinism and Nazism is legitimate but *equating* one with the other is not without being labeled a *Putinverstehher*. Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to debate the past even in Germany, where historians who refuse to adopt a nationalist, affirmational perspective are stigmatized as ‘useful idiots’ and their arguments dismissed solely because they are seen to serve Vladimir Putin’s interests.

Clearly, the orthodox narrative of the Second World War was based on a number of omissions. It is clear that Poles dislike references to interwar Poland’s virulent anti-Semitism and its contribution to the Holocaust there and reminders of how Red Army soldiers were killed in Poland on their way home in 1945. Many Russians, for their part, dislike being told that Red Army soldiers were not always seen as, and did not always act like, liberators. They do not want to hear about the many German women raped by Red Army soldiers. Germans, for sure, don’t like when their achievements in “working through the past” are

questioned, when somebody speaks about politically motivated selectiveness of German memory. Americans don't like when somebody tells them that they used a nuclear bomb in Hiroshima not so much to force Japanese to surrender, but rather to test it and to put pressure on Stalin. The question whether Dresden and some other German cities had to be burned together with the civilian population is still unpleasant for Brits and Americans. Brits and French don't like memories of Munich agreement of 1938. Brits dislike to be reminded how many people perished in Bengal starvation due to decisions of Winston Churchill in 1943. French or Norwegians have problems with recognizing that the number of collaborators with the Nazis in their countries exceeded the number of resistance fighters. And so on. Our respective memories of the war, then, remain incomplete and particular – and not only along national lines. For example, communists are widely remembered as butchers yet featured prominently among Nazism's victims and played an important role in the anti-Nazi resistance.

Much about the history of the Second World War and our engagement with it has not been looked at closely, or critically, enough. Far from righting this wrong, today's memory wars do not bring us any closer to the truth – a complete truth taking into account both that of which we should be proud and that of which we should be ashamed.

Like real wars, memory wars divide us into 'us' and 'them,' reducing 'us' to victims and 'them' to criminals, and discourage nuance and balance, making it impossible to confront omissions and distortions and giving rise to new omissions and distortions. They are unwinnable, but, as a result of them, we have lost each other's trust as well as any chance of self-critically examining the past.

About the authors

Alexey Miller is Professor of History and Academic Director of the Center for Research in Cultural Memory and Symbolic Politics at European University in St-Petersburg. He is also leading research-fellow at the Institute for Scientific Information in Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Miller is author of 7 books, including 2 in English, and editor of more than 20 collective volumes, including “Nationalizing Empires” (2015) and “Memory Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe” (2020). His research is focused on comparative history of Empires and nationalism, Russian history of the 19th and early 20th century, and memory politics in Russia and Eastern Europe.

E-mail: millera2006@yandex.ru

Olga Malinova is professor of National Research University Higher School of Economics and chief research fellow of the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION), Russian Academy of Sciences. In 2000, she completed his Habilitation thesis (Doktor nauk) in philosophy on the history of liberal nationalism. Her current research interests are primarily focused on symbolic politics, memory politics and national identity construction. Olga Malinova is the author of five research monographs, dozens research papers and articles in Russian and international scientific journals.

E-mail: omalinova@hse.ru

Dmitry Efremenko is deputy director of the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION), Russian Academy of Sciences. In 2007, he completed his Habilitation thesis (Doktor nauk) in political science on the global environmental politics. His current research interests are primarily focusing on the issues of postbipolar world order, political transformations in Post-Soviet space, memory studies. Dmitry Efremenko is author of seven research monographs, dozens research papers and articles in Russian and international scientific journals.

E-mail: efdv2015@mail.ru

Alexandr Voronovici is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for the History and Sociology of World War II and Its Consequences, at the National Research University Higher School of Economics. He holds a PhD in Comparative History from Central European University (2016). He has published articles on interwar Soviet nationality policies in Ukraine and Moldova, contested borderlands, and memory politics in Eastern Europe, particularly in the separatist republics of Transnistria and Donbass.

E-mail: alex.voronovici@gmail.com

ALEXEY MILLER, OLGA MALINOVA,
DMITRY EFREMENKO, ALEXANDR VORONOVICI

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