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* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2020.01.001. KONSTANTIN DOLGOV, SERGEY RYABKOV. THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY AT THE PRESENT STAGE // *Condensed abstract from "Bezumie ili prosvetlenie razuma: zhizn ili smert chelovechestva [Madness or Enlightenment of the Mind: Life or Death of the Mankind]" by Dolgov Konstantin, "Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn," Moscow, 2019, No. 2, P. 174–181 & "Otkrovennyi razgovor o voine i mire [A frank conversation about war and peace]" by Ryabkov Sergey, "International Affairs," Moscow, 2019, No. 2, P. 12–36.*

Keywords: World War I and World War II, the anthropocene era, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear weapons, the United Nations, Russia, the USA, the INF Treaty, ABM, the OSCE, security threats.

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According to Konstantin Dolgov in the article “Madness or Enlightenment of the Mind: Life or Death of the Mankind,” the history of mankind has repeatedly found itself on the verge of death. Long before the advent of the Apocalypse, people feared for their fate and the fate of the Earth. Scientists point out several similar periods in history when it came to a

universal catastrophe. Currently, as scientists acknowledge, mankind has entered the sixth period – since 1945, when nuclear weapons appeared and were used and the anthropocene era began.

However, Konstantin Dolgov writes, people quickly forgot the horrors of both the First and the Second World Wars, not to mention all kinds of revolutions, armed conflicts and local wars. And almost all countries, especially developed ones, began again to spend exorbitant amounts on new, even more destructive, types of weapons. Soon after atomic weapons, hydrogen weapons were invented, and not just the threat of the Third World War hung over humanity, but the threat of destruction on a planetary scale. In this regard in many countries public organizations to protect peace, to justify international law and its strict observance began to emerge. That is why the UN and many other international organizations appeared. A struggle was unfolding between various political and public organizations in defense of peace and an active upholding of cooperation between peoples. But the trouble was, the researcher emphasizes, that inside each state there were people who were not happy with the peaceful situation: it prevented them from fulfilling their own selfish goals and satisfying the exorbitant ambitions associated with seizure of foreign territories and claims for world domination. Thus, humanity has come to that border that red line, to pass through which will mean an absolute and universal catastrophe. Scientists note that after the end of the Second World War, the world many times stood on the verge of the beginning of the Third World War for a variety of cases and circumstances. But so far, fortunately, all of this has been overcome.

According to Konstantin Dolgov, two points testify to the fact that this fatal moment can still come. Firstly, a number of top modern politicians expressing the interests of the owners of transnational corporations and oligarchs openly seek various armed conflicts and wars. This, the researcher believes, is not

surprising, because at present, mankind has degraded to the establishment of oligarchic political systems and regimes, when any discussion of democracy and freedom seems an idle talk. And secondly, at the same time, there is almost absolute indifference on the part of the majority of the world's population to what is happening in modern domestic and foreign policy, especially in developed countries. At the same time, the peoples stopped suppressing the adventurous, criminal policies of modern statesmen of leading countries, threatening to start wars against other countries. The leaders of the most economically and militarily powerful countries openly declare their right to world domination. At present, Konstantin Dolgov emphasizes, it is necessary in both domestic and foreign policy to limit the irresponsible behavior of the highest political leaders of all states, especially the most developed ones.

It is known that the United States and Great Britain, worried about the growing danger of a thermonuclear war, made at one time a very valuable proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Unfortunately, these same states, the author of the article notes, have since resisted the real creation of this nuclear-free zone and nuclear-free zones in other regions and blocked all proposals on this issue. Moreover, they constantly seek opportunities for interference in the internal affairs of other states, up to the use of armed force.

According to the researcher, the next danger of our Anthropocene era, which threatens the death of all mankind, the entire planet, is the barbaric attitude of people themselves to nature, to the environment as a whole, the predatory use of resources, and ever-increasing pollution of the planet. Instead of moving from the use of organic resources (oil, gas, coal) to renewable energy sources, the ever-expanding extraction of natural fuel continues, causing irreparable harm to the environment. This is not only about global warming, the melting of polar glaciers, but also about already irreversible processes in all of nature that threaten universal death.

Another danger lies, as some scholars and politicians note, in “human madness,” when the main resources are spent not on the development of various areas that improve the physical and spiritual life of a person and of all mankind, but on the spheres that are aimed at destroying all life. Instead of developing health care, education, culture and power, those in power strive to invent ever new types of deadly weapons. Currently, such countries as the United States, Russia and several others have accumulated such a huge amount of WMD that life on Earth can be destroyed many times. In this regard, Konstantin Dolgov believes, it is time for the political forces of the modern world under the auspices of the UN to develop a new, more perfect system of international law that would exclude the possibility of unleashing the Third World War and would categorically prohibit the use of any armed forces by any country in any region without the sanction of the UN Security Council. It is also necessary in all countries to create public organizations that would exercise civilian control over the activities of politicians and political organizations in the use of armed forces.

In his interview with Armen Oganesyanyan, the editor-in-chief of the journal “Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn” [international Affairs], Sergey Ryabkov (“Frank Talk about War and Peace”) referred to the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty). The Americans, at least an influential part of their political elite, the diplomat emphasized, do not need any arms control treaties that impede the United States, entangle them with some kind of web of obligations, keep the country in a limited space, make it difficult to implement the concept of total military domination in all environments. Apparently, representatives of this elite came to the conclusion that now there is an opportunity – taking into account the country's economic and technological potential – to make a decisive breakthrough in various fields in order to guarantee for a long time the position of a military hegemon. This

is stated in many doctrinal documents of the United States, for example, in the U.S. ABM Policy Review.

For Russia, the diplomat believes, this means only one thing: it is necessary to persistently explain to everyone in the world the harmfulness of this course. The international community needs to be mobilized to counter these approaches. Russia needs to create a constructive alternative, search for additional ideas that could be used to ensure greater stability of the multilateral and bilateral arms control system and the non-proliferation of WMD. The American policy of denying the principles and norms of international law, rejecting existing agreements in the field of arms control and non-proliferation is a very alarming bell. Russia should oppose the general American destructive approach with a reasonable, balanced alternative and vigorous work to counter dangerous plans, Sergey Ryabkov emphasizes.

According to the diplomat, for the Russian Federation and the United States it is necessary to jointly develop and conduct certain de-escalation measures on the line of contact between Russia and NATO in Europe. In particular, the so-called structured dialogue that is taking place in the OSCE should be aimed at this subject. Sergey Ryabkov also believes that in the current conditions it is necessary to expand the work with the public, with the media, hold more conferences, attract the attention of those who are not indifferent to the security situation. It is not apparent that the security and stability system that has developed over decades will survive. It has already been shaken and will soon be at risk if the U.S. “playing with fire” continues. If, for example, the practice of inflicting unlawful attacks on sovereign states does not stop. In 2018, the United States and its allies twice used force in Syria in violation of a number of fundamental norms and principles of international law. If American doctrinal documents continue to be penetrated with the concepts that were used in the 1950s and 1960s, such as the idea of creating a battlefield nuclear weapon (production of low-

powered miniature nuclear warheads supposedly to prevent the escalation of nuclear war has already been launched. A return to ideology and practice of acute confrontation, fraught with real conflict will be inevitable. The United States ABM Policy Review contains the concept of preemptive strikes on nuclear deterrents in the interests of missile defense. Sergey Ryabkov qualifies it as an extremely destabilizing and harmful idea, an attempt to find a verbal frame for the transition to a direct and aggressive form of escalating a military threat.

Russia, the diplomat concludes, offers everyone a constructive alternative to that trend of scrapping the existing arms control system of existing international institutions, which in 2018 – early 2019 can be dangerously seen in the politics of Washington and the states that are the closest allies of the United States.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

KAMIL ZIMOV. REPATRIATION OF EX-JIHADISTS: POSSIBLE RISKS // *This article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: jihad, re-adaptation, ex-jihadists, Syria, Idlib.

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Abstract. The article considers the situation around the fate of foreign ISIL fighters and other terrorist organizations, as well as members of their families, who have to leave the country due to the early end of hostilities in Syria and Iraq.

At the beginning of 2019, there were still about 18,000 jihadists in Syria and Iraq. In the South-East of Syria, there were conducted operations to destroy the remnants of ISIL – formations, which included many foreigners, including Europeans, as well as people from Central Asian countries, who are traditionally called Russian-speaking. There were also those who were “unlucky”: they were captured in Iraq, where they were executed. Those who are still alive are looking for opportunities to save their lives... There are two options. The first one – you can return to your homeland and, repent and endure punishment. The second option is to move to Afghanistan together with the most militaristic fighters. There is still an opportunity to settle in one of Syria’s neighboring Muslim countries, but it requires facilities and ties.

The return of ex-jihadists to their homeland can have catastrophic effects, as these people are used to solving problems with weapons. This situation is relevant to the governments of European states, Russia and neighboring countries. It must not be forgotten that, for the Syrian leadership, the return of its citizens, who fought in the ranks of ISIL against their own fellow citizens, who abided the legitimate Government, issues a challenge of their re-adaptation and reconciliation of the society in all.

To execute or grant a pardon?

In Europe, there is a debate about what to do: to deny citizenship or allow return, assuming that these people are not involved in the crimes. But how can we prove their innocence?

In Germany it was decided to deprive them of passports, who voluntarily joined the Islamic States. And the British

authorities decided to deprive even wives of jihadists of their citizenship. Denmark is also opposed the return of its fellow citizens home, who fought in Syria, applying to ex-article provided for treason. However, not all Danes advocate this view. It is typical that, among the Arab countries, Morocco, Algeria and even Saudi Arabia denied citizenship to their fellow citizens who had joined ISIL.

The Government of Syria is also in a difficult situation. Some of the former members of terrorist organizations are their own citizens. It is obvious that the most “active” radicals have already chosen to leave the country, having moved to Afghanistan or Europe, others hang about, staying in neighboring countries. It is interesting to note that there is the “jihadist international,” of the most “utter” fighters from among foreigners in Idlib. There are not many Syrians among them. The Government of Syria adopted a number of amnesty decrees and established various reconciliation committees. Provincial, urban and tribal authorities were involved. About 60,000 people have already received pardon in Syria. Basically, these are those who deferred from service. The amnesty was also carried out by local authorities. Thus, on 5.08.2018, 500 former fighters were granted amnesty in the province of Djraa. However, it is obvious that the final reconciliation of Syrians among themselves will take many years.

In Russia, also, it was difficult to come up with the status for this category of persons for a long time – either they are potential terrorists or victims of recruitment. It was decided to pursue a full-dress investigation for each ex-jihadist. According to lawyer Eugene Korchago, “the very fact of participation of a citizen in an extremist organization, regardless of the commitment of other illegal actions, already constitutes a crime... And for the commission of other crimes by this person (illegal crossing of the state border, murders, arms trafficking, etc.) responsibility will be taken together.” Thus, recruited Russians who fought on the side of terrorists but returned back to their

homeland in all cases will be subject to criminal liability. The punishment will be determined by the court taking into account the totality of all the crimes (except for the participation in a terrorist or extremist organization) that they committed.

A. Yanger, Head of Military Counterintelligence (Director of British Foreign Intelligence) is confident that returning fighters will continue their terrorist activities in Europe. President Trump believes that those who fought until the last day must be brought to court, but they must be allowed into European countries first. Moreover, the President of the United States demanded that the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and a number of other European states commit for trial their citizens who joined ISIL. However, the German authorities are not sure that this is possible, as although all German citizens have the right to return to their homeland, it is extremely difficult to carry out an investigation of their activities in ISIL, as witnesses to crimes will remain in the Middle East and without a bill of indictment it will not be possible to impose sentence.

Kurdish organizations make an appeal to all governments to take their radicals back as they do not want to spend money on the maintenance of prisoners (including their wives and children), courts, imprisonment, etc. Kurdish groups stated that Europe expresses solidarity only verbally, does not want to share the burden of maintaining thousands of imprisoned jihadists and their families.

French President E. Macron suggests that the countries in the territories of which the crimes were committed (i.e. Syria and Iraq) decide the fate of the fighters themselves. In response, human rights organizations say that in this case the militants are likely to be executed, as in Iraq, where the death penalty is already provided only for belonging to ISIL and other terrorist organizations. By the way, France sent information to the Iraqi authorities in 2017 about “its” jihadists in the hope that they would face the trial there.

The representatives of Syria note that it is extremely costly to investigate the commission of a crime by foreigners, as remand detainees, even knowing Arabic, will deny it. European states agree that it is near – impossible to build an evidence base outside the crime scene.

In fact, European politicians understand that any sentence to a returned ex-jihadist could elicit a response from “their” Muslims within the European continent. It’s worth reminding that 6 million Muslims live in France. In Germany, between 3,8 million and 4,3 million Muslims are approximately 5% of the total population. In the UK, Muslims include 4,8% or 2.7 million people. In Belgium – about 685 thousand, which was 6,23% in 2011.

Only recently in Paris the French citizen Mehdi Nemmushi of Algerian origin was finally convicted, he shot four people in May 2014 at the Jewish Museum of Brussels. Shortly before commission of the crime, he fought in Syria for more than a year, in one of the Islamic State units. It should be noted that the trial lasted almost 4 years.

The International Research Center for Radical Organizations at King’s College London suggests that 1,765 of the 6,000 European nationals (mostly from Belgium, France, Germany and Great Britain) who fought alongside the ISIL in Syria and Iraq have already returned at the beginning of 2019. Up to 1/3 of those who left, returned to Belgium and Germany. About 12% of the total number of French citizens who took part in jihad returned to France.

Commenting the process of returning jihadists to Europe, the American analytical group Soufan Center notes: “Some of them will remain dedicated to the form of violent jihad promoted by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. And it’s not a secret that those who want to keep fighting will find a way to do it.”

Some ex-jihadists, citizens of European countries, managed to return to Europe on their own. In almost all countries, the authorities have to take measures to help them adapt. But until recently, no one thought about how a man from a Muslim environment would break with a radical environment. In Sweden,

which in Europe ranks high among the number of jihad tourists, a non-governmental organization, Ikos, was established to help people break free of the extremist environment. Geir Stakset, the founder of this organization, notes that few former jihadists seek help. However those who took risks find a whole bouquet of problems, “a mixture of crime and ideological blast.” G. Staxet also drew attention to the fact that being recruited young people are interested in the emerging sense of fellowship, which unites them, allows to assert of their kind, as well as secrets and the prospect of adventures. Ex-jihadists who have returned to Europe, who have escaped justice, are usually stuck, and thus forced to remain in their past society, which prevents them from changing their world view.

Much the same situation is in the Balkans, where volunteers were also sent to jihad from the States of the former Yugoslavia. According to the Montenegrin newspaper “Pobjeda,” more than 50 people who fought alongside the ISIL were undergone a criminal trial. 23 law suit took place in the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 22 ex-jihadists were convicted, but the sentence was not large – about 2,5 years imprisonment. Only Zechia Chazimi, the famous preacher of radical Islamist ideas in Kosovo, got a long sentence of 10 years. However, observers doubt that his associates will not help him reduce his jail term.

Thus, it must be noted that there is neither consensus on the prospects for the return of Europeans who joined radical groups and fought in Iraq and Syria, nor a strategy for their re-adaptation. The European Union didn’t comment it, and the head of European diplomacy Federica Mogherini (in anticipation of the end of her mission), said that this issue is proposed to be solved by each national government individually.

Jihadists’ children fate

European politicians pay particular attention to the problem of jihadists’ children re-adaptation returning to

European countries. In particular, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany draws attention to the fact that so far no strategy has been developed, same for all the Lands of Germany, towards the children of jihadists. The Government has already amended the draft law on improving information sharing between various agencies within the framework of anti-terrorist struggle. It is considered that, sharing information will simplify the process of supervision of teenagers whose parents participated in jihad for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. However, children under 14 are not mentioned in the law, although there are already cases of children participation in terrorist attacks and not only in Syria. In particular, in 2016, at a Christmas fair in Ludwigshafen (in the south-west), a 12-year-old teenager, a citizen of Germany of Iraqi origin, tried to detonate a bomb.

Peter Neuman, an expert on terrorism research at King's College London, notes that "ISIL is no longer trying to justify its brutality with political or religious necessity. Islamic State is behind a "pop culture of horror" that has become particularly attractive to young people, those who experienced trauma or are in search of consonant ideas." The Swedish newspaper "Skånska Dagbladet" in the article "Jihadism as a youth culture" writes: "Young people turned terror into pop culture. Sounds like a bad joke, but they did. With the help of hip hop, fashion, skillful use of social media and subcultural entourage, confused young people are convinced that being a jihadist is "cool." There are a number of denominators with other forms of youth cultures, such as the violent street gang culture in the United States. "According to the European Union Police Service "Europol," most young jihadists find themselves recruited through group pressure and emulation among close friends." Considering the above observations, it is necessary to agree with the head of German counterintelligence Hans-George Maassen that jihadists' children pose a particular risk to social security.

The examination of video – and photographic materials reflecting weekdays of ISIL and other terrorist organizations shows that the organizers pay great attention to the appearance of jihadists: all where black hoodies, but sneakers are white; on mass executions, the victims are dressed in red robe. Slender rows of white open-top cars moving endless procession on Syrian ground and streaming black flags, should impress the invincibility of ISIL. For young people, much less children, it is more than a convincing factor in the power of the jihadist movement.

Fate of ex-jihadists from CIS countries

The analysis of the situation in the Central Asian republics of the former USSR also did not reveal a common standard towards its citizens who fought on the side of ISIL in the Middle East. Former jihadists, as well as members of their families, began to undertake attempts to return as early as 2015. In 2018, letters were sent to Central Asian governments from Syria requesting measures to remove their compatriots from Syria. Only Kazakhstan responded immediately and organized the export of its citizens.

Precise data on the number of Kazakh nationals fighting in ISIL and other radical Islamist organizations cannot be determined. According to official information, at the end of 2014 the number of Kazakhs who left, reached 300 people. Practice shows that men often went for “seasonal work” to different countries and it was difficult to trace their further destination. However, the study of the ISIL media demonstrated significant presence of Kazakhs in the ranks of fighters, and even children, who in Kazakh called for the killing of “infidels.” The fact that Muslims from the Central Asian republics left as families indicates that Islamist propagandists took into account the importance of family and family ties for recruitment of fighters. It was known that 300 fighters created their “Kazakhstan jamagat,” which had many women.

In summer 2018 it became known that 390 Kazakh children, mainly orphans, were in the conflict zone in Syria. Their relatives asked the Government of Kazakhstan to return them to their homeland. In spring 2019, on behalf of the Government of Kazakhstan, there was carried out a large-scale humanitarian action Zhusan on citizens of Kazakhstan return from Syria. As a result of the second operation (Zhusan-2), 231 persons (including 156 children) were returned to their homeland. 16 men and four women of this group were detained under suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities on the side of Islamic radicals. The representative of the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan stated that “the authorities are obliged to ensure the principle of inevitability of punishment... And those who are innocent must undergo a rehabilitation procedure.” The returning wives and widows of the militants were housed within specially created adaptation centre near the town of Aktau. One of the fighters brought to Kazakhstan in May 2019 was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.

Ever since ex-jihadists from Kyrgyzstan, from 2014, began to return home, the authorities decide what to do with them. Then the government promised to punish all those who joined jihad. However, the promise of severe punishment without exceptions poses other challenges. In summer 2016, the number of those who return began to increase rapidly. As media reports, the reason is banal: ISIL stopped paying salaries to its adherents...

Analysts of the security services of Kyrgyzstan claim that the majority of the natives of the republic were recruited to jihad in Russia, as well as in other countries where they came as guest workers. In this regard, there is an opinion of the Russian military expert L. Korolkov, who draws attention to the factor of labor migration: wage reductions in Russia led to a significant outflow of Central Asian migrants, and “it is mainly a young and excessive labor resource with which IS recruits actively work.” Tellingly that the majority of those recruited are natives of Osh region, which at the turn of the 20th and the beginning of 21st centuries has

repeatedly been a center of anti-government speeches and where Islamist propaganda has so far been extremely active.

Bishkek also evacuates its citizens, mostly women and children, from Syria. But, unlike Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, this country has no opportunities and means for systematic work with “returnees.” The drama of the situation gains momentum because of religious component – there are officially about 3 thousand religious organizations. Conversations with former jihadists gives evidence of undereducation and a poorly formed outlook. As main reasons they called “the desire to do God’s work to get to paradise,” etc. However, psychologists drew attention to the fact that some young people, not well-grounded in religion, admitted that they wanted to lead an active life, fight against injustice, perform feats. ISIL immediately offered them a scenario where it was necessary to “free the people of Syria from the tyrant,” about which few future jihadists had information. The third category of young people ran to adventure, looking for opportunities to see the world, to make a fortune through adventure. Many had negative life experience, consisting of economic problems, professional invalidity, disenchantment with the world around them and problems in private life. For such people, usually single and self-contained, the internet becomes a place where they assert themselves. This is the place where ISIL recruits find them.

The problem of former jihadists’ repatriation is also relevant for Uzbekistan. In June 2018, a law on control of extremism was adopted. It provides for measures to raise the legal consciousness and culture of the population (art. 8). According to the law, members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU) and other radical organizations are subject to severe punishment, including long terms of imprisonment: only for the fact of membership – 10–15 years, for acts threatening the social system there are also more severe penalties. The Government put in charge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to prepare a list of criteria according to which a person convicted for

participating in the activities of radical organizations abroad has successfully undergone social and psychological rehabilitation. So far, it is prescribed that former Islamists will be transferred to serve their sentences in their home areas, to the colony-settlement regime.

In Tajikistan, work to improve legislative development on recruited jihadists has been under way since 2015. The Criminal Code of the Republic was amended, whereby those who voluntarily left the jihadist ranks and returned to their homeland are exempt from criminal liability. It is contemplated that, after his repatriation, a former fighter is put in pretrial custody while his activities in Syria are under investigation. Some people were discharge from liability by applying to them (art. 401 of the Criminal Code of Tajikistan), according to which “a person who voluntarily withdraws from illegal participation in military outfit, armed conflict or hostilities in the territory of other states until the cessation of the activities of military outfit, the end of armed conflict or hostilities, and unless his actions have indications of another components of crime, shall be exempted from criminal liability.” For impenitent fighters, there is a prison sentence of 12 to 20 years.

The Government of Tajikistan is extremely concerned about the possibility of transferring hostility to the territory of the Republic. In this regard, it was decided to withdraw Tajik students from Muslim countries. However, this measure is insufficient, as according to official data, more than one thousand Tajik theologians are illegally trained in religious educational institutions in the Muslim east.

The authorities of Turkmenistan are worried about penetration of the ISIL virus and Islamism into the country. According to some reports, between 300 and 500 citizens of young Turkmen, brainwashed by Islamist propaganda, fought on the side of ISIL. The newspaper Chronicle of Turkmenistan also reported that several hundred Turkmen lived with families in Syrian Homs. They usually represent themselves as Turks, as Turkmen and

Turkish languages are alike. By the end of the war, in the light of obvious defeat of ISIL, Turkmen fighters join the Syrian Free Army, an opposition to Syria's government.

The closer the end of hostilities in Syria, the less chances there are for people from the Central Asian republics who want to return to their homeland are to escape the law. Many will no longer be able to opt out of participation in jihad before the cessation of activities of the military outfit, as covered by law. Therefore, they think about the possibility of relocating to another country. This is especially true for those who are in Idlib. The bulk of Uighurs – Muslim and volunteers from China – are also concentrated here. For them, the issue of repatriation is closed, so they will have to move to Afghanistan, where many prominent figures of the jihadist movement have already moved.

Public fears of the republics of Central Asia that a new jihad is about to happen in neighboring Afghanistan are not groundless. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan shares a common border with three of the five republics of the Central Asian region – Tajikistan (1,344 km), Uzbekistan (140 km) and Turkmenistan (745 km). In case of destabilization in one of them, the conflict, supported by radicals from neighboring Afghanistan, could proliferate the entire region. This unfavourable scenario is also taken into account in Russia, which is the main member of the Collective Security Treaty.

Conclusion

To sum up it is to be noted that, repatriation of ex-fighters exposes to danger the civilian population of all countries. So far, the above-mentioned countries do not have experts, developed methodology and sometimes resources, to ensure the productive work of deradicalization of former jihadists and their families. Consequently, this work must be carried out jointly in order to prevent the virus of radicalization from subduing peaceful life of our countries.

Editorial note: The Russian Bureau of Interpol reported that 68 people were extradited from abroad to Russia under the International Counter-Terrorism Project in 2019, including members of armed gangs that fought as part of ISIL in the Middle East. According to the Defense Ministry, more than 5,000 fighters from the Russian Federation were annihilated in the course of hostilities in Syria.

IGOR DOBAYEV, ELENA SCHUKINA. ISLAMOPHOBIA IN RUSSIA: THE ORIGINS AND CURRENT STATUS // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem world."*

Keywords: jihad, Islam, Islamism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, takfir, terrorism, extremism.

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Abstract. The article considers Islamophobia, its historically determined origins, a complex historical path of development, the current state and possible vectors of leveling the challenges, risks and threats to the country's national security associated with this phenomenon as a type of xenophobia in Russia. The conclusion is that such a task is within the power of Russian society and the state.

At the turn of the 20th – 21th centuries xenophobia in Russia has become one of the most acute challenges to national security. The systemic crisis of the 1990s exacerbated social contradictions, which in the context of a multi-component multi-ethnic society acquired the character of inter-confessional and interethnic conflicts.

Xenophobia means hostility to strangers; the attitude to regard them as the source of one's problems. It is the eternal companion of human history, and not just the product of the modern transforming and contradictory world. Xenophobic tendencies in an open or latent state usually exist at the state, public, or personal level. They are based on negative stereotypes, in which the negative characteristics of representatives of another ethnic group, faith, social group are fixed. As a rule, they represent absolutization, the extension of ideas (real, but often distorted) about responsibility for any negative phenomena to an entire social group. In a social process that is developing evolutionarily, xenophobia is in a latent state; negatively colored stereotypes are replaced by positive or neutral. However, in a crisis, xenophobia is becoming one of the causes of ethnic, religious intolerance, conflict and even war.

Among the religious-based phobias in modern Russia the greatest danger to national and regional security is Islamophobia, which has its historical grounds.

The non-acceptance by the People of the Scriptures (Christians and Jews) of Islam, as the last world monotheistic religion, goes back to the Medina period (since 622) when Muhammad received divine revelations, since it was then that the Jewish tribes living in Medina (Banu Kainuka, Banu Kuraiisa and Banu Nadir) questioned his prophetic mission. In turn, the controversy between Christians and Moslems was opened by the famous St. John Damascene (died c. 787). In his treatise "On a hundred heresies in a nutshell," which is a catalog of heresies "from where they began and from what they came from," Islam was placed in the category of heresies descended from

Christianity. The interpretation of Islam given by Damascene had for a long time determined the attitude of Christian polemicists (both Orthodox and Catholic): “The religion of the Ismaelites, the forerunner of the Antichrist, is still hitherto valid, misleading the people.” Damascene further notes that the ancestors of the followers of the new “heresy,” until the time of the emperor Heraclius (d. 641), “clearly served idols; from that time and until now they had a false prophet called Mamed (Mohammed). Having got acquainted with the Old and New Testaments, as well as having communicated with the Arian alleged monk, he composed his own heresy.”

A similar perception of Islam is demonstrated at the end of the VIII century by an Arabic-speaking bishop Theodore Abu Kurra. Considering himself the ideological successor of St. John Damascene, Theodore Abu-Kurra also reacted negatively to the personality of Muhammad and his teachings: for him he was a false prophet-Arian, obsessed by a demon.

As for Russia, the history of Islam on its territory is as ancient as Christianity. During the reign of the Kiev prince Vladimir I Svyatoslavich (980–1015), Islam was already established in the lands of the closest geopolitical neighbor of Russia, Volga Bulgaria. Close military-political and economic contacts with the Bulgars, the presence of a common enemy in the person of the Jewish Khazaria – all this acquainted the population of Kievan Rus with the Moslem faith, its principles set forth in the Quran and the Sunnah, its rites, and everyday life of Moslems. And although Christianity triumphed in Russia later, the influence of the Islamic world on Russian civilization and culture had never weakened.

Acquaintance with Islam was reflected in the most ancient written monuments of Russia, in particular, in the so-called “Tale of the Choice of Faith,” which was included in the most authoritative of the surviving written sources: the code “The Tale of Bygone Years.” According to the Tale, in about 986 the Bulgars sent an embassy to Kiev with the aim of converting the pagan Vladimir to a new faith. However, the embassy was not

successful, since the adoption of Islam involved circumcision, rejection of eating pork and drinking wine (polygamy was approved by the prince, who, judging by the everyday legend, before his baptism had a great fondness for women), which the prince did not agree to. As far as is known, after the Bulgarian ambassadors, Prince Vladimir was visited by German and Jewish ambassadors, followed by a certain Greek “philosopher,” who spelled out the Christian doctrine quite extensively and retold a number of plots of the Old and New Testaments. The prince liked the speech of the Orthodox missionary, generously gifted him and let him go. However, the “philosopher” began with the “blasphemy” of other people's faiths, and his assessment of Moslems was especially striking, translated from ancient Greek it sounds as follows: “We heard that the Bulgarians came and taught you to accept their faith; their faith defiles heaven and earth, and they are cursed beyond all people, they likened to the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, on whom the Lord let out a burning stone and flooded them, and they drowned. So these ones will also face the day of their perdition, when God comes to judge the nations and destroy all those who do iniquity and evil. For, having washed themselves, they pour this waste into the mouth, smear their beards with it and commemorate Mohammed. So their wives do the same filth.” Hearing about this, Vladimir spat on the ground and said: “This is a dirty thing” [2, column 106 (p. 37)].

When the Russian ambassadors, fulfilling the will of Prince Vladimir: “First go to the Bulgarians and test their faith,” returned to Kiev, they literally told the following: “We went to Bulgaria, watched them pray in the temple, that is, in the mosque, they stand there without belts; having made a bow, one sits down and looks here and there like crazy, and there is no fun in them, only great sadness and stench. Their law is not good” [2, column 108 (p. 37)].

Thus, the findings from “Tales of the Choice of Faith” show that the initial outward acquaintance of the Russians with the ritual side of Islam was superficial and negative and caused

certain hostility to this religion. Subsequently, Russian authors called Moslems (Basurmans) nothing more than “godless,” “infidel” and “filthy.” So, even before the complete Islamization of the Horde, the chronicler curse “Basurmans” and wrote: “Release us from the fierce languor of Basurmans” [2, column 476 (p. 167)].

That was how the relations between the population of Russia, which became Orthodox in 988 and the Islamic world neighboring with it, began. Both sides, probably through their mutual misunderstanding, contributed to the creation of a negative image of Islam. It is also obvious that the Russian chronicle tradition, once established, continued to be reproduced; moreover, all new external enemies (Polovtsy, Tatar-Mongols, Turks, etc.) were associated with the world of Islam, its aggressive militancy, which, of course, strengthened Islamophobia tendencies among the Russians. The rising process of entry into the Russian state of new territories with a predominantly Moslem population, as well as the gradual secularization of Russian culture, along with a deeper penetration into the spiritual world of Moslems, which began in the middle of the 16th century, changed the image of a Moslem in the eyes of the population of Russia, mainly the Orthodox.

The first inclusion of territories inhabited by Moslems began in the 16th century, when the Kazan (1552), Astrakhan (1556) and Siberian (1589) khanates, fragments of the once powerful Golden Horde, were incorporated into Russia. At the end of the 18th century, Crimea became Russian, the Caucasus (North Caucasus and Transcaucasia) became part of the Russian Empire relatively late – in the 20–80s of the 19th century, and Central Asia was annexed to Russia in the last third of the 19th century.

The annexation of the Caucasus to Russia was dictated by religious and moral considerations (salvation from extermination and annexation of the Christian peoples of the Caucasus to Russia) and the military-strategic position of the Caucasus, as a

barrier to the expansion of Great Britain and its instrument, Turkey, as well as a springboard for Russia in the completion of its natural geopolitical development both as a European and a world power (Constantinople, Bosphorus and Dardanelles). The economic aspect in the 18th – first half of the 19th centuries did not play any significant role for Russia in the development of events in the Caucasus, although in the future it was taken into account by the Russian power sub-elites.

Russian-Turkish wars of the second half of the 18th century led not only to the annexation of Crimea to Russia, but also to the transition of the Caucasus and the Northern Black Sea region to the sphere of influence of Russia. Subsequently, two Russian-Persian (1804–1813), Russian-Turkish (1806–1812) and World War predetermined for the Russian Empire, practically, the status of a superpower of the time. The Bucharest (1812), Gulistan (1813), Turkmanchay (1828) and Andrianopol (1829) peace treaties secured the international legal transition of the Caucasus under the jurisdiction of Russia.

The violent reaction of Great Britain to the annexation of the Caucasus pushed Russia to force the establishment of control over the region and the introduction of the military and civil administration of the empire. This was one of the reasons for the protracted and bloody Caucasian war (1817–1864), in which Russia had to fight against not only the imamate of Shamil and the Circassians of the North-West Caucasus, but also the intervention of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, Polish, Hungarian and other European revolutionaries and adventurers.

The Caucasian war was particularly fierce in the eastern part of the North Caucasus region, where it was run by the legendary Avar imams (Gazi Muhammad, Gamzat-bek and Shamil) under the slogan of ghazavat (ghazavat is jihad “in the form of a sword” or a combatant jihad). No doubt, at that time, the role of Islam in the socio-political life of the North Caucasian highlanders sharply increased, and a powerful movement, known as “Caucasian Muridism,” emerged in the North-East

Caucasus, It reached its zenith under Imam Shamil. "Caucasian Muridism," as a religious and political phenomenon, emerged on the basis of the Sufi order of Naqshbandiya, which was developed in the region, but differed from it in its parameters using only the ideological and organizational shell of this tariqa. During the years of the Caucasian war, Shamil even created on part of the territories of modern Dagestan and Chechnya a theocratic state, the Imamate, which ceased to exist in 1859 with the capture of Imam Shamil.

At the same time, it should be noted that before and after the end of the Caucasian war, certain forms of "agitation" of Islam, ethno-religious extremism and even terrorism were recorded in the North Caucasus: raiding system, kidnapping for sale or ransom, Abrek bands, armed separatism and calls for jihad (after the end of the Caucasian war); political banditry (20–30s of the twentieth century); ethnic collaborationism, creation of mountain military units and their participation in military actions on the side of fascist Germany.

The activation of the "Islamic factor" was especially acute on the eve of and as a result of the revolutions of 1917 (February and October) and the ensuing civil war. At that time, the so-called "Shariatists," whose leaders advocated creation of an Islamic state like the Shamil's imamate. Sheikh N. Gotsinsky and Sheikh Uzun-Haji were especially active in the implementation of the idea of an imamate. As a result, in August 1917, at the second congress of mountain peoples, held in the village of Andi (Dagestan), Sheikh N. Gotsinsky was elected the imam of Dagestan and Chechnya, and, in alliance with Sheikh Uzun-Hadji, began to create a religious monarchy as part of Chechnya and Dagestan. In the fall of 1919, the sheikh proclaimed Chechnya and the northwestern part of Dagestan the "North Caucasian Emirate." However, this project was not viable and soon collapsed under the pressure of the Bolsheviks, and Soviet power was established in the North Caucasus.

No less dramatic events were developing during the civil war in Central Asia. Soviet power was established there after the revolutionary events of 1917, and in January 1918 the counter-revolutionary separatist action of the local Moslem nobility, trying to create “Kokand Autonomy” in the Ferghana Valley was suppressed. However, it was not possible to completely localize this movement, as a result the Bolsheviks soon encountered a wide rebel movement – Basmachestvo, whose ideological basis was pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Turkmens are Turkic peoples; Tajik belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-Europeans; they all profess Islam, predominantly Sunni).

If in 1918 the Fergana Valley was the main center of resistance, then in 1919–1920. It spread throughout almost the whole Central Asia. Arousing religious fanaticism and flying the banner of a “holy war against the infidels,” gang leaders pursued the goal of separating Turkestan from the Soviet Russia and restoring there medieval feudal orders. The leaders of Basmachestvo had a relatively broad accomplice base, which included rich landowners, most of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and Moslem clergy, who had a significant influence on the mindset of the bulk of the local population. This made it possible to put together numerous gangs, freely navigate in the unfolding situation, and also be equipped with weapons, ammunition, food and horses.

The main forces of the Basmachi were defeated by the Red Army in the early 1920s, but the bandits and their western patrons managed to escape from the final defeat. In the years 1924–1925 the Basmachi, with the active assistance of the United Kingdom, reorganized, received centralized management under the leadership of an agent of the British special services, a Uzbek named Ibrahim Bek, a bodyguard of the former Bukhara emir. He was actively supported, trained, supplied with weapons, ammunition and equipment by a number of foreign intelligence services, primarily the United Kingdom. After heavy losses during clashes with the Red Army, the Basmachi, as a rule,

retreated to Afghanistan, where in the northern provinces their ethnic groups lived: Tajik, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and others. There they restored forces, replenished their troops with personnel and weapons, receiving comprehensive help, first of all, from the British (the territory of Iran was used to a much lesser extent for the same purpose). As a result, in the second half of the 20s the Soviet government undertook severe political pressure on Afghanistan. As a result, the Afghan Emir Amanullah Khan sharply limited aid to the bandits, forcing some of them to leave the country.

However, at the end of 1928, a rebellion supported by the British broke out in Afghanistan. As a result of it the power was seized by the adventurer Bacha-i Sakao ("the son of a water-carrier"), an ethnic Tajik with whom "the best intelligence agent of all time and people," a British intelligence colonel Lawrence of Arabia worked. As a result, the situation of the Basmachi in Afghanistan improved dramatically. In this regard, Red Army detachments crossed the Afghan border twice (in April 1929 and June 1930), smashing the Basmachi gangs and the infrastructure of their support throughout the north of Afghanistan, up to the spurs of the Hindu Kush. Bacha-i Sakao was overthrown and killed. King Nadir Shah, who came to power in Afghanistan after a harsh Soviet ultimatum, disarmed part of the Basmachi detachments, and in the spring of 1931 the cavalry of the nomad Turkmen, who were paid well by the Afghan government, apparently with the Soviet money, delivered a sudden attack to the bases of the irreconcilable Ibrahim Bek. By that time, the mood of the Central Asian population had changed, its representatives began to actively join volunteer groups to combat the Basmachi, and in the mass consciousness, bandits were no longer perceived as "Basmachi" (raiders), but as "Dushmans" (enemies) and "Shaitans" (demons). Only after that the Basmachi movement began to fade. However, their separate attacks were recorded until 1939–1940. The last Basmachi groups disappeared after the Soviet Union and Great Britain agreed in 1942 to stop

subversive activities from Iran and especially Afghanistan, which once again underlines the geopolitical conditioning of Basmachestvo in Soviet Central Asia.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, thanks to the educational activities of Russian Moslem Jadidists, among which we single out the Moslem reformer, the Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, the phenomenon of “Russian Islam” gradually began to take shape. However, in the period after the revolution of 1917 and in the Soviet period, “Russian Islam,” as well as other traditional religions in our country, was dealt a powerful blow, blocking the further course of their natural and positive development. The politicization of Islam was gradually gaining momentum, leading to the emergence of the so-called “Islamic factor.”

The “Islamic factor” was actively used in various separatist projects aimed at splitting Russia, its dismemberment, weakening, depriving it of its ability to influence the world processes in any way between the First and Second World Wars, as well as during the last World War. It should be emphasized that separatism in the geopolitical space of the Russian state has always had interested external sponsors. In the times of the Civil War, hard for our Motherland, and then the Great Patriotic War, there were always forces that raised the banner of separatism. A significant part in this was played by a certain part of the post-revolutionary, including Moslem, emigration from the USSR, which some European and Asian countries could not resist the temptation to use.

The next surge of separatism under Islamic banners was recorded after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Separatist-oriented elites who came to power in Chechnya, headed by a former Soviet general Dzhokhar Dudaev, set a course for a forceful secession from Russia and formation of their own independent state. The events in Chechnya of 1994–1996 under the slogan of “establishing constitutional order,” opened doors for accelerated internationalization of the radical Salafi movement in the region. This period of time was marked by a

massive participation in military actions in Chechnya on the side of the separatists of their like-minded people from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and various Moslem countries.

The Chechen “off-season” (1996–99), marked by the transformation of the Chechen Republic into a practice ground of terrorism, a haven of murderers, traffickers of “living goods,” drugs and weapons, allowed the development of an extremist movement under the cover of Islam. In turn, this circumstance predetermined the invasion of gangs of local and foreign terrorists in August 1999 on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan. The extremists were rebuffed by the joint efforts of the federal armed forces and the Dagestan population. In the fall of 1999, the “anti-terrorism campaign” began on the territory of Chechnya, which evolutionarily passed a number of important stages: from frontal battles, the climax of which was the storming of Grozny, to the process of “Chechenization” of the conflict, that is, solution of the latter mainly by the forces of the Chechens themselves. This, of course, led to positive results in Chechnya itself, as a result of which the counter-terrorist operation on the territory of this republic was officially completed in April 2009.

Thus, in the post-Soviet period, under strong external influence, in Russia there was recorded a steady process of politicization and radicalization of Islam and Islamic groups. This process was aggravated by the weakness and fragmentation of traditional and official Russian Islam, and the implementation of separatist projects in some regions of the country. At the same time stable groups of radical Salafists, institutionalized initially in some North Caucasian republics, emerged and strengthened under the influence of the doctrines of radical Islamists and military operations in the North Caucasus. Subsequently, there occurred the process of “spreading jihad” practically throughout the North Caucasus, and prerequisites were created for the creation of radical Salafi groups in the Volga region, in the Urals and in Western Siberia, as well as their appearance in the “Moslem enclaves” of Russian megacities.

In this regard, it is not surprising that in the post-Soviet period, marked by a religious, including Islamic, revival, the politicization of Islam and extremist manifestations of militant Islamism appeared in the public mind, international journalism, and sometimes even in the writings of scientists, precisely as an essential feature of Islam itself, the radicalism of which is allegedly stemming from its endogenous properties. In our country, especially with the outbreak of military actions in Chechnya, Islam in the mass consciousness began to be associated with the threats and challenges to the Russian statehood, with radicalism, extremism, and even terrorism. Such speculations and fears result in a rampant domestic everyday nationalism, in Islamophobia and xenophobia, which is manifested in numerous publications and fabrications on Islamic topics.

However, it should be emphasized that the main supplier and distributor of terrorism is not the authoritative world monotheistic religion of Islam itself, but its perverted form of existence: the so-called “Radical Islam” (other names – Islamic radicalism, or Islamism). “Islamic radicalism,” as an ideological doctrine and the political practice based on it, is realized in the activities of various kinds of Islamic organizations, which together form a radical Islamic movement. This movement is part of a broader trend of re-Islamization of society and the politicization of Islam, recorded in recent decades in many regions of the world, including Russia. In other words, Islamism manifests itself as an extreme, aggressive part of politicized Islam.

Traditionally, Islamism is relatively arbitrarily divided into moderate and radical. Their goal is the same: construction of an Islamic state, but the methods for achieving it are different. The moderates favor the evolutionary way, and the radicals stand for the revolutionary way to achieve their worldview ideal. Extremism and terrorism under the guise of Islam are produced by radical Islamists (they are also called takfirist-jihadists). Of course, “Islamic radicalism,” especially in its extreme forms, cannot be identified with Islam in general.

At the same time, we emphasize that the basic, indispensable attributes and qualities of “Islamic radicalism” are the general Islamic concepts of “takfir” and “jihad,” interpreted in a special way and the practice of them in the modern world generates Islamophobia.

Takfir is an accusation of unbelief, i.e. accusation of Moslems of believing incorrectly or insincerely. The Sunnah of the Prophet says: “When a person calls his brother an unbeliever, it returns (at least) to one of them.” The Code of Sunni Orthodoxy, the Qadiri Tract of Faith (ar Risal al Qadiriyyah), adopted during the reign of the Abbasid Caliph al-Qadir (11th century), also prohibits accusing Moslems of disbelief if they missed any of the legitimate principles of the faith excluding prayer.”

From the Prophet's sayings, it follows that by tradition no Moslem can call another unbeliever (regardless of his shortcomings or committed sinful deeds) until the latter himself publicly admits it. This provision was specifically stipulated and considered very important, since apostasy was considered one of the most serious sins and was punishable by death (although in this case people were given three options to renounce unbelief). However, takfirits arbitrarily assumed the right to declare other Moslems apostates (murtaddun) or hypocrites (munafikun) on the basis of some deviations made by them, according to takfirits, from the faith or worship, with which takfirits salafis did not agree or simply did not understand. And, of course, they themselves act as judges for such “bad” Moslems. As the world and North Caucasian practice shows, this kind of “court” becomes a prelude to takfirits killing other Moslems who do not share their ideological principles.

Further, takfirits consider all Christians and Jews unbelievers and even infidels (kafirun), while orthodox Islam calls them “Ahl al-Kitab” (“people of the Scriptures”), believers, same as Moslems, but professing earlier scriptures sent by God. On this basis, takfirits consider themselves entitled to kill them.

So, for example, members of the Shariah and Jennet (Dagestan), Caliphate (Ingushetia), Yarmouk (Kabardino-Balkaria) and other gangs acted, committing terrorist attacks and killing Russian policemen and military personnel, calling them “infidels,” which, as we see, is a departure from Islamic orthodoxy.

Attitude to political power. Traditional Islam requires believers to obey their legitimate rulers (even if they commit sinful acts and are immoral in behavior) in all matters that do not contradict Sharia. The Quran says: “O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the messenger and those who hold power among you ...” (4:62).

In various madhhabs (schools of thought in Islam), there is no complete agreement on the problem of what specific meaning should be put in the words “legitimate ruler,” but suffice it to say (since there is agreement between all four Sunni madhhabs that one should always proceed from the simplest rule in any orthodox madhhab) that in the most common Hanifah madhhab, a ruler is considered legal until he: 1) has not publicly recognized himself as an apostate or heretic; 2) participates in general prayers; 3) maintains public order and protects the state; 4) does not actually commit or does not lead to the commission of serious crimes (such as fitna, a civilian riot), even if he does not introduce the Sharia completely. In Islam, the order and security of the population (i.e. the most important element of national security) is seen as the primary responsibility of the government, and anarchy, riot and civil war are considered the greatest danger to the population. The Quran explicitly states: “...Temptation is worse than killing” (2: 187).

Takfirits, however, believe that all branches and structures of political power that do not adhere to their ideas – and absolutely all their vicious and heretical ideas regarding Islam – are illegal. They consider the leaders of states and republics to be illegal usurpers (ta uts), and representatives of power and administration, law enforcement officials and law enforcement agencies from among local citizens – apostates. Therefore, they

have appropriated the right and even consider it their duty to try to overthrow them, kill, remove from power.

Jihad (holy war) in Islam. According to Moslem orthodoxy, jihad (holy war in Islam) can be declared if the lives of Moslems and their lands have been threatened by attack or assault. Jihad is a holy war for the sake of legitimate self-defense. Jihad can only be declared by the rightful ruler, if and when he considers it necessary, in order to protect the lives of Moslems, their descendants and their land. In this sense, the sacred duty of every healthy man is participation in jihad, otherwise there will be an eternal curse on him.

Moreover, even if jihad is declared, there are rules of conduct and military operations that cannot be violated, regardless of how the enemy acts. In Islam, there are no concepts like “total war,” “politics of scorched earth”; murders (including by means of explosions) of the civilian population, etc. are blamed. All these are absolutely alien and immoral, regardless of conditions, concepts for traditional (orthodox, standard) Islam.

Takfirs, meanwhile, recognize neither the rules for declaring jihad, nor the form, nor the methods of conducting it.

Sabotage and terrorist acts of takfirs. Since takfirs – jihadists themselves have assumed the right to declare people “enemies of Islam” (infidels, apostates and hypocrites), reject traditional political power, because they not only sanction the suicide of their comrades-in-arms (shahidism), but also incite people to these anti-state actions, while ignoring all the rules of jihad, from the moral point of view it is very easy for them to commit murders, sabotage and terrorist acts.

Thus, these are takfirs-jihadists, the bandits who are guising themselves with Islam and are still operating in the North Caucasus and in some other regions of Russia. Then it also becomes clear how, calling themselves Moslems and claiming to act in the name of Islam, they at the same time completely ignore all the basic principles of Islam regarding murders and the rules of jihad. Familiarity with the basic principles of the ideology of

radical Islamists in the field of key concepts for them (takfir and jihad) explains not only their numerous killings, but also the fact that militants and bandits planning and committing such actions can feel completely right.

However, it should be emphasized that among millions and millions of Moslems around the world, including in Russia, takfirists-jihadists make up only a fraction of a percent. Yes, indeed, any Islamist is a Moslem, but not every Moslem is an Islamist, the more so radical. The vast majority of Moslems for whom the religion of Islam is faith are respectable and law-abiding citizens of their country. Secular Islamic scholars, religious Islamic scholars, representatives of the Moslem clergy, the vast majority of ordinary Moslems do not share the ideology of takfirist-jihadists, do not accept terrorism, do not associate it with jihad, and condemn the inappropriate use of violence for political purposes.

In conclusion, we emphasize that, in general, Islamophobia in modern Russia and its regions is of situational nature. Its reasons are connected with the systemic crisis that has not yet been fully overcome, which hit the North Caucasian republics with the separatist tendencies of the turn of the 80s and 90s. XX century especially strongly, as well as with numerous external and internal conflict factors that threaten the national security of the Russian state. At the same time, Russia has rich experience in building constructive relations between different religions and confessions, opposing the mythology of inevitability of a clash of civilizations. On the basis of the dialogue of traditional confessions for Russia, a balance of spiritual and moral values has historically been formed (with full preservation of independence of each of them and rejection of proselytism in relation to ethnic groups professing other religions from century to century), which underlie the socio-cultural system of Russia and without reliance on which it is impossible to implement any major social project.

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. MIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS (Analytical Review) // *The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: migration processes, the North Caucasus, population censuses, population size, ethnic composition, ethno-confessional relations, migration statistics, migration (external and internal), migration reasons, labor-surplus and labor-deficient regions, differentiation of migration flows, adaptation of migrants.

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Abstract. Researchers critically evaluate the sources of statistical information on migration in the North Caucasus, show which of them should be relied upon in analyzing the situation in the region, and reveal objective difficulties in obtaining reliable information. The main trends in the content of migration flows at the present stage, external and internal migration are differentiated, their significance is determined. Particular attention is paid to the adaptation of migrants in the "receiving territories," as well as to ethno-confessional relations.

Introduction

The authors of the articles turn to the currently vital topic of population migration. In the North Caucasus, migration processes have their own specifics. This region, the researchers emphasize, is one of the most “problematic” parts of Russia in terms of reliability of data on the composition of the population, making it difficult to plan social policy in this region. Inaccurate information on population migration generates incorrect estimates of the population of the regions of the North Caucasus and their individual groups, which can lead to unjustifiably high transfers from the federal budget and inefficient spending on social policy.

Migration statistics in the North Caucasus

The article by N. Mkrtchyan, PhD(Geography) [3] (Institute of Demography, Research Institute “Higher School of Economics,” Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences) critically evaluates those sources of statistical information on migration in the North Caucasus, on the basis of which the extent of this phenomenon is estimated. In particular, the data on migration obtained from the censuses of 2002 and 2010 were called into question in a number of republics. The main problems of the migration data used in the analysis of are shown; their incorrectness is confirmed both by comparing census data and administrative sources, and by the conclusions of other researchers. The most reliable data sources indicate a continuing outflow of population from the region. The question of the reliability of the data of municipal statistics is considered separately.

It has been demonstrated that the analysis of data on municipalities in most regions requires recounts, after which an unusual picture emerges: the “backwoods” of the North Caucasus (remote rural areas) are migratory analogous to similar territories in other parts of the country, and cities and their

suburbs have specifics: unlike other regions, statistics do not record their migration growth. The analysis shows that this is most likely due to a large share of unregistered migration to cities. This phenomenon, known in Russia as a whole, in the North Caucasus is intensified due to the peculiarities of the resettlement of migrants in its large cities.

Migration in the regions of the North Caucasus (North Caucasian Federal District) has pronounced special aspects. On the one hand, migration in the Caucasus was measured, especially during the years of ethno-political tensions (Ossetian-Ingush conflict in 1992, both Chechen wars), by tens of thousands. But it is here that living for centuries in villages has generated a special attachment to native places. Both of these circumstances, complicated by the imperfection of migration statistics, complicate the study of migration in the region. N. Mkrtychyan assesses the reliability of available sources and concludes which of them are the best to rely on when exploring migration in the North Caucasus. This issue is relevant for planning social policy both in the North Caucasus Federal District and in those regions of Russia where immigration of the North Caucasus population has been going on in recent decades.

Information on the population of certain regions of Russia is based on census data: the latest All-Union census (1989) and All-Russian census (October 2002 and 2010), as well as current population records. According to the results of the censuses, the data of this accounting are adjusted, migration growth is subject to recount. Since the population of Russia according to the results of the 2002 census exceeded the estimated data by 1,8 million, and according to the 2010 census by almost 1 million people, these adjustments are great. However, the population of certain regions, according to the census, "deviates" from the calculated figures to a greater extent, and the regions of the North Caucasus occupy leading positions in terms of the scale of inconsistencies and necessary adjustments. The results of post-Soviet censuses raise doubts among researchers. According to the

author's calculations, during the 2002 census, "doctored records" of the population in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria could amount to about 1 million people. Similar unreasonable deviations (820 thousand) as of the census dated 2002 are given by an estimation of the dynamics of the number of individual peoples of the North Caucasus. Census data in the regions are also questioned: for example, in Kabardino-Balkaria, inaccuracies in the census prevented the assessment of population dynamics in individual rural settlements and shifts in resettlement. In 2010, the main problems were in Dagestan and Karachayevo-Circassia. Major violations can be detected by comparing the data of current accounting and censuses, the dynamics of the number of representatives of individual peoples.

The reasons that do not allow trusting statistics based on census results in the regions of the North Caucasus are set forth by researchers. These include the objective complexity of organizing and conducting a census in the regions that survived two waves of emergency migration from Chechnya in 1994–1996 and 1999–2000 and the consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of 1992. The registration of displaced persons in places of temporary residence was carried out poorly, which gave rise to the possibility of double or even triple counting. The process was also influenced by specific problems of population accounting in the district associated with the following circumstances. Firstly, the migration of residents of the republics from the mountains to the plain, including to large cities, created the possibility of double counting of the population: at the place of previous residence in mountain villages, and at the place of new residence, often without registration. Secondly, the departures of residents outside their own republics were not taken into account either by current statistics or by census. Local authorities try not to notice these departures, which fact is reflected in the census results. Despite doubts about the reliability of the census data, Rosstat is forced, on this basis, to adjust the population of many regions

upwards. An official estimate of migration loss cannot be considered reliable. Since 2003, the data on migration at the level of all regions of the North Caucasus are available, but not entirely reliable: according to the 2010 census, the population of the North Caucasus Federal District again exceeded the calculated data. Rosstat recounted the data on the composition of the population in the regions, taking into account the census, writing off their “post-census” increase as unaccounted migration growth.

Comparison of the census results in the regions of the North Caucasus with the current accounting data shows that they have serious differences. The 2010 census suggests that, in a long retrospective, the regions of the North Caucasus were also characterized by an outflow of population. Only the Stavropol Territory had a real stable migration growth, which also does not correspond to the assumption of a large migration growth in the republics allegedly discovered during the census. The reason for doubts about the adequacy of the latest population censuses in the North Caucasus becomes clear when comparing them with the data of current accounting. By regions, the size of these deviations is greatest in Dagestan, where population exceeded the current data by 152 thousand people, Karachayevo-Circassia – by 51 thousand, in the Stavropol Territory – by 79 thousand. It is logical to assume a real unaccounted migration in Stavropol discovered only by the census: the region is attractive to migrants from neighboring regions, primarily from Dagestan and Karachayevo-Circassia, who often live without registration.

Current migration trends in the North Caucasus Federal District

The article by a professor of Pyatigorsk State University M.A. Astvatsaturova, ScD (Politics) and an associate professor of the same university E.V. Davydova, PhD(Pedagogy) [1] deals with modern migration trends in the North Caucasus Federal District with an emphasis on their determinants and factors in the

ethnopolitical context of the North Caucasus. The main trends in the content of migration flows in the Stavropol Territory at the present stage are identified; their nature is differentiated, as well as the goals of migrants, both from abroad and from neighboring regions – the republics of the North Caucasus. The directions of joint work of the authorities and civil society on optimizing the relations of the communities of the North Caucasian Federal District are proposed taking into account the problems and risks of the migration process.

Migration trends at the present stage reflect many general socio-economic, socio-political, geopolitical processes. A true fact is the differentiation of migration flows by regions of the Russian Federation, since the latter significantly differ in living standards, the development of economic and social infrastructure, as well as population employment and the degree of unemployment. In the Russian Federation there are both labor-surplus and labor-deficient regions, as well as subjects and cities (primarily the capital of the Russian Federation and the main cities of the subjects, resort towns) that attract migrants due to the wide front of implementation of their life strategies. Moscow, the Moscow region, as well as such large cities as St. Petersburg, Voronezh, Ryazan, Saratov, Samara, Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar, Volgograd, Orenburg, Astrakhan form large-scale migrant clusters around themselves.

In comparison with large cities, the influx of migrants to the peripheral regions is weak: many republics of the Russian Federation, in which, firstly, the level of economic development is low, secondly, the social infrastructure is weak, and thirdly, labor surplus is high (primarily at the account of young people) . This category of the Russian Federation regions in regions of the North Caucasus, in this case, the republics located in the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD).

Studies of migration in the North Caucasus Federal District as a regional migration science have been actively developing since the 90s of the XX century in connection with the collapse of

the USSR and many post-Soviet conflicts, collisions and wars, both within and between the former Soviet republics which have now become sovereign states. At that time, the Stavropol Territory became a territory of intense positive net migration – the territory of the first refuge. This migration was determined by threats, including human security, of thousands of former USSR citizens who left their place of residence to preserve property, and often their own lives. Former citizens of the USSR turned into refugees, internally displaced persons, temporarily displaced persons, often without status, compensation payments, livelihoods and housing.

In the 90s – 2000s, migration became a conflict factor in the ethno-political context of the North Caucasus Federal District, significantly destabilized the situation and updated the quality of migration, national and social policies in the North Caucasus Federal District. Intensive migration replenishment of some ethnic groups and the formation of new ethno-territorial zones exacerbated interethnic relations, damaged national security. Migration exacerbated the topic of interethnic dialogue along such lines as Slavs – Caucasians, Russians – non-Russians, Cossacks – Caucasians, Cossacks – indigenous North-Caucasian peoples, Orthodox – Moslems.

Migration to the North Caucasus at that time as a mass ethnic migration took place, first of all, from such new sovereign states as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, as well as from the self-proclaimed republics – South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Some influx of non-titular ethnic groups, primarily Russians, from Central Asia and Kazakhstan was recorded. First of all, thousands of Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Tsalkin Greeks, Ossetians-Southerners (Kudars), as well as thousands of Russians, arrived in the “Russian subject” of the North Caucasus Federal District, the Stavropol Territory, as well as in North Ossetia-Alania.

At the same period, internal migration between the regions of the North Caucasus became a factor reflecting the emergency situation. Tens of thousands of Russians and other non-titular

groups from the Chechen Republic entered the Stavropol Territory in connection with the armed conflict and ongoing anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya. Internal migration was expressed in two interrelated trends: the first was the entry into the Stavropol Territory of a large number of representatives of the titular, indigenous peoples of the Republic of Dagestan, the Chechen Republic, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, and the Karachay-Cherkessia Republic; the second was the departure of a large number of Russians from the republics of the North Caucasus.

In these processes, conflicts of the local population and migrants during communication, aggravation of intergroup relations, and the interpretation of migration as a destabilizing factor in the ethno-political context of the North Caucasus Federal District were noted. During the migration of the 1990s – 2000s, such processes such as intensive replenishment of individual ethnic groups; the formation of ethno-territorial segments and ethno-compact territories; changing the “hierarchy” of ethnic groups and ethnic groups; transformation of the traditional ethnocultural and ethno-confessional balance took place in the North Caucasus. The competition between the old-timers and migrants in the sphere of socio-economic and socio-political relations intensified; contradictions between “ethnic neoplasms,” as well as within ethnic communities took place.

The authors of the article note that in addition to contradictions and conflicts, a certain destabilization of the general situation, migration in the Russian Federation to the territory of the North Caucasus has also generated a number of trends that can objectively be characterized as positive. Thus, the North Caucasus has become practically the only territory of the Russian Federation (with the exception of Moscow and the Moscow region) of a significant population growth of almost 1 million people compared with the 1989 All-Union Census. Migration neutralized the natural population decline (as well as loss due to emergency reasons – conflicts, elements of a civil war,

terrorist acts, mass anti-terrorist operations, introduction of the CTO regime). Labor and personnel resources of the economic and socio-cultural complex (agriculture, business, entrepreneurship, services, tourism, the resort, health care, education, culture) were replenished. National-cultural associations, national-cultural autonomies, councils of elders, friendship houses, centers of national cultures, councils of interethnic relations under the heads of the executive branch and local self-government intensified their activity. Also, it was precisely mass migration to the region that served the organization and functioning of effective public associations of migrants and human rights organizations. Migration to the territory of the North Caucasian Federal District from outside (from foreign countries), as well as migration between the constituent entities of the RF NCFD served to enhance public awareness, to structure group interests. The decrease in the degree of “migration stress” in the Russian Federation, in general, and in the North Caucasus Federal District, in particular, occurred due to general stabilization of the geopolitical and internal political situation in the post-Soviet space. The migration flow, as well as of conflictogenic factors exhausted.

In 2010–2018 interstate migration has lost its significance for the North Caucasus Federal District. It reduced qualitatively and quantitatively in connection with the general geopolitical situation, the negative situation in the economy and in the financial sphere, both world and Russian. It has ceased to be a noticeable factor in the ethnopolitical context and has practically no significant consequences either for socio-economic development or for socio-political relations of the region. However, the authors believe, it would be wrong to underestimate the migratory movements of the present, which are nevertheless being carried out both from outside and inside the North Caucasus. Migration movements take place in the specially protected ecological-resort region of the Caucasian Mineral Waters (CMW), which includes the territories of three

constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus Federal District: Stavropol, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Circassia. At the same time, migration is carried out, first of all, to the territory of the Stavropol CMW segment to cities – federal resorts: Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Essentuki, Zheleznovodsk. Firstly, a significant migration influx of internal migrants – actually non-migrants – citizens of the Russian Federation. According to their legal status, they are not migrants, but often this is how they are perceived by the local population. This inflow comes from neighboring republics – Karachayevo-Circassia (KCR), Kabardino-Balkaria, (KBR), as well as from Dagestan (RD) and Chechnya (CR), which are geographically remote from the CMW region. This influx occurs primarily in Pyatigorsk, which is not only a large federal resort, but also, since 2010. The administrative center of the North Caucasus Federal District. Secondly, a migratory influx of external migrants – actually migrants – citizens of neighboring countries. These are, first of all, migrants from the states of the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Migration from the countries of the South Caucasus is proceeding at a slow pace; its peak is a thing of the past. Thirdly, a migratory influx of external migrants – actually migrants – from the sovereign countries of Central Asia. These are labor migrants, employed by urban exploitation campaigns to implement housing and communal services tasks. Fourthly, a migratory influx of migrants – actually migrants – citizens of China and Vietnam. Their inflow to CMW is connected precisely with the purpose of organizing trade, outlets and complexes in the wholesale and retail markets of CMW. Fifthly, a migratory influx of external study migrants – actually migrants – applicants, students, undergraduates – citizens of foreign countries. Students from the CIS countries, as well as from China, India, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Egypt, France, Italy and others study in Pyatigorsk universities. Foreign students, through inclusion in the intercultural community and in the traditions of social and cultural life of the CMW, acquire new competencies of

tolerance, interest in Russian history, culture, as well as interest in the culture of the North Caucasian regional community.

To stabilize the ethnopolitical context of the North Caucasus Federal District, the authors note, it is advisable, in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Migration Issues and the socio-cultural adaptation of foreign citizens of the Council on Interethnic Relations under the President of the Russian Federation, to direct joint efforts of the authorities and society on the socio-cultural integration of citizens of the Russian Federation – residents of different regions NCFD – representatives of different ethnic communities.

Features of modern migration processes in the North Caucasus Federal District

An associate professor of the North Caucasus Federal University I.A. Soloviev, PhD(Geography) [4] shows on the basis of the analysis of scientific literature and official statistics the transformation of modern regional features of migration processes in the North Caucasus. The researcher reveals the share of the North Caucasus in the scale of migration growth in Russia, its regional characteristics, as well as the main reasons for the migration attractiveness of the subjects of the North Caucasus, at the level of urban and rural areas as well. The article identifies, on the basis of systematization of empirical material, the main stages of migration processes in the North Caucasus in 1990–2010, characterizes the key factors that determine the specific dynamics of migration processes in the North Caucasus, and points out the most common types of population migration. The author classifies regional features of migration performance by type of migration: international, domestic and interregional, and considers the main donor countries in migration terms on the example of the Stavropol Territory.

The migration trends which emerged in recent years of the USSR, caused by stress factors, intensified in the post-Soviet

period. The collapse of the state, accompanied by emergence of ethno-territorial conflicts, the complication of the interethnic situation, as well as the policy of oppression of the Russian-speaking population, contributed to the growth of forced migration in the 1990s throughout the post-Soviet space. In the second half of the 1990s, a gradual decrease in stress migration occurred, and in the new millennium, migration processes began to be determined, as before, by socio-economic factors.

The relevance of the study is associated with the latest transformations of migration processes in the North Caucasus. The author of the article reveals the regional characteristics of population migration in the North Caucasus in the post-Soviet period. The informational basis of the work was represented by scientific literature and official statistics. The main factors influencing modern migration processes in the North Caucasus are geopolitical, transit and border situations, as well as unique ethnic heterogeneity, different types of population reproduction and climatic features.

By the nature of migration processes, the entire post-Soviet period can be divided into 3 stages: the first stage includes the years 1990–1995, when the most massive stress migration was observed; the second stage covers the years 1996–2000, when stress migration was gradually decreasing; the third stage began in the 2000s and continues to the present. The main distinguishing feature of the third stage is the return to the first roles of voluntary migrations, mainly “rural-urban,” determined by socio-economic development.

In the first half of the 1990s (stage I), in the North Caucasus there was recorded a sharp increase in migration in the conditions of forced migration. As a result, there was an increase to 26,8% (785,8 thousand people) of the region’s share in the structure of the all-Russian migration growth. This phenomenon is explained by the neighboring position of the North Caucasus in relation to many former union republics, as well as the presence of national entities, from which a steady outflow of the Russian

population was identified. For many stress migrants on their way to Russia, the first acceptable regions for permanent residence were the Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories and the Rostov Region. A distinctive feature of the first stage was the high attractiveness for migrants in the conditions of the economic crisis of rural area. The latter accounted for about 2/3 (65,7%) of the total indicator in the total migration growth of the region. The same situation was observed in the second half of the 1990s. The peculiarities of migration growth within the region, led to formation of two zones: the “receiving” and “giving” the population. The first zone with migration growth included the majority of subjects of the North Caucasus (7 out of 10). The migration growth of the “receiving” zone amounted to more than 1 million people. There, subjects with a dominant (more than 80%) Russian population – Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, Rostov Region, as well as regions with a predominant (64–70%) Russian population – Adygea, were distinguished by increased migration attractiveness for Russian-speaking stress migrants. At the second stage (1996–2000), with a gradual decrease in forced migration, there occurred a significant decline in migration growth (5,5 times; up to 142,7 thousand people). In this connection, the proportion of the region’s migration growth in the structure of the all-Russian indicator decreased by 2 times (up to 9%). In the “receiving” zone, the proportion in the migration balance of the Krasnodar Territory, North Ossetia and Adygea increased. At the third stage (2001–2016), the migration trends of the 1990s broke. Forced migration “subsided” and urbanization became the main determinant of migration flows. Urban areas and especially large cities have become points of economic growth in Russia, which led to an increase in migration in the direction “village-city.” In the course of this trend, all migration growth in the North Caucasus at this stage began to take shape at the expense of the urban population. The transformation of population migration is associated with a high regional polarization of the socio-economic development of Russia. At the

third stage, a steady migration outflow from most of the republics of the North Caucasus (-312,2 thousand people) remains unchanged. The largest decline in migration is recorded in Dagestan – the region leading in terms of population among the republics (3 million people). An intensive outflow of the population is observed in Karachayevo-Circassia and Kabardino-Balkaria, and it has decreased significantly in the Chechen Republic.

As for the nature of modern population migration in the North Caucasus, by the researcher's mind, three stages are distinguished: 1) "stress (1990–1995), 2) "transitional" (1995–2000), 3) and "urbanization" (2001–2016). In the first half of the 1990s, during the period of mass stress migration, most of the subjects of the North Caucasus had migratory attractiveness, primarily the low-lying regions of the Ciscaucasia: the Rostov Region, the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories. By the geographical features of the formation of migration growth, all the regions of the North Caucasus are divided into three groups. In the first group, the migration balance is made up mainly due to the inter-regional trend, with a secondary role of international migration (Krasnodar Territory, Adygea). In Ingushetia and the Rostov region, migration growth is accounted for by international migration. In other subjects of the North Caucasus, internal migration is characterized by a steady migration decline, which in its scale superposes the migration growth of international migration.

Population size in the North Caucasus Federal District, ethno-confessional relations

M. Magomedova (RCEI DSC RAS, Makhachkala) [2] notes that in the region of the North Caucasus there live about 150 ethnic groups, representing almost the entire Russian ethnic area. The North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) is traditionally quite complicated in terms of migration activity of the population. For Russia, migration is becoming an increasingly

important factor in the demographic, economic and cultural development of the country. In the coming decades, the significance of migration processes on a statewide scale will increase even more. According to the medium version of the forecast of Rosstat, the reduction in the working – age population of the Russian Federation by 2025 will reach about 14 million people. The maximum decline in the working-age population occurred in the period 2011–2017, when the average annual population decline of this age group exceeded 1 million people. In the period between the censuses of 2002 and 2010 the population of Russia decreased by 2,3 million people. According to Rosstat data , the total population of Russia as of January 1, 2018 amounted to 146,880,432 people. The largest population growth as of January 1, 2017 was observed in the Central Federal District – by 105,263 people, the next was the Southern Federal District with an increase of 60,509 people and the North Caucasian Federal District with an increase of 57,769 people.

Against the backdrop of the rapid natural decline in the able-bodied population in Russia, there is an acute problem of more fully utilizing the existing labor potential of the North Caucasian subjects of the country. Since the population in the North Caucasus Federal District in the census period increased by 0,5 million people. As a border territory, the region accepts or passes through its territory immigrants from neighboring states, and within the region itself over the past decade there have been active migratory movements of their own population. Separate subjects of the federation became centers of attraction and concentration of domestic Russian migrants (Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, Rostov Region), and other territories became the main sources of “discharge” of migrants (Republic of Dagestan, North Ossetia-Alania, Chechen Republic). A significant part of migrants, including refugees, internally displaced persons, in particular from Azerbaijan (Armenians, Kurds), Uzbekistan (Meskhetian Turks) and Chechnya (Russians, Chechens, etc.) left for the “Russian” subjects of the North

Caucasus and continues to leave. If the migration outflow of the population from the republics of the North Caucasus caused the process of “sovereignization,” aggravation of interethnic relations, then a significant migration influx of the population into the “Russian” regions of the region resulted in a significant increase in interethnic tension in these subjects. Interethnic relations in the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories and the Rostov Region today are characterized by pronounced xenophobia not only of the indigenous population, but also of the authorities of these entities in relation to migrants, especially to internally displaced persons and refugees from among the so-called “people of Caucasian nationality.” Anti-Armenian and anti-Chechen sentiments and hostility towards the Meskhetian Turks are very strong in these subjects of the region.

According to the results of 2017, the total population growth in Russia amounted to over 250 thousand people only due to migration growth. The North Caucasus republics traditionally show a stably high percentage of natural growth. Among the titular ethnic groups of the republics of the North Caucasus, a significant population growth is observed in the Republic of Dagestan: Kumyks (19%), Dargins and Lezgins (15%), Nogais and Laks (14%)

As for the migration outflow of Russians and the population of other non-titular nationalities from the republics of the North Caucasus, along with economic reasons, they also had ethnic reasons. The republican and central authorities tried to ignore the ethnic causes of their migration outflow from the republics of the North Caucasus, explaining the increasing migration only by economic reasons. These reasons, the researcher notes, are certainly present in the migration attitudes, but they are not critical in deciding whether to move to other “Russian” subjects of the Russian Federation. The bulk of the population leaving the North Caucasian republics travel mainly to the Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories and the Rostov Region. The next most attractive region for people leaving the

republics of the North Caucasus (regardless of ethnicity) is the Central region of the Russian Federation, in particular, Moscow and the Moscow region. The migration outflow of the population of the republics of the region as a whole to these constituent entities of the Russian Federation is about 25% of the total migration outflow of the population from these republics.

The main goal of migration policy in the North Caucasus is related to ensuring the manageability and predictability of migration processes in the region with a special geopolitical status – the southern border of the country with access to the Transcaucasia, the Black Sea basin and the Middle East. The concept regarding internal migration, according to the author, should be based on creating conditions for stopping the outflow and influx of the Russian population into the republics, reorienting migration flows to the needs of the socio-economic development of the regions.

The Russian population of the republics of the North Caucasus is settled mainly in cities, primarily in capitals. The proportion of city dwellers in the Russian population of these republics in the 90s ranged from 58 to 85%. At present, this indicator is slightly lower, since the migration outflow of Russian citizens from the republics of the region is higher than that of residents of rural settlements. The bulk of the Russian rural population of the North Caucasian republics lives in the “Russian” regions. These regions, or a significant part of the settlements, were, as a result of repeated territorial redraws, transformed into “Russian” ones. These are the Kizlyar and Tarumovsky districts in the Republic of Dagestan, Sunzhensky, Shelkovsky and Naursky in Chechen-Ingushetia.

The intensive migration outflow of the Russian-speaking population from the republics of the North Caucasus negatively affects entire sectors of the economy and slows down their socio-economic development. Such an “ethnic” component of migration flows enhances the ethnic isolation of the regions, which may lead to adverse geopolitical and ethnopolitical consequences for the

country. In these regions, it is necessary to eliminate or at least minimize the conditions for the emergence of forced migration by stabilizing the ethno-political situation, resolving crisis situations, and preventing inter-ethnic conflicts.

Conclusion

At the present stage, a small number of external migrants does not significantly affect the content of the ethno-political context of the North Caucasus Federal District.

This context is significantly influenced by internal migration, which has a unidirectional character, i.e. the movement in the Stavropol Territory of Russian citizens from the republics of the Russian Federation of the North Caucasian Federal District: the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Dagestan, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Karachayevo-Circassia Republic, etc. For the republics of the Russian Federation themselves – the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, Karachayevo-Circassia Republic – the problem of migration as a problem of the arrival of foreign and Russian citizens is practically not relevant. This is understandable in connection with the labor redundancy of these entities.

However, in some cases, the problem of migration and socio-cultural adaptation and economic rehabilitation of foreign citizens is relevant for the republics, namely: for Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Circassia – the repatriation of compatriots and ethnic relatives from Turkey, Syria, the USA, some European countries, etc.; for North Ossetia-Alania – migration of South Ossetians from the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia. Inter-regional movements of representatives of the titular peoples of the North Caucasus (from the republics towards the Stavropol Territory) aggravate competition and contradictions in the sphere of property, employment, politics and management, as well as in the socio-cultural sphere. It is obvious that it is internal migration

in the ethnopolitical context of the North Caucasus Federal District that actualizes the implementation of the state national policy and state migration policy in neutralization and prevention of:

– Conflict situations, mutual negative ethnic stereotypes, extremist sentiments based on nationalism and xenophobia, especially among young people;

– Repolitization (“new politization”) of the activities of individual national-cultural organizations, ethnic congresses and forums;

– Geopolitization of interethnic relations due to events in Ukraine, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, etc.;

– Dissemination of Sharia norms in the communities of the North-Caucasian Federal District as substitution of secular law and the legislation of the Russian Federation;

– Ethnicization and confessionalization of the doctrines and practices of policy and governance as opposed to the secular nature of the organization of power.

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historiography and, at the same time, the discussion on the national image of the countries of the region.

To project the national image among many means states choose mega-events. Last year three million people visited the World Expo 2017 exhibition in Astana. The World Exhibition is remarkable that it broadcasts the image of the country through the six channels mentioned in the model of S. Anholt. In addition, the flexibility of exhibition arrangements attracts multi-purpose audience, not only from the host country, but also from other states. The exhibition in Astana showed the world a new Kazakh nation, united by its “symbol-brand” – Astana and the figure of the main state organizer – the president. The Asian Winter Games were held in Astana and Almaty in 2011, bringing together two main cities of the country, the former capital and the modern one, the past and the present. The VII Asian Winter Games were attended by more than a thousand athletes from 27 countries, and more than 500 million viewers worldwide watched the competition. The previous winter Asiad was held in three most developed Asian countries: Japan, China and South Korea, that is, holding of an international competition in Kazakhstan mentions the desire of the republic to take its place next to the world recognized economic actors. The 28th Worldwide Winter Universiade is another sports event of world scale, which took place in Almaty in winter 2017. For the first time among the CIS countries Kazakhstan became the organizer of the Winter Universiade. The infrastructure created earlier for the VII Asian Winter Games 2011 was used for the Universiade. Additionally, the Ice Palace, Ice Arena and Athletic Village were built. The largest sports event of the region brought together about two thousand athletes from 57 countries, about a billion of viewers saw it.

News about the opening of the International Financial Center “Astana” in July 2018 made people talk about Kazakhstan again. The first international financial centre in the Eurasian Union, which provided for work in the English law system, a

favourable tax regime, a simplified visa system, aimed at attracting global business and intensify economic cooperation in the country and the region.

In 2010, Kazakhstan was the first state in the post-Soviet space which chaired the OSCE; in 2015 it became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO); in 2016 it was elected to non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for the period 2017–2018 and since January 2018 headed this structure for a month. The Republic is an active participant in all regional and international associations: the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Customs Union (CU), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFSA), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and a number of others. The Kazakh capital often became the centre of peacekeeping processes and conflict resolution, the outcome of which was watched by the world community. From January to September 2017, Astana hosted international negotiations to settle the situation in Syria. The negotiations continued in 2018. At the same time, Kazakhstan does not ignore the issues of regional cooperation. Recent initiatives (together with Uzbekistan) include holding of the first summit of Heads of State of Central Asia in Astana.

The results of the multi-faceted political course together with the recent mega-events of the international level produce the capital of “soft power” of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In the classical definition, this concept is an instrument of foreign policy, but the capital of “soft power” is also applicable to domestic policy. The initiatives of the Kazakh authorities aimed at creation of a positive national image are supported among the citizens of Kazakhstan, which is one of the key pillars, as the successful broadcasting of the national image to the external audience directly depends on internal support.

Kazakhstan national branding is accompanied by initiatives of international importance, political and economic activity. Partly confirms the effectiveness of the Kazakhstan campaign statistics is partly confirmed by UNWTO (World Tourism Organization) for

between Northern Europe and the Persian Gulf, and the East-West Transport Corridor between South and South-East Asia, China and countries of South and Central Europe.

- The second phase (2016–2020) of the program provides further development of the country. This period implies the development of the national innovation system, the deepening of structural and sectoral reforms in the economy, the creation of developed market economy institutions, the expansion of private property and the integration of the latest advances in science, technology and innovation into the real economy. Economic diversification will predetermine the emergence of new industries and services based on the application of advanced technologies. Moreover, the process of fundamental development of regions and rural areas will be completed including new transport and communication systems.

- The third phase (2021–2030) implies that Turkmenistan will become one of the highly developed countries of the world, with a highly developed economy capable of integration with foreign countries. At the stage, Turkmenistan's economy will be fundamentally diversified, incomes and social conditions will reach the level of developed countries.

The author points out that, despite the fact that China and Turkmenistan have close economic relations, the contradictions of both sides are becoming increasingly apparent. It is reflected in growing economic dependence of Ashgabat from Beijing. China provides funds for projects either through joint ventures and production sharing agreements, or in exchange for property and it causes discontent of Ashgabat. However under the competition between transit countries, Turkmenistan is forced to accept the conditions. China constantly demonstrates the alternative route of the Silk Road to Turkmenistan and other transit countries. It is of great importance for China, because no country will be able to block the route in case of a political conflict. For example, in December 2015, the train from China arrived in Georgia via Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea by ferry, bypassing Iran,

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Russia. Furthermore, there are contradictions on such matters as the cost and export of gas.

The narrow focus of Chinese interests in Turkmenistan does not allow the latter to solve a number of socio-political and environmental problems, as well as security problems. The country is already implementing international and regional projects in the energy sphere, transport and communications sectors (the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, the transnational gas pipeline Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India is under construction. The project is an important element for the economic development not only for Turkmenistan, but also for countries located along the gas pipeline route.

On the one hand, China's policy of increasing Turkmen gas extracting is restrained by the fact that Ashgabat is still not selling its oil and gas assets to anyone, because Turkmenistan tries to maintain state control over this industry, as it is the country's only major source of income. On the other hand, the strategic plans of the PRC to increase its share in Turkmen gas extracting are facilitated by the fact that Ashgabat itself willingly reserves significant volumes of gas for long-term supply to the PRC to pay of Chinese loans and, moreover, willingly concludes production sharing agreements. As a result, in the context of actual absence of external competition for Turkmen gas and extremely limited opportunities of Ashgabat over diversification of its gas exports, China has so far managed to steadily increase gas production in Turkmenistan, and reserve more and more gas for supply to China.

Turkmenistan is interesting to Beijing not only as a hydrocarbons-rich state, but also as an important transit region. Turkmenistan is focused on creating a single logistics center and rationalizing transport routes that would lead to the reduction in the value of the final good. New transport corridors should connect the various transport modes, therefore, reviving the Great Silk Road. The important links of the international transport corridors should become the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran

and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railways, airports, motorways, bridges across the Amu Darya, the Turkmenbashi International Sea Port, etc.

The author underscores the significance of the Turkmenbashi International Sea Port, which provides new opportunities for the countries of the region that do not have access to the sea. In particular, it allows sending goods along the Great Silk Road and attracting investments and tourists. The multimodal logistics center located here will provide a range of services for the storage and combined processing of containerized cargo delivered by air, road and railway transport, ensuring their transshipment to water transport and vice versa.

All this allows the author to conclude that Turkmenistan is able to turn into a large logistics center of Eurasia. However, Turkmenistan urgently needs highly qualified personnel to manage all the necessary processes on the ground. As a matter of fact, 1,300 Turkmen students pursued higher education in China in 2016. Moreover, the number of schoolchildren and students learning Chinese is growing.

Security becomes extremely important because of extensive borders of Central Asian countries with Afghanistan and activity of the radicals in the region. Such structures as the SCO, CSTO and private military companies can take responsibility for objects and roads. Ensuring the security in Afghanistan is of key importance for the region, which is currently the base for terrorists from Central Asia and a zone of total economic devastation.

Ashgabat initiated the creation of Trade & Transport Lapis Lazuli Corridor. The project involves the creation of an integrated transit and transport system of five countries (Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey). According to the plans of Turkmenistan Lapis Lazuli Corridor will be a continuation of the Great Silk Road. Thus, Afghanistan will become a bridge between South and Central Asia and Europe due to its geographical position. The International Sea Port of

Turkmenbashi should become one of the key elements of the corridor.

There are factors that limit the cooperation between Central Asia and China, such as interethnic contradictions and social instability, disagreements and contradictions between the countries. Therefore, the development between the actors within the frameworks of the project will have significant impact for the entire region. The state ambitions will decline because of the necessity of energy, logistics and industrial projects implementation.

The author concludes that Turkmenistan not only gives meaning to the development of transport and logistics structures of the country and consistently implements the Chinese “OBOR” initiative, but also initiates important logistics projects to establish links with less developed countries of South Asia and the Middle East. The advantages of the geographical location of Turkmenistan allow it to use profitably the national transport resource for the country's socio-economic development and regional and international cooperation.

In the article “Turkmenistan – the heart of the Great Silk Road: in the mirror of history and modernity” (2) Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Turkmenistan in Russia B.G. Niyazliev considers the largest transport projects of the century in the Central Asian region, the core of which is Turkmenistan. The author states that the legendary ancient route of the Great Silk Road is being revived in a new quality nowadays. It entails the idea of strengthening and reviving trade, economic and humanitarian-cultural connections between states and peoples. Turkmenistan is the heart of the project.

The author argues that new highways created with the active participation of Turkmenistan reinforce the role of the region in ensuring sustainable development in Eurasia. An extensive international transport and logistics system acts as an effective foundation for establishing a political and economic dialogue. The system has become a significant factor of the

integration processes. It performs the function of the Great Silk Road in the current context.

Turkmenistan implements the concept not only in building of large transport facilities, highways and transit corridors. The country also makes a major contribution to the development and strengthening political, trade, cultural and humanitarian relations expanding the ideological ground of the motto: «Turkmenistan is the heart of the Great Silk Road». A number of projects have been carried out in Turkmenistan in recent years. Projects such as the construction of international airports in Ashgabat and regional centers, the construction of modern highways, the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway, which has become a part of the Asian International Transport Corridor, which goes to and from China's extensive railway network – to the markets of the Asia-Pacific region.

The functioning international railway line (Kazakhstan – Turkmenistan – Iran) can transfer up to 10–12 tons of cargo. It makes possible the integration with the transport infrastructure of Eastern and Southern directions and connection with the rapidly developing market. Turkmenistan considers that it is necessary to focus efforts on fulfilling the maximum realization of the potential that opens up for the states of Central Asia and the Caspian region in connection with the implementation of these large transport projects. It is essential for the effective functioning of the transport corridors South – North and East –West to use the possibilities provided by using railway lines Kazakhstan – Turkmenistan – Iran and Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Tajikistan and the combining automobile, railway and sea transit lines.

Creating the Trade & Transport Lapis Lazuli Corridor (Afghanistan – Turkmenistan – Azerbaijan – Georgia – Turkey) seems to be promising also. The countries have already discussed the main provisions of a five-party agreement. The transport corridor Uzbekistan – Turkmenistan – Iran opens up the real possibilities for the direct access to the Middle East. The agreement was signed in Ashkhabad in April 2011.

In the near future the International Sea Port in Turkmenbashi will start functioning.

It was common knowledge that celebrations of the beginning of a new stage of the TAPI pipeline building, power and fiber-optic lines construction along Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan (TAP), and putting in operation new railway Sehetabat – Turgundi took place in Mary Region of Turkmenistan and the Afghan city of Herat in February 2018. Thus, the legendary road revives in the new quality.

The TAPI project can be called as unprecedented in forming of energy security structure. It is indeed a move in the direction of implementation of Turkmen energy strategy. The strategy key points are complex modernization of fuel-and-energy industry facilities, forward-looking capacity building, establishing a diversified pipeline system to provide energy supply to the world market taking into account the interests of manufacturers, transit countries and consumers. After commissioning of 1840 km length pipeline TAPI, there will be an opportunity to transfer 33 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas. The pipeline's origin will be in "Galkynysh" natural gas field that ranks second on the planet in terms of reserves of "blue fuel." It will be possible to create thousands of jobs. New power transmission lines are expected to be stretched along the building pipeline TAPI. The transmission lines will supply not only the infrastructure of the pipeline with energy, but also enable energy transfer to Pakistan and other countries of South Africa through Afghanistan. Fiber optic lines of TAP will follow the same route. It is expected to reinforce the integration processes along with the development of the information and communication networks. The 814 km fiber optic line will stretch between Turkmenistan and Pakistan through Afghanistan.

Huge government investments are guided towards transport industry in order to upgrade the materials and technology and improve management using modern technologies. The country rolling stock in the rail transport has been fully updated in recent

years. Over a thousand new passenger and freight cars were purchased. The great importance attaches to the development of maritime and river transport infrastructure. Integrated work is carried out in improving cargo and passenger transportation, developing port and port objects and systematizing of state supervision over the safety of navigation. Seven tankers compiled with international standards have been bought and commissioned for getting oil and gas to the international markets. Also two contemporary ships (“Berkarar” and “Bagtyýar” type RO – PAX) have been built for cargo and passenger transportation in the Caspian Sea. Air fleet is under sequential upgrading and a developed network of air transportation is forming. The geography of air-routes is constantly evolving, it contributes to the building of “bridges of friendship” between different states.

Thus, the author stresses that integrated transport system which covers all logistics sectors and has clear technological and legal policies, agreed liason and coordination arrangements can influence geopolitical situation by steering the connections between its economic components and national strategies of the development of the state.

Turkmenistan promotes its role of an important logistics hub on the Silk Road in the current era. The Silk Road has become a vivid phenomenon of human civilization and its new capacity is embodied not only in the economic and logistics relations of the country, but also in its humanitarian contracts. Nowadays Turkmenistan declares himself as an international tourist center where the relevant infrastructure is being developed. Historical and cultural identity and rich heritage, including famous Turkmen carpets and Akhalteke horses, antiquities and unique ecosystems allow the country to increase its international rating in tourist sector. One of the most popular destinations is a journey along the route of the Great Silk Road. It includes the objects that are on the UNESCO World Heritage List.

In conclusion, the author claims that Central and South Asia are active international cooperation area. For many centuries

the ancient trade routes had passed through these territories and united Asia and Europe. Currently, the states of the region occupy significant positions in the building of global economic partnership. The implementation of the projects in these directions opens up enormous prospects for optimizing transport, energy and humanitarian ties in the Eurasian space.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

TOHIR KURBONOV. NATIONAL MENTALITY OF THE UZBEKS: THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE // *Th article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: mentality, historical memory, social image, social sentiment, value, ideal, principle, imperative, national character, language, mindset, behavior, nation-specific.

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Citation: Kurbonov T. National Mentality of the Uzbeks: the Content and Structure // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, N 1 (307), P. 73–79.

Abstract. In the article, the author reflects upon the content and structural elements of the concept of “national mentality.” According to the author, the peculiarities of the continuum have an impact on the national mentality, in the same way the national mentality acts as a development factor of the historical character of people. A thorough study of the content and structural elements of the national mentality, the study of it in the context of historical processes will help to experience the natural existence of the nation.

Historically, it is obvious that the mentality of each nation, including the Uzbek people, is determined by specific historical, ethical and climatic conditions, and its social and political events and historical processes are undoubtedly diverse. It is based on socio-economic and political processes, natural and geographical position, intercultural contacts, religious ties in the historical period, ancient traditions, customs and rites are formed on the basis of these and psychological views of people.

Before talking about the national mentality of the Uzbek people, it is worth noting that the Uzbek people passed four main religious and ideological stages (Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Islam, communism) and so many generations passed through each of these ideological and religious periods that it left an indelible mark on the character of the nation. One of the features of the Uzbek national mentality is the fact that life of society and the way of life are regulated by traditions.

In the new century, the whole world has experienced structural and functional changes. The spheres of society and an individual – whether it is economic or social, political or spiritual and cultural – all acquire a new content and essence. These processes leave national limitations in the past, turning various spheres of life into an object of integration and unification. Thanks to the wide-ranging reforms carried out over a quarter of a century, our country is also becoming an integral part of world civilization under the influence of these processes [1].

These processes leave national narrow-mindedness in the past, turning various spheres of life into an object of integration and unification. Due to the wide-sweeping reforms carried out over a quarter century, our country is also becoming an integral part of the world civilization under the influence of these processes [1].

The democratic transformation of the society in Uzbekistan objectively requires a new approach to the theoretical analysis of the political consciousness of a person, especially of young people, as a rather complex and contradictory social

phenomenon. This new approach should act on the premise that in the process of democratization of public life it is necessary to take into account the national dimension, the national mentality, as the level and pace of democratization of society are functionally related to the nature of the national mentality that affects the process of developing a democratic political consciousness. Nowadays great attention is paid to the comprehensive development of civil society, the implementation of judicial and legal and other constitutional reforms, as well as economic ones. In the formation of its identity, the country took into account the positive experience of foreign countries and centuries-old cultural and historical traditions of the Uzbek people.

Special significance in the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan had its conformity not only with generally accepted norms of democracy, but also with the mental peculiarities of the Uzbek people. In particular, article 66 of the Constitution of the UR it's stated that "adult able-bodied children are obliged to take care of their parents."

Understanding of the national mentality is "democratized" (Sh. Madayeva et al.) only when society is "self-organized" without the intervention of the state, government agencies. This condition or level are achievable only at a certain stage of social, economic and cultural development of society. This level is due to the real individual liberty, which is not possible in a society of genuine democracy, where society has priority in regard to the state. Transition to such a society is historically a long process involving the formation of an appropriate political mentality and political consciousness.

Integrative and unified processes don't depend on a genuine social, economic or political situation. Cultural traditions in society, system of values, national and spiritual peculiarities also have a significant influence on these processes. In this context, considering the question of national mentality, it becomes a social and philosophical topic of special significance.

As distinctive features of historical development demonstrate national mentality, the national mentality is also the factor forming people's historical behavior.

Representatives of ancient philosophy considered the characteristics of social behavior that were inherent to members of a certain culture. For example, Hippocrates, Aristotle accept influence of natural environment on a human world view. In the Middle Ages, many thinkers analyzed psychology of people living in an area or environment, perception of the world, the presence of similar properties in the way of thinking. Although they are all under different concepts, they actually studied the problem of mentality [2]. "The concept "Mentality "is first found in 1856 [3]. It is used by R. Emerson, but the scientific world considers that this term belongs to the French ethnographer Levy Bruhl, after whom Emerson began to use it widely. The scientist used this concept to define peculiarities common to those who live in the same cultural environment [4]. The issue of mentality has become the object of scientific research of many specialists [5], including Uzbek scientists, whose scientific interests are related to national mentality [6].

Mentality is an integral characteristic of the spiritual life of a nation and is the ontological basis of national identity. This is the result of people's integration around a certain value system that reflects perception of the nation of the universe and its place in it [7]. The national mentality has its structure. The experts include the following elements:

1) historical memory are historical events, processes, personal memories are an important source of national identity. Knowing of historical processes determines not only continuity of social being, but also behavior of the people who inhabit it. The importance of the historical chorus in defining national development goals and presenting national ideas is particularly important;

2) social concepts are ideas, values, knowledge and experience that have emerged as a result of science and

education, literature and art, media, etc., are also important for the national mentality.

3) social sentiment is a social and psychological phenomenon that reflects the feelings of community members at that moment and the significance of this phenomenon should not be overlooked. For example, in historical time, when spirit of optimism rooted in society, people were able to realize large-scale social plans. On the contrary, implementation of the reforms in a “pessimistic” society is a problem;

4) values and ideals, rules and requirements are the world view of the nation and it is formed by its values, dreams and aspirations; hence this element has a special place in the national mentality. In fact, these phenomena determine spiritual and moral position of the nation, its attitude to events and processes in public realm;

5) national character is what each nation has as a view of life, creating a system of sociocultural norms unique to this nation. These sociocultural norms, known as national character, are a central component of the national mentality; Some experts are leery of the existence of a national character. However, if we accept this concept as a set of social norms, it is not difficult to define general norms for ethnic groups;

6) language is an important element of the spiritual life of a nation, and moreover, changes in all spheres of spiritual culture must be reflected in the language. As language is an element of the spiritual culture of the nation, it is also a component of the national mentality. Language is a verb that is objectively changed and enriched. The attempt to change it in accordance with the requests of times or political circles will not come to the end positively;

7) the way of thinking is own ideas, common forms of thinking, conclusions inherent to each nation, which are reflected in its mentality and is another element of national mentality. Concepts, judgments and conclusions drawn in the nation's thinking derive from natural and social conditions and may therefore differ significantly from each other;

8) existence of a certain behavioral patterns of nations is axiomatical thinking; these specific behavioral patterns are also part of mentoring. Behaviour is also based on generally accepted rules in society. For example, it is not difficult to distinguish the behaviour of ethnic groups that are accustomed to living according to the principles of individualism, unlike with the behaviour of the dominating community;

9) national affiliation – this concept combines peculiarities of history, culture, language, religion of people, attributes of their spiritual existence, peculiarities of spiritual image and therefore is included in national mentality [8].

These are components of the national mentality. All these elements must be analyzed in detail when investigating the specifics of the mentality of any nation. Each community has its own geographical, sociocultural and historical conditions. These circumstances, especially historical events, left an imprint on the nation's mentality by social activism of historical figures. For example, the social and political activities of Emir Timur (Tamerlan) and historical events in the region have played a key role in creating values, character and national identity of our nation. Therefore, the mentality of the nation needs to be studied and estimated in harmony with its history.

Throughout the nation's history, elements of the national mentality also change according to social conditions. Moreover, some elements of mentality are gaining momentum in different epochs, while others are a secondary consideration. It also demonstrates the necessity to examine the national mentality in the context of historical processes.

The study of national mentality in the context of history is not only a matter of gnoseological significance. There are also practical aspects of the problem. The study of national mentality in harmony with history allows us to define its peculiarities. For instance, according to the history, the feature of the national mentality of our people is that it is used to giving estimation to historical events and areas morally. Therefore, it is necessary to

pay special attention to its conformity with social norms during the historical period of social reforms. Only then popular support for reforms will be as high and strong as it is today.

So, national mentality is a concept that allows us to understand not only the peculiarities of life and spiritual existence of the nation, but also the nature of the processes taking place in its modern life. Therefore, in the modern era of social changes, the question of determining its structure is becoming increasingly relevant. Detailed study of the content and elements of the national mentality, its study in the context of historical processes allows us to learn about existence of the nation.

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

VLADIMIR KIRICHENKO. THE SHIA COMMUNITY IN MALAYSIA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Malaysia, the Shia, Iran, Saudi Arabia.

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Abstract. The article focuses on the situation of Malaysia's Shiite community. Malaysia is a Sunni-dominated Muslim state. It is natural that against the background of sanctions against Iran and pressure from Saudi Arabia, Shiites experience some discrimination.

Malaysia is a Muslim state with a population of 30 million, with almost 60% of the population being Muslim. At the same time, 300,000 Shiites live in the country. Malaysia has two parallel systems of justice: the Sharia court system, based on Islamic law, and the civil court system.

The specific nature of the national and religious composition of the population of the country – except Muslims, Hindus, Buddhist, Christian also live here, etc. – makes the authorities to fight against the spread of radical views in the

territory of the country. At the proper time, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and bringing of Soviet troops into Afghanistan contributed to the spread of fundamentalist ideas in Malaysia. However already in 1981, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad called the population for moderation and tolerance, trying not to let radicals come into office. At the same time, Malaysia's representatives at international forums began to criticize Israel's position in the Middle East and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This moved Malaysia closer to the Islamic world, but when some states tried to impose hand cutting and other sharia norms as a punishment for theft, the authorities concluded that the previous traditions in legal procedures should be continued. The Malaysian government became concerned about the 2011 wave of overthrow of ruling regimes in a number of Arab States. Malaysia differs from other Muslim countries by a sufficiently high level of economic development, which avoids manifestations of discontent and mass protests.

Later it was officially announced the ban on Islamic State activities in the country. A special agency, the Jihad Clarification Committee, was established in Kuala Lumpur to explain the population genuine nature of the Islamic State and to oppose the recruitment of young Malaysian to jihad. However, 132 persons suspected in activities of the Islamic State were detained in the country. According to Malaysian counter-intelligence, at least 45 Malaysian citizens are engaged in hostilities in Syria.

In spite of the fact that the federal constitution guarantees freedom of religion, dual governance system under which state Islamic courts regulate religious affairs drastically restrict freedom of religion of both non-Muslims and Muslim minorities. The situation is also complicated by the fact that Shiism in Malaysia is prohibited and declared a "deviation from Islam."

The legislative basis for government action against Shiites can be found in the Internal Security Act of 1960. It provided for a 60-day period of detention in custody that could be extended to

two years if the accused person acted “undermining security of Malaysia.”

The official ban on Shiism in Malaysia was adopted in 1996 by the National Council of Fatwas. The council is subordinate to the government Department of Islamic Development, so its regulations are de facto laws. 10 of 14 Malaysia’s states initially agreed to perform the fatwa. The eleventh state, Kedah, introduced the fatwa in 2013 on insistence of the Sultan. It was announced that Muslims in Malaysia were allowed to follow Sunni, and that the propaganda of Shiism in the press and mass media was effectively prohibited.

According to the fatwa, Malaysian government officials subject Shiites to discrimination. In Malaysia, the authorities often severely interfere with Shiite religious gatherings. Shiites are not allowed to keep religious books in their houses. After the publication of anti-Shia fatwa, the United Malay National Organization, the largest political party in Malaysia’s parliament, announced that it would try to advance a law according to which the only direction of Islam recognized by the constitution should be Sunnism.

Malaysia’s mass media launch a campaign against Shiism in the country. Religious programs on television portray Shiites as a minority whose representatives are supposedly “followers of bloodshed and militancy.” Meanwhile, some Sunni religious figures criticized this attitude towards Shiites and called for Muslim unity, but they couldn’t stop discrimination against Shiites.

Shiites are often arrested and raided. In December 2010, more than 200 Shiites, including Iranians, Indonesian and Pakistani, were detained and accused of breach of Islamic laws. In early August 2013, two Shiites were arrested, then in September of the same year other six Shiites were also arrested. At the same time, the head of law enforcement agencies of the Islamic religious administration of Perak state Ahmad Nizam Amiruddin said that Shiites should be eliminated. In March 2014,

Perak authorities arrested more than 100 Shiites. The arrests were carried out at a time when Shiites were celebrating the birthday of Zeinab – the daughter of Ali, the fourth guided calif and granddaughter of Prophet Muhammad.

In 2019, Malaysian police detained dozens of Shia Muslims during the Ashura celebration in Selangor State. All detainees were soon released, but fears remained that they could face litigations in religious courts.

Arrests of Shiites were also carried out in Penang. At the same time, Penang's mufti, Van Salim Van Mohd Nur, stated that Shiites should be given the freedom to manifest their religious beliefs. The religious leader noted that Shia Muslims should conduct their rituals in concealed form, as holding them in the street among predominantly Sunni Muslims could undermine Muslim unity.

Despite external interreligious and inter-ethnic harmony, observers note that in the political sphere there is an increasing divergence between fundamentalists associated with Saudi Arabia and more moderate Muslims.

Other minorities – ethnic and religious ones – also suffer some disadvantage from the authorities. Associations of Chinese and Indians repeatedly accused the Government of undemocratic cultural policies. Marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims are considered illegal. Between 2006 and 2007, several Hindu temples in different parts of the country were demolished by order of government, that lead to discontent in Hindu population.

Iran and Malaysia

Despite negative attitudes towards Shiites in Malaysia, Iran, where Shiites make up the majority of the population, and Malaysia maintain rather good relations. Diplomatic relations between the states were established in 1984. In the 1980s and 1990s, many Malays and Indonesian, mostly Sunni, who

converted to Shiism, studied in the Shiite theological centers of Kum, Iran.

Both states are jointly involved in the construction of a number of large-scale industrial projects, many of which are related to energy. In December 2007, the countries signed an agreement worth \$6 billion. For the Development of Iran's Naval Gas Fields. In April 2009, the National Iranian Oil Engineering and Construction Company and the Malaysian SKSD created a joint company to build an oil refinery in Kadh, Malaysia. In June 2009, the Entrepreneurs Council of Iran and Malaysia was established in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time, Seyed Nureddin Shahnazade, Iran's deputy oil minister met Malaysia's Datuk Mustapa Mohamed, the minister of international trade and industry, to discuss strengthening of relations in energy development.

Malaysia participated in the Iranian Gas Forum on September 26–27, 2009, together with Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands and South Korea. In February 2010, the head of the Offshore Oil Company of Iran, Mahmoud Zirakkianzade, announced that Iran had reached an agreement with a Malaysian company to help develop oil fields. Although energy relations between two countries turned to be stable, fear of US sanctions made Malaysian oil company Petronas decide to suspend petrol supply to Iran. The decision came into operation in March 2010. Despite Petronas "actions, in April 2010 Noharuddin Nordin, the head of the Malaysian External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE), claimed that anti-Iranian sanctions had little impact on Malaysia-Iran trade relations."

In May 2010, Iranian Finance and Economy Minister Seyed-Shamseddin Hoseini and Malaysia's second Finance Minister Ahmad Husni Hanadzlah met to discuss ways to expand economic cooperation. During the conversation, Hosseini noted that Iran's energy and banking sectors are open for Malaysian investment.

The active cooperation between Malaysia and Iran in a number of economic sectors nevertheless hasn't affected the Shia situation in Malaysia. The authorities scrupulously monitored all attempts to promulgate Shiism. For example, in 2013, after several Shiites, including an Iranian citizen, were arrested and accused of violating fatwa prohibiting Shiism propaganda, this incident led to the boycott of Malaysian goods by a group of Iranian trading firms. Although the boycott was not formally sanctioned by the Iranian government, the campaign temporarily damaged bilateral relations. For their part, Malaysian officials have made efforts to re-establish relations and tried to calm the concerns of their Iranian counterparts. Despite some tensions between Iran and Malaysia, goods exchanges between these two countries were 532 million US dollars in 2015, Iran, in its turn, is extremely interested in continuation of economic cooperation.

In 2019, Malaysian ambassador in Iran Dato Rustam bin Yahaya stated that there was very ground for Malaysia to invest in various industrial enterprises in the Iranian province of Alborz (north-west of Tehran). This province, including 3,6 thousand production and industrial factories, about 68 thousand fertile gardens and agricultural land, in addition to large research and scientific centers, is one of the most productive and scientific centers in Iran. Over the past four years, more than 200 foreign delegations visited the Iranian province to analyze prospects for economic and trade cooperation.

On April 30, 2019 it transpired that Malaysia and Iran intend to establish cooperation in the field of security and defense. The issue was discussed at a bilateral meeting between Malaysia's Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu and Iran's Defense and Logistics Minister brigadier Amir Khatami. The meeting took place during the working visit of the Malaysian Prime Minister to Tehran (26 April – 1 May 2019). He was accompanied by the Malaysian ambassador in Iran, Datuk Rustam Yahaya, and several senior officials of the Ministry of Defense and the Malaysian Armed Forces.

Malaysia and Saudi Arabia

Diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Malaysia were established in early 1960. Malaysia and Saudi Arabia cooperate closely in the economic sphere. Bilateral trade increased from \$260 million in 1990 to \$3,66 billion in 2012, Saudi Arabia became one of Malaysia's largest partners. Since 1990, Saudi Arabia's investment in Malaysian economy reached tremendous 2,6 billion Malaysian ringgits. The countries successfully cooperate in banking sector: in 2006 Malaysia launched Al-Rajhi Bank, the world's largest Islamic bank and one of the largest corporated enterprise in the Kingdom. There were opened many of its branches throughout Malaysia. Malaysia also successfully attracts Saudi tourists, more than 20,000 tourists from the kingdom come to the country every year since 2001. Malaysian companies are actively looking for opportunities to do business in Saudi Arabia. They have, for example, taken part in major development projects, including an independent water and electricity supply project in Shuaib, the construction of Al Faisal University in Riyadh, and King Abdullah University of Science and Technology in Tuwal. Malaysian firms were involved in the reconstruction of the Jamarat Bridge and adjacent areas in Mina, and in the construction of the Kingdom Tower in Riyadh.

However, close relations with Saudi Arabia do not prevent Malaysian religious leaders from confronting the impact of Wahhabism in the country. Wahhabism, unlike Shiism, is not prohibited in Malaysia. Nevertheless, Malaysian religious authorities tended to minimize its influence. Thus, in 2015, the National Council of Fatwas stated that Wahhabism have no place in Malaysia, because its followers like to call other Muslims recreants just because they don't adhere to Wahhabism teachings.

"They consider every practice that Prophet Mohammed did not commit as a *bida* ("unnecessary innovation" – V. K.), and a deviation from Islam," said Dr. Tan Shri Abdul Shukor Husin, chairman of the National Council of Fatwa. He also stated that

each state should restrict Wahhabis teachings through fatwas or religious decrees, and admitted that Malaysia's outlook of Wahhabism should not influence the bilateral relations between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.

Earlier, the mufti of Negri-Sembilan state Datuk Mohd Yousof Ahmad announced that the Wahhabis movement was declared haram (prohibited) in the state because it contradicts Sunni teachings.

In fact, Malaysia's religious establishment considers Wahhabism no less threat to the country's security than Shiism. This does not prevent Saudi Arabia from providing financial support to religious structures in Malaysia. This support takes various forms, including funding religious and educational institutions; distribution of the Quran texts and religious literature; granting scholarships to Malaysians to study in Saudi Arabia. In 2006, Riyadh founded Al-Madina International University in Malaysia. In December 2016, the authorities arrested two foreign students studying at Al-Madina University under suspicion of any ties with ISIL. The incident fueled concern, especially among non-Muslims in Malaysia.

However, it is important to note that the establishment of Al-Madina University is a part of the longstanding and extensive social and cultural cooperation between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in the field of education. The university was established fully compliant with the rules and norms established by the Ministry of Higher Education. Like all other institutions of higher education, the university has been tested by the Malaysian Qualifications Agency to ensure that the level and its educational program content go along with Malaysia's national education policy.

The Malaysian authorities concern about the entry of Wahhabism into the country is not baseless. It should be noted that several religious movements in Malaysia may be considered to be influenced by Wahhabism: Ahl as- Sunna (Arab. "Sunna people") of Perlis, Sunni Johor Movement, Orang Sunna (Malay.

“Sunna people”) from Pahang and so on. These movements do not usually identify themselves as any of the four Islamic (Sunni) law schools. At the same time, their leaders disagree that they are called “Wahhabites.” However there are some similarities between these movements and Wahhabism, including their drive to incorporation of elements of the notion “salafiyi” into their daily lives. It is also worth noting the desire of these movements to eradicate all that they consider superstitions (hurafat) and innovations (bida), especially in the sphere of worship (ibadat), for which Shiites are often blamed. Nevertheless, in Iranian media there is often information about money flows from Saudi Arabia aimed at spreading Wahhabite ideology.

Relations among Malaysia the U.S. and Russia

U.S. diplomatic relations with Malaysia were established on August 31, 1957, when the United States upgraded the status of Malaysia's Consulate General in the United States to embassy status.

In 2019, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia stated that bilateral trade with the United States increased by 1,2% in 2018 to 155,76 billion Malaysian ringgits, representing 8,3% of Malaysia's overall volume of trade this year. Similarly, exports to the US increased by 2,4% to 90,81 billion Malaysian ringgits, reaching the highest level marked since 2008.

In December 2018, for a total 809 manufacturing projects were carried out in Malaysia with the participation of the United States with a total investment of 74 billion Malaysian ringgits. These projects created 204,536 workspaces. Meanwhile, in the first half of 2019, the volume of American investments in the Malaysian manufacturing sector amounted to 11,7 billion Malaysian ringgits.

The USSR established diplomatic relations with Malaysia on April 3, 1967. In November 1967, a Soviet trade office was founded in the country. In 1972, the countries signed the

Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation. The Embassy of the USSR in Kuala Lumpur was opened in April 1968, and the Embassy of Malaysia in Moscow was opened in November of that year. Traditionally, trade and economic relations between Malaysia and the Russian Federation are regulated by the economic cooperation agreement signed in 2000.

In 2013, on the initiative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, the Business Council for Cooperation with Malaysia was established. The goals of the Council include facilitating information exchange between the business circles of Russia and Malaysia, promoting the interests of Russian business in Malaysia and Malaysian business in Russia, organizing cooperative activities, facilitating bilateral trade, etc. As at December 2017, volume of trade between Malaysia and Russia amounted to 2,2 billion U.S. dollars 55% of which were oil and gas-related goods, 20% were fertilizers, the rest were consumer goods, and electronic components. In the first 8 months of 2018, the turnover between both countries increased significantly - by more than 60%.

Russia and Malaysia cooperate in the scientific, technical and military-technical spheres. The Russian Federation regularly participates in exhibitions of marine and aviation equipment held in Malaysia. Representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Malaysia, in turn, take part in the international Moscow Aerospace Salon MAX.

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Summarizing, Malaysia's Shiites are short of religious freedoms and are often attacked by the authorities. We can hope that the situation will change for the better, and Malaysia's leadership will be able to minimize the influence of radical groups and preserve Malaysia's reputation as a country of "moderate Islam."

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ISMET KONAK. THE TURKISH POLICY DURING THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR (1918–1922) // *English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

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Abstract. The history of the Russo-Turkish relations is coming into prominence in recent years. Especially, the role that Soviet Russia played in the formation of the Republic of Turkey is drawing high attention of Turks and Russians. As known, in 1917, Bolsheviks came to power and began to rebuild Russia within the framework of the communist doctrine. The dominant classes, who held the production means in their hands, were opposed to the Bolshevik power and waged a war, which spread to the territories related to Turkey. Thus, two politically various administrations, the Istanbul government and the Ankara government, pursued a specific policy in Crimea, Caucasus and Turkestan during the Russian Civil War. The aim of our study is to focus on the policy, which was implemented by Turks toward the Bolsheviks from 1918 to 1922.

Introduction

Turks and Russians positively or negatively interacted with each other for centuries. Both sides were involved in many wars in the regions, related to Caucasus, Crimea and Balkans. No doubt, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire, composed

of the multicultural ethnic formations, were obliged to be disintegrated after the French Revolution in 1789. Every nation suffered from uppermentioned monarchistic regimes and started to struggle for their self-determination. Thus, in the XIXth century, various independent states were established particularly in the lands of the Ottoman Empire.

With the French Revolution, a new class, the bourgeoisie emerged and took over the power. Under bourgeois oppression, another class, the proletariat quantitatively became strong, and it was organized by the communist movement led by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

Undoubtedly, the communist movement passed to the Russian Empire. Especially, the Bolshevik faction, headed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, tried to spread the communist ideology between Russian proletarians. After a period of decisive struggle, the Bolsheviks reached a great victory in October, 1917. With the formation of the socialist power, the counterrevolutionary classes revolted against the Bolsheviks, and the Russian Civil War broke out in 1918. The civil war lasted approximately 4 years and resulted in the Bolshevik success.

Needless to say, the Russian Civil War influenced the territories, inhabited by Turkic and Muslim population. Thus, the Turkish governments in Istanbul and Ankara followed a different foreign policy in line with their demands. In this regard, the aim of our study is to touch upon the impact of the Russian Civil War on the establishment of the Turkish state. In this paper, we also try to compare the foreign policies of two different Turkish governments.

I. Emergence of the Russian Civil War

Tsarist Russia had entered the First World War with great hopes in order to hold an absolute dominance over Istanbul, the Straits and the Eastern Anatolia. However, the lack of military material on the front and the shortage of food in the rear

complicated the situation in Russia. Especially the poor peasantry, proletariat and simple soldiers highly suffered from the war policy of the Kremlin, and they deemed a resistance necessary. In a way, all war conditions paved the way for a massive revolution.

Thus, the revolutions broke out behind the front in 1917, disrupted the aforesaid plans of the Kremlin, and also put an end to the Romanov dynasty. The Bolsheviks, took over the “state apparatus” in the end of the October Revolution in 1917, had taken the number of radical steps in order to build socialism in Russia. Immediately after the revolution, the socialist principles such as the decree on land, the domination of labourers over production, the right of nations to self-determination and the continuous peace were put into practice by Bolsheviks. These socialist steps, on one side, satisfied a group (e.g., poor peasants, proletarians, simple soldiers) on the other side, dragged the opposition group (bourgeois class, landlords, aristocracy, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, Cadets, White Army etc.) into an indignation. Following the decrees, the relations, between two combatant opposition groups steadily deteriorated. Especially, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918, were the last straw that broke camel's back. It was clear that the Russian bourgeoisie wanted to make use of the Constituent Assembly for seizure of the state power. In this regard, the Bolshevik faction, regarded the Constituent Assembly as an instrument of representative democracy, decided to establish the Soviet system, which is theoretically consonant with the participatory democracy.

Also, the Russian bourgeois class, considered by Bolsheviks as a “comprador class,” was allied with French and Britain investors. For this reason, it had to continue the world war against Central Powers. However, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk prevented the bourgeoisie from continuing the war.

Thus, the class interests forced Soviet Russia into the civil war that lasted from 1918 to 1922. The Russian Civil War, undoubtedly, ended with the absolute victory of Bolsheviks, and changed the fate of region on a large scale. In terms of its neighborhood with Soviet Russia, Turkey directly or indirectly took part in the civil war as well. In this context, highly different foreign policy was carried out by Istanbul and Ankara governments, especially over Eastern Anatolia, Caucasus and Turkestan.

II. The Russian Policy of the Istanbul Government

Needless to say, the Istanbul government viewed the Bolshevik Revolution and the fighting between factions as an opportunity to expand the territory of the Ottoman Empire toward Caucasus and Turkestan. The government in question based on the ideology of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Thus, it planned to unite all of the Muslim and Turkic nations under one state. Particularly, the losses that the Ottoman Empire suffered during the First World War forced the Ottoman troops to move eastward. To be sure, the disintegrated Soviet Russia would be the first victim of this expansionist and aggressive policy.

While the Ottoman administration was doing negotiations for the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Turkish forces were advancing and retaking the cities such as Erzurum, Kars, Trabzon, Ardahan and Batumi. Especially, Elviye-i Selase, a given name for the area which consists of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, historically was a worthy region for the Ottoman Empire.

In next months of 1918, the progress of Turkish army continuously went on. The Ottoman forces occupied the major cities in the Caucasus, namely Gyumri, Ahilkelek, Meskheta, Ganja, Baku, Nagorno Karabakh, Derbent, Temirhan- ura and Petrovsk. Please note that Enver Pasha, the predominant figure of the Istanbul government, particularly attached great importance to the invasion of Baku, and he appointed his inexperienced

brother, Nuri Pasha, as a commander of the invasion. Nuri Pasha was commanding the Islamic Army of the Caucasus (Turkish: Kafkas İslam Ordusu), which especially had an alliance with the anti-Bolshevik Caucasian Mountaineers, also known as “Dağlılar” in Turkish. The Turkish administration even provided the weapon and ammunition to the Mountaineers against the Bolshevik power. Thus, the Mountaineers, with Turkish assistance, gained victory in northern Caucasus in the autumn of 1918.

With the annexation of previously mentioned cities, the Istanbul government explicitly became a rival of Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War. The Moscow administration had nearly lost its control over Caucasus. This aggressive policy, which seriously affected the course of civil war, lasted to the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918. By concluding the armistice, the Turkish army had to retreat and surrender its arms to the Allies. In the meantime, the prominent members of the Istanbul government, Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha and Djemal Pasha ran away abroad not to face the Armenian Genocide.

In 1921, the interior minister Talaat Pasha, who was considered to be the main organizer of the Armenian massacres, was gunned down by an Armenian in Berlin. Another Ottoman statesman, Djemal Pasha, served as a marine minister in the Istanbul government, also was accused of exterminating the Armenians, and assassinated by two Armenians in Tbilisi in 1922. As to Enver Pasha, who was the real leader of Ittihadists (Turkish: İttihatçılar), went to Turkestan, and carried on the struggle against Bolsheviks. In collaboration with the anti-Bolshevik Basmachi movement, predominantly composed of the Turkic landlords, Enver Pasha fought the Reds, and in 1922, he was killed by the Bolshevik troops.

III. The Soviet Policy of the Ankara Government

In comparison with the Istanbul government, the Ankara government, led by Atatürk, adopted an agreeable policy toward

Soviet Russia. Definitely, both sides needed a compromise. Firstly, with the assistance of the Anatolian movement, Soviet Russia had the intention of preventing Allies' intervention in the Caucasus. Secondly, the Bolsheviks wanted to spread communism on the Turkish soil. On the other hand, the Ankara government, supported by the Anatolian and Rumelian landlords, merchants and nobles, aimed to save the Turkish territory from Allies. For this reason, the Turkish side strongly needed the Soviet military and financial aid.

Soviet Russia, which was ready to support the Anatolian movement, stipulated that Turkish government should accept socialism. It is believed that Atatürk tactically promised to pass to the state socialism during the negotiations with Soviet representative in Havza, Samsun. In exchange for this, the Soviet representative, S.M. Budenny, said that the Moscow administration would provide the military and financial aid. He also added that Soviet Russia definitely would not allow the Armenians, Kurds and Greeks to establish their own states in Anatolia. As a matter of fact, the Turkish War of Independence (Turkish: Kurtulu Sava ı, also known as “Millî Mücadele”) was based on preventing the indigenous people of Anatolia from founding a state. Thus, the Ankara government declared the ethnic rebellions took place in Anatolia especially by Kurds to be a separatist action of Allies, and it also persuaded Soviet Russia to believe this. When the Treaty of Sévres was signed on August 10, 1920, Bolsheviks together with the Ankara government were strongly opposed to it. Because, the pact that abolished the Ottoman Empire, provided for an independent Armenia, for an autonomous Kurdistan and for a Greek presence in eastern Thrace.

To get the terms of Treaty of Sévres accepted by the Ankara government, the Greeks, at the direction of Britain, moved toward Ankara. It sparked the Greco-Turkish war, which lasted from 1919 to 1922. In this war, Soviet Russia supported the Turkish side with weapons and finance. However, while the

Ankara administration was battling with Greeks on one side, it was occupying the Soviet territory in the eastern front. The Turkish troops annexed the Caucasian areas such as Gyumri, Ahilkelek, Meskheti, Batumi and Surmali. Thus, the Ankara government, like its predecessor, followed an extension policy in the east, and also passed the borders that determined by the National Oath (Turkish: Misak-ı Milli). Actually, the Turkish rule thought that Soviet Russia would give permission to occupy the previously mentioned areas because the Ankara government believed that it supported Bolsheviks for sovietizing Azerbaijan on April 28, 1920. However, the Soviet side didn't allow occupation and forced the Turkish army to retreat. Finally, the definite boundaries between both sides were decided by the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921. The Ankara government, in fact, gained advantage from this treaty. Particularly, the provinces such as Van, Bitlis, Kars and Ardahan, which were considered to be Armenian regions by Bolsheviks, had been passed to the Turkish side. In Van and Bitlis, the Soviet administration had an intention of resettling the 300.000 Armenian survivors of the genocide.

It is obvious that the Ankara government inherited the genocide policy from its predecessor, and had also an intention of removing the rest of Armenian people. In 1920, the Turkish forces occupied the prominent cities of Armenia, and especially left the main Armenian city, Gyumri in ruin. According to the archival documents, approximately 5.000 people were killed in Gyumri. Besides that, many statesmen, who participated in the Armenian Genocide, were rehabilitated by the Ankara government. The qaimakam of Bogazlıyan, Kemal Bey and the governor of Diarbekir, Mehmet Re it Bey were given the title of "national martyr (Ottoman Turkish: ehid-i milli)" by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1922. Also, the statues of Topal Osman and Gabash Ali were erected by Kemalist regime. Whereas Topal Osman was accused of murdering the Greeks and Armenians in the Black Sea, Gabash Ali was charged with the extermination of

Armenians during the genocide in Amasia. Furthermore, the abandoned properties (Ottoman Turkish: emval-i metruke) of Armenians were seized by Turkish government, and they were distributed among the some public and private foundations such as the Turkish Hearts, Trabzon Idman Yurdu, Ministry of Education etc. In a way, Armenian people had been dispossessed, and the new Turkish-Muslim bourgeois class was created. Even though the last Ottoman administration juristically accepted to return the confiscated property and possessions to the deported Armenian families, the new Turkish government, in 1928, passed a law, which was called “the Disposition Law (Turkish: Temlik Kanunu),” and according to the article 7 of this law, the return of the confiscated properties was officially ended.

When it comes to state socialism, the Ankara government simultaneously changed its manner of policy, and implicitly tried to remove the communist movement from Anatolia. In this context, it is necessary to touch upon the emergence and the termination of the Turkish Communist Party (hereafter “TCP”), also known as “TKP” in Turkish. The Soviet Russia-centered TCP was founded in September 1920 under the leadership of Mustafa Suphi, who lived in Russia, and struggled for the revolution on the side of Bolsheviks during the civil war. According to the programme of the Soviet-based communist party, Bolsheviks aimed to transform Turkey into a socialist republic. The party also planned to provide autonomous commissariats to the Kurds, Armenians and Laz people. Thus, the Soviet-based TCP, in general, considered a class revolution necessary. This purpose posed a major threat to the dominant class in Anatolia, which was composed of the bourgeoisie and landlords. As a political representative to the Turkish dominant class, Ataturk, also didn't want to lose his power. He, explicitly, prevented the political organization of the Soviet-based TCP within Anatolia. Even, on Ataturk's initiative, the Turkish-based TCP was founded in October 1920. With the foundation of this party, the Ankara government wished to dominate the communist organization

overall. As a matter of fact, it is believed that in the beginning of 1921, Mustafa Suphi and his fellows were murdered by a criminal network.

Conclusion

The Russian Civil War (1918–1922) began as a result of the class struggle, and in a short time, spread to the all parts of Russia. Needless to say, the Turkish administration didn't remain indifferent to the disorder, particularly, in the Caucasus and Turkestan, where the Turkic and Muslim population lived. In this context, the Istanbul government followed an aggressive extension policy against the Soviet regime. The Ankara government, by contrast, seemingly adopted a peaceful policy.

The victory that Bolsheviks won in the end of the civil war, was important for the future of the Turkish state. If the tsarist Russia or bourgeois class had become successful, the Turkish state wouldn't have been established. For the continuation of partnership, the Soviet administration especially abandoned its demands over Armenia. Even during the murder of Mustafa Suphi and his comrades, Bolsheviks never accused the Turkish government. It was obvious that Soviet power, at any rate, tried to strengthen its alliance with Turkish side against ambitions of the imperial countries.

Clearly, the Soviet-Turkish partnership posed an obstacle to the self-determination process of the indigenous people of Anatolia such as Kurds, Armenians and Greeks. Even though the Soviet-based Turkish Communist Party provided for an autonomy for upper mentioned ethnicities, it didn't quite meet their expectations. Thus, with the support of the Soviet power, the Turkish nation-state was built, and native ethnic people were removed from their homeland. Particularly, the Turkish government persuaded the Soviet administration to recognize the Kurdish revolts as “divisive” movements, which were organized by so-called “colonial countries.”

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12. In fact, all of the Mountaineers weren't opposed to the Soviet system. While the prominent religious figures such as Necmeddin Gotsinsky, Abd al-Majid Chermoyev, Haydar Bammатов were fighting against the Red Army, the pro-Bolshevik revolutionaries, Celal Korkmazov, Mahaç Dakhadayev, Ullubiy Buynaksky, etc., supported the Soviet power, by becoming the members of the Bolshevik organizations. See also: GARF. Fond. P–440. Opis. 1. Delo. 23. L. 8; Ivanov V.V. *Severnyy Kavkaz i Zakavkaz'ye v*

- 1900-1991 gg (The Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia in 1900–1991). Komsomolsk na Amure, 2010. P. 48.
13. Bal Halil. Azərbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin Kurulu Mücadelesi (1914–1918) ve Kafkas İslam Ordusu (The Struggle for the Establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan [1914–1918] and the Islamic Army of the Caucasus). İstanbul, 2010. P. 159.
 14. Konak. *ibidem*. 232.
 15. Regarding the Armenian question, Djemal Pasha, in his memories, advocates the Armenian Genocide and writes as follows: “I advise the Ottoman Armenians, in the interest both of their own peace and happiness, and especially in the interests of the Turks, to give up their hare-brained dreams that Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekir, Mamuret-ul-Asis shall ever become part of Armenia.” See also: Pasha, Ahmad Djemal. *Memories of a Turkish Statesman*. London, 1922. P. 300.
 16. The Basmachi movement, which officially lasted from 1916 to 1934, was principally a resistance of the dominant Turkic class in the region of Turkestan against the Russian power. The term of Basmachi (Russian: *басмачи*), according to the definition of Zeki Velidi Togan, is derived from the word “Baskıncı”, a Turkic word that refers to bandit or marauder. The Basmachi movement was ruled by the feudals such as Korbashi Irgash, Mustafa Chokai, Muhiddin Beg and Hal Hodja. See also: Hayit Baymirza. *Basmacılar: Türkistan Milli Mücadele Tarihi (1917–1934) (The Basmachis: The History of Turkestan National Movement [1917–1934])*. Ankara, 1997. P. 429; Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). Fond. 25859. Opis. 1. Delo. 10. L. 141; Togan Zeki Velidi. *Bugünkü Türkîli (Türkistan) ve Yakın Tarihi (Today's Turkic [Turkestan] and Its Recent History)*. İstanbul, Cilt. 1. 1981. P. 429.
 17. Meram Ali Kemal. *Türk-Rus İlişkileri Tarihi (The History of Russo-Turkish Relations)*. İstanbul, 1969. P. 296.
 18. Pope Nicole and Pope Hugh. *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After*. London, 1997. P. 55.
 19. From 1920 to 1922, the Soviet administration, step by step dispatched the weaponry such as thousands of rifles, millions of cartridges, many cannons and cannonballs. During this time, it also delivered approximately 12 million gold rubles to the Turkish government. See also: Karabekir Kâzım. *Stiklâl Harbimiz (Our War of Independence)*. İstanbul, Cilt. 2. 2000. P. 81–82; Shirokorad A.B. *Vzlet i Padeniye Osmanskoy Imperii (The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire)*. Moskva, 2012. P. 373.
 20. RGVA. Fond. 25896. Opis. 8. Delo. 1. L. 123.
 21. The National Oath, which is also known as “Misak-ı Milli” in Ottoman Turkish, was acknowledged by last term of the Ottoman Parliament on January 28, 1920. It triggered the occupation of Constantinople by the

British, French and Italian troops on March 16, 1920, and the establishment of the Grand National Assembly led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Misak-ı Millî, which was consisted of six decisions, had been adopted by Mustafa Kemal Government, as well. However, the Ankara government moved eastward and occupied the cities like Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, the status of which should be determined by a referendum according to the second decision of the National Oath.

22. Tengir enk Yusuf Kemal. Vatan Hizmetinde (In the Service of the Homeland). Ankara, 2001. P. 204–205; emsutdinov A. and Bagirov Y.A. Bir Karagün Dostlu u: Kurtulu Sava ı Yıllarında Türkiye-Sovyetler Birli i li kileri (A Dark Day Friendship: Turkey-USSR Relations in the Years of the Turkish War of Independence). Çev. A. Hasano lu. stanbul, 1979. P. 9–10.
23. GARF. Fond. P-130. Opus. 5. Ed. Xr. 847. L. 133.
24. Beyo lu Süleyman. Topal Osman (1883-1923) (Osman the Lame [1883-1923]) // TDV slam Ansiklopedisi. 2012. No. 41. P. 242–244.
25. Temizgüney Firdes. Lozan Sonrası Ermeni Emval-i Metrukesine Yönelik Düzenleme ve Uygulamalar (1923–1928) (The Regulations and Applications Related to the Abandoned Properties by the Armenians After Lausanne [1923–1928]) // Ankara Üniversitesi Türk nkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi. 2018. No. 62. P. 301–334.
26. Temizgüney. ibidem. P. 301–334.
27. Gigineishvili O.I. Danilov V.I. Oreshkova S.F. and Shamsutdinov A.M. Velikiy Oktyabr' i Turtsiya (Great October and Turkey). Tbilisi, 1982. P. 11–12; The Crimean Peninsula was the basic region that Mustafa Suphi conducted his political activities. For Bolshevik propaganda, he went on publishing the newspaper “Yeni Dünya” in the city of Simferopol in 1919. Mustafa Suphi also founded the Eastern Volunteers International Regiment (Turkish: Do u Gönüllüleri Enternasyonel Alayı), and this regiment, within the 12th Soviet army, decisively fought against Denikin's forces. See also: Sa lam Önder. Ölümsüz Sava çı Mustafa Suphi (The Immortal Warrior Mustafa Suphi). stanbul, 1978. P. 41–42.
28. RGVA. Fond. 25896. Opus. 8. Delo. 11. L. 116; Topçuo lu brahim. Neden ki Sosyalist Partisi 1946: TKP Kurulu u ve Mücadelenin Tarihi 1914–1960 (Why Two Socialist Parties 1946: The Foundation of TKP and the History of Struggle 1914–1960). stanbul, III. Kitap. 1977. P. 250–254.
29. Mustafa Suphi and his comrades were bloodthirstily murdered by a “mysterious” criminal network on 28 January, 1921, in Trabzon. The death of Mustafa Suphi and his fellows is not a common event. Undoubtedly, it was an assassination, which was organized by people were closed to the Ankara government. The member of the Committee of Union and Progress, Hacı Selim Sami, the boatman's housekeeper Yahya and Faik Reis together committed the assassination. In this context, the former president of

Bukharan People's Soviet Republic, Osman Kocaoglu, in an interview of 1963, proudly said that Hacı Selim Sami organized the assassination. Please note that the Soviet administration charged Mustafa Suphi with the formation of the soviet system in Turkey. Thus, Mustafa Kemal considered him as an enemy. Nonetheless, this assassination didn't damage the relations between USSR and Turkey. See also: National Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (BCA). Fon No. 93 02 00. Kutu No. 3. Dosya No: 24, Sıra No: 3, (28-1-1923); ehido lu Süreyya H. Eylül 1920 Bakü Kurultayı ve Millî Mücadeleye Sa dan Soldan El Koyma Çabaları (September 1920, Baku Congress and the Efforts to Confiscate the National Struggle from Right to Left). stanbul, 1975. P. 96.

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development of physical culture, which has grown to professional sports. After which the history of Olympism began.

Until 1992, many Arab countries did not send women to the Olympic Games, as physical education and sports were considered to be exclusively male activities. In 2000 for the first time female athletes in swimming and athletics competed for Bahrain, earlier athletes of Bahrain turned out in the Paralympic Games. In 2004 at the Olympic Games in Beijing it was possible to observe a female athlete from Afghanistan wearing hijab. In 2008, for the first time in Beijing, the UAE and Oman included female athletes in their national teams. Previously, the national teams of these States were strictly male. In 2012, Brunei, Qatar and Saudi Arabia expressed a desire to include representatives of the weaker sex in the team roster, as the IOC threatened the refusal to participate in the OG to countries that don't comply with the conditions of gender equality. At the Olympic Games it is increasingly possible to see athletes from Muslim countries. At the last Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro 2016 there were athletes from such countries as: UAE, Iran, Afghanistan, Qatar, Brunei and Saudi Arabia. They took part in tennis, boxing, weightlifting and other events. Since 1993, the Olympic Games for Women of Islam have been held in the East. They are held every 4 years in 18 events.

Having analyzed league tables and medal standings of the Olympic Games, the author concluded that participants from Islamic countries much more often compete at summer Olympic Games. The author also found that Arab countries could win more medals, as women perform well.

The Islamic Games are open for the representatives of Islamic countries. There are no organizational difficulties related to the pause for namaz.

Summing up, it can be concluded that sports in the Islamic world have always been and will continue to be at a decent level. The basis for the development of sports has already been provided in Islamic countries.

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

BAKHROMJON MAMADIEV. FATWAS OF MUSLIM SCHOLARS ON EARLY MARRIAGE AND POLYGAMY // *Th article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World." Presented in an abridged version.*

Keywords: Fatwas, Islamic law, early marriage, plurality, women's rights, fatwa centers, Egypt's house of Fatwa ("Dar ul-Ifta"), Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey (Diyanet), Indonesian Ulema Council, Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs of Qatar.

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Abstract. Author analyzes modern fatwas on early marriage and polygamy issued by Fatwa Centers in Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Indonesia. The material considers the positions of the ulama of various Sunni madhhabs on the issues mentioned.

Introduction

In the Moslem world, conjugal marriage – nikah¹ – is of particular importance. On the issue of marriage, the Prophet emphasizes the importance of marriage in Islam and warns that rejection of marriage is equivalent to rejection of the scriptures. There are many misunderstandings and problems in family matters, despite the importance of marriage. This article analyzes fatwas regarding family issues in modern Moslem societies.

From the point of view of Islamic jurisprudence, the family is a group of people, which is considered the core of society, formed through the marriage of a man and a woman, who then have offspring. Family members maintain constant relations with the ancestors of this couple, as well as with brothers and sisters, grandchildren, uncles and aunts from the side of the father and mother and their children. (Quran. Sura 30 Al-Rum ayah 21).

According to the Quran, the definition refers to protection, support and the existence of a strong bond based on consanguinity, affinity or foster relationship. [1]

Care of the family and family relationships is an integral part of the processes of state building and religion in many Arab-Moslem countries. Islamic lawyers are actively discussing family issues, in which fatwas are prominent.

In determining the role of the family, many Islamic lawyers consider the family a concise image of society, its morality and cohesion as morality and cohesion of society as a whole. The relevance of family relations in Islamic jurisprudence differs from those that were in the past. Although these issues were of a socially significant nature, however, state and religious regulation was absent in this area. In family relations, Shariah covers marriage, divorce, inheritance issues, as well as

¹ Nikah (from Arabic: marriage) – in Islamic family law, a marriage concluded between a man and a woman. For the marriage to be valid, it is necessary to fulfill a number of conditions. The spouse must be an adult Moslem and not fall under the category of mahram.

guardianship of children, which in many modern Moslem countries are legalized by modern standards.

Fatwas of early marriage

By the example of Qatar, where Islam is based on the Hanbalith madhhab, the Ulama defend the traditional Islamic concept of early marriages. They support the possibility of Moslems getting married before they reach the minimum age of majority. Nevertheless, Article 17 of the Qatar Family Law prescribes 18 and 16 years as the minimum age for men and women, respectively.

In 2003, muftis published a fatwa on the Islamweb Internet publication managed by the Ministry of Donations and Islamic Affairs of Qatar (the only authorized body authorized to issue fatwas in Qatar), according to which a child marriage is permissible, referring to the hadith of Imam Bukhari, which says that the Prophet married Aisha when she was six years old, and she was with him in a conjugal relationship when she was nine years old. [2] Currently, ulama and muftis, adhering to modernist and conservative ideas, continue to argue among themselves over the question of permissible age at the time of marriage. [3] In addition, the Qatari muftis state that the consent of a minor girl is not necessary for marriage, the consent of her guardian is sufficient. [4]

The Hanbalite ulama of Saudi Arabia hold a similar position. In 2009, after numerous public debates about the controversial practice of child marriage, the Supreme Mufti of KSA issued a fatwa which allows girls to be married at the age of 10 years. [5]

In January 2019, the Advisory Council of Saudi Arabia (KSA Parliament) approved rules prohibiting marriage for girls and boys under the age of 15 years, and persons under 18 years of age need the approval of a specialized court. [6] The ulama of fatwa publishing centers of the countries where the Hanafi

madhhab prevails tend to take different approaches to the issue of child marriage. For example, in Turkey, the Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in 2009 and 2012 published two fatwas [7] [8] on its internet portal fetva.net, the content of which is as follows: unacceptability of minor marriages. Modern society reacts harshly to crimes related to the violence of children, which cannot be compared with certain historical periods.

Nowadays, such interpretations, as well as the dissemination of other information without taking into account the historical, geographical, cultural, traditional and social aspects, cause distress and ideological disorder (the acquisition of the right to choose after reaching adulthood) in the minds of modern society. We must solve these problems by substantiating the misinterpretation of such issues using the Quranic ayahs, since, in our modern world, many facts of child violence continue to be recorded... [9]

According to the Civil Code, Turkish citizens can marry on reaching 18 years old. At 17 years of age, a marriage may be concluded with the consent of the parents, at 16 years of age - for special circumstances with the approval of the court.

According to the Institute for Strategic Analysis of Turkey, families do not comply with the law establishing marriageable age. Some parents who want to marry their daughters early go to court, but most simply evade involving public services in this process. Religious betrothal ceremony of the newlyweds is conducted by an imam and is not registered officially. More than 40% of girls in rural areas marry under the age of 18, which is based on local traditions. Experts in the field of sociology indicate that in the culture of rural areas of eastern and south-eastern Turkey, it is customary to marry off 12–15 years old girls. This problem has been ignored for a long time. Legal proceedings on the fact of marriage with minor girls are rarely instituted, especially since the brides themselves in most cases agree to get engaged to the groom. Girls generally get married at the age of 14 and give birth to their first child at the age of 15. If the girl is

13 years old or less, then such marriages most often end with the arrest of her husband, who faces 8 to 15 years in prison.

The problem of early marriages in Turkey, according to women's organizations, is characteristic of all Turkish cities. However, the situation is beginning to improve gradually. In society, they began to perceive the observance of the legal age of marriage not for granted, but as a problem. [10]

Despite an increase in the average age of marriage, child marriages remain a constant problem in Turkey and reflect a model of gender inequality that reinforces the stereotyped roles of girls and limits their education, jeopardizes their health and puts them at risk of violence and poverty. [11]

In 2016, in view of the severity of this social problem, Diyanet published a fatwa regarding juvenile marriage, which condemned early (child) marriages, i.e. both marriages of adults and minors, and marriages of two children. Fatwa also emphasized that early marriages increased the risk of biological, psychological and economic problems that minors cannot cope with. Early marriages also make them fall behind with studies and prevent them from having a right childhood. [12]

A similar problem exists in Egypt. In an official report by the Egyptian Statistical Agency, it was announced that 117,000 children under the age of 18 in Egypt were married, even though Egypt was actively combating early marriages. The report announced that there were 39 million children in Egypt, accounting for 40% of the total population. Egypt's gender difference is 51.7% of men and 48% of women. 117 thousand children aged 10 to 17 years are married or were married. [13]

In this regard, in October 2017, in response to the attempt by President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi to take measures to combat child marriages, Al-Azhar announced the launch of awareness campaigns against this practice. By the order of the great Mufti of Egypt, Ahmad Tayyib, the Friday sermons actively explained the negative consequences of child marriages, especially in rural areas, where such cases are common.

A. Tayyib also issued a fatwa, according to which in Islam there are no sacred texts permitting child marriage. The document states that Islam categorically prohibits any action that could lead to health complications or imminent physiological harm that could be caused by child marriages. [14]

Since 2018, Egypt has criminalized the marriage of minors. The sentence for those who participated in the process is imprisonment of up to one year, as well as the granting special services the authority to take children from the parents, who allow their children to marry at an early age. The law also stipulates that the official performing the marriage procedure, incl. a mufti, must notify the Prosecutor General of cases of marriage with a child, while a refusal to do so will be assessed as a crime punishable by suspension of work of this official and imprisonment for one year. The law also states that a marriage contract with a person under the age of 18 will not be certified and the contract cannot be ratified without the approval of the family court. [15]

In Indonesia, the Marriage Act of 1974 allows women and men to marry at the age of 21, but allows girls to marry at the age of 16 and boys at age of 19 with parental permission. Parents may also ask religious courts or local officials to allow girls to marry earlier, in which case the minimum age is not set. [16]

All the largest Moslem organizations - Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, as well as the Indonesian Ulama Council (focused on the Shafi'i madhhab) in their fatwas allow the practice of child marriages and refuse to support amendments to the law on the minimum age of marriage for girls under 18, which is required by international organization. [17]

In 2017, the Congress of Moslem Women Clergy at the Indonesian Ulama Council issued a fatwa against marriages with girls under the age of 18. The assembled women called on the local government to increase the minimum age for marriage for women from the current 16 to 18 years. According to this fatwa,

early marriage prevents Indonesians from continuing education, and half of such unions end in divorce. [18]

The above situation in Indonesia reflects the so-called pluralism, where there are three fatwa issuing centers that differ from each other in the madhhabs, as well as many other organizations that can issue fatwas.

Fatwas about polygamy

The most heatedly discussed issue in family relations in Moslem countries is the problem of polygamy.

History shows that for many peoples, although to a small extent, practiced polygamy. The predominance of female population in number and the decrease in the number of men due to wars forced people to practice polygamy. In every society, polygamy became first a necessity, then the norm. Even later, polygamy, which first appeared to solve social problems in society, turned into a practice that violated the rights of women, playing with their honor and dignity.

In eastern countries, the practice of polygamy took place even before the advent of Islam. This practice was not fair. Men were able to have as many wives as they wanted, and this led to great injustice and a decline in morals.

Currently, state family law and women's rights laws in many Moslem countries restrict this practice.

In 2014, new results of a study of polygamy undertaken by scientists from the United Arab Emirates [19] showed that polygamy harms women's mental health, stimulates negative feelings, and ultimately creates conflicting circumstances that harm healthy emotional life. In some countries, polygamy is perceived as a normalized phenomenon in marriage and is presented as a solution to various social problems.

Despite the permissibility of polygamy in Islamic prescriptions, researchers have found that many men are mistaken in their efforts to legalize polygamy. The wives of

polygamous families interviewed during the study complained not only that they did not see their husbands regularly, but also that they fulfilled their financial and fatherly obligations carelessly.

Similar but broader studies of polygamy were carried out by the Malaysian group "Sisters in Islam" in 2010, the results of which showed that polygamy not only negatively affected wives, but also had an extremely detrimental effect on children who were the product of such unions. As the number of wives and, consequently, the number of children grows, resources and attention become smaller. These conditions also jeopardized children's attitudes towards their mothers, whom they considered weak and unable to properly attract the attention of their fathers. [20]

In most Islamic countries, polygamy is a legal norm. However, in Turkey, Tunisia and Algeria, polygamy is prohibited by law. In Iran, the consent of the first wife is required for re-marriage. In Iraq, Morocco, Syria and Pakistan, this requires permission from the authorities.

Despite legislative restrictions in secular states with Moslem population, there is a desire on the part of confessors to promote and maintain in society the acceptability of polygamy in marriage. Modern proponents of polygamy argue their position as a way to solve various social problems of society. According to the Emirate and Malaysian researchers, in response to such calls, it is extremely important for clergymen to use restrictive fatwas that could show the negative effects of polygamy.

Tunisia is the only Arab country that prohibits polygamy legally. Four months after obtaining independence, the government of this country ordered to officially ban polygamy. The Family Code provides punishment for offenders in the form of imprisonment for one year. These ulama, who support the reformist trend, did not hesitate to endorse the efforts of Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba to end polygamy once and for all, not considering themselves to be contrary to Sharia principles.

Tunisian Islamic jurists have built their jurisprudence on the basis of the general goals and objectives of Islam. Their practice focused on the idea that a man cannot achieve justice among his wives, and therefore the state should intervene to prevent polygamy in order to protect the rights of women and their children.

In Morocco, the leader of the nationalist movement of the 1950s, Allal al-Fassi, also issued a fatwa prohibiting polygamy. He argued his position on the basis of Islamic experience in the field of pluralism. Legally, Allal Fassi's demands remained a dead letter, although the Moroccan Family Code (2004) gives women the right to demand from their husbands not to marry a second woman.

At the beginning of the last century, the Mufti of Egypt Mohamed Abdo (1849–1905) called for prevention of polygamy, becoming the first Islamic leader to oppose polygamy and issued a fatwa. He submitted to the government a proposal to introduce a system restricting polygamy, but this proposal was not accepted. His students made similar proposals in 1928 when the Committee on Amending Certain Articles of the Civil Code was created. But they also failed to legitimize this. [21]

In March 2019, the renowned Egyptian imam of Al-Azhar Sheikh Ahmad Tayyib issued a fatwa based on Sura 4 "Women," ayah 3 of the Quran, where he called for reforms of the practice of polygamy in Moslem societies, considering it an institution that oppressed women. The fatwa of the great imam was announced in the Sheikh Al-Azhar program, which is broadcasted on Egyptian satellite television every Friday. In the course of the program, it was noted that in recent years the problem of polygamy had become an urgent topic in women's social networks, that numerous fatwas of religious Salafi scholars were trying to persuade girls to accept polygamy in Egypt. In the last episode of his program, Ahmad Tayyib said that polygamy was often unfair to women and children and was a distortion of the correct understanding of the Quran and Sunnah. Many ulama, based on their subjective judgments, distort this verse of the Holy

Quran, as a result of which many Moslem societies have problems associated with polygamy, gender inequality, divorces and orphaned children.

A more thorough analysis of the above ayah shows that it does not call for polygamy, but clarifies the need for care and protection of orphaned girls.

In early October 2017, A. Tayyib issued a decree establishing a committee to draft a bill amending certain provisions of Egyptian laws regarding personal status in order to protect the rights of an Egyptian family. The committee held its first meeting under the chairmanship of A. Tayyib at the end of October of the same year, during which he determined that many problems arise as a result of polygamy, as well as unequal rights and obligations of the husband and wife after the divorce.

In May 2008, the Turkish Religious Affairs Directorate – Diyanet, in response to raging polemics in the public about the permissibility of polygamy, published the fatwa on polygamy. The Diyanet statement said that the permissibility of several marriages, which are mentioned in the main sources of religion, used for several centuries in Moslem-Turkish societies, has never been correct. Diyanet states that a second marriage is unacceptable to the community.

Diyanet also emphasizes that the Department of Religious Affairs acknowledges the historical fact of the practice of polygamy, however, regardless of the interpretation of the norms of the Holy Quran and Hadith, it urges Turkish society to emphasize that such issues should be resolved on the basis of Turkish law, in particular family law and Civil Code. This position of Diyanet is based on the need to correctly explain the religion to the population and comes from the responsibility of the Religious Affairs Authority in providing services based on the principle of secularism to the public.

Similarly, Diyanet emphasizes that the corresponding ayah of the Quran (Surah 4 “Women,” ayah 3) promotes monogamy, not polygamy, in a country where one marriage is essentially a

legally faithful and publicly accepted aspect, since otherwise the rights of a woman and her children cannot be protected – i.e. fairness ensured. [22]

Conclusion

Analysis of the above fatwas in some countries of the Moslem world shows the degree of development of Islamic jurisprudence and the tendency of its adaptation to modern standards.

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