

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

**RUSSIA
AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2018 – 2 (300)**

SCIENCE-INFORMATION BULLETIN

**Moscow
2018**

ББК 66.3; 66.4; 86.38
УДК 297

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УДК 297

Russia and the Moslem World: Science Information Bulletin / INION RAS, Centre for Global and Regional Studies. – Moscow, 2018. – N 2 (300). – 119 p.
ISSN 1072-6403

The published scientific materials on the current political, social and religious issues concerning the relations between Russia and the global Islamic Ummah as well as Muslim countries are represented in the form of articles, reviews and abstracts.

ББК 66.3; 66.4; 86.38

ISSN 1072-6403

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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2018.02.001. VLADIMIR BARANOVSKY. CHANGES IN GLOBAL POLITICAL LANDSCAPE // *“Puti k miru i bezopasnosti.” Special issue: Problems of Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalization (Russian and American approaches)*. Edited by E.A. Stepanova, Moscow, 2017, № 1 (52), P. 55–63.

Keywords: international system, world order, hierarchy in international arena, centers of influence, changes in alignment of forces, main world actors, megablocs, non-state actors.

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This article by Academician Vladimir Baranovsky examines changes going on in the modern world political system at the global and regional level. The author notes that the modern political landscape is changing, and this is not “the end of history,” as certain analysts maintain under the influence of Francis Fukuyama’s ideas. At the present moment the international system as a whole is living through the process of evolution, which began as the replacement of the classical bipolar system of the Cold war

time in the 1980s – 1990s. To date it can be stated that the basic features of the emerging world order have become quite distinct.

Further on, the author outlines the following basic characteristics of the world system in the process of formation:

1. One of them is polycentrism of the new world system, although it is necessary to take into account other formulas suggested for describing the configuration of the emerging world order, such as “unipolar world,” “new bipolarity” (with varying composition of participants), randomness of international relations (“dirty pool”), “concert of nations” (on the basis of agreements within the narrow circle of the biggest powers). Such formulations can describe adequately enough certain trajectories of the modern international process, but they are not fit to denote its final vector. The author emphasizes that it is precisely a polycentric organization of the world order as the main starting point of the world political system is the most significant and widely accepted antithesis to bipolarity. Such position has not always been the dominant one, because the syndrome of “victory in the Cold war” and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have brought to life ideas about a unipolar world and oriented in a certain way the policy of the United States and its allies. However, these ideas proved only a temporary and inconsistent antithesis to a more fundamental and prolonged phenomenon of polycentrism in international relations.

In a foreseeable future this is a trend to the formation of a polycentric world order, and for a longer term – it is its irreversibility. Polycentrism is not a synonym of harmony in the world arena. As time goes by we shall have to take into account in a greater measure the fact that the polycentric system of international relations is also hierarchic, and the struggle for a place in this new hierarchy will grow in all spheres – economic, scientific-technological, cultural-ideological, and military-political ones. Today, it is clearly seen that a structural change of the world political system is going on parallel and in connection with the changes in the alignment of forces in the world arena and the role of the main objects of world politics.

2. The change of the nucleus of the international system. More than ten states of the world vie for the informal right to enter into this nucleus (which is associated with a higher status and greater opportunities of influence). Primarily, these are China and India, whose positions are strengthening and connected with regional and global economic and political balances, and are extrapolated to the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the author notes that it is necessary to take into account the fact that the role of China and India will largely depend, first, on the inner socio-economic steadfastness, as well as, secondly, on the character of outside factors. These two factors are rather indeterminable, which will require from international actors a cautious and balanced political course. The point is whether they are ready to follow this imperative.

3. The gradual formation of multilayer, variable and liable hierarchy in the international system of relations. Such type of hierarchy does not exist in a fixed form and can change its configuration and structure depending on the specific features of a concrete sphere, correlation of forces, the character of mutual relations between the states involved, as well as the impact of other external factors. This can not only engender tension and collisions, but also create additional opportunities, which lends more flexibility to the system and enable it to adapt to n problematic situations. The hierarchy will not remain unchanged conformably to the international system as a whole, and to its individual segments, which creates a potential of instability. But the significance of this factor will gradually diminish along with the general structuring of the international system, as well as the growth of economic and political interdependence.

4. Gradual relative weakening of the position of the United States, along with preserving its great influence on international affairs. The U.S. role in economics, finances, trade, science and informatics will remain unique for a sufficiently long period. The United States has no equal in the world in power by the size and quality of its military potential, except the Russian resource in the sphere of the strategic nuclear forces. The United States can be a

source of serious conflicts in the international arena (on the ground of its orientation to the unipolar system of international relations. It can also be an agent of cooperative interaction with other participants in international affairs. The determining factor will be the readiness of the U.S. elites to restrain their hegemonic syndrome and ability to correlate their interests with the interests of other participants in international affairs, and ability to formulate its ambitions in the language of responsible leadership. The author presumes that traditional polemics between supporters of isolationism ("The U.S. should first of all deal with its internal affairs") and active interference in world affairs will exacerbate from time to time and even be put to the fore, although with more modern emphases and nuances. Donald Trump's presidency will show as to how realistic suppositions are that the focus on domestic problems may lead to a reduction of the foreign-policy activity of the United States. So far such scenario does not seem realistic.

5. Redistribution of share between different centers of influence, weakening of ability to exert influence on other states and the world as a whole. The states traditionally possessing a weighty potential in this field come across problems in their development, although they retain a considerable resource of influence. The role of new actors in Asia, Africa and Latin America is becoming more noticeable, and to the already mentioned China and India are added Brazil and the SAR.

The researcher notes the fact that the widely popular idea in the information field about the weakening of the West often exaggerates the importance of this phenomenon, although the development center of the world economy and international system is shifting toward the East / Asia. It is there that the attention of the global economic actors is turning to, and where economy and human capital are dynamically growing. It is there that the most acute and dangerous risks and threats to security, proliferation of nuclear weapon and territorial disputes exist.

The presence of the Islamic factor in the international arena is ever more noticeable. So far there are no grounds to see in it the

formation of any single center of force due to the lack of political, economic and ideological integration of the Islamic world. Its internal fragmentation by the national-state, confessional (sectarian), clan and other features makes the idea of “clash of civilizations” nothing more than a metaphor fit for an adequate description of the system of international relations at the global and regional level.

Another important factor singled out by the author of the article is the formation of new political-economic megablocs and projects, such as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Economic Belt of the Silk Road, Eurasian Economic Union. In the international system being formed these components will hold a major place.

The author determines two trajectories of the main systemic challenge within the framework of the world order taking shape: it is the formation of a new configuration of forces at all levels and the “center - periphery” relations on development problems in the broadest sense of the world (technologies, information, resources, financial instruments, human capital, movement of people, etc.).

In the section of the article “Lines of Contradictions and Demarcation” the author analyzes contradictions between various centers of forces at the global and regional levels. In V. Baranovsky’s view, the major delimitation is taking place along the Russia - the West line, whose mutual divestiture is sometimes interpreted as another version of the “Cold war,” and sometimes as a manifestation of geopolitical rivalry. What is important here is the very scope and size of such a phenomenon as dissociation between Russia and the United States / NATO, which includes a broad circle: from the alliance broadening to the East, rivalry in the post-Soviet area, and the crisis in Ukraine up to the use of force without the sanction of the UN Security Council, plans to create the European anti-missile defense system, and the conflict in Syria. The situation in the relations with the West will hardly be improved by small efforts and within a short space of time. There is another dividing line between China, on one side, and the United States and its Asian allies, on the other, and it has all possibilities to acquire more importance by

pushing off contradictions between the West and Russia to the background. However, these contradictions can become mutually complementary: their logic may prod Russia and China to rapprochement and give an incentive to the course of developing the CSTO / SCO / BRICS as the economic and political counterbalance to the West. At the same time there are serious contradictions within these very alliances (between India and China, India and Pakistan, and between Central Asian countries), and they are sometimes more acute than contradictions between these countries and the West.

Other configurations of dissociation seem to emerge on the ground of opposition to Islamic radicalism. Theoretically, this trend could serve cohesion in the Russia - West - China triangle, placing these countries on one side of barricades. But this is a too far-fetched hypothesis, which has no practical corroboration.

In the section "Ways, Forms and Problems of International Cooperation" the author defines prospects of the functioning of the new international system and offers its development ways. He states that the radical restructuring of the already functioning bodies of international cooperation and mutual actions in the foreseeable future cannot be seen as yet, and this is why he determines the consolidation of the world order in this sphere as a realistic prospect, but not its fundamental transformation.

The basic factors are as follows: 1) the central place in the organization of international affairs belongs to the United Nations as the official and formally recognized algorithm, which does not exclude a possibility of a reform of the UN Security Council, without putting in doubt the right of veto belonging to its permanent member s; 2) the preservation of the basic multiform formats G7 ("Big Seven") and G20 ("Big Twenty"), above all as platforms for exchange of views at a high level and coordination of common approaches and structures designed for a more detailed dialogue and interaction (above all, under the UN aegis and its specialized bodies); 3) continuation of the activity of most intergovernmental bodies existing today and oriented to regional and transregional interaction (OSCE, NATO, EU, Council of

Europe, CIS, CSTO, SCO, BRICS); 4) formally recognized respect for and consolidation of international law.

Another problem of the world order, in the author's view, is the correlation between internal problems and international relations. The most serious challenges emerge in connection with collisions around sovereignty and the problem of "color revolutions." Maximally limited interpretation of the motives for interference in the domestic affairs of a state proceeds from the premise that it can be an expression of desire to dominate expressed by certain actors in political affairs. The opposite approach points to impossibility of absolute sovereignty due to the close ties of problems within a country with the outer world also because the growing influence of transnational economic and political processes on internal political realities.

In conclusion, the author puts forward a number of new challenges, (for example, cyberthreats, which are now regarded very seriously, although they have existed for several decades already. They have not become noticeable factors of international interaction, when the positive impulse of overcoming the Cold war was still preserved, and a wave of solidarity with the United States after the terrorist act of September 11, 2001, quickly died down and the fight against terrorism did not become a powerful factor, as expected.

Global problems create not only new incentives to cooperation between states, but also contradictions between them.

Political orientation to solving emerging problems by joint efforts proceeds from the model of the globalized world and common values. But at present there are many signs that an opposite approach is becoming stronger, and one's own interests prevail. How long will this bent toward the strengthening of "national imperatives" in foreign policy, economic progress and security continue? This factor will be a major one in the behavior of states, undermining the prospects of international solidarity.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.02.002. ALEXANDER SAMOKHIN. ON THE ROLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IN THE TIME OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION WAR // *Informatsionnye Voyny, Yubileiny, Moscow Region*, 2016, № 3 (39), P. 37–40.

Keywords: scientific community, information war, information blockade, labels and stamps, popularization of science.

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The possible role of the scientific community in the current global information war is discussed in the article. Unlike previous more or less “hot” wars, the current stage was called the global information or hybrid war or the “new type” war. The collapse of an entire country without the direct use of military force can be the result of such a war. The possible role of the scientific community in conditions that require certain training and professionalism for an adequate response to emerging new challenges facing the country becomes urgent. The importance of the problem associated with the role of the scientific community in the current conditions depends on the fact that science has long been one of the main factors determining the development of modern civilization.

Representatives of the scientific community should implement a solution of the current scientific and organizational task of creating intellectual resistance and counteracting all variants of information aggression. This task is beyond the scope of their main scientific activity. However, the professional qualities that all science workers should ideally have are perfectly suitable for participating in its solution. The main goal is to monitor information flows and provide a continuous large-scale process to neutralize labels, cliches and inadequate arguments scattered through the media or the Internet, regardless of their sources and distributors.

The author gives examples of the mass use of such arguments along with accompanying labels and cliches.

U.S. President Reagan called the USSR the “evil Empire” in March 1983. Such a label was widely replicated by the world media, but did not meet adequate counteraction even within the USSR. This omission has proved the organizational and mental weakness of the system, which did not last ten years after that. Now the popular media stamp is the thesis of the “Russian Threat.” It is also claimed that Russia is even more dangerous than ISIS, since Russia is a more powerful state than ISIS. Following this logic, the greatest danger to the world comes from an even more powerful superpower – from the U.S. However, such a further elementary logical step is not made and a consumer of such information actually agrees with the statement about the “Russian Threat” exceeding the danger from ISIS.

Another example is the argument against the introduction of a system of progressive taxation in Russia, in which the value of the tax increases relatively faster than the taxable amount. The standard objection to such a scheme is that if it is adopted, the state will not be able to collect such a tax, since part of the potentially taxable amount will go “into the shadows,” “into envelopes,” etc. The Use of this argument means that the representatives of the state recognize its complete impotence in fact, since proper tax collection is one of the necessary conditions for the normal existence and functioning of the state. However, the majority of civil society, including the academic community take this argument for granted without thinking about whether such representatives of the state can actually fight corruption and lawlessness.

This year a quarter of a century has passed since the adoption of the law “On the indexation of money incomes and savings of citizens” of October 24, 1991. It was stated in the Decree of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of May 31, 1993, that non-fulfillment of this Law violates the constitutional rights of citizens in full. The victims of this violation were not only Sberbank depositors, but also millions of other citizens, including

employees of the public sector, pensioners and students. Claims that “there is no money,” that “money has devalued” and that “deposits have been burned down” were used to “justify” this mass violation of legality. Meanwhile, failure to comply with the Law on Indexation was precisely the reason for the inflationary devaluation of Russian money, with which Soviet rubles were replaced. Proper implementation Of the law on indexing would not allow the robbery of Sberbank depositors and create a state of “new Russian” “out of thin air” (another stamp).

The history of the Law on Indexation and all the numerous legal, social, political and other consequences of its non-fulfillment are poorly reflected in the domestic media and are actually in the conditions of the information blockade. Over the past decades, representatives of the scientific community could quite inform the public about the results of their research on the main articles of this “robbery of the century.” Nothing like this has been done yet. This is not the case only with the Law on Indexation. All of our recent history is often presented in materials that are not based on fundamental research and do not correspond to reality.

Such approaches to history are much more dangerous than the search for “new chronology” by A. Fomenko and his co-authors. A careless attitude to history, an inadequate response of professionals lead to tragic consequences quickly even with extremely unilateral interpretations and just gross distortions in the conditions of a large-scale information war. An obvious example of such an evolution is the current events in Ukraine. More active, than now, work on bringing the basics of scientific approach to the discussion and analysis of socially important problems to the general public can help to prevent such historical “reversals.” Popularization of the scientific approach to developing and defending an adequate civic position in the context of information warfare is one of the most important tasks of the scientific community, the researcher concludes.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.02.003. IRINA SAVCHENKO, LUDMILA SNEGIREVA, SERGEI USTINKIN. TRANSFORMATION OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS OF YOUNG PEOPLE: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS // "Vlast," Moscow, 2017, № 5, P. 29–34.

Keywords: young people, religious consciousness, religious radicalism, fundamentalism, Islam, Christianity, Orthodox Christianity, secularization.

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In recent decades an analysis of the problems of the interaction of the social institutions of religion and young people as a social group exerting a strong influence on socio-cultural processes in society has become quite important. The place of religious norms and values in the formation of personal activity of modern young people and also the influence of religious and anti-religious sentiments in the youth medium are now studied more thoroughly in modern society.

Works have come into being examining religious elements in the system of the value orientations of modern young people in post-secular society. Special attention is devoted to the attitude of young men and women to traditional, first and foremost Russian Orthodox Christianity. Among such works mention should be made of those studying religious standards and orientations of modern young people, as well as ethnic-religious stereotypes of student communities. Comparative studies merit special attention, because they cite examples of foreign and Russian students representing

different confessions and reveal their attitude to faith, religious taboos and ethical ideals. They also analyze difficult aspects and inner conflicts which come to the fore in young people's consciousness under the impact of religious concepts and rituals.

Certain Russian works discuss the problem of religious radicalization of modern youth. In recent years Russian science has concentrated on the view that religious radicalism entrenches itself mostly in new religious associations or sects. In the view of the authors of this article, such approach makes it possible to differentiate religiousness and religious fanaticism, Islam and Islamic fundamentalism.

Researchers attempt to map out ways to prevent religious radicalism. They analyze causes and consequences of the radicalization of Islamic youth in Russia and abroad. There are works reviewing foreign non-governmental religious-political organizations operating in Russia. The socio-cultural consequences of modern migration processes, their influence on the transformation of modern civilization are analyzed, and the need for regular monitoring of value consciousness of young people is substantiated.

Russian experience in studying the transformations of the religious consciousness of young people shows that in the youth medium two polar and differently-directed tendencies can be singled out. The first one is characterized by complex religious self-identification of a modern young Russian for whom the post-secular period comes not after the natural secularization, which took place in Europe, but after the forced secularization characteristic of the Soviet epoch. The other tendency is turning part of modern young people to radical ideas which form the foundation of fundamentalist, quite often extremist, pseudo-religious trends. These polar and autonomous trends form the main contradiction of the transformations of the religious consciousness of young people in Russia.

A study of foreign works on the problems of youth and religion makes it possible to reveal parallels in scientific interests of

Russian and Western scholars of public law. Works by foreign researchers also represent radically different types of investigation of religious problems of young people. On the one hand, Western scholars pay more attention to problems of the spreading of Islamic radicalism in youth communities in recent years. The radicalization of young people in the European Muslim communities and the religious roots of Islamic terrorism has become a current topic of investigation recently. Growing religious radicalism among young people of the Middle East countries, South and Central Asia and Albania is under investigation. On the other hand, just as in Russia, Western scholars tackle problems dealing with different attitudes of young people in modern Europe and the United States to traditional Christian religion. The problem of interdependence of ethical and religious reference points of young people is of special importance for scholars. The problems of religious radicalism of young people are investigated mainly in politicized context, whereas religious and counter-religious phenomena in the youth medium are studied from socio-cultural positions.

In studying relevant trends in the transformations of religious consciousness of young people in Russia and in other countries, a definite contradiction is revealed: Russian scholars examine the problems of young people's attitude to religion and their religious radicalism at the present time as two independent problems. Whereas many foreign scholars hold the view that the growth of religious, primarily Islamic, fundamentalism is connected with the general weakening of Christianity. Perhaps, researchers note, discrepancies in the interpretation of development trends of young people's religious consciousness in Russia and in the West are connected with the fact that in Western countries Catholic and Protestant churches lose their influence on society, primarily on young people, whereas the Russian Orthodox Church restores its social importance.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

ELENA DMITRIEVA. THE SYSTEM OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN RUSSIA (20TH - EARLY 21ST CENTURIES) // *The article was written for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islamic education, theology, madrasah, maqtab, traditionalism, jadidism, religious school, "Mir-i Arab," Spiritual Board of Muslims.

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Abstract. The article examines the history of Muslim education in Russia from the beginning of the 20th century to the first two decades of the 21st century. Three periods of the existence of Islamic education in Russia is analyzed: the prerevolutionary period of the beginning of the last century, Soviet period, and the modern period of the development of Islamic education.

Preparation of the Muslim clergy has taken place in Russia in madrasahs and elementary schools organized at mosques. Such was the traditional form of Russian Islamic education and its foundation. Muslim priests were trained at these schools during the prerevolutionary period in Russia (from the beginning of the 20th century). They worked in all districts of the compact living of the Muslims population in Russia, and this enabled any Muslim believer to receive a more or less decent religious education. Young men who graduated from madrasah could become educated Muslim theologians with a good knowledge of the literary Arab language, if they were persevering enough and went on to study. Such system of Islamic education existed on the territory of the Russian Empire right up to the revolution of 1917 and the changes following it in all spheres of life of Russian society.

At the beginning of the 20th century Islamic education in Russia was represented by two schools: traditional and jadidist. The former gave knowledge based on classical principles of Islamic theological education. Graduates from these schools received profound religious knowledge in the field of Islam and

Muslim theology and their activity was concentrated around solving internal confessional problems. The problems of the adaptation of the system of religious education to the changed Russian world realities at traditional educational establishments were ignored and this was why their graduates were not in demand outside the boundaries of their Muslim community. In an attempt to preserve the traditional foundations of the Islamic ummah representatives of traditionalism came out against even insignificant novelties. Traditionalism was a reaction to changes which emerged in the socio-economic and spiritual-ideological life of Russian society in the 19th century, when a turn appeared to modern development.

Adherents of the jadidist school (“*usul-al-jadid*” – “new method” in Arabic) called for modernization of the educational system and inclusion of secular subjects in the study process, which were necessary to the Muslim community for bringing the traditional systems of world outlook in line with the rapidly changing requirements of time.

The madrasah curricula have now included such subjects as foreign languages, physics, chemistry, mathematics, psychology, hygiene, agronomy, economics, book-keeping, and commerce. Reformers often came across resistance of the conservatively-minded imams. Well-known theologians, as a rule, were graduates of traditional Islamic educational institutions, whereas the Muslim intelligentsia were represented by graduates from jadidist educational institutions. The main jadidist madrasahs, as a rule, functioned in towns, in contrast to traditional ones, which were mostly in rural areas.

Soviet power put an end to this situation. By the beginning of the 1930s a greater part of mosques and Muslim religious educational centers were closed, and thus the system of Islamic religious education was destroyed. The collapse of the system of Islamic education took place after the complete transfer of the written language of the Muslim peoples of the USSR from the Arab script first to Latin and then to Cyrillic.

Nevertheless, Islamic education as such did not disappear. The drive to religious knowledge still existed, but teaching was carried on unofficially (in private homes or in far-off and hard-of-access places).

During the years of World War II the religious policy of the Soviet Union was noticeably changed: the attitude of the state toward religion was softened. This was largely due to the high patriotic spirit of believers of the country, who took an active part in the fight against Nazism. A new stage in relations between the state and religion set in. In 1945 the higher Islamic educational institution opened in Bokhara, the one and only Madrasah "Mir-i Arab" at the time. The study process there was strictly regimented and controlled by state bodies in charge of religious affairs. Students had to wear secular clothes and lead secular way of life. The curricula of the madrasah consisted of eleven subjects (six religious subjects, three languages, and two secular subjects). Students had an opportunity to pass a probation period at Islamic universities abroad (Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Sudan and Jordan).¹

The work of the "Mir-i Arab" Madrasah was supervised by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which was considered the informal leader among the spiritual boards of Muslims on the territory of the USSR from 1957 until 1961 the Barak-khan Madrasah worked in Tashkent,² and the first Islamic institute – Tashkent Islamic Institute named after Imam Al-Buhari was opened in 1971 where future theologians and madrasah teachers could improve and enrich their knowledge. People from all Soviet republics studied there.

Thus, the Islamic educational centers of Uzbekistan contributed to the continuation of the traditions of spiritual education of Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union and tackled the task of training priests for Muslim communities in other Soviet republics.

Muslim educational establishments on the territory of the USSR began to revive only from the late 1980s, when radical changes in the life of Soviet society set in. In 1988 the Moscow

Cathedral mosque opened a madrasah on the basis of the courses to study the Koran, the ABCs of Islam, history of Islam, the Arab and Tatar languages, which later became one of the first Muslim educational institutions in post-Soviet Russia. After the disintegration of the USSR the Muslim community of Russia had an opportunity to restore and develop a system of Islamic education to a full extent.

At the first stage of re-Islamization in the 1990s the questions of the revival and organization of religious education were dealt with by representatives of the traditional Muslim clergy. Many heads of local Muslim communities gave lessons of Arabic and the foundations of Islam, which took place at mosques, at Sunday schools and elsewhere. The initial teaching level was constantly upgraded. At that time the formation of a professional Muslim education began. New Muslim educational institutions of a secondary and higher grade emerge, and also old educational centers began to be revived in almost 11 regions of Russia, where the Muslim people traditionally lived (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Volga Area, North Caucasus, etc.) and where there was no single coordinating center of Islamic education.

Educational institutions appeared chaotically during that period, the teaching process was not elaborated well enough and there were no agreed-on curricula and proper public control. At the initial stage in professional Muslim study centers textbooks printed and used in different countries and on the basis of various religious trends were used, which were not traditional for Russian Muslims. As a result, some of these educational institutions have become bases for Muslim extremists. Foreign missionaries exerted a considerable influence on the formation of the basic concepts of Muslim education in Russia during that period. The democratization of public life has contributed to the restoration of ties with foreign coreligionists. The official heads of the Spiritual Boards of Muslims largely helped the development of missionary activity of foreign preachers, and muftis in Russia themselves allowed foreign religious figures to take part in the education of

Russian Muslims, seeing nothing prejudiced in this. It could also be explained by the absence of our own teaching personnel and educational religious programs, and this was why invitation of foreign teachers was regarded a forced measure, Apart from that, many young Muslims have gone abroad to receive religious education at universities there.

In these conditions it became necessary for the state to take part in organizing a system of religious education of Muslims, on which representatives of the Muslim clergy themselves insisted for a long time. In March 2005 the Council of Muftis of Russia adopted a decision to set up the Council of Islamic Education, which later endorsed a uniform standard for all levels of religious Islamic education. In 2007 the Government of the Russian Federation adopted a program of training specialists with a profound knowledge of the history and culture of Islam for work at Islamic religious associations (priests, teachers, mosque attendants, and officials of spiritual boards and publishing houses). This measure was aimed at countering the spreading of radical Islamic ideas. Several higher educational institutions began to train such specialists (Pyatigorsk Linguistic University, Moscow State Linguistic University, Nizhni-Novgorod State University), as well as Islamic religious higher educational establishments (Russian Islamic Institute in Ufa, Moscow Islamic University, North Caucasian Islamic University). At present there are over eighty Muslim religious educational institutions working in the system of Islamic secondary and higher education. Attempts are being made to evolve basic documents to help studying serious theological problems and uniting Muslims living in Russia. This will help the Spiritual Boards of Muslims of Russia to work out a uniform position on the major problems of Islamic theology and determine the place and role of Islam in the modern socio-political life of Russia.

Notes

- ¹ Z. Khalilova... (take the headline from bulletin 2016. No 10, P. 49)
- ² V. Ahmadullin. Tipichniye oshibki issledovatelei, izuchayushchikh islamskoye obrazovaniye v SSSR [Typical Errors of Researchers Studying Islamic Education in the USSR] // Post scriptum: Translations, reviews, opinions. No 3 (13). 2013, P. 235–238.

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2018.02.004. ZINAIDA SIKEVICH. ETHNIC IDENTITY OF RUSSIANS AND CHECHENS IN THE CONTEXT OF HISTORICAL MEMORY (COMPARISON STUDY) // "Vlast," Moscow, 2017, № 2, P. 122–129.

Keywords: ethnic identity, ethnic consolidation, historical memory, historical representation, historical event, content analysis method.

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Historical memory is one of the dominant characters of national consolidation. In modern society historical memory to a large extent, than the cultural tradition, represents some kind of ethnic identity core. Today, the researcher is convinced that the history performs some kind of protection function, not only keeping positive ethnic identity at the group level but also promoting formation of civil consciousness. The Post-Soviet states pay careful attention to national history, especially to those images which are conveyed from pages of school textbooks. Equal significance is attached to formation of historical consciousness in the national republics of the Russian Federation, and along with the all-Russian component in the course of development of

historical knowledge at the historical memory there can't but be a local color.

The complexity of history presentation in particular Russian regions consists in that due to historical peripetias of formation of the Russian state the same historical events and personalities are interpreted in various manners. For example, in Tatarstan capture of Kazan by troops of Ivan the Terrible is perceived not as in Russian regions. In one instance – as a victory of the Russian weapon and liberation from The Golden Horde dependence, in another one – as defeat and loss of independence. For Russians the general Yermolov is the war hero of 1812, and for Chechens – the conqueror of the Caucasus who was remembered by his cruelty.

Z. Sikevich compares an image of national history in vision of Petersburgers of the Russian nationality and Chechens – residents of Grozny, hypothetically assuming that this image will differ, despite “fellowship” of population of both cities. Images of the Russian and the Chechen “I” vary considerably. If for Petersburgers there is a competition between an ethnic and territorial component, then for Chechens the confession is a leading character of self-determination dominating even ethnic one. The territorial identity for the Grozny selection is insignificant, the rank and teypovy membership is low that allows to judge indirectly on formation of single Chechen consciousness and overcoming of traditional patrimonial “reference.” The civil identity for both selections, but especially for the Chechen “remains short of” the ethnic one. Important sign of ethnic consciousness is the consolidating characteristics of identity – the supports which allow speaking about group self-identification.

Religion for Chechens is a consolidation basis that confirms the particular importance of Islam for self-identification of people. A likeness between attitudes of both groups is found by a hallmark “home ground” which appears among bases of consolidation of both Chechens and Petersburgers. Geographical determinism despite negative attitude of the scientific environment to this theory keeps its positions in mass consciousness, at that such

various on mentality and cultural tradition communities as Chechens and Russians Petersburgers. The greatest divergence is found on hallmarks "way of life" and "state." Predominance of "state" in the idea of Chechens about Russians is taken by "way of life." According to Chechens history is much more important for consolidation of Russians than Chechens. Apparently, this results from the fact that in mass consciousness history is the past of a state, but not people and therefore in Russia there is the "Russian" but not the "Chechen" history.

The author addresses the main milestones and the facts of collective historical memory which allowed finding a poll in St. Petersburg and Grozny. Questions were formulated as follows: "What events in the history of Russia cause personally you to feel pride and which one – sense of shame or regrets for the fact that they took place?" Answers in St. Petersburg and in Chechnya were at something alike and something diverse that is naturally, considering a challenging road of integration of Chechens and Chechnya into the Russian statehood both in 19th and in the 20th centuries. Between both groups of participants of the poll it is obvious the distinction on the events causing pride.

St. Petersburg selection. The Soviet era cause the most positive emotions here: among positive associations – the Great Patriotic War or its separate events, in particular the battle of Stalingrad, battle on the Kursk Bulge and capture of Berlin. Every second respondent remembered Yury Gagarin's flight (the first satellite, space exploration). Among events of a positive row practically there are almost all wars which were waged by Russia throughout the centuries-old history – from the Battle of Kulikovo and the Battle on the ice to war with Napoleon 1812. The most negative feelings are caused by Stalin repressions, but it is telling that approximately every fifth person from those who consider repressions the most negative event of the Russian history simultaneously assesses Stalin's personality as the outstanding figure of history. For some people first of all young ones, Stalin exists as if out of a negative context of his activity. As for the

Contemporary history, the greatest regret is caused by the collapse of the USSR and also the war in Afghanistan. For the first time restructuring got negative assessment and the age factor was insignificant, i.e. among its conditional “opponents” both young and elderly participants of the poll are approximately equally presented.

Chechen selection. A chain of historical events made by participants of the poll in Grozny can be conditionally divided into events of all-Russian and national history. During the pre-revolutionary period in historical memory of the interviewed Chechens the all-Russian past dominates. The exception is just the First Caucasian war and its separate events estimated both positively and negatively.

So, in particular, pride causes a revolt of the sheikh Mansour (the Islamic prophet [1760–1794], the first imam of the North Caucasus, the head of the national liberation movement of 1765–1791 died in the Shlisselburg fortress). Also the history of Zelimkhana is remembered (the abrek who cooperated with anarchists in the days of the First Russian revolution, killed in 1913), Baysongur Benoyevsky's heroics (naib Shamil [1794–1861], captured and released by Murid sect. After Shamil's capture in 1860 he rose a new rebellion, in a year was grabbed and hung up). Negative emotions are evoked by B. Benoyevsky's execution, fall of the Imamah, surrender and betraying of the imam Shamil. The First World War is associated in historical memory of Chechens first of all with victories of the Wild division (July, 1914 – September, 1917) consisting of volunteers who lived for spoils of war.

It is remarkable that neither the First Caucasian war which Russia waged in the North Caucasus more than 40 years nor participation in World War I of the Wild division was remembered by any Petersburger though these events are not only the Chechen, but also national history, however they didn't leave in historical attitudes of the Russian respondents. This fact demonstrates not only differences in historical memory of representatives of

different nations of Russia, but also national specifics of interpretation of the past.

During the Soviet and Post-Soviet era events of own history dominate among respondents in Grozny. Even the Great Patriotic War taking an important place in historical associations of this period is remembered through a prism of inclusiveness of own people in events of that war. So, in particular, it is said about participation of Chechens in protection of the Brest fortress. The central place in the Soviet history for Chechens is taken by deportation and the subsequent rehabilitation of the Chechen people. The pride causes firmness and respect for seniors which remained in exile. Ambivalent feelings arise at respondents in connection with charges of betraying of Chechens, "mockeries" at them. Some participants of the poll consider that during this period there was "a loss of national pride" and "degradation." A core of the Contemporary history for the Chechen selection both in positive and a negative context is the Chechen conflict and its consequences. So a sense of shame is caused by military operations of Dzhokhar Dudaev, his government in general, death of young people, trafficking and weapon sales, destruction of Grozny, Basayev's invasion into Dagestan, terrorist attacks in Budyonnovsk and Beslan, the Wahhabite movement. Positive emotions occur in view of the end of the Chechen war, cancellation of counter-terrorism operation, revival of the Chechen people and restoration of its statehood as a part of the Russian Federation, return to peaceful life. Thus, interpretation of the events connected with the Chechen conflict in general corresponds to the all-Russian interpretation.

The researcher compares the events causing pride and sense of shame in the St. Petersburg and Chechen selection. As modal events of national history Chechens rank four (except the Great Patriotic War and the conquest of space - the War of 1812 and annexation of the Crimea), as events of national history - seven. Like a historical chain of events causing pride and in negative connotations between two selections there are both the similarity,

and distinction. So, Stalin repressions are modal both for Petersburgers, and for Chechens. However, unlike residents of the capital of the North, residents of Grozny, and it is quite clear, separate deportation of their people from the general notation “repressions.” The first Caucasian war and the Second World War cause not only pride, but also negative emotions at Chechens. Inclusion of these events not only in positive, but also in a negative number of associations it is allegedly possible to explain with defeat of highlanders in the First Caucasian war and a large number of victims, initial retreat in days of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, and in this case the national “picture of the past” dominates over the all-Russian interpretation of history. For participants of the poll in both cities a core of historical process as in a positive, and negative context are victorious (or lost) wars. The events reflecting cultural achievements take the minor place. For respondents history first of all is a political process. The Chechen conflict of the 1990th causes most of residents of Grozny negative emotions. Unlike this event, the First Caucasian war of the 20th century generate mixed feelings – not only regret, but also pride. Revival of Chechnya after the conflict, activity of the leaders of the republic is assessed positively by one and all respondents. Perception of the past by Chechens is far more personified, than participants of the poll in St. Petersburg that is an indirect evidence of historical consciousness mythologization of these people, the researcher concludes.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.02.005. MADINA BATCHAEVA. MUSLIM YOUTH SUBCULTURES IN THE KARACHAYEVO-CIRCISSIAN REPUBLIC: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS // "Vestnik AGU," *Maykop*, 2016, Issue 4 (189) *Sociology*, P. 44–49.

Keywords: Muslim youth subcultures, re-institutionalization of Islam, subcultural features, globalization, gender relations.

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The author of the article notes that the process of globalization, which affected all aspects of the life of the society – political, economic and cultural, exacerbates the problems of confrontation between the traditional and the modern in Russian society, both in the cultural system in general and in the institution of religion in particular. On the one hand, globalization as a political phenomenon contributes to the spread of liberal ideas, the promotion of human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, globalization as a cultural phenomenon becomes a source of contradictions and problems in the sphere of ethnic, religious and other social identity. Globalist culture may provoke contradiction with the national and religious norms and traditions.

The author emphasizes that the modernist attitudes contradict to the norms of the traditional culture of the Caucasus in many respects, these settings lead to a reassessment of values in the traditional culture. Liberalization and democratization of the social system of the modern Russian society promote freedom of morals and freedom of choice of a system of values and beliefs in the context of globalist culture. Globalization transforms culture into a single large motley mosaic of subcultures.

The author refers to Mike Brake, an American sociologist, according to whom the subculture is a special form of organization

of people (most often the youth), an autonomous integral formation within the dominant culture that determines the way of life and thinking of its carriers, differing in their customs, norms, sets of values and even institutions. The concept of “subculture” is also used to describe the style and way of life, the set of symbols, cultural patterns and values of a particular social group, maintaining ties with the dominant culture, at the same time.

Improving mass communications, increasing the flow and availability of information in Russian society in general, and in Karachayevo-Circassia in particular, leads to the emergence of various subcultures within the dominant traditional Caucasian culture. The formation of subcultures of various types is peculiar to youth in the first place, as the most progressive part of the society, which is caused by a number of factors, both political and social. Among these factors, we can note the events of the world scale related to the development of Islam, the Chechen wars at the turn of the century, the aggravation of the intergenerational conflict of “fathers and children” in connection with the transformation of the social system, the effect of youthful maximalism, the re-institutionalization of Islam, and economic problems in the region. A negative image of a young Muslim has been formed in the mass consciousness, and the younger he is, the more negative that Muslim is perceived by others.

Muslim youth communities can be analyzed through a subcultural approach from the position of sociological science, since they have the basic characteristics of subcultures: style and way of life, value system, symbols and cultural patterns, such as appearance, food restrictions, gender relations, self-identification, etc. The fundamentalists of the KChR, as well as throughout the North Caucasus, advocate the expulsion from Islam of “unauthorized innovations” that have been rooted in the consciousness and religious practice of the Muslims of the Caucasus yet, in their opinion. Sunni Islam of Hanafi is the dominant religious culture in the region, it can also be called “traditionalist” Islam or, as it is also called, “Islam by birth.” The dominant religious Islamic culture is

manifested exclusively in cult and ritual practices, primarily in funeral rites. The process of re-institutionalization of Islam in the post-Soviet period, continuing in modern Russia, has become an impetus for the emergence of subcultures within the dominant Islamic religious culture.

The author of the article notes that Muslim youth subcultures are dynamic volatile formations, with a constant movement "from center to core" and back. The author uses the concept of "circles" to determine the territorial entities that are formed on the fact of immediate everyday interaction. The author believes that the uncompromising views, demonstrative devotion to faith, younger age of followers, superficial knowledge of the basics of fundamentalism are the characteristics of "outer circles." The characteristics of "center-core" are the religious maturity, moderation of views, older age of followers, deeper knowledge of the basic foundations of the Islamic religion. "Circles" of subcultural unity are represented by moderate fundamentalists in the majority. They are more open for study, go to contact, are not hostile. "Circles" of radical fundamentalists are completely closed, which makes it difficult to study them, generates many myths and fears in the mass consciousness.

Young Muslims are isolated within the dominant culture of traditionalist Islam; Value orientations on the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism, appearance and clothing, food prohibitions, self-identification, ritual practice, economic and labor activity, gender role order are signs of identification in their environment.

Appearance is one of the main distinguishing features in any subculture. Young Muslims are distinguished by their clothing, hairstyle and other attributes. The author notes that today in Karachayevo-Circassia, as well as throughout the North-Western Caucasus, strict regulations on clothing, hairstyle, appearance are not observed due to the influence of globalist culture, modernization processes and the atheistic Soviet past. Now the European style of clothing with minor ethnic motives is considered the norm in the dominant culture. The author notes that the more

moderate the "circle" is, the more freedom in clothes and appearance is allowed there. The same applies to food prohibitions, and not only on meat products and alcohol, but the more radical part of the community strictly defines the concept of "halal" - permitted, cooked only by "true Muslims."

The author notes that self-identification is defined as the appearance and the system of "friend or foe." The peculiarities of ritual practice are determined by the preference of Muslim norms and traditions, but not the Caucasian ones in youth Muslim subcultures. This is especially evident in funeral ritual practice. Significant differences are also characteristic for the rituals of the birth of children and marriage. Wedding rituals are focused on avoiding the norms of traditional culture as well. The permission for polygamy, the possibility of divorce and remarriage (including by women), that are being blamed in traditional culture, become the norm for young Muslims.

Diligence and conscientious attitude to work among young Muslims become attributes of their professional activity. Young Muslims prefer economic independence, they are engaged in small and medium-sized business mainly, and they also prefer working in the private sector, rather than in state institutions. Mainly men are economically active.

The author writes that gender role order can be called one of the subcultural features of youth Muslim formations.

The gender pattern of young Muslims strictly obliges men to take care of women, responsibility for them, and for the financial well-being of women. A woman is associated with the traditional patriarchal role of the mother, whereas in the dominant culture of the region the image of a woman is replicated, viewed as an object of consumption under the influence of Western culture.

Youth Muslim subcultures, like any others, can act as elements of a dominant culture if they are in demand by the social system when they perform certain social functions. The main function of the youth Muslim subcultures of the region is the socialization of youth, in particular, the socialization of the religious. The lack of a

clear system of religious continuity and effective mechanisms of religious socialization brings to life youth Muslim subcultures. These formations also perform specific functions, among which the author singles out the provision of collective support and solidarity in solving social and economic problems, as well as the proposal of a system for identifying and adapting to the changing realities of life, which is very important at a young age.

Growing up, most young Muslims occupy strong positions in the social system, depart from strict identification with the "jamaat," leave "circles." But these "circles" are replenished with new ranks of young people who are in spiritual search, in a difficult life situation, experience a marginal state, are under the influence of youth maximalism.

Author of the abstract – Natalia Ginesina

2018.02.006. ELДАР KASAEV. AZERBAIJAN: WITH RUSSIA OR THE WEST // "Strategiya Rossii," Moscow, 2016, № 6, June, P. 71–78.

Keywords: Azerbaijan, Russia, the U.S., Syria, Turkey, Europe, the West, hydrocarbons.

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The countries wishing to cooperate with Russia, for example Azerbaijan, become targets for Europeans and the U.S. which by means of various instruments actively influence the European policy – the Candidate of Economic Sciences E. Kasaev writes.

Azerbaijan possesses heavy stocks of hydrocarbons. Despite solid deposits of natural gas, the country cooperates with Russia, including in raw materials import. In 2015 honor Gazprom having oversupply of natural gas on 200 billion cb.m, again began to supply natural gas to Azerbaijanian market. The parties pursue negotiations about delivery expansion, considering growth of gas

consumption in Azerbaijan. The European Union hopes for Azerbaijani gas and long ago wants to diversify supply sources of raw materials, driving Russia out, which provides almost a third of the gas consumed in Europe. However today Azerbaijan is unable to help Europe. Azerbaijanian field Shah – Deniz 2, for which Europeans hope, is developed far slowly, than it was expected. Nevertheless, Baku is desperate to cover demands of European clients.

As a result, Azerbaijan gets not only economic, but also political weight. And the international community doesn't ignore the opinion of Baku on the most burning matters of the agenda. For example, position of Baku concerning Syria interested the UN and the European leaders though before such interest wasn't observed. In February, 2016 by the invitation of the UN Secretary – General Ban Ki-moon, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the prime minister of Great Britain David Cameron, the prime minister of Norway Erna Solberg and the emir of Kuwait Sabah Al-Sabah the president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev visited London where he participated in the conference “Support of Syria and the Region.” As researcher supposes, the UN neither Europeans, nor the Gulf’s monarchies didn’t expect anything supernatural from Baku. Actual weight of Azerbaijan on the international arena is not as big as the republic would like. However, the West after all wants to draw over the states which have average, or emerging power. An additional player in the team of like-minded won't prevent.

There is a conflict between the West and Russia. Europeans, undoubtedly, want Baku to support their position. Particular actions (for example, brining of troops to the territory of Syria), of course, are hardly probable here. Azerbaijan now has no opportunity to pursue effective policy on the Syrian track which Russia, the U.S., other large western states have. In this regard so far from Baku at least the “correct” rhetoric is expected. If Azerbaijan begins to announce through senior officers a position which is close to Europe, it will already be certain success in

cyberwarfare. Now it goes no less fiercely, than “hot” war in the region of the Middle East, in particular in Syria.

The purpose of the West is clear and whether it will succeed “to take” Azerbaijan in allies, thereby distancing Baku from Moscow is another question. It must be kept in mind that Azerbaijan is a pragmatic state: to calculate risks, to study possible pros and cons there, they can no worse, than in the U.S. and Europe. Baku, apparently, will develop a position of double-crosser. On the one hand, Azerbaijanians won't begin to make tense relations with Russia. Now it is extremely not profitable for Baku because diplomacy and Aerospace forces of Russia powerfully approved themselves on the Syrian theatre of hostilities, and it is difficult to shake their authority. The ceasefire regime introduced on February 27, 2016 in Syria between government forces and moderate opposition became an initiative of Russia and the U.S., co-chairmen of the International Support Group of Syria. This day month, on March 27, the Syrian army achieved the game in fight against the IS, restored control over the ancient city of Palmyra which was occupied by extremists since May, 2015. Syrians achieved it with assistance of allies – Russia, Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and a Shiite militia (Iraqis and Afghan Hazaras). After liberation of the city whose ancient ruins are an object of the World heritage of UNESCO, the Russian Defense Ministry sent specialists of the International antimine center and robots sappers for mine clearing of Palmyra.

In spite of military and diplomatic progress of Russia, Azerbaijan won't exacerbate relations with Europe – Baku will demonstrate something similar to the well-known Chinese policy of a neutrality. In all fairness it is worth emphasizing that the Chinese not nearly always sit idle overwatching fight of two tigers from the mountain. Beijing effectively interferes in solution of important problems for it, and ably advocates the economic and political interests.

Multifaceted policy which was so loved by Baku last few years can sputter out for several reasons, E. Kasayev notes. Recent negotiations in Geneva once again came to nothing. Saudi Arabia and Turkey have ground operations in Syria on their mind. Another incident with Russian plane in Turkish sky happened. The situation obviously aggravates therefore it is harder and harder for Azerbaijan to keep a neutral attitude. Sooner or later it will be necessary to choose. Initially Baku will try to wait: it will allow to analyze whose positions are stronger in Syria.

If Russia, the researcher emphasizes, will act the same determinately effectively, carrying out military strategy and political and diplomatic line as it showed last month, of course, Azerbaijan will choose Moscow. In this scenario Europe will be irrelevant. If Europeans can offer Azerbaijan easy terms, then Baku can take off the table friendship with Moscow. As there is no friendship, there are partnership economic and political relations. However it is unprofitable for Azerbaijan to quarrel with Moscow now. Nevertheless Europeans act very aptly. If they can find financial leverages for Azerbaijan which is in unfavorable economic situation, then Baku will begin to cooperate with them more actively. Azerbaijani manat, national currency, at the end of 2015 – the beginning of 2016 fell by 35%. As a result, the power had to impose 20% tax on big money transmissions abroad to slow down capital outflow.

It has been revealed by Western press, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are ready to start the first support program for the country suffered from low price environment in the world market of “black gold.” Both organizations allegedly promised Azerbaijan a bridging loan of 4 billion dollars. Despite the information published in foreign press, the Minister of Finance of Azerbaijan S. Sharifov denies the fact of negotiations on attraction of the IMF and the WB of 4 billion dollars in the form of loan. According to him, a condition of the republic is not so unfortunate to ask for the credit. On the contrary, the country itself provides loans to other states. The minister

emphasized that reforms which the government wants to carry out are welcomed by international financial institutions. They, in turn, declared determination to help with it including financially.

The question is about wide privatization programme, lowering of the levels of bureaucracy and also about improvement of public administration and business landscape. It is done so that Azerbaijan could create a new development model which doesn't depend on oil. The country receives about 95% of revenues from oil and gas export, and for falling of prices of hydrocarbons the economic crisis began. Oil and gas occupy centerpiece in its export, but the specific weight of not oil sector grows in economy of Azerbaijan. However, it is still far before full diversification of economy, including less dependence on sale of hydrocarbons. Now for oil industry of the country there are tough times, and currency reserves reduce: at an annual rate more than 40% of reserves are spent already. Oil production volumes fall: over the period of three quarters of 2015 they reduced more than by 2% in comparison with the same period of 2014, and putting new wells in production is postponed.

Floating rate of national currency is a desperate measure as well as for some other states, for example Kazakhstan. But it is hardly capable to improve the economic situation qualitatively. It is necessary to consider one more important point. The population of Azerbaijan is mainly Muslim. It is extremely difficult to stay neutral, especially when Saudi Arabia creates so-called anti-ISIS Islamic alliance. Speaking about fight against the international terrorism in Syria, it is necessary to mention a position of Turkey. It would like to hear not pro-European rhetoric of Baku, and in lockstep with Salafi states – Saudi Arabia and Qatar. All the more as, Turkey also is a Muslim state which unsuccessfully tries to become a part of the European Union. As well as the Arabian monarchies it is connected with terrorists of the Islamic State and other radical groups which deliver in the shadow way oil and oil products from the territory of Iraq and Syria to the Turkish market.

As it appears to be, Turkey will act as the antagonist to Europeans, trying to win over Baku to cause.

It is known that Islamic State terrorists get into Azerbaijan and practice recruitment there. However Ankara won't be able to blackmail Baku. First, at the country level Azerbaijan deals with the fighters who are in its territory. In the autumn of 2015 the group participating in activity of the IS and also illegal military groups in Syria and Iraq were neutralized. Secondly, if suddenly Azerbaijan more actively cooperates with the Kremlin or Europe, then Erdogan will come off a loser. He has already broken up with Russia, and with Europeans he has never been friends. In spite of the fact that the EU is the main trade partner of Turkey, political relations between the parties have always been difficult.

Earlier it was more dangerous for Azerbaijan to quarrel with Europe and Turkey, than to be friends with Moscow. However, nowadays the U.S. and Europe begin to appreciate Russia, which for a short period of time has made serious progress in Syria, recognizing its role. The recent visit to Moscow of the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry during which he negotiated with the president Vladimir Putin and the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed it. Within split year J.Kerry visited Russia three times (in May, December, 2015, March, 2016). Following the results of the March trip the Secretary of State said that cooperation with the Russian Federation satisfies strategic interests of the U.S., at the same time noted a role of Russia in achievement of the deal with Iran and implementation of the ceasefire agreement in Syria. During the December trip the Secretary of State informed the Russian leader that the U.S. were ready to work with Russia to combat the IS terrorist groups.

For Russia, the researcher considers, it is necessary to keep doing what it does, and the respect of the West will only get stronger. And Azerbaijan will begin to cooperate more actively and take into account the position of Moscow. However, Azerbaijan isn't capable to make any decision in the short run.

Most probably it will analyze various scenarios, as much as possible safeguarding neutrality.

Russia behaves self-sufficiently, and players who indirectly take part in the Syrian problem solution and can't decide on the position, have to make decisions and work out possible consequences of their own actions. Not to get into a scrape, the states should effectively respond to challenges finding well-timed and considered answers. There is a wish to believe that pressing into service common sense and foreign policy vision, Baku will demonstrate such strategy, – E. Kasayev concludes.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

LYUBOV SIMUTENKOVA. REGIONAL PRIORITIES OF FOREIGN POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN: BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCE // *The article was written for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific region.

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More than a quarter of a century has passed since the end of the Soviet Union's existence as a state, however, the consequences of that event are still felt all over the entire post-Soviet area to this day.

Today, the republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) are not full-fledged actors in the international arena, and the problems facing the region do not attract the attention of the entire world as, for example, those of the Middle East or the Asia-Pacific region.

In this connection experts and journalists are not watching the situation in these Central Asian republics too closely.

In Soviet times Central Asia was regarded the “underbelly” of the country. And it remains such for Russia at present. The region serves as a buffer between Russia and the turbulent eastern world. This is why the study of the problems preventing the integration of the region seems especially important in the context of security of the region and the entire Russian Federation.

Disunity of the Region

The disintegration of the USSR has been followed by a host of difficulties which cannot be overcome to this day. The countries of the Central Asian region have to cope with the problems of disintegration alone, which in turn are followed by challenges to security, political stability, economy, ecology, etc.

The fact that the countries of this region are not interconnected is crucial for understanding the specific features of each of them, in this case it's Uzbekistan. The government of this republic deems it necessary to pursue a policy based exclusively on the national interests of the state, disregarding the specific features and problems of the entire region.

As to the Republic of Uzbekistan, several experts analyzed the reasons why the state cannot place the interests of the region above those of just one state, and why the disunity of the region will hardly be overcome within a short- or middle-term period. We shall look at the views of some of them – Paul Stronski, Yuri Sarukhanyan, Aleksei Malashenko, Ekaterina Borisova, Vitaly Klaptsov, Rafik Saifullin and Elena Ionova.

Paul Stronski is a senior research associate of the Carnegie Center and studies the relations of Russia with the states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. In his article published on the site of the Carnegie Center in Moscow he discusses certain aspects of Uzbekistan's domestic and foreign policy, including political and economic problems, security questions, relations with China, and

problems of transfer of power. The author explains the reasons why it is difficult for Uzbekistan to have good relations with its neighbors. He thinks that Uzbekistan maintains the best relations with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, however, there is a number of difficulties and contradictions. The greatest number of problems exists between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.¹

The government of Uzbekistan thinks it right to pursue a policy answering the national interests of its country, disregarding the common problems and requirements of the entire region of Central Asia. Such approach prevents Uzbekistan to build good and fruitful relations with the neighboring states and claim the status of a regional power.

Yuri Sarukhanyan, expert in international relations, in his article "Why Central Asia Is Not Ready to Become United"² notes the fact that today the region is disintegrated, despite numerous attempts to unite it, in a way. One of the reasons, in his view, was the absence of conditions for the foundation of the union. The author cites the history of the European Union where its member-states have united not after formally signing a corresponding treaty, but after the creation of the proper conditions for a real union. The author also points to the presence in the region of several foreign actors (the U.S., Russia, the EU, China, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, Japan) which influenced the situation in the region, where the two biggest regional powers (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) rival for leadership.

Aleksei Malashenko, Dr.Sc. (Hist.), professor at the Institute for Oriental Studies and expert of the Carnegie Center, among the reasons preventing the integration of Central Asia names the following ones: the unsolved problem of the demarcation of state borders, water resources problems, preponderance of national interests over regional ones, absence of a base for integration, unfriendly personal relations between the leaders of the regional states, positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the problem of leadership, security problems (terrorist threat, threat of coups,

“color revolutions,” civil wars, drug trafficking), and positions of the foreign actors on the question of regional integration.³

Aleksei Malashenko gives three possible scenarios according to which the situation in Central Asia may develop.

The first variant presupposes the worsening of the situation in the region right up to the emergence of interstate conflicts.

The second variant is a complete integration of the countries in the region right up to the setting up of a supra-state structure with certain powers.

The third variant, which seems the most probable to the author, envisages tripartite or quadruple cooperation of the states on the most crucial problems (water and border).⁴

We cannot say that there have been no attempts to create an integrated region. In 1994 the Central Asian Union was set up, which existed to 1998. From 1998 to 2001 there was the Central Asian Economic Community. The Organization called “Central Asian Cooperation” existed from 2001 until 2005. But after that, the Central Asian republics did not try to set up any organizations which could lead the local countries to a new qualitative level of interaction.

The above-mentioned works mentioned enough reasons for “integration failure.”

First, the sovereign republics prefer one’s own interests to regional ones, which, understandably, do not contribute to integration.

Secondly, the water problem divided five states into two camps.

Thirdly, the problem of border demarcation, in one way or another, prevents the favorable development of mutual relations.

The latter circumstance specially concerns Uzbekistan which borders on all Central Asian republics.

Finally, security problems are very important for all countries of the region, nevertheless, each state is trying to deal with this question independently.

Hence, a conclusion that there are points of contact, however, ambitions and the human factor (that is, personal relations between certain heads of state) prevent to change a conflict foreign policy course into a creative and fruitful one.

It should be borne in mind that there are two actors in the region claiming the role of the regional leader. They are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The reasons for gaining this status differ in each state. Kazakhstan possesses the biggest economic potential in the region and is in the most advantageous geographical position – between the European and Asiatic worlds, whereas Uzbekistan wins in the demographic indices and has the biggest army in the Central Asian region. The ambitions of both countries do not allow them to become submitted to one of them, and thus their “confrontation” continues to this day.

The Water Problem

The water problem has already been mentioned as a factor which could have contributed to integration in the region. Indeed, two rivers flow through the territory of the republics, which are vitally important for the normal functioning of the states there. These are the Amudarya and the Syrdarya. These rivers flow from the mountains in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The policy in hydro-energy and the operation of various hydropower plants has become the stumbling block between the “upper countries” (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and the “lower countries” (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).

The water problem gives birth to regional political and economic tension, however, the attempts to resolve this problem run against many other problems (from backward and insufficient technical equipment to a lack of economic and political initiatives on the part of the national states). Contradictions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan concerning the construction of the Rogunskaya hydropower plant remain unresolved.

The water situation, namely, water distribution of the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers remains an acute and controversial problem, however, foreign actors (Russia, the United States, China and the European Union) prefer to stay aside and not interfere in these matters.

The monograph by E. Borisova, senior research associate of the Center of Studies of General Problems of the Modern East at the Institute for Oriental Studies RAS, is a fundamental work on the water situation in Central Asia.⁵ In her view, the main reasons for the dwindling of the water resources in the region is the inefficient system of water conservation and utilization still existing from Soviet times, on the one hand, and on the other, the unified energy system destroyed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The author also notes that much in solving this problem depends on Uzbekistan, which uses the regional water resources in agriculture irrationally. The demographic situation in the republic does not contribute to a reduction of water consumption and, naturally, to solution of the existing problem.

This subject is also discussed at length in the article of the leading research associate V. Klaptsov at the sector of bio-economics and stable development of the Center of economic investigations of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies. The author notes that the water flow system in Central Asia is the region-forming factor, and he cites certain statistical indices, namely, the fresh water reserves in the post-Soviet countries, provision of water in the Central Asian countries (2007), average river flow for many years in the Aral Sea basin (2002), etc. Almost all water resources of the Central Asian countries are spent on agriculture. However, the problem lies in the fact that along with demographic growth the area of cultivated lands also increases, which entails spending much more water resources on agriculture. This forms a condition for emerging contradictions between water-forming countries and those situated downstream.

Apart from using water resources for agriculture, much water is spent on power generation. The biggest hydropower

plants of the region are situated on the territories of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and these two states are mostly interested in using water resources for power production, whereas Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan need water mainly for irrigation of agricultural lands, which is another reason for their differences.

A unified and uniform state with a planned economy existed until 1991, where all actions were coordinated and directed from a center. The Central Asian states have now faced different interests, uncoordinated actions, and inability to solve the problems of the joint utilization of water resources after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and they still have it and suffer from it a quarter of a century later.

Uzbekistan's policy towards the countries lying "upstream" was quite uncompromising. There have been cases of Uzbekistan suddenly closing down gas supply to neighboring republics or sealed its borders, explaining it by security reasons.

Regional Security

The sphere of security is one of the most important in Uzbekistan's cooperation with other states of the region. This is due to several reasons.

First, the republics of Central Asia are Muslim states. In the light of the latest events in the Middle East more and more attention is paid to the problem of non-proliferation of extremist and terrorist ideas and prevention of the activities of such groupings on the territory of the region as a whole, and in individual republics.

Secondly, Uzbekistan, just as its regional neighbors, is constantly threatened from the side of Afghanistan. In this sense there are several threats: a possibility of the Taliban breaking through into the territory of Central Asian republics (although this variant seems hardly probable); the activity of the terrorist groupings (Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, ISIS, and others),

drug trafficking from Afghanistan through the Central Asian countries.

Unfortunately, interstate contacts on these problems are not effective enough, each state prefers to deal with them individually, without cooperation with the neighboring countries. Nevertheless, regional cooperation in this sphere still exists through the channels of international and regional organizations, like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), from which Uzbekistan withdrew in 2012. These associations organize and carry on anti-terrorist training sessions, camps, conferences and seminars, which bring Central Asian republics closer at various levels.

For a more detailed analysis and better understanding of the problem of regional security and the development of cooperation in this sphere we'd recommend you to get acquainted with the view of the Uzbek political analyst R. Saifullin. In his article entitled "New Independent States of Central Asia: Problems of Security, Cooperation and Partnership. View from Uzbekistan."⁶ He makes an attempt to explain his country's policy in the sphere of security and singles out three basic problems of security for the republic, in particular, and for the entire region: the threat of international terrorism, drug trafficking, and the border with Afghanistan. The author is convinced that the states of Central Asia should tackle the security problems jointly; however, not one of the existing integration bodies (CIS, SCO, CSTO, etc.) can muster enough strength of the republics to tackle effectively the common difficult problems.

New Administration of Uzbekistan

In 2016 state power changed in Uzbekistan after the death of the first head of the republic Islam Karimov. The question of transfer of powers has been ripe for some time, inasmuch as Islam

Karimov had stood at the head of the republic for quite some time, and besides he was rather advanced in years and not too healthy.

In December 2016 Shavkat Mirziyev became the official President of Uzbekistan. He was considered the successor of the first President and believed to continue Karimov's policy. However, the real situation proved otherwise. While developing relations with the Central Asian states Sh. Mirziyev follows the concept of an active foreign-policy activity of the republic, according to which its priority direction is to build friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the countries of the entire region.

Elena Ionova, senior research associate of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS, analyzes in her works the tasks facing the second President of Uzbekistan and his team. In the article "Priorities of the New Administration of Uzbekistan" she examines in detail the actions in their domestic policy and certain steps in foreign policy concerning relations with the neighboring countries.⁷

In Uzbekistan's relations with Kyrgyzstan the main stumbling block is state borders. To date more than half of disputed land between the states have been delimited.

The most strained relations in the region were those between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and the reason was personal dislike of Islam Krimov and Emomali Rahmon. After election of the new President of Uzbekistan relations between the two leaders have improved and the air link between the two republics was resumed. Consultations began between delegations of the two countries on the border delimitation.

However, despite the seemingly positive shifts in relations and relative successes, the author makes a conclusion that the problem of water resources may prevent any improvement of relations.

Summing up, it can be said that at the end of 2016 positive shifts emerged in the development of relations within the region, which has been noted by all doing research in Central Asian

problems. Numerous meetings at various levels are arranged, various documents signed, and problems tackled, which have been frozen for almost a quarter of a century. All this became possible with the change of the leadership of Uzbekistan. It cannot be denied that the further development of regional relations largely depends on the thoughts and feelings of Uzbekistan's higher-ups. Time will show how successful integration will become.

Notes

- ¹ Paul Stronski. URL.: <http://Carnegie.ru/2016/04/04/ru-pub-63206>
- ² Yu. Sarukhanyan. Ot platonicheskoi integratsii do razobshcheniya regiona: pochemu Tsentralnaya Aziya ne gotova stat edinoi? [From Platonic Integration to Disunity of the Region: Why Is Central Asia Not Ready to Become United?]. URL.: <http://www.centralasia.ru/newsA.php?st=475473560>.
- ³ A. Malashenko. Tupiki integratsii v Tsentralnoi Azii. Proekty sotrudnichestva i integratsii dlya Tsentralnoi Azii: sravnitelnyi analiz, vozmozhnosti i perspektivy [Impasse of Integration in Central Asia. Projects of Cooperation and Integration for Central Asia: Comparative Analysis, Possibilities and Prospects]. Bishkek, 2007, pp. 16–19.
- ⁴ Ibid., p. 20.
- ⁵ E. Borisova. Vodniye i energeticheskiye resursy “Bolshoi” Tsentralnoi Azii: Defitsit vody i resursy po ego preodoleniyu [Water and Energy Resources of “Greater” Central Asia. Shortage of Water and Resources to Overcome It] Moscow, LENAND. 2015, 236 pp.
- ⁶ R. Saifullin. Noviye nezavisimiye gosudarstva Tsentralnoi Azii: problemy bezopasnosti, vneshnego sotrudnichestva i partnerstva. Vzglyad iz Respubliki Uzbekistan [New Independent States of Central Asia; Problems of Security, Foreign Cooperation and Partnership. View from Republic of Uzbekistan]. URL.: <http://www.centralasia.ru/news2.php?st=1.208324340>
- ⁷ E. Ionova. Prioritety novoi administratsii Uzbekistana // Rossiya i noviye gosudarstva Evrazii [Priorities of New Administration of Uzbekistan // Russia and New States of Eurasia] – 2016, No 4, pp. 96–105.

NATALYA TOTSKOYNOVA. COOPERATION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES ON COMBATING TERRORISM // *The article was written for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: terrorist threat, emergence of radical Islamism, ethnonational separatism, organized crime, drug trafficking, arms traffic, illegal migration.

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Abstract. The level of terrorist threat in countries of the Central Asian region was high throughout all post-Soviet years. Largely it is caused by factors of an internal order: a low level of social and economic development of society creating grounds for emergence of radical Islamism, ethnonational separatism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and arms traffic, illegal migration; clan fight which quite often uses political extremism in its own purposes; insufficient development of religious and cultural consciousness.

The situation is aggravated by proximity to the centers of the international Islamic threat. With aggravation of the situation in the neighboring Afghanistan, creation and spread of a new terrorist association – the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS, prohibited in Russia), the region turns into a zone of the increased terrorist threat. Meanwhile, owing to the geographical location the post-Soviet Central Asian region is an important member in ensuring global security, at the same time it is obvious a particular significance which maintenance of peace and stability have in the region for its closest neighbor – Russia.

Terrorist threat in the Central Asian region

For a long time on the territories of the Central Asian region there was the extremist group "Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan” (IMU). It pursued an aim of separation of the Fergana Valley from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and formation of a separate state in its territory which, as envisioned, was to be a part of the World Islamic caliphate including all Middle East and the Caucasus.

As known the Fergana Valley represents a densely populated area with high unemployment rate that does its territory convenient for activity of radical organizations and recruitment of new participants. IMU is accused of many terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan and also an invasion of the armed groups into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

IMU groups were involved in the civil war in Tajikistan on the side of the Joint Tajik opposition, and after truce their major part moved to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan IMU together with the Taliban fought against coalition forces. According to sources after fighters of IMU were pushed aside to the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, they got in touch with Al-Qaeda.

Over recent years, as experts note, the organization experiences a split, on its base there are new terrorist organizations, including Islamic Jihad (2002).¹

And in August, 2015 IMU took sides with ISIS. Flowing of one terrorist associations into others doesn't change a core of the problem – considerable strengthening of global terrorist threat in the thick of which post-Soviet Central Asia can be found.

New challenges are created by gathering of formations of fighters the border of Afghanistan with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Escalation in Afghanistan near the southern boundaries of the CIS was registered at the end of April, 2015 when Talibs announced the beginning of spring offensive blow on government forces.²

Further escalation of the intra Afghan conflict was connected with capture by fighters of Kunduz, located in 70 km from the Tajik border. In this regard since October 1 border troops of Tajikistan were got fully operational. At the bilateral meeting of presidents of Tajikistan and Russia which took place soon after

that from the Tajik part there was expressed concern about every day worsening situation in Afghanistan. According to the President of the Republic of Tatarstan E. Rahmon, military operation goes throughout 60% of all Tajik-Afghan border. Emphasizing that this border is in a zone of responsibility of the CSTO, he raised a question of ensuring safety in the region by the organization.

In May-June messages about violent military clashes of Talibs with government troops in bordering with Turkmenistan provinces of Herat on and Badgis regularly came in. At the same time manifold preponderance of force of Talibs was noted. Intense combat actions in these provinces at the end of May led to increase in a flow of Afghan refugees in the direction of the border with Turkmenistan. However, Turkmen frontiersmen didn't let them in the country over fears of Talibs attack.

In the fall of 2015 in connection with new military advance of Talibs in the north of Afghanistan the Turkmen troops also changed to a mode of constant combat readiness. It was announced a mobilization of officers and common reserve soldiers, it was realized re-deployment of military equipment as a result of which about 70% of mission capable equipment and arms of ground forces of Turkmenistan were concentrated along the Turkmen-Afghan border. However, the new head of the Taliban mullah A. Mansour who refused to conduct negotiations with the government in Kabul said that his movement didn't pose a threat to northern neighbors, and the countries of the Central Asian region shouldn't worry on this matter.

Most of experts agree that now the real threat to the countries of the Central Asian region proceeds not from Taliban, and from ISIS gaining influence in the northern provinces of Afghanistan. Ranks of this terrorist association grow at the expense of immigrants of the Central Asian region number of whom, by various estimates, reaches to 4000.

According to the director of MGIMO research center A. Kazantsev, "classical Talibs, being Pashtun nationalists, of

course, won't go to the Central Asian region - it is a myth, and invasion into the region of various ethnic extremists groups connected both with Al-Qaeda, and IS is not only probable, and in general it is expected in the light of that situation which developed in Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Middle East.”³

Nevertheless not all political scientists, especially in a series of countries of the region, adhere to this point of view. Some experts consider direct military invasion of ISIS groups into the Central Asian region unlikely, believing that talks on ISIS threat for the Central Asian region are substantially caused by external forces interested in strengthening of their influence in the region or leaders of the republics counting on financial aid from abroad.

War on terrorism

The Uzbek political scientist Y. Sadikov, admitting activization of international terrorist organizations agents in the countries of Central Asia, believes that there is no military threat to Uzbekistan and other countries of the region from ISIS.⁴ One of the reasons of it he considers constructive cooperation of intelligence agencies of the countries of the region with Afghan colleagues, including safety on their common borders. Meanwhile, according to objective data, in the republics of the region activity of ISIS agents who manage to blast state power, recruit secret supporters and provoke disorders got into overdrive.

With the assistance of Russian intelligence agencies, a series of terrorist attacks which were to happen in Bishkek was prevented. In response to these actions ISIS delivered ultimatum to the leaders of the republic. Direct threats concerning leaders of Kyrgyzstan appeared on social media: if the authorities of the republic continue detaining of ISIS supporters and impeding recruitment of new fighters, then in the near future the country will be overflowed by a terror wave.

In Uzbekistan extraordinary security measures across the population are undertaken, preachers in mosques educate about

the essence of Islam. On August 1, 2015 in the south of the republic, in Andijan, there were held joint anti-terrorist tactical maneuvers of relevant departments of Ministries of defense, internal affairs, emergency situations and National Security Service of the republic.

As noted by experts, nowadays Uzbekistan possesses the strongest army in the region, and Uzbek part of the border with Afghanistan is one of the most protected. Nevertheless, the former president of the republic I. Karimov showed angst with a view to terrorist threat increase in the region.⁵

It should be noted that security strategy led by Tashkent supposes maintenance of close good neighbor relations with the government of Afghanistan and development of economic relations (construction of transport, logistic routes to Afghanistan, participation in development of its electricity sector, supply of food and other goods). In case of realization of ISIS threats republics of Central Asia will not be able to cope with this situation individually, and it finds understanding in the Central Asian capitals. Meanwhile one of the main weaknesses of the states of the Central Asian region in fight against terrorism is a low level of interaction in this direction that is broadly caused by their old contradictions.

Disunity of the region

Relations among Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan remain complicated which were damaged because of the problem of use of water resources in the region. Quite often there are collisions on the border of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 970 km long only 567 of which are demarcated and delimited. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan E. Abdyldayev said at the 70th session of General Assembly of the UN (September, 2015), direct multilateral political dialogue between the countries of the Central Asian region is actually absent. He, in particular, suggested creating a dialogue platform for the countries of the region within

the UN, "to intensify political and economic cooperation in the region."

Escalating terrorist threat forces the republics of Central Asia to cooperate more actively with each other in the sphere of security. So, in July, 2015 in the south of Kyrgyzstan in bordering with Tajikistan district with the assistance of OSCE joint command and staff tactical maneuvers of two republics "Barrier-2015" were held with participation of the expert group FSB RF.⁶

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, two closest allies in the region having non-bloc status following the results of the meeting of presidents of two countries which took place on October 7-8, 2016 in Tashkent reached an agreement on enhancing the interaction of borders protection with Afghanistan and signed a number of cooperation agreements in fight against terrorism, organized crime and other challenges. (The arrangement on joint protection of borders is an effect between two countries since 2012).

The management of the Central Asian region count on support in fight against Islamic threat on the part of the world community and the centers of power having the greatest influence in the region – Russia, China and the U.S. The anti-terrorist subject is included into the agenda of various international summits, forums and other events within the CIS, the CSTO and SCO in which countries of Central Asia take part. Decisions of the October summit of the CIS in Kazakhstan are focused on increased interaction of post-Soviet states in the sphere of fighting against terrorism.

At the summit there were adopted the Declaration on combating international terrorism, the Concept of military cooperation till 2020, the Programme of cooperation in strengthening boarder security on external borders for 2016-2020. According to the Executive secretary of the CIS S. Lebedev, politicians agreed about mutual assistance in regions arrangement of external borders of the CIS states on "the most threatening directions." Special groups of border troops were created for this purpose. Experts don't rule out that the Russian frontier guards can return to the Tajik-Afghan border from where they left in 2005.

Nevertheless, the main vectors of foreign policy cooperation of the states of the Central Asian region regarding security differ.

CSTO and Central Asian region

For Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan interaction with Russia within the CSTO is overriding. In the middle of September in Dushanbe the regular meeting of Council of common security of the CSTO at which heads of the CSTO member-states discussed problems of combating terrorism, crisis in Syria, cooperation in defense sphere and others took place.

The president of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev considers that Russia and Kazakhstan have common vision of the situation development in the world, closely coordinate approaches to solution to the problem of security.⁷ He emphasized that the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria is of great importance for the countries of the region, and the Syrian crisis constitutes a danger for all Central Asian region. At the October summit of the CIS in Kazakhstan Nazarbayev put forward an initiative of creation of the forum "Islam against Terrorism" which should join efforts of Muslim countries.

Russia is ready to act as a guarantor of security for the Central Asian region as evidenced by its leading role in the CSTO. Due to growth of terrorist threat in the region Russia intends to strengthen its presence in Central Asian the region, in particular, by means of strengthening of military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and also surge of military and technical support of allies within the CSTO.

Russia signed treaties with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on extension of the validity of Russian military bases in these countries till 2047 and 2032 subsequently. Also Moscow announced of military contingent extension of the 201st Russian base in Tajikistan from 5900 to 9000 people by 2020. On Ayni's airdrome where the Russian Federation tried to get access since 2004, the helicopter team will be sent for strengthening of this Russian base.⁸

Besides, within the CSTO there were exercised military maneuvers with an access to the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. According to sources, considering a difficult domestic political situation in Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation is ready to grant military aid in the amount of 1 bln. dollars to the republic.

Due to modernization of airpower the Russian air base in Kant will be also strengthened where 10 new enhanced SU-25 fighters have already arrived. Besides, according to the bilateral treaty, Moscow provided to the republic with 10 armored personnel carriers, artillery systems and ammunition for them, spare parts and equipment for anti-aircraft defenses.

Till 2017 Kyrgyzstan has to receive the main part of military aid which includes armored personnel carriers, combat vehicles, planes and helicopters. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which announced their non-bloc status hold isolated position. As for Uzbekistan which in 2012 left the CSTO, SCO remains the main platform of its cooperation with Russia.

Since 2003 in Tashkent there is the Regional counter-terrorism center of SCO (RATS). The bilateral agreements which exist between Moscow and Tashkent about strategic partnership oblige the parties to render assistance to each other in the sphere of security. Some Uzbek analysts don't rule out that in case of serious security threats from terrorist, extremist groups, Tashkent can settle for creation of certain framework of cooperation with the CSTO.

For example, to create a platform for dialogue within a formula of the CSTO Uzbekistan, accurately discussed that this format doesn't consider participation of the republic in organization activity, except cooperation in anti-terrorist sphere in the region.

The U.S. and Central-Asian region

However it is difficult to divine actions of Uzbek government, policy of which always differed by ambiguity. In particular, at the above-mentioned meeting of the presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan there was coordinated a

synchronous refusal of an appeal to the Russian Federation for help in a case of escalation on the Afghan border.

At the same time in the Declaration on strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the U.S. it was recorded readiness of Washington to help the republic, up to military one, in case of security threat. Transfer to Tashkent by American side some military equipment after partial withdrawal of its contingent from Afghanistan demonstrates continuation of cooperation between two countries in this sphere. Within a special program the Pentagon gave Uzbekistan 300 armored cars with a total cost of 180 million dollars.⁹

The United States don't intend to leave Central Asia in Russian and Chinese sphere of influence and recently show the increasing interest in participation in enhancing its security. Strengthening of influence in Central Asia is important for Washington also in connection with its decision to leave its troops in Afghanistan for Islamic threat manageability there. At the end of August D. Rozenblyum the Assistant of the U.S. Secretary of State for the Southern and Central Asian region was in Tashkent, and general Lloyd J. Austin III the head of the Central command of the U.S. visited Dushanbe. In both Central Asian countries it was question about regional security and situation in Afghanistan.

On September 26 at the initiative of Washington in the UN General Assembly in New York the meeting of the U.S. Secretary of State D. Carrey with Ministers of Foreign Affairs of five Central Asian countries took place, following the results of which the American party announced establishment with these countries of "a new format of interaction for discussion of regional issues." As noted by mass media, at the meeting it was a question about joint actions for neutralization of new challenges in the field of security and development of economic ties.¹⁰

"Presentation" of this "new format of interaction," or "C5+1" (the republics of Central Asia plus the U.S.), was realized in Samarkand within D. Carrey's tour across the countries of the region

at the beginning of November, 2015. Here it was held the meeting of the U.S. Secretary of State with Ministers of Foreign Affairs of all five countries of the region. The first visit of the U.S. Secretary of State to the republics of Central Asia demonstrated the next raise of interest of Washington in this region. Following the results of the meeting it was adopted the Joint declaration in which the parties declared readiness to carry out regular contacts in this format and that six countries will promote attraction of foreign investments into the region, development of local business, regional trade, infrastructure, economic development and power links.

In fact, the C5+1 format represents an attempt to integrate all the republics of the region under the patronage of the U.S. Thus, there is competition to integration associations of the Central Asian countries with Russia and China, that shows the aspiration of Washington to limit influence of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in Central Asia. It is characteristic that the U.S. Secretary of State began his tour from Kyrgyzstan which closely cooperates with Russia on the military questions. At the meeting with the president of the republic A. Atambayev Kerry offered to sign a new military agreement with the U.S., though hinted that Washington doesn't plan creation of military base in the territory of the republic.

In Tajikistan to which Washington along with Uzbekistan earlier directed an offer to adjoin the anti-terrorist coalition, the U.S. Secretary of State promised support in protection of the border and solution of electrical shortage. The special role of Uzbekistan for the United States was already emphasized by the fact that the meeting within "C5+1" took place in this republic. As for Turkmenistan, recently in a position of Ashgabat it is more and more obvious its commitment to the U.S. Even in the spring of 2015 when military advance of Talibs began in the north of Afghanistan and there was information about presence of ISIS fighters there, Ashgabat made an official request to Washington for military aid and received an affirmative answer.

The president of the republic G. Berdimuhamedov ignored the October summit of the CIS at which it was accepted the concept of military interaction of the Commonwealth countries and directed instead of him the prime minister there. At the same time the Turkmen delegation headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkmenistan R. Meredovym was in the U.S. where conducted negotiations concerning American assistance for provision of security of the border with Afghanistan. Following the results of the negotiations the American party declared that the U.S. plans to deepen its relations with Turkmenistan.

Among the factors which caused turn of Ashgabat towards Washington, an important role is played by oil and gas interests of the republic. On the one hand, there is a traditional discontent of Ashgabat with cooperation with Russia in export of Turkmen gas and pressure from Russian Gazprom. Besides, the Turkmen government is concerned about growth of military activity of the Russian Federation in the Caspian Sea. The Russian political scientist A. Dubnov doesn't role out that the Turkmen authorities were dissatisfied with, uncoordinated with them rocket attacks, from the Caspian Sea water areas on Syria.¹¹

As a result, it is possible to state the following. First, there is a real threat from ISIS for the countries of Central Asia. This threat going from the southern borders of the CIS poses risks to the national interests of Russia. Decisions of the October summit of the CIS in Kazakhstan are aimed at its prevention.

Secondly, Russia is ready to claim additional responsibility for security in Central Asia that reflects in growth of its military aid within the CSTO.

Thirdly, strengthening of interaction of the countries of the region in the sphere of security is a required efficiency condition of combating terrorist threat. Fourthly, the lack of adequate level of this interaction gives the United States an opportunity to join integration processes of Central Asia, at the same time Turkmenistan can become their main support here.

In the conclusion it would be desirable to note the success of realized military projects within the listed organizations. At the same time ideological and information response to terrorism, dethronement of appeal of the ideas of pseudo religious organizations in the eyes of Russian youth and the countries of the Central Asian region, educational projects on studying bases and culture of traditional religions have to become the main instruments of counteraction.

Notes

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2018.02.007. VASILY BELOZEROV. IRANIAN FACTOR OF RUSSIAN STATE STRATEGY // *“Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Irana v politicheskoy, ehkonomicheskoy i kul'turnoj oblasti kak faktor ukrepleniya mira i bezopasnosti v Evrazii: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoj nauchno-prakticheskoy konferencii 19 oktyabrya 2016 [Cooperation of Russia and Iran in Political, Economic and Cultural Fields as a Factor of Strengthening Peace and Security in Eurasia: Proceedings of the International Scientific and Practical Conference. October 19]”*, 2016, Moscow, FSBEI HE MSLU, 2017, P. 69–72.

Keywords: Iran, Russia, the state strategy of Russia, existential contradictions, tradition and postmodernity, identity, Russian-Iranian cooperation.

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According to the researcher, the global “watershed” in modern international politics arose as a result of exacerbation of existential contradictions and differences in values. The sides of confrontation are tradition and postmodernity.

They are fundamentally different in the understanding of the family, the right to identity and subjectivity, violence and its application. Postmodern are transnational structures that, in order to achieve their goals, tend to weaken the state as an institution of political organization and self-government of the nation, to eliminate and replace it as a decision-making center.

Traditional actors seeking to maintain their identity and value system in the conditions of globalization (an integral component of which is the right to independently determine their own destiny and preserve the historically formed political organization of society) are on the other side of the global political confrontation.

States build strategies for action and their development, taking into account the above criteria. The notion of “state strategy” has recently been included in the political and scientific lexicon. The state strategy is the implementation of the long-term development project of the country and ensuring its security.

States have the right to determine the path of their development independently in accordance with the norms of international law. Russia is open to cooperation with its partners and allies on an equal footing and fulfills its obligations in relations with them. It is aware of its status in world politics, contributes significantly to solving global and regional problems and has its own vision of a world order.

Today, Vasily Belozеров asserts, Russia is developing its own global project. Russia openly declares its adherence to traditional values when developing and implementing its state strategy. Russia and Iran have differences in understanding the picture of the world, but there is no basis for confrontation. Established Russian-Iranian cooperation is a confirmation of this.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

MUSTAFA KHALED KHADZH. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST DIRECTION // *The article was written for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: US foreign policy, US foreign policy strategy, Middle East, US international assistance.

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Abstract. The article reveals certain historical aspects of the U.S foreign-policy strategy toward the Middle East. It gives a brief outline of the U.S. foreign policy evolution and its foreign policy priorities. Attention is turned to the fact that they have undergone substantial changes, yet one can hardly expect U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East, despite the shrinking of room for maneuver.

Instability in the Middle East has an influence not only on regional, but also on global political processes, which calls for an analysis of the role of this region in world politics and determination of the possible scenarios of the development of the situation. This requires examination of certain historical aspects, which would allow us to bring out the factors making the Middle East so significant in the world.

Speaking of the 20th century, in its first half this region was rather an object of world politics: the leading colonial powers of the time rivaled with one another for dividing the spheres of influence on it. The end of World War I and Germany's defeat led to increasing influence of the British Empire in the region (yet, it continued to remain in the periphery of world politics). The discovery of rich oil deposits in Saudi Arabia in the latter half of the 1930 did not change the situation. This could be explained

by the fact that the main oil deposits were situated closer to consumers in the industrial western countries.

On the whole, it can be said that even World War II and its end did not change the state of affairs. It was only the beginning of the Cold war that could be considered one of the factors, which contributed to the beginning of the transformation process of the Middle East and its role in the world political process. This was connected with the fact that on March 12, 1947, the U.S. President Harry Truman appeared in the U.S. Congress and spoke of the need to give an urgent financial aid to Greece and Turkey to a sum of \$400 mln to fight the spreading of communism (it was called the Truman doctrine). About two months later the Congress adopted a corresponding law.

Generally speaking, this doctrine envisaged Washington's aid of various kind to democratic countries for protection from communism. This meant the reorientation of the U.S. foreign-policy strategy and its foreign-policy course to interference in conflicts which occurred in far-off and strategically unimportant regions of the world. This aid was rendered to developed countries (under the "Marshall Plan") and developing ones, which were regarded important (Greece, Iran, Turkey, and others). The point was not only to give financial aid as such, but also deploy military bases and objects, and train local armed forces.

In this way, one may say that from that moment onwards the Middle East began to play a definite role in the U.S. foreign policy and became part of the system of confrontation with the U.S.S.R., although, as it could be seen from the Marshall Plan and a number of other undertakings, priority was given to Western Europe.

Gradually, the influence of the White House in the region has been growing. The late 1940s - early 1950s could be termed a period of Washington's formation as a Middle Eastern actor. Thus, the initial stage of the train of events included diplomatic recognition of Israel (1947), aid to Turkey and Greece, and Turkey becoming a NATO member (1952). It should be noted that during the 1950s relations with Saudi Arabia were distinguished by

mixed dynamics, however, from the early 1960s bilateral relations were growing on different directions.

In 1953, after Dwight Eisenhower came to power in the United States, the CIA took an active part in preparing and staging a coup d'état in Iran. From the mid-1950s Washington increased its political and other activity in the region, gradually ousting Britain from there. In 1955, with a view to containing the U.S.S.R. the "Baghdad Pact" was signed, which confirmed that the Middle East was thus included in the U.S. foreign-policy strategy, and its role (just as the role of other regions) was to contain the U.S.S.R., which was also increasing its influence on that direction (which was demonstrated by its support of Egypt and its President Nasser).

It should be noted that the strengthening of the positions of the United States in the region did not have a linear character: along with successes, there were failures, too. For example, a coup attempts in Syria (1957) failed, just as intervention in Lebanon (1958). After a coup in Iraq (1958) the new authorities of the country withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. President Nasser of Egypt carried on a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and Washington was powerless to influence him.

The misbalances accumulated to the early 1960s required a revision of the foreign-policy course. Within the framework of his first State of the Union Message President John Kennedy admitted the presence of crisis tendencies and emphasized the fact that it was precisely non-military aid to countries (primarily developing ones) that will enable the United States to restore the lost geopolitical positions and outstrip the Soviet Union. In order to render such aid a corresponding normative-legal basis, namely, the Foreign Assistance Act was adopted, as well as other legislative acts.[1] This provided the foundation for the formation of the USAID, the Peace Corps, and other bodies, which became the elements of the U.S. "soft power."

The first half of the 1960s was determined predominantly by the Caribbean crisis and the events connected with it. However, in

the latter half of the 1960s the situation in the Middle East exacerbated drastically. One of the key events of the period was the “six-day war” (1967) whose results formed the prerequisites of further instability in the region. The conflict assumed permanent character, passing into a “hot phase” from time to time between Egypt and Israel (1967–1970), and the “Yom Kippur war” (1973). The latter resulted in an oil crisis and the further rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

In the late 1970s two major changes in the regional political landscape took place. The first was connected with the reorientation of Egypt to the United States. From the mid-1970s American assistance to Egypt was steadily growing. Up to 1978 the White House granted Cairo only economic assistance, but from 1979 (after signing the Camp-David Agreements) it began to render it military assistance, too, whose volumes were growing annually, and by 1985 reached \$1.2 billion with economic aid remaining the same – about \$1 billion.

Another change was connected with the revolution in Iran in 1979. The latter had more serious consequences for the U.S. foreign-policy strategy in the region and outside its boundaries. Thus, the Iranian-U.S. confrontation, despite the conclusion of an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program with the Obama administration, continues to influence the foreign-policy strategy of the U.S. in the region, although by now Iran can hardly be included in the number of priority issues for the United States. Apart from that, the CENTO bloc was disbanded, which undermined the global system of American alliances in essence; NATO remained the only multilateral element of U.S. global policy.

The loss of Iran did not lower U.S. activity in the region. From the early-1980s the White House has considerably increased the volumes of both military and non-military aid to Middle Eastern states. With Ronald Reagan coming to power in the U.S., the figure increased from \$10.5 billion in 1981 to \$14 billion in 1988, and its peak was reached in 1988, when the figure exceeded \$18 billion (in current prices). A more detailed analysis shows

that the main recipient of American assistance was Middle Eastern countries: beginning from 1983 the figure always exceeded \$5 billion. Thus, the share of the Middle East in the total volume of American assistance comprised 30 percent and more, and the main recipient of it was Israel.

On the basis of the figures cited one can make a conclusion confirming that the Middle East was among the foreign-policy priorities of the United States in that period. This was connected not only with supporting Israel, but also other countries (for example, Egypt). Besides, in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1989) Washington, in accordance with its interests, actively supported both Iraq and Iran, which led to a great scandal in 1986 (the "Iran-contra affair").

The "Desert Storm" operation in 1991 was a major event not only of regional, but also global character, it demonstrated the growing might of the United States and actually proclaimed the formation of a unipolar world, inasmuch as the Soviet Union at the time was at the final stage of disintegration. The collapse of the U.S.S.R opened up new opportunities to Washington and shifted the foreign-policy focus to a new direction, thus placing the Middle East to the background. True, in the 1990s the United States began to worry over it becoming the source of new threats (primarily Iran's nuclear program).[2]

Among major regional initiatives of the United States mention should be made of an attempt to settle the Palestine-Israeli conflict, which began in the late 1980s. In 1991 a Peace Conference in Madrid was held at which the sides agreed to the principle of "territory in exchange to peace," and also agreed to hold direct bilateral negotiations. On September 13, 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the joint Declaration on Principles.

Within the framework of the implementation of a peace process in Washington, a Provisional Palestine-Israeli agreement was signed on September 28, 1995, on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Its realization could not have been stopped even by the

assassination of Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995. However, this agreement has not been implemented due to a number of factors, including the growing tension caused by frequent acts of terror, corruption in Palestine, the change of the government in Israel in May 1996, etc. Taking into consideration the continuing conflict, it is hardly possible to talk of a foreign-policy success of the White House in this direction, although the United States declares, as before, adherence to its settlement.

In the 1990s the United States continued to maintain its military-political presence in the Middle East, the volumes of its military and economic aid were stable, and its main recipient was, as before, Israel. However, it is worth noting that the volumes of aid to a number of countries (both military and economic) began to diminish. This concerns, first and foremost, Egypt. In 1990 it was \$2.4 billion, in 2000 – \$2.07 billion. (in current prices). This trend persisted in the 2000s (in 2009 the figure was less than \$2 billion), and the military coup in July 2013 led to a considerable reduction of the U.S. aid. In 2017 its volume was worth only \$141 million.[3]

The situation changed in the first half of the 2000s, which was connected with the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This increased the significance of the region and aid to it. In that period the main means of the United States were channeled to the rehabilitation of Iraq, which became the main recipient of the U.S. aid. In 2002 the volumes of aid to the region comprised \$6 billion, in 2003 the figure was doubled (up to \$12 billion), and in the 2004–2008 period it slightly diminished to \$12.7 billion.

This tendency continued in 2010, too, which could be explained by the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq. In the financial year of 2010 the total volume of assistance to countries of the region fell to \$8.8 billion. It was kept at the level of \$9 billion until 2014, when it came down to \$7.1 billion. As shown by an analysis, it was connected with the military coup in Egypt in July 2013.

Summing up, it can be noted that from the latter half of the 20th century until the early 21st century the role of the Middle East in the foreign-policy strategy of the United States changed, just as did the role of the countries of the region. Reviewing the foreign-policy strategy and foreign policy of the United States toward the region one can draw the following conclusions:

First, from the latter half of the 20th century, when the United States began to draw countries of the region in its orbit, and until the late-1980s the region played a subordinate role, being part of the foreign-policy strategy aimed at the containment of the Soviet Union. This also explained the growing support of Israel (which is the case both today and at the time of the Obama administration). Despite its subordinate role, the importance of the Middle East was growing considerably, which was especially noticeable in the period of the oil crisis of 1973 and in the middle of the 1980s.

Secondly, the first noticeable transformation of the region took place in the 1970s and it was connected with three major events. The first was the oil crisis of 1973, which became a factor of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia drawing closer (in the mid-1980s agreements between the two sides on the subject of the oil market became one of the reasons for the collapse of the U.S.S.R.). Another event was the inclusion of Cairo (1979) in Washington's orbit, although it was earlier regarded an ally of the U.S.S.R. Egypt remained an important link of the foreign-policy strategy of the United States right up to 2013 and in a greater part of that period was one of the biggest recipients of American assistance (holding second place in certain years).

The third event was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, which brought the overthrow of the Shah's pro-American regime and the establishment of "anti-American theocracy." It largely determines the relations of these two countries to this day, which bear a confrontational character, despite the coming to power of President H. Rouhani (2013), who is believed to be a representative of the national elite adhering to a course aimed at cooperation with the West. Taking into account the fact that allied relations have

been formed between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and that the latter and Iran have been fighting for leadership in the Islamic world, one can speak of the U.S. continuing its course to confrontation with Tehran.

Inasmuch as Washington realizes full well that Saudi Arabia will continue to use the United States for containing Iran, this confrontation will hardly have an acute character. If need be the two sides will be able to resort to harsh rhetoric (for example, on condition of a change of power in Iran in 2021). On the whole, taking into account the domestic problems of the United States and the changed alignment of forces in the Middle East, one should talk of a more narrow space for maneuvering of the White House in that direction, and of a serious opposition to it on the part of the big regional actors (Russia, Iran, Turkey), which joined forces to neutralize U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Thirdly, the “Desert Storm” operation (1991) against Iraq, which did not result in changing the ruling regime there, laid the foundations for the reformation of the Middle East in the mid-2000s, which led to its destabilization, increased influence of Iran, and lowered influence of the United States. On the one hand, the U.S. continued its activity in the region in the 1990s, having made a settlement of the Palestine-Israeli conflict the priority, while the volumes of American aid to countries of the region were kept at the level higher than \$5 billion a year (a considerable part of this aid went to Israel). On the other hand, the U.S. elite spent the first half of the 1990s on a thorough analysis of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the new reality. In this period, just as in the latter half of the 1990s, the U.S. efforts were concentrated on Europe, and this was expressed in the expansion of NATO and other anti-Russian undertakings.

Fourthly, the strategic importance of the Middle East for the U.S. considerably increased in 2003, which was due to its anti-Iraq campaign. Its specific feature was that the rapid military victory did not bring success and after it the White House bogged deep in the conflict. Actually, the United States suffered defeat,

which placed for discussion the question of the need to withdraw from the region at the end of the 2000s.[4] Moreover, this problem came to fore again in 2016–2017.[5] Examining statistical data (for instance, the figures of international aid), one can speak of the lowering of aid during the period of the Obama administration.

In 2009 the figure was \$12.7 billion, and in 2010, due to the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, it fell to 8.8 billion. The coup in Egypt in 2013 resulted in a further reduction of aid: in 2014 it was only \$7.1 billion, which was the lowest figure since 2003. A subsequent increase of assistance was due to the development of the situation and growing importance of such countries of the region as Iraq and Syria. Besides, in 2015 aid to Egypt was partly restored and now it amounts to \$1.2–1.3 billion a year. It should be noted that in 2016 the aid by the FMF program of \$1.10 billion was postponed, that is, one could assert that the real size of American aid was lower.

On the basis of the analyzed data it can be said that by the mid-2010 the U.S. foreign-policy priorities in the region changed – at present more attention is paid to Israel, Syria and Iraq, and the role of Egypt became less important, and is hardly to grow. It became evident that the complete withdrawal of Washington from the Middle East is impossible. But the positions of the United States there tend to worse.

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2018.02.008. MIKHAIL SLINKIN. SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION WARFIGHTING // *“Konfrontatsiya mezhdu Zapadom i Rossiey: S kem vy, strani Asii i Afriki?” – Moscow, IV RAN, 2016. – P. 28–34.*

Keywords: Syria, the Syrian armed opposition, IAG, FSA, radical Islamists.

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The author of the reviewed article M. Slinkin notes that one of peculiar features of the majority of wars and armed conflicts of the end of 20 – the beginning of the 21 century is broad participation of irregular armed groups (IAG): groups of guerrilla fighters, insurgents, separatists, terrorists, ethnic and tribal levies. Events in Syria also concern them. Originally armed wing of the Syrian opposition used the principles of waging city guerrilla which main goals are: physical elimination of armed forces heads, police and their assistants; expropriation of the resources belonging to the government and individuals. At the same time the purpose focused on fight financing in Syria pales into insignificance as money for arming and maintenance of opposition groups were granted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar and also some other countries. With that it was transformed to the aspiration to put as great as possible damage to industrial facilities, economic and social infrastructure of the country. In Syria militia groups also

applied individual terror against civilian managers for destabilization of a situation, carried out attacks against garrisons of army divisions and police posts, realized detonations of the improvised explosive devices (IED) on streets of cities as a result of which ordinary citizens perished.

The opposition activity concentrated over time on acquiring one of the large centers of the country in which its political wing could be approved for its recognition by the international community in the capacity of "full-fledged representative of the Syrian people." The main efforts of the Syrian Free Army (SFA) and going own way of it radical Islamists' groups were aimed to creation of such basic reference localities. Their attempts to consolidate in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and other cities broadly defined the nature of warfare which is conducted as a rule in urban environment in Syria.

Urban saturation in the country is rather high - 56%. Particular qualities of urban area in Syria are such that houses line narrow streets wall to a wall. It allows militia members to create reference localities, coordinating them in a unified system of communications through breaches in walls and underground tunnels where it can't be made. They light them up, place underground storages, shelters, day rooms. So, in Homs in the middle of 2013 about 40% of its territory were kept by opposition. In the Old city of Homs the fighters who were forced out by government forces from one or several houses went to neighboring buildings from where buffeted to ground flank or back areas, and if it was necessary moved to other districts of the city.

"Underground war" is a special feature of warfare in Syria. Underground communications were used by opposition forces in many cities and settlements, connecting the whole quarters in joint centers of defense. However carrying out underground works demands knowledge and technological means. By declaration of opposition, these means are delivered from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the U.S., France, Belgium which experts train militia

members skills of handling them. In Damascus and its suburbs there is a developed system of underground communications which couldn't be created after the beginning of warfare. Separate positions and firing-points are connected by tunnels to 1 kilometer long, forming defense system equipped in engineering regard. Near Bars government forces found the tunnel at a 12-meter depth 4 m wide and around 5 m height equipped with ventilation system and electric lighting. However Homs remains "champion" by underground communications in Syria, where tunnels appear as an extensive network with streets, conjunctions and lanes, leading outside the city.

Rebels seek to use military equipment seized at government forces effectively and take care of it. It concerns as FSA in the ranks of which there is a lot of former military personnel, as jihadists who got experience of handling heavy weapons during warfare in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other countries. As for armored vehicles, considering its insufficient quantity, the shortage of weapons and fuel, they pay considerable attention to its camouflage security, promotion on in advance chosen positions and withdrawal from them, using at the same time these surveyings, including satellite images of target objects.

Militias are forced to resort to handicraft industry of arms, military equipment and armament. This is not only about IED, but also about mortars, launchers of unguided air-to-surface missiles tractor-drawn and self-propelled guns. There is an abundant practice of weaponry installation on motor transport (heavy machine gun, anti-aircraft machine-gun, a small anti-aircraft artillery, etc.). Besides pickups which have already become a traditional arsenal of mobile means of combat of insurgents in different "hot spots" in Syria, in the light of rather developed traffic network of the country, small trucks are used as chassis, installing on them 37-mm anti-aircraft guns with local armored protection.

Particularity of warfighting of IAG's opposition is the Use of sniper specialists, the majority of who are foreign mercenaries. It is explained by the fact that training of the sniper specialists takes time

and can be successfully carried out only in the conditions of a training center having necessary base. Snipers in Syria act actively and defiantly. The territory won back of militia members for a long time remains dangerous for movement of civilians and military men. Therefore the last try to secure the routes of movement, pulling along them fabric aprons or lining up burned-out automotive equipment to remain behind them imperceptible for snipers.

Transferring by opposition of the main fight to cities and settlements pursues one aim – to break normal life of citizens, to incur displeasure and to direct it against the state which is incapable to ensure their safety. In conditions when it is impossible to reach it, oppositional groups recourse to terror, including murders of big groups of civilians with subsequent accusation of crime of government forces.

Slide towards terror not only against the authorities, but also against people is not a new phenomenon. It was noted in the 1960th in countries of Latin America, then in the 1980–1990th in Afghanistan, the Turkish Kurdistan and other “hot spots” and received the strategy’s name of creation of “a situation of double terror.” Its essence consists in provoking of authorities by means of acts of terrorism of inadequate punitive measures from which first of all ordinary citizens suffer, as envisioned by terrorists, these can force to revenge security forces and to rise in arms against authorities. Practice of this strategy realization leads to the fact that civilians turn in human shield for fighters. As for Syria, here the opposition often violently holds in areas of armed clashes population presented by confessional (Christians, Shiite Muslims, etc.) and ethnic (Kurds) minorities.

Presence of civilians in urban areas occupied by fighters creates considerable restrictions on use of airpower and heavy weaponry of Syrian ground forces, equating powers of opposing parties. Another “vulnerability” of regular army is that dislocation of force grouping, mobilizable resources, back area, the camp of replacement training and economic objects are known to the opponent that promotes his opportunities for the choice of place

and time for carrying out attacks and raids. These preferences of militias are added with efficiency of guerrilla methods of waging armed struggle. Their effectiveness has even more raised in connection with the following factors today. First, regular armed forces experience the increasing dependence on sustainable maintenance supply and operational stability of rear services. Secondly, the majority of modern military equipment samples and armament are very vulnerable even from insignificant damages. Thirdly, fighting capabilities of weapons system increased sharply (ATGM, LAW, MANPAD, mines, land mines), comparable by their combat capabilities with heavy IAG which are commonly used by fighters. Besides, modern compact mobile means of communication have simplified a task of the organization of an effective interaction not only between groups or their divisions, but also certain militias.

Space-like range of armed struggle contributes success of rebels' actions when the opponent – government forces – is forced to fragment forces and means, responding to militias' actions involving all new settlements in various regions of the country. The armed opposition, considering big extent of not covered with government troops and gendarmerie frontiers with bordering countries and lack of extensive network of checkpoints on roads, could create an effective pipeline of weapon, ammunition and equipment, specifically to Aleppo region from Turkey and to Homs region from Lebanon. The same factor also facilitates a replenishment of detached units by foreign contractors and Syrian citizens who were trained in foreign camps of Islamists.

Thus, IAG of the Syrian opposition use guerrilla ways of waging combat operations, including attacks on military facilities and military posts, captures and possession of settlements, entrapments, and widely resort to guerilla warfare. The armed violence is committed by them against governmental security agencies, authorities in the center and at the local levels, political opponents and big groups of population presented by religious

minorities of Shiite Muslims (first of all Alawites), Christians, etc., ethnic minority – Kurds and also against Sunni Muslims who refuse to contribute to fighters.

From the perspective of military art the civil war in Syria is a fight of active armed forces with the assistance of militia army created by the government and other security agencies against IAG. The Syrian armed forces posing an undoubted risk to the Israeli army were insufficiently effective in fight against separated, not having sole command IAG. The Syrian army, the author of the article emphasizes, prepared not for counter-terrorist operations, and was intended to wage traditional war which main opponent was Israel. Force development and its were directed at reflection of external aggression in the framework of echeloned defense providing differentiation of the concepts “front line” – “back area,” absent or washed away in the Syrian interstate armed conflict. However theoretically, having superiority of forces and means over unorganized, without sole command, the eclectic opponent presented by separate detached units and just groups of bandits which are at war with the robbery purpose, security agencies of Syria were to cope with it easily. It didn’t happen because besides the internal armed opposition out of Syria there are forces carrying out their financial, material, informational and foreign policy support.

M. Slinkin notes: use of regular forces in modern armed conflicts demonstrates that provisions and principles of military art based on the experience of World War II demand consolidation. Intensive, separated by place, but connected by the general concept actions of IAG often make impossible detailed planning, organization and waging combat operations by traditional methods. It is proved by character and features of waging combat operations during the civil war in Syria.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.02.009. GRIGORY LUKYANOV. LIBYAN CRISIS: FIVE YEARS OF INSECURITY, DEGRADATION AND DISINTEGRATION // *“Konfrontatsiya mezhdu Zapadom y Rossiey: S kem vi, strani Asii y Afriki?”* – Moscow, 2016. – P. 51–64.

Keywords: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (GSPLA), crisis, degradation, disintegration, “Arab spring”, M. Qaddafi, Africa, ISIS.

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Libyan crisis, the researcher writes, presents a spate of military-political conflicts lasting more than 5 years, differing in their form and nature, but representing a part of a single process of degradation and disintegration of Libyan society at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century.

In February, 2011 the wave of popular outrages which subsequently became history under the name “Arab spring,” having swept wider population and brought down political regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, reached northeast provinces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (GSPLA). Within a week as limited on number and membership meetings of Libyan human rights defenders escalated into something more, having no parallels neither in Cairo or Alexandria, nor in Tunisia. In Benghazi in 2011 the armed revolt which became a fundamental principle of the collapse of not only the regime, but also all Libyan statehood in the form in which it existed more than 40 grew from the protest directed against a judicial arbitrariness in separately taken case.

Contrary to the widespread belief representing Libyan events as a part of the “Arab spring” and identifying them with the situation in Egypt and Tunisia it is necessary, the researcher emphasizes, to prove fundamental differences of the “Libyan spring” to determine not only roles of an “external factor,” but also internal background. Long before the crisis of 2011 in Libyan society and the state there were formed contradictions

undermining bases of the political regime and turned institutions which earlier accomplished stabilizing functions, in a source of problems for further development of the system in whole.

The political regime created by M. Qaddafi combined elements of traditional political culture – that was necessary in the conditions of prevalence of tribal character of public relations – and differentially selected tools and institutions of the state of an era of art nouveau period. Oil resources of the country which provided economic boom and “Libyan social miracle” made a similar hybrid form of state effective for fulfillment of society’s requirements during its transformation and inclusion in regional and world economy, in 1970–1980th years. Nevertheless, in the 1990th several destructive tendencies for Libyan state took place. First, it was an ideological delegitimization of the regime in the eyes of the Jamahiriya population. Foreign policy reorientation of GSPLAJ – instead of the Arab Middle East the main direction of its foreign policy became Africa – destroyed the myth about a special place of Libya in family of Arab peoples. Turning around Africa and opening borders for Africans, M. Qaddafi got an influx of “new blood” to Libyan society. Thereby the leader of revolution and political elite received an ideologically loyal layer and economically dependent population but appearance of African migrants triggered off interethnic and interracial contradictions in Libyan society.

Secondly, there is a loss by a political regime of the arbitrator status over the tribes which are the main social institute of Libyan society defining political and cultural identification of most Libyans. For the 1970–1980th the base of M. Qaddafi regime and all Jamahiriya was the triad of tribal unions of a warfalla, the magarha and a kaddafa. From among their representatives there was a formation of power structures on all hierarchical vertical that provided balance of interests and distribution of benefits and preferences between the most numerous tribal union of the coast, the largest tribe of the South and native tribe of the revolution Leader, relatively. In 1993 after exposure of attempt of a military

coup tribal union leaders of a warfallal tuned out to be under suspicion of its organization that led to repressions against them. Loss of preferences resulted in consecutive deterioration in living standards for representatives of the largest tribal association, loss of confidence to the regime in general and privileged tribes - in particular.

Thirdly, there is an escalation of elites' conflict. This tendency represented itself in a new perspective in recent years of the regime existence - after lifting of international sanctions and restrictions. Removal of external barriers gave opportunities for integration of GSPLAJ into regional and world economy, returned old (the Russian Federation, Italy, France, Great Britain) and attracted new (Turkey, the People's Republic of China) investors and partners, promoted growth of welfare of the highest political and economic elite of the country. The political system created by Qaddafi with the purpose to resist external influence was too conservative and almost not reformed. There was polarization of elite in top echelons of power. For the lack of legal mechanisms and procedures of devolution after beginning of physical inability of Qaddafi to execute functions of the leader in the country there should have come crisis of power and open a "window of opportunities" on system reforming.

Split of elite became the reason that outrages in Benghazi in February, 2011 escalated into the organized insurgent movement provided with organizational and material resources within the country and from abroad, and system of State agencies and security was paralyzed and disoriented. Within decades army of the Libyan Republic, and then of Jamahiriya existed in two forms: support of the regime and a source of infinite plots against it. By 2011 in the country there were no armed forces capable to constrain external threats adequately. Having enormous stocks of outdated, but efficient weapon Libyan army which lost discipline and unity was paralyzed by passivity of the Supreme command and a rigid vertical of attachment. While opponents of M. Qaddafi supporters and "old" Jamahiriya not without

external support managed to accumulate forces and resources, including military ones.

G. Lukyanov considers main stages of development of Libyan crisis. The first stage which began in February and ended in October, 2011 is called a civil war and can be characterized as a period of the interstate internationalized armed conflict in Libyan Jamahiriya to falling of which it led. Two military-political camps acted as participants of opposition – supporters and opponents of the political regime of M. Qaddafi respectively. During battle actions on the party of the regime opponents who united under the auspices of the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi in March, 2011 a number of the foreign states and international organizations acted that doesn't allow to consider the conflict purely internal. Completion of this stage happened after M. Qaddafi's death on October 20, 2011.

The second stage evolves a short chronological period from the second half of autumn of 2011 till summer of 2012 inclusively when insurgent groups which won at the previous stage with active foreign mediation started the preparation for the first general election designed to create temporary nation-wide representative body of the Supreme power – the General National Congress (GNC). The leadership of PNS which is formally recognized as foreign observers, but not being such in practice was debated by large associations (The Council of War in Tripoli), and separate local groups (tribes and revolutionary teams). Emergence of various platforms for negotiation process and coordination of positions of various actors groups (tribes, new political parties, armed groups, local authorities) in the course of elections preparation, nevertheless, didn't allowed them to avoid application of organized violence of armed groups. Armed conflict of low intensity continued up to the beginning of vote and didn't come to the end after its termination and coming down.

The third stage is the most long-term which began in summer of 2012 after start of work of GNC, it came to the end in spring of 2014. During its existence central authorities didn't stop

trying to establish control over all territory of the country that only lead to reverse results. Including, emergence of autonomous sentiments at the local level (Benghazi, Misurata), strengthening of centrifugal tendencies, increase in number of federalization supporters of the country and decentralization of a system of government. Splits in GNC made a process of adoption of political decisions in it long and difficult, and work in general – inefficient. The internal political conflict of jurisdiction caused by refusal of GNC Islamic fractions to recognize results of the Constitutional assembly work, elections results of deputies of a new – already constant – representative body, the House of Representatives, and to stop work of the Congress became the reason of this period ending. An attempt of military authorities of Libyan national army to deprive of Islamists of their main support in the person of militarized organizations and revolutionary teams by the means of military and police operation “Dignity” was unsuccessful and propelled the country into a new civil war.

Throughout the fourth stage which lasted since spring of 2014 to winter of 2015–2016 in Libya violent confrontations of supporters of two parliaments which refused cooperation and dialogue with each other continued. This refers to a new civil war. Renewed GNC in Tripoli and the House of Representatives in Tobruk posed themselves as autonomous centers of force each offering a way of further development of the country. At the same time resources of both governments – both material, and moral and political – were restricted that didn’t allowed any of the parties to achieve a decisive preeminence in bilateral opposition. In this context the ability of Cabinet of Ministers in Tripoli and Tobruk to control own supporters turned out to be in ambiguous , real power appeared in hands at warlords and military leaders, tribal and ethnic leaders.

The sixth stage originating in December, 2015 and proceeding up to present time in many respects represents aspiration of a number of political forces, mainly outside Libya, to keep territorial integrity and political subjectivity of Libyan state

contrary to all destructive tendencies. Formation under the aegis and protection of the UN, European and Arab states of national unity government of Libya in December, 2015 – January, 2016 on the territory of the neighboring Tunisia represents nothing but an attempt of external forces to moderate Libyan crisis and not to allow distribution of its influence in Maghreb and the Mediterranean. The conflict passes into the new stage of development which showed full inability of various political camps in Libya to find a way to political settling of developed contradictions.

The author of the article analyzes key features and elements of disintegration process. Defeat of supporters of Jamahiriya in the military conflict of 2011 which is also called the Civil war in Libya marked crash of GSPLAJ as a political system and model of Libyan statehood. But death of Jamahiriya didn't lead to the end of its political elite, her considerable part also created new structures of power. Despite the lack of experience of party construction and parliamentarism in modern conditions, the political pluralism became natural heritage of Jamahiriya and Civil war. In summer of 2012 first time for many years general elections of deputies of the General National Congress (GNC), temporary representative body of power in the country took place. The liberal law on political parties providing a facilitated procedure of registration allowed, to create in the country dozens of parties and associations for participation in electoral process as soon as possible since the end of 2011 till spring 2012. The ideological range of organized political forces was rather wide, but reflected in many respects programs of associations of Libyan opposition abroad and also large foreign parties popular in all Arab world.

According to changes in the initial law on elections in GNC not representatives of parties, but independent candidates were to occupy a bulk of seats (120 of 200). In many respects for this reason in spite of the fact that with a certain overweight the victory among parties was won by secular association – “Alliance of national forces,” outran “Party of Justice and reconstruction” – in

interim parliament there were many supporters of Islamization of the country. So-called Libyan Islamists had no unity and were presented by a galaxy of political parties and associations which were built around symbolic figures and groups at financial support of external sponsors of neighboring countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan), Turkey and the states of Arabian Peninsula (KSA, the UAE, Qatar). The conflict between supporters of a secular way of development and those who spoke in support of Islamization need of society and the state, couldn't be resolved at rearrangement of structures of TNC before elections of 2012, within newly elected GNC. Any of political forces had no due overweight and support in society, in Libya there is no tradition of trust to these institutions.

At the end of 2013 and first quarter of 2014 conflicts undermining the General national congress from within reached the height. In the spring 2014 government's authority of Ali Zeidan trying to meet too many contradictory requirements of various forces within the country and beyond its borders failed downright. Forced measures of the Minister of Defence Abdullah al-Thani who has released Zeidan from duty of prime minister, aimed at stimulation of Constitutional assembly work, establishing order in GNC and preparation of new elections met organized repulse of supporters' coalition of Islamic organizations. Militarized groups of pro-Islamic associations "Dawn of Libya" and "Board of Libya" not only offered rebuff to government troops of General Khalifa Haftar, but also occupied the country's capital - Tripoli.

Against the backdrop of internal conflicts in Libya there was a new external force possessing far-reaching plans of further fate of all North African region in general. Having appeared at the end of 2014 near Dern town the cell of "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) soon declared about creation in Libya of three provinces of the Caliphate and by the end of 2015 established control over several settlements, including Sirt. From local and few group a Libyan branch of ISIL for only a few weeks turned into a serious military-political force with which the applicants for power

in Libya and interested in the crisis pacification by governments of foreign states should regard. At the same time, in G. Lukyanov's opinion, it isn't necessary to exaggerate value of a factor of ISIL and its influence on internal political situation in Libya in general. This organization with its ideology and structure continues to remain predominately unfamiliar for Libyan society, it can't be built in tribal structure and use it for itself to the benefit as it was made in Iraq and Syria. For this reason the territory under its control is small and limited to the areas ruined by war and left by population. For a year and a half the main efforts of troops of LNA and "Dawn of Libya" were mainly directed not against ISIL, and against each other. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2016 attempts to consolidate political forces of the country under the auspices of national unity government were based on designing of an image of a general enemy as ISIL was positioned.

In the medium term the Libyan crisis is still far from solution, and the fate of a single Libyan state is also foggy. The concept of a single centralized unitary state lost the legitimacy in eyes of a considerable part of the population and its representatives: centrifugal tendencies still gain momentum against the background of the continuing destruction of economic infrastructure, degradation of public institutions and total inefficiency of institutions of state. Federalization, or broad decentralization, seems to be the only means to hold together turning into self-sufficient bulwarks of conflicting tribes and military-political groups of the city and settlements. Fragmentation amplifying at all levels and atomization of society does well to the most radical political groups which earlier didn't have so favorable conditions for penetration into it and serves as the favorable environment for further disintegration of once single socio-political space of the Libyan state, – the researcher comes to such conclusion.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.02.010. URAL SHARIPOV. POLITICAL AND INTRA-RELIGIOUS CRISIS IN YEMEN AND PROVOCATIVE ROLE OF EXTERNAL FORCES // *Trudi Instituta vostokovedeniya RAN. Vipusk. 4. Economicheskie, sotsialno-politicheskie, etnokonfessionalnie problemi afro-asiatskih stran,* Moscow, 2017, P. 189–196.

Keywords: Shiism, Sunnism, Zaydiyah, Houthis, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the U.S.

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The Yemen crisis, the researcher emphasizes, reflects not only internal contradictions between tribes, Sunnites and Shiites, but also interests of monarchic regimes of the Arabian Peninsula and also the U.S.

In Yemen throughout centuries tribal entities belonging to two leading branches of Islam – Shiism and Sunnism coexist. Though there were ideological religious differences between them, their mutual contradictions didn't take severe forms. During the 20th century this country which was long time a feudal monarchy was involved in a whirl of political changes. In 1962 as a result of revolution Zaydiyah (a branch of Shiite Islam) monarchy was overthrown, and the country began to live within the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) under auspices of a Sunni ruling elite. The Shiite minority was represented as if playing supporting roles. There were changes in state system of Yemen in the last decades of 20th century: in 1967 the southern Yemen which was the British protectorate got independence, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) adhering to pro-socialist orientation was formed; in 1990 YAR and PDRY united in one Republic of Yemen (RY). During this period on the political stage of the approaching Yemen penetration of Al-Qaeda into this country began. However, Yemen is considered by Al-Qaeda not as an object for establishment of its supreme power, in view of its tribal

structure and as a support point for carrying out diversions to destabilize KSA and undermine American interests in a zone of the Arabian Peninsula and also in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and East Africa. Using inability of the government under Ali Abdalla Saleh's presidency to control the most part of the territory, "Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP) more and more penetrated into Yemen society. The strategy of Al-Qaeda in Yemen came down to demonstrative acts of terrorism against objects of Western states. They were followed by propaganda campaigns in settlements under control to it by providing local residents with security and decrease in inter-clan contradictions, medical services and carrying out in life projects of social and economic appointment. In the south power was seized by field commanders of various groups. AQAP and ISIL representing mainly the interests of local Sunnites at the same time, opposed intervention of the U.S. and the KSA and also, for the purpose of pacification of Shiite tribes, didn't beat up their antagonism against foreign enemies. The war in Yemen developed into an intra religious conflict with intervention of Sunni and Shiite external political forces that led to empowerment of radical Islamic organizations.

The Shiites compactly living in the North and the West of the country also opposed the government of the president Ali Abdalla Saleh in Sana'a, its corruption and ties with the U.S. Their representatives demanded autonomy of the region. Hussein Al-Husi became the leader of the revolt (was killed in 2004). In 1994 he created radical Islamic group "Ansar Allah." After his death the movement of insurgent Shiites began to be called Houthis. Since 2009 Houthis movement became more active and made a raid on the Saudi village Jabal al-Dukan where two frontier sentries were killed. In return Saudi Arabia began open intervention in the Yemen intra confessional conflict. Though in 2010 between Houthis and the government it was signed a truce, it existed prior to the beginning of "the Arab spring."

In January, 2011 in Yemen mass demonstrations with requirement of resignation of the president Ali Abdalla Saleh and

social reforms began. Under pressure, the president declared some concessions: he reduced the number of presidential terms to two consecutive ones, refused to participate in future elections. However, government repressions began to strengthen, and on 18 March in Sana'a, the capital of the country, 52 demonstrators were killed. Ali Abdalla Saleh established a state of emergency regime but contrasted with shutdown of government and also resignations of several ministers and the ambassador of Yemen in the UN demonstrations continued. Then it was reported about achievement of truce and readiness of the president Saleh to resign within 30 days, and within two months after his leaving new presidential elections must be held. But Saleh refused to sign the document coordinated by the parties. Demonstrations were resumed with increased intensity and enveloped all North of the country that led to great victims among the parties. On 3 June presidential residence in Sana'a was attacked by fire. At the same time Ali Abdalla Saleh, prime minister and a speaker of parliament were wounded. Saleh escaped from Yemen, and in November from the capital of the KSA it was announced from his name a shift of power to Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi – the vice-president of Yemen. But also, his government within two years turned out to be incapable to put in place vital reforms, and the Houthi movement, AQAP and ISIS continued strengthening their positions in provinces under control.

More than five years there is chaos of internal war between political opponents among whom pro-Shiite and pro-Sunni religious groups and also tribal entities clearly appear. Nowadays the country was divided into three zones of attachments: the North and the West were under the reign of radical Shiite group “Ansar Allah”; the South and a part of the central territories – under control of the central government supported by militia, a part of the Yemen army and also Saudi coalition. “Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP) is concentrated in the central part of the country, east areas are controlled by the IS, tribal militias and Salafis from “Ansar-ash-Sharia.” Confrontation went on with varying success.

However Houthis began to succeed, they took control of oil-field regions and their transport communications to the Red Sea and partially to the south, eventually captured the capital of Sana'a, with all government agencies, the central bank, armoury, in January, 2015, occupied the residence of the president of Yemen, have forced Mansour Hadi to make an application for resignation. In February he fled the country through the southern port Aden. Then Houthi insurgents created their own body of central power – Revolutionary committee which in August, 2016 was eliminated, delegating the powers to the Supreme Political Council. The president Hadi, understanding that Riyadh didn't meet views of the Yemen events development to the benefit of Shiites and Iranian influence, he chose the KSA as asylum where he called for organization of external military intervention to Yemen. There was formed foreign military coalition consisting of member countries of GCC, Egypt, the U.S., Morocco, Sudan, Pakistan, Senegal and Jordan. After that Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi returned to Aden and proclaimed it the temporary residence of the government. Riyadh began to lay down the laws of activity to the cabinet. Thus, the international coalition ensured an official invitation for conducting military operations on the territory of Yemen. In March, 2015 military operations of the international coalition against Houthis began with the operation "Decisive Storm" which lasted for a month. Further new operation "Restoring hope" was organized. Firings overwhelmed a number of regions, including Aden, Taiz, Saad, Ibb. In the course of military operations the artillery, aircraft and Naval Forces were used. Houthis succeeded not only in occupation of the large city of Taiz, but also in temporary establishment of control over Aden. Then the president Hadi ran to eastern Sayvun in the province Hadramaut. Aden, the main port of the country, was recaptured of Houthis after long-term fights by forces of Saudi coalition in July, 2015. Though the UN offered mediation to stop bloodshed by means of "Road map," fighting was resumed in August, war continued.

The U.S. unexceptionally supports Saudi Arabia and connected with it and the West forces in Yemen to fight against the IS together, Al-Qaeda, with anti-American forces and sentiments on Near and Middle East, and during the present period presented by the IRI, Syrian government and also against a possibility of influence expansion of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China and other factors which are capable to undermine actually established military occupation by the world government of the western corporations and the U.S. of the Near and Middle East region. Washington constantly intensifies arms tap and modern military technology to Riyadh to help the KSA to interfere with political contradictions on Near and Middle East.

The pro-Saudi coalition, the researcher draws a conclusion, doesn't want to solve the Yemen conflict peacefully, hoping that, eventually, its troops will be able to defeat Houthis, Saleh's supporters. It can happen only after long and bloody battles between the Arabian coalition, on the one hand, and joint groups of Houthis and armed forces of Abdallah Saleh on the another one.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

IGOR DOBAYEV, RUSLAN GAJIBEKOV. "SHAHIDISM": KIND OF TERRORISM DISGUISED AS ISLAM // *The article was written for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islamism, radicalism, terrorism, "shahidism," extremism.

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Abstract. The article examines "shahidism," its interpretation in early Islam, as well as the transformation of its meaning in ideological doctrines of modern radical Islamism. It proves that assertions of Islamist ideologists contradict the premises of Islamic orthodoxy. This is why radical "shahidism" can be regarded as terrorism camouflaged with Islamic faith.

Against the background of the escalation of terrorist violence, which began in the latter half of the 20th century, the most dangerous type of terrorist attacks - those committed by suicide maniacs - continue to spread. These people are wrongly termed "shahids."¹

Muslim religious-political culture use the term "shahid" to denote a Muslim who sacrificed himself for faith. All who died a

violent death, or died during the hajj, are considered "shahids."² However, Islamic orthodoxy categorically denies identity between the "shahids" and suicide-terrorists.

According to Islamic traditional doctrine, a Muslim who committed suicide should not and cannot be regarded "shahid." Suicide which has caused death of peaceful people is considered one of the gravest sins, which God never forgives.

However, religious figures who adhere to extremist ideology and use Islam for political purposes try to approve and substantiate suicide as a necessary means of struggle against the enemy, presenting it as "shahidism," and those who died in the terrorist acts as "shahids."

Suicide, and consequently, suicide-terrorists killing thousands of innocent people run counter to the moral principles of Islam. Although the Koran allows retribution for murder, nevertheless, it is strictly restricted by the denial of excessive violence.

Acts of "pseudo-shahidism" were widely used in the Middle Ages, for one, by the adepts of one of minor sects of Ismailites (Hashishins, Assassins). Suicide terrorism existed in the past, but it became quite widespread in the latter half of the 20th century – early 21st century.

According to one of the experts on this subject, S. Chudinov, suicide-terrorism originates from the Shi'ite version of radical Islam, which became widespread in war-ravaged Lebanon, which was plundered by foreign occupation after World War II. Most extremist movements, which accepted and adapted the tactic of suicide-terrorists to the conditions of a socio-political conflict in their Motherland during the 1990s, copied the Lebanese model of resistance. (In turn, this model was a replica, in a way, of the Iranian "Basi" Force at the time of the Iranian-Iraqi war soon after the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran.)³

In the 1980s "shahidism" began to be connected with the Shi'ite activity, inasmuch as its manifestations became more frequent after the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran. During

the war with Iraq young Iranian boys were sent to the minefields of the enemy: the more victims the higher the morale of the army.

From the early 1990s members of pro-Iranian, Palestinian and Lebanese groupings ("Jihad Islami," " Hamas" and "Hezbollah") often acted as "live bombs," quite a few of them were young boys and girls.⁴ Their age was between 18 and 30. As a rule, they were people with a secondary or incomplete secondary education,, however, the number of those with a higher education tended to grow lately.

If the suicide-terrorists' attacks are viewed in the context of the Palestinian "intifada" (it began in 1987), they were the peak of the Use of these means of struggle by the Palestinians. From April 1993 until March 1996 the Palestinian terrorists of the "Jihad Islami" and " Hamas" committed 32 acts of terror in which 127 Israelis were killed and 638 wounded.

In the view of the ideologists of "shahidism," terrorist acts of suicide-terrorists glorify the role of the Islamist movement in this struggle. Moreover, suicide-bombers broaden and popularize Islamic resistance and draw new adepts to the ranks of the Palestinian resistance who are ready to do everything for the sake of realizing the ideas crammed into their heads.

Motivation and religious aspect of "shahidism":⁵

Radical Islamism has created its own ideological concept of "martyrs' death." The ideas of "shahidism" give their adherents a sort of the sacral sanction to carry on terrorist activity, which is regarded by them as a "sacred war for faith, jihad." This is why no matter how successful anti-terrorist operations might be, they will go on until the conditions exist creating the atmosphere contributing to the growth of the terrorists' ranks.

It should be emphasized that suicide-terrorist who fulfills his mission is promised by the ideologists of "shahidism" boundless mercy, freedom from all personal problems, heavenly life in paradise, honorary position for himself and his family, and profound satisfaction from participation in Islamic jihad and "salvation of Muslims."

Spiritual gurus – Muslim authorities who are not direct participants in terrorist acts or members of terrorist groupings, drive potential suicide-terrorist to the state of religious exaltation, which brings him to the sphere of “holiness” and leave him in that state of ecstasy until the completion of his mission. The potential suicide-terrorist is persuaded that his intentions are chaste and noble, that his death will be light and painless, and that he will get to paradise after it.

Suicide-terrorist acts differ from other forms of terrorism by the perpetrator’s readiness to fulfill his “divine” mission, which will end with death. This readiness is based on his personal qualities and is largely a result of the ideological influence of his ideological mentors on his mentality. Some people have strong religious motives to be ready to sacrifice their life to a “noble” cause. Especially, when religion promises a considerable posthumous requital and the deed itself is committed in critical conditions. In this case spiritual enthusiasm of a potential suicide-terrorist, his readiness to sacrifice his life becomes irreversible.

Training suicide-terrorist. The authoritative expert on political Islam A. Ignatenko described preparations of an Ismailite shahid for a terrorist act in the early Middle Ages. First he was given some wine mixed with henbane. Then he was brought to a beautiful garden with everything best, which had ever created by Allah – wonderful trees, flowers and fruit. Young beautiful girls, slaves and musicians served him for a whole week. Then he fell into a drunken sleep and brought back home. On waking up he asked his old master to take him back to the garden. The old master said to him: “Kill so and so. If you are executed after that you will get to the beautiful place where you had already been.”

The ignorant man believed his master and agreed to commit the fatal deed.”⁶

The Palestinian radical groupings, for example, “Jihad Islami” and “ Hamas” use definite psychological methods to prepare the future “shahids”: one of them is fictitious funerals at night, which has a very strong effect on man’s psychology and state of mind.

During these funerals excerpts from the Koran are read; potential suicide-bombers are promised rewards from Allah and the Muslim ummah; they are also promised eternal life full of pleasures in the “garden of Eden”; potential suicide-terrorists are offered the opportunity to join the ranks of “honorary heroes of Islam.”

Religious mentors use sacral sources of Islam to prove that in the present military, political and socio-cultural situation terrorist acts are absolutely necessary and are justified by religious laws of Muslim life.

The ideologist of “shahidism” claim that at present a bitter fight is going on between the “weak world of Islam” and its strong enemy. In this situation jihad should be waged by all Muslims and all means could be used for the purpose. The methods used so far have not been effective enough, because the enemy is better armed, better equipped and organized. Besides, there are great difficulties in arms and explosives transportation and penetration of certain countries’ territories.

In order to inflict greater damage on the enemy and sow fear in his hearts more explosions should be made in different places, especially at centers of big concentration of people.

Use of women – suicide-terrorists. Certain radical Islamic groupings believe that the role of women is to give birth to and rear children, who will fight the enemy in the future. This is why there is no place for women in direct armed struggle.

However, many extremist leaders of terrorists, for instance in Palestine, encourage the Use of women suicide-terrorists as an effective weapon in fighting the enemy, because it is more difficult to spot and neutralize them. In contrast to men, it is much easier to women to worm their way to the “enemy camp with the shahid belt” bypassing police control posts, all the more so since a woman-bomb often looks like pregnant woman. In connection with the Use of women as “shahids” an argument is going on concerning the “legal character” of such practice from the Sharia view. Many experts on Muslim law maintain that woman has no right to appear in the street alone without a male escort, to boot,

with a “shahid-belt” on her body. This is why, from the point of view of Islamic orthodox priests, it is forbidden to use women as live bombs. However, radical Islamists adhere to another view.

Although at present most terrorist acts committed by suicide-bombers are sponsored by Islamist groupings, the religious component of their motivation is not so necessary for all historical types of suicide-terrorism. Sometimes the spirit of nationalist struggle waged by a minor ethnic community and its cultivated ideology of self-sacrifice are intertwined with an Oriental cult of the charismatic leader of a rebel movement so much so that it may be enough to turn adepts of a nationalist movement into live bombs. As an example we may cite the activity of the “Tamil-Ilam” (“Tamil Tigers”) in Sri Lanka, or the Kurd separatists from the PKK who perpetrate terrorist acts in Turkey. The nationalist component was strong even in Lebanon, the birthplace of modern suicide-terrorists among nationalist parties and groupings of Lebanon (Syrian social-nationalist party, etc.). However, radical Islam remains the most important cultural and ideological basis of spreading suicide terrorism in the modern world. Moreover, it was precisely the Islamist interpretation of Islamic martyrdom that became the foundation of its globalized form.⁷

Meanwhile, the number of suicide terrorist acts continues to remain a serious problem for certain regions of the world. For instance, Iraq occupied by the United States and its allies in the mid-2000s. The years 2005 and 2007 were the peak in this respect. (478 and 442 cases of using “live bombs”). In all, about 1,700 big explosions committed by suicide terrorists were registered in the country. Another country with a broad activity of “shahids” is Afghanistan where 140 suicide terrorist acts have been registered annually since 2006.⁸ Pakistan, too, has become a country where suicide terrorist acts have become more frequent and bloody.

“Shahidism” in the North Caucasus. “Shahidism” has ceased to be a local phenomenon inasmuch as it has acquired a global scope: shahids’ acts are registered in many countries, including in Russia, especially in its North Caucasian region.

Previously, these acts were very few and far between there. The phenomenon of suicide is alien to the North Caucasian ethnic groups. There is even no such term meaning this phenomenon in the Chechen language.⁹

During the first Chechen campaign (1994–1996) there were practically no cases of “shahidism,” but in the second war (1999–2009) they became almost an ordinary happening. In the early 2000s the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev announced the formation of death squads which committed numerous acts of terror in the North Caucasus, as well as in Moscow and Kislovodsk in which innocent people lost their life.

Suicide terrorism in Chechnya is unusual in many respects. First, it is characterized by a very high percentage of women taking part in terrorist acts. It has been calculated that women participated in 22 of 27 terrorist operations from June 2000 until May 2005. Women’s share among suicide bombers amounted to 43 percent (47 of 110 people). As to the objects of the attempts, out of 28 terrorist operations with the participation of suicide-killers committed from June 2000 to July 2005, ten were aimed at military objects, four – at Moscow government offices and Chechen government officials, fourteen – at civilian objects (eight of them were in Moscow). In the first two years suicide terrorists’ attacks took place only in Chechnya and were aimed at Russian military bases, later on they spread to other areas. 2003–2004 were the peaks of the activity of Chechen suicide terrorism, although it still remains a marginal phenomenon unapproved by the local public.¹⁰

A new wave of suicide-terrorism was registered in the North Caucasus (particularly in Chechnya in 2009, which spread not only to neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia, but also to some other Russian regions). For one, in the summer of 2009 an attempt on the life of Yunus-bek Evkurov, President of Ingushetia, was made. That very year ten people became “live bombs” on the territory of Chechnya, four such people were in the Republic of Ingushetia and one person in Dagestan.¹¹ Suicide-terrorists have also committed their acts in North Ossetia, Stavropol Territory and in

Moscow. This tendency continued in the following years. According to official data, of the 23 terrorist acts registered in the country in 2010 eight were committed by suicide-bombers, and in 2011 – of ten such acts four were made by suicide terrorists.¹² Law-enforcement bodies manage to stem the activities of such terrorists by liquidating or arresting them from time to time.

As is the sad practice, the role of “live bombs” in the North Caucasus is played by young men and women, that is, “black widows.” The training of such terrorists is conducted in groups and according to special methods with the Use of zombie technologies and special assignments forming harsh motivating instructions with corresponding attributes and rituals.

However, in recent years the ranks of suicide-terrorists were filled mainly by younger men. The development of “shahidism” in Russian regions shows the growing influence of Middle East extremist organizations on evolutionary processes in North Caucasian radical Islamism, and broader participation of mercenaries in preparing and perpetrating terrorist acts in the North Caucasus.

The North Caucasian militants have succeeded to train and set up a good reserve of potential suicide terrorists, as well as ideologists and trainers of “shahids” from among not only foreign, but also Russian citizens (for example, Said Buryatsky, who was killed later). According to experts, the practice of “shahidism” is quite effective: explosions of “live bombs” account for three percent of all terrorist acts, but they claim 48 percent of the victims.¹³ As to Russia, in the period between August 1999 and September 2009 suicide-terrorists committed 41 acts of terror in various regions of Russia, mainly in the North Caucasus, which took a toll of many lives. In 2010–2011, 12 more suicide killing acts were registered. Thus, between 1999 and 2011 suicide-terrorists committed 53 terrorist acts. For comparison’s sake: in Israel during the “infifada” (the first such campaign was in Palestine in 1987, the second – in 2000) there were 59 Palestine deaths.¹⁴ In other words, for the number of “live bombs” the North Caucasus was definitely catching up with Palestine, and by the number of acts was definitely

ahead of it. True, it should be noted that the doubtless leaders in committing the acts of terror by suicide terrorists were Afghanistan and Iraq occupied by the United States and its allies. There have been hundreds of such acts annually, just as in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, suicide is banned not only by Islam, but also by the adats (laws) of the mountain people of the North Caucasus. Under these laws, a man or woman who committed suicide should not be buried on the cemetery where his or her relatives lie. He or she is usually buried in another place, more often unknown.

More frequent cases of suicide among North Caucasian mountain dwellers in the first decade of this century is an extraordinary phenomenon as such. "shahidism" is an alien phenomenon to Caucasian mentality and to traditional socio-cultural being, however, it is persistently forced on the local people.

As a result, in the period under review "shahidism" has become an almost ordinary phenomenon in the North Caucasus. The terrorist acts in Grozny (May 12, 2003) and Ilskhan-Yurt (May 14, 2003) were committed by "Kamikaze." On June 5, 2003, a woman-suicide committed an act of terror in Mozdok as a result of which eighteen people were killed. On July 6 a block of flats in Grozny was exploded, with ten people killed, including eight children. A military hospital was completely destroyed in Mozdok in 2014 with more than 100 victims, and a suicide-bomber committed another act of terror in the center of Grozny in 2014.

However, unfortunately, the official Muslim clergy has not paid due attention to the problem of theoretical-ideological opposition to terrorism for quite a long time under cover of Islam in its most acute form. This can partly be explained by the fact that representatives of traditional Islamic structures, unprotected from violence on the part of the militants, do not risk, even fear, to oppose them. There are weighty grounds for this: during the past two decades more than fifty Muslim clerics were killed by terrorists in the North Caucasus. In 2003, in Shatoi (Chechnya) the son of its Mufti A.-Kh. Shamayev and three of his villagers were killed by terrorists. In another village an authoritative mullah was

murdered in Vedeno district. The former mufti of Chechnya and then its President Ahmad-hojja Kadyrov has also been killed by terrorist-militants. Unfortunately, such examples are many and varied in other North Caucasian republics, too.

At the same time, terrorism, being a socio-political, but not a religious phenomenon, often acquires an Islamist disguise. As the well-known Russian expert on Islam A. Ignatenko notes, "terrorists (if they are Muslims) represent another Islam, not the one led by its traditional heads. I think that all terrorist acts of recent months and years with the participation of Muslims in the United States, Indonesia, in the Philippines, Russia and elsewhere have been planned and committed with a view to radicalizing Islam and turning it into a more extreme form. In other words, it looks like the forces of law and order deal blows at terrorists who entrenched themselves in the living quarters of peaceful citizens. Naturally, during these operations peaceful civilians suffer, too, and gradually become sided with terrorist militants."

Thus, modern "shahidism" is, above all, a socio-political phenomenon. In committing retaliatory forcible acts Muslims have no right to resort to violence exceeding the limits allowed by Islam. It is important to note that Islam calls on all Muslims not to kill themselves and refrain from committing vicious crimes, which shows a high spiritual potential in the Koran and sunna of Prophet Mohammed. All this gives grounds to assert that terrorism, all the more "shahidism," connected with excessive violence has nothing in common with pure orthodox Islam. The above-mentioned features are characteristic exclusively of radical Islamism.

Notes

- 1 Yujeoglu. Islam o shahidakh i terroristakh-smertnikakh // Islam o terrore i aktsiyakh terroristov-smertnikov [Islam on Shahids and Suicide-terrorists // Islam on Terror and Acts of Suicide-terrorists] / Moscow, 2005, p. 144.
- 2 Islam: Encyclopedic Dictionary. Moscow, 1991, p. 296.
- 3 S. Chudinov. Terrorism smertnikov [Terrorism of Suicide-killers]. Moscow: Flinta, Nauka Publishers, 2010, p. 88.

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- ⁴ L. Mlechin. Kno vzorval Ameriku? [Who Blasted America?]. Moscow, 2002, p. 418.
- ⁵ Palestinian “shahidism” is described on the basis of a review entitled “Suicide Terror and Muslim Extremist Organizations” on the site of Israel’s Embassy in Moscow.
- ⁶ Ismailites’ Paradise (translated from Arabic) // Otechestvenniye zapiski. 2003. No 5, p. 116.
- ⁷ S. Chudinov. Op. cit., pp. 88– 89.
- ⁸ I. Dobayev, A. Dobayev, V. Nemchina. Geopolitika i terrorizm epokhi postmoderna [Geopolitics and Terrorism of Post-modern Epoch] // Rostov-on-Don, YUFU Publishers, 2015, p. 170.
- ⁹ Description of “shahidism” in the North Caucasus is based on the book by V. Akayev Islam: sotsiokulturnaya realnost na Severnom Kavkaze [Islam: Socio-cultural Reality in the North Caucasus] // Grozny, 2004, pp. 221–231.
- ¹⁰ S. Chudinov. Op. cit., p. 65.
- ¹¹ I. Dobayev. Sovremenny terrorizm v mire i na Severnom Kavkaze: sushchnost, praktika, opyt protivodeistviya [Modern Terrorism in the World and North Caucasus: Essence, Practice, Experience of Opposition]. Orientir. 2010, p. 12.
- ¹² See: National Anti-terrorist Committee [official site]. URL.: <http://www.nak.ru>.
- ¹³ D. Nechitailo. Zapal dlya “umnoi” bomb [Fuse for “Clever” Bomb] // NG-religii. 2009, September 16.
- ¹⁴ I. Sukhov. Marsh smertnikov [March of the Doomed] // Vremya novostei. 2009. September 18.

GAFUROV UYGUN. HISTORY OF FORMATION AND PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF MUSLIMS IN UZBEKISTAN // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Muslim World.”*

Keywords: Islamic education, madrasahs, secular sciences, SADUM.

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The history of Islamic education in Uzbekistan has more than twelve centuries. There was a ramified network of madrasahs, and in the 9-10 centuries, both Islamic and natural

(secular) sciences were taught. In essence, madrasahs were equivalent to the modern system of secondary specialized and higher education. The evolutionary processes of the system of Islamic education are especially noticeable in the late 20th - early 21st centuries.

The need to analyze the evolution of religious education in modern Uzbekistan, the educational and methodological content of new educational programs in Islamic educational institutions, the understanding of the common processes associated with the transformation and reform of the system of modern Islamic education are becoming apparent.

In the 1920s, the Soviet government issued hypocritical statements supporting Muslims and promising them religious freedom, trying to manipulate Muslim believers in order to gain support for the new government. However, ten years have not passed since the Soviet government discovered that the anti-religious state policy did not succeed among the followers of Islam due to the high religiosity of Muslims and took a number of measures, as a result of which the network of Muslim educational institutions in Uzbekistan was practically destroyed.

I. Formation and functioning of the Muslim education network of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan in the years of Soviet rule (1943–1991).

The only legal and educational institutions available for Soviet Muslims to train religious personnel¹ not only for the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM), but also for all four Islamic spiritual administrations of the former Soviet Union² in the post-war decades were: the restored Mir-i Arab Madrasah (known since 1540, recreated in 1945) in Bukhara and Barak Khan Madrasah (1956–1961) in Tashkent. The Tashkent Islamic Institute (Aliy Ma'had) named after Imam al-Bukhari was created on the basis of Barak Khan Madrasah in 1971 and it functions to the present day.

The family of muftis Sadum Babakhanovs - Ishan Babakhan Abdulmadzhidkhanov (1943–1957), Ziyautdinhan

Babakhanov (1957–1982), Shamsiddikhan Babakhanov (1982–1989) – had a great influence on the formation of the above-mentioned educational institutions in the new conditions. In May 1945, Sadum adopted a resolution “On the establishment of two madrasahs in the cities of Tashkent and Bukhara,” with a total contingent of 90 students and a period of study of 9 years. The training cycle consisted of two stages: the first ibtidhi (5 courses) and the second rushdi (4 courses).

On October 10, 1945, the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom, SNK) of the USSR adopted an order to open Muslim spiritual schools in the cities of Tashkent and Bukhara after long correspondence with Moscow. Since October 1, 1946, 30 students have started training in the Mir Arab Madrasah. The academic year began on October 2 and lasted until May 1, according to the decision of SADUM, i.e. 6 months including winter holidays. From 1962–1963 academic year, the duration of study was changed to 8 months (from 1.09 to 1.05).³ Takaev Abdukhamid was appointed the principal of Mir Arab. Mukhitdinov Hodzhiakbarkhan (chief mudaris, teacher of the Arabic language, sarf, nahv, kiraat, tajvid) and Izamov Gulam (teacher of the Uzbek language, sarf, nahv, husnihat, hisab) – teachers.⁴

But the opening of the “Barraq-Khan” madrasah was delayed and a final decision was made to open a second madrasah in Tashkent only in 1956 with the assistance of Inogamov,⁵ the former Authorized Council in the Uzbek SSR. 6–7–8 Classes in the Mir Arab madrasah were transferred to the madrasah “Barakhan,” and 1–5 classes remained in Mir Arab in accordance with Protocol No. 4 at a meeting of the full members of the SADUM Presidium of May 22, 1956.

Fazilhodja Sadikkhodzhaev, deputy chairman of SADUM, was appointed the principal of the school “Barakhan,” Sirajitdin Ziyautdinov, former secretary – a deputy principal.⁶ Later, the deputy chairman of SADUM, Ismail Sattiev, was appointed the principal (1959), and Shaikram Shaismamov – a deputy principal (1962). Fazilhaja Sadiqvajayev, Mukhiddin Babakhadzhayev,

Sulaiman-kari Khamidov and Muhammad-Amin Abdurakhmanov were teachers there.

On November 1, 1956, studies were started in the building of the Tilla-Shaikh mosque in Tashkent and 34 people (16-18) studied in 2 classes of "Barakhan," 23 of whom were from Uzbekistan, 4 from Tajikistan, 4 from Kyrgyzstan, 2 from Kazakhstan and 1 from the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

At that time, 13 subjects were taught in both educational institutions, 4 of which were religious (tafsir, hadith, mustali al-hadith - terminology of hadith, fiqh), and 7 - language (syntax, literature and rhetoric of Arabic, writing words in Arabic, Russian and Persian) and 2 - secular (economic geography, the history of the USSR). The results of the students' knowledge were assessed by the mudaris and teachers. Intersessional examinations were conducted in 5 subjects usually: tafsir, hadith, fiqh, syntax (nahv), eloquence (balagat).⁷

New persecutions towards Islam and other confessions began in the country in the Khrushchev era (1953-1964). In 1960, the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan "On Measures to Eliminate Violations by the Clergy of Soviet Legislation on Cults" were adopted, as well as the decision of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR "On the Closure of" Holy Places "and Mazars and their Transfer to the Committee for the Protection of Monuments of Material Culture at the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR," thus one of the main channels of SADUM revenues was closed.

In 1961 the madrasah "Barakhan" was closed as an illegally functioning one, the madrasah "Mir Arab" with a total contingent of 40 people was left by the only Muslim religious educational institution.⁸

The amount of hours of the curriculum allocated to the study of religious disciplines was reduced significantly, and some religious subjects, such as the history of Islam, were excluded from the program. Particular attention was paid to the study of the

Russian language and other secular subjects (Russian Soviet literature, political economy, the history of the peoples of the USSR, the history of the peoples of the East, the political and economic geography of the countries of Asia and Africa).⁹

The decision to open the Tashkent Islamic Institute named after Imam al-Bukhari was taken by the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR in 1969, but the institute began functioning only in 1971. A total of 5,878 study hours were provided for all four courses, of which 2,812 (46.2%) were assigned to religious disciplines and 3,066 (53.8%) to secular ones. The curriculum consisted of 21 disciplines, including the geography of the USSR, the Constitution of the USSR, the history of the USSR, physical education, the foundations of the state and law.¹⁰

A significant place in the teaching and education of students was given to extra-curricular activities. Lectures for raising the “cultural and political level” of students on topical issues of international life and the most important events of the day were regularly held.

A subscription was made to more than 25 titles of magazines and newspapers of the all-Union and republican level (Science and Life Magazines, Science and Religion, The Soviet Union, Pravda, Izvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Soveta Uzbekiston, etc.). Watching the information program “Time” of central television became mandatory for students, radio reproducers were installed in each cell. A collective visit to the cinema or theater was organized once a month.¹¹

The requests of students to increase the hours for teaching religious subjects were left without attention. Foreign religious figures mainly assessed the low level of teaching of religious subjects and the Arabic language, as well as a small number of students.

The state of Islamic education depended to a decisive extent on the attitude towards it from both central and local authorities in this period. There was a noticeable difference between the new Soviet confessional educational institution and the traditional one –

the transition from individual studies to collective ones. The quality of perception and assimilation of material by students and the assessment of their knowledge was lost at this very moment. The division of disciplines into two groups (secular and religious) became noticeable in the curriculum, and secular disciplines (the history of the motherland, geography, Russian, etc.) began to prevail over the religious ones for the first time even in comparison with the program of the new-method confessional educational institutions.

Serious changes also occurred in the methodology of teaching religious disciplines. First, the traditional system was denied, i.e., teaching on old classical textbooks-compositions of medieval authors. There were two tendencies in their replacement: 1) the ideological attitudes of the traditionalist school; 2) attempts to imitate the Arab Muslim universities. An important role was played by the internship of responsible SADUM employees in Islamic universities in the Arab world.

The absence of a special methodological body and experienced methodologists produced negative results. Working curricula were drafted by teachers themselves (*mudarrisami*) very superficially: there was not published a single textbook or manual for all years of existence SADUM. The main goal of the educational institution was to train personnel loyal to the Soviet state, who were not particularly well educated in the religious sciences. In fact, many students spent time within the walls of this institution with the sole purpose of legalizing religious education that they received privately (in *hujra* or in the family).

“Perestroika” initiated the liberalization of attitudes toward religion and believers. The liberalization became a surprise, and first of all, for state bodies. Uncontrolled processes began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The construction of mosques and madrasahs took place in every small village, a quarter of large settlements and cities. Their number does not lend itself to accurate accounting. If in 1989 there were 89 mosques, then, in 1993 there were more than 3 thousand of them. “Schools for

studying the Quran” or other schools were created at every mosque almost. The process of legalization of underground religious schools started then.

The openness of society gave rise to a new phenomenon: an intensive penetration of various Islamist organizations and the importation of a huge amount of Islamic literature into the territory of Uzbekistan began. The greatest activity was shown by such organizations as “Jama'at-i table,” “Hizb at-Tahrir al-Islami,” Turkish, Iranian and Saudi organizations.

These and other trends began during the years of perestroika and were developed in the post-Soviet period.

II. The system of Islamic education of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Uzbekistan in the years of independence (from 1991 to the present)

There has been a significant weakening of the role of the traditional model of Islam due to the repressive, atheistic policy regarding religion during the period of Soviet rule in the Central Asian region. The traditional model of Islam belongs to the Hanafi theological school, as the most liberal, tolerant to the “religious dissent” madhhab, which has developed over the centuries and is a synthesis of Islamic positions and local pre-Islamic traditions.

In the early 1990s, a critical shortage of qualified cadres among the clergy (imams, teachers, scholars, scholars of Islamic Sciences) was a key moment in the weakening of the positions of local Islam and the growth of unconventional Islamic trends, including radical and previously unknown in the region.

In the first years of independence, there was a need for foreign religious education in order to acquire a professional Islamic education. At first, this process was largely chaotic, ill-conceived. And a large number of students from Central Asia fell into little-known, questionable educational institutions (in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.) along with sending them abroad to study in the world's famous Islamic educational centers, such as Al-Azhar (in Egypt). All this contributed to the fact that many students became acquainted with radical trends in Islam, including

the ideology of the so-called "pure Islam," "Islamic caliphate" instead of acquiring professional knowledge in the field of Muslim theology.

On the other hand, a protest base has been formed among the informal clergy that supports the idea of the re-Islamization of the Muslim community of the region within the framework of "Pure Islam," by the time of active penetration of various radical Islamic organizations from the outside into the region, under the slogans of the return of "true" Islam to the Muslims in Central Asia.

It was believed then that only pure ideas, devoid of any political background, would come from the Arab-Muslim world. Meanwhile, the process of revival of spirituality through the importation of religious ideas proved to be very painful - the unity of traditionalists was undermined, and favorable ground for uncontrolled spread of various Islamic currents, including radical and previously unknown in the region, was created.

Part of the Muslim population, instead of acquiring knowledge about the creative essence of Islam, met and absorbed the morals of the radical groups, including the ideology of the so-called. "Pure Islam," "Islamic caliphate" by the time of active penetration into the region of various radical Islamic organizations that act under the slogan of returning "true" Islam to the Muslims in Central Asia.

The complex of reasons for the growing influence of the ideas of religious radicalism was also caused by the ignorance of many ordinary Muslims about the internal nature and humanistic ideas of the Islamic religion. Despite the fact that there are significant differences between traditional Islam and religious extremist ideas, the latter have gained a sufficient number of supporters among the population.

The uncontrolled processes of the revival of religion began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The construction of mosques and madrasahs took place in every small village, large settlement and city. If in 1989 there were 89 mosques, in 1993 there were more than 3 thousand mosques.

Almost every mosque created “courses on the study of the Quran” or other religious schools. The total number of Islamic educational institutions (madrasahs) exceeded 100 in Uzbekistan in 1992 and only 20 of them were directly administered by the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan.¹²

It should be noted that the teaching and methodological documentation was not available in many of these madrasahs. The lessons were conducted not by graduates. In contrast to the Soviet era, the main emphasis in the educational process was on the development of religious disciplines. At the same time, the personal positions of teachers and graduates differed sharply from each other.

The problem of the limited, insufficient number of qualified religious personnel caused by the chaotic nature of the opening of religious organizations (mosques and madrasahs), the uncontrollability of appointment of imams, the illiteracy of most clerics (often minbari – the tribunes of mosques – were occupied by people far from religion), led to the impossibility of effective religious opposition to the penetration of religious extremist ideologies.

The above-mentioned factors and circumstances determined the relevance of the revival of the Islamic traditions of the region, revealed in the scientific works of the great thinkers of Maverannahr, and stressed the need to improve the system of Muslim education and training of qualified religious personnel.

Islam Karimov, the first President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, stressed that it was necessary to mobilize forces and help enlightened and tolerant Islam in opposing those militant fanatical forces that tried to dominate this religion.

Great importance was attached to contrasting the creative essence of the traditional model of Islam with non-traditional ideologies, as well as carrying out large-scale explanatory work among the population, revealing, on the one hand, the content and essence of the spiritual and moral values of Islam, and on the other, the negative aspects of the ideology of extremism, thereby weakening the position of the latter.

The state has formed a new attitude to religion after gaining independence. Two principles are observed when conducting religious policy in independent Uzbekistan:

- 1) The secular nature of the state;
- 2) Tolerant and equal treatment of all religions, aspiration to develop creative cooperation with religion.

An important step was the state re-registration of all religious organizations, including confessional educational institutions, with the establishment of order in the religious sphere.

The government has taken a lot of effort to help the Ummah to establish order in the activity of religious educational institutions. As for the legal plan, this was reflected in the tightening of legislation on their registration and licensing.

The training of competent religious personnel in sufficient numbers was due to changes in the religious sphere. Tashkent Islamic Institute, ten secondary special Islamic educational institutions, including two women's, functioned in Uzbekistan until the opening of the Mir Arab supreme madrasah in the city of Bukhara this year on the initiative of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the President of the country.¹³

Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted on August 22, 2003 deserves special attention. According to this resolution, the diplomas of graduates of the Tashkent Islamic Institute and secondary special religious educational institutions were equated with state certification documents, taking into account the fact that they teach religious and secular subjects.

Secondly, religious objects (mosques, madrasahs) that have passed state registration as objects of cultural heritage are transferred for use to the Administration of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan.

Thirdly, religious organizations will pay for utilities not as legal entities, but as individuals from now on. Released funds, as well as charitable contributions, will be sent for the repair and reconstruction of mosques, strengthening the educational and

material base of religious educational institutions, material stimulation of the activities of imam-hatibs and teachers of mudaris.

The academic disciplines are taught in four blocks at the Tashkent Islamic Institute: humanitarian and socio-economic, mathematical and natural, general, professional, Islamic subjects.

The native language and literature, foreign languages, history, the foundations of spirituality, the foundations of state law, social science, pedagogy, psychology, aesthetics, geography, physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology, mathematics, informatics are taught on the block "general disciplines" in all secondary Islamic educational institutions.

In the block "special disciplines" students study the history of religions, the Arabic language, the history of Islam, theology, Islamic law, hadith studies, recitation of the Quran, and tafsir. In addition, madrasahs students also study art craft, calligraphy and ornamental circles work. Particular attention is paid to sports. Since 2000–2001 academic year, the holding of sports competitions between theological educational institutions within the framework of the Barkamol avlod program (Comprehensively developed generation) has become a tradition.

Also, retraining of pedagogical staff is established for further improvement of the methodology of education and enhancing the impact of the learning process. Republican well-known theologians, competent scientists, professors and scientists work in the courses of advanced training at the Tashkent Islamic University.

Students of Islamic educational institutions are also taught folk crafts and useful professions, such as wood carving, artistic ornament, gold embroidery, carpet weaving, calligraphy, cutting, sewing, etc.

Educational institutions have their own libraries equipped with the necessary religious, scientific, political, spiritual, educational literature, textbooks and manuals. More than 32 thousand volumes of books have been accumulated in the collections of libraries, 22 thousand of which – religious, the rest – of secular content.

Great attention is paid to the Use of technical means in the educational process, the material and technical base has been constantly strengthened. Computer classes began to function in every educational institution, where students study modern computer technology.

The Unified Olympiad in all subjects has been conducted since 2002–2003 academic year, which stimulates the growth of students' interest in scientific and educational disciplines.¹⁴

It is important to note the imparting of a new powerful impetus to the issues of ensuring social stability, preserving the true essence and content of the sacred religion of Islam, preserving and studying the richest religious and spiritual heritage of great ancestors after Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the new President of Uzbekistan, came to power.

The President pays special attention to increasing the level of knowledge of the people about the true essence and content of religion, along with the expansion of international cooperation and the strengthening of interethnic harmony and religious tolerance in society and through living and effective examples instills a healthy attitude towards religion among young people.

Shavkat Mirziyoyev spoke at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly and stressed that the most important task in the country was to bring the truly humanistic essence of Islam to the wider world community; that the people honored their sacred religion as the center of their native values and resolutely condemned and never reconciled with those who placed their great faith on a par with violence and bloodshed; that Islam called for good and peace, the preservation of a genuine human beginning.

Changes in the state policy on religion, as well as radical changes in the educational sphere, allowed solving a wide range of issues related to the improvement of the system of Islamic education in Uzbekistan.

There have been structural changes and improvements in the organization of the educational process in order to further improve

the methodology of education, enhance the impact of the learning process. The goals of secondary and higher Islamic education have changed and expanded. New approaches are noted for the development of educational standards, certification of scientific and pedagogical personnel in the system of Islamic education. There are new requirements to the intellectual level of religious personnel, designed to help them answer the burning issues of our time.

New programs of measures for further comprehensive and qualitative development of the system of Islamic education, improvement of the educational and methodological content of educational programs of Islamic educational institutions, raising the level of training of highly qualified religious personnel, strengthening and modernizing the material and technical base of Islamic educational institutions, equipping modern educational, scientific and information-communication technologies are developed and consistently implemented.

Taking into account the existing measures to revive and deepen the religious and spiritual heritage of ancestors and to train qualified personnel in the sphere of religion, it should be specially noted that the international research centers named after Imam at-Termizi in Termez and Imam al-Bukhari in Samarkand, the Center of Islamic Civilization in Tashkent and another higher Islamic educational institution – the Mir Arab Higher Madrasah in Bukhara since the beginning of this year were established on the initiative and in accordance with the decisions of the President of Uzbekistan.

Since the 2017–2018 academic year, the curricula of nine Islamic secondary specialized educational institutions (madrasahs) have been improved at the bachelor level.

In 2017, many happy events took place at the Tashkent Islamic Institute. In particular, quotas for admission of applicants have been increased by 70%. A new special correspondence department has been established at the institute for a period of 3 years in order to provide mosques to imam-hatibs with a higher Islamic education. In 2017–2018 academic year 60 acting imam-

khatibov of the republic, having an average special Islamic education and experience of practical work in mosques for at least five years, entered a special correspondence department.

Since November 2017, five Islamic scientific schools under the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan started their activities: the school of Islamic law (fiqh) at the Burhaniddin al-Marginani scientific center in Ferghana, the hadith school at the al-Bukhari scientific center in Samarkand, the school of Islamic theology (akida) at the scientific centers of Imam al-Maturidi in Samarkand and Abul-Muin al-Nasafi in Kashkadarya, the school of tasawwuf at the scientific center of Bahauddin Naqshband in Bukhara.

The Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan was established by the Decree of the President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on December 15, 2017. The Muslim Board of Uzbekistan acts as the founder of the non-state higher educational and research institution.

The activities of the Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan, which was registered by the Ministry of Justice on January 15, 2018, is aimed at providing the highest and secondary special religious educational institutions of the country with highly qualified scientific and pedagogical staff.

Masters in the field of "Quran studies," "Science of fiqh," "Hadith" and "the Science of Kalam" will be prepared in the Islamic Academy. In addition, the basic doctoral degree (PhD) and doctoral studies (Doctor of Science) will operate here.

Citizens of Uzbekistan and other countries will be accepted for training and conducting research on a contract-grant basis. The introduction of opportunities for distance education and independent research is planned for independent researchers.

The quota for admission of students to the master's program of the Academy is determined in the number of 16 places for the 2018-2019 school year. In subsequent years, the quota will be determined by the Muslim Board, depending on the needs for scientific and pedagogical personnel.

The Specialized Scientific Council for the Protection of Master and Doctoral Dissertations and the Assignment of Scientific

Degrees of the Master of Islamic Studies, PhD and Doctor of Science in Islamic Studies will operate under the new Academy.

Thus, it can be said that the Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan (9 madrasahs, the Tashkent Islamic Institute and the Mir Arab Higher Madrasah), the Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan, together with Islamic academic schools (fiqh, akids, hadith, tasawwufa) and research centers Imam at-Termizi, Imam al-Bukhari, Center for Islamic Civilization) will create a unified system of continuous Islamic education and science.

Summing up the aforesaid, it is necessary to note specifically that the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan has risen to a qualitatively new level over the past years in the field of training qualified religious personnel, reviving and deepening the invaluable religious heritage of scientists and theologians of Maverannahr, counteracting ignorance by educating young people in the spirit of national pride, tolerance and universal values.

Notes

- 1 Imams of mosques, mudarrisas of Islamic educational institutions, heads of regional rank – kadis, muftis and other religious ministers.
- 2 Since 1944, four independent centers have managed the spiritual affairs of the Muslims of the USSR - The Spiritual Administration of Muslims (DUM) of the Middle Asia and Kazakhstan (Tashkent), the DUM of the Transcaucasia (Baku), the DUM of the North Caucasus (Buinaksk (now Makhachkala), DUM of the European part USSR and Siberia (Ufa).
- 3 Information about the beginning of the academic year in the spiritual school of the madrasah Mir Arab in Bukhara - Central Statistical Office of Uzbekistan, fund No. 837, list No. 39, file No. 1319, sheet 18 (September 13, 1962).
- 4 List of management and service staff of the madrasah "Mir Arab" of Bukhara - Central Administrative Office of Uzbekistan, fund No. 2456, list No. 1, file No. 92, sheet 104 (1945)
- 5 On February 4, 1960 he was dismissed from his job for connivance, help and support of the Muslim clergy with the announcement of a severe reprimand with a note on the registration card. On November 18, 1960, the issue of Inogamov was repeatedly discussed at the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and Inogamov was expelled from the ranks of the CPSU by its resolution.

- 6 Information about the beginning of 1960–1961 academic year in the spiritual schools of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan - Central Statistical Office of Uzbekistan, Fund No. 2456, inventory number 1, file No. 275, sheet 2.
- 7 Curriculum of the madrasah “Mir Arab” - Central Statistical Office of Uzbekistan, Fund No. 2456, inventory No. 1, file No. 92, sheet 105 (1945).
- 8 Letter No. 150, July 12, 1961, from the Deputy Authorized Council for Religious Affairs at the Council of Ministers of UzSSR, A.Ivanov, to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR - Central Statistical Office of Uzbekistan, Fund No. 837, inventory No. 39, file No. 900, sheet 1.
- 9 Information about the beginning of the academic year in the spiritual school of the madrasah Mir Arab in Bukhara - Central Administrative Office of Uzbekistan, Fund No. 837, list No. 39, file No. 1319, sheet 19 (September 13, 1962).
- 10 Information on the activities of Muslim educational institutions, operating in the territory of the Uzbek SSR - Central Statistical Office of Uzbekistan, Fund No. 2456, inventory number 1, case No. 589, sheet 18.
- 11 Information about the activities of Muslim educational institutions operating in the territory of the Uzbek SSR - Central Statistical Office of Uzbekistan, Fund No. 2456, inventory No. 1, file No. 589, sheet 20.
- 12 List of madrasahs, subordinated to the Maverannahr Muslim Board - Archives of the Religious Education Department of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan.
- 13 In June 2017, the Ministry of Justice of Uzbekistan registered the Mir Arab Higher Madrasah in Bukhara region as another higher religious educational institution.
- 14 The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Uzbekistan (in Uzbek, English, Russian, Arabic), Tashkent, 2014. P. 78–93.

**РОССИЯ
И
МУСУЛЬМАНСКИЙ МИР
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Гигиеническое заключение
№ 77.99.6.953.П.5008.8.99 от 23.08.1999 г.
Подписано к печати 8/VI – 2018 г. Формат 60x84/16
Бум. офсетная № 1 Печать офсетная
Усл. печ. л. 7,5 Уч.-изд. л. 7,0
Тираж 300 экз. (1-100 экз. – 1-й завод)
Заказ № 81

**Институт научной информации
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Москва, В-418, ГСП-7, 117997**

**Отдел маркетинга и распространения
информационных изданий
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E-mail: inion@bk.ru**

Отпечатано в ИНИОН РАН
Нахимовский пр-кт, д. 51/21
Москва В-418, ГСП-7, 117997
042(02)9

