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## MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

IGOR DOBAYEV. MAIN TRENDS OF OPPOSING TERRORISM IN THE YOUTH MEDIUM OF RUSSIA IN IDEOLOGICAL SPHERE // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: ideology, Islamism, young people, radicalism, terrorism, extremism.*

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*Abstract.* The article examines successes and shortcomings of the fight against religious-political extremism in the ideological sphere among Russian young people. It is established that despite lower activity of jihadists, it was not possible to achieve a proper solution of the problem recently due to the lack of coordination in pursuing a strategy and policy of opposing terrorism. Various methods and approaches are offered to step up ideological and propaganda work in combating terrorism in the Russian youth medium.

After adoption of the Concept of opposition to terrorism in the Russian Federation in October 2009, experts have begun talking of the need to shift the emphasis in the anti-terrorist activity from fighting to preventing terrorism and avoiding

forcible methods. Later on, the National Anti-terrorist Committee (NAC) of the Russian Federation has time and again turned attention of participants in the anti-terrorist struggle to this circumstance. Special attention is paid to the need to concentrate efforts on preventing the spreading of terrorist ideology, above all in the youth medium [3].

However, it should be admitted that there are certain shortcomings in this system of opposing terrorism. It becomes evident, among other things, that the measures offered in this sphere concern a certain amorphous mass of the country's population, as a rule. Moreover, they are addressed to ordinary law-abiding citizens far from the ideology and practice of terrorism. At the same time there is an obvious shortage of concrete proposals connected with the vulnerable categories of young people preaching religious-political extremist ideas. In the South of Russia, where manifestations of terrorism are registered to this day from time to time, there is not a single government – sponsored center of Islamic studies. Such studies are carried on unsystematically, and more often than not on the initiative of individual scholars, mainly in the North Caucasus by Daghestani experts [1]. It should be taken into account that ideological and political terrorist ideas are widespread among young people in the North Caucasus.

A broad information-propaganda activity is carried on in the country. Thousands of conferences and round-tables are arranged, a great number of pamphlets, books and collections are printed, many articles and video subjects are circulated in the mass media, and films and video pictures on anti-terrorist subjects are made. However, the anti-terrorist fight in the North Caucasian region of Russia is not coming to an end, although its potential is relatively not too high. It should be admitted that we have not succeeded to create an adequate system to oppose terrorism in the information sphere. Apart from that, it is also necessary to oppose the ideology of terrorism in the information sphere [10]. The main task is to free real and potential supporters of terrorists from the influence of

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jihadists, curtail the social base of their assistance and prevent the increase of their ranks.

Two factors of major importance: the Islamic factor in the formation of ideological doctrines of radical Islamists and the youth character of the terrorist and religious-political movement in certain regions of Russia, primarily the North Caucasus. It is common knowledge that the attractiveness of the ideology of radical Islamism, especially in the youth medium, is quite high. These two factors are closely interconnected and support each other.

At the same time it should be recognized that there has been no full-fledged state policy on the education of the younger generation in our country so far, although we do understand that young people should be taken proper care of by the state. The North Caucasian young people have grown in the epoch of permanent armed clashes, social inequality, and difficulties to find proper self-realization. They often get under the influence of religious extremist propaganda and all and sundry religious authorities, and this is why need a special attention on the part of the state [4]. Naturally, periodic “round-tables” will not be enough to solve the problem. What is needed is a serious day-to-day work with young people oriented to their education on bilingual basis and ethnic variety. For this purpose it is necessary to begin urgently the training of teachers at general educational establishments on cultural and historical subjects, emphasizing the unbreakable unity of the Russian Caucasus and rejection of all and sundry forms of violence. Apart from that, various studies, scientific, sports, military-patriotic and cultural programs should be initiated, and ties between young people of various parts of the Russian Federation should be broadened and strengthened.

The religious factor in the developments in the North Caucasus should not be ignored. Certain scholars of Islam openly talk of radicalism inherent in Islam, and also of the existing connection between individual trends in Islam and terrorism, claiming that “excessive political correctness closely connected

with political interests does not allow the Russian leadership to be open and outspoken enough in this question” [6]. Today in the North Caucasus groups of mujaheds arms in hand continue to fight for creating an Islamic state, liberating the land of Islam, and try to solve this spiritual and ideological problem with a simple increase of the number of jobs, which is definitely improper, to say the least.

The religious factor does exist and acts. In Islam, just as in other religions, there are radical trends, which are out to establish very harsh rules of life and behavior. Ideologists of radical Islam are doing everything possible to persuade young Muslims that they should wage a relentless offensive struggle (“jihad against the infidels”), against apostates and hypocrites, the struggle against who in the specific conditions of the North Caucasus often takes the form of vendetta. Thus, local pre-Islamic customs (adat) join the specific features of Islam and even ordinary crime.

There is no doubt that growing religious and political extremism in the North Caucasus is largely due not only to a profound crisis of all secular ideologies of our time, but also the ideological foundations of traditional Islam in the region which needs radical modernization. Tackling this problem seems, necessary along several mutually coordinated and dependent directions.

In the 1990s – first decade of the 2000s the country’s leadership placed great hope on the prestige of representatives of traditional official Islam. However, the social alienation and political passivity of “official Islam” with its shortage of well-educated experts on Islam and connoisseurs of Muslim traditions have actually raised the chances of Islamists in ideological rivalry for winning the sympathies of the Muslim population, primarily young people [8]. Despite the fact that quite a few representatives of the Muslim clergy have been mercilessly killed by terrorists, their role cannot be ignored in fighting the man-hating ideology of jihadists. However, the confrontation between the Wahhabis and representatives of official Islam is not confined to ideological



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struggle. Wahhabi ideology regards those who do not share it enemies of Islam and calls on all its supporters to a sacred war against them, that is, to jihad. A true Wahhabi is bound to hate all enemies of Islam, his hatred should take concrete practical forms [9]. Among these “enemies” are representatives of official Islam, and the most active of them are under close watch of radical Islamists.

It is known that the biggest terrorist activity is observed in Daghestan at present, where the Sufi tariqats rule the roost. In the view of the Daghestani sociologist Z. Abdulagatov, more and more Daghestani young men join the ranks of Salaphites, which is directly connected with the fact that Sufism itself gives birth to tariqat ideology and religious extremism [2].

Apart from that, inasmuch as “official” Islam is striving to come closer to the state, and it succeeds to do it, opposition to the official clergy includes opposition to the state. This is why, Z. Abdulagatov thinks, “the state should find ways closer to all Islamic confessions. Openness towards them, even to those which are in harsh competition with “official Islam” is an effective way to oppose radicalization [2]. This idea finds support among the leadership of the NAC.

However, it is not that simple: there are doubts concerning the expediency of work with moderate Islamists. For example, experts at the Center of Situational Analysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences believe that the implementation of definite slogans calling for contacts of the authorities with Salaphites are fraught with negative consequences for followers of traditional Islam. They assert that the attempts of the Daghestani authorities to hold negotiations with the “forest people” have resulted in their putting forward their conditions, including demands to appoint their representatives on high administrative posts [8].

There is no doubt that to oppose radicals at the intellectual level there should be well-versed connoisseurs of Islam, who are few and far between in the Russian traditionalist circles so far. In this connection the training of Muslim clergymen in Russia causes serious concern. The quality of Muslim religious education is at a

low level, there are practically no secular experts on Islamic theology, a shortage of specialists of the Arab language, the number of translators from and into Arabic and Turkish is inadequate. Books translated from Arabic and Turkish quite often contain extremist ideas.

It is evident that in order to oppose religious and political extremism the state and society should pay special attention to the system of religious education. It is necessary to create our own model of Islamic education in both intramural and extramural studies. It should be admitted that in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, other countries of the Middle East and North Africa students from Russia continue to study Islam in its most radical forms and undergo anti-Russian ideological indoctrination. Quite a few leaders of the armed underground have studied in Saudi Arabia, the state dominated by Sunna Islam of the Wahhabi trend. All in all, after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the number of those who have received Islamic education abroad exceeded 10,000 men [8].

Moreover, the system of Islamic education in Russia is still one of the major sources of the formation of fundamentalist mentality of young people [9]. As justly noted by the Daghestani scholar I. Shamov, the curricula of Islamic educational institutions of the Republic of Daghestan do not contain history, geography, mathematics, foreign languages, computer ABC – in short – nothing making a person educated, and society itself developed [12].

Apart from creating and improving Russian Muslim education today, it is exceptionally important to carry on a sound stable information policy on Islamic problems, including publication of periodical material, study aids, and setting up special Internet sites opposing similar products made by radical Islamists.

It is necessary to emphasize that undermining Islamic literature gets to this country not only from abroad, but also directly from Russian territory (for instance, the “Badr” Publishers

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printed such literature in Moscow and in Moscow region.) Naturally, such publications should be completely banned.

The activity of various telecommunication systems of the Internet type also merits close attention [5]. Virtual space is filled with Islamist sites, forums and disputes of an extremist character. All terrorist acts are fixed on the sites of terrorists coming out for the “world jihad,” and also in social networks. The activity of individual subjects of the Internet bears a definitely anti-Russian character. Accordingly, opposition to ideological subversion should have a specific character. Yet, Russia has not found effective solutions so far to prevent the use of the Internet for spreading terrorist ideology [7]. Work to compromise the ideology and practical work of radical Islamists is far from adequate. The available opportunities are not used as they should. Propaganda against the Wahhabi militants is weak, bodies of power and administrative units fail to work properly and effectively fight the ideology of religious-political extremism.

It is necessary to step up and strengthen organizationally and materially the already working near-Islamic bodies – the Fund of support of Islamic culture, science and education and the Group of strategic vision entitled “Russia – the Islamic World.” Similar approach is necessary to other structures which have not been supported by the Federal Center and heads of the administrative parts of the Russian Federation. (We mean a number of organizations in the South of Russia and in the North Caucasus.)

A new generation of Islamic scholars should be trained, who well know the realities and languages of Muslims abroad, and first and foremost the Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages.

At the same time, it is necessary to uphold the secular character of the Russian state and its equal attitude to all traditional confessions. There is no doubt that a modern state is able to achieve successes in civil construction only on the basis of values common to representatives of all religions and cultures; moreover, it is on a secular state that can ensure genuine personal freedom of conscience.

Apart from that, of great importance is the elaboration of an effective youth policy in the Russian Federation and its regions with due account of its specific features. In the North Caucasus today young people are the main medium for spreading extremist ideas and their implementation in political activity. Youth policy should be based on a firm ideological foundation of Russian patriotism, for which purpose it is necessary to form the basis of modern national ideology, without which the anti-terrorist activity will not be successful. Besides, the elaboration of youth policy should be closely connected with a comprehensive solution of problems facing modern North Caucasian society (and not only that society), especially with such its vices as corruption, embezzlement and clan structure. In other words, in tackling youth and Islamic problems it is necessary to use all measures and approaches to oppose modern terrorism at the national level and bring to naught foreign influence, which increases it.

It is only by joint efforts of the authorities and civil society will it be possible to strengthen the front of fighting terrorism in the information field.

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2018.04.01. KONSTANTIN VODENKO. THE INTERETHNIC HARMONY RESOURCE IN THE YOUTH CIRCLES IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY // *“Gumanitarni Yuga Rossii,” Rostov-on-Don, 2017, Vol. 6, 3, P. 203–214.*

*Keywords: resource of interethnic consent, Russian youth, interethnic relations, value and normative orientations.*

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In the article it is investigated the resource of interethnic consent as a factor influencing realization of vital strategies, and the sphere of civil activity of Russian youth. The author considers structural, institutional and valuable criteria of the relation of

youth and its role in achievement of the international peace in the ethno-national relations. The researcher emphasizes that it is necessary to withdraw from the scheme of ascertaining of extremism among young people in evaluation of the ethno-national relations. According to this scheme, politically active youth is a subject of extremist, not tolerant practices in the sphere of interethnic relations. Meanwhile this group makes 5-6% of young Russians and can't be presented peer one, as a group – “substitute” of youth. Consideration of background practices, the exerting impact on positioning of youth in the sphere of ethno-national relations, shows two multidirectional tendencies: on the one hand, young Russians make ethnic and civil identity actual at the same level (26 and 25%), on the other hand – there is an adjustment for feeling themselves as a part of the nationality (73%). An unstable balance of ethnic and civil identity was formed. In this state there are latent risks which can emerge full blown in conditions of sharpening of strife in interethnic relations. Agreeing to be a part of the all-Russian nation, young Russians in everyday practices are aimed at interaction with representatives of their nationality having the greatest level of credibility. Under current conditions the ethno-national relations concentrate social and social and territorial distinctions. Young Russians, adhering to identifiers of state and civil identity (common state, territory, a state language), at the interpersonal level actualize a proximity factor with people of their nationality. Among young people the civil identity has partly sacral value, and ethnic one – is accepted as a scheme of social self-determination. The background practices in the Russian society connected with implementation of mechanisms of interethnic competition, manifestations of social discrimination influence positions of youth in positive sense of national pride strengthening, and in destructive one – in virtue of imagined or real impairment of a right of people and their nationality.

In social positioning of youth, in its perception of ethno-national relations, it is obvious an aspiration to use an ethnic factor

as a personal resource in conditions if there are practices of inequality of access to imperious, professional, social resources by ethnic status. The ethnic factor is actualized in the conditions of not realization or a delay of realization of youth vital expectations. The complexity of the situation consists in the fact that young Russians don't include institutes in the level of sufficient trust, recognized to harmonize international relations (it is about political parties, media, noncommercial association). 49% stand for strengthening of control over manifestations of nationalism and extremism while 26,9% – for creation of more full-fledged conditions for development of national culture, national language and traditions to all peoples of Russia.

The Russian youth is focused on balance of ethnic and civil identity, but introduction of negative factors in background practices (corruption, crime, excess social inequality) creates a zone of marginalization of youth. Among young people, as a result of socially important problems (job placement, living standards, not implementation of project of life), dominance of strangers or undeserved privileges of other ethnic groups become an explanatory mechanism. A tendency of marginalization is followed by growth of bullying behavior to representatives of other nationalities, ethnic egoism and negative attitudes in the sphere of international communication.

Among the Russian young people radical groups represent a peripheral segment, but their activity contains social risk as it is a behavioral pattern for youth in the conditions of open inter-ethnic strife. As the Russian youth is in a credibility crisis to government agencies and anti-rating as a result of difficulties in state of the economy and social sphere grows, ethnic ethnocracy can act as the mechanism of canalization for discontent to the sphere of interethnic relations.

The resource of interethnic consent among young people is formed on the basis of system approach to socially important issues of youth, positive assessment by youth of activity of political and social institutes in carrying out the policy of equal

opportunities. In general young Russians are ready for public integration, but it is important that the associating role of Russian identity is felt in everyday practices, at the level of interpersonal trust. At the same time consequences of “ethnicity explosion” in the 90th of the 20th century led to the fact that there is an experience of ethnic marking when the youth, supporting the idea of common house, perceives prospects of their life stances in the context of “national apartments.” Interethnic concord among young people is transferred from rhetoric to practical deeds if the barriers of international interaction are removed at all levels.

The youth forms request for legal equality, for removing constraints and privileges connected with ethnic status. A resource of interethnic consent of youth as an ability to integrate into multiethnic space of the Russian society, formation of constructive relations with representatives of other ethnic groups and realization of an attitude for peace and harmony are defined by its social potential, priorities of social and professional and civil self-realization neutralizing an appeal of ethnic positioning.

The author draws a conclusion that activity of highly educated, professional, successful groups of the Russian youth is connected with a resource of interethnic consent, in positions of which ethnicity is shown in commitment to family tradition, choice of lifestyle or leisure preferences. Among young people, thus, there is a request for equal opportunities and inclusion of a resource of interethnic consent as the condition defining equal launching bases.

In a potential situation of ethnic tension the valuable and standard orientation of youth gets ethnocentric tendency. Besides that the Russian youth is aimed at pragmatics in achievement of success in life, international peace and harmony which refer to the values adjoining to fundamental (welfare, public benefit, justice). The youth considers inadmissible manifestation of hostility, violence in international relations, qualifying it as disvalues, but positions of a considerable part of youth (35%) are expressed by positive assessment of achievements of people of their nationality.



In the context of life horizons narrowing, complexities with social self-determination and social self-realization can develop myths of national exclusiveness or a national derogation. Instrumental values (success, wellness, enterprise, efficiency) don't contain restrictions for interethnic contacts, but at the interpersonal level don't create a situation of trust and don't transform interethnic relations to the status of interethnic consent.

Though fundamental values are declared in collective consciousness of youth, there are certain difficulties of acceptance of valuable complexes at the institutional level. Within the existing circumstances special attention is paid to a confessional factor, inclusion of interfaith dialogue in regulation of ethno-national relations. In fact the Russian faiths make a significant contribution to normalization of interethnic relations as in mass perception of Russians belonging to faith is often associated with ethnicity. However, considering that most of young Russians are not deeply religious people, there are difficulties connected with correlation of confessional values with civil identity which forms a basis of political unity of the country. Ethnicity binding to confession in conditions when the Russian youth isn't characterized by high degree of religiousness and isn't active in a confessional manner, can lead to nationalization of an ethnic confessional factor, to the fact that confessional arguments can be used as designing of new ethnic distinctions. Results of sociological researches show that in positions of youth the tolerance occurs in the form of neutrality to what happens in nonethnic environment if it doesn't affect their right. The youth keeps from a violence formula in interethnic relations, but also doesn't consider that it can become an active conductor of the harmonization idea, make an interethnic consent resource an imperative of living abilities. Correlation of fundamental and instrumental values of youth fixes a tendency to their rapprochement, but interethnic consent isn't perceived as the general welfare.

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DMITRY ASINOVSKY. THE SOVIET UNION, NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (1955–1980) // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

*Keywords: religion, nationalism, Soviet foreign policy, Cold war, decolonization.*

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*Abstract.* A change of the Soviet foreign-policy course with a greater orientation to the developing countries of Asia and Africa after Stalin’s death has provoked a change of the foreign policy instruments. Along with channeling great resources to study the countries of Asia and Africa, a revision was made of the attitude toward the decolonized regimes actively using nationalism and religion as the ideological foundation. The article turns to the study of the assessments of the role of religion and nationalism in the revolutionary movement in the 1955–1980 period, which were rather paradoxical for Soviet ideology.

The geopolitical conditions of the mid-1950s created a unique situation within whose framework the Soviet Union had to adapt its ideological activity, at least in its part intended for foreign consumption. After Stalin’s death a sharp turn has taken place in Soviet foreign policy, the postwar concentration of attention on Europe was expanded and tuned to other regions. In recent years several works have been published showing that in the postwar period under Stalin the Soviet position on the revolutionary movements in developing countries largely depended on the situation in Europe and other places on which agreements were valid and relation with our former allies were rather tense. Moreover, during Stalin’s period our readiness to come to terms and conclude agreements with “bourgeois-nationalist regimes”

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was very low, be it Sukarno's regime in Indonesia or the young revolutionary regime in Egypt.

A change in the attitude to the international situation after Khrushchev came to power was reflected, above all, in a stand to national-liberation movements and decolonization. From the mid-1950s onwards these processes were regarded as a potential which the Soviet Union should use to advantage. In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev was not only ready to render aid to revolutionary regimes (primarily revolutionary-oriented), but also give assistance to a broader range of the national forces fighting against colonialist domination. It was in connection with this situation that Soviet representatives were not invited to take part in the Bandung conference, which was very disappointing to the Soviet leadership. Moreover, one of the biggest discussions at the conference was connected with the proposal to adopt a resolution condemning the Soviet Union as one of the colonial powers. This resolution was based on the facts of the preservation by the Soviet Union of Russian imperial gains in Central Asia and the Soviet leading position in one of the two blocs in global confrontation.

The Bandung conference and the emergence of the non-aligned movement following it became a strong motive factor for the Soviet foreign-policy apparatus in order to begin the advance of the Soviet Union in the anti-colonial struggle. However, the position of scientific and social progress adhered to previously did not bring tangible result, as shown by practice. It was during that period that the building of channels of informal cultural diplomacy and a more thorough study of the traditions of the decolonized world began. Institutionally, reforms were started through the reorganization of the All-Union Society of Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (Russ. abbr. "VOKS") and other bodies. The real "heir" of VOKS was the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (Russ. barb. SSOD). However, if we take exclusively developing countries of the Third World, a more significant role in cultural diplomacy was assigned

to the newly-formed structure – the Soviet Committee of Solidarity of Asian and African Countries set up especially by public organizations of the Asian republics of the U.S.S.R. in 1956. Inasmuch as closer contacts were established with traditionally Muslim regions, it was only natural that among the mediators should have been representatives of Central Asia and the Caucasus – party functionaries, intellectuals, scientists and scholars, etc. Besides, it should be admitted that the transformation through which Soviet Islam has gone through, makes it possible to speak of certain special Soviet Islamic culture, which represents rather Islamic cultural, but not religious heritage. Thus, Soviet political and cultural emissaries came out as bearers and representatives of Islamic civilization rather than Islam as religion. This idea reflected the position and was supported by the Communist party leadership. Cultural diplomacy openly used the religious parlance and rhetoric, and was represented by the Central Asian Spiritual Board of Muslims and its head Mufti Babakhanov.

Africa has attracted the attention of Soviet foreign policy long before the start of mass decolonization. It was one of the most important regions of the world where many developing countries could be drawn into the orbit of Soviet influence. For Premier Khrushchev Africa represented a new arena for spreading socialist ideals to replace the outgoing colonial influence. At the same time for the European colonial powers. Africa was a region remaining exclusively in their sphere of influence, despite decolonization. On the other hand, for many African revolutionaries and new national leaders the Soviet Union was the alternative road of modernization, not connected with dependence on technologies, resources, and capital of the former metropolitan countries.

This is directly connected with the development of the concept of neocolonialism. New independent African leaders (the first of them was the leader of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah) have successfully applied the Marxist theory to realities of decolonized states. If classical Marxism turns to the subject of social injustice within the system, neocolonialism asserts the presence of growing

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injustices born of colonialism within the framework of the postcolonial system. A special ruse, which characterized the postcolonial order of the world from the point of view of the theory of neocolonialism was hidden in the fact that the former colonies were granted formal independence, however real dependence was preserved in the form of economic exploitation in the interests of representatives of the old metropolitan countries. For such political figures like Kwame Nkrumah it was necessary to emphasize that the neocolonialists were guided not so much by their striving for economic benefit, but to a greater extent the desire to retain their power and influence. On the other hand, within the framework of assessments of colonialism and its aftermath the major theoretical investigations asserted the inconvertible essence of cultural and linguistic changes and transformations as one of the most significant factors of the influence of European colonialism on the traditional culture of the Third World countries. At the same time, despite the fact that religion did not hold an important place in neocolonial and other theories close to it, it could well be defined as one of the aspects of cultural neocolonialism. The absolute majority of national-liberation movements avoided religious rhetoric in their ideology. Their ideological basis was anti-colonial nationalism. In this sense the revolution in Iran and a new turn of post-colonialism anti-colonialism is an exclusion, which will be examined in greater detail in later chapters. For an earlier period and most national leaders of a broad range from Kame Nkrumah to Hamilcar Cabral religion was not a banner of their movement, but on the contrary a struggle against it often became a major ideological task. Similarly, for nationalists and socialists in the Third world religion symbolized backwardness, which should have been overcome, often irrespective of the cultural sources of religion – be it Christianity or Islam imported from outside, or local religious cults. At the same time most people had a serious attitude to religion, and only a few leaders were ready to take the path of Mustafa Kemal and remove religion from public medium. Thus,

new nationalism of the former independent colonies, in contrast of European socialism, was founded on anti-imperialist feelings and tied to national pride and local traditions. Irrespective of whether new national leaders were or were not ready to include religion in their understanding of the “local” ideology of anti-colonialism of most people, it was present. One can cite examples of another type of national leaders, thus, the Indonesian leader Sukarno offered his supporters an original mixture, including Indonesian nationalism not only with elements of socialism, but also of Islam. Another example of an interesting ideological mixture can be given by the ideology of African socialism (“ujamaa”), whose main protagonist was the first President of independent Tanzania Julius Nyerere. Just like Sukarno, he was a deeply religious person till the end of his day. At the same time a confirmed socialist, he did not see an alliance with the Soviet Union as the unique way to establish a just social order. In turn, as to the Soviet Union, such leaders as Sukarno in the 1950s and Nyerere in the 1960s came out as motivating triggers to search for flexible aspects in Soviet ideological export. Gaining sympathies of new regimes with a bent to socialism, but with nationalist (and sometimes religious) elites at the head was one of the key tasks in the foreign policy of Nikita Khrushchev, and even to a greater extent for Brezhnev.

Khrushchev’s ideological offensive in Africa can hardly be called successful. Soviet assistance to Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Patrice Lumumba in Congo and Ahmed Sekou Toure in Guinee has not given such benefits to the U.S.S.R. A certain disappointment, however, did not mean a return to Stalin’s unbelief in the revolutionary transformation of backward regions. Almost a decade later Brezhnev’s foreign-policy trio (Gromyko, Gecko and Andropov) made a comeback to Africa. Modern investigations show that Soviet policy directed to Equatorial and South Africa in the 1970s was a result of a combination of a number of factors. An open confrontation with China for leadership in the socialist camp, disintegration of the dictatorial regime in Portugal, and at the same time U.S. collapse in Southeast

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Asia, the brothers Castro pressure for whom Africa was always an important testing ground and springboard where it was possible to manifest the independence of Cuba's foreign policy. However, from the ideological point of view the crucial factor was the mass turn of African revolutionaries to left ideology. For the Soviet Union it looked as a historic opportunity which should not have been missed. Turning the new leaders of the former Portuguese Empire in Africa to Marxism-Leninism has created a state of euphoria in the Soviet foreign-policy bloc. Now the Soviet Union had business not with Nyerere or Nkrumah with their unique African socialism, but with leaders of a new type, representing Marxist-Leninist ideals among the newly-free African peoples, such as Agostinho Neto in Angola, or Samora Machel in Mozambique.

Another region where changes influenced the formation of an optimistic view on the ideological prospects of Soviet foreign policy toward developing countries was the Middle East. After the defeat of the coalition headed by the United Arab Republic in the 6-day war the impasse of the Pan-Arabic project became ever clearer. Despite the fact that the President of Egypt Anwar Sadat, who replaced President Nasser, did not justify the hopes of the Soviet foreign-policy bloc, another part of the unlucky project – Syria headed by Hafez al-Assad proved a more promising direction. Syria became the key partner of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East, as it adhered to the nationalist Baathist ideology. The situation in its neighbor Iraq was still more favorable from the Soviet point of view. Despite the fact that the friendly regime of Abdel Karim Kassim's regime was overthrown in 1963, by 1970 the Iraqi communists were able to get a whole number of high government posts. Iraq's example proved very important for the emergence of positive expectations in the U.S.S.R. concerning developing countries with nationalist regimes. Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism itself was criticized by Soviet analysts after Nasser's death, which made it look like African nationalist projects.

The left-wing ideological trend in the Middle East has become stronger after the withdrawal of the last units of the British armed forces from Aden and decolonization of South Yemen. The newly-formed People's Democratic Republic has become an important factor for the Soviet Union's involvement in conflicts in the region of the African Horn. In this context it was not only ideology, but also questions of military-strategic and geopolitical planning that have played a major role. The struggle for spreading socialist ideology and new military and naval bases has prompted the Soviet Union to render support to the left-wing radical uprising in the Oman province of Dhofar and later the new revolutionary regime of Mengistu in Ethiopia. The revolution in Ethiopia proved such spectacular event for the Soviet foreign-policy bloc, that even allied relations with the Somalia regime and the presence of the naval base in that region did not stop the Soviet support of Ethiopia in the Ogaden conflict with Somalia. In this case ideology was more important than short-term geopolitical advantages – Mengistu's regime was not only socialist, but was even ready to adapt the Soviet model and turn it into a theoretical base of Marxism-Leninism. It seemed to become a complete success, which anticipated the future global proliferation of Soviet ideology.

However, if we turn back to religion, we should understand how it was connected with geostrategic and ideological confrontation within the framework of the Cold war in developing countries. By the 1970s the political potential of religion seemed to be part of history rather than a real ideological background. Not a single of the said revolutions or transformations used religion as part of political game. Most political analysts regarded religion as ideology preceding nationalism, the anti-colonial foundation around which local nationalism was formed. Religion (especially Islam in the Middle East) does not seem to have the potential to become an anti-people, universal political ideology, one that it will be in some regions and countries by the end of the 1970s. However, religion has indeed proved an important factor in





In the confrontation with colonialists the Indians, Iranians, Afghans, Arabs and other peoples of the downtrodden East tried to oppose the alien invaders with the help of their languages, traditions, unique way of life, in which religion played an important role.

Along with the development of petty-bourgeois nationalism and local progressive-minded movements Oriental intellectuals (Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Mohammed Abdo, and their followers) proclaimed the need for religious reform. The interpretation of their ideas by Soviet researchers presupposed return to religious chastity, which could oppose the ideology of colonialists, and at the same time could make religion compatible with bourgeois achievements of the modern world. Another aspect of religion touched in analysis is that Western culture and ideology were taken in societies of the developing countries as materialistic, whereas reformed religion could bolster up the spiritual force of the Orient.

In the view of Soviet experts, religion in the liberated countries of Asia and Africa was of great importance as part of the national myth largely due to the fact that a greater part of the borders of newly-formed states were drawn on maps by colonialists, and there could hardly be one decolonized state demographically close to tribal or ethnic homogeneity. Thus, reformed and “nationalized” religion could become a uniting factor for these new disunited communities. Among such examples we come across in Soviet literature is Chad of the period of the presidency of Ngarit F. Tombalbaye where religion was proclaimed part of progress; Zaire under Mobutu, where “Africanization” of Christianity was used for reducing the influence of the European clergy and the Catholic church as a whole, concentrating religious belief within the framework of state national ideology; Uganda under Idi Amin Dada, who, despite his adoption of Islam, issued a decree on the deportation of all foreign clergymen in order “to Ugandize” religion. Similarly, Nyerere’s policy in Tanzania during that period was described as nationalist.

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His “Utopian African socialism” did not exclude religion from state ideology and, in contrast to Mobutu and Amin, Nyerere never used reprisals against clergymen. Moreover, he offered them to become allies of the government in the transformation of Tanzanian society: “The state in Africa has enough opportunities to suppress clerical opposition and complete the process of separation of church from the state. In Zaire suppression and separation successfully proceeded under nationalist slogans. In both cases these processes will probably end with the creation of syncretic religious Christhood national ideology, which is necessary for national self-identification and development of a unified strong state.”

In any case, these quotations and descriptions confirm the importance which religion had in the assessments of Soviet experts. Despite the fact that religion did not play a considerable role in the socialist transformation of certain regions of the Third World in the 1970s, it was a major factor of the formation of local nationalism and that was why the socialist triumph in new regions and more thorough establishment of Marxist-Leninist doctrines in the already revolutionized countries were impossible without the determination of the role of religion in revolutionary processes. Nationalism in developing countries in works by experts was closely connected with religious roots due to a special situation in the colonial period. In this connection analysts time and again turned to Lenin’s words about a dual essence of religion and the need to assess the political nature of one or another religious movement through the prism of forces, which this movement includes in itself, and the role which these forces play under certain socio-political circumstances. Indeed, religion, according to Lenin, could be used by the reactionary forces, but at the same time it could play the role similar to that it played in the anti-feudal movements in Europe – the role close to be to progressive and even revolutionary one. The task facing a well-educated Marxist researcher is to investigate thoroughly enough the role played by religion. Even the Soviet anti-religious propaganda







**PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM  
IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,  
THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA**

2018.04.002. ALEKSEI STAROSTIN, ALEXANDER YARKOV.  
MUSLIMS IN PRIAMURYE: A HISTORIC PORTRAIT'S  
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*Keywords: Islam, mosque, imam,  
Muslim population, Tatars, Bashkirs,  
development, migrants, Cossacks, community,  
Far East.*

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In the article authors cover a problem of Islam development in the Far East, in particular, in the Amur River region. This subject is still very poorly studied. Authors of the research, based on an analysis of historical sources from archives of Ufa, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, materials of statistics, interview, make an attempt to give a complex retrospective of Islam development in the Amur River region since appearance of the first Muslims up to now. Authors note a tendency towards creation of ethnic and regional communities living according to their traditions. Authors come to a conclusion that as a result of migration and demographic

processes there is a change of ethnic core of Muslim community – from Tatar to Central Asian and North Caucasian. Despite its fewness, Muslims of the Amur River region became an integral part of a religious landscape of the region.

Preparatory to make reference to history of Ummah of the Amur river region authors draw attention to that it is necessary to distinguish the Amur region of the end of XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries, covering territories of a number of modern constituent entities of the FEFD (The Jewish Autonomous Region, a part of Khabarovsk Krai), the Amur district of the Far East region (FER), the Amur province and the modern Amur region. Anyway, this region was then and now and still remains the outpost of Russia protecting its Far East boundaries.

The cemetery Saadak-Terek found in 1991 in the Republic of Tyva where there was found cajak of Umar ibn Mahammad ibn Ali al-Balkhi (local imam and overseer of the grave of “saint” Sayeed Rasheed of ad-Din) was one of the earliest artifacts of Muslims’ presence in this territory. The inscription on the finding was written in Farsi and dated 1194. Traces of Muslims presence in the period of the Middle Ages in the Amur River region haven’t been found yet.

Authors, investigating history of Muslims appearance in the region, note that, first of all, Cossacks and service men participated in development of Siberia and the Far East. In 1644 the group (including service Tatar men carrying out a role of interpreters) entered Amur creek. Information on presence of service Tatar men among those who expanded east boundaries of Russia is known, but the question of their confessionary practice remains in abeyance. The number of Muslims was too little during that period to speak about Ummah. What local features did their confessionary practice have? Obviously those that were characterized by a zone of their inhabitancy – practice of adat Islam of the Irtysh Land.

The situation changed when the territory of the Amur river region finally turned out to be in the grip of Russia – from the second half of the XIX century dozens of settlements were built



from Ust-Strelki to the Hingansky gorge, and then to the low reaches of the Amur river and on the right coast of Ussuri. Such settlements were built in increments of the Siberian corps which were formed in places of densely populated by the Russian Muslims – Tatars, Bashkirs and the islamized people of Central and Lower Volga area. Aborigines of Siberia and the Far East weren't called up for military service (in 1822 it was fixed a release from recruiting of Siberian “foreigners”). Besides, the Minusinsk (Achinsk / Abakan) Tatars (“the Yenisei Kyrgyz,” since 1917 – Khakas) were followers of Shamanism, and then and Orthodox Christians, but didn't profess Islam.

In initial reclamation of the Amur River region great importance had the military among which there were many of the Volga region descents where Muslims compactly lived, and it defined ethnic “face” of the developing Ummah (ceremonies of the birth and burial, sermon in Tatar, psychological and behavioral attitudes). Since 1877 by request of the mufti of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly in army and on the Cossack lands there were established regular appointments of imams.

Many Muslims after military service stayed behind in the Far East, merchants and handicraftsmen also left here, making one more element of the forming Ummah. So, in the 1890th there was also Blagoveshchensk community. A part of Ummah in the Amur River region governor-generalship at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries was formed of exiled or Muslims who fulfilled sentence.

Authors of the article provide data of the first All-Russian population census of 1897 according to which the total of Muslims in the Amur region was 665 people (0,55% of the total number of the population of the region). The contingent of Muslims was quite simple: overwhelming majority about 80% was made by Tatars. The class structure of Tatar community was presented generally by peasants (492 people), but there were also noblemen (3), bourgeoisies (73), clerks (2), foreigners (61). By a form of activity allocation was the following: a quarter of Tatars was engaged in personalized services, 122 worked at mines, 55 were engaged in

agriculture, 42 – cabbing. The literacy among them was a bit higher, than on the average among other Muslims of the area: 24% among men and 22% among women.

Chinese Muslims were the following outmen in Ummah, there were 56 people, all of them were men and lived in Blagoveshchensk. Only two of them owned reading and writing (obviously the Russian one). Among Muslims of the Amur River region during the census there were found 17 Russians (13 men and 4 women, 9 men and 1 woman of them were literate), 10 Lezgians and 2 representatives of Finno-Ugric group of languages, all men. Besides, 24 Muslims were considered to be Indo-European languages speakers and as much (besides Tatars) – to Turkish-Tatar languages speakers [Zabiyako, Belyakov, Voronina, 2017, 358].

By 1900 the number of Muslims increased, being already 879 persons. It has posed before the authorities a question on building of a prayer house or a mosque in the capital of the region. We believe that providing a lot for "Muslim" burial places was approved even earlier. Newcomers were settled irregularly. Mainly – along the Trans-Siberian Railway, that became a significant factor of the region development.

As for connections with the criminal world, the statistics demonstrated that among ethnic groups most often crimes were committed by Bashkirs and Tatars, and men of Caucasian descent who already fulfilled sentence were in the third place. It is known that more than a half of Muslims was sent into exile for theft. Then there were crimes “against life” (10% of the total number of the condemned). There were also condemned for crimes “under religious banners.” Degree of committed crimes deprived considerable part of Muslims of the opportunity to return home. After serving their sentence they stayed in the Far East, signing up themselves and children in adroit estate.

Authorities tried to settle the served their sentence in isolated locations, but the number of entrants couldn't exceed 1/3 of indigenous population. As a result, for example, in 1902 in Nikolayevsk – on – Amur there were about 200 Muslims, including

served sentence earlier in Sakhalin. Their moral concerned the imam M. Fattakhuddinov who in two years of his being there could found a local mosque and organize charity. It was created evening maktab where pupils of high school of 4–5 classes studied (from Kyrgyz and Circassians), and also children of Muslims who came from Sakhalin, but left without parental care. The activity of Fattakhuddinov promoted softening of customs and education of local Muslims.

The mosque, Charity and a maktab appeared at the same time. These institutes of Muslim community “mahalla” reflected that stage of development of Russian Islam that it is commonly referred to as Jadidism which consisted in social and political movement since 1880s of Jadida forced into application a sound method of reading and writing tuition, development of curriculums and programs with secular subjects, class and lesson system, examinations, textbooks in native languages, studying of Russian. Authors of the article note that the Jadidism pushed Muslims forward integration subsequently, prevented from clericalisation though sometimes it focused them on wrong path of development, for example, support of pan-Islamic ideology.

Many Muslims appeared in the Far East during the Russian-Japanese war. Exactly during this period there was a group of officers and generals from among natives of Caucasus. For repletion of spiritual discipline of military officers as well as for registration of births, deaths and marriages mullahs were required. Researchers point at a special role in Ummah life during this period of the imam and mudarris of S.M. Urmanov, due to whom contradictions between dzhadidas and kadimists were not so urgent as, for example, it was in the Volga region or Central Asia.

To the beginning of World War I the total of Muslims in the Amur region made already 3 486 people (1,6% of the total number of the population). The problem of maintaining loyalty of Muslims became relevant for authorities during World War I. There were fears that could influence the situation, as before (in 1806–1812, 1828–1829, 1853–1856, 1877–1878) opened military operations with

the Ottoman Empire which was still ruled by the sultan – the Caliph of all Muslims. Fears of the most part didn't come true. Moreover, the Siberian Tatars who were non-conscripted for drafting, served in the military as volunteers. Muslims, who arrived, swore the oath in presence of the mullah under detail with the command staff of the Amur River region military district.

In 1917 the institute of military mullahs was closed down by an Interim government, but Ummah of the Amur river region got so much strong so that it could support ministers of religion without government support, removing from them, at the same time, both official obligations to support the power by sermons and precepts.

The period of the Soviet power establishment in the Far East was short-term, and initiated Civil war ran over time till 1922. If the Soviet Commissariats on Muslim affairs created before White Czechs' march off felt as combat staff of mobilization of all Muslim masses (but without imams), then, on the contrary, in A.V. Kolchak's army the institute of military mullahs was revived.

The Amur river region experienced migration waves, sometimes (quickly) many-fold increasing Ummah (including ministers of religion), but finally it carried away out of borders of the country both many famous theologians and imams, and a prosperous part of local population and guest (temporary) parishioners. A part of them settled then in Harbin.

During the first period of restoration of the Soviet power there weren't oppressions concerning Muslims. Moreover, in the Amur province in 1925 there were two communities (a year before – one). In the time following, as well as throughout the country, pressure upon laities, and then upon believers the number of whom it's impossible to defined due to the lack of statistics increased. In January, 1930 long while survived community of Blagoveshchensk received a “blow” – after antireligious meeting the mosque was closed, and in the late 1930s, as well as almost all other temples of Blagoveshchensk, it was blown up. During 60 years of follow up Ummah was an unformalized association

practicing Muslims gathering in private houses and for maintenance of funerals.

In 1939 in the region there were 2 042 Tatars. Presence of the Central Asian ethnic groups (more than 200 people) became more remarkable. As it was forbidden to place in a border zone dispossessed and deported people, obviously, they were civilians, military and members of their families.

In the post-war period in the region big construction was conducted. For January 1, 1953 there were 16 903 of special settlers (including Balkars, Ingushes, the Crimean Tatars, Chechens). Respectively, their life and spiritual practices were registered by supervisory authority, but without analysis of differences with traditions which developed local Muslims for the previous decades on this ground. Released from under the supervision subsequently they tended to leave the places of the exile, reducing the number of Muslims by creed (or already only by origin) though religious buildings for confession of faith by them didn't appear, and old ones weren't returned.

The number of Muslims by origin in the post-war period increased, and by 1959 reached 5 870 people (0,8% of the population). We will note data on Tatars (including Crimean ones) – 5 006 people. In 1979 the number of this population group was 13 902 (1,48%), 7 939 people of them – Tatars. By 1989 the quantity reached the biggest indicator – 25 285 (2,41%) people, but the cumulative number of Tatars and Bashkirs was less than a half – 11 785 people. The others were immigrants from the Central Asia and Kazakhstan republics – 5 594 people and the North Caucasus – 1 737 ones. The considerable growth was explained by the fact that many villages and Baikal Amur Mainline stations were built by representatives of the different republics. So, Turkmens built the Larba station; Tajiks – Soloni; Uzbeks – Kuandu and Leprindo, natives of Bashkiria – Verkhnezeyensk, and from Checheno-Ingush, Dagestan and North Ossetian the ASSR – Kunerm. As a rule, they were young people de minimis connected with religious traditions of predecessors, but near new villages on the line of Baikal Amur

Mainline “Muslim” areas at local cemeteries appeared. Therefore, we assume that someone from youth could organize funerals according to traditions “under Sharia.”

Considering the current situation in the Amur region authors note essential reduction of Muslim population in the 1990–2000th. Among the reasons there are: natural losses, assimilation, resettlement to other regions of Russia because of economic woes of a transition period. According to a population census of 2002 the total number of Muslims (by origin) in the region reduced twice – to 12830 people (1,4%). The number of Tatars and Bashkirs at the same time was 6081 persons. By 2010 the number of Muslims (by origin) decreased even more – up to 10571 people (1,27%) where the number of Tatars and Bashkirs became less than a half – to 4290 people.

Among the remained and again arrived Muslims growth of religious feelings was noted that reflects all-Russian tendencies during this period. In January, 2003 in Blagoveshchensk there was held the meeting of diasporas of the area at which it was adopted a decision on creation of Muslim public center and its governing body- the High Council. About three representatives from Tajik and Uzbek diasporas, two – from Daghistanis and one – from Tatars and Turkmen joined it. I. Usmandzhanov was elected the chairman.

The organization under the leadership of this leader acted under different names and not all of them had official registration: “The Far Eastern democracy movement of Muslims,” “Muslim Brotherhood,” “Muslim community,” “The Amur Muslim council.” For example, public association Muslim Brotherhood was officially registered in justice department in 2003, however next year Directorate of the Ministry of Justice brought a court action for dissolution of Muslim Brotherhood as the association beared a name of the international organization which is considered terrorist in Russia. The question of construction of the mosque was particularly acute. The community addressed the city authorities concerning allocation of the land property repeatedly, however the lands offered by the city administration were rejected because of hardness.

Since 2009 in Blagoveshchensk activity of Russia's Central Spiritual Governance for Muslims intensified, to a large extent thanks to activity of the representative of this structure in the Far East H. Kuznetsov. The first religious organization (as a part of Russia's Central Spiritual Governance for Muslims) in Blagoveshchensk got official registration on December 14, 2009. Its Chairman was a lawyer I. Fasakhov, and imam – O. Omarov. In October, 2010 as a part of it the second organization in the region was registered – in Zeya (chairman T.A. Kidrachev) where the community acted first of all as a religious group. Most of Muslims of this city are natives of the republics of the North Caucasus, mainly from Ingushetia. The worship house of 70 sq.m has been functioning since 2013 in Zeya. The religious group (head S. Magomedov) is also in Tynda where local authorities allocated ground for construction of the mosque.

By the end of 2011 Muslims of Blagoveshchensk were left without imam, and namazes were carried out by the representative of Uzbek cultural center "Oltin Vody" M. Tulunov in a rented room. All administrative work of the community was on the representative of Uzbek national cultural center "Oltin Vody" ("Golden valley") A.A. Palvanov. Nowadays Central Asian component dominates in ummah, but with important role of natives of the Caucasus. When in 2011 Muslims didn't compel allocation of a lot on the territory of Blagoveshchensk, on their own money they bought land in the suburb of the regional center in the village of Chigiri (in 7 km). And in March, 2013 started construction of the mosque with a total area of 1 200 sq.m.

There is no own centralized religious organization in the Amur region, but communities are geared at Russia's Central Spiritual Governance for Muslims and its plenipotentiary in Khabarovsk akhund A. Garifullin.

Authors of the article pay attention to interesting research results "Image of Muslims in consciousness of the Amur river region population," [Voronkova, Voronkova, 2012, 173–190]. On the basis of an interview with residents of the region (including

representatives of orthodox and Catholic communities) it is concluded that in consciousness of the respondents there was a contradictory image of Muslims marked by both positive and negative characteristics. As positive, for example, it is possible to refer responsibility of Muslims in questions of faith. However, according to the authors, after all in consciousness of orthodox respondents either negative associations, or suppressed tolerance or indifference prevail.

Particularity of perception of Muslims by Orthodox Christians is a combination of the concepts “nation” (or “ethnos”) and “confession.” “The Russian faith” (i.e. Orthodoxy) is opposed, alas, to “non-Russian” faith. It is also pointed out existence of the known stereotype: “the Russian means Orthodox Christian” which can be compared with the stereotype: “Muslim means terrorist.”

For answers of the members of the Catholic community of Blagoveshchensk tolerance and even sympathy in relation to Muslims is more showed. A part of respondents points at belief in one God as a unifier; however, Muslims remain nevertheless different, with “another” culture, dogma, traditions, communication style and mode of dress. Severity, restraint, closeness and cruelty are given as typical features of a Muslim. Responsible attitude to faith, way of interacting and pattern of conduct are virtues of Muslim’s image in consciousness of the respondents. None of the respondents followed a stereotype: “a Muslim – a terrorist.”

The results of the response analysis of the citizens who don’t reckon themselves in any faith showed that their attitude towards Muslims can be characterized as tolerant and neutral, but Muslims are perceived by the respondents as representatives of absolutely other culture. In consciousness of this group of inhabitants it is possible to refer serious attitude towards faith, abstentionism, and respect for the elderly, good attitude towards children to number of positive features of Muslims’ image. However, polygamy and impairment of women’s rights are given by respondents as negative sides of Muslim culture. “Muslim means extremist” still leaves an important stereotype in consciousness of this category of respondents.



Multiplication of Muslims among the population doesn't raise fears at most of the respondents of all three groups.

In conclusion authors of the article come to a conclusion that though Islam is an over ethnic religion, but there is a tendency to creation of ethnic and regional communities seeking to cultivate on the Far East territory traditions, inherent in places of their origin. It is obvious, for example, on Zeya community where most of parishioners are from Ingushetia. Judging by the evolution of Blagoveshchensk community authors also note occurred for the last more than hundred years (as a result of migration and demographic processes) change of its ethnic core – from Tatar to Central Asian and North Caucasian.

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2018.04.003. SAIDA SIRAZHUDINOVA, SURKHAI GALBATSEV. ETHNO-POLITICAL COMPETITION AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN // *"Vlast," oscow, 2016, 2, P. 149–154.*

*Keywords: ethno-political competition, elite, civil society organizations, sustainable development, the republic of Daghestan.*

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The authors analyze the problem of the ethnopolitical contest and the structures of civil society of the Republic of Daghestan

which influence it. RD differs by unique variety of ethnic groups living on common territory. High importance of ethnic identity in modern Daghestan society requires inquiry of their interaction in the conditions of cosmopolitan society.

Multiple Daghestan society is imbued by crosslining. Ethnic rivalry is most clearly shown in political, public sphere and in business. Business area is guided by its own “rules of the game” which work privately, forming division according to clannish lines where ethnic factor also plays the role. Rather strong competition in the republic happens in religious sphere – between religious organizations and movements; it is most rigid, complex and politized.

Ethnic and religious elite and organizations are the main public competing actors considerably influencing stability of RD and the North Caucasus in general. They are capable to consolidate or destabilize the Daghestan society.

Two widespread approaches to ethnicity – primordialist and constructivist are specific for the Republic of Daghestan simultaneously. From the point of view of primordialism ethnicity is natural and congenital and is defined by fixed deep initial accession into group and culture and belonging to them. For constructivism ethnicity isn't objective, isn't set as a reality, it is streaming and determined ad hoc. The designed all-Daghestan identity depends on the choice of a person: he or she feels as a representative of ethnos (the first approach), or considers himself “Daghestani” or “Russian.” According to the research “Expectations of Daghestan” 51% of respondents identified themselves as “Russian,” 43% – as “Daghestan” (having emphasized at the same time – “living in the Russian Federation”) and only 5% – as representative of the specific nation.

In the course of competition elites often resort to use of political mobilization of ethnicity (politicization) on the basis of ethnic (and religious) identity. Elite and representatives of civil society structures use the existing dissatisfaction, using discontent of the population. An important role is played by rivalry in the

sphere of identity, competition for resources (territory, influence, the power). Political elites use ethnicity as a pretext to realize own interests and purposes.

In 2015 Research center of global current issues and regional problems “Caucasus. World. Development” in RD carried out a social research “Ethnopolitical Contest in Modern Daghestan.” Existence of ethnic competition in the republic is recognized by 81% of respondents, 16% declared about its absence. At the same time 75,6% of respondents consider that the ethnic competition exerts impact on the system of sustainable development of RD, and the lack of this influence was noted by 18,9%. 59,4% of people answered a question of importance of “presence of representatives of their nationality at supreme authorities” that it isn't obligatory, “everything depends on personal qualities;” by 35% of respondents consider presence at supreme authorities of representatives of their nationality important. 10,8% consider such presence desirable. To a question of what nations play the role in political life of the republic, answers were the following: Avars – 39,5%, Dargins – 31,4%, all – 21,4%, Kumyks – 3,1%, Laks – 2,2%, etc. This answer shows inequality of nations’ representation in power and complexities for advance of talented representatives of small-numbered peoples into political elite. The dominating numerous people compete with each other. Sometimes the following dominating outman peoples – Kumyks, Laks and Lezgians (in Southern Daghestan) join the fight against unequal forces and smaller opportunities. National quoting (representation of all nations in power) is considered necessary by 75,6% of respondents. National quoting is considered not important by 16,2% of respondents, noting that the main thing is internal skills.

In the republic there is a division not only on ethnic grounds, but also within ethnoses; in some areas and villages status class division on the basis of origin still exists: “clear” (high, precious) – descendants of khans and noblemen, “mixed” and “slavish” – descending from Georgian slaves. Such division remained still in private sphere – attention is paid to questions of friendship and

communication, but especially it is factored into marriages. To a question: “Whether you consider correct the division of people by origin?” – answers were divided as follows: “I consider that is important to keep the noble birth” – 10,8%; “these are vestiges of the past which it is necessary and to leave in the past” – 32,4%; “all Muslims and all people are equal” – 27%; “no” – 5,4%; “I don't understand the question” – 9% (more often representatives of those areas where there wasn't similar division).

The ethnopolitical contest is the strongest between Avars and Dargins (the first two nations outman) — consider 72,9%, between Kumyks and Avars (mountaineers) – 22,5%; participation in the ethnopolitical competition of Lezgians, “those who have more levers of power” was also noted, and only the few answered that there is no competition along ethnic lines. Answers to this question showed unequal participation of various Daghestan ethnoses in the power. The most competing there were, according to the answers, Avars (most numerous), then Kumyks and in part – Lezgians. And it is with the presence of several dozens of ethnoses which aren't rather strong to participate in such competition. The current situation in Daghestan is illustrated by the following opinions of respondents: “all of us are Daghestanis, and division into nationalities isn't so important (but I consider it a utopia)” – 62,1%; “there is interethnic consent” – 29,7%; “there is an interethnic competition” – 21,6%.

The problem of the Kumyk people is urgent for the Republic of Daghestan, with its deficit of flat lands. Resettlement of mountaineers to a plain gains momentum so that traditional places of residence of Kumyks are narrowed that generates discontent of the Kumyk intellectuals. Attitude toward “the Kumyk question” was a miscellaneous, and differed depending on competition. Most of the respondents answered that “there is no such problem,” also the negative attitude is noted 27% (was expressed by mountaineers and mainly Avars). Also, there were such answers: “the lands of Kumyks can't be taken away,” “it is necessary to be sympathetic,” “it is a problem which should be solved.”

For sustainable development of the Republic of Dagestan this is considered to be important: decrease, eradication and fight against corruption – 19,5%, competition (the ethnic competition) – 8,6%, job creation – 7%, tourism development – 5% of respondents. Are also important: peace, lack of terror, comeback to the legal framework, attraction of investments, fair management, competence, confidence in the future, education, work, growth prospects, development of the village, open recruitment, development of agribusiness and industry, transparency of the existing power, presence of professionals in power. In answers ethnic differences were also shown. The number of the respondents who noted influence of the problems connected with ethnic question on sustainable development made 17% (“equal access for all nations of the republic to senior positions according to employment training,” “refusal of national division”). Importance of eradication of clannishness and abolishment of clan system was noted by 11%.

Dagestan society differs in highness of solidarity and along with it in ethnic and religious competition to a larger extent. If there is competition prevailing at big groups only, there are no serious ethnic conflicts here. All the conflicts are connected with the conflict of interests – territorial, status, imperious. At the same time because of ethnic solidarity it is noted here an ability of the conflict to outgrow swiftly from domestic in ethnic ones that can influence ethnic stability. Ethnic interests turn into competition of political elite. For prevention of ethnic conflicts there are informal rules legitimized by tradition defining ethnic representation of dominating ethnoses in power in each concrete area. There is “a quote division” between ethnic groups in Khasavyurt and Kizilyurt to avoid fight for repartition of spheres of influence between clans.

Structures of civil society are capable to play an important role in maintaining interethnic stability or, on the contrary, in ethnic destabilization. Institutes of civil society (as traditional structures of public self-organization) have a long history.

The tradition of mutual aid, self-organization for solving local problems developed and was implemented effectively throughout centuries. They solved social problems and were an important mechanism of strife resolution. The institute of senior colleagues and influence of religious leaders continue to be used for solution of interethnic tensions.

The structures of civil society directed to formation of general civil identity and at the same time to maintaining traditions of the people and articulating of their interests are necessary for sustainable development. Conservation of traditions and values is a basic core for preservation of stable development of society. It is necessary a strict observance of ethics by ethnic media and organizations influencing moods of the audience which are capable both to harmonize a situation, and to promote stirring of problems.

Current ethnic competition generates a situation when often a person isn't put in perspective, and through ethnicity prism that is antithetical to the idea of equality and equal time. There is rather strong group (ethnic, clan) solidarity that complicates social elevators, generates tension. At the same time strong point seeks for monopolization of own power, securing of the achievements, uses administrative resources that creates barriers to competition and realization of the principle of equal time. In the republic, authors of article conclude, there is a high ethnic competition which penetrating with the public sphere often has political accent. Therefore it is very important to pay attention to structures of civil society, preservation of effective traditional mechanisms of settlement and prevention of the ethnic conflicts.

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VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN REGION // *The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: Caspian region, geopolitics, security, legal status, problems, threats and challenges, hydrocarbon raw materials, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, the U.S., Turkey, China.*

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*Abstract.* The Caspian region has always been in the limelight of researchers. It is a hub of the interests of many countries working on oil-and-gas deposits. Primarily, it is the "five" – Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran. At the same time the region also draws the attention of the United States, Turkey and China.

The disintegration of the U.S.S.R in 1991 and the emergence of new sovereign states on the Eurasian continent have resulted in the formation of geopolitical regions with its own problems and threats. One of such places is the Caspian region. The international expert community devotes much attention to its examination. This is due to its rich deposits of hydrocarbon raw materials and convenient transport routes along the North – South and East – West axes. Huge deposits of oil are an object of exceptional attention of world business tycoons. This explains the striving of the United States, EU countries and Turkey to increase their economic and political influence in this region. The Caspian basin resources are of great interest for the rapidly growing Asian market, where China is playing the main role.

1. *M. Dzhantaleyeva. Strategic Challenges and Security in the Caspian Region in the 21st century // Socio-political and historical and cultural aspects of present geopolitical situation: materials of international conference of the 10th Scientific-educational Forum. Moscow, 2017, P. 299–304.*

M. Dzhantaleyeva, PhD(Politics), Astrakhan State University. Due to its geostrategic position, as well as economic, political and ecological factors the Caspian region is of great importance to the Russian Federation, including for ensuring its national security. Russia as the successor of the U.S.S.R. and a regional power of the Caspian basin is trying to preserve its influence there, taking into account its energy and geopolitical factors. The author of the article emphasizes the need to establish the boundaries of the Caspian region from the point of view of international law. First, a state bordering on the Caspian Sea, no matter how big, is a regional subject. Secondly, countries which do not border on the Caspian Sea, but are close to it and can by right exert an influence on the international situation on the sea are also the states of the region. In the narrow sense of the word it is only near-Caspian countries – Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran that are regarded the states of the region. In a broader legal and geopolitical sense the Caspian region includes only those countries whose geographical position and policies exert a considerable influence on the laying out and building of oil-and-gas pipelines, other transport communication lines, and on the whole situation in the region. These are China, Turkey, Georgia, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Going over from the determination of the region to the key problems of security in the Caspian basin, the author notes that for over twenty years already the outstanding problems of the Caspian region include:

– the unresolved character of the international status and regime of the Caspian Sea;



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- energy security, problems of transportation of Caspian energy carriers to world markets;
  - ecological security, inimitable ecosystem of the Caspian Sea, which should be preserved;
  - military security, great interest on the part of certain EU countries and the United States in the processes taking place in the region, including the attempts to control the matters of military security.

The legal status of the Caspian Sea has not been established until today. The absence of a clear-cut legal definition of national belonging of the oil-and-gas structures of the Caspian basin between the Caspian states causes prolongation of interstate disputes. This circumstance is viewed as a serious political risk and this is why it contains the drawing of investments in Caspian hydrocarbon deposits. Thus, the author writes, in the long run the region may become one of the serious exporters of oil, and because of this it is quite clear why the Caspian states have been unable to agree on this and other problems connected with it.

The key factor largely determining the state and development of the economic potential of the Caspian region is the hydrocarbon resources which are crucial for the progress of the region, and at the same time a source of challenges of all kinds. In any case, the author emphasizes, it is the energy factor that will be the determining one in any situation in the Caspian region during the next few years.

At the close of the last century it was believed that the region held second place in the world in oil reserves and third place in gas deposits. Suffice it to mention that the additional oil reserves may reach more than 31 billion tons. (All the same, this figure is several times smaller than the prognosticated figures related to the Persian Gulf deposits).

M. Dzhantaleyeva notes that the role of the oil resources of the Caspian basin for the countries of the region differs. For example, as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are concerned, the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian basin are an important



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Russia and Iran. This, in turn, means the emergence of new threats and challenges for the countries of the Caspian region. The author writes that the Caspian region can easily be turned into the ground suitable for provoking events like the “Arab spring” or Ukrainian “EuroMaidan.” All the more so, the West is dissatisfied with the political regimes in the Caspian region. They all are potential aims for the west to stage new “color” revolutions there with a view to creating more loyal and manageable regimes. The factor of “color” revolutions is a serious threat to security and stability in the Caspian region.

Thus, the conclusion made by M. Dzhanaleyeva is that the Caspian region contains an entire range of mutually connected problems which cannot be resolved to this day due to opposition and mutually exclusive interests of the Caspian states themselves. Actually, the region is a hub of negative tendencies retarding the process of ensuring and protecting the national interests of the Caspian states.

2. A. Nogmova. Geopolitical Prospects of Modern Russian Policy in the Caspian Region // *Vestnik of Diplomatic Academy of Russia's Foreign Ministry. Russia and the World. Moscow, 2017, 4 (14), P. 84–95.*

A. Nogmova, PhD(Politics) (Diplomatic Academy, Russia's Foreign Ministry). She regards the Caspian region as one of the most important geopolitical centers connecting Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In the last decade of the 20th century and at the beginning of this century the Caspian region took firm positions in the international agenda: thanks to its geographical situation and resources the region draws the attention of many leading states, including western countries and the United States. The unique position of the Caspian region as one of the leading oil-and-gas centers and its geographical situation make it also a center of regional geopolitical disputes and arguments whose significance goes far beyond the framework of the Caspian states themselves and regional political arguments.



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Russia should better analyze regional problems and work out strategic tasks. The importance of this region is reflected in the Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, the draft Convention on the status of the Caspian Sea, the Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation up to 2020, and other documents,

At the present stage Russia is faced with a number of problems in the Caspian region calling for speedy solution. The most effective and acceptable solution will be through a close strategic interaction and cooperation between all Caspian states. In the past decade five concepts of Russian foreign policy have been evolved. The last one, of November 30, 2016, points to a special importance of observing the universal principle of solution and equal; and indivisible security conformably to the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, Asia-Pacific, and other regions. Attention is centered on network diplomacy presupposing flexible forms of participation in multilateral structures with a view to effectively searching for solutions of common tasks. Special mention is made of Russia pursuing a course aimed at the comprehensive development of cooperation with Kazakhstan, Iran and other Caspian states. Thus, Russia's policy is aimed at solving three basic strategic tasks:

1. Protection and strengthening of its positions in the Caspian region.
2. Preservation of stability and support of security in the region.
3. Promotion of inter-regional cooperation of the Caspian states.

The author of the article notes that Russian foreign economic and geopolitical course toward the Caspian states is quite acceptable and feasible along with the observance of the principles and tasks outlined in the Russian foreign-policy concepts. At present the Caspian Sea connects the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan are situated on its shores. This century the control level of one or another country over the fuel and energy resources and means of

their transportation and protection determines the role of a given state in the preservation of its geopolitical positions in the region.

Proceeding from contemporary history, Russian foreign policy in the Caspian region is determined by several stages:

- 1st stage (1996–1998) – support of limited presence in the region;

- 2nd stage (1996–1998) – determination of directions of foreign policy and return to the region;

- 3rd stage (1999–2000) – working out of new basic approaches to mutual relations with the Caspian states and consolidation of bilateral relations, transformation of Russian policy, taking into account changed alignment of forces in the region;

- 4th stage (2000–2002) – determination of constructive foreign policy aimed at ensuring reliable security of the country, multilateral and bilateral cooperation with participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);

- 5th stage (2002–2017) – realization of direct and constructive interaction with the countries of the Caspian region on determining the legal status and security of the Caspian region (conferences and meetings, 1st–4th summits of the Caspian states).

In 2003, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan came to uniform opinion concerning the principle of dividing the Caspian Sea bed, and considering the sea surface common. This decision was reached as a result of a compromise of three countries. Azerbaijan stopped to force the division of the Caspian Sea into sectors, although it did not abandon this idea, and Russia softened its approach, having agreed to divide the deposits in the sea. In 2007, at a summit in Tehran several premises were adopted on a peaceful character of the use of the territory of the Caspian basin and non-admission by the Caspian or other states of using these or other territories for aggression against any countries. The main subject of discussion at the Baku summit in 2010 in was security. The determination of the political and legal status of the Caspian Sea depended on solution of the questions connected with

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security. The main result of a meeting of the presidents of the Caspian states at the 4th Caspian summit in Astrakhan (2014) was a political statement which laid down the basic principles of international security, as well as interaction on the Caspian Sea and its delimitation.

As far as solution of territorial disputes is concerned, it is suggested to use the existing principles and standards of international law by mutual agreement of the sides involved. By the official documents on the results of the negotiations of the “five” the size of the exclusive economic zone is fixed (25 miles) for the first time, which the coastal states may claim. The remaining sea surface is left in the common use for shipping and fishing.

Russia is interested in developing the riches of the Caspian Sea, which may help ensure energy security and greater currency gains to its budget. This is why Russian interests in the Caspian region boil down to the preservation of access to the resources of the region and preclude the penetration of foreign influence in it. Apart from that, Russia is concerned over the problem of using the mineral and biological resources of the Caspian Sea. Its further development will contribute to Russia’s economic progress and make the region an important link in the system of economic ties. In order to use the advantages of Russia’s geographical position and its greater role in the world economic system it is necessary to develop in a planned way the Russian international transport corridors, which answer its domestic and international economic interests. The most important of them is the “North – South” corridor: Northern Europe – Russia (Caspian Sea) – Central Asia – Iran (Persian Gulf) – India. The use of this direction for international cargo transportation, as compared with the transit via the Suez Canal, saves much time and money

Indeed, for many centuries the Caspian basin has been a major link in transport communication system, connecting parts of the Eurasian continent along the North – South and the East – West directions. The strategical status of the Caspian basin answering the interests of the five coastal states is a decisive factor in opposing

Western policy, and the United States' policy above all, which has declared the Caspian region a zone of its vital interests.

The modern economic and political development of the Caspian region leads to the realization of the idea of determining its geopolitical center, which could coordinate and consolidate the geopolitical process for solving all timely problems. The author of the article emphasizes that Russia would wish to have this center on its territory. The Russian Federation has close historical and cultural connections with other Caspian countries, which fact largely determines its great influence on the Caspian region. Russia is a participant of eight geopolitical regions: North-European, East-European, Caucasian, Central-Asian, Far-Eastern, Pacific and Arctic.

Confessionally different regions of the Caspian area (Slav-Orthodox Christiana and Turkic-Muslim) can form stable units of civilization.

3. *S. Chernitsyna*. Geopolitical Specific Features of the Caspian Region: Range of Scientific Research: Economy and Management // *Togliatti*, 2017, Vol. 6, 3(20), P. 421–423.

One of the basic geopolitical features of the Caspian region, S. Chernitsyna, post-graduate student of the Russian Diplomatic Academy, writes is that it is a connecting link in the North – South direction (Russia – Persian Gulf), which is responsible for the gas and oil supply to European markets. The Caspian region is a sort of a crossroads of several energy-transporting arteries, which are very important in providing the economies of Western countries with energy resources. This is why control over oil-and-gas pipelines is of primary importance to the United States and the European Union.

The disintegration of the U.S.S.R. has resulted in the formation of several independent states in the Caspian region – Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. However, these pipelines have remained under the control of Russia, which became the legal successor of the Soviet Union. This circumstance has placed its certain former republics in energy-transport



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dependence on Moscow, because the existing transport routes do not give these newly-formed states the right to control and manage the transportation of hydrocarbon resources independently. Thus, the main task of the Caspian countries during the first years of their independence was to create a pipeline system, which would be part of the East – West energy corridor, bypassing Russia.

The problem of transportation is an urgent one in the relations between states, both in the given region and outside it – the European Union, the United States, and China. The United States paid much attention to the Caspian region during its involvement in the operations in the Middle East in the 2000s. At the time the region was a zone of energy security for the U.S. “strategy of national security.” Later, the key vector switched over to military-political interaction.

The position of the Caspian region is strategically advantageous and answers the U.S. geopolitical tasks, namely increasing American influence in the region and weakening the influence of such states as Russia and Iran in the region. Besides, Washington also sees a threat in the growing interest of China in the region. As a result the U.S. concept has changed and now envisages an expansion of military-technical cooperation with Caspian countries within the framework of the “Caspian Guard” program. Several projects are also implemented to develop oil deposits on the Caspian shelf within the period between 2018 and 2022.

And so, the energy and transport arteries in the East – West and North – South directions crossing in the region are one of the key geopolitical features there. It should be noted that rivalry for control over the Caspian energy resources in the present picture of the world is one of its key features, especially because, in the view of most analysts, the mining of hydrocarbon resources will go down in the nearest future. This is why the Caspian region rich in oil and gas is of great interest to many geopolitical actors as a source of these resources. One of the key features of the region is that so far its legal status has not been determined and finally agreed on. Some countries regard the Caspian Sea “a lake,” others

view it as “a sea.” This problem has been discussed in the current political agenda ever more frequently after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. One of the strictest positions in the legal aspect has been taken by Iran, which did not join the UN Convention of 1982 on the Law of the Sea; this is why in its legal formulations the Caspian Sea is a “lake.” Accordingly, Tehran would like to divide the Caspian Sea shelf into five identical (20%) sections between the five coastal states; the other suggestion is to use the entire surface of the sea jointly. Meanwhile, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan would like to divide the Caspian Sea by the middle (modified) line, as a result of which Iran will have only 13 percent of the water surface, and Kazakhstan – 29 percent, for example. Tehran is against such principle of solving the legal dispute.

The attempts to solve this dispute have been made since the time of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the formation of new states. However, the common positive trend chosen, and international agreements and protocols already signed have not yielded positive results so far. Thus, in 2016, during a meeting of the foreign ministers of the “Caspian five” a satisfactory decision on the draft convention of the legal status of the Caspian Sea was not reached, although the parties reached consensus on most issues. Decisions on the remaining ones were postponed to the Caspian states summit in 2017. It should be noted that although the Caspian states have not reached a decision on the legal status of the Caspian Sea so far, they have solved the key questions unanimously. In 2014, at the Astrakhan summit the presidents of the Caspian states declared their joint decision not to allow the presence of the armed forces of non-regional powers in the Caspian region.

The unresolved legal question on territorial division, as well as a proper definition of the Caspian Sea itself entails a multitude of geopolitical risks, which are connected with the presence of resource deposits disputed between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. A greater risk of a potential conflict is due not only to the absence of the legal status of the Caspian Sea and presence of disputed oil and gas deposits, but also to the active militarization

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of the region. Practically all Caspian states are increasing their military might in the region and bolster up the naval forces. The problem of military cooperation with third countries, which are not related to the region, seems rather controversial. For example, today there are two groups of states which assess differently military cooperation in this region with other countries. Iran and Russia are categorically opposed against any military presence of third countries, primarily the United States, in the Caspian region; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are ready to accept foreign aid in the militarization of the water reservoir on the conditions offered by third countries, and can even agree to deployment of these countries' military bases on their territory.

Thus, the author of the article concludes, the sum total of geopolitical specific features of the Caspian region, especially those as the presence of energy and transport arteries connecting the North and the South and the East and Europe, great deposits of hydrocarbons, unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea, as well as the question of territorial affiliation make this region a possible venue of the clashes of interests of global geopolitical actors. Moreover, these specific features characteristic of the Caspian states, like irremovability of the powers that be and a number of domestic problems result in a high threat of the forced change of the ruling regime, that is, a "color revolution" with a view to bringing a loyal political force to power. And the nearness of seats of tension, such as Syria, creates a high level of terrorist threat.

4. *S. Morozov, I. Savchenko. Socio-Political Security in the Black Sea – Caspian Region in the Context of Realization of National Interests // Socio-political and Historical-cultural Aspects of Modern Geopolitical Situation: materials of an international scientific conference of the 10th Scientific-educational Forum. Moscow, 2017, P. 311–314.*

A new alignment of forces in the international arena depending on the positioning of the political actors, who offer their projects of political interaction and influence in the international

arena is one of the main sources of a geopolitical threat to Russia. This is said by research associates at the Volgograd State University – assistant professor S. Morose, PhD(Politics), and assistant I. Sachiko. The socio-political security of Russia largely depends on the situation at a regional level. In this context the role of one of the key regions in the system of socio-political security – Black Sea – Caspian region rich in hydrocarbon resources, is growing rapidly. The main sphere of rivalry between the world geopolitical actors in this region is political control over the transportation corridors of oil and gas.

The confrontation between the Russian Federation and western countries over the construction of oil-and-gas pipelines connecting the Caspian region with the Black Sea concerns the entire southern region of Russia. The traditional list of problems of the Black Sea-Caspian region security and the development of transport-and-energy communications, solution of local conflicts, formation of regional security and cooperation systems has become longer for it now includes new factors: growing terrorist threats, ethnic and confessional tension, greater migration flows, etc. All this engenders the growth of radical fundamentalist sentiments and creates a favorable ground for attempts to settle controversial problems by force and acts of terror. The globalization of anti-terrorist struggle and a change of the U.S. policy toward Russia may entail a change of Russian policy in the context of regional processes.

Among the factors of the growth of ethnic and political tension are geographical and socio-economic disproportions between various parts of Russia. They worsen interethnic and ethno-political situation.

The Black Sea – Caspian region draws close attention of many states, including Iran, Turkey, the Middle East and Balkan countries, as well as the United States and China. The region is a zone of competition and confrontation between leading world powers. The South of Russia is the most vulnerable link of the Russian post-Soviet system: armed conflicts periodically flare up



Caspian region makes it possible to reveal the key points of opposition and threats to the national security of Russia.

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*Keywords: image of Russia, population of Kazakhstan, security, threat, defense, Soviet experience, anti-colonial rhetoric.*

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The author of the article analyzes the main factors, which influence the formation of the image of Russia among inhabitants of Kazakhstan. The article contains certain results of a poll among citizens of the republic, which will help understand their ideas about Russia as a threat to Kazakhstan's security or a guarantor of this security. Views of the poll's respondents are cited concerning the role of Russia in the CIS and the Eurasian area for the past several years. All answers are grouped in several thematic blocs, which give an idea about the main features of Russia's image. Those who take Russia for a haven and guarantor of security have personal experience of interaction with Russian reality, and those who regard Russia as a threat receive information about Russia through the mass media and social networks.

The perception of Russia by inhabitants to the CIS and EAEC countries is constantly monitored. The trends of people's attitudes to Russia are regularly revealed and made public. The data for 2016 showed that Russia remains a friendly country for 81 percent of the Kazakhs polled, but this share tends to go down gradually.

General figures are not enough to understand the reasons for some or other tendencies in the perception of Russia by Kazakhs. Such tasks are tackled in research works using qualitative methods. The recently published report by S. Jaksylykov makes the following conclusion on the basis of

interviews carried out in Pavlodar in 2015: the attitude of Kazakh citizens to integration in the EAEC depends primarily on their ethnic affiliation. Kazakhs and “Kazakh nationalists” support only the economic variants of integration. Russians and “Russian nationalists” favor deeper forms of integration, and for them Eurasian integration means, above all, integration with Russia.

Such results clear up the situation, but leave unanswered the motives of the formation of views, reducing everything to ethnic affiliation. But the factors forming the main features of Russia’s image in the minds of Kazakh citizens are more varied. This became evident in the course of investigation carried out in 2016 and 2017 by research associates of the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS I. Kosmarskaya and I. Savin in two cities of Kazakhstan: Petropavlovsk (June 2016) and Alma-Ata (October 2016 and May 2017).

The author cites the following results of his work: the most varied aspects of the image of Russia in Kazakhstan have been revealed: from utilitarian use of close-to-border situation to security questions, cultural memory and identity. The author of the article and research was interested, first and foremost, in the factors characterizing Russia’s image in Kazakhstan in the context of security, that is, the answer to the question: “In what situations and who perceives Russia in Kazakhstan mainly as a factor of a threat? “And when and who takes it for a factor of maintaining security of Kazakhstan?”

Among the multitude of views and concepts the researcher singles out several original ones, which have been formulated and mentioned more frequently. They concern Russia’s characteristics as a subject of Kazakhstan’s security.

1. Russia is the most comfortable place as a haven, all the more so for civil activists, where the security level is higher than in Kazakhstan. To this is added the idea that there is more liberal civic order and milder regime. The inhabitants of the near-to-border districts, who maintain regular relations with Russians are characterized by a quite positive attitude to Russia. One of the



arguments against considering Russia a threat is the view that it is more developed in certain spheres, which makes life more comfortable and cooperation with it more attractive.

2. Russia is not a threat, but protection. The people polled answered the direct question as to how they regard Russia from the point of view of looking at it as a force or subject influencing their security as Kazakhstan's citizens. One of the most frequently mentioned arguments in this respect was that Russia was important not as a source of such threats, but as a force which protects from them. Part of arguments is based on the contention that Russia is a strategic partner of Kazakhstan, and its citizens can rely on its military resources.

The mass media more often than not use materials by their Russian counterparts, or refrain from using any negative stuff about Russia (this is characteristic of the northern districts of Kazakhstan, whereas in the south of the republic there are very many Kazakh-language newspapers and sites full of more varied information about Russia (including much negative one).

3. Russia is both a threat and protection. There are other trends of perceiving Russia among the inhabitants of Kazakhstan. Sometimes they are influenced by linguistic and ideological reasons. Different attitude to Russia also depends on respondents themselves. About 80 percent of Kazakh citizens do not take Russia for a threat, others – adhere to an opposite view. It is important to note that no one of the respondents perceived this difference of views as a problem of “divided consciousness.” Everyone understood that in any society there can and should be different views conditioned by a different social experience of people. Some people maintained that there were more anti-Russian sentiments among active members of social networks and bloggers, whereas “plain Kazakh people” support Russia's policy, that is, they do not live within the Russia / not Russia coordinate system.

4. Russia as a threat. In some interviews it was noted that the idea about Russia as a threat has been formed throughout the entire period of Kazakhstan's independence. The authors cite

views of certain respondents to the effect that “definite part of the population holds the view that Russia wishes to annex Kazakhstan. This is an irrational question, and Solzhenitsyn’s articles are remembered to this day... For them Russia is a country which had colonized poor Kazakhs. Perception of Russia within the framework of the decolonization logic is felt in replies from young people of Kazakhstan. The image of Russia is now perceived either in an out-of-body manner, or as a threat. Russia and the Russian language cease to be a certain center, Russia is no longer a very attractive country technologically, culturally and intellectually, as it used to be regarded.

Evidently, the presence in the country of people holding so many difference views on Russia can be explained by the absence of absolute tendencies in mass consciousness and it contributed to the relatively stable consensus on the policy of the state toward the Russian Federation and the development of the integration vector. Despite the continuing criticism of Russia in social networks and certain mass media and local public actions of the Eurasian Economic Community, there are no mass anti-Russian sentiments in the republic.

Summing up, the author notes the following: The image of Russia as a threat or a condition for security of Kazakhstan still retains its ambivalence. There is a relative domination of neutral-positive characteristics with a prospect of a decrease of their number due to demographic and ideological reasons. The number of the adherents to previous Soviet model of world outlook is dwindling, and the number of the adherents to the so-called new anti-colonial model (also anti-Russian) is growing due to the same demographic reasons. It is difficult to talk of ethnical dependence of views. Russians are less categorical in their opinions and less prone to generalizations on a countrywide scale. At the same time there are quite a few Kazakhs for whom it would be more convenient and habitual to be included in the sphere of Russian influence. For people of the older generation due to their Soviet

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past, and for those of the younger generation due to the existing educational prospects and business contacts.

A neutral image of Russia among part of the population of Northern Kazakhstan is largely based on personal experience. They feel advantages of living close to the border with Russia, but do not feel threats because it is difficult to fear anyone whom one knows quite well and is in constant contact with. In Alma-Ata such logic is widespread among students, political journalists, and taxi-drivers. The number of direct contacts is much smaller, and people tend to invent a more comfortable model of perception of Russia, which is not always positive.

*Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich*

ELENA DMITRIEVA. THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION AS AN INTERNAL FACTOR DESTABILIZING SITUATION IN CENTRAL ASIA // *Review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: Central Asia, ethnic enclave, disputed territories, delimitation and demarcation of borders, conflict, territorial claims, geopolitical instability, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.*

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*Abstract:* This review is devoted to territorial problems in the Central Asian region which have a long history and after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. have become a stumbling block for the newly-independent states of the region, because they turned into a permanent source of ethnic and territorial disputes and border conflicts.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that until now there has been no delimitation and demarcation of the borders between the Central Asian countries.

### **Introduction**

This review deals with ethnic and territorial problems and border-territorial conflicts between Central Asian states. The timely character of the subject is determined by the fact that the territorial problem is now the key factor in the system of regional policy.

After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. independent states have emerged in Central Asia in place of the former Union republic of the Mother country – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, Unfortunately, they were unable to build up friendly, good-neighborly relations between themselves during the quarter of a century which passed since then, agree with one another on the border issues and create a uniform political, economic and cultural area. Today the process of degradation of interstate relations in this region continues, and one of the reasons for it is the pendency of the territorial question.

From the time of gaining independence by the Central Asian republics of the former U.S.S.R. ethnic and territorial conflicts between them have exacerbated and their near-to-border districts have turned into dangerous zones, because the borders established back in Soviet time, which were of a formal. Nature within the framework of a uniform state has ceased to satisfy the newly-independent states. Disputes on the problems of border delimitation and demarcation quite often lead to armed conflicts on border territories, and the circle of parties to conflicts becomes ever broader: not only people living in near-border districts are involved, but also border services, forces of the Interior, district administrative bodies, and various organizations, to say nothing of criminal elements.



settled people at another time of year. However, these circumstances were not always taken into account and therefore certain purely Kyrgyz districts were included in Uzbek territories, thus forming an ethnic enclave.

2. The principle of actual use of locality at the moment of border determination. In the author's view, the decisive factor at the time was settled irrigated farming, and the interests of nomadic peoples were not taken into account, which led to the incorrect distribution of territories for the habitation of some or other peoples.

3. The principle of economic expediency connected with the abolition of cotton dependence of the U.S.S.R., which relied mainly on the development of precisely that branch of agriculture to the detriment of others.

4. The principle of avoidance of sharp bends, crossings and disseminations in alien territories when drawing borders. This principle was not applied correctly in many cases, in the author's view, and led to the emergence of ethnic enclaves, which are many and varied especially in the Ferghana Valley.

Border disputes between the Central Asian republics were going on throughout the entire period of the existence of the U.S.S.R., and they were not settled by the time of its disintegration. Certain districts were included either in one or in another republic, with changing the border line, which was explained by the attempt to settle the problems of land-utilization, but which only led to further exacerbation of the conflict in the future. At present border territorial claims have acquired a strong conflict character, and the border issue has become one of the most urgent disputed aspects at the interstate level.

In tackling the delimitation and demarcation problem in the Central Asian region, according to the author of the article, emphasis should be laid on a comprehensive solution of the problem, which should include equal consultations, mutual understanding and mutual compromise. As a major component of a rational solution of the border issue the author suggests to set up

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an international legal basis for a preventive search of mutually beneficial and rational use of border natural and communication resources. Civilized conditions for the vital activity of the population in the enclaves and their environs, in the author's view, can be created by the sides only through agreements on the enclave regime, taking into account the interests of each side.

### **Territorial Claims as an Internal Factor of Conflicts in Central Asian Region**

*Z. Murataliyeva. "Analysis of Certain factors of Influence on Political Processes in Central Asia" // Vestnik Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, Bishkek, 2017, Vol. 17, 9, pp. 61–64.*

The article examines external and internal factors influencing the level of conflicts between the five Central Asian states.

Among the internal factors the author singles out territorial claims of states to one another, which is connected with the natural and demographic resources of Central Asia. In his view, the presence of big ethnic communities living on the territory of neighboring states carries a threat of national conflicts on ethnic grounds. This was a consequence of the national delimitation carried out in the 1920s, which created prerequisites for territorial disputes after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.

The author names the territory of the Fergana Valley the epicenter of the conflict. This place is distinguished by a high tension level and a great degree of overpopulation (seven million, three-quarters of them – mainly Uzbeks – are rural dwellers). The Fergana Valley is also known for its very high population density (up to 500 – 600 and even 1,000 per square kilometer in certain places) and very acute socio-economic problems and a high degree of Islamic radicalism.

The author analyzes the reason for the growing contradictions between the neighboring states in the region, turns to the history of the problem and notes that part of Southern

Uzbekistan around Samarkand and Bokhara were inhabited by Tajiks and historically these cities belonged to Tajikistan, but in the 1920s were handed over to Uzbekistan, and hence, acute contradictions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan also has territorial claims to Uzbekistan in Chardzhou region. In the most densely populated state of Central Asia – Uzbekistan there are forces supporting the idea of the “Great Uzbekistan” – from Southern Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Chardzhou and Tashauz in Turkmenistan up to two south-western regions of Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan cannot agree on the border line passing through the water area of the Aral Sea.

The author also points to another factor weakening regional stability – the Tajik enclave in north-eastern Afghanistan. Recently, Afghanistan has begun to present its territorial claims to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and this also contributes to the growing tension in the region.

Speaking of the importance of the territorial factor in interstate relations, the author cites certain results of investigations carried out by the Sociological Service of the Central Asian Agency of Political Research (APR), on whose results the problem of disputed territories took first place in the rating of the existing interstate problems of Central Asia.

In conclusion the author of the article defines the vectors of possible future conflicts between Central Asian countries, names the external factors influencing the security of the region, and gives his forecast for the nearest future. He maintains that drug trafficking, international terrorism and religious extremism are among the problems directly influencing the security of the countries of Central Asia. They are largely engendered by the close proximity to the region of the world’s major source of instability, that is, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the near future the situation in the number of Central Asian countries may become greatly aggravated in connection with the threat of the expulsion of part of the Afghan militants from the territory of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan a Kyrgyzstan.



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Thus, there are quite a few external factors negatively influencing the essence and form of political processes in Central Asian countries. A major part of political processes reflects the dependence of the regional states on their historical past. For one, it is the existing geopolitical ambiguity connected with attempts to retain the multivector character of geopolitical choice. The low level of regional identity exerts a great influence on the character of political processes, inasmuch as a positive cultural-identification structure is absent in Central Asia.

### **Conclusion**

The absence of demarcation and delimitation of borders increases the risk of the breaking-up of conflicts in Central Asia, although the changes of the already established frontiers on the ethnic principle could lead to catastrophic consequences. However, the border problem must be settled sooner or later. The conflicts on borders and in near-border stretches of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in recent years and months make it possible to characterize the present situation as unstable and deteriorating.

The most acute border conflicts take place in the Ferghana Valley divided between three states – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Statements of the heads of state of these countries about their readiness to complete work on the legal formulation of the state border line, and even certain practical steps undertaken in this direction have been fruitless and showed the inability of the Central Asian states to tackle these matters as they should be dealt with. The persistently acute shortage of natural resources for the population of enclaves, as well as stricter rules and regulations of border crossing have been, and still are, the main factor of ethnic and territorial conflicts between citizens of these three countries. This circumstance is aggravated by the intensive population growth in enclaves. Taking into account the geographic position of the Ferghana Valley, the ethnic composition of its population, and the specific features of its land tenure and the use of its water

resources, one of the means of solving the problem could be the introduction of a simpler procedure of border crossing for people living in near-border districts.

Central Asian countries are not striving for close cooperation with one another to create a uniform economic, political and cultural area. They adhere to the principle of multi-vector geopolitics.

The newly-independent Central Asian states have not yet shown a desire for a compromise in the legal establishment of their state borders, although this problem is a crucial one, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs. It is also one of the barriers to such outside threats to national security as smuggling, international criminal activity, extremist and terrorist movements, and illegal migration.

2018.04.005. DENIS MALTSEV. HISTORICAL MYTHS OF THE COUNTRIES OF MIDDLE ASIA // *“Moskva,” Moscow, 2016, 7, P. 161–181.*

*Keywords: mythologization of history, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, pan-Turkism, folk-histories, concept of “nomadic civilization,” indigenous ethnos, “colonial period,” 1916 uprising.*

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Countries that have gained independence use history as one of the main ideological tools within the framework of national and state construction throughout the Modern and Recent history. After the First World War, Turkey acts as an example close to Central Asia with its official historiography of Turanism (Pan-Turkism) and later the Turkish nationalism of Atatürk. In the second half of the 20th century, historical myths arose massively in

the course of colonization, with the aim of strengthening the emerging states and regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

During the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, the history of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – was also mythologized. There was a pronounced tendency to embellish, idealize distant historical events, mythologize the ancient and medieval history of peoples Central Asia. The authors of many contemporary publications magnify the distant past of their people and, on the contrary, belittle the significance of the history of other peoples of the region. The true historical sources and scientific methods of research are ignored in this case.

Modern historical science in post-Soviet reality has experienced a crisis of changing methodological grounds. There was a reassessment of Marxist methodology, a transition from formational to civilizational periodization, familiarization with the methods developed by Western schools, and attempts to use them. These processes, which are typical for all CIS countries, have also affected the countries of Central Asia. Here there are processes of building state and national identity on a predominantly ethnic basis during the post-Soviet years. Each of the five states of the region has its own “indigenous” ethnos from the Soviet times. Their state ideology and practical internal policy are based precisely on this basis, directly affecting the historical consciousness of the Central Asian nations. In such political realities, the historical science of the republics came to mythologization and the artificial construction of history. The following methods, approaches and concepts were involved in this: the use of folk tales and legends as historical sources; propaganda of the greatness of the “golden age” of its people in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the artificial aging of its ethnonym (self-name) and statehood; the denial of the provision on the equal value of the contribution of all the peoples of the region to the development of the historical and cultural heritage; the theory of the “phenomenon” of an individual people, their ethnic selectivity

towards other peoples of the region; a comparatively controversial approach to history on the principle: which people are older, who founded the earliest states and cities; The use of history for the purposes of the current political situation.

Myths develop in two main directions: the deep antiquity of the “indigenous ethnos” and its statehood, as well as the absolutization of “the sufferings of the colonial period.” The first theme in the ideological plan is to prove this republic superiority over other Central Asian republics, and the second justifies separation from the “Russian metropolis.” But the states of Central Asia were unable to create full-fledged historical schools in the post-Soviet period and are forced to build their structures in many respects on the factual basis of Soviet historical science. The ancient history of Central Asia was not the main object for the construction of Soviet historical myths. It was based on easily verified data from annalistic and archaeological sources.

The ideas of the falsifiers of history, writing in the genre of the so-called folk-history, can be considered as popular science books for the people, which can create a strong historical myth combined with more balanced works of academic scholars. Target audience is invited to the so-called “scientific work” that distorts reality to the extent that this group is capable of distorting uncritically. For example, this is the concept of “nomadic civilization.” Modern historians actively joined in the development of this idea, voiced by A. Toynbee, one of the founders of the civilizational approach, in the first half of the 20th century. A. Toynbee's formulation regarding the stagnation of the economy of nomadic unions, with a general lack of progress moving in a circle, is unacceptable for contemporary Central Asian historians. But with the presentation of Lev Gumilev, who wrote in the genre of historical journalism, a series of discussions was held on the nomadic civilization in the 70–80s of the 20th century, which made this concept acceptable in scientific circles. Even different directions and schools have been identified in the study of nomadic civilization. The existence of this civilization is virtually

unchallenged in academic circles already. This approach leads to the fact that all outstanding achievements of modern civilization are associated with nomads. This concept is popular among the descendants of the same nomads, and most of the Central Asian peoples belong to them. “Nomadic civilizations” in the territories of the former USSR were popularized by the works of Lev Gumilev, and one of his epigones was M. Adzhiev.

In Kazakhstan, scientists who adhere to the idea of “nomadic civilization” were involved in historical myth-making. E. Tursunov, a specialist in the mythology of ancient Turks, believes that Samarkand experienced periods of special prosperity precisely with nomads: with Ushans, Ephtalites, then with Turks. Kazakh archaeologist R. Ismagilov argues that the Turkic-speaking groups were found among the Scythian and Sak population, who lived in ancient times on the territory of Kazakhstan. This, in his opinion, is the direct ancestors of modern Kazakhs. But there is no evidence of this version. The idea of autochthonousness became the core of the state “Concept of the formation of historical consciousness in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” which emphasized the direct continuity from the Andronov culture of the Bronze Age and the Saks to modern Kazakhs. According to the language, all these cultures were interpreted as “mostly Turkic-speaking.”

The history of Turkmenistan is much more mythologized, where the “historical myth” was formed with the participation of Turkmen President S. Niyazov. He focused on the Seljuk roots of Turkmen statehood, which corresponded to the local folklore tradition that relates Turkmen to the ancestor Oguz-khan, the head of Oguz-Seljuks. A sort of competition of falsifiers was launched. The favorite of the “creation of history” was one of the advisers of President Niyazov – archaeologist O. Gundogdyev. He included the Medes, Scythians, Saks, Massagets and Parthians among the ancestors of the Turkmen, said that they were all Turkic-speaking. And he refreshed the old constructions of Turkish Pan-Turkists with new fantasies. In fact, this is the revival of an ideology based on the

Pan-Turkic theory of world development, as it was represented in Ottoman Turkey at the beginning of the 20th century.

Ch. Aitmatov, writer, and A. Akayev, the first president of Kyrgyzstan, played a key role in the historical myth-making of Kyrgyzstan. The idea of the Millennium celebration of the Manas epic belonged to the first of them, and the transformation of the content of the epic into a modern national ideology, and its use for popularization Kirghiz culture and history belonged to A. Akayev. “The Seven Commandments of Manas” were formulated on the basis of the materials of the epos “Manas,” which were put in the basis of national ideology.

Speech of A. Akayev on August 31, 2003 at the II World Kurultai of Kirghiz became a landmark for the formation of the Kirghiz historical myth, where he presented a version of the Kyrgyz history since the Kyrgyz state in 201 BC. The Kyrgyz state in the Upper Yenisei appeared in the middle of the 1st century, according to his interpretation of history. He reported on receiving a gift from the Chinese leadership of new information about the Kyrgyz state of the era of the Kyrgyz Great Power, dated 843–845 years. Pro-Chinese historical myths ceased to exist after the removal of A. Akayev from power.

Ancient history was distorted in Uzbekistan relatively little. In Soviet times, the most popular approach was the approach based on the multicomponent composition of the peoples of the world, which indicated a long process of mixing local Aborigines, carriers of East Iranian languages, and foreign Turkic-speaking tribes. The result of this process was the formation of the ancestors of Uzbeks and Tajiks, according to Soviet authors. The tribes of the early Iron Age (Saks, Massagets and others), associated with the world of Iranian nomads, were called among the ancestors of the Uzbeks. In the second half of the 1990s Academician A. Askarov claimed that the Turks appeared on the territory of Uzbekistan at the end of the Bronze Age. Later, he made more specific statements, endowing the Turkic language of the creators of the Andropov culture of the late Bronze Age and the nomads of the early Iron Age. As the

researcher notes, all such conclusions were made in the context of polemics with Tajik specialists mainly. Uzbek scientists claim that the Turks live in Central Asia for at least 3,500 years and thus justify that they are “indigenous people.”

The Tajik historical myth is different from the Turkic myths of this kind. Turkization of Tajiks was carried out for decades in Uzbekistan, their historical heritage was appropriated by Uzbeks. Today, Tajik intellectuals contrast this with the “Aryan spirit” of the Tajiks, emphasize their belonging to the European race, trying to build an insurmountable wall between themselves and the Uzbeks. In the early 2000s, these intellectual aspirations reached the authorities of Tajikistan, who were looking for a national idea. The first attempt to do so was made in October 1996, when the government of Tajikistan turned to the heritage of the Samanid dynasty for the first time. President E.Rahmon chose the folk etymology of the ethnonym “Tajik” from numerous hypotheses about the origin of this name, which erects the word “Tajik” to “hajj” (“crown”), and artificially linked it with the etymology of the word “Aryan.” The word “Tajik” (“crowned,” “noble family”) is supposedly equivalent to the word “Aryan,” which means “noble origin.” And these Aryans-Tajiks are “the most ancient people of Central Asia.” In this case, he does not give any reasoning, except for the etymological. According to E. Rahmon, all achievements of the ancient and early medieval periods of the history of Central Asia belong to the Tajiks.

Tajik historians present the Samanid state as the “highest point of Islamic civilization,” developing creatively the ideas of their president. The combination of Samanid and Aryan historical myths gives the necessary antiquity of the ethnos for the heroic history, for the fixation of the appearance of the first representatives of a particular ethnos in this or that geographical region is an important feature that attests to the history of the people. In the case of Tajiks, there is a myth about “historical Tajikistan,” covering the significant territories of modern Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan. It exists for at least 2500 years and was created by the Achaemenids, according to some Tajik authors. The Aryan civilization on the territory of the

so-called Ariana has an even more ancient origin, at the present time numbering about 8000 years. The myth of the Aryan civilization has become one of the key segments of the historical ideology of the Tajik regime, as well as one of the bases of its opposition to neighboring Uzbekistan.

A slightly different situation has arisen with the interpretation of the “colonial period” in comparison with the coverage of ancient history. The “atrocities of tsarism” in the conquest and management of the Central Asian territories were exaggerated and absolutized after Soviet historians. Conflicts were highlighted extremely unilaterally within the framework of Marxism and the class approach, where any speech against the central Russian government was viewed as “progressive,” and all the activities of the Russian authorities in Central Asia were presented in a negative, “aggressive” way, considered through the Leninist concept of imperialism. Such Soviet concepts formed the basis for nationalist interpretations of the history of the countries in question. Post-Soviet historians had to place “necessary” accents, add the Soviet period of history to the “colonial” period.

History events related to Russia were presented to the mass consciousness of a number of newly created states as debatable, or even mostly conflict, after gaining independence. The situation in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan is most alarming in this regard. There are two historical issues that are painful for the local intelligentsia and national patriots: the problem of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan joining Russia and the uprising of 1916. The question of joining Russia is discussed in two aspects: was it necessary, was there an alternative, and also was it act voluntary? Historical interpretations are gradually shifting from the interpretation of the fact of joining Russia as a “voluntary entry into the composition of Russia” to the allegations that this was basically a forcible adherence. The work to discredit the policy of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, carried out by Soviet historians, played a role here. Local historians could only slightly increase the emphasis in describing the “colonial policy of tsarism.” Joining Russia is assessed in both Kazakhstan



and Kyrgyzstan rather negatively. At best it is relied upon as a lesser evil. The entry of these countries into the EEU is unlikely to change anything in the already formed historical consciousness.

The situation with regard to the uprising of 1916 underwent significant changes. These changes are radical in Kyrgyzstan especially. If it was regarded as an element of the class struggle in the Soviet era, then in modern Kyrgyz historiography the issue of the insurrection is discussed in the pledge of the historical fault of Russia, and the insurrection is regarded as anti-Russian and even anti-Russian itself. Several scientific conferences were held on which the assessments of the events of 1916, which had already been given at the beginning of the last century, were recorded. However, then they were adjusted or ignored in the later Soviet period. These assessments were extremely ideologized and written from russophobic positions and were used as the basis for the modern view of Kyrgyz historians for the uprising.

The researcher concludes that the emergence of new states in Central Asia is accompanied by the creation of their national myths there, the most important component of which is the narrative of great ancestors. Such narrative is built on the model of national superiority. The place of the main hero of history is occupied by the local title people. Henceforth it is his ancestors, who are destined to perform great feats, create outstanding cultural achievements and influence the ancestors of those who dominated during the previous historical epoch, which they will certainly declare to be “colonial.” The author concludes that the revived idea of pan-Turkism, spread among the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, presents a remote, but real, danger of the fall of these republics from the orbit of the civilizational influence of Russia.

*Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich*

## ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2018.04.006. STANISLAV KLEPIKOV. ON THE QUESTION OF THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (2017) // “*Vlast*,” Moscow, 2017, 4, P. 174–178.

*Keywords: Iran, Russia, strategic alliance, partnership, politics, sanctions.*

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From 1991, cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran has included all major aspects of international partnership. Among them are: energy, trade, tourism, and military interaction (from recent time), that is seen in Russia’s and Iran’s participation in the civil war in Syria. S. Klepikov’s article deals with the possibility of creating a strategic alliance between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, taking into consideration the present international situation.

On February 19, 2017, the Russian mass media reported the formation of a full-fledged strategic alliance between Russia and Iran. It was noted that the Chairman of Iranian Majlis A. Larijani in an interview to the TV channel “Almadin” pointed out that his country was interested in a strategic alliance with Russia. Russian public commenting this news expressed the hope that such alliance would create a new medium for the further development of Russian-Iranian partnership. The author of the article analyzes

the present state of Russian-Iranian relations and conditions in which they are developing.

At the beginning of 2017 the situation in Iranian–American relations exacerbated once again. The two years that have passed since the lifting of sanctions have shown that the economic situation in Iran remained at the sanction level. Despite a certain lowering of the U.S. “aggressive rhetoric,” a great part of Iranian money (about \$107 billion) remains frozen on foreign bank accounts. It becomes evident that the program of the Joint comprehensive plan of actions to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem can be optimal in the context of the Iranian nuclear problem, but it can hardly contribute to the development of Iran’s economy. The situation was aggravated by the U.S. President Donald Trump, who during his election campaign declared his negative attitude to Iran. He said that he was sure Iran was working on its nuclear program bypassing previous decisions. Being tired of President Trump’s aggressive rhetoric and the still existing sanctions Tehran has resumed strained relations with Washington (and consequently, with Europe). On January 29, 2017, Iran made a test launching of a ballistic missile, which was repeated on February 8. In reply the United States threatened to impose new sanctions on Iran, which may bring Iranian-American relations to the 2002–2008 level. In this context the further development of Russian-Iranian partnership becomes quite evident. Russia is faced with almost similar situation. First, its economic potential is blocked by American sanctions, and secondly, during the past two years relations between Russia and the U.S.A. have deteriorated to such an extent that certain mass media use the expression “new Cold war” ever more often. These circumstances are a factor forming strategic relations between Russia and Iran.

Despite the fact that the possibility of strategic partnership between Russia and Iran was discussed by experts back in 1995 (at the signing of the contract on building a nuclear power plant in Busher), this subject was raised again seriously at the beginning of

the civil war in Syria in 2011. It was these events that have opened a new development stage of Russian – Iranian partnership. Both Iran and Russia hold similar views on the ways to resolve the Syrian conflict. Both support President Bashar Assad of Syria and wish to preserve the regime existing in that country. However, the aims of the two countries are quite different. In experts' views, the main aim of Russia's participation in the Syrian civil war is to preserve agreements and contracts with the present government on arms and military equipment deliveries and bolster up the Russian positions in the Middle East, inasmuch as in the event of Assad's victory Syria will become a convenient springboard for the Russian armed forces in the region. This will naturally weaken U.S. influence there. As to Iran, it continues to export its Islamic revolution and wishes to see Syria headed by its Alawite (a Shia trend) President Assad. Using limited military contingents on Syrian territory (mainly the Russian airforce, as well as Iranian military advisers, volunteers of paramilitary militia and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), Russia and Iran successfully cooperate in opposing numerous radical terrorist groupings operating on Syrian territory.

Talking of the political aspect of the conflict between participants in the civil war, it is important to note the fact of creating the coalition of Tehran and Moscow as against the coalition of Washington and Er Riyad, which resulted in the actual exclusion of Saudi Arabia from participation in the civil war in Syria and weakened the positions of the United States. These developments have created conditions for inter-Syrian dialogue, in which Russia and Iran play the role of the leading peace-makers.

Certain similarity of the sanction situation in Russia and Iran and their success in the Syrian civil war makes possible the creation of a military- strategic alliance between Russia and Iran.

Despite the successes of Moscow and Tehran and prospects of their cooperation, it is too early so far to talk of their full-fledged alliance. There are many contradictions between Russia and Iran (for example, the Caspian problem), putting off the creation of an

alliance. The main problem is connected, naturally, with the different mentality of representatives of both countries. Naturally, Iran will always cooperate with Russia, because the Russian Federation is in the Iranian vector of its geopolitical direction. However, it should be remembered that the Iranians will never sacrifice their interests and will always protect their rights. It is necessary to bear in mind that Iran is very cautious in choosing its partners and any expression, even the slightest, of disrespect toward its sovereignty or imposition of alien rules will lead to breaking up relations. S. Klepikov writes that in 2017 Russian-Iranian partnership reached a new level, however, relations between the two countries cannot be called allied ones. There is no doubt that 2017 will be the year of adoption of cardinal decisions in the sphere of international relations. That year the election of Iran's President should take place, and its result is bound to influence the further development of ties between the two countries.

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2018.04.007. VLADIMIR AHMEDOV. RELIGIOUS FACTOR OF ARMED UPRISING IN SYRIA: SOCIAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS // *Trudy Instituta vostokovedeniya RAN. Vyp. 4. Ehkonomicheskie, socialno-politicheskie, ehtnokonfessionalnye problemy afro-aziatskih stran,* Moscow, 2017, P. 197–209.

*Keywords: Syria, “Arab spring,” Islamists, jihadism, Salaphites, Bashar Asad.*

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The specific feature of the Syrian conflict and the difficulty of its solution, in the researcher's view, lie not only in its unprecedented duration, as compared to uprisings and conflicts in

other Arab countries, but was also largely determined by the role of the national armed forces and the geostrategic position of Syria. The Syrian crisis has brought to the political limelight new social forces, having revealed acute social, ethnic, and local conflicts. Previously, the unified Syrian society in the conditions of the exacerbation of the crisis began to split rapidly, radicalizing Islamists tendencies in the country and the entire Middle Eastern region as a whole. As a result, the Arab national movement, which has revived on the crest of the wave of the “Arab Spring” became dominated by the religious motives of a radical nature. Its secular component was practically brought to naught. During the period between 1940 and 1960, the secular forces played the leading role in the Arab peoples’ struggle for national independence, and their ideology served as the foundation for forming political systems and state institutions of modern countries in the Arab East. It is necessary to take into account that Islam is much slower than other religions in abandoning the idea of a religious war. Despite the outwardly secular character of state power in many Arab countries of the Middle East, it retains strong elements of Islamic fundamentalism. In these conditions a danger emerged of undermining the existing military-political balance in the region. This was connected with the exacerbation of the struggle for a change of power and escalation of tension in the region in connection with the continuing Palestine-Israeli conflict, attempts of the Islamists to penetrate the army, and also the interference of outside forces in the regional processes.

There is a new situation in the Syrian society today. The mentality of many social groups of the population, which stand in the vanguard of the armed struggle, is now dominated by the assessments of the ruling regime as one of “occupation,” which has entered into a criminal deal with Iran, a number of influential world powers, and Israel with a view to subjugating the Arab people and subordinating them to foreign domination. Such views serve as a motive for the struggle to overthrow the present ruling regime. These sentiments have been used by all and sundry

internal and external forces, which under the guise of religion were striving to realize their real aims in Syria and the Middle East as a whole. In this situation the opposing forces have become hostages of the Islamist ideas and sentiments themselves and were forced to act in line with this ideology. As a result, the political aims of the struggle in Syria were submitted to this ideology, which has gradually spread further and gripped the regional and international forces involved in the Syrian conflict. A vast and acute religious war has unfolded in the Middle East, which placed the region on the brink of a territorial split and seriously exacerbated the internal situation in other regions of the world, primary in Europe.

Although jihad is mainly directed against one's own ruling elites who submitted to foreign influence, and secondly – against the infidels, the main motive of this idea in the Arab-Muslim world is as strong now as previously. All this shows that today, too, the idea of war as the continuation of religion, especially in its extremist forms, is still popular. On the other hand, in the conditions of the “Arab spring” going on in the Middle East since the end of 2010, the Syrian authorities relying on the special services and the army represented mainly by the Alawite minority (12 percent of the entire population) will hardly be able to control effectively the actions of the Islamic factor in a multi-confessional and poly-ethnic country,, without resorting to open violence against its population.

The main driving force of the Arab national movement has been people believing in Islam of Sunna trend. And Syria, where the three quarters of the population are Sunnites, is no exception. Initially, Islam of Sunna trend contained many elements which can conditionally be called secular and democratic. In this lies the main difference between Sunna and Shia Islam. The latter is based on a sort of the vertical of power in the person of the imamate. In the conditions of a revolutionary upsurge a road has opened for the transformation and renovation of Islam both as an ideology and a social order. In this case transformations could take different

forms, depending on the domestic political situation and foreign influence. New post-modern Islam is a product of local big cities, the “culture of new urban dwellers” who demanded the overthrow of power which came to rule the roost from far-off mountain settlements more than half a century ago, seized towns, created their own culture there and established their own order. The “new city dwellers” wished to establish a type of power different from the previous regime. The Syrian revolutionaries actively used the Internet. They displayed the bodies of their killed fellow-countrymen and portraits of deserters, which is categorically banned in Islam. Perhaps, the author of this article writes, this new habit could become widespread, if the Syrian regime refused to apply forcible methods against the protesters and did not invite Iran, the Lebanese “Hizballah, and the Shia militia units, which number more than sixty combat detachments.

Despite the fact that today Syria is dominated by “jihadist” ideas expressed in the actions of the “Islamic state” and other extremist and terrorist organizations, it would be wrong to believe that the post-modern Islam born of the revolution has disappeared completely and has no chances to revive. The researcher emphasizes that it has to be studied along with militant Islam, inasmuch as it can, under certain political conditions, make a positive influence not only on Syria, but on other parts of the Arab East and also on Europe, where many Muslim residents have become radicalized. If it is to be assumed that post-modern Islam is a product of the new urban culture, it should have inevitably imbibed the spirit of liberalism characteristic of many Arab cities and democratic sentiments. In the Syrian conditions post-modern Islam can become a major element in the formation of a new ideology of social order.

Periphery has played a definite role, as compared with that of towns at the initial stages of the Syrian revolution, by exerting a specific influence on the religious aspects of the revolt, which had a Bedu rural character and which explained the spreading of Islam of the Salaphite trend. Salaphite ideas have become widespread



primarily in the conditions of provincial urban centers. The contribution of the so-called civilized Islam inherent in the urban sections of the bourgeoisie, traders, intellectuals, and military elite had a modest character among the civil and military participants in the revolutionary movement. This became evident on the example of an insignificant presence of the Sufi elements in the units of armed and civil opposition. As a result, the Islamist phenomenon of the revolution had a strong provincial component and was of a potentially temporary character. In the researcher's view, it would be too early to consider the situation stable ideologically. The financial factors continue to exert influence on the formation of ideological orientation and political agenda of these groupings. The researcher emphasizes the need to follow the change of the religious-ideological preferences of the bellicose Islamists. The "Islamist phenomenon" of the Syrian uprising has changed during the past several years, especially due to specific conditions of the Syrian revolution. It cannot be excluded that in the event of a stop of the military hostilities in Syria and a gradual return of the country's life to a peaceful course the "Islamist phenomenon" may gradually disappear, inasmuch as its vital foundation is the bitter armed struggle in the country.

The reasons that caused the revival of jihadist Salaphism in Syria began to mature gradually in the 1990s, and along with the exacerbation of the armed struggle only contributed to its emergence and development on the surface. The policy of privatization adopted by the ruling regime in the mid-2000s led society to acute social polarization, impoverishment and marginalization of the considerable masses of the population in the rural areas. Simultaneously, the regime's policy of supporting the Islamic resistance in Palestine and Lebanon increased conservative religious sentiments in depressive districts of Syrian provinces. This resulted in the population of these districts becoming very sensitive to the most radical ideas. As a result, the role of moderate Islam in Syrian society has diminished, which tended to increase the extremist aspects in government policy and ideology, and in

public sentiments. The situation proved very favorable for the growth of jihadist Salaphist ideas, and the subsequent actions of the authorities after the beginning of the Syrian uprising have only bolstered up its positions. Such sentiments in society have contributed to spreading jihadist ideas of local origin, as well as those coming from abroad.

Units of the most evident jihadist groupings directly connected with al-Qaeda, such as “Jabhat an-Nusra,” ISSL, “al-Muhajiria,” can be referred to the most radical militant groups. There were other groups of bellicose Salaphites and supporters of the jihadist trend of “political Salaphism.” They were closely connected with the Islamic Front of Syria (IFS) and its units. Another group was represented by traditional; Salaphite jihadists. There were various groupings of armed Islamists of Salaphite orientation, like “Faruk al-Islamiya.” Another group was the Islamic Front for Liberation of Syria (IFLS) Its ideology was based on common Islamic identity combining the ideas of Salaphism, “Muslim Brothers,” as well as various Islamic schools of liberal trend. Most groups supported the ideas of an Islamic state as the future political regime in Syria. In their view, this political regime should be based on the Islamic Sharia laws,

Today, V. Ahmedov asserts, it is rather difficult to forecast the prospects of the Salaphite movement in Syria. They will rather be determined by the development of the concrete situation in the country and the changes which await Syria in a not-too-distant future. In the event of the continuation of the civil war we may observe the further growth and spreading of jihadist Salaphism. In case of the change of the regime and return to peaceful life, the chances for moderate reformist and political Salaphism are growing and it will at first begin to develop in rural areas, and then in big urban centers.

*Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich*

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AZIZ NIYAZI. SAUDI ARABIA, QATAR, NORWAY, RUSSIA AND GREEN ECONOMY // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: Qatar, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, hydrocarbon economies, global index of green economy, sustainable development, renewable energy, air pollution, green economy, green spin doctoring, environmental safety, efficient use of resources.*

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*Abstract:* In the article there is a comparative analysis of green economy development in the oil and gas extraction countries. On the basis of the global index of green economy (Global Green Economy Index) it's shown the real situation with adoption of innovative technologies in key branches of green economy in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Norway and Russia. Conclusions about efficiency of state policy in these countries in the field of achievement of global environmental safety goals are drawn.

The common clear definition of green economy doesn't exist, as well as its verified formula which could serve as a world standard. But this concept caught on, became clear therefore it is more often written without quotes, as well as terms – green technologists, green investments, green innovations, etc. international indexes among which the most developed is considered to be the global index of green economy allow to measure results of green development of the countries, their problems and prospects in this direction. Comparison of situations with green growth in Qatar and Saudi Arabia – hydrocarbonic states, Norway and Russia where the hydrocarbonic sector of their

economies remains significant allows to draw some conclusions on environmental policy and the possible future of these countries.

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Since 2010 the independent consulting company Dual Citizen LLC (USA) publishes progress reports on development of green economy worldwide. The last report submitted in 2016 covers 80 countries which are ranged according to Global Green Economy Index (GGEI). Ecological measurements of national economies development along with indicators of social and economic progress, estimation of environmental efficiency of certain sectors of economy, green investments and innovations, national leadership in the field of climate change are used in it. The GGEI index of 2016 is calculated on the basis of 32 indicators forming part of 24 basic groups of quantitative and qualitative indicators. They, in turn, are divided into 4 key groups allowing to define, how successfully the country copes with problems in creation of green economy and environmental problems in general.

The first group “Management and Climate Change” contains the indicators reflecting the climate reversal and efforts directed at response to negative changes in this sphere. Impact assessment of climate change is carried out on the basis of such indicators as emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> per capita, per unit of GDP and per unit of primary energy consumption. The efficiency of policy of the country in the field of climate change is analyzed also by the frequency of participation in international ecological forums, undertaken obligations, statements of the heads of states concerning green economy and environmental protection, coverage of these issues in public media.

The second group “Sectors of Efficiency” reflects a condition of the most important sectors in green economy development: constructions, transport, energy, ecotourism, etc. By GGEI developers it is controlled how efficient use of resources in these

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sectors allows to receive incremental capacity and at the same time to lower environmental load, to reduce power input and emissions of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In the sphere of construction, it is considered the modernization of buildings and constructions taking into account environmental requirements, in the transport sector data on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are used. In power industries it is accepted how green energy sector is in each country. The share of electrical power produced by means of renewable sources (RS) is miscalculated: hydroelectric power stations, geothermal stations and also the energy generated from the sun, wind, inflows, biomass, biofuel. It is analyzed information on resource efficiency, their recirculation in the sphere of waste recycling.

The third group “Markets and Investments” is based on the analysis of data on the state and private investments into green technologies: renewable energy sources, waste recycling, sewage treatment plants, non-waste industry, clean technology. Fiscal and political measures for appeal of national green projects and markets, their growth, participation of leading world companies corporations in them, investment promotion for sustainable development from various organizations and the public are taken into consideration.

The fourth group “Environment” is based generally on measurements of The Environmental Performance Index (EPI). It reflects environmental health and natural capital on indicators: agriculture, quality of water and air, biodiversity, fish resources and forestry.

The countries are ranged according to two ratings. Performance rating (GGEI performance rank) reflects the place which the country really deserves according to the index of green economy. The second rating classifies them to the extent of figurative green perception (GGEI perception rank) both by citizens of the state, and abroad. The surveys are conducted mainly among qualified specialists of diverse fields of economy and science, business community. Their opinion on the status and

prospects of green economy in any given country is considered along with desire and readiness of citizens to support ecological initiatives. The political leadership doesn't take part in polls. Country assessment according to the index of perception can show its appeal to green investments and also level of green public mood, but not in all cases.

**Global Green Economy Index of (GGEI) 2016.  
The rating of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Norway  
and Russia in comparison with 80 countries**

Rating (result)	Country	Index (overall score of 100%)	Rating (perception)	Index (overall score of 100%)
2	Norway	69,11	5	88,95
74	Russia	48,08	51	32,59
78	Qatar	36,33	57	31,79
80	Saudi Arabia	31,34	62	31,20

Norway in rating for 2016 showed great progress (the 2nd place), giving the first place to Sweden. Russia (the 74th place), Qatar (the 78th place) and Saudi Arabia (the 80th place) occupied positions at the end of rating.

Norway takes the 5th place in terms of perception of progress in green economy development that demonstrates ecological sustainability of national economy and the excellent prospect of green growth. It is obvious that it even surpassed expectations in this progress though constantly it appears in the top group of the leaders of the rating, makes progress in all four basic directions. This country with high degree of dependence on export of oil and gas serves as a fine example for sustainable development.

The state successfully solves interconnected social and ecological and economic problems. The highest-level leaders initiated a large number of programs and measures for advance of RS. Norway already receives more than 95% of electricity of

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hydroelectric power stations. Priority instruments of counteraction to climatic changes are: reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases in the transport sector; development of low-carbon technologies in the industry; development of technologies of catching and storage of CO<sub>2</sub>; decrease in emissions of greenhouse gases in maritime industry. Economic mechanisms are essential to emission limitation of greenhouse gases. The carbon tax in Norway as an instrument of environmental policy began to work in 1991 for consumption of fuel and extraction of energy resources on the shelf. Besides, since 2008 the country is a participant of the European system of trade in quotas for emissions of greenhouse gases promoting decrease in expenses of participants during reduction of greenhouse emissions. Norway plans to stop felling of trees, to forbid auto sales of gas-operated and diesel fuel cars since 2025 and also to reach the neutral level of carbon emission due to combustion of organic fuel, continuing to extract and export at the same time considerable volumes of oil and gas to other countries, first of all to the EU.

Absolutely opposite picture is observed in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In the report on the index of green economy it is noted that high dependence of Qatar and Saudi Arabia on production and export of fossil fuel negatively affects their indicator of GGEL. At the same time, as is seen from this document, the index not always reflects a real technological contribution of the country to sustainable development. The example of Qatar shows that his GGEL grew considerably after the regular annual Conference of the Parties of Framework Convention on Climate Change took place in Doha in November, 2012. Qatar was host party that added points to it in the estimating group "Governance and Climate Change" and also raised its brand according to the index of perception (57 points at real 78). In the meantime, this state remains extremely inefficient in elimination of high dependence on hydrocarbon resources and doesn't make any serious intentions and attempts to green economic growth. For example, it advances much more fast emerging eco- dangerous economies of India and China on

emissions of exhaust gases, is the worst leader in this indicator of all surveyed countries. From 2001 to 2015 transport emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> increased in Qatar by 291% while in China for 191%, India for 137%. “While GDP of Qatar is one of the highest per capita in the world, there are no proofs that its authorities use huge income from oil and gas sectors for formation of lower carbon economy. Such situation is observed on GGEI indicators: extremely high emissions of greenhouse gases per capita; a zero contribution to renewable energy sources in generation of electric power; any of the largest Qatar companies doesn't participate in development of standards of corporate ecological sustainability; a number of the worst indicators of quality of air among the examined 80 countries” – come to a conclusion experts of Dual Citizen LLC.

Not less serious concern, it is noted in the report, is caused by the situation in Saudi Arabia which took the last place in the rating of 80 countries. It doesn't show almost any real signs of reorientation to a model of green growth in economy; carbon emissions per capita in this country are one of the highest in the world; the share of renewable energy sources in electricity production is insignificant, putting into operation of their new capacities is minimized.

Qatar and Saudi Arabia get more points in the rating of perception rather than in measurements of real achievements. The disparity for Qatar in 21 points and Saudi Arabia in 18 points is more likely connected not only with incongruity of public expectations in the sphere of ecological modernization and real economic policy but with effective green public relations. Participation in the international ecological forums, their sponsoring, organization and holding in their countries, loud declarations and statements, promulgation of commitment to sustainable development goals strengthens green reputation that in turn generates the overvaluation of experts about green economy development in a number of countries. Idealized perceptions help to gain political weight on the international scene, to attract investments, high western technologies and innovations



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which aren't always used for sustainable development. Their green contribution to manufacturing sectors can actually be much less than it seems.

The report of GGEI of 2016 gave Russia the real 74th place and supposed 51st position. The gap in 23 points shows that in the Russian Federation there were laid great hopes on promoting the mechanisms of green economy among the public and experts, that is a pressing issue, requires policy making. During the covered period of the research of 2014–2015 because of the known difficulties in national economy any essential development of elements of green growth wasn't observed. Rates of natural resources depletion remained almost at the same level, insignificant recession of their growth in individual industries was connected with falling economy of recent years. Levels of uncontrollable fish capture and deforestation decreased, but in general reduction of biodiversity was observed. For the last decade decrease in emissions in transport sector was noted. Essential development of renewable energy sources, green innovations and investments didn't happen.

Since preparation of the last research of Dual Citizen LLC of 2016 the practical situation hasn't changed cardinally though a number of large Russian companies and corporations took certain steps for ecological protection of the territories and the population in areas of their activity. Industrial emission abatement was mainly connected with re-engineering in metallurgy and other sectors. The companies removed outdated “dirty” technologies, closed enterprises, moving loading on more effective assets with smaller emissions. It is important that that time the institutional and legal groundwork for green sectors of economy and environmental protection began to be laid. In “The strategy of scientific and technological development of Russia” approved in 2016, the ecological direction was defined as priority. 2017 was announced as a “Year of ecology,” specific problems of transition to sustainable development to mid-term and long-term outlook were set for the government. First of all there is the strategic objective of

achievement of cardinal reduction of emissions of harmful substances in the atmosphere, aquatic disposal and into the soil first of all due to technological re-equipment of the industry. There are indicated aims and time limits of accumulation of resource-saving technologies, effective recycling, development of renewable energy sources. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of the Russian Federation plans investment in development of RES till 2035 equal to 53 billion dollars.

The increasing implementation of capacities of RES has to play an important role in reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) in Russia. By 2020 it is planned to reduce the volume of emissions of GHG to the level of 75% volume of emissions in 1990. To achieve the goal, it is almost not required to take further steps which are beyond the policy on decrease of energy intensity of economy. By 2030 its reduction is planned for 44% in comparison with 2005. Within the Paris climate agreement of 2015 for the purpose of achievement of bigger volume of emission abatement Russia claims to consider volumes of absorption of emissions by forests. Russian forests make 25% of world forest resources and annually absorb up to 500 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub>.

Our country has huge resource potential, acts as the ecological donor of the world, providing nearly 10 percent of biospheric stability. We still have a reliable social-and-ecological margin of safety. There is a hope that the upcoming greening of the Russian economy will give good results: it will promote its diversification, improvement of quality of people's life, the solution of global climatic problems, will up-grade the status of Russia on the international scene.

Of course, as a fine example of green progress and human development is Norway – the country of very responsible attitude to living conditions of the population, to own and global ecological challenges. A situation in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, on the contrary, is extremely unsatisfactory by the level of environment load and rational use of natural resources. Efforts on introduction of high technologies in basic industries of green economy are minimum.

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The situation is more deplorable in the group of indicators of “sectors of efficiency” especially on indicators of air pollution, water use, emissions of greenhouse gases, development of RES, efficiency of resource use on the basis of recycling. Healthy hydrocarbonic economies of these countries remain the main pollutants of the atmosphere on the Arabian Peninsula. Judging by weakness of affairs in the field of development of own RES Qatar and Saudi Arabia with great probability are expected by a role of chronically lagging in the begun rush of power technologies, it is possible with far-reaching consequences in social and economic development. All that is lacking is to be surprised to carelessness and sluggishness of their authorities.

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OLGA BIBIKOVA. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISLAM IN HUNGARY // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

*Keywords: Hungary, European Union, Islam, refugees, Islamophobia.*

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*Abstract:* Hungary holds first place in anti-Islamic sentiments in Europe, despite the fact that there are very few Muslims living there. In 2016, about 400,000 refugees passed through the territory of that country, part of whom the European Council is trying to

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settle in Hungary. However, the government of that country, taking into account the negative attitude of the local population toward Islam, refuses to accept them.

The PEW Research Center has conducted a poll on attitude to Islam in a number of European countries in order to establish quotas for East European countries to receive refugees. The results of the poll have shown that the most negative attitude to Islam was registered in Hungary. Seventy-two percent of its population spoke very negatively about adherents to that religion.

Perhaps, the reasons for this phenomenon lie in the country's history, which back at the time of its state formation was connected with peoples believing in Islam.

Hungary is a multinational state. Apart from Hungarians there live Gypsies, Germans, Jews, Romanians, Slovaks, Croatians, Serbians, Ukrainians, and others. According to population censuses from the year 1980, the number of pure Hungarians is dwindling. (In 1980 – 10 million 709 thousand, in 2017 – 9 million 770 thousand). The biggest national minority is the Gypsies (Roma).

In 1993 a Law on ethnic and national minorities was adopted. At the time 13 national minorities who have lived no less than one hundred years on the country's territory received the right to self-government.

Another specific feature of the Hungarian political system is the presence of considerable number of confessions. The Constitution of 1949 guaranteed religious freedom to all citizens of the country, at the same time having confiscated church property, closed down religious orders and nationalized parochial schools. The Law of 1900 confirmed the separation of the church from the state, declared the freedom of conscience and guaranteed financial support to religious communities. In 2011 a new Law on religious communities was adopted, according to which the state recognized only 14 religious communities (out of 358), which should number no less than 1,000 believers and have

functioned for more than twenty years. Thus, quite a few religious communities (including the Muslim ones) were declared illegitimate and they were deprived of financial support.

It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of Muslims in Hungary. The published figures differ from 26,000 to 62,000. The most precise data concern the Muslims who have arrived from Arab countries, Turkey, and Africa. There are a few ethnic Hungarians among Muslims (only 10 percent). However, the community is growing due to proselytes (mainly women who married foreign Muslims).

There are several Muslim communities in the country, but no uniform organization representing the interests of all Muslims. One of them – the Hungarian Islamic Community is headed by Zoltan Hajji Bolek. He is also President of the Society of study of Islamic history of Hungary. It is the biggest Muslim community in the country. It also includes descendants of the Bosnian Muslims, who arrived to Hungary at the time when Auster-Hungary annexed Bosnia.

Sulok Zoltan heads another Muslim community of Hungary – the Organization of Muslims of Hungary, which was formed on September 22, 2000. It is believed to be the successor to the Muslim student organization, which existed in Hungary from 1987. In Sulok Zoltan's view, the law adopted in 2011 would not influence the existence of the Muslim community, yet he admits that the mailbox of its mosque is full of letters with threats.

There is no mosque in Budapest until now and the building of the mosque during the Ottoman rule has long been turned over to the Catholic Church. In 2015, at the time of a great influx of migrants to Europe the Ambassador of Turkey to Hungary offered, on behalf of his government, financial help to the Mayor of Budapest, but he declined it.

The greater part of Muslims in the country lives in the capital of Hungary and in big cities. Hungarian Muslims note that Budapest is more tolerant to them than the provinces. In small towns Muslims come across anti-Muslim sentiments quite often.

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During the recent mass movement of refugees from Turkey in Europe, 400,000 immigrants have passed through Hungary. The Hungarian mass media were full of photos of dirty roads littered with stale food products and garbage left by Muslim refugees. In some places there were clashes between refugees and local residents. The Hungarian authorities even ordered to erect barbed-wire blocks 175 kilometer-long and 4 meter-high. Then the border with Croatia was closed altogether. All these developments testified to and increased the growth of anti-Islamic sentiments, especially in places through which the crowds of immigrants have passed.

Hungary, just as other European countries, has been living through a demographic crisis. However, the Hungarian leaders are against compensating a shortage of the country's population by people of another culture and another faith. They held the view that the cohesion of the Hungarian nation is largely based on Christianity. Viktor Orban, Hungary's Premier, calls the intrusion of refugees to the European continent "the Trojan horse of terrorism." In an interview to the German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* he said that "most refugees are Muslims, and this poses a threat to the identity of the Christians of Europe." In 2012 a new Constitution of Hungary came into force. Its Preamble spoke at length of the Hungarian people's adherence to the Christian roots, and also of their contribution to the defense of Europe from the invaders' encroachments. Apart from that, it confirmed the role of Christianity as a factor uniting the Hungarian nation, which fact can be regarded as a manifestation of non-admission of other religions. Certain premises of the Constitution directly contradict contemporary European values.

Budapest regards it unjust, as it has previously, the abruption of part of its territory from Great Hungary. Hungary has territorial claims practically to all of its neighbor-states. Its differences with the European Union made the Hungarian elite revise foreign-policy vectors. The country's leadership made a





There can hardly be any hope for a change in the Hungarian leadership's attitude to Islam and Muslims, because the Muslim countries inevitably put forward the demand to build or restore mosques and open madrasahs as the primary condition. Perhaps, the idea of the Turan origin will help establish relations with certain Asian countries, and will also give Budapest an opportunity to play the role of a representative of a big group of countries where Turkish communities live.

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2019.04.008. GYULNARA GADZHIMURADOVA. EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: SIDE BY SIDE OR TOGETHER? // *“Vlast,” oscarow, 2018, P. 60–63.*

*Keywords: Islamic liberalism, European Muslims, integration, self-segregation, EURO-ISLAM.*

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In this article the author studies the concepts “European Muslims” and “Muslims in Europe.” The author notes that presence of Islam in Europe though it isn't a new social phenomenon, but requires understanding as it is an integral part of Europe, and Muslims are a significant part of European society. According to approximate forecasts of the western sociologists, every tenth inhabitant of Europe will be Muslim by 2030, and by 2100 – every fourth one.

Migration activity caused by events of the Arab spring, and then refugee crisis of 2014–2015 strengthened migration processes around the world, and especially on the European continent. In the first half of the XX century migration had midland character and was carried out generally within the Christian world, modern migration has evident interfaith character. Reconcilability of Islam with standards and living of Europeans throw the issue into sharp relief. As a result of increase in the number of Muslim communities in countries of Western Europe and their socio-political activity according to some researchers it is possible to speak about revival of Islamic tradition in modern Europe and also about inability and unwillingness of a certain part of Muslims to be integrated in the country of domicile. As an example, the author mentions works of S. Huntington, G. Haynson, T. Saratsin [Huntington 2003; Heinsohn 2003; Sarrazin 2012].

People of different cultures and different faiths have to live nearby and interact actively and therefore in Europe a question of compatibility of Islam with democratic standards and acceptance of European values by Muslims arose. The author gives an opinion of the German writer and pamphleteer Ralph Giordano, 1923–2014 who criticized opinion of German politicians that Islam henceforth is the same part of Germany as Christianity and Judaism and said that it is impossible to compare existent Islam to the idealized one, corresponding to European values Islam which exists only in their dreams. Giordano considered that “political and militant Islam can't be integrated anywhere” that still nobody has given an answer to the question of compatibility of Islam with freedom of worship, equality of women, pluralism and the principle of separation of religion and church from the state – everything that forms the basis of democracy.

The author gives an interesting viewpoint of the German politician Tilo Saratzin who insists that migration from countries with Christian culture isn't as destructive for Germany as migration from Muslim ones. Migrants from the non-Muslim countries quickly adapt and don't form closed communities. Muslims become isolated in their Ummah and keep up only their traditions that causes tension in those countries where they come. According to the politician, it is all about religion, which defines life of Muslims from birth and to death. According to the politician the problem of Muslims is a lack of progress in education, underperformance of the majority of Muslims in labor market, it is a problem of woman status in these cultures, a problem of high birth rate.

At the heart of life attitudes of Muslims is the Dar-al-Islam, or the territory where laws of Sharia work, and according to many researchers, it's a stumbling block for their successful integration. Europe and Islamic world refer to absolutely different cultural areas which represent two entirely different, but equal systems of values.

The author gives an opinion concerning migration of the professor of the university of Bremen (Germany) G. Haynson who

points that immigration problems of Europe have duplicitous nature: on the one hand, the most energetic and talented people move away, and birth rate is very low among those who stayed, on the other hand, immigrants from countries with low standard of living have no sufficient education to occupy vacant positions, and their rates of reproduction are rather high. The author gives statistics that 150 000 people annually leave Germany, and the majority of them go to the Anglo-Saxon countries which accept them with pleasure. And as a result there is absolutely unequal replacement of local population with migrants who have under education, don't know language, are poorly integrated and often aren't going to work at all, preferring to live on welfare.

The author wonders whether all this means that Muslim migrants don't have future in Europe, and Europe has prospects in view of Muslim communities' growth? As the answer the author cites and analyzes such concepts as Islamic liberalism and European Muslims which demonstrate successful experience of integration of a part of Muslims into European society.

Whether so there is a difference between European Muslims who consider themselves a part of the European family, and Muslims in Europe? An attempt to answer this question was made by professor of the Friburgsky university (Switzerland) Tarik Ramadan in his book "What Means to Be a European Muslim" who is an opponent of division of the world into western and Muslim, surrounding them within Ummah and speaks about rapprochement of Islam followers living in Europe with European culture. Calling themselves Muslims living in Europe, people beforehand reject social realm as extraneous, but, calling themselves Liberal Muslims, on the contrary, emphasize that at the same time they belong both to Islamic and to the western civilization. According to Ramadan, it is necessary to distinguish principles of Islam and its traditions which can be different considering history and culture of people and also laws of the country of domicile. Islam is common, but there is a variety of cultures. In Islam there is a place for both unification and diversity.

When we speak about European, Canadian, American, western Islam, “Europeanness,” “westernization” refer to culture while principles stated in the Koran remain Islamic.

Muslims who decided to live in Europe have to “be Europeanized,” without losing at the same time their identity. But it is possible only granting adoption of the concept of fundamental principles of European values that is unlikely at increasing self-segregation of Muslim communities.

What is Liberal Islam, and who are Liberal Muslims? According to the author of the article Liberal Islam is a form of moderate or unlighted Islam in which ritual (religious practice) part is combined with cultural attitudes of European society. It is clear, that formation of a single concept of Liberal Islam is a process demanding a long time and theoretical underpinning.

In conclusion the author of the article comes to the point that now we stand at the origins of emergence of a new form of Islam, but there is an open issue whether Liberal Islam can become a link between Muslims living in Europe and Liberal Muslims.

*uthor of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich*

## THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

2018.04.009. URAL SHARIPOV. GEOSTRATEGIC ROLE OF THE WEST IN EXACERBATING POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST // *“Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Irana v politicheskoy, ehkonomicheskoy i kulturnoj oblasti kak faktor ukrepleniya mira i bezopasnosti v Evrazii: materialy mezhdunarodnoj nauchno-prakticheskoy konferencii,” Moscow, October 19, 2017, P. 12–24.*

*Keywords: Middle East, conflict, Sunnism, Shiism, West.*

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The Middle East is a very troublesome region politically and militarily in the modern world, the author notes. Among the crucial factors of international tension in the Middle East inhabited by a greater part of the world Muslim population a sharp exacerbation of Sunna-Shia relations was one of the gravest events... In a number of countries of the region military hostilities are going on between pro-Sunna and pro-Shia elements to this day. There are also cases of interference of neighboring countries in these conflicts, as well as countries situated far from this region. The author writes that the present tragic situation in the Middle East had major negative consequences for many Muslim countries during the first years of this century. Hundreds of thousands of local people have been killed and there are millions of refugees moving to various European countries. Hundreds of thousands of

towns and villages are destroyed, and economic activity of entire regions has been stopped, which causes further impoverishment of the local population and other calamities.

1. The egoism of the Arab countries' leaders with exorbitantly high incomes from hydrocarbon deposits in the Middle East is the main reason for the strategic backwardness of the Arab community and its failures in geopolitical international relations.

As is known, the author notes, the 20th century was the period of the crumbling of the world colonial system, the political establishment of peoples' sovereignty and their search for development roads within the framework of new national states. However, in the sphere of the economy the Middle Eastern region was unable to use the entire potential of its natural resources and opportunities, which determined its place in the world community.

The Middle East possesses gigantic deposits of hydrocarbon raw materials, which are in high demand by the modern economy. Thanks to the vast export of oil and gas products to many regions of the world which are short of these strategic goods, the countries rich in hydrocarbon resources have received enormous incomes to their budgets for several decades. It would seem that historical destiny gave an opportunity to the one-time backward Middle East with a big population, many big cities and vast agricultural lands, which had been in colonial dependence on western powers, to develop at a very high rate.

However the hydrocarbon wealth and colossal incomes of the region have been used only for enriching the local ruling circles and part of the elites of a limited circle of the Arab countries. The remaining Arab countries (there were many more of them and with much bigger population were forced to get along with their own limited resources. As a result, the Arab area with a population of about 400 million has lagged behind technologically, in the GDP volumes, and the vital indices of the local people's life, especially as compared to the living conditions of the population of other regions of the world, notably, the seven industrially developed countries of North America, Western Europe and the Far East. In

essence, the present-day Arab world has been left without strategically important industrial and military branches, missile and space technology, etc.

In the modern international relations characterized by acute national and inter-regional contradictions this circumstance has made the Arab world quite vulnerable for expansions and political and economic domination from the outside world. This circumstance is actively used by quite a few present state formations, their special services, and political and economic structures. The Middle East region, apart from Iran and Turkey, finds it ever more difficult to oppose the growing expansion of the outside forces.

2. What is more important – confessional or political reasons for the exacerbation of interstate and domestic crises in the region? An active foreign political or military interference – is the main factor determining the present tragic situation in the Middle East.

If we view the Middle East problems only in the confessional aspect, the author writes, they will seem as ideological and political contradictions among the followers of Islam, which flared up after the death of Prophet Mohammed. The main question then was: “Who should inherit supreme power in Muslim society?” Another controversial issue was: “What were the main premises and vectors of that faith?” As is known, one group of Muslims believed that it was necessary to do things on the basis of the Sunna, which contained the rules and regulations following from the words and deeds of Prophet Mohammed, and embodied the main Muslim traditions of the Arabs. The new head of the Muslims – Calif should have been elected by the Supreme Council of elders. This trend of Islam was called “Sunnism.”

Another ideological trend came into being under the rule of the “righteous califs.” According to it, supreme Muslim power should have been inherited by descendants of Prophet Mohammed along the line of his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali ibn Abu-Talib, Mohammed’s cousin. Thus, a new Islamic trend formed – Shia’t’Ali – the party of Ali and his descendants were named imams and considered to be the only legitimate leaders of the Muslims.



Further on, internal Islamic confessional division between these trends consolidated still more, mainly on the basis of ethnic groups: Arabs, Persians, Turks, etc. This division became deeper and played a greater role in international relations in the Middle East.

Confrontation between states under the banners of these confessions, for example, in the Middle Ages, between the Sunna Ottoman Empire and Shia Persia showed that the main causes of conflicts in the Middle East were national and dynasty interests.

The author notes that, attempts have been made to bridge the gap between the two trends and neutralize at least ideologically the differences between the postulates of the two main trends of Islam, but all of them failed. At the same time, in contrast to intra-Christian sharp differences and wars in Europe, they were more tolerant to each other.

The 20th century was a period of the political formation of the sovereignty of many peoples in the Middle East. This is why the situation in the region should be viewed by countries in the 20th century and in the first decades of the 21st century confessionally and politically.

The author notes that the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran became the banner of the worldwide Shi'ism and the restoration of the equal rights of the Shi'ites in the Muslim world. But this called for changes in the confessional and political structures of several Arab states with predominantly Shi'ite population, as well as those where Shi'ites were in minority.

The ruling circles of these countries could not agree with such turn of events in these countries and the entire region. Baathist Iraq and the Arabian monarchic regimes of the Gulf began to undertake efforts to prevent the development of the Shi'ite process.

Having committed whole series of major anti-Iranian actions in the financial, economic and political spheres and taking into account the new socio-political situation in the region, the United States, along with some other western countries, began to use the factor of the growing Shia – Sunna contradictions.

First, they used the growing Iraqi-Iranian confrontation. The Sunnite President of Iraq Saddam Hussein, supported and helped by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as the United States hurled his armed forces on Iran, hoping that the formerly mighty army of that country became much weaker and would not stand against the onslaught of the Iraqi troops.

Iraq was actively assisted by the pan-Arabic states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf monarchies; their credits to Iraq reached a sum of over \$ 100 billion. As to the United States, it increased its military presence in the Persian Gulf region. Thus, Washington with its provocative role sort of joined the Iranian-Iraqi war. Its deplorable results are well-known, as to the United States, politically and militarily it has gained ground in the Persian Gulf region.

In the 1990s using the invasion of the Saddam Hussein's army of Kuwait, one of the richest states of the region, the U.S. administration has changed its position towards Iraq. This time its policy was against the Baghdad regime, and the United States established its military control over almost two-thirds of the Iraqi territory (in the south and the north of the country). Thus, it actually made prerequisites for the division of Iraq into three parts.

Apart from that, strict international punitive sanctions were imposed on Iraq. At that stage the Americans were opposed in Iraq by both Sunnites and Shi'ites, but on the whole Baghdad ceased to be among serious enemies of Israel and Saudi Arabia. At the same time the neighboring Islamic Republic of Iran was also kept under strong pressure of international sanctions by the West. The latter gave political initiatives among the Muslim countries of the region to the monarchic Sunnite regimes of the Arab Peninsula headed by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The United States became the guarantor of the protection of the said monarchies from outside threats. This century the West's expansion to the Middle East with support from Sunnite monarchies has been further intensified. At the beginning of 2002 the U.S. government proclaimed a new foreign-policy concept in accordance with which it assumed the right to

overthrow any government whose policy, in Washington's view, was not to the liking of the United States. Washington did not even have a pretext of human rights violations by one or another country in order to undertake any act of aggression against it, or achieve a change of its political regime.

In order to carry on its aggressive actions violating international law and sovereignty of states not to its liking Washington uses any pretexts now. The terrorist act of September 11, 2001 in New York was used by Washington urgently in Afghanistan in less than a month's time – in October 2001 without the UN sanction – the country was simply occupied by U.S. troops.

The United States and Britain, and in the spring of 2003, the American-British forces, even prior to the adoption of a corresponding decision by the UN Security Council perpetrated an act of aggression against the Saddam regime in Iraq with a view to completely destroying it. The power of a new coalition government was proclaimed in Baghdad formed mainly by Shi'ites and Kurds, and the Sunnites, who supported the previous regime, were ousted. The aggressive actions of Anglo-Saxon imperialism in the Middle East and its impunity had a serious influence on the political situation in the region, as well as the growing impact of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It should be taken into account that at the end of the first – beginning of the second decade of this century the displeasure of the Arab public circles with the impotence of the ruling circles of their countries and their submission to western penetration in the economic, political, and military spheres of the Middle East should have reached an "urgent challenge" to liberate Muslim territories from the contemporary "crusaders." This was why, when at the beginning of the 2010th the Middle East was swept by the waves of the "Arab spring, which gripped Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and other countries, all mass media of the West were almost unanimous in asserting that the new stage of the exacerbation of the political and social crisis in the Middle East would contribute to the broadening of the Shi'ite positions in the region. And this threatens not only the status quo of the local states,

but also the strategic hydrocarbon interests of international corporations, and the entire world community. In this connection it should be taken into account that the highly-developed powerful computer systems are serviced by highly-skilled specialists, who have predicted and calculated a great many possible development variants in connection with each region, country and government, political situation, group, or individual. Information on each element was constantly checked and revised (if need be) in order to take more optimal decisions by the U.S. government services concerning a solution of various problems in the Middle Eastern region.

The monograph entitled “American Concept of ‘Greater Middle East’ and National Tragedies in the Middle East” published in 2014 noted that from the beginning of the second decade of this century the West has considerably increased the territory of its militant “safari” in Libya, Syria, partly in Egypt, in Yemen, threatened to invade Iran, and also promised to use sanctions against Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Western “policy-makers” did not forget Afghanistan and Iraq in their large-scale and small-scale operations. They take all steps possible to maintain control over the region and its major states.

In actual fact, the author writes, the West has brought back the Middle East, politically and economically, to armed colonialism of the first half of the 18th century – first half of the 20th century. A case in point was Libya in 2011.

When Syria was in the grip of a civil war with a strong confessional tint there was only Iran in the Middle East, which could oppose western expansion.

At that stage in western Middle East policy a general regional crisis was staged, in which a major role was given to the confessional factor. The fact of the growing influence of Shi’ism in the Middle East under the influence of Tehran was taken into account and counter-operations of the Sunnite monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Arabian Peninsula monarchies, Egypt and a number of other Sunnite states of the region were undertaken to oppose the

spreading and consolidation of Shi'ism. Thus, conditions have been created for organizing frontal clashes of big local armed units, as well as whole states coming out under the banner of Sunnism, on the one hand, and Shi'ism, on the other. This circumstance has provided broader opportunities for the procolonial interference of world powers in the life of the Middle East. The major arenas for such political armed clashes called confessional or intra-Muslim, were in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.

The author concludes that international strategic contradictions and collisions connected with the Middle East have been determined by the political interests of the ruling circles of the local states, and also foreign state. However, the important inciter of intra- and interstate conflicts was the Muslim confessional factor, which now plays the major role in international relations in the Middle East. Besides, in some Arab countries, where military hostilities are taking place between pro-Sunna and pro-Shia forces, an active role belongs to armed groups and individuals from other countries which are far from the Middle East.

*author of the abstract – Natalia Ginesina*

2018.04.010. ALEXANDER FILONIK. THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INDUSTRY AND MODERN CHALLENGES // “*Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*,” *oscow*, 2016, 8, P. 31–37.

*Keywords: Islamic banking, Islamic financial industry, financial business, assets, conventional banks, micro-financing, challenges.*

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The researcher notes that Islamic banks operate softer than classical ones, which is especially important now, when extreme

manifestations of instability in the Arab East complicate the situation in the markets. Islamic banks are in a better position, actively operating in the economy of Arabian oil exporters and beyond. They are focused on the distance from the problematic Arab States and are not subject to the randomness of the non-economic order.

It was here that they earned the trust of a reliable business partner and formed an organic element of the financial system that ensured the stability of investment, trade and credit operations after the oil price revolution in the mid-1970s. The financial power of the Arabian holders of foreign exchange resources has changed the situation. Their interests collided with foreign capital, and the internal structure of banking and financial activities in the region began to change, spurred by the dynamics of the globalization process.

Islamic banks are counting on advantages in their countries not only because they successfully entered into a highly competitive environment. They are psychologically more comfortable for Muslim clients. And besides, follow the Islamic tradition of social justice. The rise of national consciousness was a factor that contributed to the final institutionalization of the idea of Islamic banking. It has been realized in a large Arabian project and has accumulated enough strength to compete with conventional credit and financial brands in the zones of settlement of the Muslim diaspora.

The transformation of Arab capital into Islamic capital can be viewed as a collective Arab response to the global claims of Western capital, to a certain extent, which should be put ideological and economic barriers. This moment fits into the scheme of relations of a part of the Arab intellectual elite to globalization, the concept of which cannot appeal to the Arab public consciousness, especially since it reinforces the dependence of the Arab-Muslim world on external influence. Islamic banks have found a worthy place in global finance and have formed an influential niche, which they are improving with a view to further expansion. Ordinary banks in

Arab countries did not degenerate and only limited themselves in some cases to Islamic branches.

A significant drawback that can reduce the popularity of Islamic banking among non-Muslim clients and restrain its role in modern credit and banking operations is seen in a certain archaization of commodity-money payments. It lies in the fact that it can cause associations with the medieval foreign cultural era. Gentiles often do not take into account that the terminology is more intended to set off the national identity of the credit and financial system in its traditional form. But isolation is emphasized deliberately, and it raises a moral barrier, behind which lies the danger of unforeseen risks for foreign customers.

The “Islamic economy” (or the financial block in fact) is developing at a rather rapid pace. Its total assets were estimated at \$ 2 trillion at the end of the first decade of the new century. According to forecasts, total funds may already reach \$ 3,4 trillion by 2020, which should serve as proof of the dynamic process. Islamic finance gave strong evidence of active growth. It seems that all branches of the economy in the monarchies of the Persian Gulf are permeated with connections with Islamic institutions, one way or another, and work only with their support. During the crisis years, this sector suffered the most, being carried away by speculation and real estate transactions. Nevertheless, the Islamic financial business does not reveal any special signs of anxiety, as it was possible to believe in its “unsinkability” in the crisis years 2008–2009. The “Arab Spring” and the events that followed did not cause any noticeable changes in the financial position of the monarchies either. The authorities have invested \$ 1,5 billion in possible zones of increasing social tension and have prevented mass demonstrations. Otherwise, Islamic banks could suffer, being an integral part and, in a certain sense, the face of the financial system of the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf.

Islamic financial capital remains at the same positions in the Arabian economy, participating actively in savings and services in

all types of economic activity, while remaining an attractive area for investing capital.

The attractiveness of Islamic money as an object of professional activity creates not so much competition as the temptation to ignore the rules when making transactions to accelerate them. Such frequent occurrences become a serious challenge, undermining the trust of customers in the system. However, Islamic economists are not so much worried about how often banks bypass the requirements of the system, as they wonder why this phenomenon has become regular. In some cases, operations are carried out arbitrarily, limited to formalities that create the appearance of mandatory procedures. The approach, devoid of unification, has led to the emergence of a variety of techniques that give rise to discrepancies and inaccuracies in the most important issue of determining the nature of traded goods and establishing Sharia purity of transactions. The leadership of the Islamic banking industry requires focusing not only on growth rates, but also on related legal procedures.

Islamic banks have established themselves as a phenomenon that took place, although not in all aspects equally advanced and ready to work adequately at any sites. Moreover, the authorities' desire is felt to bring them up to standard, improving their management and the entire economic system as a condition for bringing the Islamic business into the spaces of the Muslim world and beyond. The Global Islamic Microfinance Forum, held in mid-2014 in Dubai, was deliberately focused on the effectiveness of the use of financial resources in the field of small business. The current situation is practically a challenge to the Islamic finance system, which demonstrates insufficient attention to promising areas of capital investment. Islamic microfinance, as well as conventional microfinance, has not received a noticeable spread in the Arab world. In general, only a quarter of the population of Muslim-majority countries has access to the official financial services market. According to the statistics of 2008, the inhabitants of Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nigeria accounted for more than



half of the world contingent of poor people who had incomes no higher than the minimum acceptable national levels. The intervention of Islamic monetary capital in these conditions has a chance not only to give real money to specific people, but also to promote the Islamic principles of assistance to the poor on an organized basis. Moreover, the majority does not make contact with ordinary microfinance organizations, fearing bondage as a result of turning to usurious capital. Islamic institutions could fully demonstrate the humanity of the approach to the problem, without slipping into frankly speculative actions.

The microeconomics in the plans of Islamic banks can also be important politically. Organized funding can be a displacing alternative to targeted subsidies from extremist organizations. They provide small, but always demanded means, and recruit supporters who easily respond to calls for jihad in such a simple way. In fact, banks can also perform counter-terrorism functions by using money rather than weapons, expanding lending and meeting the demand for financial resources in time.

Another object of Islamic banking efforts is the introduction of a new vision of the organizational and technical side for the functioning of the Islamic financial industry institutions. The pace of intensification of the Islamic industry and the rate of gaining signs of a higher technological structure, as well as a general increase in the efficiency of the financial unit, seem insufficient against the backdrop of global trends in highly organized business like banks. The idea of connecting subtle mechanisms to capital management has already entered the Islamic financial community quite deeply, and the number of supporters of the use of advanced information technologies is gradually growing. From a corporate point of view, the transition to the release of internal reserves at the expense of rational use of personnel and optimization of relations between the structural units of banks to open the way for innovations, can become more advantageous.

Islamic financial business in its current form is quite settled in the Arab-Muslim world as a natural part of its modern

economic structure. The current practice suggests that improvements in different parts of Islamic entrepreneurship can give significant impetus to its development. The final result should be realized in at least two dimensions. One materializes in the willingness of Islamic capital to improve and develop its banking component, thereby demonstrating a response to the challenges of the world market. Another is seen in strengthening the position of Islamic Finance in competition with Western institutions, despite the fact that they have monopolized a huge segment of the global financial space.

*Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich*

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