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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2017.04.001. SAIDA SIRAZHUDINOVA. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: PROTEST POLICY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN MODERN WORLD // *"Information Wars," Korolyov, 2016, No 4(40), P. 37–42.*

Keywords: civil society, protest, protest policy, policy from the bottom, color revolution.

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The author examines the activity of civil society in the context of protest policy. In recent years certain sections of civil society have been used ever more often as a force stepping up protest activity. This circumstance has resulted in a greater activity of civil society in the political sphere and made it an instrument to overthrow political regimes. The wave of protest actions in the post-Soviet territory, which take the form of opposition activity and revolutionary processes is distinguished by similar scenarios and protest groups.

Protest policy is one of the threats to stability in the post-Soviet area. A chain of protests and revolutions, which gripped the post-Soviet (initially, post-Communist) countries, has become

a link of the global revolutions with their anti-Soviet (and anti-Russian) slogans. The “Velvet” Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989 laid the foundation to the transformation processes of regimes from communist and socialist to democratic and liberal. Protests have also resulted in the victory of the “Solidarity” in Poland. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union protest policy has become stronger. The emergence of the Russian Federation was preceded by organized protest campaigns. Beginning from 2003, the coup in Georgia opened the period of “color” revolutions which broke out from time to time in the post-Soviet area (tulip, orange, rose...). These soft revolutions often led to the destruction of a state. Beginning from the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the tendency to break-up continues. Successes of many revolutions have not been complete and resulted in a loss of part of the country’s territory. The Georgian revolution led to the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Ukrainian Euro-Maidan in 2014 was followed by the loss of the Crimea, the aggravation of the situation in Donbass, and the emergence of Novorossia. Protest policy came to Russia too in 2011–2012 and 2015. Protest actions with “color” names took place in Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan. Among the causes of protests were struggle for democracy, fight against vote rigging, outrage provoked by actions of the political regime, or separate actions of the powers that be.

In the author’s view, it is necessary to determine the essence of protest policy and ascertain the role of civil society in it. The author defines protest policy as a set of concepts based on the theory, technology and practice of protest social mobilization aimed at creating the atmosphere of conflict in a state and society, and change of the regime or power. Protest policy includes a concept of debatable policy, a concept of civil society or protest activity / policy “from the bottom”, “color” revolutions, and the concept of collective actions and social movements.

The concepts of protest policy and their realization are connected with the activity of civil society, which is the subject,

and the government (power, regime) is the object, and protest activity acquires a political trend. Consequently, it can be termed "protest policy" and, being adversary and disputable, it remains policy as such. Here the subject of civil society is its structures from individual groups and local organizations to international non-governmental organizations. Religious and ethnic activists and organizations are also used. International and local non-governmental organizations, media-resources (the Internet, mass media, social networks, etc.) play an important role in the escalation of protest policy. Their activity increases, especially it is seen in the countries of the post-Soviet area. The information and network technologies have increased the scope and results of protest actions, which engulf greater areas. This shows the growing politicization of civil society and its turning into an instrument of geopolitics.

The protest events in the world force us to turn to the concept of "contentious politics." It is a trend of modern sociology and comparative political studies examining protests, civil mobilizations, social movements and collective actions from conflicts (ethnic, political and religious) to opposite actions, revolutions and civil wars. The emergence of the concept is connected with the collective action, growing organizations and movements expressing various interests opposing the state.

Usually, protests and claims are aimed at making political changes. The activity of civil society acquires a political tint here. This is why the term "protest policy" is used as contentiousness and argument of the opposing sides striving for victory, where one of the sides is power. Definition of contentious policy includes argument (statements, programs), collective actions (media-campaigns, protests, strikes, marches from peaceful to forcible), and interaction with power. International media and non-governmental networks help distribute protests, guerilla fight and terrorism. Guerilla wars widely use modern communications (mobile phones, the Internet, YouTube, cameras, the mass media) and arms for attacks in the urban conditions.

One of the specific features of contentious politics is that all its forms pursue hidden political aims, declaring the need for social and cultural changes, except civil wars.

In the studies of the activity of civil society recently, one can come across ever more often the term "Politics from below," which leads to changing political regimes as a result of the protest activity "from below." It is usually connected with the development of democracy, and this is why the words "politics from below" are preceded by the specifying word "color." Street protests demand answerability, promotion and broadening of democracy (Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania). At the same time a change of the political regime is not necessarily a step toward democracy. Under democratic slogans, populist, conservative, nationalist, ultra-right and racist movements may act.

Religious movements have also begun to play a more active role. In post-communist countries after the collapse of their previous regimes religious activity has grown markedly, which has influenced in some cases the political process, having given rise to religious and social activity (for instance, in Poland). At present in Russia (and not only here) Salaphite protest movements of non-traditional Islam are widely used for "guerilla" fight against social injustice, drawing international groups of civil society, their sponsors and the mass media.

"Color" revolutions (like "velvet" revolutions) became the most radical manifestation of protest policy. They spread in many countries, and their activity was especially registered in the post-communist and post-Soviet area. The "color" revolution is the widespread practice of changing power (regime) through the stepped-up activity of various groups of civil society (activists, movements and organizations). A common scenario, methods and the active role of non-governmental organizations in such revolutions make one believe that these revolutions have been thoroughly prepared and well connected with the promotion of democracy and human rights, as well as with the staging of protests against election results. The United States actively

promotes democracy in foreign countries by developing these non-governmental organizations. In Georgia, for example, the leaders of civil society taking part in the “rose revolution” received sponsor’s aid from the United States (via NED, USAID, the Soros Foundation, etc.). Expert communities and networks were set up in Georgia, and as a result, victory was achieved by a non-revolutionary way. A similar scheme was used for staging “color” revolutions in Ukraine, Serbia and other countries.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

DMITRY YEFREMENKO. BY THE RIVERS OF BABYLON. MIDDLE EASTERN ORDER IN A STATE OF HALF-DECAY // *Russia in Global Affairs*, 2017, No 3 // *English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: Middle East Collisions, Middle East, USA, Iraq history, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Islamic State, ISIS, geopolitics, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Trump, Bush, territorial integrity, Erdogan, Russia's foreign policy.

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More than a century has passed since Britain, France, and Russia arbitrarily divided the vast territories of the Ottoman Empire into areas of their own post-war dominance. The Sykes-Picot Agreement started the process of partitioning the Middle East into countries that cut through regions historically populated by Arabs and Turks, Kurds and Assyrians, Sunnis and Shiites, Christians and Jews, etc. Subsequently, the borders of

those countries changed many times, but the great powers remained consistently involved in the process. And yet, although the borders were largely artificial and the risk of conflict was quite high, the Middle Eastern order held for almost a century (assuming the 1920 Treaty of Sevres is the starting point), and some countries in the region developed quite successfully. But the quality of governance and functionality of the State were never high, and the ability to resist centrifugal tendencies was often ensured by harsh – and sometimes downright repressive – regimes. But the U.S. intervention in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and the subsequent Arab Spring created such turbulence that the Middle Eastern order started to crumble, putting Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen on the brink of disintegration.

The paradox is that almost no one wants the existing Middle Eastern states to collapse. This is not only because of adherence to the fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also because the collapse of those Middle Eastern countries would create too many threats for their neighbors and more distant countries. But risks always generate new geopolitical opportunities. Indeed, countries that have declared their commitment to the territorial integrity of Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and other states in the region are keeping an eye on those opportunities. In particular, they are considering scenarios where chaos and internal confrontation gain such momentum that blocking them from the outside would be ineffective, and external players would simply prefer to wash their hands of it all. One of the scenarios currently on the negotiating table for deescalating the crisis in Syria calls for separating territorial enclaves not controlled by the Syrian government and giving them security guarantees from international mediators.

It is highly probable that a military defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS), a terrorist organization banned in Russia, and particularly the liberation of Mosul, Raqqa and other territories in Iraq and Syria seized by extremists may trigger the disintegration

of key states in the region. The current reconfiguration of external and internal forces, directly or indirectly involved in various conflicts in the region, may be regarded as a prelude to greater transformations.

America is Returning

Over the past eighteen months the armed conflict in Syria and geopolitical processes in the Middle East in general have taken a radical turn due to the Russian military operation to support Syrian government forces. By the summer of 2016, Russia, Turkey, and Iran had developed a new format of interaction aimed at coordinating their positions for the settlement of the Syrian crisis and combating the Islamic State. As U.S. activity on Syria had declined due to Donald Trump's election campaign and his unexpected victory, the Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle became a political reality that led to negotiations in Kazakhstan to complement the Geneva talks. The successful operations conducted by the Syrian Arab Army (with the support of Russia and Iran) to force armed anti-Assad opposition groups out of Aleppo and by the Free Syrian Army (with the support of Turkey) to push Islamic State militants out of Al-Bab should be considered in the context of joint efforts undertaken by the three countries. The intensity of armed confrontation in Syria has decreased significantly, except for the efforts to crush the Islamic State.

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States stirred hopes for building a broad front led by the U.S. and Russia to destroy ISIS militarily within the shortest possible time. But these hopes turned out to be premature, to say the least. A possible deal with Russia was blocked by a rabid information campaign against Trump and members of his team, who were accused of improper contacts with Moscow. However, the U.S. took some steps to show its resolute return to the Middle East.

Trump made this return as demonstrative as possible when he ordered a missile strike against a government airbase in Syria. While solving several tactical tasks, the Trump administration nevertheless gave no clue as to how it was going to defeat ISIS and raised even more questions about its long-term strategy towards Syria. And yet a new system of coordinates is beginning to emerge. Full-scale support for Israel and a reversal of Barack Obama's policy towards Iran are key elements of this new system. The U.S. and Iran are heading towards a new standoff. The U.S. missile strike on the Shayrat airbase in Syria reflects Washington's choice of Iran as its main opponent in the region and Syrian government forces as a target, since the new U.S. administration views Syria as an Iranian ally and client. This sends a strong signal to Russia, whose response to the U.S. attack was quite reserved, which not only made it possible for Russia to maintain contact with the U.S. on the crisis settlement process in Syria, but also work out initiatives that take into account Trump's new approaches. However, these approaches may prove quite tricky for preserving statehood in Iraq and Syria.

U.S.-Iranian Confrontation and the Future of Iraq

Paradoxically, the U.S. operation to remove Saddam Hussein significantly strengthened Iranian positions both in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf region. As former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer rightfully pointed out, "America was powerful enough to destabilize the existing regional order, but not powerful enough to establish a new one." Iran largely filled this vacuum. As a result, the U.S. and Iran took steps to divide Iraq into spheres of influence at the end of George W. Bush's presidential term, but especially during Barack Obama's presidency. The Iranian nuclear deal sealed in 2015 paved the way not only for lifting sanctions on Iran, but also for starting a dialogue with the U.S. on the future of the Middle East, for which

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Gates, and several other leading U.S. foreign policy experts had repeatedly called.

Today we are witnessing a new and radical turn in U.S. policy towards Iran. Attempts to break the Iraqi sector of the Shiite arc or crescent are behind the renewed efforts to isolate Iran. But is this possible? Iran cannot be equated to the Shia majority in Iraq because the latter is not consolidated. Iran is not only an ally and protector, but also a kind of arbiter for Iraqi Shiites. The U.S. may try to rely on one of the Shiite forces in Iraq, but this will most likely trigger an internal conflict among Shiites and prod the majority of them into siding with their brothers in faith in the east. In other words, a new confrontation with Iran will create a situation where the Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad will become even weaker and eventually start gravitating towards Iran.

It is unlikely that the Americans will be able to find strong support among Sunnis until ISIS is defeated or at least forced out of Iraq. But the U.S. may try to form a new, post-ISIS balance of power in Iraq that would take into account the interests of moderate Sunnis and give them a fraction of influence in the central government and control over parts of the territories currently held by ISIS forces. But this task is quite difficult as it is, even without anti-Iranian escapades. In fact, a delay in a new attack on Mosul was caused not so much by military-tactical or humanitarian considerations, as by deep disagreements over who will take and control the city. U.S. attempts to diminish Iran's influence and strengthen the Sunnis will most likely undermine the Haider al-Abadi government's positions. The main opponent of the present government in Baghdad — former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki — remains a figure who provokes disagreements between key religious and ethnic groups despite his efforts to form a new broad-based coalition.

With ISIS far from being fully crushed and the U.S. seeking to set back Iran, preserving the integrity of Iraq appears to be an increasingly illusory pursuit. Kurds have become the key to the

future of not only Iraq, but of the entire Greater Middle East. In fact, the Kurds in Iraq and Syria are the most valuable U.S. ally in the fight against ISIS in the region. Iraqi Kurdistan has been an important U.S. outpost since 1991. The alliance with the U.S. made it possible for Iraqi Kurds to survive (under Saddam Hussein) and it subsequently gave them autonomy close to sovereignty along with some economic advantages. But the U.S. kept the Kurds from pushing for full independence. However, now that U.S. policy priorities in the region have changed, the situation has become particularly favorable for Iraqi Kurdistan to proclaim its sovereignty. Another factor conducive to this step is that the Kurds control many disputable territories, including large oil fields near Kirkuk. But the situation in Iraq may change in several months and the Kurds will run out of luck.

Iraqi Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani has called an independence referendum within the next several months. That decision apparently reflects an agreement between the region's two main parties and the Barzani and Talabani tribes that support them. The central government in Baghdad will most likely have to accept the results of the referendum due to constitutional reasons. But the borders of an independent Kurdistan may be challenged since the current Iraqi Constitution localizes the Kurdish autonomy within the Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Halabja provinces. Control over Kirkuk remains an open question because of its valuable oil fields and mixed ethnic composition. The idea of making Kirkuk the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan is quite popular among the Kurds, but doing so may trigger a new confrontation between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (Barzani) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Talabani), which controls the city. It is highly unlikely that Baghdad will try to force the Kurds out of Kirkuk after the Islamic State's defeat.

The U.S. officially supports the territorial integrity of Iraq. But under Trump, the U.S. will be less inclined than under Barack Obama and George W. Bush to commit large sums of money and

use its influence to prevent Iraq's disintegration. The U.S. also listens attentively to Israel, which would welcome the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. If Iraqi Kurdistan leaders choose the right time to hold their referendum and proclaim their independence, the U.S. will most likely accept the breakup of Iraq as a *fait accompli* and focus on consolidating its dominant positions in a new state. If Iran's influence in Iraq continues to grow, Kurdistan will serve as the main U.S. bridgehead in the territory that is currently part of Iraq.

Turkey is the main threat to the independence of any part of Greater Kurdistan. However, if Erbil proclaims independence, Turkey is unlikely to resort to violence to suppress the move. The Peshmerga are a serious force, and starting a full-scale war against Iraqi Kurds will inevitably destabilize Turkish Kurdistan and draw Syrian Kurds into the conflict. Both the U.S. and Russia are using their influence to keep Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from responding too aggressively to the emergence of the first independent Kurdish state. At the same time, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan are bound by the oil business that may become even more profitable if it is fully legalized through interstate trade. But of course, in order to pacify Erdogan, the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan will have to distance themselves from the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the idea of consolidating Kurdish lands. But these assurances will not make the Kurdish irredenta disappear.

Iraqi Kurdistan's independence (it could tentatively be called South Kurdistan) will, on the one hand, mean the collapse of the regional order established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. On the other hand, South Kurdistan may become a new regional equilibrium in the mid-term, some kind of balancer that will prevent the excessive strengthening of both Turkey and Iran. In this respect, Russia can regard the emergence of South Kurdistan as a positive development.

The situation of Sunnis in Iraq is coming to the fore as the Islamic State nears defeat. If the Kurdish-controlled territories are

separated from Iraq, the share of Shiites in the remaining part of the country will increase, thus prodding Shiites into building a state system that excludes territorial division on religious or ethnic grounds. Sunnis will be offered positions in the central government (possibly by quota) regardless of which Shia political leaders head it. Agreements over the distribution of other important posts may also be amended. For example, the post of president, currently assigned to Kurds, may become part of the "Sunni quota." But this compromise will have to pass the test from both sides. Radical Shiite groups will continue to push for the maximum advantages from Shia dominance, while many Sunnis will demand control over towns and territories where they have a majority. It is highly unlikely that the advocates of "Sunnistan" will limit their aspirations to just a political struggle. If the authorities in Iraq accept the separation of the Sunni territories, the way will be paved for the ultimate disintegration of Iraq.

External forces will undoubtedly be drawn into these processes, with the main confrontation flaring up between Iran and the Arab monarchies. The U.S. and Turkey will also significantly contribute to the conflict. As for Russia, it should be vitally interested in strengthening political, economic, and military-technical cooperation with the government in Iraq as well as with South Kurdistan, whether autonomous (for the time being) or independent. Russia does not want to get directly involved in processes that may lead to the emergence of "Sunnistan" in Iraq. At the same time, it is important to maintain contact with those Sunni forces in Iraq that are determined to look for political solutions to existing problems.

The territorial separation of the Sunnis in Iraq will not affect Russia directly, but through Syria. The emergence of "Sunnistan" will also reverberate through the region. But will today's Middle East ever look like the map drawn by Army Lt. Col. (ret.) Ralph Peters? Borders can only be drawn along ethnic and sectarian lines when leading domestic and

international actors are not prepared to commit enough resources to avert such a scenario. What makes the situation around Iraq distinct is that key actors are unlikely to accumulate and use sufficient resources in order to prevent the partial or complete disintegration of Iraq. The situation in Syria is different because the major external players have already committed significant resources to support the warring factions and achieve their geopolitical goals.

Syrian Alternatives

Just like the liberation of Mosul will determine the future of Iraq, the contours of Syria's future will start shaping up after ISIS is pushed out of Raqqa and other Syrian territories. Although ISIS structures of governance have already been relocated from Raqqa to the vicinity of Deir ez-Zor, taking Raqqa will be an event of great political and symbolic significance. It seems that the U.S. and Russia have agreed in principle that Raqqa will be stormed under American control. It is up to the U.S. now to choose the striking force that will do the fighting on the ground. Syrian Kurds are the most likely choice, which will significantly restrict U.S.-Turkish activities in Syria and in the region as a whole.

This choice is quite acceptable for Russia, which maintains working contact with Syrian Kurds and calls for constitutional guarantees of autonomy in the territories under their control. With the tacit consent of the U.S. and Russia, Kurdish territories can be scrambled together. But international actors will not support the independence of Rojava or its integration with Iraqi Kurdistan in the foreseeable future. Rojava may become a very important factor of stabilization in Syria, as well as a deterrent against Turkey's neo-Ottoman aspirations.

After ISIS has been forced out of Raqqa, control over this city and some of the adjacent territories will most likely be handed over to one or several Sunni groups opposing Bashar al-Assad. By that time, it should become clear how to implement

the agreements on de-escalation zones. Four scenarios are possible:

- The conflict flares up again, forces regroup, and a broad coalition is formed to overthrow Assad.
- The conflict is allowed to simmer in order to tie up the Syrian government forces, opposing Sunni groups, Iran and Hezbollah, Russia, Turkey, and Arab monarchies.
- New efforts are launched to settle the conflict on the basis of an agreement addressing key issues between Russia and the U.S. at first and then between other domestic and external actors.
- Key actors give their tacit consent to Syria's breakup after the possible disintegration of Iraq.

The first scenario means that the crisis will keep growing and may develop into a large regional war, because a broad anti-Assad coalition will inevitably enter into confrontation with Iran and Russia. The second scenario is less risky for both the U.S. and Israel, even though flare-ups and regroupings are also possible. Also, it gives no guarantees against the reincarnation of ISIS or similar terrorist organizations.

The search for a political solution may be fruitful if Russia and the U.S. agree on the formula for a compromise not only on Syria, but the entire Middle East. Such a compromise may also include agreements concerning Russian and American interests in other parts of the world. However, an agreement between Russia and the U.S. is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a breakthrough in settling the Syrian crisis. The reverse side of a multipolar world is that even an agreement between the U.S. and Russia cannot guarantee the desired result in such regional conflicts.

In general, a political settlement in Syria may include a formula for the political system, economic influence, and security that will guarantee long-term peaceful co-existence of different ethnic and religious groups, with broad autonomy of the territories under their control and an inclusive central government. It could also draw on the Taif National

Reconciliation Accord, which put an end to the civil war in Lebanon, and the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. However, in the case of Syria, the probability that Russia, the U.S., Iraq, Turkey, and the Arab monarchies will get involved is quite high. Thus the Syrian settlement will require a compromise on their further presence in the country if at least Syria's formal integrity is preserved. One may assume that the presence of certain external actors in one form or another will become an element of security guarantees for different parties involved in the Syrian conflict. The creation of de-escalation zones, which are not controlled by the central government, will speed up all processes. The territorial configuration will most probably change, but the Americans are likely to stay in Syrian Kurdistan, the Russians will keep their presence on the Mediterranean coast and in territories populated predominantly by Alawites, and the Turks will dig in in Idlib. A key question is the military presence in Syria of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah groups. This is utterly unacceptable for the Trump administration, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, and quite undesirable for Turkey. However, it is these forces that provide al-Assad with reliable support.

If a compromise is possible at all, Russia should become the main guarantor for the Alawites and their political and security structures. Russia's exit from Syria, whether voluntary or due to some extraordinary circumstances, would create a power vacuum that the U.S., Turkey, and the Gulf countries, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other hand, would immediately try to fill. Adverse consequences for the region would not be far off. In other words, the time when Russia could contemplate an exit strategy seems to have passed. It would be virtually impossible now to guarantee a negotiated settlement in Syria or at least a lasting truce without Russia's substantial military presence in that country.

Russia's long-term military presence in Syria is more preferable for Turkey and Israel than Iran's. In fact, only Russia's

presence can ensure a balance of power in Syria acceptable for Iran if the latter is forced to give up plans to deploy its troops and Hezbollah units in Syria due to external pressure or domestic problems.

The issue of Assad's future could delay negotiations indefinitely. But unless this issue is resolved in a civilized manner, there will be no chance to form an inclusive central government in Syria. Currently only Russia and Iran, acting together, can tell al-Assad how long he can stay in office and how he should leave. Iran can be convinced into supporting Russia's position if the Iranian leaders see an opportunity to ensure their interests when new people come to power in Syria. On the whole, Iran is facing a serious dilemma in Syria. Iran would like to keep the current state of things, which allows it to extend its influence in some form or another to Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen as parts of a single "Islamic resistance front." Iran would also like to see the Shiite branch of Islam, currently stymied by the Saudi monarchy, consolidate its positions on the Arabian Peninsula. However, overstrain becomes a serious obstacle towards this goal. If Iran nonetheless decides to keep or even expand its military presence in Syria (including creation of naval bases in the Mediterranean), it may end up in dangerous isolation. An alternative could be guarantees of political influence in Damascus in exchange for the withdrawal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah units from Syria. Political leaders in Damascus agreeable for Iran should keep their levers of power. Essentially this entails preventing a politically motivated restructuring of militarily efficient units of the Syrian Arab Army (including the 5th Assault Corps currently being created), the Republican Guard, and Alawite-dominated security services. This will most likely be the red line and price Syria's opponents will have to pay if they are truly committed to a political settlement and territorial integrity in Syria.

If the Syrian state collapses, the leading actors will have to understand that neither side can win in this conflict, and that no

acceptable formula can be found for peaceful co-existence of the main ethnic and religious groups. But external forces will keep their presence in different parts of Syria even after its breakup.

The partial disintegration of Iraq (after the separation of Kurdistan) could provide an external impetus for the breakup of Syria. Yet the real problems will begin with the emergence of “Sunnistan” in Iraq, which more than likely will merge with Sunni-controlled regions of Syria and cover a territory almost identical to what ISIS controlled before the offensive on Mosul and Raqqa. But even if the international community recognizes the disintegration of Syria as a *fait accompli*, relative peace can only be achieved in some parts of the country. “Sunnistan” will seek to control Damascus and Aleppo, while “Alawistan” will remain under external pressure as long as Iran has a substantial military commitment there. Finally, once Syria falls apart, it will be hard to stop the chain reaction sending ripples of disintegration throughout Lebanon, Jordan, and the entire Arabian Peninsula. Turkish Kurdistan and Iranian provinces with large Kurdish, Azerbaijani, and Arab communities will also face the risk of destabilization.

Balance of Cooperation / Rivalry between Russia, Turkey, and Iran

Let us take another look at the prospects of trilateral interaction between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The level of cooperation they achieved in the second half of 2016 and the beginning of 2017 is truly unprecedented. But the idea of such cooperation is not new. In his work *The Russian-Eastern Agreement of 1896*, Ismail Gasprinski, a renowned Crimean Tatar intellectual and Jadidism ideologue, suggested that the Russian Empire could pursue a positive and mutually beneficial rapprochement with both Turkey and Persia. Gasprinski was critical of the West’s goals: “Acting either against Russia or against Muslims, Europeans in both cases reap the benefits and

move forward... If one looks at how heartlessly Europe oppresses the whole of the East economically, turning into a beast each time when it comes down to a pence, centime or pfennig, it becomes clear that the East should expect no good from the West." Gasprinski suggested making an agreement with the Ottoman Empire and Persia to establish Russian naval bases on the Mediterranean Sea and in other places close to the Indian Ocean. He believed that such an agreement would have allowed Turkey and Persia to "calmly engage in internal revival, borrowing forms not from the West, but from Russia as a country that is closer to them civilizationally and in terms of people's way of life."

One hundred and twenty years later, Turkey and Iran have complicated relations with the West, sort of giving Gasprinski's ideas a new lease on life. Under certain circumstances, some elements of this discourse may be reproduced in modern political rhetoric. However, it was the temporary alignment of divergent interests of each of the three countries due to internal and external factors that provided a real basis for the Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle. Ultimately, Russia, Turkey, and Iran will draw together, but not along anti-Western lines, and their possible estrangement will certainly not be caused by a sudden outburst of affection for the "values of the free world."

There is no guarantee that the triangle will last in the mid- or long term. Even a slight change in the combination of factors or efforts that brought Russia, Iran, and Turkey together could undermine their interaction and eventually upset it completely. In fact, Turkey may yield to U.S. pressure aimed at wrecking the alliance. If this pressure coincides with internal transformations accompanying the establishment of Erdogan's personalistic regime, a revision of Turkey's positions will ruin the triangle.

At the same time, there are some important circumstances that help keep the trilateral format working, since the only alternative to the Astana peace talks would be a new outbreak of more violent confrontation in Syria. In addition, with the trilateral format gone, the sides will no longer be able to control

each other's activities. The lack of mutual trust between Russia, Turkey, and Iran can be made up for if each of them opts for a strategy that gives all of them a positive balance of gains / losses, while reducing related risks to an acceptable level.

The Goals of Russian Policy in the Greater Middle East

Russia needs to reevaluate its goals in the Greater Middle East. While the decision to provide direct military support to al-Assad was made in the fall of 2015 largely in the context of the Ukraine crisis and Western efforts to isolate Russia, in 2017 a foreign policy priority is to consolidate Russian positions as one of the centers of power in the region.

It should be a key position that allows Russia to use its influence and have a foothold in different parts of the region. This means that Russia should not be viewed solely as al-Assad's ally or a secret patron of the Shi'ite arc. It is vitally important to avoid a situation where Russia's actions will be interpreted as prejudiced against certain religious or ethnic groups in the region. Russia should maintain partner relations with Iran, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, and raise the dialogue with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to the level of partnership. And, of course, Russia should achieve an acceptable level of understanding with the U.S. and its main NATO partners on how to resolve conflicts in the region (including coordination of efforts if Iraq and Syria fall apart). By and large, this can be viewed as an attempt to transform the Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle into a multilateral format incorporating all key actors in the Greater Middle East. This task cannot be solved without Russia.

Russia's long-term presence in the region will require considerable resources. Clearly, Russia should offset those costs by gaining serious economic preferences in Syria and other parts of the Greater Middle East, including participation in post-war

reconstruction and development of natural resources. Political and military-strategic achievements should be converted into economic dividends.

Ultimately, our policy in the region should become part of a comprehensive strategy aimed at creating favorable conditions for the development of Russia as a country that helps, along with China, reformat the geo-economic and geopolitical landscape in Greater Eurasia. This process will have to go hand in hand with the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and China's Silk Road Economic Belt project, the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the creation of continental transport and logistics chains, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal development corridors. The Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle could provide the basis for this process in the Greater Middle East. Interest from Middle Eastern countries in mega projects associated with Greater Eurasia's geo-economics may become an important factor encouraging the search for compromises and relaxation of tension. Greater Eurasia will gain integrity only when the stabilized Greater Middle East becomes its natural part. However, the latter forebodes new turbulence since global geopolitical transformations will inevitably meet resistance from some of the national and supranational actors seeking to preserve their privileged positions in the present world order.

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2017.04.002. FARID ASADULLIN. ISLAM IN PUBLIC SPACE OF MOSCOW METROPOLIS IN THE 21 CENTURY // *“Mir Islama v Obshchestvenno–Kulturnom Prostranstve Moskvoy: Opyt Proshlogo i Sovremennost.”* Moscow, 2015, P. 171–184.

Keywords: Islam, migration, Moscow metropolis, religious identity, criminalization, Muslim ethnic groups.

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The author writes that the 21st century is characterized by global integration processes which intensity is more obvious among the population of big cities. Their reverse side is aspiration of scientists to find a hypothetical formula for defining optimal proportions in the urban space of historically indigenous (“title”) population and growing over the last years influxes of “new citizens” from migrants.

Intensive development of Moscow, constant population increase, territorial expansion around Moscow, and as a consequence expansion of labour market lead to constitution in the beginning of the XXI century of Moscow urban conglomeration – the biggest one not only in Russia but in Europe with population base about 15 million people. Being the most populous European metropolis Moscow suffers from

challenges of urbanization process because of considerable in recent years population increase for account of migration from other Russian cities and neighbouring states. About 35% of overall migration flow to the Russian Federation is accounted for Moscow and the Moscow region.

About 10% of Moscow population are representatives of Muslim nations, Islam and ritual practice are main ethnocultural marker of their identity. This population to different extents is incorporated in Moscow life reality. If there is no such a problem for the majority of Moscow Muslims, then for labour migrants from the Central Asia and their fellow believers from North Caucasus who were born in Fergana Valley, kishlaks or mountain villages, problem of social and cultural adaptation is one of the principles. For many of them who first ended up in multinational metropolis there is a question of indolent way of adaptation into new environment and conservation of primordial national and religious identity under new urban conditions. For this reason according to the experience representatives of these nations are often of rural districts descent tend to preserve close hometown ties entering into exogamous marriages only on extraordinary occasions. This is particularly the case of migrants from the Central Asian states. It is commonly recognized that especially system of housing and utility sector, newbuilds, trucking and retail business, fast food restaurants, public transport and service industry in Moscow and oblast (reconditioning and cleaning of roads and living accommodations, hairdressing saloons and so on) are held in place by the Tajiks, the Kirghiz and the Uzbeks. Recently in medical centers and various business and government institutions of Moscow there is an influx of specialists with diplomas of Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Tajik higher education establishments. Among illegal labour migrants which number is in 4-8 times more than officially registered there is a high level of unemployment and social exclusion that frequently result in their lumpenization and criminalization.

Indisputable problem of compact living of Muslim ethnic groups is essential for a big city rivalry of its citizens for “a place in the sun” and a complicated dialectic of relationship among “new” and “old” Muslim ethnic groups Asians, the Caucasians, civil and practicing Muslims and finally the most pressing one – indigenous Russian citizens. The roots of these frequently emerging conflicts are of different kinds: historic, religious-dogmatic, national-domestic or economic. Typically their dependence is aligned with birth place and one or another ethnic group, convoluted history of regional neighbours relations, for instance, the Azerbaijani and the Dagestanis, the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks. Municipal criminal chronicle can give a lot of examples of stepped-up interethnic confrontations (quite often using weapons) when fiery temperament caused conflicts and domestic disputes by implication.

Migration problem leaves today one on the most principal pressure point of Moscow society that is confirmed by more frequent nationality conflicts. Phobia of migrants is considerably fuelled by formerly deeply-rooted in Russian society phobia of Islam that is an urgent social problem of all big cities suffering from influx of excess population. Moscow as St.Petersburg and European million cities constitute open multi-ethnic and multi-confessional societies experiencing rapid economic and demographic growth. Interests of different cultures representatives and religious traditions neighbor and often overlap in this urban space. Attempts to restrict affectedly display of Muslims’ religiousness on the part of authorities with a deficit of Muslim temples backfired a few years ago – by opening of “alternative” mosques so called unofficial chapels and demonstration of religious enthusiasm and zealotry among young Muslim people. It was particularly notable on days of Friday and festive mass. Current explosive growth of Islamic religious identity manifestation (especially on days of Kurban Bayram and Eid festival) makes city authorities take suitable measures for regulating and organizing public religious events.

For that end religious ceremonies except for 4 mosques are held at dedicated places in Sokolniki, in Southern administrative district and Chertanovo and in Moscow satellite towns. However the quantity of mosques and allocated sites is not sufficient. Best way for integration of Islam into familiar public scenery and at the same time best preventative measures of extremism based on religious belief and youth radicalism (in F. Asadullin opinion) is visualization of Islam in urban realm by creation of Islamic infrastructure under Moscow authorities and mufti. European experience in this sphere even if not giving guaranteed positive effect shows ongoing Islamisation of migrant communities is ultimate establishment of integration impossibility. Eurasian Moscow which has centuries-old history of close Islamic-Christian interplay (more exactly Russian-Tatarian one) is in a better position. Complete reconstruction of Moscow cathedral mosque (area and capacity of which is manifoldly extended) is an important however not the only step in this field.

Talking about problems connected to processes of migrants' socialization and looking for ways of communication with host society it is important to notice an experience of Tatarian community which can be exemplary for new Muslim ethnic groups settling down Moscow and Moscow region. Search process of balance between own traditional culture and faith on the one hand and new social realm on the other one long and difficult but its alternative can be steadily producing mutual vigilance and throwback of intolerance. Moscow Tatars demonstrate put by the course of history integration possibilities, this cultural reconcilability test with Russian ethnos traveled the long evolutionary path but finally reserved their language, faith and customs. Along with that there is really existing threat of "parallel society" genesis in a short time from the generation of Muslim migrants' children who found themselves in servant class because of social barriers as their fathers bothers many experts. F. Asadullin agrees with a number of well-known scientists who defend prospects of intercultural hybridization

ideas of new and indigenous residents in contemporaneous metropolises.

Modern Moscow first time in the recent history faced phenomenon of migrants network functioning as evidenced by acting in the capital formal and informal associations of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Uighurs and so on. Since 2005 in the capital it is published a newspaper "Voice of Tajik people" All-Russian social movement agency "Tajik labour migrants," and it is intermittently issued a Russian newspaper for migrants "Uzbeginim." On pages of "Voice of Tajik people" there can be found a lot of material about the difficulties and deprivation with which migrants workers face in the capital. There are revealed numerous facts of money extortion from migrants by police officers in the course of document checks. In the newspaper it's largely highlighten the problem of "parallel marriages," about 50% of married Tajiks in Russia that gives an opportunity to obtain concessions for living and work in Moscow. In 2013 it was published a research and information publication "Russian Kyrgyz" - All-Russian non-governmental organization "Kyrgyz Congress" agency. Upon an initiative of the Congress there are formed pilot projects aimed at social assistance, education and business programs for Kyrgyz expats in Russia. As far as from the end of 2012 testing by Russian for labour migrants who want to work in the area of municipal service, retail trade or domestic services became binding. An interregional social movement of Kyrgyzstan labour migrants and the Centre of interregional and international cooperation "Dialogue of cultures" basing on one of Moscow libraries organized courses in Russian for foreigners from neighbouring countries since May 2013. Since 2015 such a requirement should be spread to all categories of migrants who besides that will have to pass exams in history and basic legislative principles of Russia.

Moscow religious tolerance, about which it was known in medieval Eastern Europe from the time of Peter the Great and today thanks to concern of traditional religions headers and

policy of Moscow authorities, is still one of the main characteristics of the capital social life. Violations made by ethnic Muslims or directed against them and their family members as a rule have religious subcurrent rather than aligned with character of coexistence and rivalry (commercial, economic or related to amenities) of various ethnic groups in the setting of metropolis. Incidents on grounds of religious intolerance on extraordinary occasions often have purely domestic or incendiary character playing into nationalists' hands.

Today we can state that "Moscow" Islam is a significant and dynamically developing segment of socially-religious and cultural life not only of Moscow region but all Russia. The history of Muslim community in Moscow in which there is a reflected history of Russian Islam on the whole demonstrates its complicated and at times the tragic fate. Religion for which it was prepared honorary in essence official role in the beginning of XIV in times of the Golden Horde, became persecuted after conquest of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible, later beginning with ruling of Catherine the Great tolerable, and finally nowadays it's got a status of established religion as an integral part of Russian nations legacy. Concentration of the capital Islamic life today is a huge experience of institutional cooperation with the state-Moscow Muslim Spiritual Authority (operating on the base of the cathedral mosque) which got an authoritative religious body during a short historical period uniting Muslim communities of the Russian Federation. Today this activity is fulfilled by two official religious structures directed by mufti Rawil Gaynetdin – Council of Muftis of Russia and Spiritual Body of the Muslims of Russia. Most important achievements of spiritual renovation are aligned with the name of mufti Rawil Gaynetdin in Russia and CIS nations. There is a significant role in the process of other civil, youth, national and other organizations – Mardjani Foundation, Association of cultural and educational non-governmental organizations "Sobranie," Congress of Caucasian nations, Fund of Karachaytvo-Balkarian younger generation advancement

“Elbrusoid,” Cultural and educational fund “Nadezhda,” charity fund “Zakyat,” Center “Spiritual tradition and modernity.” Traditionally an important place in organization of cultural and religious life for Moscow Muslims belongs to Arab Islamic countries Embassies and various national communities.

Modern-day Moscow is a huge metropolis Muslim component of which, according to forecasts of scientists in the globalized world, will change quantitatively and its weight in social-economic processes, cultural transformation of urban space. Today the Russian capital taking into account rapidly developing national diasporas from Azerbaijan, republics of the Northern Caucasus, Central-Asian and other Islamic countries (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey) is the biggest Muslim city in Russia with over 3 million people ethnically and spiritually related to Islam.

In contemporary Islamic society there is almost all communal spectrum of Islam as a world religion – from Isma'ilism and other Shia denominations to traditional for Russia Hanafism and Shafi'ism in Salafi or other version and variety of semilegally acting Salafi tariqahs including Maghrebian and other exotic branches. According to scientists project role of Muslims in the capital public space will develop dynamically in spite of islamophobia outbreaks and ethnic discrimination and arising administrative barriers (for example in relation to plans of new mosques building).

To the end that Moscow becomes as noted by scientists-urbanists – livability it is necessary together with simple for a big city economic and social questions to regulate the problem of illegal migration and consequentially excess population that will allow bringing a level of international and interreligious relations into compliance with interests of Moscow metropolis population and general strategy of the capital development for the next few years. In addition, it is important to take into account the increased importance of Islamic factor in the country and the world, and expand understanding of Russians about Islam as an

integral part of Russian state multi-ethnic legacy through federal and municipal social and cultural programs. The Russian Federation strategy of state national policy for the period until 2025 accepted December 19, 2012 by presidential decree, creates objective conditions for rising of Russian multinational society unity and preserving of ethno-cultural singularity of Russians. Today on the basis of established tendencies it can be stated that forecasting of future characteristics of the Russian capital and the state in general excluding the increased ethno-Muslim factors is impossible.

The future of Moscow metropolis depends on many factors but its main formal feature will leave close cooperation of different, due to course of history, ethno cultural traditions being the basis of multinational Moscow, as the researcher suggest.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2017.04.003. SERGEY USTINKIN, NATALIA MOROZOVA. INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN NIZHNY NOVGOROD REGION // *“Observer.” Moscow, 2017, No 4, P. 51–58.*

Keywords: interethnic relations in Nizhny Novgorod region, migration policy, nationalities policy, media-discourse, diaspora, interethnic conflict.

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Nizhny Novgorod region has unique ethnic-demographic characteristics: on the one hand, it is a multinational part of the

Russian Federation (more than 150 nationalities live on its territory), and on the other, the number of the Russian population comprises about 92 percent, which makes it possible to regard it as a mono-ethnic formation. The situation in the sphere of interethnic relations in the region has always been characterized by a high level of tolerance. At present, under the influence of a number of external and internal factors the indigenous population began to display a rather cautious attitude to representatives of the Caucasian peoples and newcomers from Central Asia.

A definite level of tension in the sphere of interethnic relations was registered during the monitoring of the socio-economic and socio-political situation in Nizhny Novgorod region carried out by the Volga affiliation of the Institute of Sociology RAS during the 1st - 4th quarters of 2012 and in the 1st quarter of 2013. At that time a rather low level of hostility towards migrants was revealed (on average, 3-5 percent), on the one hand, and on the other, a highly cautious attitude of the indigenous population to the growing number of migrants in the territory. On the whole, 35.3 percent of the people polled displayed a negative attitude to migrants or settlers from nearby countries. Among regional dwellers there were about 32 percent of such persons, and in the city of Nizhny Novgorod - 40.7 percent. About 13 percent of respondents had a positive attitude to migrants.

Today the state of interethnic relations in Russian regions is influenced by the growing conflict potential in the world community. The mass flow of migrants from Asian and African countries gripped by destructive wars, terrorist acts and hunger to West European countries is reflected in the contemporary Russian reality. In January-June 2015 the migration exchange with the former CIS countries ensured a surplus of the population in 75 Russian regions, from January to May 2016 the number of parts of the Russian Federation in which the numerical

strength of the population increased due to more migrants from the CIS countries grew to 81.

Such change in the qualitative composition of the population tells on the socio-economic and political situation in this part of the country and causes growing tension in society. In order to study the problem objectively enough it is necessary to take into account the negative phenomena cropping up in a poly-ethnic regional society, among which nationalist ideas, extremism, "politicization" of the Islamic factor, and as a result, a more cautious attitude of the Russian Orthodox population to Muslims become widespread. The authorities of certain national republics continue to implement the titular-nation-oriented policy and linguistic segregation which is a forced measure and a necessary instrument in ethnic consolidation and creation of a regional society.

A major role in the formation of public sentiments, including toward migrants and visitors from other national regions in Russia, is played by the mass media. In the Nizhny Novgorod regional media-discourse a positive information background for interethnic relations has been created. This can be explained by the fact that the program for harmonization of interethnic relations adopted in Nizhny Novgorod region consists of measures implemented in the sphere of cultural interaction (information about festivals of national cultures in the mass media, which do not point to petty conflicts or blunders which might take place during contacts between representatives of different ethnic groups even in the most tolerant society.

The Nizhny Novgorod press and the Internet largely reflect the problems of regional society connected with the stay of migrants in the region and the activity of representatives of the peoples of Russia. An analysis of the regional media area makes it possible to determine the key events, which influence the development of interethnic relations, and find problems in relations and interactions of representatives of different peoples and ethnic groups.

The Volga affiliation of the Institute of Sociology RAS has carried out a study of the media area of Nizhny Novgorod region using the automated monitoring system "Medialogia." An analysis has revealed a whole number of characteristics of the regional media area reflecting the specific features on interethnic relations in Nizhny Novgorod region.

First, in connection with the growing tension by December 2013 a transformation of the media-discourse has taken place: instead of "tolerance" come the words "newcomers", "Southerners", "people of Caucasian nationality", "Eastern diaspora." Such generalizing categories can prompt people to show a negative attitude to migrants and representatives of other nationalities.

Secondly, in most cases the content of articles is connected with concrete information cases. There was only one publication that examined a theoretical problem and made an attempt to define the term "diaspora."

Thirdly, one of the major characteristics is the frequency of and reasons for mentioning one or another diaspora in the mass media.

The leader of mentioning in the mass media has been the Azerbaijani diaspora (30 percent), which is quite influential in Nizhny Novgorod region, which is partly due to the active behavior of its leaders who give interviews and comment on local developments.

Frequent mentioning of Ukrainians (23.7 percent) can be explained by the latest developments in Ukraine (joining the Crimea to Russia, the war and the growing number of refugees including in Nizhny Novgorod region).

A considerable share of information is connected with the Tajik and Uzbek diasporas (16 percent and 17 percent respectively). These groups are the leading ones in the statistical data of migrants coming to the region. As a rule, illegal migration mention precisely representatives of these diasporas.

One of the sources of the emergence of the ethnosocial tension seats is contradiction between the requirements of the

ethnosocial practice and the conservative nature of the existing system of social institutions. One of the most efficient methods to reach social accord in a poly-ethnic region is settlement of ethnosocial conflicts on the basis of elimination of inequality in the spheres of common interests of different ethnic groups.

In order to preserve a stable situation in interethnic and inter-confessional relations in the region, in the view of these researchers, it is necessary to evolve a comprehensive monitoring program, develop active cooperation between bodies of power, scientific and expert communities, national-cultural autonomies and non-commercial organizations working in the sphere of public relations.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

IGOR DOBAYEV, OLEG CHEREVKOV. TRANSFORMATION OF RADICAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS: FROM “IMARAT KAVKAZ” TO “VILAYAT KAVKAZ” // *The article was specially written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: “Al-Qaeda,” “Vilayat Kavkaz,” Wahhabism, “Imarat Kavkaz,” Islamism, ISIS, North Caucasus, terrorism, extremism.

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In 2007 the new leader of the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” Doku Umarov announced the formation of the “state” under the name “Imarat Kavkaz” whose leaders soon proclaimed

it a filial formation of the worldwide network grouping "Al-Qaeda." However, in view of neutralization of D. Umarov in November 2013 and the emergence of a new and powerful grouping of radical Islamists called ISIS in the Middle East, most commanders of the "Imarat Kavkaz" units, having turned away from orientation to "Al-Qaeda" gave their loyalty oath to the leader of ISIS. These groupings not only have sent their fighters to Syria for taking part in "jihad", but also transformed their activity on the territory of Russian regions, thus having created new threats to the security of the Russian Federation.

In 2007 the new leader of the virtually existing "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria" Doku Umarov announced the completion of the nationalist plan to build the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and simultaneously made public the new geopolitical project – "Imarat Kavkaz." It consisted of six administrative units (vilayats): Nokhchicho (Chechnya), Galgaiche (Ingushetia), Daghestan, Iriston (North Ossetia), Nogai Steppe (Stavropol territory), and united vilayat of Kabarda, Balkaria and Karachai.¹ Later, on May 11, 2009, vilayat Iriston was included in vilayat Galgaiche.² The vilayats were headed by amirs from among the leaders of ethnic autonomous combat units. The "Imarat Kavkaz" claimed the territories of Krasnodar territory and the republic of Adygea, which did not form a separate vilayat.

The "Imarat Kavkaz" was a terrorist Islamist separatist underground which included Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayev-Circassia, and also armed units of militants which were active on the territory of these republics. According to the data of the special services, as well as statements by leaders of the "Imarat," underground jihadist networks also existed in the Volga area, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and in certain parts of the Russian Federation in the Urals.³

The main units of the network structure of the "Imarat Kavkaz" were "jamaats." They were united by religious ideology and the methods of the armed struggle against Russian statehood in the North Caucasus, local bodies of power and Russian special

services. The “Imarat Kavkaz” movement was based on the distorted ideas of jihad.

There are two basic views on this problem. According to the most widespread view among experts, the “Imarat” was a structured hierarchic network in which the amirs (leaders) of vilayats (territories) were appointed by and subordinated to the amir Doku Umarov, whom they gave their loyalty oath. The structure of the organization was determined by Umarov’s decree and had a typical network form. The borders of the vilayats coincided with the administrative borders of the republics almost everywhere. Each vilayat was divided into fronts – zones of responsibility of local amirs.

In turn, certain experts maintain that it would be wrong to regard the “Imarat” as a strictly structured vertically-built organization. In actual fact, it was rather a network consisting of various cells, which were “dormant” until a certain moment, and could launch a sudden and effective attack without asking permission from Doku Umarov or other chief jihadists. These experts note that far from always the “Imarat’s” responsibility for one or another terrorist act corresponded to the truth.⁴

Certain experts call the “Imarat Kavkaz” a “virtual state”: on the one hand, its territory was ruled by the Sharia law, which, in real fact, replaced Russian law; there were also “specialized institutions of power”; the supreme consultative body under the amir of the “Imarat Kavkaz” was “Majlis ul-Shurah,” consisting of the amirs – heads of the vilayats and the leaders of the “jamaats”; the supreme judicial body was the High Sharia court” headed by the Kadi (Court Chairman). It should also be mentioned that the “Imarat” had the Security service – Muhabarat headed by the rais, which was in charge of investigation of the anti-state activity of the enemies of the “Imarat” and their “neutralization.” However, it would be wrong to assert that all these functions were quite real, but not an imitation.

Besides, the composition of these groupings constantly changed.

Despite the presence of allegedly “state” features, the “Imarat” is a terrorist organization posing a threat to the regional and national security of Russia. In this connection, on February 25, 2010, a decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation went into force, banning the activity in Russia of the international terrorist organization “Imarat Kavkaz.”⁵

As to the position of the United States, which took upon itself the role of the main fighter against terrorism all over the world after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, it recognized the “Imarat” as a terrorist organization much later, on April 29, 2010. The U.S. Helsinki Commission called on the Department of State to include the “Imarat Kavkaz” in the official list of international terrorist organizations. In June 2010 the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton named the leader of the “Imarat Kavkaz” Doku Umarov a terrorist, and it was only on March 11, 2011, that the “Imarat Kavkaz” was included in the list of terrorist organizations in the United States.

On July 28, 2011, the UN Security Council Committee on sanctions against the “Al-Qaeda” and physical persons and legal entities connected with it adopted a decision to include the “Imarat Kavkaz” in the list of sanctions. In accordance with the resolution, the UN member-states are duty bound immediately to introduce the regime of sanctions against the “Imarat Kavkaz,” which envisages freezing of all financial assets belonging to the organization and stopping any assistance, including the deliveries of arms and economic resources.

It should be emphasized that the “Imarat” is full of internal contradictions. In August 2010 a split occurred in the organization, the first in its history. Aslambek Vadalov, who was regarded the successor to the then head Doku Umarov, and several amirs of the Chechen sector of the “Imarat” suddenly announced their retirement and the end of their loyalty oath to Doku Umarov. Amirs of other vilayats proclaimed their support

to Doku Umarov and denounced the actions of Vadalov and his followers. In September 2010 Doku Umarov deprived the “rebels” in the Chechen sector of all ranks and titles.

However, on July 25, 2011, Aslambek Vadalov and other Chechen field commanders returned to their duties under Doku Umarov and renewed their loyalty oath to him. Thus, the split in the “Imarat Kavkaz” was temporarily overcome, but not for long. According to the data of the Islamist ideologist Orkhan Jemal for 2015, there were serious contradictions between representatives of the leaders of the Chechen and Daghestan band underground, which were the main centers of the “Imarat.” The Chechen militants were against terrorist actions against peaceful citizens and preferred to concentrate attention on men of the special forces, whereas the Daghestani militants called for total terror.⁶

The main types of actions of the “Imarat” bandit gangs were terrorist acts, shootings, explosions, etc., in order to frighten peaceful civilians, representatives of the authorities and clergy. Their main victims were men from the special services, army and police. It is important to note that the militants did not make difference between Russian servicemen and employees and the local Muslims. Their main targets were government officials at various levels, the Muslim and other clergy supporting the official authorities, tradesmen selling alcoholic drinks, fortune-tellers and quacks, and prostitutes. As a rule, the militants took responsibility for murders upon themselves, basing them on decisions of “Sharia courts.”

In April 2009 Doku Umarov announced the renovation of the “jamaat “Riyadus-Salihin” (“Gardens of righteous”) – a special unit of suicide-terrorists, which had been set up by Shamil Basayev. The ideologist of the resurrected jamaat was Said Buryatsky, alias Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Russian Islamist from the city of Ulan-Ude in East Siberia. During several months the suicide-terrorists killed many policemen and peaceful citizens. For example, on August 17, 2009, the building of the local department of the Ministry for the Interior in Nazran was

completely demolished, twenty-five people were killed and more than 260 wounded.

At about that time a video address of Doku Umarov was circulated in which he approved and justified the terrorist acts against peaceful citizens, who, in his words, by paying taxes and keeping silent, supported the government, army and police.⁷

In June 2009, the “Imarat” militants took responsibility upon themselves for the murder of the Minister for the Interior of the Republic of Daghestan Adilgirei Magomedtagirov, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of Ingushetia Aza Gazgireyeva, and the former Vice Premier of Ingushetia Bashir Aushev. In July 2009 the militants took upon themselves responsibility for the attempt on the life of the President of Ingushetia Yunus-Bek Evkurov. And in August of 2009 they announced that it was they who committed an act of terror on the Sayano-Shushenskaya power plant in Siberia, which shook the entire country. True, the special criminal investigation disproved this version.⁸

In December 2009 the militants took upon themselves responsibility for the murder of the Orthodox Christian priest Daniil Sysoyev. It was then that they claimed the explosion of the passenger train “Nevsky Express” on November 27, 2009, in which 28 people died and more than 90 were wounded.

On March 31, 2010, Doku Umarov issued a video address, in which he said that the act of terror in the Moscow underground on March 29 was committed on his order.⁹

On January 24, 2011, a terrorist act was committed in Domodedovo Airport in Moscow which took a toll of 27 dead and over 150 wounded. At that time Umarov said: “Let Russia know that it is at war with the Caucasian Muslims and we deal blows at strategic objects, which we shall continue to make. A war is a war and it is waged with its own methods, whether good or bad.”¹⁰

By the fifth anniversary of the creation of the “Imarat Kavkaz” it made, directly or indirectly, more than 2,200 acts of violence, as a result of which about 1,800 people died; 2,600

policemen, servicemen and officials were wounded. More than 450 peaceful citizens were killed and 1,200 were wounded.¹¹

In January 2012 the investigation established that the explosion on the passenger train "Sapsan" from Moscow to St. Petersburg prevented by the Federal Special Services in the summer of 2011 was planned by Doku Umarov. The organizer of the crime Gasan Abdulayev, the leader of the South Daghestani sector of militants fled and was adjudged to be tried.

On January 16, 2014 the YouTube issued a recording of the Sharia judge of the "Imarat" Ali Abu-Muhammad Kebekov, in which he reported the death of the leader of the organization Doku Umarov. He also suggested that the "Imarat Kavkaz" should be headed by "Brother Aslambek" (that is, Aslambek Vadalov).

Speaking of the problem of searching for a new leader, the well-known expert on the Caucasus M. Roshchin expressed the view that the "Imarat Kavkaz" movement was now fragmented too much and is in decline "The point is that nobody wished to take the post of its leader. The strategy of an underground struggle and the broad use of suicide-bombers mean, among other things, a reduction of the number of people taking part in underground activity. This shows a decline of the entire project."¹²

The head of the Republic of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov also reported Umarov's death. In his words, Umarov was killed in one of the operations, but his body was not found.

On March 18, 2014 the "Imarat" command officially announced that Ali Abu-Muhammad was elected new head of the organization.

On June 28, 2014, YouTube showed a reel in which the new head of the "Imarat" said that inflicting harm to the life and property of the civilian population is unacceptable. In his words, the main aims of the actions of the militants are men of the special services. He also called on his people, especially women, to refrain from suicide acts.

On April 19-20, 2015, during a special operation in the suburb of the Daghestani city of Buinaksk five people were killed. A little later it was reported that among them were the leader of the "Imarat Kakaz" Aliashab Kebekov and four leaders of the Daghestani smash-hits, including two women. This special operation of the national anti-terrorist forces destroyed the top of the bandit underground in the North Caucasus.

However, in July 2015 the news came that Magomed Suleimanov, also known as Abu-Usman Gimrinsky, was proclaimed the new amir of the "Imarat Kavkaz." He was the "Qadi" of Daghestan" and continued the policy of his predecessor Kebekov. According to certain inhabitants of Daghestan, under Kebekov and Sulaimanov the level of violence and racket with regard to peaceful citizens (including men of the special forces) has gone down considerably, which displeased many field commanders.¹³ However, he was soon killed by the Russian special forces.¹⁴

Magomed Abdullayev, also known as Abu-Dujana Gimrinsky, was proclaimed the new amir. However, he stayed at the post for five days only and was killed during another operation.¹⁵

Zalim Shebzukhov, a Kabardian, was proclaimed the last amir of the "Imarat." It can now be said that the center of the "Imarat" has moved to the West.

Zalim Shebzukhov has prepared several terrorist acts against civilian population and representatives of the official authorities and especially during the May Day holidays in 2015. He was very active in recruiting new fighters for the armed conflict in Syria. On August 12, 2015, Zalim Shebzukhov came out with a video recording in which he called on all fighters to do everything in their power to spread the faith of Allah.¹⁶ On August 17, 2016, in St. Petersburg a special force unit apprehended a group of fighters from the North Caucasus. During the operation four of the fighters were killed. One of them turned to be Zalim Shebzukhov. He stayed in the city, apparently, for preparing a

terrorist act. According to some sources, he was going to quit terrorist activity and flee to Finland.¹⁷

Experts believed that another possible leader of the “Imarat Kavkaz” was Aslambek Vadalov, who was once a field commander, and in 2010 even the acting head of the “Imarat.” One of his most notorious crimes was the murder of ten policemen in his native village in Chechnya in April 2004. In fighting at the time three peaceful village inhabitants were killed and several houses burned. On October 27, 2016, it became known that Vadalov and two former Chechen field commanders were captured by the Turkish special forces at the Syrian border. The head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov demanded their extradition to Russia.¹⁸

Since the liquidation of Shebzukhov and the arrest of Vadalov there has been no information about the election of a new leader of the “Imarat.” Certain experts think that it has ceased to exist as a single whole. According to the head of the Republic of Daghestan Ramazan Abdulatipov, all terrorist groups in the republic have been smashed.¹⁹ Similar statements have been made by the head of Ingushetia Yunus-Bek Evkurov²⁰, as well as the Ministry for the Interior of Kabardino-Balkaria.²¹ Why has the “Imarat Kavkaz” grouping actually ceased to exist? It can be supposed that the decisive reason was some “external factor,” namely, the weakening of “Al-Qaeda” and the emergence and strengthening of the ISIS.

Speaking of the external relations of the “Imarat,” it should be noted that the Islamist underground in the North Caucasus poses a serious threat to security not only of Russia, but also of Europe and the United States. Although it is powerless to take the North Caucasus under its control and create an Islamic state there, nevertheless the “Imarat Kavkaz” can perpetrate major acts of violence and deal serious damage at Russia and the entire world. Among the serious factors of the situation connected with the “Imarat” mention should be made of its spreading long-term ties with the “Al-Qaeda” and global jihad, as well as the presence

of the terrorist network of the “Imarat Kavkaz” as an organized political and military force engaged in jihad in the region with the solid backing from abroad.

Indeed, the “Imarat” maintained active ties with various Islamist forces abroad, as well as with representatives of the Persian Gulf monarchies. True, its official mission was closed in August 2010.

At the same time the “Imarat” has established close contacts with the ISIS recently. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has recognized it as a terrorist international organization and banned its activity in Russia.

According to the data of the Federal Security Service of Russia, there were from 800 to 1,700 Russian citizens fighting in the ranks of the ISIS military units.²² Sometime later this figure was increased to 2,000.²³ On February 23, 2017, President Putin said at a meeting with officers of the Northern Fleet of Russia that 4,000 Russian citizens are fighting in the ISIS ranks.²⁴ The National Anti-terrorist Committee of Russia has reported that representatives of the “Imarat Kavkaz” and supporters of the Islamist “Khizb ut-Tahrir” movement, whose cells are functioning in the Russian Federation, were fighting in the ranks of the ISIS units.

In early September 2014 the ISIS fighters published a video in the Internet which contained threats to unleash a war in the Russian Federation. One of the Islamists stated to President Putin that the ISIS intended “to free” Chechnya and the Caucasus and create an “Islamic Caliphate” there.

From that moment onward one can speak of the beginning of a confrontation of the local organization of the ISIS (so-called “Velayata Kavkaz”) and the “Imarat.” The ISIS with its activities has caused a split among the fighters of the North Caucasus. In the autumn of 2014 Suleiman Zainalabidov, one of the commanders of the Daghestani fighters, gave the oath of loyalty to the leader of the ISIS Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi. This caused a split

and embroilment in the ranks of the Islamist underground in Daghestan and Chechnya.

YouTube published a reaction of the Sharia judge (Qadi) recorded on a video, in which he took the side of Zainalabidov, calling him the real amir and pronouncing not guilty of a split.

Following this, on December 19, 2014, the YouTube service distributed an address of Abu-Muhammad, the amir of Daghestan, who also gave the oath of loyalty to the ISIS leader. He was joined by Abu Muhammad Agachaulsky, one of the commander of the fighters operating in the sector which included Makhachkala, capital of Daghestan. From the statement of Abu-Muhammad followed that he stopped subordination to the "Imarat Kavkaz" and asked other fighters to follow suit. The statement of Abu-Muhammad increased the rift in the ranks of the fighters of the North Caucasus.

On December 28, 2014, the YouTube service published an address of Kebekov, in which he accused the amir of Daghestan Abu-Muhammad of treachery and split. He said that Abu-Muhammad should leave for the territory controlled by the ISIS and appointed Said Arakansky the amir of Daghestan. His address demanded that the supporters of the "Imarat Kavkaz" should not cooperate with and assist the fighters who gave the oath of loyalty to the ISIS.²⁵ However, after the death of Kebekov, as some experts noted, the "Imarat Kavkaz" began to lose its positions in Daghestan.²⁶ On June 21, 2015, the YouTube reported about the oath of allegiance given by all fighters of the "Imarat Kavkaz" to the ISIS leader Abu-Bakr al-Bagdadi. All fighters of several vilayats were unanimous in this.²⁷

On October 22, 2015 it became known that the Investigation Committee of Russia started an action on the criminal case of the supposed organizers of and participants in the organization "Vilayat Daghestan of the Islamic State" - an affiliate body of the emirate. According to the version of the investigation, it was created by Rustam Aselderov, alias Abu Muhammad, and Gasan Abdullayev, alias Abu Yaser) for "changing the foundations of

the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, violating its territorial integrity, and gaining financial and other material benefits." In all, 19 persons were being investigated.²⁸

On October 24, 2015, in the settlement of Gimry in Dagestan during a counter-terrorist operations shooting began as a result of which a presumed member of the armed underground was killed. He was identified as Abdula Nustafayev. He was an active member of the Gimri group of fighters, which was long and firmly attached to the "Imarat." However, as official sources had it, Nustafaayev gave the oath of allegiance to the ISIS.²⁹

Summing up, one can say with assurance that the ISIS bodies have now replaced the "Imarat Kavkaz" bodies. Although the "Imarat" was connected with "Al-Qaeda," it was actually a local organization whose activity was confined to the territory of Russia, whereas the ISIS has proclaimed itself a "worldwide caliphate." Besides, after the death of Osama bin Laden, "Al-Qaeda" has been living through hard times, being unable to render any real help to the "Imarat," while the local sources of financing proved negligible.³⁰ At the same time the ISIS has already had considerable means and possibilities to refill its treasury through robbing banks, control over the enterprising activity on territories in Syria and Iraq under their occupation, and trade in oil on the black market. Moreover, it was the "Vilayat Kavkaz" as an affiliation of the ISIS that was financed through Georgia, but now this financing goes directly through Qatar and Saudi charity foundations.³¹ It should also be noted that the ISIS has broader opportunities to use propaganda means, and also the quality of propaganda of the ISIS is considerably better than that of the "Imarat." Besides, the epoch of bright, charismatic leaders on which the "Imarat" relied has now ended never to return. Today, any member of an armed group can become a leader, and this is due to the coming to the region of the ISIS which does not stake on bright charismatic figures. It is quite possible that the armed groups of the North Caucasian fighters

have common leaders, but recently they have become more secretive and conceal their real names. The “Imarat” members may spread all over Russia, having preserved their connections, which is rather dangerous for the country where there is no strict control over the movement of its citizens.

In any case, with the emergence and strengthening of the ISIS positions in the North Caucasus, the command of the special forces of the Russian Federation is now faced with a qualitatively different enemy. On the one hand, there has been a big outflow of members of the Islamist underground to Syria and Iraq, and the Russian special forces tried to do everything possible to bar their re-entry to the Russian Federation and make them stay in the Middle East. On the other hand, the ISIS is using a completely different tactic and their acts of terror are more unpredictable and even “old-fashioned.” Apart from “traditional” explosions, shootings, and hostage taking, they now use car accidents among a big crowd of people, as were the cases in Nice (2015), London (2017) and Stockholm (2017). In Russia the ISIS took responsibility on itself for shooting at people in Derbent (2015), where one man was killed and 11 were wounded³², an attack on policemen near Moscow, when two men were wounded (2016)³³, an attack on policemen in Nizhny Novgorod where two people were wounded (2016)³⁴, an attack on a military unit of the Russian Guard in Chechnya with six men dead³⁵, an attack on policemen and guardsmen in Astrakhan where two men were killed (2017).³⁶

It is still unconfirmed whether militants of the ISIS took part in the terrorist act in St. Petersburg’s Metro on April 3, 2017, in which 15 people lost their life and several dozen were wounded. It was perpetrated by the suicide-bomber Akborjon Jalilov of Uzbek-Kyrgyz origin, who had a passport of Russian citizen. On April 5, 2017, eight ISIS recruiters were arrested in St. Petersburg – citizens of Central Asian republics.³⁷ On April 6, 2017, six men in St. Petersburg and two in Moscow were arrested – all of them were of Central Asian origin.³⁸ Their places of

residence were full of fire arms, explosives, and extremist and propaganda material of the ISIS. The ISIS leadership praised the men who prepared and carried out these terrorist acts, but did not take responsibility for them on itself.³⁹

An ever greater danger, especially for Russian young people, is presented by the ideological influence of the ISIS propaganda. It should be admitted that at present there is a well-organized and well-hidden network of recruiters effectively working in the North Caucasus. They are actively using the Internet, especially social networks and messengers, such as WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, etc. in their activity.⁴⁰

Recruiters carry on monitoring work among people, preferably those being in a spiritual quest, as to their trade or profession, preference is given to medical and oil workers. The former are needed for helping the wounded fighters, and also for transplanting human organs and their subsequent sale abroad. This is one of the financial sources of the revenue section of the ISIS budget, along with the sale of Syrian and Iraqi oil.⁴¹

This article shows that the continuing activity of the Islamist organizations in the North Caucasus is fraught with new risks and threats to the security of Russia and should not be taken off the agenda. Despite certain successes of the Russian special forces, it requires still greater efforts. It would be wrong to suppose that the Wahhabis will give up their specific socio-political activity not only in the North Caucasus, but also in other regions of the Russian Federation.

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2017.04.004. ASLANBEK ADIYEV, ELENA SHCHERBINA. DAGHESTAN AND KARACHAYEVO-CIRCASSIA: SETTLEMENT PROBLEMS OF ETHNIC COMPOSITION IN POWER BODIES OF POLY-ETHNIC REGIONS // "Vlast," Moscow, 2017, № 2, P. 59–63.

Keywords: informal ethnic representation, poly-ethnic region, state nationalities policy.

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The Republic of Daghestan (RD) and the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic (KCR) are the most multinational parts of the Russian Federation. Their experience in maintaining ethnopolitical stability is largely connected with the balanced political representation of ethnic groups living on their territory in the state and local power bodies.

The main ethnic groups living in KCR are the Abazins, Karachais, Nogais, Russians and Circassians. They account for 95.5 percent of the population of the region, according to the results of the All-Russia population census of 2010. In 1996 the KCR Constitution proclaimed the subject-forming status of these peoples whose languages were recognized as the national languages in the republic, and the leading composition of the government and parliament of the republic is formed with due account of national representation. Thus, the constitutional model of the formation and functioning of the state power bodies is based on the principle of political representation of ethnic groups.

The present system fixed the key posts in KCR as follows: the head of the KCR – Karachai by nationality, the chairman of the government – Circassian, the chairman of the National Assembly – Russian. The republican government and parliament consist of members representing the ethnic groups living in the republic, and the republican leadership and public closely watch observance of the proportionate representation of these groups in the KCR bodies of power. The informal ethnic representation takes place not only in the bodies of state power, but also in local power bodies. Thus, at the head of rural municipal districts of KCR stand representatives of the ethnic majority living there. Of the ten districts of the KCR the municipalities are headed by four Karachais, two Russians, two Circassians, one Abazin, and one Nogai.

The observance of the principles of informal ethnic representation in the bodies of power has always been under strict control of national public organizations which have initiated the problem of ethnic representation in power bodies from their very inception, and the positions of public activists have largely been determined by the numerical strength of ethnic groups. The Karachais and Russians due to their greater number as compared to other KCR people maintained that the proportionality principle should be the foundation of ethnic representation. Smaller ethnic groups – Circassian, Abazins and Nogais – insisted on the principles of parity representation in power and alternate leadership of the republic by representatives of five-subject-forming ethnic groups of the KCR, and also on the constitutional warrant of this rule. The active struggle of the leaders of national public organizations for greater representation of their people in the republican bodies of power is also motivated by the fact that each people's statehood is largely guaranteed by their representation in the state power bodies of the KCR.

In the poly-ethnic Karachayevo-Circassian Republic, from its very inception, the state structure model has been based on the

proportionate informal ethnic representation, which ensures a political balance among the five subject-forming peoples of the region. This model is a result of a private social contract aimed at ensuring ethnopolitical stability in the region, which is periodically violated due to differences between political appointments and the system of informal ethnic representation in the KCR.

An example of the informal institutionalization of the distribution of important posts by the ethnic principle is demonstrated by the Republic of Daghestan, where 14 so-called titular ethnic groups have been included in the quota share system (Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezghins, Russians, Lakhs, Tabasaran, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, Aguls, Nogais, Rutuls, Tsakhurs and Tats). Prior to the first elections to the People's Assembly (parliament) of Daghestan in 1991 elections took place to urban councils of deputies. At that time, before the problem of national representation was regulated, it was mainly representatives of the ethnic majority who lived there that were elected to the local bodies of power. A wave of indignation swept the republic and national movements came into being. In 1995 new regional laws were evolved, new regional political institutions and bodies of power formed, such as the State Council of Daghestan. In 1995 during the first elections to the regional parliament the ethnic principle of quota share established by law was used. The electoral reform of 2003 introduced the use of the proportionate principle at elections in parts of the Russian Federation, Daghestan included. However, the old quota share practice of distributing posts by the ethnic principle continues. By tradition the post of the head of a part of the territory is taken by a representative of one of the most numerical Daghestani nations (Avar or Dargin). Not a single leading post in Daghestan is taken by a representative of any concrete ethnic group. But the distribution of important positions is made on the ethnic principle depending on the nationality of a person holding the post of the head of a given region.

For example, if he is Avar, the post of the speaker of parliament will be taken by either a Dargin or Kumyk, but not an Avar.

Ethnic representation at the state power bodies in the poly-ethnic regions of the Russian Caucasus can be regarded as an informal political institution. This principle is recognized by the Federal Center, because it is believed that such practice ensures socio-political stability in poly-ethnic republics. It is a regional political tradition, informal political institution and a factor of politicization of the nationalities problem. Observance of this balance is controlled by society and the authorities. At the same time, as the experts note, this system of political representation of ethnic groups is not perfect, there are many shortcomings in it, for instance, in the distribution of important posts between the ethnic segments of multinational communities.

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EMMA ASATRYAN. INTERSTATE CONFLICTS IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION // *The article was specially written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Interstate conflicts, water and energy resources, interethnic conflict.

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Annotation: The article refers to the interstate conflicts in the Central Asian region. This topic has taken the attention of orientalists, political scientists, experts in the field of conflictology of various countries for many years. Two main interstate conflicts in the region are discussed in the article: the ethnic conflict in Osh region and disputes over water and energy resources between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The author pays special

attention to the analysis of scientific literature on this issue. At present, the urgency of this issue for the Central Asian countries is caused by growing tension in international relations, as well as the likely worsening of the conflict up to the possibility of a military confrontation.

At the moment, two major interstate conflicts can be observed in the Central Asian region: the ethnic conflict in the Fergana Valley in the Osh region and the struggle for water and energy resources in this region. These conflicts are a threat to the security of states in this region.

Many political scientists are engaged in this problem in Russia. One of them, PhD (political) Boyarkina O.A. writes in her monograph "Problems of the settlement of international conflicts in the field of water use" that the settlement of water conflicts is due to the regime of joint water use in the Central Asian region (CAR). And the security of the southern borders of Russia on the issue of CAR depends on the political situation in the border areas.

Regulation of these issues is due to such official documents as the Water Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, No. 1235-r, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on August 27, 2009. The author also writes that today the problem of availability of water resources becomes an important factor of modern international relations. The author notes that international and interstate conflicts often become conflicts of interest. In this case, it is a conflict over water resources. Despite the long-term struggle for water, scientists have not found a rational solution to this conflict still. And, nevertheless, O.A. Boyarkina does not provide clear information in her monograph on the conflict over water resources to date. In this regard, it should be noted that the conflict between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has worsened over the past two years. The climate in this region has changed dramatically - it has become more arid in the past five years. There is a drought and a decrease in water resources due to sharp

cooling and warming in some regions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which was repeatedly mentioned in the UN report on water conflicts in the world (2014). The authorities of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan can not come to an agreement, rather than unite and find a solution to this problem. For example, Uzbekistan opposes the construction of the Rogun hydropower station by Tajikistan. And the authorities have a sharp reason for this – this project is being implemented in the seismically dangerous zone and will cause great damage to the Aral Sea.

Uzbekistan also supports the coordination of actions to implement this project between all bordering countries. Tajikistan should not control the inflows of rivers alone, but all the countries of the region as a whole.

The conflict over energy resources arises against the backdrop of this problem between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. At the moment, Tajikistan is in energy dependence on Uzbekistan and therefore seeks to implement the Rogun hydroelectric project as soon as possible. Thus, Tajikistan will have its own energy industry, and will not depend on Uzbekistan. Independent observer of the countries of the Commonwealth of the Eurasia Heritage Foundation I. Kirsanov writes that the water deficit will cost Uzbekistan \$ 600 million in annual losses only in agriculture because of the construction of the Rogun HPP. Therefore, Uzbekistan does not support this project. I. Kirsanov emphasizes that basically Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan suffer because of lack of water resources, as the most important sources of fresh water of the Amudarya and Syrdarya Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are controlled. For example, Uzbekistan depends on the flow of water to its regions. The flow of the Amu Darya to Uzbekistan accounts for 8% of the total runoff to other countries in the region (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan), as can be seen from the UN report on water conflicts in the world.

Another important component of the inter-state conflicts in the Central Asian region is the ethnic conflict in Osh. Many analyst analysts analyzed this issue. For example, experts

Shibutov M.M. and Solozobov Yu.M. published an article in the Sulakshin Center (Center for Scientific Political Thought and Ideology) in May 2016 on conflicts in the Central Asian region. They write that the main causes of interstate conflicts are not only ethnic disputes, but also border territories. Territories in the Ferghana Valley are extremely important for Uzbekistan and other countries of the region. The Fergana Valley becomes a springboard for various terrorist groups and for the development of drug trafficking because of poor security. Not only Russian, but also foreign analysts adhere to this opinion. For example, in 2012, experts from Foreign Policy magazine called the conflict in the Ferghana Valley a threat to the world order in Eurasia. They believed that by 2014 destabilization in this region will intensify not because of ethnic strife between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, but the economy and the desire to gain material benefits and profits from transboundary territories in the Ferghana Valley would be the main reason.

Andrei Grozin, head of the department of Kazakhstan and Central Asia at the CIS Institute, points out that the conflict in the Ferghana Valley can become aggravated at any moment, since it has a permanent character of development and the situation in this area will not be resolved in a favorable direction in the near future. Experts emphasize that the security situation has not changed much since 1990–2016. There are often clashes between Uzbeks and Kirghiz in the border areas in the Osh region, the Sokh enclave, in Batken and Jalal-Abad. The urgency of this problem is that these contradictions arise not because of interethnic, but economic disagreements.

For example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can not agree on the construction of a railway in Kyrgyzstan for several years, since the Isfahan and Batken areas are disputed territories for these two countries. According to Russian experts in these areas, roads should not be built. But the U.S. analysts believe that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should declare these territories neutral for the construction of the railway and obtain material benefits

from this project. The urgency of the problem is that it has not been studied thoroughly, and at the moment there is no solution to it. These large and influential UN departments like the UNDP tried to find a way out of the situation, but this problem was not solved because the situation in this region was not sufficiently studied by the UN Department.

At the moment, conflicts in this region can also arise because of the following factors, according to the information and analytical center "The Laboratory of Social and Political Development of the Neighboring Countries": poverty, unemployment, the problems of ecology and overpopulation. These and other socio-economic reasons can become a factor in the development of a new conflict situation in the Fergana Valley. You can also see the following when analyzing these sources: world powers – China, India, the United States and Russia – will influence security and conflict resolution in the Fergana Valley. Each of these countries has its geopolitical interests in Central Asia, but they all have different, sometimes diametrically opposed ones. One state may be interested in the development of the conflict in the region, and the other – directly in the settlement of this. Although it can also be assumed that every state in the region has a number of its internal problems, because of which it will not provoke new conflicts in this area.

Thus, it is possible to come to the following conclusions, analyzing the sources on this issue:

- the degree of study of the problem of interstate conflicts in Central Asia is still low, which causes misunderstanding between the states of the region and the underestimation of events.

- Thus, it is possible to come to the following conclusions, analyzing the sources on this issue;

- the conflict over water and energy resources in Central Asia has worsened. Water resources in this region are getting depleted faster and faster, but political elites in Central Asia can not take coordinated actions to solve this problem.

- Although the conflict in the Ferghana Valley has many causes, but its main reason - inter-ethnic strife - is receding into the background at the moment. The main factor in the development of the conflict situation is the desire of the leadership of the countries of this region to obtain economic benefits from various projects in the border areas. The political elite of independent republics is not inclined to cooperate and resolve the conflict.

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AZIZ NIYAZI. RUSSIA – CENTRAL ASIA IN ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS // *The article was specially written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: exploitation of nature, depletion of ecosystems, quality of life, environmental protection, distribution of water, land and energy resources.

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There is a limit to the functioning of the economy due to the increasing exploitation of nature. This axiom is obvious under current technologies. Depletion of ecosystems with intensive consumption of resources causes serious disruptions in the life of societies. Many socio-economic models, whether developed or developing countries, are beginning to lose their prospects for

development.¹ Moreover, it is a question of the physical and mental health of people and, in the end, of uncontrolled natural and climatic megalogs that are capable of inflicting enormous damage to mankind in several decades.

Concern about this situation is growing all over the world, including Russia. 2017 is declared as the “Year of Ecology” in our country, and the environmental direction is designated as a priority in the “Strategy for Scientific and Technological Development of Russia,” approved in 2016.² At a meeting of the State Council on the issue “On the environmental development of the Russian Federation in the interests of future generations” on December 27, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted specifically that Russia's transition to a sustainable development model in stages means a transition to an environmentally sustainable development model. The development of the economy with an emphasis on resolving environmental issues, increasing its effectiveness in general, and at the same time improving the quality of life of Russians, revealing the potential of the regions – this is the essence of the matter.

The head of state stressed that long-term work is to be done – for 20, 30 years or more, but it is impossible to postpone large-scale measures in this direction already, and not to solve strategic tasks, referring to insufficient funds. If we go further in half-measures, referring to more important tasks, then the emissions of pollutants and greenhouse gases will reach a critical limit by 2050, and therefore an unfit living environment will be left to future generations.³ The report specifically noted that the annual economic damage reaches 6 percent of GDP, and taking into account the health effects of people – and up to 15% due to environmental degradation in Russia. Our country has great resource potential, acts as an environmental donor of the world, providing it with almost 10 percent of biosphere stability. Therefore, we have a great responsibility for preserving the planet.

The realization of such a difficult situation and the setting of specific tasks in the field of environmental protection at the highest level of the Russian leadership take place for the first time in the entire post-Soviet period. It is important that the conceptual and practical development of the model of sustainable development of Russia is conducted at a qualified academic level. The strategic goal of achieving a drastic reduction in the emission of harmful substances into the atmosphere is placed first of all, their discharges into reservoirs and into the soil, primarily through the technological re-equipment of industry, the introduction of the best available technologies.

There are reasons to believe that Russia will become an attractive scientific and technical center for the sustainable development of Central Eurasia, with the tendency of strengthening the integration processes that rally most of the former Soviet countries around common political and economic goals, it will give impetus to overcoming the most serious socioeconomic, environmental and cultural problems in The Central Asian region, which seems to have approached the critical limits of growth. There is already a lack of local natural capacity to maintain the life support systems existing there. Attempts to revive the industrialization of industry and agriculture, often with the use of obsolete technologies, moreover, in conditions of declining natural reserves and high demographic indicators, undermine the very basis for further progressive development.

If large numbers of the population had the opportunity to develop new living spaces of the region before, now there is almost no such chance. Unemployment and low incomes force millions of working people to earn a living outside the countries of their permanent residence, mainly in Russia. Related problems contain a serious charge of conflict and are still very far from solution.

The reasons for the internal potential for instability in Central Asia lie not so much in authoritarian types of

government and archaization of social relations as in illiterate management, exacerbating the socio-economic, environmental and political situation within the countries of the region, generating serious tension between them in the distribution of water, land and energy resources.

It can be judged from the data of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, how difficult the environmental situation in Russia is and how troubling in Central Asia. In 2016, the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Police presented the next report on the results of a survey of 180 countries around the world in terms of environmental performance (The Environmental Performance Index, 2016).⁴ The reports on the indexes of environmental efficiency (EPI) are published every two years. The EPI is improving from year to year and in the present time it enables politicians, scientists and the public to have more accurate information about environmental change at the national, regional and global levels. Its parameters reflect the state of health of the population under the influence of environmental factors, the viability of ecological systems, the conservation of biological diversity, the counteraction to climate change, the practice of economic activity and the degree of its environmental burden, and the effectiveness of public policy in the field of ecology.⁵

The Environmental Performance Index is presented in a report for 2016, ranking the countries on their environmental achievements over the past decade. EPI shows, in which countries the ecological situation improves over time, and in which, on the contrary, it deteriorates, provides an opportunity to compare the current efficiency with the past.

According to the latest research results, Finland has the most effective policy in the field of the environment. Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, Slovenia, Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Malta and France also entered the top ten leaders. The most powerful economic country - the US - is ranked 26th out of 180 countries. The list is closed by dozens of poor countries with unstable

political regimes, many of which continue armed conflicts. Russia occupies a good 32nd place – between Azerbaijan and Bulgaria. The situation in the countries of Central Asia is alarming, demonstrates a weak policy to protect the environment and health of citizens, long-term stagnation in these areas, and sometimes environmental degradation in a number of parameters. Kazakhstan occupies the 69th place in the rating, Kyrgyzstan – 71st, Tajikistan – 72nd, Turkmenistan – 84. The worst position is in Uzbekistan – 118th place. It is located between Senegal (117th place) and Libya (119th place). The ruined Iraq, which is in the process of war, also stands above it – 116th place. Moreover, the overall environmental situation in the Republic of Uzbekistan has deteriorated noticeably over the decade – more than 4%, and has slightly deteriorated in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – by less than 1%.

Table 16

Rating	Country	Index, total score of 100%	Changes in 10 years
32	Russia	83.52	2.33%
69	Kazakhstan	73.29	2.63%
71	Kyrgyzstan	73.13	2.97%
72	Tajikistan	73.05	-0.29%
84	Turkmenistan	70.24	-0.71%
118	Uzbekistan	63.67	-4.26%

Researchers are inclined to link a good overall rating of Russia not so much with comprehensive large-scale environmental measures, as with the economic recession of recent years. Extensive areas of the country that are not subject to intensive anthropogenic impact, as well as steps to protect the projects of a number of large companies and corporations, should also be taken into account. More detailed data on the expanded indicators of the EPI show that the Russian Federation occupies: 72nd place in air quality according to the rating from 180 countries, 74th – on water supply and sanitation; there has been progress in these areas. Russia stands on the 44th place in the

state of agriculture; there was a slight regression, and 67th place – due to the condition of forests, no change in forestry in a decade. The indicators were improved by fishing – 36th place. There was no change in the climate and energy indicators – 31st place. There was no change in water resources – a good 24th place, but the decrease is observed in terms of biodiversity and habitat – about 1.55%, and here Russia is at 113 unenviable place in this rating.

The countries of Central Asia lag behind Russia in their ratings significantly. Special climatic and natural conditions of the region should be taken into account. These states are united by a complex of interrelated environmental problems – depletion of water and land resources, increasing anthropogenic impact on the environment, accelerated demographic growth in the reduction of natural resources, desertification, soil erosion and salinization, the use of obsolete dirty technologies in industry and land improvement, depletion and pollution of transnational waterways, accelerated melting of glaciers and much more.

The situation is unfavorable, to a greater or lesser extent, with air quality, water resources, in agriculture, with water supply and sanitation, biodiversity and habitat conservation according to the extended EPI indicators for CA countries.⁷

Accordingly, it is necessary to solve fundamental ecological problems on the way of mutual integration of Russia and the Central Asian states, otherwise fruitful cooperation on the sustainable development of Central Eurasia is impossible. If efforts in this direction are not unified in the near future, then a noticeable deterioration in the quality of life of the population, aggravation of interstate and internal conflicts in the struggle for water, land and energy resources are possible. Most likely there will be a serious problem of massive internal and external environmental migration.

Notes

- 1 See: I.Kirshin. *Ekologicheskie ogranicheniya sovremennogo ekonomicheskogo rosta* [Ecological limitations of modern economic growth // Problems of forecasting] // *Problemy prognozirovaniya*. No. 3 (144). 2014. P. 86–95.
- 2 *O Strategii nauchno-tehnologicheskogo razvitiya Rossijskoj Federacii* [On the Strategy of Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation] <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/420384257> (Date of reference: 26.01.2017.)
- 3 *Zasedanie Gosudarstvennogo soveta po voprosu ob ekologicheskom razvitiu Rossijskoj Federacii v interesah budushchih pokolenij*. [Meeting of the State Council on the issue of environmental development of the Russian Federation for the benefit of future generations]. December 27, 2016. <http://kremlin.ru/catalog/keywords/89/events/53602>(Date of reference: 01.16.2017.)
- 4 *Global Metrics for the Environment. The Environmental Performance Index* (ranks countries' performance on high-priority environmental issues). 2016 report. Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy; Yale University Yale Data Driven Environmental Group, Yale University Yale-NUS College; Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University. In collaboration with the World Economic Forum. With support from the Samuel Family Foundation, McCall MacBain Foundation. New Haven, CT: Yale University. 2016. The report is available at: http://epi.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2016EPI_Full_Report_opt.pdf
- 5 IEE indicators for 2016 are calculated in two large groups: environmental health (protecting people's health from adverse environmental factors caused by human activities) and the viability of ecosystems (protecting ecosystems and using resources). These two tasks are divided into nine priority categories of environmental policy, such as: air quality, agriculture, forests, biodiversity, water resources, fish stocks, climate and energy, health effects (comprehensive assessment of health risks from five risk factors : unsafe water, poor sanitation, air pollution by solid particles, air pollution in domestic conditions with solid fuels and pollution of the ozone layer of the atmosphere). These 9 categories combine mainly 19 indicators, calculated from the data for each country. In some cases, there are more than 20. For each indicator, the country receives points. Their number depends on the state's position within the range set by the worst country for this indicator (relative zero on a one-hundred-point scale) and the desired goal (the equivalent of one hundred points). The desired goal is established on the basis of international treaties; standards defined by international organizations; professional conclusion, reflecting scientific consensus, other sources.

- ⁶ Table is based on: 2016 Environmental Performance Index. New Haven, CT: Yale University. Executive Summary. Regional Trends and Results.2016 P. 113-114. More detailed information on the extended indicators is available at the following e-mail address: http://epi.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2016EPI_Full_Report_opt.pdf (Date of reference 02.03.2017.)
- ⁷ Detailed extended indicators with their description are presented on the example of Uzbekistan. See: A.Sh. Niyazi. Uzbekistan v mezhdunarodnom ekologicheskom izmerenii: mezhdu Senegalom i Liviej [Uzbekistan in the international environmental dimension: between Senegal and Libya]. <http://central-eurasia.com>

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2017.04.005. SERGEY IVANOV. ARMED CONFLICTS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: PROSPECTS FOR THEIR SOLUTION // *“Obozrevatel – Observer,” Moscow, 2017, No 3, P. 14–24.*

Keywords: Syria, Iraq, armed conflict, Kurds, Islamists, Sunnites, Alawites, ISIS.

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By the beginning of 2017 Syria and Iraq remain in the throes of prolonged civil wars, which have assumed the clearly confessional character. In Syria the ruling Arab-Alawite minority (close to the Shia trend of Islam) has been at war with the Arab Sunnite armed opposition since 2011, and in Iraq the ruling Arab Shia majority provoked an uprising of the Arab Sunnite minority by harsh reprisals at the end of 2013. Tens of thousands of Sunnite Arabs closely connected with the ruling Baathist regime, Christians and representatives of other ethnic and religious minorities are on the side of Damascus. Taking advantage of the weakening of the central authorities in Syria and Iraq the radical Islamist groupings in the region have stepped up their activities. The most militant of them are ISIS, “Jabhat an-Nusra” and Muslim Brotherhood.” The jihadists established their control over vast areas of these two countries and several big cities (Mosul,

Rakka) and even to create their own “pseudo-state” – Islamic caliphate. Both countries are distinguished by the fact that the Kurdish minorities living there adhere to neutrality in inter-Arab wars (10–12 percent of the Syrian population and 15–17 percent of the Iraqi population). Moreover, the Kurdish minutemen rebuffed all attacks of the militant Islamists and played an important role in the stabilization of the situation in the region.

Nevertheless, a bitter struggle for power, territories and resources in Syria and Iraq continues. Initially, foreign forces took an active part in these armed conflicts. Men and officers of the Corps of the warriors of the Islamic revolution of Iran, militants of the Lebanese military-political grouping “Hezbollah,” Shia volunteers from Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan are taking part in the hostilities in Syria. The numerical strength of the foreign fighters can be compared with that of the Syrian armed forces (up to 80,000 men). The armed Sunnite opposition and bands of Islamists were supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Sunnite Arabs of Lebanon.

Iran and the international coalition headed by the United States support Baghdad, and the Iraqi Sunnite Arabs and Islamists are supported by the Persian Gulf monarchies and Turkey. By the end of 2016 Russia succeeded to persuade Turkey to stop its aid to the jihadists in Syria and Iraq and join the common struggle against terrorism in the region. Although Turkey regards B. Asad and the Kurdish Syrian party of Democratic Union as terrorists, formally Turkey has joined the common front of the fight against radical Islamist groupings. But there are no grounds to exclude support of the Islamists in Syria and Iraq by the Turkish special forces and non-governmental organizations. The ruling Turkish Party of Justice and Development and Turkish Islamists groupings are ideologically close to the extremists Sunnite trends of Islam (Salaphite and Wahhabite).

The ceasefire agreement between the Syrian government and the armed opposition reached due to mediation of Russia,

Turkey and Iran, which went into force on December 30, 2016, was a turning point in the situation in Syria. Although this agreement does not cover the territories controlled by the ISIS militants and "Jabhat an-Nusra," fighting has stopped, in the main, and a greater part of Syrians, who have been hiding in shelters for several years, were able to emerge in the open and tackle certain problems of the humanitarian nature. Ankara and Tehran, along with Moscow, mediated in Syrian negotiations in January-February 2017 in Astana and Geneva. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and representatives of the foreign and domestic Syrian opposition oriented to them remain outside the negotiation process so far, and this may lead to failure of peace negotiations and the use of ceasefire for regrouping and redeploying armed units of the opposition and more deliveries of more arms and ammunition to them. Besides, representatives of Turkey and Saudi Arabia during the ceasefire may enter into a deal with the jihadists for expanding the territories controlled by the opposition through voluntary redeployment of the ISIS and "Jabhat an-Nusra" units, or join with part of their militants the ranks of the "moderate opposition." Ankara wishes to expand the Syrian districts controlled by it and prevent their return under control of Damascus.

The numerical strength of the Syrian army by the beginning of the armed conflict reached 320,000 men and officers, and by now there are not more than 80,000. As a result, it is difficult for the Syrian armed forces to wage offensive operations and keep liberated territories under control. This is why Russia's help to Syria is so important for its fight against terrorist groupings, fighters of the Lebanese Shia grouping "Hezbollah," Iranian "Islamic revolution warriors," and volunteer Shia units from Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. After ceasefire came into force, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and some other Arab states continue to help the Islamist militants openly along the line of special services, non-governmental organizations and Wahhabi foundations.

The Kurdish ethnic minority holds a special place in the Syrian conflict. Prior to the Civil war in Syria there were up to three million of them in the country, living mostly in its border districts with Turkey. By 2012 the government forces and official bodies were forced to leave the Kurdish districts; the Kurdish local authorities had to set up their own self-defense forces to rebuff the Islamists' attacks. With the help of their fellow-compatriots in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, and with support of the U.S. airforce the Syrian Kurds were able to contain the onslaught of the Islamists and then to liberate practically all districts of their compact living. They established control over districts situated up to 900 kilometers from the Syrian-Turkish border. By the beginning of 2016 they proclaimed the creation of an autonomous (federative) district in the north of Syria under the name of "Rojawa" (Western Kurdistan). The Syrian Kurds would like to be the third party in the peace negotiations on settling the conflict in Syria. However, neither the Asad government nor the opposition leaders wish to see a Kurdish delegation at the negotiation table. Nationalist ideas continue to prevail in the minds of the leaders of the Arab majority in Syria.

The radical Islamists adhere to much harsher positions: they are waging war for the destruction of all ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslim-Kurds and Ezdi Kurds. The governments of Iran and Turkey also come out against any form of the autonomy of the Syrian Kurds, fearing a flare-up of the Kurdish national-liberation movement in their Kurdish enclaves.

Against the backdrop of the dramatic events in Syria Iraq remained in the background for quite some time, and came to the fore again only after the beginning of a major military operations to liberate the country's second big city - Mosul, known for its rich oil deposits and water resources (the Tigris River) from the ISIS terrorists. This city in the north of Iraq was for two years under control of the jihadists, who proclaimed their quasi-state "Islamic Caliphate" on the captured territories of Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi government and its allies in Tehran and Washington

have prepared the operation for the liberation of Mosul for quite a long time, however, its start has been postponed several times due to the absence of unity among the internal and external forces interested in driving the Islamists away from the region.

It was only by the middle of October 2016 that Baghdad succeeded, with the help of Iranian and American military instructors, to gather a unit of land forces of about 40,000 men and officers backed by the Shia military-political groupings "Hashd ash-Shaabi" and "Badr Brigade" (in all, up to 8,000 men). These units were supported by Iranian "warriors of Islamic revolution" and army special forces. Another contingent operating at the approaches to Mosul and numbering up to 20,000 men was the Kurdish "Peshmerga" brigade. Its units liberated dozens of populated settlements and took hills to the north and east of the city. In the "Peshmerga" ranks there were advisors, instructors of special services of the United States, as well as servicemen from some other western countries. The third participant in the onslaught on Mosul was a 5,000-men contingent of Sunnite Arabs and Turks trained by Turkish instructors some 12 miles from Mosul.

The external centers of force differed in their plans and intentions in Iraq. The radical Shia groupings of the country and Tehran demand from the Iraqi authorities that they should completely expel the Turkish military from the country. In its turn, Turkey insists on the removal of the units of Shia volunteers and Iranian servicemen from the military operation. The U.S. administration adheres to a wait-and-see neutral position in the Turkish-Iranian disputes, formally calling for the preservation of the balance of forces around Iraq, but in actual fact preferring interaction with its partners in NATO - the Turkish military. Washington has come to a conclusion that flirting with radical Islamists of the ISIS and "Jabhat an-Nusra" type harms the image of the United States in the world arena and the region. Offensive on Mosul was destined to start the beginning of the struggle of

Washington and its allies against the forces of world terrorism in the person of radical Islamist groupings.

For a long time the variant of a possible deal of the Turkish authorities or other mediators (Saudi Arabia, Qatar) with the ISIS leaders or even an attempt to bribe the latter in order to make the militant jihadists leave Mosul along special corridors left for them in the west to other districts of Iraq or Syria (the city of Rakka, Palmira and Deir-ez-Zor) has been examined. This variant could suit the United States and its allies, bolster up the positions of the central government in Baghdad, and at the same time brought more pressure to bear on the Asad regime in Syria.

Despite superiority in manpower, arms and air support the land forces attacking Mosul found it difficult to move forward. The battle for the city assumed a prolonged character and required more time to clear it from the ISIS forces. Eventually, much will depend on subsequent statements and actions of Baghdad and its ability to adopt decisions independently without diktat of Tehran or Washington.

The Shia civil war with Sunnites in Iraq can end only in case of a radical change of the internal and foreign policy of the Iraqi authorities. The creation of coalition bodies of the legislative and executive power of Iraq with the active drawing of Sunni Arabs, the latter's army service, work at government offices, special services, and the restoration of their positions in business could serve as a basis for stopping the prolonged interethnic and inter-Arab struggle in the country. Another condition of the normalization of the situation in Iraq is Baghdad's ability to establish relations with foreign allies of the Sunni Arabs: Ankara, Riyadh, Doha, Amman, etc.

If Baghdad cannot distance itself from Tehran and become equally distant from the radical centers of force, the civil war in the country may continue even after the liberation of the territories occupied by the jihadists. Moreover, the disintegration of the Arab part of Iraq into two enclaves is possible: Shiastan (the South and center) and Sunnistan (North-west). Iraq may turn

into a springboard of an armed confrontation between Iran and the Persian Gulf monarchies.

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Keywords: Yemen, Sunnites, Shia'ites, intra-religious conflict.

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Yemen is a country where numerous Shia and Sunna tribes have lived close by for centuries. Despite ideological and religious differences, their mutual contradictions were not acute. Throughout the 20th century the country, which was a feudal monarchy for a long time was drawn into a whirlwind of political changes. In 1962, as a result of a revolution the Zeida (trend of Shia Islam) monarchy was overthrown and the country became the Yemeni Arab Republic under the Sunnite rule. The Shia minority was pushed into the background. But after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 the successes of the Shi'ites in the political arena of the Middle East in restoring their socio-political rights pushed the Yemeni Shi'ites to greater activity in promoting their rights.

As far as the state structure of Yemen was concerned, there were changes in the last decades of the 20th century: in 1967 South Yemen, which was a British protectorate, received independence and proclaimed the People's Democratic Republic

of Yemen adhering to prosocialist orientation. After two decades of hostile relations the Yemeni Arab Republic and the new Democratic Republic of Yemen united in the single Republic of Yemen. During that period the "Al-Qaeda" organization turned its attention to Yemen. However, the country was regarded not as an object for establishing its power, but as a springboard and base for arranging subversive and terrorist acts with a view to destabilizing the situation in Saudi Arabia and undermining American interests in the zone of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and East Africa. Under outside pressure the Yemeni Islamists were defeated in 2003, but Islamic radicals managed to introduce quite a few of their supporters in the government and special forces. Using the inability of state power and President Ali Abdallah Saleh to control the greater part of the country's territory the "Al-Qaeda" penetrated deeper and deeper in Yemeni society. Field commanders representing the interests of various Sunna groupings seized power in the south. The main threat to stability in Yemeni society comes from local tribes who have complex relations with one another. The Salaphites from "Ansar-ash-Sharia" are a supra-clan structure and take part in resolving various conflicts between tribes. In other words, the war in Yemen took the form of inter-religious conflict with the interference of Sunna and Shia political forces from the outside, which resulted in the growing influence of radical Islamist organizations from both sides - Sunnites and Shi'ites.

As for the latter, who live in the north and west of the country, they also came out against the government of President Ali Abdallah Saleh in Sanaa, his corrupt government and their close ties with the United States. Their representatives demanded the autonomy of the region. Hussein Al-Husi became the leader of the uprising (he was killed in 2004) and set up the radical Islamist organization "Ansar Allah" in 1994. In 2009 the movement, which he headed, stepped up its activity and raided a Saudi border village where they killed two border guards.

In reply Saudi Arabia began its interference in the Yemeni inter-religious conflict.

In January 2011 mass demonstrations began in Yemen demanding the resignation of President Saleh and social reforms. In reply he promised certain concessions, curtailed his terms of office to two in succession, and refused to take part in the forthcoming elections. However, government reprisals began to grow and on March 18 fifty-two persons taking part in a demonstration in Sanaa were killed. Saleh introduced a state of emergency, but demonstrations and manifestations continued. Then it was announced that he was ready to resign, despite that he refused to sign the document agreed on by the conflicting sides. Manifestations were resumed and took place in the entire northern part of the country. On June 3 the presidential residence was fired on in Sanaa. Saleh himself, the prime minister and the speaker of parliament were wounded. Saleh fled the country and it was announced on his behalf that power was handed over to Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Yemen's vice president. However, in February 2012 political and religious struggle in the country continued. Hadi's government proved unable to carry out vitally important reforms for the next two years and the political and religious struggle continued unabated.

The internecine war continues for over five years between political and religious rivals, among them Sunnite and Shi'ite groupings, their supporters, and also tribal groups. Then country is actually split into three zones: the north and the west, including Sanaa, are under the Shi'ite grouping "Ansar Allah," the south and part of central territories are under control of the central government supported by people's volunteers, the loyal part of the Yemeni army and the Saudi coalition. The central part of the country with big cities and certain eastern districts are controlled by the ISIS, tribal volunteers and Salaphites from "Ansar-ash-Sharia." The fight between them all was going on with varied success, however the Shia Houthi rebel movement began to score success, having occupied the oil-bearing districts

and taken transport communications. They also captured the capital Sanaa with all government buildings, Central Bank and the arsenal. On January 20, 2015, having taken the residence of the Yemeni President, they forced Hadi to resign. In February he fled the country from the port of Aden. Then the Houthi rebels formed their central power body – the Revolutionary Committee and turned over all power to the Supreme political council.

Having realized that Saudi Arabia does not like the course of events in Yemen in favor of the Shi'ites and Iran, President Hadi fled to Riyadh and called on Arab states to organize a foreign military intervention in Yemen. A military coalition was formed consisting of Egypt, the U.S., Morocco, Sudan, Pakistan, Senegal and Jordan. Besides, certain states agreed to render partial assistance. After that Hadi returned to Aden and proclaimed it provisional residence of his government. Riyadh began to dictate its conditions to his cabinet. Thus, the international coalition ensured itself an official invitation to wage military operations on the territory of Yemen.

On March 26, 2015, the military operations of the international coalition against the Houthi Shi'ite insurgents began. Blows were dealt not only at military objects, but also at civilian ones in towns and villages – living quarters, schools, ports, and factories. Artillery, airforce and navy were used in these operations.

The United States supports Saudi Arabia and the forces connected with it in Yemen in order to fight the ISIS, Al-Qaeda and all anti-American forces in the region. It also opposes every opportunity of enlarging the influence of the Russian Federation in the Middle East. Washington constantly increases arms deliveries to Riyadh.

The military impasse which emerged by the end of 2015 in Yemen has not been overcome as yet, but strategic preponderance is gradually moving toward the Houthi Shi'ites and the ex-president Saleh. During the first six months of 2017 the military situation changed but very little, although on March 9

the government forces of President Hadi moved closer to the capital Sanaa captured by the Houthi insurgents. Meanwhile, the number of victims and destroyed military and civilian objects in Yemen is constantly growing.

The researcher concludes by saying that the irreconcilable confrontation between the Sunnites and Shi'ites, with the participation of the international coalition headed by Saudi Arabia continues against the backdrop of almost futile negotiations. The pro-Saudi coalition does not wish to resolve the Yemeni conflict by peaceful means, hoping that its forces will be able to smash the Houthi Shi'ites. But this can happen only after prolonged bloody battles between the Arabian coalition, on the one hand, and the Houthi units and Saleh's armed forces, on the other.

Author of the abstract – Natalia Ginesina

2017.04.007. BAGRAT SEIRANYAN. THREE PILLARS OF GROWTH. (Introduction to book) // V. Isayev, A. Filonik. *Qatar: Three Pillars of Growth (socio-economic essay)*. Moscow, 2015, P. 5–8.

Keywords: Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Britain, U.S.A., Wahhabism, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani.

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At the beginning of this century Qatar was mentioned in articles and reports on the developments in the Middle East ever more frequently.

Meanwhile, in the mid-19th century Qatar was a God-forsaken territory fully dependent on Bahrain and an object of expansion and rivalry of the ruling Arabian families of Bu Said (Oman) and the second Saudi state, the Ottoman Empire and

Iran. The Saudis and Wahhabi ideology spread by them exerted the greatest spiritual influence on the Qatar population. But the leading role in the principalities of North-East Arabia was played by Britain.

By the beginning of World War I Britain fully controlled North-East Arabia. In 1916 the United Kingdom recognized Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani (1913–1949) as the ruler of Qatar and signed a treaty with him by which the ruler of Qatar could not enter in any agreements with foreign countries, except Britain, and the latter guaranteed the protection of his country from outside aggression.

The establishment and expansion of the “exclusive rights” of Britain in the Gulf countries led to the period of early modernization of the region at the turn of last century, which was due to two basic reasons. The first was the establishment of a relatively stable peace and political stability connected with a ban on intertribal conflicts, piracy, slave trade and slavery. And the second – the creation of objective conditions for the accumulation of material resources and organization of economic activity in the hands of able entrepreneurs. From the political point of view, the British contributed to the transformation of a traditional tribal sheikh into a national leader and the main symbol of power.

In the epoch of the early modernization the economy of Qatar was centered on fisheries, sea trade, oasis agriculture, traditional cattle breeding and handicrafts, but the main role in the economic and social spheres was played by the production of pearls, which provided a considerable share of the national income. A new stage in Qatar’s life was connected with the discovery of oil deposits by the “Petroleum Development of Qatar” (filial of the British “Petroleum Concession”) in 1939. But due to World War II the commercial mining of liquid hydrocarbons began only in 1949. During the 1950s – 1960s the oil incomes were growing very rapidly and stably, but the first dollar flows were appropriated by the ruling elites in the Gulf countries. Qatar’s oil prosperity and joining the world economic

system have led to a collapse of the traditional economy, transformation of foreign trade, and growth of import, while export was replaced by re-export. The flow of foreign commodities led to the ruin of the traditional social strata of the urban population and nomadic people, and the disintegration and polarization of Qatar society. Under the impact of the protest movement in the latter half of the 1960s considerable means began to be channeled to the development of the infrastructure and implementation of social projects.

On May 16, 1968, Britain announced its intention to withdraw its armed forces from the Persian Gulf zone before the end of 1971, renounce its protector rights, and grant political independence to the countries east of Suez. Following Bahrain, Qatar proclaimed its independence on September 3, 1971, and its ruler accepted the title of Emir.

The first temporary Constitution of Qatar, which determined the specific features of the structure of state power in the country, was adopted on April 2, 1970. According to the Constitution, the head of state and supreme executive power was the Emir from the Al Thani family, and all legislative and executive power was in his hands. He appointed the Council of ministers and Consultative council which had only deliberative functions. Nevertheless, even such consultative body limited in its rights consultative was an important step forward. The Constitution also guaranteed the basic democratic rights.

The ruling emir Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali bin Abdullah was not interested in state affairs. His cousin and actual co-ruler Sheikh Khalifa had all state power in his hands. He used the rejection of the emir to convene the Consultative Council as a pretext, and on February 22, 1972, with the support of the ruling family and the army, staged a coup when Sheikh Ahmad was on a visit to Europe. He overthrew Sheikh Ahmad and proclaimed himself Emir. With a view to easing the political tension in the country he convened the Consultative Council, which now received the right to discuss the budget and financial questions.

The system of drawing the state budget was put to order, and the incomes of the ruling family were separated from it. The Administration of monetary management and the Council on investments were set up. In connection with the growing oil incomes after 1973 and the organization of the national "Qatar General Petroleum Corporation" in 1974 oil extraction and incomes from it were placed under control of the state.

These and other measures have created favorable conditions for the implementation of effective economic, social and institutional transformations. Considerable means have been channeled to the sphere of social services, housing construction, health service and social welfare, which have brought qualitative changes in the life of the state and society. In May 1989, on the initiative of Crown Prince Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, the Supreme Council of planning was set up, whose task was to help diversify industry and agriculture. It had the task to reduce the country's dependence on the oil sector.

The Persian Gulf countries occupy a special place in Qatar's foreign policy. It concerns primarily the biggest and most influential country - Saudi Arabia, which is close to Qatar because of common official religion - Wahhabism. It also helps settle contradictions in territorial demarcation, which arise from time to time. Important influence on the political and ideological position of Qatar was exerted by the Iranian-Iraqi war of 1980-1988), the Kuwait crisis (1990-1991), American occupation of Iraq, and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

One of the important consequences of the Iranian-Iraqi war was the setting up of the Council of cooperation of Arab states of the Persian Gulf in May 1981. It envisages coordination, integration and cooperation of its member-countries in all spheres and, above all, in joining efforts for the strengthening of the defense capability of the region. Within the framework of the Council of cooperation Qatar rendered assistance to Iraq in the war with Iran, and the period of preparing and carrying on the war in Iraq in 1990 it offered its territory for the deployment of

the forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition, and in June 1992 Qatar agreed with the United States on the setting up of an American military base on the peninsula.

On June 27, 1995, the crown prince Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani who held the main levers of power and had support of the ruling family and people staged a bloodless coup and overthrew his father, who spent most of his time in Switzerland. Emir Hamad pursued an effective economic policy. In the first years of his staying in power he concentrated efforts on the stepped-up development of gas-exporting potential of the country, and drawing foreign investments to it. In a few years' time the emirate turned into one of the biggest exporters of gas in the world and became a member of the "big gas trio", along with Russia and Iran.

One can argue about the results of the economic policy of Emir Hamad, but two facts are worth mentioning. First, in 2013 Qatar held first place in the world in the per capita GDP. And secondly, the growth of the country's population, which numbered 5,000 in 1945, grew to 744,000 in 2004. According to official figures, of 33,800 public sector office employees, government officials and special service and army personnel) 66.3 percent were people of Qatar origin. Thus, the upper and middle sections of Qatar society consisted of indigenous people.

Among the emir's achievements in the social sphere mention should be made of important legislative acts, which made the rights of men and women equal, despite the fact that the country adhered to the Wahhabi trend of Islam.

After the endorsement of the new Constitution by a national referendum on April 29, 2003, its text was approved by the emir. According to Article 8 of the Constitution, the state is ruled by the Al Thani family and power is passed on to men of the family. Executive and legislative power belongs to the emir who is the head of state and is vested with wide powers. His person is immune and he is the head of executive power and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The 45 members of the

one-chamber parliament (Shura Council) have the right to wield legislative power, endorse the general policy of the government and the country's budget, control executive power and even send the government to retirement. Two-thirds of the Shura members are elected by direct universal and secret ballot, the rest are appointed by the emir. He has the right to turn down any law adopted by parliament and is bound to endorse it if it was adopted by the chamber for the second time. The emir appoints the crown prince after consultations with members of the ruling family and the Council of Sages of the state.

According to the Constitution of April 29, 2003, the people are the main subject and object of power. The Constitution guarantees them freedom of expression, religious tolerance, independent court procedure, and basic democratic rights. It allows the setting up of associations, but forbids the formation of political parties. All citizens of Qatar have the right to vote, including women aged 18 and older.

Soon after coming to power Emir Hamad expressed confidence that his country would remain stable and prosperous facing Islamic fundamentalism. The latest five years of the 20th century were marked by the dangerous stepping-up of the activity of the "Moslem Brotherhood" in all countries of the Persian Gulf. Each one of these monarchies has chosen its own way of fighting Islamic extremism. Emir Hamad preferred an original method taken from the arsenal of the diplomacy of tribal aristocracy. In 1999 he reached an agreement with the "Brotherhood" under which the latter's activity in Qatar was terminated. In exchange the emir promised to support the Association politically and financially in other countries. Another factor of Qatar's foreign policy is the operation of an American military base on its territory. Washington does not pay too close attention to the foreign policy of the emirate, which looks independent, but the last word in the key questions belongs to the latter.

One of the notable achievements of Sheikh Hamad and its main trump card was the popular Arab TV channel “Al Jazeera” founded in 1996. It succeeded in combining the professional western level of journalism with an analysis of conflicts reflecting different points of view in assessing current developments, freedom of expression, including critical remarks concerning the activity of certain regional governments. The support by the Qatar government of this TV channel and its refusal to impose censorship on its work have caused irritation and antagonism on the part of repressive regimes. As a result, the “Al Jazeera” has become a powerful ideological weapon and a means of exerting pressure to bear on the neighboring countries.

At the beginning of the 2010s certain negative trends in the policy of the Qatar emir became evident, stemming from his great ambitiousness and thirst for power and the desire to turn Doha into one of the main centers of the Greater Middle East, taking a place for itself between Egypt and the financial might of Saudi Arabia. The Qatar ruler has decided to use the “Arab spring,” which was largely financed by him, for he supported the Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and other countries. He decided to turn the traditional course of his country to support security to a dangerous rivalry for leadership between the heads of the Middle East countries. Such active participation in regional conflicts proved counterproductive and led to a serious exacerbation of Qatar’s relations with several influential countries of the region. Bagrat Sairanyan emphasizes that it is too early to give an assessment of such energetic activity of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa, which has definite ups and downs. He is an original and controversial figure in the Arab history of the late 20th – early 21st century. On June 25, 2013, the 61-year-old emir unexpectedly abdicated in favor of his 33-year-old son Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

The new monograph by V. Isayev and A. Filonik analyzes the economic changes, which occurred in Qatar during the reign

of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, concludes Bagrat Seiranyan.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2017.04.008. ANDREI FEDORCHENKO. FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION: PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION OF POWER IN ARABIAN MONARCHIES // *“Ezhegodnik IMI” Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 2015, № 1. P. 165–179.*

Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, UAE, monarchy, succession of power.

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There are absolute monarchies in three Arabian countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar), in Kuwait and Bahrain there is dualistic constitutional monarchy, in the UAE usually reckoned in constitutional monarchies there is a peculiar symbiosis of republic form of government and an absolute monarchy writes the author.

Arabian monarchies (excluding Bahrain) still stay out of Arab “thaw.” Authorities of these countries could preserve political and social stability based on combination of three factors. First, export revenues of hydrocarbons gave an opportunity to eliminate real and potential social protest hotbeds. Secondly, the regimes supported friendly relations with conservative religious sectors and leaders of tribal clans. Thirdly, national security was guaranteed for all Western countries primarily the USA.

In spite of risen opposition sentiments monarchs could retain support by popular majority of these countries. At the same time under apparent tranquility there are concealed, recently intensified internal and social contradictions, economic problems. For more or less effective response to challenges of the Arab spring Arabian monarchs will have to carry internal modernization in one form or another. Despite partial modernization of political systems in member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) during its existence this process is slow and has multispeed nature.

There is a burning issue of supreme power shift in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) which is concentrated in hands of 80-90 years old children of founder of the state and in Qatar and Oman it required search of successors for supreme rulers. Spiritless and incoherent modernization doesn't transform political elite.

Saudi state was initially built as an absolute theocratic monarchy. It's based on Salafi interpretation of Quranic creed – Wahhabism. In the system of public agencies distribution of authority is exercised between two centres of power- political and religious elite. Saudi dynasty represented by more than 5 thousand members of royal family, controls armed forces and security services, foreign policy system, economy. Religious sphere, ideology, proceeding refer to area of activity of Wahhabism founder descendant Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab- the Al ash-Sheikh and adherent to it theologians-Ulemas groups. At the same time leading role of the king in this system is obvious: as a head of the state he bears a title of the Malik (King) and Imam (spiritual leader) and inherited from the KSA founder title of "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques."

Reforms which took place in the early 90s involved constitution of framework legislation and introduction of new participants to policy making process. In Saudi Arabia reformation didn't bring any pivotal changes into traditional division of responsibilities between two centres of force –

political and religious elite. Development of the third pole of national policy so called educated class (representatives of universities, journalists, specialists in the field of technology and engineering) goes slowly and is controlled by the royal family. Partial modernization doesn't transform political elite itself.

In general Saudi society has never been monolithic. Controversies in the royal family gained momentum after death of the founder of the state king Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud in 1953. The total number of his descendants, who could inthroned, surpassed 300 people. The founder on the Kingdom left devise for his sons in which there was a principle of devolution from one son to another.

Internal conflicts affecting the interest of the ruling dynasty follow next lines: Saudis – are extrasystemic opposition in the name of radical Wahhabis, liberals (their views are shared with some members of the ruling family) – conservatives, Sunni authorities of the country – Shia community. Presence of opposition forces caused the need to strengthen reform efforts of the Saudi authorities especially after the beginning of the Arab spring. Transformation of political elite is aimed at retaining of existing succession system.

In Saudi Arabia along with Oman transition of supreme power and generational change in the ruling elite are critical issues. Late changes in succession in the Kingdom were advanced by aggravation of internal contradictions in the country, insecurity of the KSA foreign policy position, declining years and poor health of the king and successor to the throne. Existing system of succession “from brother to brother” leads to ageing of the pretenders to the throne. Generation of 80-90 years old children of founder of the state has to take care of strengthening of stability in the KSA, ensuring continuity of administration and demise of the crown in particular by change in practice of shift of supreme power, creating conditions for transition of power from the second to the third (having growing ambitions) generation of Saudi dynasty ruling from the beginning of the XX century.

On 30 March 2014 citizens of Saudi Arabia adjured – oath of loyalty to newly-appointed “by successor of successor to the Crown” prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz who in such a manner got the second place in the line of Saudi throne succession retaining post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

In such a manner long-term supremacy of Sudairi family was for a time replaced by promotion of the Sudairi dynasty representatives as well executives of so called third generation. It was estimated that if Mukrin would become the monarch the place of the descendant could be occupied by eldest son of Abdallah prince Mutib. The king Abdallah in order to maintain stability postponed for a time transfer of power to princes-grandsons (the third generation of successors). This reflects typical for the Kingdom “medial approach” renunciation of radical shifts in public administration. Demise of the king Abdallah 23 January 2015 lead to changes in the balance of power in the Saudi administration but not in the system of succession. On 23 January 2015 Salman bin Abdulaziz took the throne and reshuffled the upper echelons of government of the KSA. In accordance with direction of Salman predecessor the heir to the throne became prince Mukrin. In defiance of experts suggestions the place of the descendant (substitute of the descendant) occupied not the eldest son of the demised monarch prince Mutib, but Prince Muhammad bin Nayef. This way quiet succession took place in the Kingdom. Bin Nayef is nephew to Mukrin and comes from the Sudeiri clan. Many people today call him the most influential person in the KSA after the king. Thereby the Sudeiri clan again moves to the fore. Two out of the three power-wielding agencies turned out to be under their control. Muhammad bin Nayef is considered to be a reformer and a relative liberal. It is entirely possible that he will be the first Saudi monarch with Western education.

In the foreign policy area staff appointments can result in positive changes in the KSA policy in regard to Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Sheik Mohammed Al Thani is deemed to be the founder of modern Qatar who united disparate nomadic tribes of the peninsula in 1868 and created unified state.

In 1995 in the result of coup d'etat son of emir Caliph Sheik Mohammed Al Thani came into office who realized fractional democratization of the system of public administration. Qatar as an absolute monarchy is characterized by underdevelopment of parliamentary institutions and opposition. Specificity of executive power resides in that ruling dynasty Al Thani preserves family monopoly on key positions. The role of emir is traditionally great and government stays just an executive body under monarch who has decisive influence over executive and legislative power.

Power of emir passes to a successor, as a rule, to the eldest son. Sometimes there is the Higher family council of Al Thani family a few closest family members form part of it for setting current issues or selection of the heir to the throne. Even quasi-parliament in the country lacks. There is only Advisory council, 25 members of which are appointed by emir. His functions are to give guidance which is not binding. According to experts it's nothing more than sinecure to place top and influential persons from emir's team. All members of government including prime-minister and his deputies are appointed by decrees of emir or Prince Royal (prince bears a title "deputy of the ruler" person who replaces the head of the government in his absence).

In projecting generation change in leadership elite of Qatar peculiar tradition of this country should be taken into account. From the date of independence declaration (1971) a ruler change came round in the result of bloodless palace revolutions.

Generation change in Qatar in 2013 happened peacefully. At a private session at the end of May 2013 members of the Higher family council of ruling dynasty Al Thani entitled to vote in solving a question of power derivation came to a decision that before the end of the year Hamad should give the emir seat to his son - royal prince Tamim who held office of emir deputy (being

right-hand man in the country). Prince Tamim became the youngest ruler of the conservative regime furthermore Wahabee on the Arabian Peninsula. It sent a message for replacement of elderly leaders in other monarchies of the Persian Gulf primarily in Saudi Arabia.

In the area of foreign policy Qatar will probably continue to support jihadis in Syria and other Arab countries however forms of it will become more disguised and its volume will diminish.

Its contemporary name Qatar got in 1970 when in the result of palace revolution sultan Qaboos bin Said came to power. He stays in power at the present time. He owns full authority of legislative and executive power. In the short term a question of succession and generation change in the monarchy will become a central one for the country. The complication for forecasting assumption of power by one or another person is related to the fact that 73-year-old Qaboos is childless and unmarried and at the same time doesn't call the name of the successor to the throne.

An important problem of succession of power in the country was considerably solved by fundamental law of Sultanate Oman in 1996. According to the fundamental law Oman is an independent Arab Islamic state, form of rule of which is an absolute monarchy. For first time ever in the country in this law there was enshrined a principle and procedure of shift in power. In compliance of the article 5 the power is passed by male line to direct descendants of Seyyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan. If within three days after the day when the throne became vacant the Council of the ruling family doesn't take a decision over a successor, the Defense council created by decree of Qaboos in 1996 is empowered to endorse a candidate designated by being in power up to that moment sultan in his message to the Council of the ruling family. This document is prepared beforehand. The name of Crown Prince will be probably called after death of the present monarch.

Violent upheaval in Oman at the present time is unlikely. According to experts there are no any overt or covert internal or international conflicts. During the reign of Qaboos two earlier existing splits: tension between possessing spiritual power Imam and secular power holder Sultan; rivalry among tribes traditionally living on the seaboard and representatives of tribes from inner districts of Oman. Rare on the number of participants, protests with economic claims took place in the country in 2011 which were mostly satisfied.

Against the backdrop of heated confessional conflicts in the Middle East sultanate can exemplify an effective solution to interfaith and intra-religious conflicts. The authorities in Oman adhering to liberal political approaches avoid arrises in questions of interfaith dialogue.

There is a reason to suppose, writes A. Fedorchenko, that the heir to the throne, there is no any credible information of whom. will continue sultan Qaboos foreign policy course based on flexibility, pragmatism and cautiousness. In practice it means noninterference in regional conflicts, commitment to create a system of collective security on the territory of the Persian Gulf, balancing between Saudi Arabia and Iran, disinterest in shifting the power balance in favor of one of those countries. Western-backed foreign policy orientation, strategic partnership with the USA will certainly stay the basis of Oman external policy under a new monarch.

Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy. Under the constitution Kuwait is an emirate. Emirs are chosen from a number of Mubarak Al-Sabah descendants. Throughout the year from the moment of enthronement every new emir appoints candidature of a heritor who should gain support of the majority of parliamentary deputies - National Assembly. In the absence of approval emir has to choose three candidates from Mubarak Al-Sabah descendants, one of who will be elected by parliament as the heir to the throne. Thus, power in Kuwait isn't demised

from father to a son. Ruling family participates in the heir to the throne designation who is approved by parliament.

In accordance with Kuwaiti tradition representatives of two branches of ruling family became emirs alternatively – Al-Jaber and Al-Salem. In the beginning of the XXI century this rule was infringed. Emerging role of parliament allowed him not to confirm the candidature of a successor to the throne Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah and propose Sabah IV Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah in place of new emir, representing Al-Jaber family. On 26 January 2006 77-year-old emir of Kuwait adjured to parliament. Parliament confirmed proposed by emir candidature of his blood brother Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah (that moment he was 69) on the post of successor to the Crown.

Representatives of Al-Sabah clan occupy many leading positions in government authorities of the country. Constitutionally emir appoints prime-minister and dismisses him. Upon the recommendation of prime-minister emir forms government comprised of not less than five members of ruling family as well prime-minister, Defense Secretary, Home Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Reinforcement of political role of parliament leads to attenuation of Al-Sabah ruling family institute. Claiming its priority among branches of power structures, parliamentarians primarily opposition spokesmen permanently conflict with government. There is a demand for constitutional revision for creation of “genuinely parliamentary constitutional regime” formation of a cabinet on the basis of election. Practically this entails annihilation of tacit agreement functioning since 1961 whereby ruling family controls key posts in the government.

In response Al-Sabah family sets about strengthening their positions. After special elections to parliament in July 2013 quantity of ruling family representatives within new government increased apart from prime-minister there are six of them, notably they headed key ministries.

In recent years Kuwaiti authorities hold a line on systematic political reforming. However these changes don't concern current constitution since 1962 where it's stated a right of Al-Sabah family for power, and granted its social status.

Accession to power of a younger representative of ruling family will hardly lead to its refusal of their key powers and authority. At the same time emir's age (85 years) and the heir to the throne (76 years) makes Al-Sabah clan look for younger claimants to throne.

The UAE is a federative state. It consists of seven emirates each of which is an absolute monarchy and possesses full sovereignty in matters not related to the federation authorities. The UAE itself is included in a group of dualistic monarchies. High Council is a supreme body of the federation composed of regents of seven emirates. Members of High Council elect president of the UAE from its members for a five-year term suitable for subsequent, frequent reelection. Presidency of the UAE is in coincidence with emir's post of the capital emirate Abu Dhabi. As the emirate is an absolute monarchy, power in it is demised like in the entire state. Before 1966 in Abu Dhabi similar to Saudi Arabia it was decided to transfer power from brother to brother.

From the time of the state establishment in 1971 and to 2004 irreplaceable president of the UAE was a ruler of the largest in terms of territory, population and oil and gas reserves Abu Dhabi emirate Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. After his death in 2004 his son Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (he's 66 now) was elected as a president. Post of prime-minister occupies ruler of Dubai emirate – the second most important in the federation.

In 2006 after death of prime-minister Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum

his brother Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum occupied this post. In such a manner in 2004–2006 generation change of the UAE rulers took place, that gave momentum for renovation of political institutes in the country its activation in international

matters. However continuity of internal and external courses was preserved.

Since 14 February 2002 the Kingdom of Bahrain is a constitutional hereditary monarchy. In March 1999 after death of emir sheik Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa his son Hamad bin Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa came into office distinguishing by his more liberal views. At the initiative of the new monarch it was elaborated National Charter – project of political development and country’s democratization. After its approval in a national referendum in February 2001 emir submitted amendments, establishing constitutional monarchy where power is divided among partially elected bicameral National Assembly and emir who is called the King. Executive power belongs to the king and the Council of Ministers. Hereditary power goes in the line of Al-Khalifa from father to the eldest son.

Although officially rights of the king are restricted, he uses broadest authorities and inner state structure provides supreme monarchy stability. It’s forbidden to make amendments in the article 2 of the constitution which is dedicated to state religion (Islam) and also articles concerning constitutional monarchy and principles of hereditary transfer of power.

A. Fedorchenko concludes that accelerated transformation of the Arab world affected this peninsula of apparent tranquility. However changes happen in inertial way, not as rapidly as in other Arab countries.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2017.04.009. ELENA VASETSOVA. LIBYA: FIVE YEARS WITHOUT GADDAFI // *“Vestnik Rossiiskoi Natsii,”* Moscow, 2017, No 2, P. 234–244.

Keywords: Libya, Russia, U.S.A., Islamism, terrorism.

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The author examines the main trends and development prospects of the situation in Libya after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, analyzed the positions of the opposing sides, as well as the role of the external factor in the current situation.

After the death of M. Gaddafi (2011) the country plunged into a structural crisis which turned into an armed conflict continuing to this day, and which seems to be unsolvable. Actually, the state disintegrates in the course of the confrontation between various armed groupings. Ethnic and tribal conflicts exacerbate the situation still more. All conditions now exist in Libya for the flow of radical Islamists to flood the country: easy access to arms, weakness of the regular army, separatist sentiments, impotence of state power, and the absence of security guarantees for people. Libya presents a great interest for Islamist terrorist groupings due to its advantageous strategic geographical position close to the Middle East and the Mediterranean. It is also a very convenient springboard to deploy military training camps. The weakness of state power leads to an increase of illegal migration through Libya. Armed groupings have organized the smuggling of people, which is a source of financing radical organizations, along with arms trade and drug trafficking.

The European Union countries have not been touched directly by the activity of the Libyan radicals, whose aim was to

set up strong points and military bases, but not to deal blows at western states. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the Libyan Islamic groupings will not plan and commit terrorist acts on the territory of European states at present and in the future. Especially dangerous is the possible use by the terrorists of transportable anti-aircraft missile complexes, or portable ground-to-air portable missiles, which can be handled by one man. In 2011 about 50 such missiles disappeared without trace from the Gaddafi arsenals.

After the brutal murder of Gaddafi several groupings have been fighting for power in Libya. In the summer of 2014, after a sharp exacerbation of the situation the country began to be dominated by diarch. Its parliament was recognized at the international level and supported by the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. It was also backed by the regular army commanded by Fieldmarshal Khalifa Haftar.

Libyan parliament was opposed by the New National Congress, a legislative body set up by politicians from Islamist parties, which replaced the Unified National Congress. After their election defeat in 2014 the Islamist parties heading militants units captured Tripoli.

In 2014–2015 a sharp confrontation of the two acting bodies of power continued, each one of them claiming legitimacy. The inter-Libyan dialogue, which was taking place in Morocco was joined by the Islamist New Unified National Congress. On October 9, 2015, the formation of a government of national accord of Libya was announced and Fayez al-Sarraj became its prime minister. A new body of power came into being – the Presidential Council of Libya set up in March 2016. It comes out as the head of state and formed a government of national unity. Prime Minister F. Sarraj became the head of the Presidential Council.

Despite positive dynamic in organizing interaction between hostile political forces, the confrontation between the centers of power continues. The government of national accord controls an insignificant part of the country's territory. The Libyan National

army is not subordinated to the government in Tripoli, and its commander Kh. Haftar is an ally of the parliament sitting in the east of the country.

Power vacuum has been used by the radical Islamist grouping "Islamic State in Tripoli" which began active military operation in Libya in 2014.

In May 2015 the "Islamic State" seized the town of Sirt and its environs. This territory has special importance due to a nearby sea and air ports and oil reserves, which the terrorists plan to sell and earn additional incomes.

Well realizing the need to stabilize the situation in the country Kh. Haftar began in May 2016 the military operation "Libya's Dignity" whose aim was to destroy the radical Islamists. However, it has not been achieved, and in May 2016 the head of the government F. Sarraj announced the beginning of the military operation to liberate Sirt from the militants. About a month later military units closed around Sirt and succeeded to liberate the sea and air ports, an airbase to the south of the city and a military plant producing explosives. However, the further offensive stopped due to the growing resistance of the militants. Unable to change the situation, the government of national accord was forced to turn to the United States and its allies for assistance.

The United States agreed to grant direct military aid for the liberation of Sirt. Libya became another country after Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria where the United States and its allies began to use force against the terrorists. In September 2016 the Libyan troops overpowered the enemy and liberated Sirt completely from the ISIL militants.

However, the liberation of Sirt will not be the beginning of the country's reunification. The level of its decentralization is too great, the state is being torn apart by various conflicts, there is no charismatic leader capable to unite more than 100 various tribes and their alliances. The country is living through one of the gravest periods of its history, and the road to its rebirth will be long and arduous. In the near future it may split into several

parts, or face years of bloody fratricidal war, and clashes and coups accompanied with bitter power struggle. Perhaps, a new leader will emerge capable to unite tribes and groupings, and then a new Libyan project may be created, the researcher concludes.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

TATIANA IGNATOVA, ANDREI DOBAYEV. ISLAMIC ECONOMY AND EVOLUTION OF THE HAWALA SYSTEM // *"Islam in the Modern World," Moscow, 2016, vol.12, No 4, P. 149–170 // English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islamic economy, religious values, Muslim Ummah, Madhhab, zakah, riba, gharar, maisir, musharaka, havala.

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Annotation. In the article based on works of the Russian and foreign scientists moral values of Islam as philosophy of economy, postulates of understanding of life which determined the central categories of Islamic economy are considered. The features of the modern Islamic economic doctrine and model which exerted impact on evolution of this branch of science and

predetermined vectors of its development are revealed. The authors argues that study of Islamic economy an finance presented by such categories as zakah, riba, gharar, maisir, musharaka, havala shows shortages of neoclassic approach and needs comprehensive complete civilization approach.

Economies in the states where Islam is presented and adopted as official religion, "absorbed" in themselves moral values from the above-stated sources of Moslem thought, first of all, concerning judgment of important moral and economic categories, such as:

- charity (for example, "waqf" (the property transferred by the state or the individual to the religious or charitable purposes) / English - Waqf, Wakf);

- objectivity and respectability (for example, "halal" (legal acts in Sharia) / English - Halal);

- strict prohibitions (for example, "haram" (in Sharia forbidden actions) / English - Haram));

- decency and honesty (for example, "Zulm" (cruelty, not right-dimensional operation) / English - Zulm).

Islam dictates a primacy of moral values over economic. In particular, Koran, Sunnah, Idjma, English Idjma - a consent, unanimous opinion or the decision of authority figures on the discussed question, one of sources of the Islamic law), Madhhab (English - Madhhab - school of the sharia right in Islam), Qiyas (English - Qiyas - judgment on analogies, one of sources of the Muslim right), Urf (English - Urf - the local custom which isn't contradicting Islam), fiqh (English - Fiqh - the Muslim doctrine about rules of conduct (law), a complex of public regulations (the Islamic law in a broad sense)), examples of business behavior of the Prophet, works of the famous theologians, lawyers, philosophers, form the code of the moral laws regulating behavior of devout Muslims in all spheres of public life.

It should be noted directly that the above-stated sources of Islam and the categories appearing in them create fundamental

postulates of understanding of life in Islamic economy to which it is possible to carry the following:

- the unique authentic owner of all is Allah;
- the person and Muslim Ummah act as Allah's representatives, actually his deputies on the earth;
- the constructive labor is approved, in case of simultaneous perversity of usury, moneymaking, unfair distribution of material resources between Muslims;
- subordination of interests of the individual to society (Muslim Ummah).

The Islamic economy, according to developers of the idea, is aimed at providing basic needs of the person, using harmonious means whereas the traditional economy is guided in the basis by the material beginning, to some extent neglecting moral laws and prohibitions. The Islamic economy is formed on recognition of private property as it is treated by Sharia. Equally it is directed to distribution of representations of social solidarity by providing conditions for a unification and a cooperation between the equity and work in case of complete negation of a monopolism, and also to achievement of social justice due to reasonable compensation and unemployment eradication. Proceeding from it, the Islamic economy succeeds in permission of the most complex challenges of the present, establishment of balance between needs of the individual and progress of society.¹

Act as founders of researches of Islamic economy:

- Abu Yusuf Yaqub ibn Ibrahim ibn Habib al-Ansari al or Abu Yusuf, 731-798, the prominent Islamic lawyer (fakikh), one of the most famous pupils Abu Hanify. After death Abu Hanify Abu Yusuf headed school of the first. Being the Supreme judge (incense al-kudat) the caliphate, promoted wide circulation of views of hanaf madhhab (legal school);

- Abu Mugammad Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Hazm al-Andalusi or Ibn Hazb, 994-1064 the Andalusian theologian, the polemist and the fakikh, the representative of zakhir madhhab, the poet and the historian;

- Abu Hamid Mugammad ibn Mugammad al-Gazali at-Tusi ash-Shafiya, (the Islamic theologian, the jurist, the philosopher and the mystic, one of the most authoritative teachers who are among founders of Sufism. The author about 70 scientific works on theological sciences, philosophy and Sufism;

- Abu Abbas Taki ad-Din Ahmad bin Abd as-Salam bin Abdullah of ibn Taymiya of al-Harrani, the Islamic jurist of a hanbala madhhab, the theologian, the critic of innovations in religion;

- Abu Abdullah Shamsuddin Mugammad ibn Abu Bakr ibn Ayub of ibn Sa-ad ibn Hariz of ibn Makki Zaynuddin or Ibn Kayim of Dzhauziya, 1292-1350, the Muslim theologian, the prominent representative;

- Abu Zayd Abdu r-Rahman bin Mugammad bin Khaldun Al-Hadrami, Ibn Khaldun better known as Ibn Haldun, 1332-1406, the Arab philosopher, the economist, the historian, the social thinker. The author of a number of works, the most visible of which is "The big history";

- Jahmal Addin al-Afgani, 1838-1897, the Muslim reformer, the ideologist of Pan-Islamism in the works devoted to a role of Afghans in Egypt in "Tatimmat al-bayan fi tarikh al-Afghan," 1901, and also about nationalism and materialism in Persian ("Ressalah e Natsche-ria");

- Mirza Basheer-ud-Din Mahmood, English, 1889-1965, the Muslim public figure, the most known works are "Ni-zame Nau" (1942), "Islam ka Iqtisadi" (1945);

- and their followers: Naeem Siddiqi, Maulana Maududi, Muhammad Hamidullah, Mohammed al-Ghazali al-Saqqa, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Manazir Ah-san Gilani, Ahmad Shaikh Mahmud.

In subsequence there were works of other scientists of Muhammad Uzair, Abdullah al-Araby, Nejatullah Siddiqi al-Najjar, Sami Hassan Homound who made an essential

contribution to an object of research, devoted to Islamic economy and finance.

Starting with the 1970th there were also essential events which influenced judgment and registration of Islamic economy already as independent scientific discipline, in particular:

- significant international conferences took place ("Conference of Ministers of Finance of the Islamic countries," 1970 in Karachi, etc.);

- the powerful Islamic international organizations are founded (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) till 2011 was called - the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)), etc.);

- large world Islamic banks (Islamic Development Bank and some other) are founded.

M. Siddiki in a number of his published works² formulated the main objectives of Islamic economy among which:

- provision to all people of equal opportunities;
- creation of due conditions for spiritual growth and self-development;

- satisfaction of the minimum needs in objects of the first need;

- ensuring equal distribution of material resources in society;

- maintenance of economic stability and steady economic growth.

Considering such difficult economic system as Islamic economy, it is necessary to emphasize that it is inseparably linked with east life and actually reflects all set of views of devout Muslims onto economic activity. Such position is shared by most of the scientists studying Islamic economy: in opinion of A.D. Larionov, D.A. Al-Sharayrekh: "The Islamic economy is indissolubly interwoven into fabric of Muslim society, and on it make huge impact both general Islamic moral ethical standards, and the direct instructions containing in the Koran and Sunnah. Religious morals together with specific economic instructions

represent basis of Islamic economy and determine a number of its immanent postulates".³ And more: "It (Islamic economy) systematizes economic experience of a community of times of the Prophet Muhammad and the first Caliphs; it lays on the religious and legal base of Islam; scoops the specific forms in sources; at last, it is penetrated by a strong core of an ethical imperative".⁴

Considering the religious and moral components which significantly influenced the forming and development of Islamic economy given on the first pages of this article are deeper it is necessary to cover the following categories: charity (on the example of "waqf"), respectability and a prohibition (on an example "halal" and "haram") and others, the important, concerning relations to material resources.⁵

The waqf represents the property alienated in the charitable purposes. After transfer of a certain property to waqf (or, in opinion of other Muslim jurists, after the announcement of the decision on it) it stops being property of the founder of waqf, without becoming, at the same time, property of the one who receives waqf and manages it for the benefit of the beneficiaries designated by the founder of waqf. The institute of waqf is a typical example of splitting of the property right in case of which competences of ownership and use of property pass to beneficiaries, and the order is limited to declaration of will of the founder of waqf. But in Koran nothing is told directly about waqf, Muslim researchers consider this institute in the context of the verses devoted to questions of charity (2: 215, 264, 270, 280; 51: 19; etc.).⁶

Waqfs bear charitable, social, religious and moral functions as the money received from waqf can be used as sources of financing of medicine (medical institutions, personnel, scientific developments), religious institutions, education (higher educational institutions, libraries, teachers, students, service personnel) that allows to provide persons in need, having partially redistributed expenses from the government budget on merciful patrons, in result waqfs create a possibility of more fair

income redistribution in society. At the same time the property transferred to waqf can be movable and immovable.

Despite the existing distinctions in approaches of scientists on the attitude towards category waqf the following requirements imposed to them are universal:

- Sharia forbids to establish waqf directly for benefit of his founder and on the forbidden types of activity;
- directly piece of waqf shall exist actually;
- the waqf is termless and can't be withdrawn or aloof nobody after its organization;
- the waqf is to be profitable;
- the waqf is to be established for benefit of needy, people with limited opportunities.

The Islam moral distinguishes the important factor determining the impact on financial and economic activities of devout Muslims. Most of foreign and domestic authors carry to justice (respectability), and moral filling of the order economic resources (property and money).⁷

Such central religious categories as "haram", "halal", "zulm" and the above-considered "waqf" cause, on the one hand, importance of ensuring freedom of declaration of will of accounting entities, the competition and denial of monopoly, in case of simultaneous moral fullness of the financial and economic activities having an ultimate goal increase in level of public wellbeing.

On the other hand, the above-stated categories forbid devout any actions leading to oppression of interests of members of Muslim society and any manifestations of injustice on the attitude towards them. Therefore any transactions integrated to drawing a loss to Muslim society in general and to the specific individual in particular as in the form of making of the speculative transactions leading to a separation of the financial sphere from real economy, to corruption manifestations, implementation of fraudulent schemes whether for the purpose of illegal assignment the stranger of property in relation to

devout Muslims regardless that damage is direct or indirect, material or formal are recognized illegal.

The devout Muslim, according to earlier given Moslem sources, should realize that a true owner of any economic resource (all types of property, money and other material values) is Allah, and therefore, according to Islamic values, any resource shall be used most effectively for the benefit of all Muslim Ummah, at the same time bringing material remuneration to its owners (if the real value added was created, but there was no isolated increase in cash weight). In many respects this concept of “a temporary possession” of resources and human “representativeness” causes, on one hand, inadmissibility of accumulating, idleness and speculation, on the other hand, - the raised taxation of the idle economic resources, thereby stimulating charitable and investment processes in the economies practising Islam. In this regard it is explainable that the resources entrusted to the devout Muslim shall be used on the purpose pleasing to Allah. The above creates motive of fixed investment on the purpose pleasing to Allah and transfers by owners of resources in case of their business discrepancy to other more experienced and skillful persons.

In this regard it is necessary to agree that “... in Islamic economy money performs functions of currency and a saving (with certain restrictions). These functions are in many respects similar to traditional functions of money in the western countries. Basic difference is that in Islamic economy the cash system is considered as the inevitable mechanism of servicing of financial and economic requirements. Money plays a role of the technical tool, in fact, allowing to perform transactions of purchase and sale, but money in itself has no cost. ... Along with traditional political economy the Islamic economic thought carries out distinction between money and the equity: money, in fact, is considered as the potential capital. However their transformation to the equity in Islamic model requires active participation of the owner of a money resource. That is profit earning by the

capitalist is justified if he is put in equal conditions with owners of other factors of production, actually itself becomes the entrepreneur, the partner within the project who isn't standing away from that business for which there is money. This new status, respectively, causes receipt of a profit share by it (or acceptances on itself parts of losses), but not fixed and guaranteed remuneration known as a loan interest. Remuneration is determined by the size of the contribution estimated from the point of view of the reached surplus of real wealth. Relations of the creditor and borrower are given new measurement".⁸

Major factors which predetermined formation of the modern economic doctrine are allocated⁹:

- disintegration of colonial system in the 20th century, and, respectively and weakening of the position of a number of the European countries in the states of the Middle East (a bus comment mainly Great Britain, France);

- aspiration of devout Muslims after disintegration of colonial system to an economic recovery and a frame of the national economic idea;

- perversity from the religious point of view of financial and economic activities for the western sample and similarity;

- increase of influence in certain spheres of the international business and rapid growth of material well-being of the Muslim population;

- exposure to the crisis phenomena western economic and financial systems.

The articles of an event provided in the beginning which influenced judgment and registration of Islamic economy, the happened important world institutional changes, and also the considered sources of Moslem created a basis of the Islamic economic model sounded during the carried-out League of Arab States in Tunisia November 15, 1988 of the scientific and practical conference (which took place soon after the emergency Summit

of League during the period from June 7 to June 9, 1988 in Algeria) which basis was formed by such theses:

- a true owner of everything existing in the world is Allah, the person can only dispose of what was entrusted to him by Allah;

- all processes happening in the world are predetermined Allah;

- the Islamic economic order shall be reflection of harmony and social justice;

- the private property in Islamic understanding can be limited only to the operating legal methods of its assignment, the order, a tax component and payment of possible debt obligations.

Professor of the Durham university M. Asutay allocates a number of the fundamental principles and axioms of Islamic economy¹⁰:

- monotheism (English - Tawhid) acts as the dominating and comprehensive ethical component which investigation is that people, being all Allah's children, are equal;

- social justice and social orientation (adalah, and Ihsan) in interpersonal relations;

- harmonious growth, continuous self-improvement (English - Tazkiyah);

- creation of prerequisites to society (to the individual, society) in achievement of the superiority (English - Rububiyah);

- freedom of action, but directed to service to public interests (English - Fard);

- people are deputies (representatives) of Allah on the earth (English - Halifah / Khalifah) also shall perform and adhere to these principles.

All-Islam declaration of human rights completely and in detail expresses the existing concept of an Islamic economic order which basic provisions are the following¹¹:

1. All the people have the right to use natural wealth in the economic activity. It is given by Allah to all mankind.

2. All the people have the right to earn means of livelihood in compliance with the law.

3. Any person has the property right which he owns individually or together with other persons. Nationalization of some economic means in public interests is legal.

4. Poor people have the right to the certain part of the fortune of the rich established zakyat and allocated according to the law.

5. All means of production shall be used for the benefit of all community. It is forbidden not to take them into consideration or it is bad to dispose them.

6. For ensuring development of the balanced economy and for protection of society against an exploitation the Islamic law forbids monopolies, excessively restrictive business activity, use of enforcement powers in case of the conclusion of transactions and the publication of false advertizing.

7. All types of economic activity if they don't do harm to interests of a community are resolved and don't break Islamic laws and values.

The modern Islamic economic doctrine is based, first of all, on Koran and Sunnah, examples of his business behavior of the Prophet of Muhammad. According to a number of scientists, the Islamic economy is a Muslim science, and the Islamic economic doctrine acts as a component of the global Islamic concept of life of devout Muslims. Taking into account that the dominating contribution so far to the Islamic economic doctrine was made by prominent Muslim theologians, lawyers and philosophers, is explainable that it incorporates the valuable reference points pledged in the Holy Koran which "determine admissible limits of economic motivations and investment decisions and prove morally the reasoned economic strategy of the person (entrepreneur) for the purpose of ensuring fair balance between material and spiritual needs, and also between individual and public obligations of the person".¹²

Due to stated the following reference provided by the Russian scientific R.I. Bekkin is of interest:

“In Koran there isn't a lot of the instructions at first sight which are directly devoted to questions of entrepreneurial activities. However Muslim lawyers consider it the main and indisputable source of the regulations for economic relations in society to this day. For example, in ayat 282 of sura Bacharach (“Cow”) are in detail described rules of the conclusion of the agreement. However in general more essential role is played not by the regulations of direct action which are in detail regulating these or those types of the economic relations, and general provisions to which Muslim lawyers throughout centuries give special interpretation. For example, known ayat: “He is (Allah) – the one who created to you everything that on the earth...” (2:29) Muslim lawyers interpret as permitting, in addition to other, the private property institution, and ayat “Allah wants for you simplification, but doesn't want difficulty for you” (2:185) is the cornerstone of regulations that in case of a collision of two precepts of law the judge shall prefer that which execution requires smaller efforts from the person. The similar ayats which don't have, apparently, any relation to entrepreneurial activities throughout centuries stimulated creation by Muslim lawyers of the numerous works devoted to questions of regulation of the economic relations in society.

Source of Sharia, the second for importance, is Sunnah of the Prophet. Among huge number of the legends (hadis) which reached us it is devoted to questions of business activity. It is known that following to Sunnah is an important obligation of each Muslim. And the questions connected with business relations, here not an exception especially as witnesses the Muslim legend, Muhammad was quite successful businessman.

Islam is called religion of traders not without a reason. Many outstanding figures of Islamic history actively were engaged in trade. So, three from four Caliphs who were among the closest associates of the Prophet – Abu Bakr, Umar and

Usman, and also the father of the fourth Caliph Ali – were merchants, the founder of the largest legal school in Islam Abu Ha-nifa successfully combined occupation commerce with writing of outstanding theological and legal works. Moreover, the Islamic law began to develop on the basis of ayat of the Koran and sayings of the Prophet – the hadis devoted to these or those types of the trade and economic relations.

Examples of business behavior of the Prophet also found reflection in the hadis. For example: “Tell that Abu Rafi also will be happy with him God Allah, told: “Once the Prophet, the world to him and Allah's blessing, borrowed from one person of a young camel. When to it drove camels from a zakah, he enjoined to repay me a debt to that person. Later some time I returned to it and told: “I found only one beautiful camel who was on the seventh year of life”. Then the Prophet told: “Give it to it because the best of people is the one who repays a debt in the best way.”¹³

As a result, as fairly state Evdokimov V.V. and Gritsishen D.A.: “... implementation of the economic doctrine of Islam has bilateral nature. On the one hand, acts as final model of social and economic development, and with another, is means of achievement of it.”¹⁴

The Islamic ethics of the financial and economic relations which are based on concepts of justice reject also a possibility of bribes, monopolization and provision of incorrect information in case of cost determination of securities, the fast and dishonest methods of enrichment, somehow doesn't accept: gambling or speculation in the stock market. The Islamic model estimates efficiency of the stock markets the volumes of investment into real projects in the sphere of the industry, agricultural industry, a construction, etc.¹⁵

It is necessary to state that under the influence of, first of all, Koran and Sunnah in Islamic economy certain types of activity in which devout Muslims are forbidden to be engaged were created. Treat them: production and sale of drugs; organization of hazardous institutions; production, sale of

alcohol, tobacco products, pork; all corruption manifestations; compulsion to occupation prostitution; involvement in the porn industry; rendering banking and insurance services on the western similarity.

The investigations in practical everyday life of devout Muslims, the considered religious and moral categories show the special relation to work, property, freedom of economical and economic activities, honesty, available material resources, taxation, number of following basic provisions¹⁶:

- ban of greed (Koran 102:1-8, 104:1-9);
- work in Islam takes the important place (the Koran 2:110, 2:254, 9:60, 73:20, 99:6-8);
- essential attention is paid to property rights protection (the Koran 6:13);
- obligatory observance of contractual commitments (Koran 2:80, 2:177, 2:282, 5:1, 16:90-95, 17:34, 61:10-12);
- honesty and decency in business relations;
- condemnation of wrong, inefficient use of material resources (Koran 4:5, 23:61);
- encouragement of effective housekeeping and trade in particular (capital utilizations);
- ban of inadequate (in value term) assets exchange.

It is necessary to refer to key categories of Islamic economy¹⁷:

1. Zakah (Arab. - tax for benefit of the needing Muslims);
2. Riba (Arab. debt increase against its initial size);
3. Gharar (Arab. - inadequate risk);
4. Maisir (Arab - income formed as a result of accidental combination of circumstances);
5. Musharaka (Arab. - partnership, foundation).

Zakah. In Islamic economy zakah throughout already many centuries takes the significant place. It is caused by what is zakah, as we know, is carried to number of five main confessional obligations of the devout Muslim. Besides, zakah in the states in which Islam acts as the main religion, it is quite often fixed in

quality of official collection (tax) which size is in direct dependence on an asset type.

In Muslim Ummah zakah traditionally it is comprehended nevertheless more as a donation, collection or assignment, than a tax. Stated the Islamic economist Sabbakhaddin Zaim supports with zakah¹⁸:

- extends only to Muslims;
- is one of confessional obligations for the devout Muslim that fills this category moral, it is moral also religious components, prevailing at the same time over financial and economic;
- it is irretrievable and non-paid;
- and also by the fact that a payment procedure of a zakah, its size are permanent and failure to pay a zakah can't be forgiven by Allah.

Zakah in the economic plane performs several important functions:

- promotes equalization of level of living of the population, smoothes the formed social gaps that as a result reduces social intensity;
- stimulates investment activity;
- creates culture of consumption among Muslim Ummah, constantly reminding that an authentic owner of all is Allah.

It is necessary to state that in modern Islamic economy there is no unity concerning the size of a zakah, its subject and subject of taxation, and also procedures of its payment. At the same time it is accepted some zakah assets which meet certain conditions, namely when are assessed:

- the size of assets at the time of calculation of a tax amount exceeds nisab (a minimum of the property which is subject to zakah taxation);
- assets are in property of the taxpayer within a year;
- assets are purchased in the legal way;
- the commercial transactions made with these assets don't contradict Sharia;

- assets are intended for private use.

It is necessary to make a reservation that the taxation subject in Islamic economy is so extensive that deserves separate detailed consideration. However for general understanding it is necessary to consider that zakah isn't the unique collection in Islamic economy, there is a number of circumstances which resolve use and other taxes and fees, uncharacteristic for usual conditions. According to M. Kafkh, sharp decrease in revenues of the budget of the state in case of simultaneous significant increase in a defense expenditure can be the basis for entering of the additional taxes.¹⁹

Riba. It is worth paying attention that in Islamic economy judgment of the place, functions and the nature of money significantly differs from the similar approaches taking place in traditional economies. In Islamic economy, contrary to popular belief, don't condemn money as the economic category (performing functions of a measure of value, means of the address, a saving and so forth), as well as in traditional economies the religion doesn't condemn money as the instrument of making of economical and economic activities.

At the same time, it is necessary to mark out the important difference characteristic of Islamic economy - a surplus of money, profit earning is approved when direct owner of financial resources takes active and mutual part in the project on an equal basis with other parties and divides possible profits and risks. Stimulation of investment into sector of real production where workplaces are created is characteristic of Islamic economy, with some clauses, demanded products are turned out, that is in general society receives the visible benefits from such activities. In this case participants can draw interest from profit, adequate to the amount of their investments into the project, but at the rate of actually got profit, but the income which isn't fixed in advance which is expressed in the loan interest condemned by Sharia.

Consequence of such religious and ethical approach to essence of money is the riba. The essence of a riba consists in a

prohibition of a number of transactions in which increase in the amount of the taken debt in comparison with its initial size is seen. The prohibition on the transactions (containing a riba) is a basis of activities of Islamic financial institutions and ideological basis of the interest-free economy offered by Islamic economists.²⁰ Modern Muslim ideologists interpret a prohibition of a rib as the regulator of economic life, claiming that with its help creation of fair society as the fixed loan interest strengthens a tendency of accumulation of wealth in hands of the few is possible and promotes dissociation of people, guaranteeing profit without risk of loss of invested funds, constrains investments and reduces employment.²¹

It is necessary to emphasize that from the religious point of view are condemned regardless of the size, a form, shares all those who sign the agreement (within which the riba takes place) or act in the signed agreement as the impartial person.

Researchers of Islamic economy incline that the riba is characteristic mainly of transactions which assume exchange of goods for goods. However in separate publications it is mentioned that the share of the transactions containing a riba in cases of commodity-money exchange extremely slightly, but the same time tends to insignificant increase.

Garar. Except earlier designated fundamental provisions the important place in Islamic economy is taken by category "garar." Garar it is possible to treat as unreasonable, excessive, unnecessary, inadequate, not subcrêpe-lenny, unjustified risk or danger.

It should be noted that, according to researchers, Sharia doesn't condemn risk - it is allowed in the sense that any of contract parties can't apply for guaranteeing itself against the related possible losses at the expense of other party or the parties. Is recognized that any economic transaction is integrated to risk which the parties can count on a basis of the available information and, thus, realize consequences of the actions.²²

The risk in Islamic economy isn't condemned if any of the parties (which participates in the contract) doesn't make attempts to protect itself from the related possible losses at the expense of other participants involved in the specific economic activity connected with contract performance.

At the same time, Sharia strictly forbids senseless risk and a vagueness (inaccuracy, an ambiguity, ambiguity), from a legal point of sight, in a formulation of factors which are considered by economic actors when calculating possible benefit from the transaction if these factors unreasonably increase risk for participants of the transaction.

Sharia condemns receipt of unilateral benefits during implementation of the contract by more informed contract party, and also the conclusion of transactions where deception is seen (from awareness of one contract party).

In general, *garar* is possible to consider as a result of information asymmetry. The Islamic view of asymmetry such consists in its ethical interpretation, that is Sharia condemns receipt of unilateral benefits by more informed contract party. On the practical level behind the term “*garar*” there is a prohibition on the contract containing an element of the delusion or deception resulting from use of lack of information of other party by one party in respect of the subject of the contract, its price or exact characteristics information asymmetry, certainly, is generated also by such situation when terms of the contract or the expected result can be perceived by its participants differently, that is they are accidentally or intentionally given ambiguous nature.

Thus, unacceptance of excessive risk in the concept of Islamic finance implies:

1. Need of symmetric distribution of risk among participants of the transaction;
2. Material completeness of the transaction, i.e. the financial transaction shall be directly or indirectly connected with the real transaction;

3. Need of observance of the rights of each party.

Maisir. This category is closely interconnected with category *garar*. Maisir (with the Arab. – the gambling) means the profit got by the person in result of accidental combination of circumstances. Such income is, as a rule, gained as a result of spontaneous (“parasitic,” as east researchers write) the activities which aren't connected with real production.

The main function of a maisir consists in a prohibition of activities which distract from productive occupation, and at the same time the wealth is created without efforts, for the loss account and losses of other party.

Musharaka. The following category of the Islamic economy caused by prohibition of collection of interest for using money is musharaka (the Arab. – partnership) which goes back to ancient forms of the commercial partnership existing in the Middle East. Now on a basis of a musharaka the majority of transactions in Islamic banking is performed. According to a musharaka, the share of each partner in profits and losses is determined by the special agreement in which all special financing terms make a reservation. Various forms of cross liabilities within musharaka allow to perform the business activity bringing profit, bypassing in a certain measure at the same time a prohibition of a rib.

In Islamic model cash assets are created as the answer to investment opportunities in real sector, respectively, non-financial institutes set rate of development of real economy, and on the contrary, the occupational sector itself creates for itself the favorable investment climate.

It should be noted that all above-considered central categories of Islamic economy in a certain measure affected, and also continue to make essential impact on financial instruments of an Islamic bank system, including system “ate,” determining vectors and features of their development. Taking into account stated it is advisable to consider the most important Islamic bank instruments in details.²³

Mudharabah or Mudarabah is an agreement signed between two parties when one party (rabbat which is small) completely provides necessary the equity for financing of the project, and another (Mudarib) – is engaged in management of the project, using the entrepreneurial capabilities. The profits resulting from implementation of joint business are distributed in the order established in advance. Losses, in case of their origin, will become covered at the expense of means the slave is scarlet – is small if only they weren't caused by contract breaches from a mudarib. That is this tool is in essence derivative and directly acts as the embodiment of the principle of participation in profits and losses.

Murabahah – is represented by transaction financing, most often trade, by the principle “expenses of bank plus a markup” generally with payment by installments of compensation by the client. This type of financing is the contract between bank and its client on sales of goods on a special price which includes the margin approved in advance, that is a difference between a purchase price and a selling price. This margin constitutes profit of bank. Transaction includes acquisition of specific goods by bank on a customer requirement, and then sale of these goods to the client with a markup. Payment is made step by step during time period established in advance. This transaction type reminds such service of the western commercial banks as sales of goods by installments with the established percent (or, in a different way, a consumer loan).²⁴

Musharakah represents an Islamic method of a cooperation in the financial sphere when two parties unite the equities for financing of any project, at the same time profit they divide in advance determined order, and losses – depending on equity in the equity. Project management can be exercised jointly of two parties or some one party. It is quite flexible type of a cooperation as a method of separation of profits and losses, and also management can be stipulated by the parties in advance – participants of the agreement. The essence of this agreement

comes down to the fact that two and more parties enter the business partnership relations with in advance determined equity and mutual separation of profits or losses.²⁵

It is usually applied in case of formation of business partnerships and joint businesses. Profits are shared in the proportion randomly approved by project participants while losses are charged to the parties in proportion to shares of their participation in the project.²⁶

Islamic banks in the activities operate also with other numerous financial instruments permitted by Sharia allowing to leave from percentage to which it is possible to carry the following the main: Baitum Maal, Idjara, Qardul Hasanah, Salam and some other.²⁷

Thus, taking into account stated above, some research works on Islamic economy are represented superficial and fragmentary when its separate lines and benefits in comparison with other systems are treated as exclusively endogenous mechanical components. Actually Islamic economy and its tools is the embodiment of moral values of Islam, and therefore the process of separating system elements and considering them from the point of market economic efficiency is scientifically limited without comprehensive complete civilization approach.

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**РОССИЯ
И
МУСУЛЬМАНСКИЙ МИР
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Научно-информационный бюллетень

Содержит материалы по текущим политическим,
социальным и религиозным вопросам

Дизайн М.Б. Шнайдерман

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