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Russia and the Moslem World: Science Information Bulletin / INION RAS, Centre for Global and Regional Studies. – Moscow, 2017. – N 2 (296). – 120 p. ISSN 1072-6403

The published scientific materials on the current political, social and religious issues concerning the relations between Russia and the global Islamic Ummah as well as Muslim countries are represented in the form of articles, reviews and abstracts.
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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

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D. Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential elections was a sign of a crisis of the West and the U.S.A. as the leader of the western world, and is largely a consequence of the policy pursued by the United States and the West for the past two decades. The social contradictions accumulated in the United States have had a latent character and since they have been ignored by the American establishment for quite a long time, they have caused the wave of protest voting which brought Donald Trump to the peak of the U.S. administration. It can safely be said today that the world has entered into an epoch of serious changes.

In the early 1990s, after the victory in the “Cold war” Western political analysts predicted the oncoming of an epoch of eternal peace. They proceeded from the premise that the victorious values of western civilization are universal and this is
why they exclude any possibility of a conflict. However, conflict is an inalienable part of any development process.

The optimism at the time of the end of the “Cold war” seemed justified for almost a decade. It seemed that the world was now more secure, the two superpowers no longer balanced on the brink of nuclear annihilation of each other, at least because one of them has simply ceased to exist. The “perestroika” of world politics has begun, true. It was planned differently by different states, but most of them hoped that globalization was a legitimate and positive phenomenon, and collective efforts would be able to cope with outstanding problems and challenges.

Almost a quarter of a century later it became clear that security could not be guaranteed even by well-to-do and influential states. Politicians and representatives of the academic community have started to repeat that the world has entered into a period of uncertainty and turbulence.

Thinking about the reasons for the inner fragility of the existing system of international relations it is necessary to note that the “Cold war”, whose end was celebrated by the West in 1991, was in actual fact a stable enough form of institutionalization of the inevitable global conflictogenic situation. The Soviet-American confrontation was the backbone of the world order. By the 1980s the “Cold war” turned into a really institutionalized form of the global order. The two blocs rivaled with each other, thus maintaining the status quo.

The disintegration of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 was a shock for the western establishment. Most American experts did not expect any crisis phenomena during a medium-term period capable to put an end to the existence of the Soviet Union. The U.S. opponent in the “Cold war” collapsed so unexpectedly and rapidly that it could not be explained there and then, and even a bit later. The western establishment, which has recently assessed the balance of forces in the confrontation with the Soviet bloc so rationally, decided that all this could be explained by certain mysterious circumstances,
which initially worked for the United States and its allies. Thus, a whole model has come into being which is dominating the minds of Americans and Europeans to this day.

The system existing in the years of the “Cold war” has not disappeared with the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. No efforts have been made to transform it on more solid foundations. In reality, an attempt was made to retain the old system of international relations oriented to the superpower domination. However, instead of two superpowers it was proposed to retain one, which had been founded on “correct and proper” values. As a result, the old system remained, but in an extremely misbalanced form.

A new interpretation of the role of the United States in the world was closely linked with the interests of the American military-industrial complex. The “Cold war” was serviced by an entire infrastructure which risked to remain redundant after its end. The West proved unable to reorient its policy in the direction of a peaceful development of global processes.

One of the variants could be recognition of the full-fledged international “subjectness” of new post-Soviet Russia. This could help rectify the misbalanced system.

But it was not possible to return the system of international relations to stability. Problems began in the 2000s. The foreign-policy failures in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were complemented with domestic political mishaps. All this was taking place against the backdrop of the world economic crisis. The U.S. leadership was forced to look for a new format of the international system which would allow it to preserve its positions. A solution has been found in the form of a mechanism of the institutionalization of the “clash of civilizations” policy. A situation of a “controlled chaos” emerges which creates an illusion of the world sliding in an abyss without the guiding role of the only one center.

The transformation of Washington into the sole center of force has not brought security and stability. Instead, it resulted in chaos
and disintegration of socio-political structures. All these phenomena have become the reason for a considerable growth of the conflict potential and the confrontation between socialism and capitalism in modern international relations. The ideology of confrontation between socialism and capitalism changed into the idea of protection from “terrorism” and “aggressiveness” in the sphere of politics after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., and in the sphere of the economy into a system based on the presumption of the unabated might of the U.S. economy and its unquestionable right to dominate in the global world. But this transformed ideology has sputtered out.

Protecting its vital interests Russia was forced to throw a challenge to the system of international relations, which the United States and the West adapted to suit their interests. Having taken the road of protecting its national interests in the conditions of a turbulent international situation Russia can hardly stepped back or turn away from that path. It is only such variant that can give a prospect of peacefully overcoming the unfolding crisis of the global political system.

Global integration and convergence processes being inevitable, mankind will realize sooner or later that it is hardly possible to form a unipolar stable world. This model will inevitably be changed by a new one, an indefinite model of neoliberal globalization whose features are already pulling ahead. They are represented by BRICS, SCO, EurasEC, “New Silk Road”, Trans-Eurasian Belt “Razvitie”.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich
The article deals with the main problematic aspects and mechanisms of maintaining political stability in modern Russia. Special attention is paid to countering "color revolutions", technologies of destabilization of political regimes.

If we turn to the experience of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, we can see the following trend: as long as the state was tightly keeping control over the political situation – whether it were the secret political police of the tsarist regime or the NKVD in the Soviet times – the country experienced relative political stability, which, with tightening of the state control over dissidents, transformed into stagnation of the political system. Next followed short periods of half-liberal reforms, causing destabilization and collapse of the ruling regime – both in the case of Tsarist Russia, and in the case of the collapse of the Soviet Union. When the authorities tried to switch over to the adaptation model the result was a crash of the whole political system. In the opinion of A. Firsov, this experience shows that an abrupt transition from the conservative model of suggestive nature to the adaptation model, characteristic of liberal democracy, is impossible.

Examples of protest activity in the United States and the EU countries show that the more rooted the adaptation model and the liberal-democratic, interactive type of relationship between government and society are, the more outrage and protest activity is caused by the government's attempt to "put things
right" by traditional power methods. Thus, the author concludes, the more mature the institute of civil society is (in the presence of human rights organizations), the harder and more painful for the political system the transition from the adaptation model to the conservative one will be. Accordingly, in the countries where civil society is still weak or is only in an embryonic stage of its formation, it is easier for the state to respond to external and internal challenges within the frames of the conservative model.

In relation to the Russian practice, one should also take into account the general level of political culture of the population, political and legal literacy, as well as national socio-cultural features. If we consider the examples of Tsarist and Soviet Russia, as well as those of the current political situation, it will be safe to say that the basis of legitimacy of power, its very nature in the Russian political practice is a deep tradition – personalized perception of the power by the society. Many researchers are convinced that the Russian people from time immemorial needs a strong political leader, directly associated with the state itself, and the punitive function of the state and strict control over dissent within the country are perceived as the only true way of control and are identified with the political one. However, repressions and stability are the concepts by far not identical, and it requires considerable statecraft to find that fine line that divides control over the political situation from a totalitarian political regime. Consequently, it is the state that bears the responsibility for identifying the threats and challenges that can really threaten political stability.

Currently, the Russian government seeks to harmonize control and "manual" management. However, the liberal expert community constantly feels oppressed due to the fact that the government follows its own principles and its own understanding of the current political processes in Russia. It should be added that a developed civil society in Russia is not formed at the moment due to the peculiarities of the national mentality that gives ample opportunities from the point of view of the use of force to ensure
national security in the country. Timely response to emerging socio-economic challenges completely meets interests of the Russian society, which as the author writes, seeks neither to protest actions nor to active expression of political positions. Moreover, Russian society has for centuries found it more comfortable to build relationships with the government on the basis of obedience, not a dialogue. As soon as the state (be it Tsarist or Soviet power) tries to establish such a dialogue through creation of new channels and institutions for bilateral communication, the situation immediately goes out of control, because the extremist forces regard such steps as weakness of the state and begin to demonstrate activity for the conquest of power (in fact, that was how the Bolsheviks came to power).

In the history of the Russian state since the moment of its formation, the national security has been viewed as a system of guarantees for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and national interests based on power methods of political stability. However, in the modern world there have emerged new, sometimes unpredictable factors of destabilization. These include, in particular, the problem of the so-called "color revolutions" and the technologies of their remote implementation. If we consider the notion of "color revolution", it usually refers to the technologies of implementation of government coups and subsequent external control of the political situation in the country in the framework of artificially created political instability. In this case external pressure over the government is exercised through political blackmail with the use of protest potential of the youth movement.

The object of a "color revolution" is not lobbying for the interests of a specific social group or the population in general, but actually the power, in this case the subject of "color revolution" is precisely the political regime, and overthrowing of this regime is the ultimate aim of all the actions. Researchers identify the existence of a specially organized (under a special network form) youth protest movement as favorable conditions
for the implementation of "color revolutions". Another feature of a "color revolution" is, according to the author, the lack of proper revolutionary ideology of the masses of protesters. This is due to the fact that the Anglo-Saxon political strategists almost always ignore the specifics of the mentality of the population in the country where the "color revolution" is conducted. In this context, it would be extremely difficult for the Anglo-Saxon strategists to organize protest activity with the large-scale mobilization of the masses due to the fact that the majority of the Russian population is accustomed to clear ideological assumptions in the protest actions. In this regard, it seems also necessary to establish a unified state political ideology and form up national mass culture so that the state ideological attitudes were a priority over external influences on mass consciousness.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich


Keywords: political class, political elite, bureaucracy, political consultants, political technologists, political journalists, political experts, political lobbyists, party functionaries.

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The author examines the structure of the political class of Russia and the role and influence of the main groups of the Russian political class on the modern political process. The nucleus of the political class is the political elite – a special social section, which takes the crucial strategic decisions. It yields
power and exerts influence through sub-elites of different social
groups and sections (business-elite, media-elite, creative workers’
elite, etc.). It is replenished by members of these elites and uses
ideas created by their representatives.

Bureaucrats, professional managers, and employees of the
government apparatus are playing the leading role in Russia. The
Russian bureaucracy has traditionally taken an active part in the
preparation and adoption of political decisions of state
importance.

Bureaucracy is the foundation of the modern Russian state,
preserving its significance in the Soviet and post-Soviet epoch.
The post-Soviet mid-ranking bureaucracy has been formed from
representatives of the Soviet nomenklatura, and this process has
taken some time. Despite the fact that today the government
apparatus of the Russian Federation is staffed mainly with
representatives of the new generation of government officials,
there is practically no regions in Russia where the bodies of
power have not been formed on the basis of the cardinal
renovation of the managerial bureaucracy. During the post-Soviet
development the Russian bureaucracy has raised its political
status. De facto it became a force consolidating the Russian elites
and expressing the will of their most influential groups.

Such situation cannot be remedied with the help of
traditional reorganizations of the government apparatus without
changing the social nature of the government and municipal
bureaucracy. In A. Kochetkov’s view, the end of bureaucratic
arbitrariness will only be possible if bureaucracy is mainly
recruited from the “middle class” as the most capable and
efficient and the less corrupt stratum, which has a law-abiding
consciousness, secondly, if there is constant control of the state
over the activity of government officials, and also control of the
institutions of civil society, which will render difficult the use by
officials of their official position for mercenary aims.

One of the components of the political class of modern
Russia is party functionaries and party members working in it on
the professional basis. The specific features of the activity of modern functionaries of Russian political parties are that they, just as their parties, determine very little the state policy of the Russian Federation. Even the party functionaries of the “ruling party” – “United Russia” – have practically very little political influence. The situation may become different in the future only after introducing institutional changes and giving greater responsibility to the legislative bodies of power in the Russian political system.

Political consultants and political technologists are an important component of the modern political class of Russia. They specialize in organizing and carrying on election campaigns and provide consultations and services to those who wish to be elected to various bodies of power (for instance, public opinion polls, media reports, mail deliveries, etc.). They also consult politicians on a broad range of issues of the on-going political process. Their influence on adopting political decisions is rather high, which enables them to act practically without any control. In the conditions of modern Russia political consultants and political technologists have an opportunity to influence public sentiments without any responsibility for their actions.

A component part of the Russian political class is also political experts. In the latter half of the 20th century the expert community in the leading countries of the world transformed into a developed sphere of services, an important element of the government apparatus and business and a source of important information about socio-economic and political processes. A considerable number of researchers and professors have been drawn to this sphere, because solution or practical tasks requires a high professional skill. For the successful functioning and development of the political sphere the expert community needs demand from state power bodies, business, political parties and movements, and an adequate tax legislation with a view to enabling the government, business circles, and citizens to finance
research centers and create conditions for competition of ideas and developments.

Another segment of the political class is political journalists. In the post-Soviet period political analysts were replaced by a new professional community – journalists specializing in political subjects. The principal difference between political journalists, on the one hand, and political analysts, political consultants and political technologists, on the other, lies in that the former are in the limelight and the latter are behind the scenes. Journalists address the entire society, whereas political technologists, consultants, and the like deal with concrete political figures or parties.

The community of political journalists also includes editors-in-chief of the mass media, editors (heads) of socio-political departments and sections, observers and leading analysts and correspondents. Press-secretaries and employees of press services of various political figures, political parties and government bodies can also be referred to political journalists, although this profession is not of an open character and is closer to public relations and political technologists’ sphere. Along with the development of the Internet, the blogger phenomenon made its appearance, that is, political journalists who are not only independent authors, but also independent editors and publishers using for the purpose the blogosphere, social networks and their own sites.

The political class of modern Russia also includes professional lobbyists representing the interests of corporative elites. The system of the business lobby acting in their interests has a serious influence on the life of society and the state. The formation of collective capitalism is going on in Russia very rapidly, and its foreign expansion is proceeding apace. The links between the ruling bureaucracy and the top heads of corporations become ever closer, which increases the dependence of government decisions on the interests of corporations. In contrast to many western countries, in Russia the weight of the
state and government bureaucracy is growing in the economic system, because most of the privatized corporations become natural monopolies functioning outside the framework of public control. These natural monopolies can successfully function only in a tandem with the state. Big business receives privileges and investments, openly lobbies its interests and often delegates its representatives to bodies of power, thus becoming a powerful political pillar for the state and government. Such close alliance of the governing bureaucracy and corporate business, in the view of A. Kochetkov, is a serious obstacle for the completion of the formation of a democratic society in Russia, because these segments of the political class more often than not act in their own interests, but not in the interests of society.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich


Keywords: Russian neophytes, new converts, Islam, radicalism, Salafism.

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The author of the article focuses on Russian non-ethnic Muslims, because attention to the neophytes or new converts to Islam has increased in recent years, as a result of changes in the religion and the conditions for its radicalization, increasing threat from Islamic radicals and the emergence of the Islamic State.
The converts are attracting close attention to many Western countries. Their number is growing steadily. The problem of neophytes is particularly relevant, especially among representatives of the Islamic faith, for the post-Soviet Russian Federation, where a sudden rise in religiosity has occurred. In recent years, the names of converts are often in the criminal chronicle associated with terrorist activity and with the militants of the Islamic state. Since 2000, much attention has been drawn again to neophyte terrorists of Slavic origin as a result of numerous terrorist attacks in Moscow, Volgograd and Daghestan.

The author believes, it is possible to understand and prevent the radicalization of these modern converts only after studying what they are, their heterogeneity, their reasons for the change of religion. The question remains open so far: why do new Muslims show a greater propensity for radicalization than those who were born Muslims.

There are few scientific works on this issue, and publications in the media, as always, are speculative and represent the convert Muslims as a terrorist threat, ignoring the fact that the majority of newly converted Muslims do not have a relationship to terrorism. The author tried to address comprehensively the problem of neophytes, examining the existing domestic and foreign sources through the methods of sociology – a method of content analysis, questionnaires, interviews with neophytes, expert interviews.

The neophytes in religion are a phenomenon that counts thousands of years. The change of religions and their transformation is a natural process. The struggle for the spiritual sphere has always been a priority. Missionary activity of all the world religions has played and is playing now an important role. In Islam (especially fundamental) proselytism has become more active in recent years and especially the invasion of new trends is active, rapidly spreading around the world. Those who accept a new religion are usually considered as the neophytes or converts, but it was revealed during a survey of the spiritual leaders of the North Caucasus that many people believed that the so-called neophytes
were the Salafis, who have become followers of the new Islamic currents in the region.

The number of fundamentalist and radical Islamist networks has been growing since the early 1990s. The overwhelming majority of the latest terrorist attacks in the world have one thing in common: the involvement of newly converted Muslims. This process is similar in many countries – in Russia, the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Philippines, etc. Islamic radicalism and militant Jihad spread throughout the world quickly.

The active participation of neophytes in the activities of the Islamic state gave rise to the question: why are more and more young people ready to sacrifice their lives for Islam of a radical direction? Young European (including Russian and North Caucasian) Muslims are trying to join the radical Islamist groups (IGIL, ISIS, ISIL) more and more often, fighting for the establishment of caliphates in Syria and Iraq, and there are a large number of young women among them, seeking to fight, or become wives of militants. The largest number of Western recruits came from France and Britain, less from Austria, Belgium and Spain. Many Russian neophytes are seeking refuge in the North Caucasus republics, being involved in the activities of terrorist structures.

The reasons for encouraging the neophytes to change religious beliefs are social and personal. Objective social reasons are caused by globalization processes, that is, by intensifying the confrontation between the West and the East, secular and religious, losing oneself and alienation, the rapidly decreasing spirituality of society and the remoteness of society from religion and religious norms. Also, one must not forget about adolescent radicalism, the attractiveness of radical and bright for young people. Adopting Islam often acts as a way to find oneself and one's place in the Muslim community, to bring religious values back to life. The neophytes in this case oppose modernity, globalization and secular society, in any case generating radicalization in self-isolation.
The author notes that there are neophyte sites and groups in social networks. Social welfare and the existence of a goal in life are also one of the decisive factors, since the most radical forms of religion are common among slum youth and are oriented toward those who have nothing to lose. Mutual support, charitable actions, assistance to members of the group, fundraising through social networks - all this prove to be effective.

There are three groups of neophytes: 1) guided by "motivated experience"; 2) travelers; 3) spiritual seekers. All these are small groups of people who discovered Islam after going through several other religious traditions, movements and cults, and they study and analyze the texts themselves. This classification is also relevant for Russian neophytes.

The author connects the acceptance of Islam with stressful tension of a person (both internal and in relations with the external environment), and believes that the impetus to the change of religion is often the life in the Muslim environment.

The most frequent change in faith is for the sake of marriage with a Muslim partner. It is often formal and neophytes seldom show interest in practice, much depends on the direction of Islam the partner belongs to.

The author notes, that the largest group of converts are women who are married to a Muslim. Young Muslim women are usually more radical than men. Women make up about 25% of the members of terrorist organizations, the age of most of them between 18 and 25 years. They are prone to fanaticism and idealization and very often their ideal dreams are crumbling, but too late. The spread of radical forms of Islam in the world, the increase in the followers of new forms of "nontraditional" Islam for the Russian regions, contribute to the emergence of an increasing number of neophytes, both Muslim and non-Muslim.

Salafism attracts an increasing number of young people since the early 1990s. Everything new is always more categorical, radical and fanatical. Growing religiosity became more
demanding and rigid after the atheistic Soviet period, and the prescriptions and practices of the new currents are more strict and demanding, supported by sayings from the Koran and Sunnah.

A growing group of neophytes consider themselves strictly related to faith and following the path of "pure" Islam, they often identify themselves as Salafis. Converts often show fanaticism, which is expressed by extremely ritualized behavior, a strict dress code and concern about what haram ("forbidden") and halal ("allowed") is. Also, the feeling of being chosen and feeling the truth of religious beliefs is characteristic of neophytes. They consider the infidels to be deluded.

The author attracts attention to penitentiary institutions as an environment for recruiting neophyte extremists, stressing that one of the priority tasks for religious extremists is the ideological treatment of neophytes that is why they are attracted and, with all-round assistance, influence the psyche. "Charity" in correctional institutions is one of the priority social tasks, according to religious leaders. The neophytes are attracted by the simplicity of understanding religion, mutual aid, monotheism, the relationship of ethnic Muslims among themselves. Most Islamic experts of Daghestan perceive the converts with caution, referring to them as radical.

Modern neophytes are quite heterogeneous. There are several types of neophytes in Russia, but the most common is "marriage neophytes" and "convinced neophytes". There have always been numerous cases of marriage with representatives of the Islamic faith, but they have never talked about their radicalization before. The reason for the change of religion is usually the spiritual search, social problems, the atomicity of modern society and individualization. Radical preachers are more active, they promote the involvement of neophytes in the radical currents of Islam, attracting them into their structure through greater openness, solidarity and organization. At the same time, traditional currents, closely related to ethnic
community, are almost not ready to accept a representative of another ethnic group.

The spread and popularity of radical Islam contributes to the radicalization of the society. Therefore, it is important to prevent the radicalization of neophytes.

Author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

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In this article the status of Islamic studies is analyzed as a research area. It is pointed out that modern Islamic studies are centered on historiographic agenda and consideration of ideological context of Islam. In the author’s opinion, the main problem associated with a concept development of Islamic communities transformation is the absence of the common frameworks for understanding of the Islamic civilization history. And the central problem is an insight of religious and political institutions interaction for transformation in Islamic communities. It is also emphasized the significance of Muslim communities secularization process, which causes composite reaction up to excess radicalism.
Nowadays Islamic studies still have a narrow-subject interpretation, which comes to a complex perception of Islam as an ideological system. Classically Islamic studies as a unique department look smudgy. There is no a significant subject of investigation, which covers all aspects of Muslim communities life and religiously ideological details of Islamic doctrine.

Russian famous expert on Islamic studies S.M. Prozorov supposes that «academic Islamic studies» can be divided in 3 parts: historiographic base baked on original Arabic compositions; conceptual construct of Islam; methodological approach to studying Islam as a self-reliant ideological system. Consequently, the object field of Islamic studies, on the one hand entails source study, on the other one-political science studying ideologies.

While there is no concrete defined particular and methodological frame such academic “liberty” doesn’t allow speaking about Islamic studies in Russia as an accomplished science. Modern Islamic studies are an assembly of interdisciplinary research of Islamic religiously-social ideas and distinct Muslim communities sphere of life.

The epoch of religious and sociopolitical movement in Europe started in the middle of XVI century and ended in the beginning of XVII century. This is a period of establishment of nation states system, which definitively formed after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. European communities, experienced series of bloody conflicts, came to an understanding of impossibility to solve sociopolitical problems through the lens of religion.

In scores of Islamic studies works it is said about the necessity to stay from the guidelines of Eurocentrism and the vestiges of colonialism. Attempts to comprehend the East from the perspective of the western academic conception are criticized.

The lack of a single conception for understanding the history of the Islamic civilization aggravates classification of religiously ideological models.

In Soviet Islamic studies a tradition to identify conservative Islamic sects with reformation was set up by a famous orientalist
A.M. Vasiliev. His view permitted Soviet orientalists to speak about reformative role of salafism today. Another orientalist I.L. Alekseev suggests contemplating such typological models in terms of Islamic discourse. According to I.L. Alekseev for understanding the Sunni discourse it is necessary to rely on notions concerned with an Arab term islakh which has an idea of recovery, reformation. First, it is said about transformation and rearrangement, restoring of original version of Islam rather than its reformation along with new realities. Secondly, the author distinguishes discursive and ideological attitude of nationalists to the problem of Muslim communities transformation. It is pointed at an ideological polarization of views, which spawns crisis of political and national identity in Muslim world. Thirdly, reformation is a term combining interaction between society, state and religious institutes that cannot be applied to reformation of salafism.

Oriental tradition focuses on studying languages and original doctrinal sources that in turn causes profound interest for discursive language theories among orientalists. Classical historic development model of the European civilization cannot be placed on processes of transformation in Muslim world. Renaissance in Muslim world started earlier than in Europe, but attention was paid to academic papers rather than art. Renaissance for Islam communities corresponds more to a political activation.

Process of industrialization and renaissance in Muslim communities started later than in Europe and were obvious, but they developed out of step. Justification of it can be found in modern Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The main result of reformation for the West development of Christian communities became division of religion and politics institutes. As concerns sociopolitical transformations in Muslim world this process is not discernible. T. Huff considers that substantial part of Muslim world is experiencing a recurrence to the primordial doctrine rather than reformation. Implementation
of sharia laws, in his opinion, is associated with domination of religious law over divinity. However the many experts in Islamic studies are not in agreement with him, pointing at inseparability of secular and religious in Islam.

Islam as a religious system has an important significance for Islamic ideology, that doesn’t prevent many Muslim communities from living under secular laws. Problems of religious legitimization of secularism conception in Islam reduce to atheism, infidelity and immorality.

Islamic states are eligible for their own development path. However rules of their sociopolitical advance don’t differ from European and other Eastern non-Islamic communities. As European countries Muslim states experienced establishment of secular state with republican government which succeeded monarchy.

Nowadays widely accepted religious conceptions of political organization lack Muslim community, based on religious principles. That leads to inhomogeneity of Islamic world itself.

Today contemporary nation states and republican government become an integral part of Muslim communities. Even countries of the Persian Gulf don’t keep out of such political entity of society. Examples of Saudi Arabia, where there is a prototype of parliament, and Turkey disclose a common vector of sociopolitical development. Unique example the Islamic Republic of Iran not only uses the most accomplished models of republican government but also created religious conceptions legitimizing them. A 40-year history demonstrates resiliency of such a model and readiness for changes.

Nowadays Sunni religious intellectuals couldn’t have elaborated general theoretic conceptions with a reliable prospect for realization. The author introduces an expression of a famous orientalist M.T. Stepanyants where the latter compares the Christian and Muslim reformation and states that Muslim reformation wasn’t as «explosive» as the Christian one. However the recent events in the Middle East may by their dramatic character surpass the European Reformation.
Today’s political engagement of Islamic socioreligious thought, segregation of Muslim community, inner strife and violation give an opportunity to draw parallels with religious reformation of XVI–XVII in Western Europe.

Entering of Western culture, secular political institutes, transformation of socio-economic structure are all challenges for Muslim communities. These processes are inevitable geopolitical ones and are not connected only with religious doctrine.

Examining biographies of Al-Qaeda terrorists and other radicals Saimon Kotty suggests considering jihadism as a subculture of social tension. He also emphasizes that criminal actions and violence are protests against established sociocultural norms in society, vesting in religious forms. It’s possible to suppose that contemporary radicalism in Islamic communities is a response of certain groups to overcome controversies of inevitable secularization of social and political space in modern Muslim countries.

Nowadays there is still no common approach in Islamic study community, because of objective and methodological fuzziness.

The core problem of present-day Islamic studies is an absence of conceptional focus on the Islamic civilization development that impedes comprehension of transformation paradigm in Muslim communities. It’s necessary to form a generalized paradigm to create not a controversial model of developmental history of the Islamic civilization.

Transformation process in the Muslim East and in Europe can be compared and they are similar to various extents.

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA


Keywords: national policy, tension, South of Russia, conflicts, gang underground.

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The North Caucasus is the most complex and conflictogenic region of Russia. The creation of the North Caucasian Federal region in 2010, modernization programs of the North Caucasus, and billion donations from the federal budget to the region have not given the desired results. Corruption, the clan system, activity of the gang underground, ethnic conflicts and rivalry between the heads of these regions have been chronic problems of the Russian North Caucasus, G. Matishov writes.

When the Southern scientific center (SSC) of RAS was organized, academic science faced the task of analyzing, jointly with state power, various scenarios of possible developments in the South of Russia with a view to working out a complex of strategic solutions. The SSC experts and various specialists have
solved the task of a systemic and managerial analysis of the key problems, threats and risks in the South of Russia and on neighboring territories. In the South of Russia the forcible methods of fighting terrorism and extremism have brought definite results. The region was cleared from gangs on the eve of the Winter Olympics-2014, and the combat ability of the organized gang underground was destroyed. On certain territories the activity of special units and law-enforcement agencies has become more effective. However, the range of problems and tasks, which can be solved by military or forcible means, is limited. Negative political processes may be put off, but they will not be resolved.

The escalation of violence in the North Caucasus began in 2008. By the end of 2009 the situation was actually on the brink of a civil war. In those conditions the North Caucasia Federal region was formed in early 2010. The main aim of its formation was economic reconstruction of the region. The emphasis was laid on a peaceful economic solution of the entire range of problems. But in doing this, a major factor was neglected, namely, that many problems facing the region were of a non-economic nature. The destructive forces in the North Caucasus reacted to the authorities’ plans with increased extremist and terrorist activity. It was no longer possible to talk of the activity of individual militants or their groups, for the crux of the matter now was the coordinated action of the entire gang underground.

Right after the creation of the North Caucasian Federal region the Southern Scientific Center turned to investigation, revelation and analysis of threats and risks for the implementation of the development strategy of the North Caucasian Federal region endorsed by the Russian government. It included a section on nationalities relations and historical memory as factors rendering difficult the realization of economic projects.

The period after the Winter Olympic Games was characterized by the growing tension in the Azov-Black-Sea-Caspian region in view of the growing activity of the gang underground in Dagestan, as well as the Ukrainian crisis and
later the developments in Syria and around it. Russia has found itself on the southern flank in a principally new socio-political situation.

The Ukrainian factor is an important element of cultural policy in the Don, Kuban and Stavropol regions. Most inhabitants of these places having Ukrainian roots are deeply integrated in the life of Russia.

Ukrainian national-cultural associations were actively and freely working in the South during the entire post-Soviet period. Schools and courses were opened in districts along the Don studying the Ukrainian language and results of investigations of the Ukrainian roots of the local population were published. Meanwhile, directly opposite developments were taking place in Ukraine. The sphere of the use of the Russian language was dwindling, and almost total Ukrainization and derussification were going on. Indicative in this respect was the erection of quite a few monuments in the South of Russia to Zaporozhye Cossacks and figures of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. These factors can be used by destructive elements for undermining a rather unstable situation in the region.

For almost a decade and a half of this century mutually beneficial relations between Russia and Turkey were successfully developing. Turkey was regarded by the Russian leadership as an important trade partner and strategic ally. However, political analysts show now that the geopolitical interests of Russia and Turkey in the Azov-Black-Sea region do not coincide, and are often contradictory. For several years already Turkey has been Russia’s rival for influence in the Caucasian-Black-Sea region. Turkey tried to set up the so-called Turkic area on post-Soviet territories in the South of Russia. Russian political analysts have found “pain points”, which the Turkish elite can use to its advantage in its activity, namely, border issues between Turkic and non-Turkic peoples in the North Caucasus, the absence of a uniform Nogai statehood, and after the Crimea joined the Russian Federation – the Crimean Tatar factor.
Ankara has widely used the “Adyge problem”. During the preparations for the Sochi Olympics the most hostile attitude to them was manifested by foreign Adyge organizations in Turkey. But the main thing is that during the entire post-Soviet period Turkey is the most attractive example for the mountain Turkic peoples of the Caucasus (Kumyks, Balkars, Karachais, Nogais, Azeris) and other parts of Russia. The Crimea is the region which Turkey has always regarded as one of its own, because for several centuries it was part of the Ottoman Empire, and because it is inhabited by many Crimean Tatars, a people quite friendly to Turks. At all critical moments of history Turkey has always attempted “to play the Crimean card”. That was the case of World War II and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For several years Ankara has been making its base in the Crimean political elite. The leaders of the Crimean Tatar majlis have always been welcome guests in Turkey. In August 2015 the 2nd World Congress of Crimean Tatars was held in Ankara. Most mosques and Tatar schools in the Crimea have been built on Turkish money.

Intelligence and subversive activities of the Ukrainian and American special services in the Crimea and adjacent territories have markedly increased. Several subversive acts have taken place on the railway line between Simferopol, Bakhchisarai and Sevastopol, and a host of explosive devices and fire arms have been confiscated in the area. Just like in the east of the North Caucasus there have been cases of suicide bombing raids in the vicinity of Kerch and Simferopol. Energetic work is going on to draw young Crimean Tatars in anti-Russian subversive activity.

The economic crisis in Russia, which began at the end of 2014 had a very negative impact on most republics of the North Caucasus. This region even in the pre-crisis period had the lowest level of economic and social development, and among the latest tendencies were a drop of the population’s incomes in the budget sector and a growing share of “informal economy”. The lower
social support of the population over the past year leads to the fall of its loyalty to the authorities.

Today it is necessary to make effective solutions of the urgent socio-economic problems. The entire economic sphere should be industrialized and the defense industry modernized. G. Matishov says that the southern land and sea borders should be strengthened.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich


Keywords: the U.S. economic strategy, Central Asia, the Eurasian Union (EAU), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), World Trade Organization (WTO), the Central Asian Economic Community (CAPS), the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Organization for democracy and economic development GUAM.

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The author notes that the struggle with the Russian integration project has become a key vector of the U.S. economic strategy in Central Asia, since the creation of the Eurasian Union (EAU) is unacceptable for Washington, as it will close the trade on Russia for Central Asian countries. The integration initiatives
of Moscow are constantly faced with vigorous opposition of the U.S. Information and diplomatic campaigns were unleashed at the expense of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), alternative geo-economic projects were put forward, the confrontation was transferred to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The first negotiations of Central Asian countries concerning the accession to the WTO started in the mid-1990s, and they were supported by Washington in general. Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO in 1998, and the process was delayed for more than a decade for the rest of the republics. A new impulse from the West was received during the active phase of the organization of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, which was preceded by a broad discussion of the idea of accelerated adoption of the Central Asian republics in the WTO on conditions that hampered Moscow's integration aspirations in expert circles and the U.S. Congress.

Tajikistan joined the World Trade Organization with the mediation of Western consultants in early 2013. Negotiations lasting over 11 years have been completed quickly and behind closed doors, and their results were most welcomed by American and European representatives. The subsequent analysis of documents showed that the republic, one of the poorest in the CIS, has entered the organization on the basis of a developed economy, abandoning many of the privileges laid down by socio-economic indicators. The agreements have made participation of Tajikistan in regional trade agreements problematic including the CU, EEA and the EEA, establishing expanded "control" of the WTO members over the integration efforts of the republic, and imposing restrictions on adapting its legislation to the terms of regional customs unions.

In the same 2013 at the negotiations on the WTO accession of Kazakhstan, which applied to the organization in 1996, the United States and the EU advanced additional requirements to reduce the customs and tariff protection of a number of commodity groups (aircraft, helicopters, agricultural machinery,
cars, etc.) agreed by Astana in the framework of the Customs Union by that time. Kazakhstan found itself in the role of a "hostage" through which the West negotiates with Russia, trying to enter the Russian market on conditions previously rejected by Moscow. The negotiations were completed in July 2015 by signing a protocol on the accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organization. According to the document, import duties of Kazakhstan were lower by 3.5 thousand commodity positions than those established in the Eurasian Economic Union, which increased the risks of importing goods into the territory of other EEA states and complicated the functioning of the association.

By the end of 2015, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan only did not join the global trading system. The WTO rules contradict their restrictive measures in the trade sphere. Official Tashkent considers the process of joining the association as a long-term one, as it is afraid of undermining the national automotive and textile industries. Ashgabat has traditionally adhered to the policy of isolationism, although the government commission for the study of membership in the organization was established in January 2013. The U.S. foreign policy institutions are monitoring the evolution of the approaches of the two countries to the WTO in order to be ready to accompany the negotiation process.

The main part of the turnover is raw. Americans import oil and metals, including uranium, from the region and exporting engineering products. The desire of Washington to intervene in the processes of regional economic integration of Central Asia with a limited level of trade relations can be explained only by the interests of the geopolitical containment of Russia.

The White House cooperated with the Central Asian Economic Community (CAPS), which existed from 1994 to 2002 and subsequently transformed into The Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The idea of a "closed" integration has failed, bumping into the sharp contradictions of Central Asian
countries, in particular, Astana and Tashkent. In 2005, the OCAC was eliminated in connection with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which included the Russian Federation as the main driving force.

Another structure, supported by the American diplomacy, was the Organization for democracy and economic development GUAM, established by the delegates of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova in 1997 during the summit of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. It was positioned as a multi-disciplinary organization covering a wide range of issues, ranging from the economy to security, and was formed as an anti-Russian bloc, uniting the leaders of the post-Soviet republics oriented toward the West. In practice, it proved to be non-functional, although formally it continues to work. From 1999 to 2005 Uzbekistan was part of the GU(U)AM - the only one among the Central Asian states. It is futile to consider GUAM as an integration alternative, especially in relation to Central Asia today.

In the mid-2000s, the concept of Greater Central Asia was formulated by S. Frederick Starr, who proposed to consider the wider region, including also Afghanistan, northwestern India and part of Pakistan, Iran and Xinjiang of China. According to the author, the improvement of the infrastructure and the minimization of trade barriers, as well as the promotion of the idea of the Greater Central Asia Partnership for Cooperation and Development (GCAP), will contribute to the realization of American interests.

The theses of F. Starr have influenced the US foreign policy line in the Central Asian direction: the Bureau of South Asian Affairs was established in the structure of the US Department of State, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and several other countries with the Central Asian five countries were assigned to its competence. The term "Wider Central Asia" became widespread, and the historical arguments made by the experts were summed up under the current geopolitical design, prefacing
the emergence of the official foreign policy doctrine of the United States called the New Silk Road (NSR).

In fact, it is a plan to integrate Central and South Asia into a single economic macro-region, with Afghanistan in the center. Firstly, the strategy involves the formation of the infrastructure from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia through Afghanistan to South Asian countries — India and Pakistan. Secondly, the trade integration of the countries of Central Asia, Afghanistan and South Asia through improving customs and border procedures, reducing non-tariff barriers, and subsequently opening markets. In 2011, they were presented as a holistic geo-economic concept, an American alternative to Russian and Chinese proposals.

The NSR initiative found a positive response among Central Asian leaders who saw an opportunity to expand trade and sales markets for their products in Afghanistan, as well as modernize their transport system through foreign donors. The principles of the NSR have been transferred to the sphere of regional energy. The American side welcomes the laying of power lines between the Central Asian republics and Afghanistan.

What are the goals pursued by the doctrine of the New Silk Road and why is it adopted as a basic reference point for the U.S. foreign policy department? On the one hand, it is the need to ensure a long-term presence in Afghanistan, as well as to stimulate the Afghan economy by expanding its ties with the neighboring states of Central and South Asia, which will strengthen the stability of the secular government in Kabul, and hence the prospects for preserving the stay of the Western contingents there. It will also help to reduce the need for permanent external grants from Afghanistan, which is very important in the context of the curtailment of the programs for the support of the European NATO allies, while the U.S. debt is growing at a record pace. On the other hand, the West can assume that the joining of the southern direction to the economic
priorities of Central Asia will reduce the importance of the Russian factor in the economic life of the region, in particular, the role of Moscow as the leading integration center.

The opinion on the opposition of the New Silk Road to the Russian and Chinese economic policy is grounded, but it is necessary to clarify. The expansion of trade, economic and transport links of the Central Asian republics with their southern neighboring countries does not threaten the interests of Russia. This extension should positively impact on Central Asia and Afghanistan, contributing to their stability and prosperity in the normal development of economic relations. Russia is interested in such a development of events to a greater extent. It even declared in different years about the willingness to participate in many initiatives that lie in the plane of the New Silk Road.

Certain requirements about the break-up of the established cooperation ties with Central Asian countries can provoke risks for Moscow. It is impossible to exclude the emergence of such an appeal as the condition for accession of Central Asian countries to the South integration project offered by the U.S. in the future. Currently only local projects (bridges, roads) that do not require high costs and infrastructure involved in the supply of NATO troops, have been implemented.

Washington demonstrated that it does not intend to incur large financial costs on the New Silk Road, counting on its allies (Germany, Japan) and the international financial institutions. The investors are deterred by the unresolved issues with security in Afghanistan. The high politicization of the New Silk Road projects hampers the adoption of well-considered investment decisions.

The deep contradictions between the individual states of South and Central Asia are contributing: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, India and Pakistan and others. Integration structures with Russian participation now seem more tangible and attractive against this background than the New Silk Road. The northern economic direction is safe and
provided with the existing developed infrastructure, deeply detailed legal framework and extensive cooperation ties.

Washington is pursuing a vigorous economic policy in the region that is disproportionate to the level of relations achieved in this sphere, actively interferes in the course of economic transformations in Central Asian countries and influences their choice of integration preferences. The strategy of the United States is focused not so much on expanding its own economic ties, as on the tasks of geopolitical containment of Russia and China.

The United States is losing ground in the regional integration race step by step in recent years. Only bringing to power of loyal governments in the oil and gas producing and transit countries of Central Asia is capable of breaking this trend, apparently, and they will become the vehicles of the economic policy, that is hostile to Russia, like "Bakiyev's Kirghizia".

Author of the abstract – N. Ginesina


Keywords: Kazakhstan, modernization, economy, industry, oil-and-gas complex, transport infrastructure, integration megaprojects.

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After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. almost all industrial branches of Kazakhstan and big agricultural enterprises could hardly survive, or found themselves on the brink of disappearance.
The structure of gross products changed: instead of goods production, the sphere of services came to the fore. This tendency is characteristic of the modern world, but in Kazakhstan it was a result of a slump in most branches of commodity production, transfer from the state order system and administrative distribution to market relations, and reduction of government allocations to economic development.

But Kazakhstan used to advantage what it received as a heritage from the Soviet past, like Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, namely, the oil-and-gas industry, as well as the heavy industry, which was in dire straits. By the 2000s, the state leadership of Kazakhstan was faced with a choice: either to go forward along the road of the Middle East “oil monarchies”, or, using the hydrocarbon raw materials as an export resource, to switch over to creating a multi-sectoral economy on the basis of modern industrial and post-industrial technologies. The Kazakhstan leadership, realizing the vital importance of the second variant of economic development for political integration and security, has chosen precisely this variant. Kazakh leaders relied on the dynamic Kazakhstan-cum-foreign sector of extraction and export of oil and gas with drawing big world oil companies to this business. By the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis, the country’s oil production has increased threefold (about 80 million tons), and gas more than fourfold. The fuel-and-energy resources accounted for 70 percent of export and more than 20 percent of the GDP.

The five-year “State Plan of forced industrial-innovative development for 2010–2014” was adopted. Its authors proceeded from the premise that private capital was not able and willing to orient to priority tasks of economic construction, primarily, to the development of the modern manufacturing industry. The loans of private banks were channeled mainly to trade and construction. Eighty-five percent of the more than $100 billion direct foreign investments in the economy during the first two decades of independent development were spent on raw material
branches. Special attention was paid to the active role of the state in the implementation of the plan. State financial resources should have been channeled through government and private operators. The central position in that structure was taken by the Fund of national welfare “Samruk–Kazyna” formed largely by profits from oil export. The volume of direct investments in planned projects was set at 6.5 trillion tenge, or $43 billion by the then rate (30 percent of the GDP in 2010). The central part of the plan was an oil-and-gas complex. The task was set to bring oil extraction to 85 million tons in 2014 (120 percent as against the level in 2008), natural gas to 54 million cubic meters (164 percent), oil export to 75 million tons (119 percent), refining of oil by Kazakhstan’s oil refineries to 15 million tons (122 percent). But along with this, the output of non-raw-material sectors of the country’s economy should have reached 40 percent of the volume of export. It was necessary to ensure the priority development of the energy, transport and information-communication infrastructure and achieve a positive change in the expansion of national entrepreneurship.

By the end of the planned period (2014) most of its targets were not reached fully, although definite positive changes and general economic progress did take place. High growth rates of oil and gas extraction were not achieved, primarily due to failure to develop key natural deposits. In 2014 the use of incomes from export for the implementation of the plans of forced industrialization was hampered by a drop in the world oil prices. Essential defects of the Kazakh economy also played a negative role, which was switching over from an administrative model to a market one. A no small role was also played by the weakness of national private capital. Another problem was the disintegration of the national economy on a territorial and reproduction basis – vertical and horizontal. Serious drawbacks came to life in the management system based on administrative command from above without feedback in discussion and realization of projects.
President Nursultan Nazarbayev in his regular Message to People in November 2014 said about the changes in the modernization priorities for the next five-year period (2015–2019). The point was the “New Economic Policy of Kazakhstan “Nurly Zhol” (“Bright Road”). It was a turn from forced modernization of industry to the development of the transport, energy, industrial and social infrastructure, as well as to support of small and medium-size business, as the mass base of economic growth. Nursultan Nazarbayev emphasized that it would be the development of the infrastructure that would be the pivot of a new policy. The common investment portfolio was determined equaling 6 trillion tenge ($33 billion, or 15.5 percent of the HDP for 2014), with the share of the state in it – 15 percent.

Summing up the results of the first (2010–2014) five-year period of the “Nurly Zol” strategy, one can conclude that neither Kazakhstan’s economy nor its managerial apparatus was prepared well enough for tackling such stupendous task as the frontal and forced modernization of the industrial economy of the country. Yu. Aleksandrov supposes that it was the main reason for Nazarbayev’s turn to a new strategy – integration megaprojects of national and international size. The leadership of Russia took such path ten years earlier, centering attention on the international expansion of the oil-and-gas sector of the fuel-and-energy complex. In this case such strategy was an alternative to modernization and broad diversification of the economy, whereas in Kazakhstan it is part of the common trend of the interest of the main actors of the Eurasian economy and integration policy toward a single economic area – from Western Europe with the Middle East to the Far East and Southeast Asia.

All the more so since in the past years a rapid growth of China’s activity has been observed there. Kazakhstan is connected with it by pipeline systems of deliveries and transit of oil and gas from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan of oil, as well as participation in the motor-road Western China – Western Europe project. The Chinese “Economic Belt of the Silk Road and
Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century” project opens up still more interesting prospects for Kazakhstan. It was initiated by the PRC Chairman Xi Jinping in 2013, and after that active preparation work has started. China has already earmarked $40 billion for the project fund. From the point of view of the Chinese leadership, the creation of economic corridors “China-Mongolia-Russia,” “Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar,” “Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century” will lend the regional and world economy a powerful impetus. The common idea of the project (“one belt, one road”) lies in the desire to set up a system of cooperation partners on land and sea and demonstrate China’s resolution to put forward reforms of the global structure and order.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich


Keywords: Central Asia, European Union, U.S.A., Tajikistan, radical Islam, international security, terrorist threat.

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The world comes across terrorist and extremist challenges, which create a real threat to international security, ever more often. Terrorism has long stepped over the boundaries of continents and confessions. It is supranational, and this is its main danger. The destructive activity of the ISIS is causing great alarm both in the East and West. From a regional organization it has turned into a global factor of the destabilization of the existing world order. ISIS has not come into being from nowhere.
Its religious roots go back into the distant past, they can be found in the 7th century A.D., in the very cradle of Islam. The traditions of orthodox Islam are connected with the names of two theologians: Ahmadi bin Hanbala (8th-9th century) and ibn Taimiya (13th - early 14th century). It was they who were the progenitors of the ideological current called “Salafism” (salaf al-salih). One of the most well-known followers of that tradition – Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 in the very center of the Arabian Peninsula. The emergence of Wahhabism, one of the most orthodox trends of Islam whose ideology has been taken by ISIS, is traditionally connected with his name and activity. The Egyptian philosopher S. Kutb played a no small role in the radicalization of Islam and the formation of jihadist ideology. It was he who connected al-Wahhab’s theory with the activity of the present-day Islamists from “al-Qaeda” and ISIS. In the early 2000s there was an upsurge of radical Islam. The recognized “Godfather” of ISIS is a native of Jordan named Abu Musab az-Zarkawi. He was an uneducated man and therefore unable to formulate and substantiate the theoretical foundations of ISIS activity. But the latter had an ideologist in the person of Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, who was the organizer of bloody “theatrical” performances – mass beheading in the name of the triumph of Allah’s ideas.

After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991 the serious radicalization of Islam was taking place in Central Asian states, which used to be part of the U.S.S.R. It was manifested in the emergence and activity of Islamist organizations and movements (often working illegally). Radical Islam in Central Asia has now become a threat no less important than in the Middle East or Africa.

The influence of radical Islam is felt in Central Asia especially strongly as compared to other regions of the post-Soviet area due to the border with Afghanistan, which is a destabilizing factor for the situation in the Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. Islamic traditions and opposition to secular rule have had a long history in the region and they proved firm enough.

The moist indicative in this respect, in D. Malyshev’s view, is the experience of Tajikistan. It feels a strong impact of radical Islamism on the local political process. This was due, first of all, to the fact that Tajikistan was the only Central Asian republic drawn in a bloody civil war in the 1990s, which was in essence a struggle of the two development trends – secular and theocratic. Secondly, it was precisely in Tajikistan that the interests of regional and non-regional actors clashed, who later took part in an inter-Tajik dialogue which has finally resulted in a settlement of the conflict. Thirdly, for quite some time Tajikistan was the only Central Asian country where the state authorities officially allowed the Islamic political organization – Party of Islamic Revival – to function. Its representatives were included in the bodies of executive and legislative power, as well as in law-enforcement agencies and military structures.

The situation connected with the radicalization of Islam in Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries was aggravated with the piling up of domestic problems which were used by the local religious underground for compromising secular ruling regimes. As the grave threats and difficult domestic problems in the region D. Malyshev cites interethnic tension, contradictions between the elites inside each country, low living standards of the population, widespread drug addiction, growing popularization of radical religious and nationalistic ideas, widening gap in the incomes of various groups of the population in each country of the region, high unemployment level, fabulous corruption, weak efficiency of the work of government bodies, absence of succession of supreme power in the countries of the region, etc.

Among the main Islamist organizations are the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, Union of Islamic jihad, “Khizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”, and ISIS. The ramified network of the organization “Muslim Brotherhood” is active in Central Asian countries. It is represented by a network of autonomous cells,
which operate in Central Asian countries under various names: “Society of social reforms”, “Committee of Islamic calling”, etc. These organizations exist in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The problem of the radicalization of Islam presents a threat to all countries in the region, but it is especially acute in Tajikistan. The spreading of radical Islamist ideas is largely connected with the historical prerequisites of the formation of Tajikistan as a state. In 1929 it became a Union republic within the U.S.S.R. It was in Tajikistan, just as in neighboring Uzbekistan, that the center of the basmachi movement was concentrated, which the Soviet authorities could liquidate only by the 1930s. But the traditions of radical Islam in the republic were preserved.

The disintegration of the U.S.S.R. has made a negative influence on all former Soviet republics of Central Asia, but its consequences were especially painful in Tajikistan. The emergence and development of the already de facto independent Tajikistan has taken place in very difficult conditions. Islamist tendencies have been on an increase in the republic, and it was facilitated by the activities of the two main political forces in the country – the Democratic party of Tajikistan and the Party of Islamic Revival. They did everything in their power to provoke conflicts. As a result Tajikistan was drawn in a five-year-long civil war, whose consequences have not been overcome to this day. Born as an inter-clan confrontation that conflict turned into a full-fledged civil war which formally lasted until June 27, 1997, when a ceasefire agreement was signed in Moscow by the President of Tajikistan E. Rahmon and the leader of the United Tajik opposition S. Nuri. Russia helped Tajikistan to do away with the aftermath of the conflict. It mediated in the solution of the conflict and helped draw closer the positions of the two sides. Western countries, too, joined efforts in order to resolve the conflict in Tajikistan. Nine rounds of inter-Tajik negotiations took place in which the UN and OSCE took place. As a result, the
situation has stabilized and the Party of Islamic Revival of Tajikistan has received the status of an officially existing and functioning organization. Tajikistan is the only republic in the region where, in the conditions of a secular regime, the activity of an Islamic party is officially allowed; moreover, it is even represented by its deputies in national parliament.

The situation in the country began to change in 2015. The Tajik Ministry of Justice demanded in the form of an ultimatum that the party should stop its unlawful activity. D. Malyshev thinks that this fact can be viewed differently. On the one hand, the republican authorities and, above all, President E. Rahmon and his entourage, who support a secular political system, fear the growing influence of radical Islam, which is quite justified. On the other hand, inasmuch as the activity of the Islamic party has always been controlled by the authorities, it deprived the party of the opportunity to act freely within the framework of the law, thus giving possibilities for illegal radical trends, with which the Islamic party was at loggerheads, to engage in propaganda activity.

Tajikistan’s authorities look with optimism at the possibility to solve security problems in their country and in the region as a whole. At the same time the country’s leadership do not conceal their concern regarding the possibility of a renaissance of Islamic extremism. In March 2016 the government of the republic took under strict control the departure of its citizens abroad in order to prevent their falling under the influence of ISIS. By the beginning of this year more than 1,000 men from Tajikistan joined the ranks of this terrorist organization and are now taking part in the war in Syria and Iraq.

Taking into account the length of Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan (1,344 kilometers), the threat of the penetration of supporters of radical Islam in Tajikistan from the territory of its neighbor persists to this day. This border passes mainly along the Pyandzh River and is easy to cross. This problem is being tackled by a joint Tajik-Afghan commission on the demarcation of the border, but it’s still early to talk of any tangible results.
The situation in Tajikistan, just as in the entire region of Central Asia, remains tense, and Islamic radicalism is still the main factor of instability. Time will show whether the interested forces of the region are ready to join their efforts to oppose and overcome this dangerous phenomenon. Meanwhile, until the status quo persists in Central Asia, many problems, including opposition to Islamic extremism, may be resolved successfully, D. Malyshev concludes.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich


Keywords: Kazakh nationalists – Kazakh national-patriots, Russian-Kazakh relations, Russophobia in Kazakhstan, Russians in Kazakhstan, Russian language in Kazakhstan.

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After proclamation of independence the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan took the course for building of an ethnic-oriented statehood, based on the titular status of the Kazakhs. Then, in the early 1990s, the Kazakh nationalism received substantial incentives for development, although such sentiments had also been observed earlier. However, emphasizes Dmitry Likhachev, up to the present the nationalists failed to become a significant political force in the country. Nevertheless, their rhetoric is constantly present in public discourse and enjoys support of certain segments of the population. The power too manifests a certain interest in using the potential of nationalist movements. Representatives of the nationalist camp of Kazakhstan
use as self-designation the term "national patriot" (abbreviated as "natspat"). In the meanwhile the ideology of this movement places patriotic ideas to the background, and Russophobia has become the ideological core of national-patriots.

Today the Kazakh national-patriotic front is represented mainly by single activists. Among the leaders of the movement there are many former officials, who, apparently, maintained the contacts with the authorities. One such well-known in the country natspats is R. Jumali, who began his career in the diplomatic field: a referent, an attaché of the Middle East Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan (1992–1995), Assistant Minister of the foreign service of the Republic (1995–1996), the press secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan (1999–2002), member of diplomatic missions in the Middle East (2004–2007). Since 2008 he has been listed among the editors of the opposition newspaper "Exclusive". In the spring of 2014 he was among the organizers of Anti-Eurasian forum in Almaty. Another national patriot, M. Taijan is also a former official of the civil service. For a long time he worked in government positions: the Agency of the RK for Strategic Planning and Development, the President's Administration, expert of the Security Council of Kazakhstan (1997–2001). Having left the civil service in 2003, he took on entrepreneurship and joined the opposition to power.

One of the leaders of local nationalists is A. Sarym, a publicist, the author of works on the history of Alash Orda, the repressions of 1930s, the events of December 1986. A. Sarym worked in the oppositional newspaper "Zhas Alash", was a member of the opposition party "Nagyz Ak Zhol", later transformed into "Azat" (2005–2009). Currently he holds the post of Vice-President of the Public Fund "Abay akparat" keeping the portal "Abai" which deals on the history and culture of the Kazakh people. He also heads the Fund named after Altynbek Sarsenbayev, established in honor of the opposition politician, killed in February 2006.
A Kazakh poet, a former politician, M. Shahanov is a veteran of the Kazakh nationalist movement. Earlier he was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and of the independent Kazakhstan (1986–1991), the Majilis of the Kazakh Parliament (2004–2007). The poet headed the Kazakh National Council created in November 2013, comprised of representatives of local intellectuals and public figures and aiming to raise the national question in the Republic. In September 2015 the Council presented proposals for constitutional approval of special rights of the Kazakh people as the titular nation and kazakhization of the television and the press.

The youth wing of the national-patriots is represented by J. Mamai and I. Imanbai (a reporter of the newspaper "Ashyk Alan" – "Tribune"). J. Mamai takes part in public and political life of the country since the time he was 19, when he headed the organization "Rukh pen til" (Spirituality and Language). The structure aims at spreading of the Kazakh culture and the Kazakh language, or, as said the activist himself, "to make those in power speak the state language". In December 2011, during the strike of oil workers in Zhanaozen J. Mamai participated in rallies and spoke to the protesters, and for that he spent several months of 2012 in custody.

The lack of consistent associations of Kazakh nationalists is compensated by the existing media framework that ensures promotion of the nationalist ideology. In this case information activity of natspats is concentrated mostly in the Internet. For agitation the following means are used: 1) actual nationalist resources, sticking mostly to moderate rhetoric and devoted to the analysis of the ethnic peculiarities of the Kazakh people and its history; 2) liberal opposition web publications, where articles critical to the government intersect with the materials of ethno-political, national and linguistic orientation; 3) social networks. For dissemination of national-patriotic ideas the interested forces seldom resort to drastically radical slogans, which find no support and understanding with the main part of Kazakhstan. Anti-Russian
and Russophobic ideas are more often propagandized by indirect methods by way of publication of materials negatively evaluating the current national and foreign policy of the authorities, as well as insufficient spread of the Kazakh language among the local residents (it is considerably less spread than Russian), and the problems of national building in the Republic.

Social networks are actively used to promote nationalist discourse, especially the American platform Facebook. Here, the agitation is conducted at the sites of two types: individual pages of popular bloggers and special network groups. Among the special groups (the so called communities) in social network the leadership belongs to "Kazakh Horde", a page dedicated to decolonization (eradication of colonialism) and protection of the sovereignty of Kazakhstan.

Today Kazakh nationalism is primarily of anti-Russian nature. The activists of the movement are campaigning on several thematic areas, the main of which are anti-Soviet and Russophobic interpretation of the history of Kazakhstan, analysis of Russian-Kazakh relations on the model of "the metropolis and the former colony", the search for alternative allies in the West, the language problem as a threat to the Kazakh ethnic building.

In the field of history of Kazakhstan natspats are trying to present an interpretation of the evolution of the Kazakh statehood alternative to traditional historiography. The period of the Russian Empire and the Soviet stage in the history of the country appears to them exclusively in a negative way. The Central Asian revolt of 1916 against the Csar power is estimated from the position of national liberation struggle against the "Russian occupation".

One of the important points of the natspat propaganda is justification of more than a millenia-old history of Kazakhstan that is used to demonstrate the insignificance and relative shortness of the periods when the land occupied by the modern Republic, were part of the Russian Empire and the USSR. In October 2015, they welcomed the decision of Kazakhstan leadership to declare
2015 the year of the 550th anniversary of the Kazakh Khanate, despite the historical divisiveness and even doubtfulness of the very fact of existence of a state there at the time.

Russian-Kazakh relations are interpreted from the standpoint of "neo-imperialism", "Imperial ambitions", "colonialism" and "chauvinism". Among the most popular themes there are: Eurasian integration project, territorial annexation of "originally Kazakh" Omsk and Orenburg, the "fifth column" represented by ethnic Russians and the so-called "Kazakh mankurts", the lease of Baikonur Cosmodrome and military sites by Russia.

The Eurasian economic union and economic cooperation with Russia are regarded as threats to Kazakhstan statehood and an attempt of Moscow to restore the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. The initiative of holding an Anti-Eurasian forum in April 2014, on the eve of signing of the EAEU Treaty in Astana belongs to the nationalists (A. Sarym, R. Jumali, J. Mamai).

As an alternative to cooperation with Russia national patriots suggest development of cooperation with the countries of the West and the Turkic world. Active promotion of the potential of the Kazakh-Turkish friendship gained momentum after the aggravation of Russian-Turkish relations in November 2015.

Special attention in the nationalist discourse is paid to the language issue. The Kazakh language is considered as the only possible cultural liaison in the construction of the ethnic oriented Kazakhstan statehood. National patriots act for abolition of paragraph 2 of article 7 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan defining that in state organizations and organs of local self-government Russian is the officially used language same as Kazakh.

In the foreign policy of modern Kazakhstan, references to the rhetoric of the natspats may be useful for the government to justify the multi-vector course of the Republic, the ideas of Turkic unity and the idea that the EAEU does not enjoy the universal support of the population of Kazakhstan.
Despite the fact that most natspats publicly position themselves as the opposition, they do not pose a threat to the current government. In those cases when the representatives of the nationalist camp demonstrate excessive independency, they quickly fall under the pressure of the law enforcement system. For its part, the official Astana, presumably, is interested in maintaining a certain level of national-patriotic sentiments, which, as required, are used by the authority to promote its own foreign and domestic policy. References to such sentiments are used as part of the economic "bargaining" in the EAEC, and also to counterbalance the pro-Russian views in the Kazakh society and the construction of a "Kazakhstan nation", concludes the researcher.

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES


Keywords: Turkey, Crimean war, the Khatt-I Humayun 1856, Islam, the Treaty of Paris in 1856.

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Turkey officially became one of the victorious powers that were called "the Concert of Europe" at the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris in 1856. In particular, this privilege was honored by the fact that the Sultan Abdulmajid published the decree "Khatt-I Humayun" on the equality of all Turkish citizens, both Muslims and Christians. The Sultan promised to continue reforms (tanzimat), which were supposed to bring Turkey closer to Europe even more. The accession to the European concert meant serious psychological problems in addition to the benefits for the Turkish people because of the current national mentality.

The author believes that a great deal still had to be done on the path of rapprochement with the West and in the search for the place of Islam in the new society. The Crimean War was ended with negotiations in Paris in 1856 that made the significant changes in the international status of Turkey and Russia. The
purpose of the war, in the words of the French Emperor Napoleon III, was to prevent the spread of Russian influence and force the Russians to return to Asia, to deprive Finland, and the Baltic lands, Poland and the Crimea, causing a grandiose fall of Russia.

The author quotes the well-known French historian A. Malé, that in 1856 Turkey achieved the goal, which it was refused in 1815, i.e. it was not admitted to the meetings of the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). Expectations of Turkey had not been realized: that it would have been included in a number of countries – members of the Holy Alliance, as a victim of the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt and other military campaigns. There were problems even with the acceptance of England into the Holy Alliance, since it was a Protestant country. On the other hand, England, France and Austria looked with prejudice at Orthodox Russia. And, moreover, could not imagine Muslim Turkey in the pan-European "consent".

The relations between Turkey and France were quickly restored, but France's invasion of Egypt had not passed without a trace. The new course of Islam – Wahhabism, gradually consolidated in the Arabian Peninsula – was largely directed against the Muslims of Turkey, the Caucasus and Iran.

Europe declared Russia a "suppressor of freedom" after the events in Hungary and Austria in 1848, while Turkey turned into the refuge of "progressive" emigrants from Hungary, Poland, Italy and other countries in the descriptions of the European press. The real triumph for Turkey was the success of the Turkish exposition at the First World Exhibition in London in 1851.

The author notes that Turkey's accession to the European "concert" has been considered the highest and unique achievement of the diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire and the European anti-Russian politicians of the West. Signatures of not only Western but also Russian officials were put under the articles of the Treaty of Paris in 1856. Unlike the projects of the past, Turkey was accepted into the "concert" without the absurd
conditions of refusal of Islam. The situation in Europe has changed so much that the idea of imposing a rejection of religion would seem insulting and "anachronistic". There were requirements for accession, but they did not concern religious issues, but civilization ones.

Entering the "concert" meant continuation of the policy of state patronage for reforms in Turkey - this is the formulation of a course for the improvement of its civilization and the adaptation of elements of Western achievements to it. The consequences of “Khatt-I Humayun” in 1856 were ambiguous. Contradictions between Muslims and Christians became acute in the Ottoman army after the declaration of "equality" between them. France was forced to introduce a significant military contingent to Syria. There was tension in some areas of the Christians residence in the Balkans. This process is sometimes called the Westernization of Turkey, connecting it with France, Britain, Russia and other states.

Summarizing the written, the author emphasizes that: the preconditions for the revolution of 1856 can be deduced from the invasion of Europe into the Ottoman Empire; Turkey's image in Europe has been so favorable since the 1840s that Napoleon III and his British counterparts used it to motivate its defense and attacks on Russia; The Ottoman reformers won support from both their own authorities and foreign diplomats, and certain groups of immigrants; There was no noticeable improvement for Christians in Turkey after 1856, but the trends of the revolutionary changes were felt; Although the changes in the Ottoman Empire were not noticeable, the new principles were gradually beginning to affect.

*Author of the abstract – N. Ginesina*
In 2010–2012, in the United States there formed an "alternative Afghan policy": support for the "New Northern Alliance" (NNA, on the basis of the National Front of Afghanistan), which was to control the Northern, Western and Central provinces of the country up to Kabul and to get ready for civil war with the Taliban and other groups loyal to Pakistani intelligence. After emergence of the ISIS, fighting its representatives in Afghanistan became regarded as one of the priorities for the NNA, I. Safranchuk notes.

The central figure, that supports this system of thought, is a Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher. D. Rohrabacher expressed his ideas in favor of Mujahideen warlords in the 1990s, and at the beginning of the first term of George Bush Jr. he advised to take the recommendations of the latter regarding the reliance on the Mujahideen, weakening of the Pashtuns and building in Afghanistan of a decentralized model of power. However, the administration of George Bush Jr. made a choice in favor of the ambitious project of building a strong centralized Afghanistan headed by a Pashtun President. After B. Obama in February 2009 set out his first attitudes in regard of Afghanistan, D. Rohrabacher started criticizing them regularly.

In may 2009, D. Rohrabacher addressed the Congress with a report on Afghanistan, in which he outlined the main elements
of his course: warlords from the ranks of the Mujahideen of the 1980s are real friends of America, Pakistan and the Taliban (as well as those who cooperate with them, like G. Hekmatyar) are enemies; it is necessary to strengthen the "New Northern Alliance" and prepare for a new round of the civil war with the Taliban. In July 2010, the former American Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill called for reliance on the warlords from the Northern and Western provinces of Afghanistan, abandonment of supporting H. Karzai and set the course for partition of the country. A representative of the most extreme form of this system of thought is Jack Wheeler. He campaigned in the right-wing Republican journals for dismemberment of Afghanistan and Pakistan and formation of two new States: Pashtunistan and Baluchistan.

At that time American experts intensified debates on the future of Afghanistan and the prospects after 2014. All of 2011, American experts discussed the need to have a "plan B", a backup variant in case the main variant of Obama administration for Afghanistan won't work. Criticizing the official policy in Afghanistan, D. Rohrabacher promoted the version of the "New Northern Alliance" as the main "backup". R. Blackwell remained the only figure of the American establishment, who spoke for partition of Afghanistan. Explaining his position, Ambassador Blackwill regarded partition of the country as the least bad of the bad variants (with no good ones at all). It can be interpreted both as a tactical option in favor of dismemberment of Afghanistan (to present this option as a more acceptable, as a necessary "evil"), and as having certain discrepancies with the group of D. Rohrabaher (who believed partition of Afghanistan a desirable option).

An important event of this "alternative Afghan policy" was the meeting in January 2012 in Berlin of American congressmen with warlords from Afghanistan. The meeting was designed as a event organized by Germany-based Aspen Institute. At the meeting in Berlin the Americans spoke from the standpoint of
friends of the National Front, putting forward the idea that Obama wanted, before the election of 2014, to make a bargain with the Taliban and with their help, to withdraw the troops, thus betraying the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. The American participants brought to the attention of the Afghans the thesis, that they understood the discontent of the National Front with the American policy and were willing to help it. They also set forward the thesis that H. Karzai was displeased with the plans of Barack Obama, but would try to negotiate both with Obama, and the Taliban, not to put up opposition to them. The Afghan participants were not of so radical disposition. They advocated a dialogue with Hamid Karzai, and the Taliban, repeating that all could agree. Meanwhile, the Afghan participants expressed the wish that in the course of such negotiations the Americans were on the side of the National Front, rendered it more help. The Afghan participants at the meeting spoke clearly against partition of Afghanistan.

Despite the fact that the meeting was held in a friendly atmosphere, there was seen a pronounced disagreement between the Americans and the Afghans. While General Dostum was closer to the American position, the others were more restrained (against partition of Afghanistan, in favor of agreement with the Taliban, but on reasonable terms). However, the American participants were determined not to discordances but to agreement, so they focused on the issues whereupon all the participants of the meeting were of joint opinion: the redistribution of political authority and cash flows in favor of provincial authorities, local elections, rejection of centralization of the power in Kabul, modification of the Constitution.

On February 8, 2012, the subcommittee of D. Rohrabacher convoked hearings on Baluchistan, which were mainly attended by supporters of independence of Baluchistan, including the Baluchi Diaspora in the United States. The general thrust of the hearings was promotion of the idea of independence of Baluchistan on geopolitical, moralistic and economic grounds. In
fact, D. Rohrabacher reiterated the points that were previously promoted by John Wheeler (who did not attend to the hearings): Pakistan and Iran violated human rights and oppressed the Baluchi people; the latter were to obtain independence; they would become loyal allies of the United States; in the areas inhabited by the Baluchi, there were local resistance groups, they needed support. The Afghan question was evaded at the hearings, but it appeared that the independent Baluchistan must be created from the provinces of three countries – Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

In 2012 the group of D. Rohrabacher got busy about the following main issues: work with the National Front in Afghanistan; an attempt to establish contacts with the major warlords not included in the National Front; promotion of independence of Baluchistan. Also, the actions of the group in the period, obviously, consciously promoted the relations of Barack Obama with Hamid Karzai and Pakistan. In general, supporting the idea of the independent Pashtunistan, the group did not conduct any active campaign on this issue, concentrating more on the Baluchi theme and acquiring respect of the Diaspora, part of Baluchi politicians in Pakistan and the Baluchi Diaspora in the United States.

The attitude of Afghan warlords of non-Pashtun origin towards D. Rohrabacher's group remained cautious. To the greatest extent D. Rohrabacher was supported in Afghanistan by the Uzbek leader General Dostum. Powerful Tajik commanders were interested, but communicated through intermediaries. They supported part of the theses of D. Rohrabacher's group (redistribution of political and economic influence in favor of the Afghan provinces, weakening of the central government in Kabul), but did not approve of the general course of redrawing of the borders in the region.

American diplomats and administration officials distanced themselves from the activities of D. Rohrabacher's group, especially in the period of their greatest activity in 2012. The State Department expressed pronounced dissatisfaction with this
"private initiative". In January 2012, in Berlin, the USA Embassy tried to frustrate the meeting with field commanders. Official American structure made an attempt, partially successful, to seize D. Rohrabacher's initiative. In the summer of 2012 Paris hosted a meeting of warlords from different ethnic groups, which could be considered an attempt of the circles loyal to B. Obama to take the lead in the contacts with field commanders who were in a state of uncertainty. The main line of the meeting was to prevent a new civil war, to remove, by way negotiations, contradictions between field commanders and maintain their loyalty to Kabul.

In 2013–2015, D. Rohrabacher's group reduced its activity. This group becomes active when there is a real opportunity for modification of the USA policy in Afghanistan. It was this way in the beginning of 2001, when George Bush Jr. had just formed his administration and it was trying to sort out the intricate system of relations with the Taliban and their sponsors, left over from the previous administration and after that, in late 2001 – early 2002, when the same administration was determining, to whom and on what terms formal power in Afghanistan should be given. But at that time the basic ideas of D. Rohrabacher were not adopted. In early 2009, B. Obama undertook a review of his line towards Afghanistan and D. Rohrabacher intensified his activity. The Obama administration understood that it was necessary to involve regional partners for the solution of the Afghan problem more actively. And D. Rohrabacher proposed his regional option. However, to no avail. Another opportunity opened for him in 2011–2012, when the United States began a discussion on the issue that it was desirable to have not only the basic plan of the current administration, but a certain backup "plan B" in case the main one failed. But D. Rorabacher's variant was not adopted again, and he reduced his activity. However, his group is constantly maintaining its system of thought and its contacts in the region. In fact, D. Rohrabacher's group has a developed alternative policy for Afghanistan, concludes the researcher.

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Yemen, writes L. Isaev, remains one of the most unstable countries of the Middle East. Anarchy, separatism, religious strife, foreign intervention, terrorist groups – this is far from a complete list of the problems besetting the Yemeni Republic today.

On April 21, 2016 in Kuwait under the auspices of a special UN envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed there started the peace negotiations between the National delegation of Yemen (it included representatives of the Ansar Allah and the General People's Congress – GPC) and "the Riyadh group", which is nothing else as a government in exile, controlled by Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who is called "the legitimate President of Yemen". The peace talks which lasted for three and a half months were unsuccessful. If the National delegation of Yemen based its proposals on the real balance of forces prevailing to the time, the "Riyadh group", by contrast, insisted on rollback and restoration of the two year-old situation.

Each side believes its standpoint fully justified. M. Hadi and his supporters base on international law, appealing to the strict observance of two fundamental, from their point of view, normative legal acts: the Peace Initiative of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) of November 2011 and the UN Security Council Resolution of April 14, 2015. Both
documents make the position of the fugitive president and his government more winning than those of their opponents. Thus, Article 1 of the Resolution requires that the Houthis withdrew their troops from the capital – Sana'a – as well as from all the occupied areas on a unilateral basis, completely lay down all the "extra arms" and stopped the activity that relates to the scope of the authority of the legitimate government of Yemen. It is evident, that implementing of even this single provision is able to force the Ansar Allah out to Yemen periphery, both in a geographical and in a political sense.

In their turn, the representatives of the National delegation of Yemen keep to the standpoint of political "realism," proposing to base on the configuration of forces, which existed by the beginning of the negotiations. From their point of view, the only way to resolve the crisis situation would be to convene the provisional coalition authority – the Presidential Council, composed of representatives of all the warring parties. However, the adoption of such proposal of M. Hadi, considering his lack of real support in Yemen, would turn this figure into a political outsider, limiting his career by the term of validity of the newly formed power structure. Under the situation that has come about at the negotiations the main claims of the parties – the establishment of the transitional authority and the disarmament of the Houthis – were not denied by the opponents; however, they failed to agree what should be done in the first place.

The situation of the recent months favors rather Sana'a, and not Riyadh. Primarily this is due to the fact that the military aggression launched by the coalition headed by SA against Yemen revealed the resource limits of the Kingdom. The Saudi army managed to meet the minimum program, limiting the expansion of the Houthis. In the meanwhile SA did not hide the fact that it was North Yemen it sought to weaken and to support the South – South Yemen was not particularly dangerous for the Kingdom. North Yemen has always been characterized by rootedness of
tribal structures and weakness of state institutions, while in the South the situation is reverse. Tribal solidity of the North explains in many aspects its military superiority over the South.

The conventional "front line" which took shape in the summer of 2015, dividing the Houthis-Saleh camp and its opponents, almost perfectly coinciding with the former border between the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic, is maintained up to this day. It is important that a prolonged pause in the fighting makes continuation of the military campaign on the Arabian Peninsula less and less likely, especially considering the enormous financial costs of SA, where the budget deficit in 2015 reached 98 billion.

The real balance of forces prevailing in today's Yemen, works against Hadi. Time is playing into the hands of the government in Sana'a, that is, the Houthis and Saleh: the longer M. Hadi will remain a nominal President in exile, not in control of the situation at home, the less incentive it will be for the world community to recognize him as a legitimate President.

The appeal to the GCC Peace Initiative as the way of settling the political crisis in Yemen today looks divorced from reality. First, this mechanism has already shown its failure. M. Hadi has never acted as an impartial "moderator" of the National Dialogue, the new Constitution was never been adopted, and all the terms of the transitional period established by the Peace Initiative of the GCC, have long expired. Secondly, in 2016 there arose the need to resolve a conflict fundamentally different from the one that took place in Yemen five years ago, during the "Arab spring". If in 2011 the question of the regime change and peaceful transfer of power from Ali Abdullah Saleh to the new head of the state was in the first place on the agenda, in the course of recent events the conflict transformed into an inter-religious and inter-ethnic clash, and the number of participants has increased markedly.
After the failure of the peace talks, the Kuwait the authorities of Sana'a started to look for legal frameworks guaranteeing the functioning of the governmental political institutions regulated by them. Basing on the Constitution of 1991, the authorities in Sana'a announced the convening on August 13, 2016 of an emergency session of the House of Representatives. The legitimacy of this institution of state power caused the least quantity of complaints from the conflicting parties. The main decision of the House of Representatives was convening of the Presidential Council under the chairmanship of Saleh al-Samad, the head of of Ansar Allah political bureau. The representative of the General People's Congress was appointed The Deputy Chairman.

The situation in Yemen from the beginning of the "Arab spring" is completely put at the mercy of the GCC, headed by SA, which launched their Peace Initiative. However, the Arabian six lacks the experience in resolving such complex conflicts. A significant disservice for the peacemaking was the fact, that that Riyadh became both a mediator and a party to the conflict at the same time. This resulted in the failure of the political settlement and reluctance of the Kuwaiti leadership to provide a platform for continuation of the senseless negotiation process. In general, the failure of the Kuwaiti talks and subsequent steps taken by the authorities of Sana'a, make the situation in Yemen even more confusing and uncertain, and reduce to zero the probability to reach a compromise in the event of a resumption of peace talks under the auspices of a special UN envoy on Yemen, the researcher notes.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich
Lebanon being an integral part of the Arabian and Moslem world couldn’t but stay on the sidelines of the mass protests of the youth in Egypt and Tunisia and then in Libya and Syria which have spiraled into street riots and attempts to conquer power by the Islamists. The same attempts found place in Algeria, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen but without a success. Having had the upper hand in Libya the Islamists broke back in Egypt and Tunis but they could dictate a severe long-standing struggle for the Syrian people. From Syria they reinforced and extended combat operations in Iraq and Kurdistan. Using a fellowship of the Islamic-extremists of Lebanon they periodically left for its territory to have a rest, to recruit personnel, to reequip and to prepare the new actions mainly beyond Lebanon but sometimes at its territory. But Lebanon itself wasn’t a goal for the extremists as the country with the unusual living conditions in the mountains for the Arabian majority and but the main thing – the country having the Sunni minority.

Nevertheless, military clashes, incidents, assassination attempts, acts of terrorism have emerged at the territory of Lebanon again. The political situation is characterized by the claims of communities to each other, as well as contributing to this fact mutual disbelief, mistrust and unresolved many of the problems. In spite of the official civil war termination a true
peace didn’t come in Lebanon. The government of Fuada as-Sin’ory being supported by the parliamentary majority and also by the West couldn’t cope with the internal political situation in the country where there was no status leader after a death of R. al’-Khariri but the president Lakhud pretending to this place wasn’t popular in the eyes of a great many of people. At the same time the Moronite’s dissatisfaction who have played a key role in the country for a long time caused the Moslems and the Druses rise, especially the Islamic radicals not pulling together as the Shia “Khizbulla” began predominating by its influence not only over the Shia “Amal” but also the extremists-Sunni associated with“ Al’-Kaida.

The situation in the country wasn’t calm in spite of R. al”-Khariri’s efforts and the following efforts of the government and his followers in the parliament (“Alliance Khariri”). It emerged by May 2007 that practically there was no national background of conflicts as a staff of the groupings was sometimes different ethnically: not only the Lebanese but the Syrians, the Palestinian Diaspora, the Saudi Arabians, the Yemenites, the Moroccans and the natives of Bangladesh. It was explained by both the relative weak position of the radical Sunnism in Lebanon and the reinforced activity of organizations in Lebanon sharing the ideological orienting points of “global Jihad” from 1980-ss having the units to destabilize the situation in the country. They were increased with the ultra-Islamists from Palestine, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. From 2003 many of them were shifted in Iraq and the wounded and the retreated were taken from there. Emissaries of “Al’Kaida” appeared in Lebanon at that time paid a special attention to the Palestinian refugees primarily with a war experience in Iraq or clandestine experience in Israel. However, the Sunni extremists didn’t manage to consolidate the position in Lebanon because of increasing of the numerical advantage and a political good organization of the Shias, the Druses’ independence and anti-Islamic position of the Christian communities.
It isn’t worth of ignoring the existing old roots of the Islamic traditionalism in Lebanon, in particular, the Salafism (following the ideas of “purity” faith return – “salaf”, that is, “ancestry, precursors”). The regions Akkar and Duniya near Tripoli are the center of Salafism distribution more than a half of century. Till 1980 the Salafists were peaceful being loyal to the other Islam trends. But when the radical “Arabian Afghans” returned in the country the situation had changed. Some Salafists were for a state establishment of “pure Islam” as far back as in 1980 having united in the rows of “Nuvat al”–Jaish al”–Islamii” (core of the Islam army). The Salafists began confronting with the Lebanon army in 1999. In 2007 there began conflicts with the army of the organization “Fatakh al”–Islam”. Besides, the Salafists gradually expanded their sphere of influence. Some part of them began learning the works of the Moslem philosophies and especially the Salafism ideologists. There is also a trend where the followers of the Salafism triumph are included by special military methods. There are the less organized groups of “neo-jihadists” acting spontaneously, from time to time, under influence of antipathies for the West or the Shias.

The antipathies for the West in the Lebanon society, especially among the Moslems didn’t grow weak. There were many reasons. From 2004 one should note the USA initiative concerning “The big Middle East” stipulated political, democratic and economic reforms implementation in the region countries of Pakistan up to the Northern Africa in exchange of the West financial assistance. The USA insisted on the regime restructuring of the Middle East countries with “democracy” (according to the American pattern), “free election” and “informed society”. These words were sounded as abstract unreal formula in the countries where democracy was realized as a life in accordance with patriarchal customs and canons of clans, tribes, deep-affined, territorial and religious communities and sects and freedom of choice came down to not to express individual opinion of an
elector but to represent the interests of clans, tribes, communities, ethnos and confessions, more correctly, the interests of their elites.

A political situation in Lebanon was always complex. But after 2004 it was especially complicated. There were also so-called “deserters” together with pro-governmental forces and opposition which changed their position in dependence of the situation. There also emerged “a third force” – a grouping of the former ministers and other politicians both the Christians and the Moslems (it testified confessionalism principle dilution) at the head of ex-prime minister S. al’-Khuss. Their goal was to maintain the national and the Lebanese state unity which to their opinion the endless disputes of opposition and regime threatened to. Different “moderate oppositionists” added a varied picture of political Lebanese spectra and also “Khizbulla” which has been seemingly in opposition but has avoided a confrontation with the president Lakhud and considering the Christian part of opposition as its main opponent. For the first time “Khizbulla” got an appointment of a minister in the government of N. Mikati, 50-years old Harvard-educated, a follower of al’-Khariri. Mikati being a personal friend of the president of Syria, B. Asada, was considered to be, nevertheless, “moderate pro-Syrian” figure and he was supported by both the regime followers and the opposition among the deputes owing to this fact. Mikati himself considered his regime to be “transient” and its members promised not to put up their candidatures at parliamentary election in 2005 and their tasks were only to organize elections, to assist the international investigation of R. al’-Khariri’s murder and to stabilize the Lebanese economy. Election in June 2005 gave an advantage to the Sunni, the Shias and the Druses (80 mandates against 33 of the Christians) and it didn’t meet views of the USA and the West as a whole as the Lebanon stopped to be frankly pro-western state orienting for NATO.

No doubt that the outside interference is a negative point for the Lebanon situation. First of all, it concerns the Sunni position. Firstly, they lost their leader R. al’-Khariri being capable
of flexible orienting in a complex kaleidoscope of the Lebanese political life. Secondly, only 20% of the Sunni are involved in the Islamic extremists activity but the rest are disoriented in many respects because their political elite having been powerful previously is quickly losing both the power among the adherents and its place in the administrative structure at all the levels. All that promotes to increase a dissatisfaction of the most part of the Sunni and to distribute the extremist sentiments among them which are brought by the rebels outside from Syria, Iraq, Palestine and other countries.

In winter 2006–2007 after the collisions of the army with the Islamic extremists in Nakhr al’-Barid there were many acts of terrorism all over Lebanon organized to destabilize the Lebanon society and to take attention off the Palestinian camps. One can suppose that the extremists tried to bring the inhabitants of the camps on their side to recruit their adherents from them and to join the ranks for the new battles in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and also to prepare the new acts of terrorism in Lebanon itself. At the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 the figures of the ruling camp and also the deputies V. Ido and P. Zhaime, were the victims of the acts of terrorism. On the threshold of the presidential election these actions were emphasized including an attempt to “weaken the parliamentary majority”, “run off the government” and even “liquidate the parliamentary majority”. The presidential election complicated a very confused situation in Lebanon. To some political analysts’ opinion the end of 9-year tenure of the general E. Lakhud (being illegal and going against the constitution in the eyes of many Lebanese) and the necessity to substitute him caused an acute political crisis. Many deputies fought for a post of the president (they elected a president in Lebanon but necessarily a Maronite) supported by a government at the head of the prime minister-Sunni and by the minority of the retiring president Lalkhud’s followers. “The majority” and “the minority” coalitions particularity was explained not so much by internal political-ideological contradictions as the foreign –
policy orientations difference. The “majority” wanted, by all accounts, to release Lebanon from Syria’s and Iran’s patronage having expanded its impact not only in Lebanon but generally in the Arabian world, in many respects owing to “Khizbulla” success. The “majority” as well as the government tried to use a massive protest of the Lebanese against R. al’-Khariri’s killing and also the anti-Syrian demonstrations commonly of hundreds of thousands of the Sunni and the Maronite so named as the Cedar Revolution and the Movement on 14 March. Opposed to them “the minority” concentrated on a struggle against the USA’s interference in the Lebanon affairs and the unity of all the Lebanese to resist Israel. Faulting the government for “anti-patriotism” the “minority” party demonstrated, first of all, the Shias and a part of the Maronite under the anti-western and anti-American slogans. By that “Khizbulla” used its achievements in the war with Israel in 2006 and faulted the government and the “majority” for the reluctance to cooperate with opposition in all-Lebanese interests including defense and economy. That is to say both the majority and the minority were self-contradictory coalitions of the different forces what testified the unsteadiness and instability of the social situation in the country. Any candidate could win under such conditions including not the most popular and powerful inside the country but leaning on a real military potential and support outside. The former commander in Chief of the Lebanese army, the general M. Sleiman, happened to be such candidate who only 9.3% of the Lebanese took a stand in favor for in October 2007. However, the “majority” officially proposed at last a candidate of Sleiman after the great debates. After F. Shikhab and E. Lakhud it was the third general in the history of Lebanon (also the commander in Chief, this fact is important) proposed as a compromise figure win-win for everyone. On the 25-th of May 2008, a 60-year general became the twelfth president of Lebanon having won 118 votes among 127 supported by the Maronite patriarch N. Sfeir and a general secretary of “Khizbulla” KH. Nasrallaa. The unity of the Maronite
and the Shias leaders turned out to be critically important though it was achieved with great difficulty.

The Maronite patriarch appealed the Lebanese to be unified, suggested to adjust down the age of a body of electors up to 18 years it was a gesture towards the Moslems where the youth was more numerous) but after the parliamentary elections on the 7-th of June 2009 he advised the Lebanese not to interfere to form a government at the head of the leader of the Sunni S. Khariri. The elections were a success for the governmental majority which had won 71 mandates against 57 of opposition. However, in 2009, a tradition of gradual informal “deconfessionalization” of a political life of Lebanon was continued. The Maronite including immigrants who lived outside the country (more than 100 thousands) and where the Maronite prevailed had taken an active part in the elections. A contradictory social reality, livid with drive state and forced from outside couldn’t but gave rise to more and more new crisis situations. A war with Israel in 2006, struggle of the Lebanese army against “Fatakh al’-Islam” and “Jund ash-Sham” in 2007 and other operations resulted in the army authority and at the same time the Maronite strengthening always hold key positions in the army owing to closer connections with the West, its general staffs, military academies, spy agencies and educational institutions in comparison with other communities. Not by coincidence some sort of “political renaissance” of the Maronite took place at this time. Though many their leaders were killed in internecine quarreling of the previous centenaries they preserved their impact on both economics and policy of the country.

In 2006 one tried to unite all the forces of the Maronite at “the meeting in Kedry” (in town Bsharr). However, one didn’t manage to do it: the Maronite part supported S. Jaaji having accused M. Aun being eligible for the all-Lebanese leadership but the other part – tended to Aun rejecting ambitions of Jaaji having strengthened his positions very quickly -to their opinion. Thus a rift on the Maronite was preserved. A resignation of the Lebanese government on 12 January 2011 mobilized Aun’s position after
11 ministers designation who resisted to appoint S. a‘-Khariri as a prime minister and insisted on a resignation of ex-prime minister N. Mikati.

Though Lebanon didn’t turn out to be involved in the events of the “Arabian political spring” as a whole nevertheless it had experienced many specific events. Firstly, the refugees from the adjacent countries, first of all, from Syria rushed in Lebanon trying to leave a terrain of attack. By that a level of a migration of Syria exceeds 3 millions of people and negatively impacted on economic, social and political situation of the neighbors of Syria, especially Lebanon, Turkey and Kingdom of Jordan. Secondly, the existing official democratic institutions don’t work in Lebanon. The parliament hasn’t been elected since 2009 because of impossibility to provide the corresponding procedures. A new electoral law was never adopted. The presidential elections are turned into endless marathon for candidate revision.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich


Keywords: Libya, terrorist danger, political instability, radical Islamists, ethnic separatism, jihadism, illegal migration.

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The author notes that the events unfolding on the African continent are in the shadow of the world attention on the background of the Middle East war. However, the whole vast
region of North Africa, the Sahel countries and the countries south of the Sahara turns into a zone of increasing terrorist threats and political instability, risking to become a zone of a permanent regional conflict.

The author believes that the manifestation of these events is traced directly in the Mediterranean region also, primarily as a growing illegal migration from Africa to Europe, which is already the second most important source of mass resettlement of people to the EU countries. The epicenter of all these threats is Libya. It is impossible to prevent their further distribution without eliminating or stopping the Libyan source of tension.

The author writes that the task of implementation of the international efforts to solve the Libyan problem is even more complicated in comparison with the task of confrontation with the jihadist forces in Syria and Iraq. The problem is that there are practically no internal actors in Libya that would have a clear prospect of becoming a consolidating national force, unlike the two above-mentioned Middle Eastern states. Today Libya is a collapsed state in the full sense: the connections between the historical regions of Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica have been disintegrated, and these territories appeared to be disunited into smaller fragments, many of which have neither a stable government nor a particular political system.

The General National Congress (GNC) and its government, located in the capital Tripoli, on the one hand, and the other government formed on the basis of the parliament that moved to Tobruk in 2014, on the other hand, have been political poles for a long time.

In 2014, secular forces, represented at the political level, after the prevalence of the pro-Islamist forces in Tripoli, decided to create a separate center of power in Tobruk, transferring there legally elected and internationally recognized parliament. The government in Tobruk relies on this elected parliament, expressing the interests of the modernized population of cities,
representatives of large and medium-sized businesses, the secular part of the army, tribal elites.

However, one of the central problems was that both governments could control only small parts of the territory, mainly in its coastal zone. Strengthening the position of ISIS in Libya has led to the fact that its leadership began to consider that country the second most important geopolitical foothold after the Syrian-Iraqi area. There were reports that the head of ISIS, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi considered the possibility of moving to Libya in the case of defeat in Syria and Iraq.

The processes related to the ethno-tribal component add an additional complexity to the internal political situation in Libya. The author notes that the Arab nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes as well as ethnic groups have played a significant role in the development of the situation, and the most important of them are the Berbers, Tuaregs and Negroid tribes of the Tuba. All three non-Arab ethnic groups have projects for the creation of their national states that only exacerbate the disintegration of the Libyan state. And since their interests are often overlapped in territorial claims, the interethnic conflicts, arising on this ground, increase the effect of the war of all against all.

The situation has changed little after the appearance in Tripoli of the Government of National Accord (GNA), established under the auspices of the UN in 2016, and the formal resignation of the leadership of the GNC and the heads of the government formed by it. Since the power of GNA in Tripoli remains illusive, and the government in Tobruk continues to operate independently from it, territorial and political bipolarity of power persists. The repeated attempts of F.Faraj, the head of the GNA, permanently residing in Tunisia, to settle in Libyan territory have ended in failure.

Thus, the reconciliation project has resulted in the fact that a triple power was formed instead of dual power, and the third power has turned into an instrument which influence is no more than imagined one in the country.
A resource factor was one of the most important aspects of the intra-Libyan confrontation. It should be divided into three main components: 1. Finance; 2. Oil and other hydrocarbons; 3. Weapons.

The plundering of public finances and the wealth, belonging to the families of M. Gaddafi and his closest associates, was one of the foundations for the existence of numerous Islamist, criminal and tribal structures. Some part of the state assets became available to the Tripoli and Tobruk governments and is still an important factor in maintaining their functioning.

However, this is not enough to expand the zone of their territorial control, and necessary agreements with local armed political and tribal forces. Therefore, the oil factor acquires a special, if not paramount importance. The struggle for control over oil fields, transportation and export of oil is more important than just control over the territories.

The author notes that the plundering of one of the largest arsenals of armaments in Africa has and continues to have an impact not only on the whole course of internal confrontation and the level and scale of power of these or those groups depend on the number of weapons and the ability to use it. Libya has become the epicenter of the spread of Islamist terrorism to the vast expanses of the African continent. The proliferation of weapons through the Sahel countries feeds the terrorists of Boko Haram in Nigeria and other terrorist groups in neighboring countries - from Cameroon to the Central African Republic. Thus, a wide zone of terrorist activity has been created in the region, covering a range of countries and threatening neighboring States.

The events in Mali in the spring of 2012, which led to the split of the country, became the most vivid manifestation of these consequences of the disintegration of the Libyan state. The disintegration of Mali has created a breeding ground for the spread of terrorism to other countries south of the Sahara.

During the Malian events of 2012, the terrorists raided Algeria. The internal danger of terrorism in Algeria today is
minimized, but terrorist attacks have occurred repeatedly on the part of the Libyan and Tunisian borders in recent years. However, if Algeria is sufficiently well protected against massive terrorist attacks, and they are of a local nature there, as a rule, they are considered as a threat of a national scale in Tunisia.

The most immediate threat is for the European continent from the territory of Libya. Libya is the second largest source of illegal migration to Europe after Turkey. Although the scale of migration from here is less on the order today, but the uncontrolled flow of immigrants from Africa has a clear tendency to increase. And since this flow from Libya is under the direct control of Islamists, and above all under the control of ISIS, the sending of terrorists into the ranks of migrants is more than a realistic prospect, if not a fait accompli. It follows that the Libyan situation, which is already in the focus of attention of the EU countries, should lead to appropriate decisions on the part of the EU, taking into account the potentially growing of the Islamist threat.

The situation in Libya is a constant concern for neighboring Arab countries. Formally, all the Arab countries of North Africa have the same positions, concludes in the necessity of ending the internal confrontation, peaceful solution to the internal problems through dialogue between the warring parties, the creation of a national unity government. At the same time, a detailing of their actual positions in relation to the Libyan situation reveals quite substantial differences.

Western policy towards Libya began to change in the direction of revitalization in 2014-2015 after a period of relative inactivity, after the political chaos in the country, the dominance of Islamist and criminal groups. NATO and the EU began to hatch plans for a direct armed participation of these structures, as well as a number of leading Western countries, primarily the United States, Britain, France and Italy in the Libyan events - from contacts with the Libyan security forces to direct armed invasion of Libyan territory. The presence of armed units of
Western countries in Libya indicates that the political authorities in both Tobruk and Tripoli, do not refuse coordination of activities, including the armed ones with representatives of the world powers. At the same time, they resolutely oppose the armed invasion of these forces on the territory of the country. This position is shared by the neighboring Arab countries, including Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia.

The author notes that one can not fail to mention a number of publications in Western press that talk about the desire of a number of European leaders to involve Russia in participating in an armed operation in Libya. The author points out that the Russian experience in counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus, where an integrated approach to eliminate the hotbed of terrorism and the restoration of state authority was productive, and could be useful, but Russian participation in any military operations in Libya totally excluded. Unlike Syria, the Libyan situation does not directly threaten Russia, and any military involvement would only distract the Russian forces from other much more urgent potential threats.

Author of the abstract – N. Ginesina
adherents of Islam. Muslims are about 87% of the 251 – million population (200 million people). This puts Indonesia on the first place in the world by the number of Muslims. There are representatives of other faiths, but they constitute a small minority in the country. Thus there are Protestant Christians – 5.7%, Catholics – 3.1%, adherents of other Christian doctrines – 0.8%. There are also Hindus – 1.8%, Buddhists – 1.3%, Confucians – 0.8%, carriers of traditional tribal beliefs – 1.4% of the population. Indonesia is a multi-ethnic state. There are more than 400 different peoples and ethnic groups. Confessional identity correlates with ethnicity in general. Muslims are representatives of large ethnic groups – Javanese, Sundans, Minangkabau, Malays, and Acehcians. Christianity is confessed to the smaller nationalities – Ambon, Toba-Bataki, Toraja, and also part of the local Chinese.

Hinduism is common among the Balinese mainly, Buddhism and Confucianism – among the Chinese. One of the most important state-political tasks of the Republic of Indonesia invariably remains the preservation of national unity and religious harmony with the goal of forming a single Indonesian nation, taking into account the multiethnic and multi-religious composition of the population of the country. One of the effective instruments for solution is politics in the religious issue. The Constitution, its basic principles guarantee the freedom of religion, religious pluralism, interfaith tolerance, prevention of ethno-religious conflicts to a large extent. There is no state or official religion in the country. Article 29 of the Constitution determines that the Indonesian statehood is based on a religious basis, while the freedom of religion and worship is guaranteed. So, six religious faiths are recognized as equal in rights officially – Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. The establishment of the Ministry of religion in 1946 answered the request of the representatives of Islamic circles, considering this structure as a real embodiment in life of the Muslim principle of the indivisibility of religion and politics. The activities of the Ministry aimed at improving the religious
life, the education of religious tolerance, improving the quality of religious education, worship, as well as the provision of high morality of Indonesian society. Since the majority of believers profess Islam, the issues of life and activities of the Islamic Ummah (community) is given the most attention. Special departments of the ministry are responsible for organizing pilgrimage to holy places in Saudi Arabia, collecting and distributing religious tax – zakat (aimed at supporting groups of people below the average standard of living), and managing the waqf (belonging to the Muslim community) property. The Ministry also deals with issues related to the Shariah court system, which operates in the country along with the civil court system. The Ministry of Religion has offices in 17 provinces, as well as in districts and cities.

There are several units within the Ministry of religion dealing with issues of Muslim education. The Ministry of Religion cooperates in this field with the Ministry of Education and Culture in modern Indonesia. Teaching of the religion is compulsory in the system of public education at all levels – from primary school to higher education. The Muslim education of Indonesia has existed since the time of the appearance of Islam on the Indonesian islands – since the 13th century. In the early Islamic times it was in the form of traditional religious mentoring and was represented by schools in mosques and chapels or existing separately. In the old days, the main attention was paid to memorizing the Koran and other sacred texts and getting ideas about the basic Islamic norms and institutions. At present, the main goal of Islamic education is the comprehensive education of the younger generation in the spirit of Islamic world perception on the basis of the humanistic traditions of the Koran. The Muslim education system provides knowledge on various branches of modern science and technology, but at the same time prepares specialists for religious education, teachers of religion, theologians, specialists in the Sharia law and clergy. The overwhelming majority of national general educational
institutions organize the teaching of Islam throughout the country.

Muslim education in Indonesia is an integral part of the national education system. Today there are more than 50 thousand Islamic educational institutions in the country. They have a serious impact on the formation of the worldview and way of life of Indonesian Muslims. The sector of traditional religious mentoring, inherited from the early Islamic times, is still great in the modern system of Islamic education and training. It is represented by schools existing at mosques and chapels or separately. 16 015 out of 50 thousand Islamic educational institutions are the so-called pesantrenes. The term "pesantren" comes from the term "santri" which means student, studying Islam, and has the connotation of a true Muslim. As a rule, these are private schools, founded and directed by reputable and respected Islamic religious mentors – kyai. Such schools are usually located in the homes of mentors. Students not only study, but also live and eat there. In the old days, the students worked in the kyai farm for their maintenance. In our day parents of students pay a small fee, so students spend more time for learning. Pesantrenes are considered strongholds of Islamic dogma in our day. Most Muslim theologians, spiritual guides and teachers go from there. Pupils aged 8 to 11 years are taught religious Sciences there. They learn the Koran by heart and the Sunnah, get acquainted with the traditional medieval works of Islamic thinkers, study the Muslim Koranic ethics. The main thing is that the Islamic way of life is instilled in a traditional school. The main task of such a mentor is the education of young people in the spirit of Islamic high morality, adherence to religious values, piety, morality, respect for elders, showing respect to parents, and he himself and his family serve as an example.

Another type of Muslim educational institution in modern Indonesia is a madrasah. Madrasahs appeared in the country in the beginning of the 20th century and were exclusively
administered by the Ministry of Religion, teaching religious subjects and a few general education subjects in independent Indonesia. Since 1975, the Ministry of Education and Culture has also joined the leadership and taken measures to improve the level of education in madrasahs. Higher educational institutions providing Islamic education were subdivided into 3 categories earlier. The first was the State Islamic University. This state higher educational institution was intended to receive academic higher education along with higher Islamic education. The second was the state institute of the Muslim religion. This higher Islamic educational institution was specialized exclusively in Islamic disciplines taught at the academic level. The third was the state higher school of the Muslim religion, which was created by the government in 1960 by merging the State Higher School of the Muslim religion in Yogyakarta and the Jakarta Academy of Muslim Servants. At present two state Islamic universities are considered to be the largest and most authoritative in the country – Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, which is based in Yogyakarta. A high level of education is given also by the Islamic University in Malang, and there is a pesantren of higher education there. The Muslim universities, as the author notes, carry out an important function in Indonesian society – education of the modern Muslim intellectuals, which are well-oriented in matters of Islam and modern knowledge. They train specialists of the highest category on theology, Sharia, pedagogy.

Islamic educational institutions not only provide knowledge and skills, but also involve students in socially useful activities, instilling in practice, responsibility before God for everything that happens in the world. The participation of Muslim youth in the mass movement for the protection of the environment is a vivid example of this in modern Indonesia. The interconnection of Islamic education and ecology is of particular importance in modern Indonesia, the author notes.

Author of the abstract – B. Mahmudov
In this article, the author examines the reasons for the migration crisis caused by the policy of the European Union, based on the US geopolitical interests in relation to the Arab Muslim world, as well as the possible consequences of this.

Western Europe is experiencing the most terrible migration crisis over the past few decades. The previous surge of migrants didn’t bring much inconvenience to Europe, but refugees of the present-day bring menace of bringing Islamic terrorism to the European ground.

The first mass surge of migrants started in the latter half of the 20 century. With the beginning of the Arab spring the flow of immigrants increased significantly. It was caused by aggravation of socioeconomic problems, fall of living standards, foreign intervention, armed conflicts and terrorist groups activation in the Arab Muslim world. Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are countries which deliver the main quantity of refugees to Europe. In comparison with the beginning of 2015, the number of refugees in 2016 increased several fold. The biggest number of refugees is concentrated in Germany, France, Italy and Spain.

The EU suffers from the difficulty to integrate the refugees in the society. Within this framework there are worries about
spate of criminal activity and terrorist threat. The Islamic state exercises terror attacks via jihadists sent out in Europe under the guise of mere refugees.

Intervention of the U.S. military and its allies in Afghanistan started after terror attacks of 9/11. Having started the war against Al-Qaeda, the United States carried out an intervention in Afghanistan, the country where the al-Qaeda leader was. Since 2014, militants of the Islamic state have been massively operating in Afghanistan.

In 2003, the United States began intervention in Iraq under the pretext of the existence of nuclear weapons, followed by the overthrow of S. Hussein and the promotion of democracy. These activities lead to disintegration of the country and elimination of government institutions.

In 2011 the leading states of NATO intervened in Libya. Excuse for that aggression was the necessity to overthrow the «bloody dictator regime» and protect civilians. The U.S. achieved toppling of Mr. Kaddafi that brought to collapse of the state and its nationhood.

When opposition protests began in Syria in 2011, the U.S. declared the illegitimacy of seated President Bashar Assad. Since 2011, Islamic movements, whose activities were banned, were actively supported from abroad, encouraging the creation of anti-government armed groups.

Social protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain and Yemen come from internal factors, such as the socio-economic crisis, corruption, police despotism, the lack of democratic freedoms. In the presence of internal problems, the main challenges for the Syrian crisis were external factors - support for the opposition of NATO member states and the trace of jihadists in it.

The author being in Syria saw himself mass demonstrations in support of B. Assad whom local citizens considered to be a national leader. There is nothing surprising because the secure peaceful life can be provided only by incumbent authorities which can suppress Islamic groups.
Syrians are forced to leave their country because of impossibility to live there. Foreign coalition in the name of National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and also Islamic opposition don’t have any support in the country.

Syrian crisis took form of a global conflict in which the U.S. and its allies in the region, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey tend to realize their geopolitical interests in the Middle East. The main goal is to topple the government of B. Assad, an ally of Iran and Russia, and that way to place Sunni Islamists in power and promote further expansion of terror «jihad» against enemy countries. For this purpose the U.S. and its allies use sponsored armed Islamic groups setting them up as «a moderate opposition». Rebels of these groups wage a terror war in Syria and commit crimes against humanity.

Radical Islamists eliminated the Syrian civilization heritage, killed hundreds of intellectuals, scientists, religious figures and civilians. Activities of radical Islamic powers became basic ground for leaving of hundreds of thousands refugees. Many of them head for not only Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan but the European countries what provoked the migration crisis by their short-sighted policy in the Middle East.

One more reason for the migrants growth, became functioning of criminal organizations networks involved in delivery of refugees in Europe. Libya is one of the stepping stones for dispatching refugees where according to the UN estimates smugglers earn thousands of millions dollars. In the perception of the International Organisation for Migration illegal trafficking of refugees brings the same income as drug traffic.

As a rule the bulk of illegal immigrants come to Europe by tourist visas or forgery papers, the rest cross the borders without any documents. There are a few routes of delivering, one-through the Mediterranean sea and the second one from Turkey to Greece. The fact is that such routes are extremely dangerous, the number of deaths of migrants every time rises.
The crisis situation with endless influxes of refugees stirs up divisions in the EU. In May 2015 the European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker suggested introducing quotas for immigrants receiving for all 28 countries of the EU. Germany, Italy, Austria and Sweden endorsed the idea, countries of Eastern Europe confronted it and France, Spain and Portugal kept a lower profile. At the meeting of the UN Home secretaries in June 2015 it was decided to give up on quotas and in exchange for it voluntarily allocate 40 thousands of refugees.

In September 2015 on grounds of refugees influx Germany the first country of the Schengen zone imposed passport control on the boundaries with Austria. At the meeting for rapprochement of member-states there were obvious fundamental disagreements within the EU. Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary confronted coercive distribution of refugees among the states.

After that The European commission issued a block of propositions concerning migration. Among them: refugee resettlement, creation of receiving points, registration and repatriation of economic migrants and so on. However these and many other propositions leave unrealized because of the dispute among the members of the EU also in view of difficulty for their realization within the Schengen agreement. Many countries take to returning to border control of their national frontiers.

The European short-sighted policy in regards to the Middle East became the reason for migration crisis which brought about a number of negative consequences for the EU. First, an idea of single Europe experiences a crisis because the common European structures demonstrated their incompetence under the conditions of the influx of refugees. The justification for Single Europe Crisis is the referendum in Great Britain regarding leaving the EU. One of the main reasons for it was demonstrated impotence for solving the migration problem and the accompanied difficulties.

Migration crisis in the EU contributes rise of nationalist positions and right-wing parties and movements, demanding policy review as for refugees, adopting stricter laws and others.
The leader of the National front party in France, Marine Le Pen, expresses disquiet concerning the uncontrolled influx of refugees. Former prisoners and persons convicted of terrorism can be found among all these refugees. Marine Le Pen declared that France cannot help all these people from the countries involved in the Arab spring. Lately the National front party gains more popularity in the society.

Public discontent of the policy in the EU states is evoked by migration crisis along with aggravation of financial and economic crisis. In France it is said that the EU bureaucracy forces on solutions which contradict national interests of the country.

The menace is that people who practice Islamic ideology or reside in extremist groups can reach the EU with other refugees. If there is a large number of Salafi extremist adepts in Europe, there may be a danger of expansion of radical Islamism.

First, Europe turned out to be a victim of its policy in the Middle East broadly acting in the geopolitical interests of the U.S. Secondly, the EU came up with Turkey’s political ambitions, the government of which claims serious concessions from Europe in exchange for containment of refugees. At the same time, Neo-Ottoman ambitions of Turkey and geopolitical aims of the U.S. do not correspond to the political and economic interests of the EU.

Author of the abstract – Yu. Androsova
It is for several decades already that the attention of scientists has been focused on the study of non-governmental religious-political organizations (NRPO) of Islamist orientation, producing religious-political extremism and terrorism under the guise of Islam. Researchers of modern terrorism and related issues, are primarily interested in the dynamics of the changes, caused by formation of ideological doctrines of radical Islamists, their organizational structures, forms and methods of exercising their specific political practices, as well as the issues of financial support of terrorism. In this connection we will analyse the four spheres supporting modern terrorism in the world in relation to DAISH (ISIL), which, translated from Arabic into Russian, sounds like "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant". Today this group is known as the "Islamic State" (IS).

The IS emerged in 2006 in the period of occupation of Iraq by the USA forces and its allies. At that time this Sunni Islamist group was called "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) and
as its goal was to struggle against the occupation forces (the Levant is the Latin translation of the Arabic geographical name al-Sham, the territory including modern Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and part of Jordan). After the outbreak of the civil conflict in Syria in 2011, part of the ISIL forces entered the Syrian territory and joined the actions of the armed Syrian opposition against the government army. The ISIL militants captured in the territory of Syria a part of the distant province of Raqqa, and announced imposition of Sharia law there. It is characteristic, that the actions of the ISIL and other opposition forces, were at the time supported by NATO members and the Gulf monarchies advocating the overthrow of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In August 2014, the ISIL militants, taking advantage of discontent of some Sunni tribes in Northern Iraq caused by domination of the Shiites in the country's administration and infringement of the rights of the Sunnis, intervened in the conflict between the Sunni community and the government of Nouri al-Maliki, launched a successful offensive deep into Iraq and occupied a number of cities, including the second largest Iraqi city of Mosul. In the occupied areas the ISIL began to practice repression and terror against ethnic and religious minorities (Kurds, Shiite Moslems, Yazidis, Christians). The ISIL militants even sought to expand there offensive to Lebanon, threatened Jordan. After some time, this terrorist group declared in the occupied territories of Iraq and Syria the "Islamic State" (IS), the headed by the leader of the ISIL Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Seeking to develop their military success, the IS militants launched an offensive in the direction of the Kirkuk oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, but were stopped by Kurdish armed groups "Peshmerga". The leading NATO countries headed by the USA announced their support for the Kurds in the confrontation with the IS and began to supply military equipment to Iraqi Kurdistan, which, after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, received broad autonomy and de facto (but not de jure) is an independent
state formation. At that time the USA, EU and Israel actually encouraged the Kurds to independence, planning to transform the future independent Kurdish state in an influential Pro-Western force in the region. The political and military Western support for the Kurds in their confrontation with the IS was also due to the fact that the IS offensive threatened the oil-rich area of Kirkuk and the city of Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan, hosting representative offices of many Western companies.

As a result, Washington and London announced beginning of bombing the territories controlled by the IS as well as forming a coalition of 40 countries (participation of Iran and Syria in the coalition was excluded by its initiators) to fight this group. At the same the USA is still bombing the IS positions not only in Iraq but in Syria too, without the consent of the official authorities of these countries. Thus, it is clear that all the USA actions in the plane of the fight against the "Islamic State" confirm the immutability of the objectives of the American policy in the region: the overthrow of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, bringing to power in Iraq the forces hostile to Tehran and Damascus, maximum weakening of Iran and the Shiite movement Hezbollah in Lebanon, and in future promotion of Jihad to the borders of Russia.

Back in the day the author of this article proposed classification of Islamist NRPO according to the stages of their evolution, which appear to clearly label the organizations of different generations according to the degree of radicalization of their ideological doctrines and escalation of practicing violence aimed at achieving power on the scale of an enclave, an individual country and at the regional or even global level. On the basis of the proposed evolutionary approach we have identified four generations (waves, stages) in the development of non-governmental religious-political organizations, and, as the result, the following typology\textsuperscript{4} was proposed:

• NRPO of the first generation: the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood (MB) the branch network in other Moslem countries
formed on its basis and the organizations that have fallen away from the MB, but adhere to the ideological principles of the Brotherhood;

- organizations of the second generation which appeared during the struggle of the Arabs against the Zionist expansion in the Middle East under the influence of the ideas of "Islamic Revolution" in Iran (e.g., the Palestinian Jihad Islami, the Lebanese Hezbollah);
- NRPO of the third generation, which emerged in the course of the events in Afghanistan since April 1978 up to the present time (the most striking example is the religious-political movement the Taliban);
- structures of the last, the fourth generation – international radical Islamic groups seeking to consolidate, monitor and control virtually all the extremist NRPO of "the Moslem world" (such organizations as Al Qaeda and the Global Jihad Front, founded by Osama bin Laden).

Of course, all modern Islamic NRPO "trace their ancestries" from the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood. DAISH is no exception to this rule. Its ideological doctrine was borrowed from takfirists-jihadists of Al Qaeda, because the underlying categories of this NRPO are two notions interpreted in a special way: the notion of Takfir (the accusation of "Kufra", i.e., unbelief) and Jihad (Holy war for the faith). In this context, radical Islamists are often called takfirists-jihadists.

The concept of "Takfir" is based on pinpointing of the so-called "enemies of Islam", which group, according to the ideas of modern Islamist theorists, includes, first, all non-Moslems ("Kafirs" – the infidels), and, secondly, the Moslems who do not share ideological views of the Islamists ("Murtaddun" – the apostates from Islam, and "Munafiqun" – the hypocrites, i.e., those whose belief is wrong or disingenuous). As far as to the concept of Jihad is concerned, it, as opposed to Moslem Orthodoxy, is now regarded solely as the war against the
"enemies of Islam", and the radical Islamists allow an offensive, aggressive nature of this struggle.

Thus, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who became the leader of Al Qaeda in June 2011, after the liquidation of Osama bin Laden, in connection with the aggression of the USA and its allies against the Taliban Afghanistan published in his book "al-Walaja -wal - Baraa" a kind of fatwa proclaiming that a Moslem is forbidden to get close to infidels, should keep under wraps any secrets of the Moslems. It is forbidden to conduct any business with the infidels. It is forbidden to accept any theories or ideas of the ungodly. It is forbidden to help the infidels in their war against the Moslems and to justify the "crusaders" in any way. Moslems are ordered to wage Jihad against the godless aggressors, apostates and hypocrites (the latter two imply the Arab regimes, which provided their territories for the anti-terrorist campaign, as well as Ulemas, bribed by the authorities, issuing false fatwas),6.

In his turn, Abu Musaba al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian terrorist, liquidated in June 2006 in Iraq, the leader of a local cell of Al Qaeda (it is on the basis of this organization that DAISH emerged later – I. D.), in his lecture entitled "Who knows more, you or Allah?", posted on many sites7, stated that "Jihad is an obligatory war against the infidels." The term "civilian population", asserted al-Zarqawi, is "false", since Islam does not divide people into civilians and servicemen: it knows only the division of people into the Moslems and the infidels. And if "the blood of a Moslem is forbidden, whatever he may do and wherever he may be ", "the blood of an infidel is permitted, whatever he may do and wherever he may be , if no treaty was made with him or if he was not spared". Al-Zarqawi divided people into three categories:

1. the Moslems;
2. the infidels, who regard Islam amicably, i.e. those who are under the protection (zimma) of the Moslems, who concluded with them a truce (hudna) or enjoying the mercy (aman) given to them;
3. all the other people. Al-Zarqawi declared the latter a "belligerent party": Sharia, he reminded, denies them protection and gives the Moslems the right to kill them, making an exception only for certain categories (primarily women and children). On this basis, al-Zarqawi considered, "disbelief in Allah is sufficient grounds for assassination of an infidel, whatever he may do and wherever he may be.

Thus, thanks to the efforts of foreign, especially Egyptian Islamist theorists in the XX – early XXI centuries there formed a well-grounded ideological doctrine of takfirists-jihadists, which became the ideological basis of the modern terrorism, hiding behind the Islamic faith, and also justification for violent political practices of radical Islamists and terrorists. Nearly all modern radical Islamist groups, including DAISH, use the provisions of this doctrine broadly, and therefore there is no question of the ideological autonomy of this structure.

With regard to the organizational structure of the modern NRPO, the history of the last century clearly shows that the activities of the organizations of religious extremist nature often depend on the attitude of the ruling regimes to them. In the conditions of diverse pressure and military impact, they usually go underground, organizing decentralized network structures. In case of benevolent attitude of the authorities, involving them in parliamentary and economic activities, they, on the contrary, often valiantly integrate into political systems of their countries. This can be fully attributed to, for example, the first organization of this kind, the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood, founded by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna in December 1928, which at times acted legally, and at times, for example at the present time, was in hiding.

It should be emphasized that most of numerous religious-political extremist groups formed on the ideological and organizational basis of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood are far from integration into political systems of their countries, and are committed to the fight against regimes of "Taghuts" (the
usurpers), using all means, including those of terrorist nature. Of course, the authorities strike cruel blows to such groups, so that they often go into hiding.

However, in the 90-ies of the last century, the world was watching processes of consolidation in the radical Islamist movement. The extremists at that time controlled Afghanistan, Sudan and partly Chechnya, hoped to expand the foothold of their power, kept talking about re-establishment of the Caliphate and Islamization of the world, etc. In 1998, they even managed to create the so-called "World Front for Jihad", which consolidated the most notorious extremist groups of the "Islamic world". A hierarchical network structure on a global scale, with claims to world domination, headed by the leader of Al Qaeda at that time – Osama bin-Laden – was being created firmly and steadily.

However, after the events of September 11, 2001 and as a result of the outbreak of the anti-terrorist campaign under the auspices of the USA decentralization of the structures of radical Islamists began everywhere. Their distinctive feature was a high degree of adaptation to the realities of the modern world. Although strictly hierarchical groups were still operating, the majority of them still obtained "fuzzy" governance mechanisms, there appeared structures organized according to the "spider web" pattern, and also fully independent ones.

The network principle of organization gives terrorist groups the following important features:

• compatibility of transnational terrorist groups, illegal arms dealers, transnational crime syndicates, drug lords, fundamentalists, ethno-national movements of extremist ideology, information pirates, smugglers;
  • high-speed receipt and transfer of information;
  • unified information infrastructure;
  • speed of command (reducing the speed of decision-making);
  • "self-synchronization" (the possibility of action in the autonomous mode);
• "power distribution" (maintenance of point operations; occupation of vast areas; possibility of concentration of a large amount of force; strengthening of the interaction.);
  • decentralization;
  • secrecy, a robust security system\(^{13}\);
  • deep integration (involvement) of the elements of the system;
  • mobility (almost invulnerable target);
  • effective use of modern features;
  • ability to work effectively under the command of an extraterritorial centre.

Besides, as international experience shows, the decentralizing radical Islamist structures have enhanced abilities to regenerate, and, in addition, their composition is constantly receiving new blood.

As a result, to date, for example, Al Qaeda is a network of regional organizations poorly connected with each other with weakened central leadership. The leaders encourage separate organizations to carry out terrorist attacks, sometimes helping them with money and advice, and training their fighters in such fields as production of explosive devices or combating in urban environments. However, the modern terrorist movement is today more appropriate to be spoken about as an extensive decentralized network structure, or even a movement of the same kind.

The same can be said about DAISH: on the territories controlled by the group its units are of a hierarchical structure. In other cases, for example in North Caucasus, where a number of gangs of the former Caucasus Emirate have sworn allegiance to the IS, Islamist networks are recorded\(^{14}\). In the case of the final military defeat of DAISH in Syria and Iraq, there is no doubt that, like Al Qaeda, the group will eventually become a network one, moving its activities deep underground. Hence, it proves that in the area of institutional building the leaders of DAISH use the scheme, already developed by their predecessors without introduction of any significant innovations.
As for the forms and methods of implementation by the DAISH militants of their practice, the range of their activities like that of other radical Islamist groups, is quite wide: from the implementation of the so-called "Islamic call" (ideological propaganda and information activities), to the most sophisticated methods of subversive and terrorist activity, including promotion of suicide bombing (the so-called "shahidism"). But in any case it can be argued that in the sphere of forms and methods of implementation of their specific practices the activists and militants of DAISH have not invented anything new in comparison with the practice of their colleagues in the Arab and wider – Moslem East, but are just consumers of the inventions of the "pioneers", from the Moslem Brotherhood and up to Al Qaeda.

Financing of any terrorist group is an extremely essential issue for the reason that it is impossible to carry out any activity without monetary funds. For DAISH a developed financial system is an important system element, determining, to a large extent, the possibility of realization of the far-reaching plans to recreate the so-called "Caliphate". Currently funding of the IS, its individual regional clusters, including the one in North Caucasus, is multi-channel. The scale of funding, the structure of its sources and their correlation are constantly in motion. However, at any specific time the financing structure of DAISH and its supporters may vary significantly for individual territories, controlled both by the organization and by its foreign network structures. At the same time, in the course of the transition from centralized structures which seems almost inevitable in the case of military successes of the Syrian army supported by the Russian Aerospace Forces, to polycentric (network) organization of the underground, sources of financing will continue to differentiate, to break up, as well as the number of possible recipients of this funding.

To date, the funding sources of DAISH can be broken down into two main groups: external and internal ones. The external sources include support from states-sponsors; religious
institutions; commercial and non-profit organizations; individuals, population and diasporas; as well as from various terrorist cells. The sources of internal financing of DAISH include revenues received from extraction and sale of crude oil, appropriation of funds as the result of capturing banks and other financial institutions, legal and illegal business (slave trade, arms and drugs trafficking etc.), and other income, for example, the help of rich terrorists who may occur among the members of a terrorist organization and racketeering.

So, currently the actual structure of financing of DAISH and its followers in other countries is a complex network, permanently changing its geography and structure, the total amount of circulating assets, the equity ratio of different sources. However, all these sources of financial-economic feeding of the IS radicals can hardly be regarded as some novelties, invented by the activists of DAISH, they all were known before in the practice of other modern radical Islamist groups.

However, DAISH significantly differs from other structures, proclaiming the same objectives and based on the same ideological principles. Among these main differences, we believe, the following ones should be pointed out:

- Speed of development of the group (in 2003 – Al Qaeda in Iraq, in 2013 – DAISH (ISIL), in 2014 – the IS, occupation of a part of the territory of Iraq and Syria).
- The scale of action (the IS was close to occupation of Baghdad and Damascus, announcement of recreation of the Caliphate, the spread of its influence in the territories that once were part of the Abbasid Caliphate).
- Creation of a quasi-state in the controlled territories (the signs: laws, land, tax and monetary system etc.).
- Availability of controlled network groups in Algeria, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, North Caucasus).
- The use of new technologies and mechanisms for ideological and informational work, especially among young people.
Summing up the above, it should be emphasized that during the XX – early XXI century hundreds of radical Islamist groups appeared in the world. In our opinion, the largest of these are three: the Moslem Brotherhood with its structures in many countries, Al Qaeda, which created network clusters in different regions of the world, and, of course, DAISH, which reached a kind of "success" in building a Caliphate. However, without external inspirations, the excitement of the "Moslem world" continues to gain momentum. Hence it would be too early to speak about the decline and stagnation of the radical Islamist movement.

References

7. See, for example: http://www.short-link.de/2054.

Keywords: Musa Bigiyev, the decline of the Muslim civilization, the Reformation, Martin Luther, the simplified Ottoman, the Turks.

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The author states that Bigiyev Musa (1875–1949), revealed reasons for the decline of Muslim civilization, suggested recipes for its revival, and also considered the concept of religious faith and the fate of the Turkish language and culture in his book "The Hulk Nazarinda bir Nitsche Mesele" [Some Questions for Public...
Review], published in Kazan in 1912. M. Bigiyev started his analysis with historical perspective.

He believed the Protestant Reformation, as the major cause of the rise of European civilization in the period when the Muslim state, led by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1494-1566), was at the peak of its power. He argued that the Reformation has liberated the mind of the civilized world from the religious restrictions and the dominance of the clergy, thus enabling knowledge and science breathe freely.

People have realized their human essence and the human mind has received autonomy, freedom and independence as a result of the religious revolution, started by Martin Luther (1483–1546), which allowed Europeans to master the wealth of nature and embrace social and technological progress, unattainable under the authority of the Catholic Church. While students and teachers of Muslim madrassas studied the endless comments of theologians at each other and the Muslim masses followed the instructions of lawyers, mired in stagnation, the Christian world was moving quickly and decisively on the path of progress.

In the very same era, when the ideas of Martin Luther took possession of the minds of Christians in Western Europe, the Ottoman scholars were unaware of the need for change in their own society, repeating memorized truths. Dervishes, Muslim analogs to Catholic monks, were also guilty of this religious and intellectual stagnation of the Muslim community, as they taught submission to the fate and oblivion essential problems in the earthly life in the hope of a good life in the future. M. Bigiyev believed that the destructive position of religious and legal schools (mazkhab), inhibiting the growth of new ideas, was also the reason for the decline and stagnation of the Muslim society.

The author writes that M. Bigiyev directly blamed the conservative Muslim scholars in borrowing practices of the Catholic Inquisition in the fight against dissent in the ranks of Muslims.
According to M. Bigiyev, another factor bearing intellectual stagnation of the Muslim community in the late 19th – early 20th centuries was the literature, lacking social meaning and moral content. It has been widespread among co-religionists, drawing youth into the world of useless fantasies instead of bringing an understanding of the real state of affairs in the Muslim community, encourage the pursuit of trade, agricultural work and active living position.

The author notes that ideas of M. Bigiyev were widely spread among the Muslim intellectuals of new formation. But unlike the famous Muslim reformers of the time, M. Bigiyev sought to implement the Muslim counterpart of the Protestant Reformation, so one of his ardent admirers, the Turk Hashim Nahid, appropriated him the title of "Muslim Luther". Indeed, parallels are evident, and the most striking of them is the attempt of M. Bigiyev to translate the Koran into a simplified Ottoman Turkic. This puts Musa Bigiyev on a par with Martin Luther, whose translation of the Bible into accessible German for his flock had played such an important role in the beginning of the Protestant Reformation. Reading the Bible in their own languages, and not in poorly understood or incomprehensible Latin, had led European Christians to realize the deep gulf between the teachings and rituals of the church and the Sacred text. Paradoxical is the fact that the Catholic Church has implemented reverence for Divine revelation as the main source of the truth over the centuries.

When the flock received a direct access to its contents through translation into the colloquial languages of the peoples of Europe, it turned out that the alternative understandings of its teachings and laws were possible, but not those the higher Catholic clergy had insisted. Was this idea the main motive in M. Bigiyev's intention to translate the Koran into Turkic, or did he formulate his task in a different way - it was not so important. But it was important that he was motivated to bring the contents of the Koran for his Turkic-speaking co-religionists.
Followers of M. Bigiyev believed that the study of the Koran in their own language would enable Muslims to realize its true greatness, and it would allow, on the one hand, overcome the bigotry in the field of religious and social life, and on the other, suspend the offensive atheism. The author notes that such ideas were truly revolutionary in the era when only one phrase "Turkish Koran" could cause accusations of heresy or even apostasy.

M. Bigiyev did not seek to replace the Arabic Koran with a Turkic translation. He believed that the translation of the Koran would be desirable for every believer for deepening and perfecting faith, but the correct and accessible translation of the Koran could only be realized by a reader who fully understood the lexicographical and linguistic traditions that had retained the original meaning of the sacred text. Criticizing the translations of his predecessors, M. Bigiyev in this way recommended himself as a possible leader of the movement for the reform of Islam, offering his translations and interpretations of the text in the Turkic version. His comparison with Martin Luther should be considered in this respect. The translation of the Koran was part of his general plan for the liberation of Muslims from the stale traditions through the reform of Muslim education, as well as moral and ethical values and ideological postulates on which the life of Muslims was built.

The author outlines the main points of the program of Musa Bigiyev are as following:

1. Reform of the educational system with the aim of eradicating the non-objective waste of time for transfusion from empty to empty in the framework of the madrasah. Bigiyev meant Kalyamic writings and legal comments of medieval authors on each other.

2. Need to end the "sleep of mind", engendered by the activities of Sufi-dervishes, who deprived believers of the desire to participate in social transformations actively to improve the
lives of Muslims and fulfill their vital material and spiritual needs.

3. Cessation of the dominance of legal and other madhhabs in the religious life of the community, which required a blind, fanatical commitment from their followers and suppressed any sprouts of free-thinking. M. Bigiyev proposed the creation of a simple and acceptable credo (based on the Koran) as an alternative that would put an end to the discord between the various theological and legal schools, undermining the unity of the community and restricting the freedom of creative search and expression of its members.

4. Creation of the Muslim literature that would form an active life position and a desire to change the world for the better through creative work.

5. Translation of the Koran into the languages of the Muslim peoples in order to give them a direct access to the Revelation under the guidance of the thoroughly knowledgeable Muslim tradition and the progressive-minded representatives of the Muslim community.

The author writes that the key vector of the U.S. economic strategy in Central Asia was the fight against the Russian integration project. If political rhetoric about the reconstruction of the Soviet Union will be removed, the creation of the Eurasian Union will close trade in Central Asia to Russia, promoting its domination, which is unacceptable for Washington. Integration initiatives of Moscow are constantly faced with vigorous opposition from the United States since that time. Information and diplomatic campaigns are unleashed at the expense of the Eurasian Economic Union; Alternative geo-economic projects are proposed; Confrontation is shifted to the field of the World Trade Organization.

Author of the abstract – N. Ginesina
The period of the collapse of the world colonial system (20th century) is a period of political formation of the sovereignty of many peoples of the East and the search for development within the framework of independent national states. Therefore, the author writes, it is advisable to consider the current situation in the Middle East in both political and religious aspects simultaneously. Interstate political and confessional (Sunni-Shiite) relations coexisted peacefully under the shadow of new local constitutions and legislations until the 1980s. The emerged cases of confrontation were neutralized by governments relatively quickly. There was a political mistrust of the Muslim community in the Middle East towards the West, and primarily to the U.S. because of their support of the state of Israel that arose in the territory of Palestine. The problem of the Sunni-Shiite contradictions in the Middle East did not seem significant under those conditions. Thus, Tehran sent troops to Oman against the guerrilla movements of Darfur to rescue the Sunni royal authority in Oman, as well as to suppress the Shiite Kurdish rebels in their own country. At the same time, both Iran and Saudi Arabia had a very restrained attitude towards the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict. Even Egypt reduced its hostile attitude toward Tel Aviv after the conclusion of the Camp David agreements (1978). In 1978–1979, an Islamic revolution took place in Iran, which expressed the new social sentiments of the common people of the Middle East - discontent with the growing penetration of the West
into the life of the Arab countries. The ideological and related political situation in the region began to escalate from this moment. Washington, basing on strategic neo-colonialist aspirations to maintain and expand the U.S. political, military and economic positions in the Middle East, also saw the main threat in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The author of the article notes that the opponents of Tehran began to search for optimal options for its neutralization, taking into account the prevailing social and political situation in the Middle East. At first, a plan based on the Iran-Iraq conflict over the Shiite status in Iraq was used. Saddam Hussein sent his army to the Islamic Republic of Iran, encouraged by American diplomats, as well as the leadership of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. American diplomats assured the Iraqi leader that the former army of the Shah was so disintegrated under the new regime that it would not stand any organized influence. However, the "blitzkrieg" undertaken by Baghdad proved to be erroneous - the war was prolonged for many years.

The main factor of public sympathy on the side of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war was pan-Arabism and implicitly - Sunnism. However, the anti-American Arab regimes – Syria and Libya – took the side of Tehran in the political aspect, considering that Iranian anti-Americanism was a political defense of the sovereignty of the Muslim area. Both sides suffered huge losses, both in manpower and in the economy as a whole in the end of the Iran-Iraq war. The West has received sufficient dividends: firstly, the region witnessed a long-term military confrontation between two major States belonging to different ideological branches of Islam; secondly, the armed contingents of the U.S. and the UK were deployed in the Persian Gulf region as the guarantors of security of the Arabian monarchies. This circumstance was used by the West for the further intervention in the internal life of the Middle East. In early 2002, the U.S. government proclaimed a new foreign policy concept, according to which the U.S. gave itself the right to overthrow any foreign government whose policy would threatened the U.S. national security. The terrorist act of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington was used by the U.S. on a much larger scale
than required by objective circumstances and without permission resolutions of the UN Security Council and contrary to the agreement of a number of world powers. The victims were, first of all, Iraq and Afghanistan: Afghanistan was attacked in the autumn of 2001, and Iraq – in the spring of 2003. Both countries were fully occupied, and the so-called "international coalitions" were formed for this purpose. As a result, the power of the Taliban in Afghanistan was overthrown, and Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun representative loyal to Washington, was appointed the head of the Afghan transitional administration. As for Iraq, the government of the coalition government was proclaimed there, formed mainly by the Shiites and Kurds. The Sunnis, the main support of the former regime, were pushed to secondary roles in the state structure.

The factor of the so-called Arab Spring – waves of demonstrations and coups, covering Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen – was promptly "used" by external and local ruling structures captured by the preservation of their interests. The anti-imperialist attitude of the Arabs has not been developed, and the "spring" has actually been brought to nothing in both social and political plans. Moreover, at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Great Britain and France carried out open armed actions against the Libyan Jamahiriya, and as a result the Middle Eastern regimes, which were the political opponents of Washington, Israel and their allies, were liquidated. The growing influence of Shiism in the Middle East was taken into account that embraced Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and the Persian Gulf countries, with the assistance of Tehran. Thus, the conditions for the organization of a frontal collision of armed formations were created, acting under the banner of Sunnism and Shiism.

This circumstance has expanded the possibilities for intervention of world powers in the region even more. Syria, Iraq and Yemen were the largest arenas of political and armed conflicts, which are often called inter-confessional in the world media.

In the first stage of the civil war (until the summer of 2015), ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda seized more than 70% of the
territory of Syria and actually threatened Damascus. As for Iraq, more than 30% of its territories came under the control of supporters of terrorist organizations as well, including the western cities of Falluja and Ramadi and large industrial Mosul in the north. The ruling circles of the U.S. and the Western coalition countries have gone through the adoption of their own military countermeasures. B. Obama said in September 2014 that although he did not introduce American troops, he would selectively bomb the territory of Syria and Iraq. As for Great Britain and France having mandated territories in the Middle East, they joined the bombing of the rebellious (by their definition) ISIS forces: France engaged in this in Syria and Iraq and the United Kingdom - in the territories of Iraq, captured by the terrorists.

The beginning of the second stage of the civil war in Syria is connected with the entry of the Russian Aerospace Forces into military operations at the request of the legitimate Syrian government on September 30, 2015. The effectiveness of the Syrian-Russian cooperation has caused some concern among NATO countries. They began to fear that the preservation of the unity of Syria under the conditions of the existing legal leadership of the country could inspire other states of the Middle East to oppose the West and neutralize its interference in the internal affairs of the region. There has been a strengthening of the military intervention of the Western powers (the U.S., Britain, Germany and France), as well as Turkey and Saudi Arabia into the conflict in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The negotiations between the conflicting parties eventually led to the signing of an armistice on February 27, 2016 between the Syrian government and the moderate opposition within the ceasefire in Syria. It should be noted that the ceasefire did not apply to the ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and other entities recognized by the UN Security Council as terrorist and banned in Russia and in a number of other countries. However, while the government armed forces have achieved considerable success in the western part of Syria, the armed clashes with terrorist groups continued.
In Iraq, the opposing sides have not reached the ceasefire regime yet and the military situation has not become simpler, although terrorist organizations are losing the initiative more and more. In Yemen, there is a long process of negotiations between the opposing Yemeni Sunnis and Shiites with the participation of an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia. However, the parties have not reached reconciliation yet.

The author concludes that the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East are more political than religious in total. The political interests of various social elites, defending their power priorities, act as agents of conflict and interstate contradictions. The provocative activity of the external forces (primarily the Western special services) which, at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, facilitated the acquisition of force by Muslim sectarianism to conduct an armed struggle for power in the region against regimes unsuitable for the West, have played a large role in the emergence of the conflict situation in the Greater Middle East.

Author of the abstract – B. Mahmudov.


Keywords: the anthropology of Islam, the methodology of Islamic studies, the insider, the outsider, the principle of objectivity.

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The author asserts that the problem of insider and outsider approaches in religious studies is an important methodological issue, previously based on the criteria of objectivity and
informative content of the received knowledge. The objectivity of
the muslim researchers studying issues of Islam became relevant
after the events of September 11, 2001 and in connection with the
growing nationalism in the former Soviet republics, when Islam
began to be considered as a part of the national heritage, that
freed apologetic potential insiders researchers. At the same time,
the problem of the objectivity may be typical not only for
insiders, but also for outsiders who can be burdened with their
own religious or ideological position, with an impact on the
objectivity of the scientist.

The author believes that it is possible to talk about the
gradation of insiders, using an anthropological approach in
Islamic studies, which implies a multi-level involvement of
researchers in the communities they study. It seems important to
the author that there is a coincidence of the identity of the
researcher with the identity of a specific muslim community, and
also the degree of this coincidence in a number of factors:
religiously proper, on the basis of belonging to a particular
religious group, national, territorial, temporal, socioeconomic,
gender, ideological, by degree, as well as the nature of the
influence of one or another Islamic tradition.

The author writes that one can talk about the absolute
insiderism when identities coincide in all factors or in the most
significant of them, and about the conditional or relative
insiderism with incomplete coincidence of the identities of the
researcher and the studied muslim community. The problem of
insider and outsider approaches in humanitarian science in
general, and in religious studies in particular, is often considered
in the context of the ratio of objectivity and subjectivity of the
researcher. At the same time, whether the research, performed by
an outsider, can be considered really objective by default?

The objectivity of scientific judgments is a conditionally
existing category. One of the main problems of modern science is
the problem of the ratio of objectivity and subjectivity of the
researcher, which manifests itself in insider and outsider
approaches both in religious studies in general and in Islamic studies in particular. Since the anthropological approach in Islamic studies (as in religious studies in general) breaks Islam into smaller local forms, the muslim researcher is not always an absolute insider, only partially correlating with the community studied by him.

A new period in the history of muslims around the world began on September 11, 2001. Since that moment, every terrorist act and bloody clash with the participation of muslims and Islamic slogans inevitably lead to attacks on all muslims in general or on the very idea of Islam on the part of the world community. The society is divided into two unequal groups: the superior believes that terrorism is the quintessence of "true" Islam, leading to the denial of everything that is different from it, the primacy of rigid (Sharia) norms and militant jihadism. The second, a small group consisting of muslims and participants in the anti-racist movement, declares that true Islam is a peaceful, tolerant religion and that muslims should not be to blame.

In this regard, there are studies in the field of Islamic studies, in which the apologetics of Islam is read to some extent. There are researchers who accept Islam in the process of studying, becoming insiders, and whose neophytes are reflected in their scientific works. Researchers-outsiders also face a choice of how to present Islam and muslims to those who are interested, and whose number has risen sharply since the events of the eleventh of September. Some anthropologists began to explain to the public that muslims living in the West are connected not only with the life of the rest of the Islamic world, but also to the West also.

The same reaction is a characteristic of that part of muslim researchers who perceive themselves as representatives of the certain currents. The 1990s were marked by nationalism for the peoples of the post-Soviet space. The former Soviet republics, left alone with their history, turned to their past. In this regard, the religion was often perceived as a part of the glorious past of the people. Therefore, apologetics did not concern only the formation
of a positive image of Islam, but rather the creation of a positive image of a specific people professing Islam, and, at the same time, Islam as a part of the cultural heritage of that people.

The basic approaches in religious studies to the research of a particular religion are the approaches of the so-called insider and outsider. In other words, these are approaches that require answering the question: a particular religion is studied "from within" by one of the adherents of this religious system or "from outside" by representatives of other religious systems or worldviews. It is not possible to avoid one of these approaches: religion will be considered "from within" or "from the outside" in any case.

At the same time, it is possible to use these approaches in parallel in the study of the same subject matter. Insider and outsider positions impose certain features both on the very process of studying the subject of research, and on the conclusions made in the course of the work of an insider or an outsider. In other words, the main problem associated with these approaches is the problem of the objectivity of research.

The author shares the opinion of some researchers that the problem of insider and outsider approaches is not a problem, but the choice of the position of a scientist. Continuing this idea, the author believes that both the insider and the outsider face the risk of bias in their investigations, it is only a special kind of bias - a bias based on the study of Oneself and the Other. Similar difficulties are proposed to be solved by abstracting from the subject of study.

The problem of the correlation between the universal and the local, the general and the particular in Islam (as well as in other religious systems) is a matter of dispute not only for the muslims themselves, but also for all researchers dealing with the issues of Islam. What is it - "Islam itself", "real", "universal", "classical", "pure" Islam and where is it? There are various approaches that ensure a different attitude of the researcher to different forms of existence of Islam.
The problem of the approach of an insider and an outsider becomes an important methodological issue also when applying an anthropological approach in Islamic studies, namely the consideration of a specific community tied to a specific time and to a specific territory. The author believes that it is possible to talk about the multi-level involvement of the researcher in the studied community. In this connection, the identity of the researcher with the identity of a specific muslim community, and also the degree of this coincidence is important.

The author identifies several factors influencing the correlation of the researcher with the typical representative of the particular studied community: the religious factor, belonging to a particular religious group within Islam; national; territorial; temporal; socio-economic; ideological; according to the degree / nature of impact of a particular Islamic tradition; gender.

The author believes that it is possible to speak of a conditional or relative insider if there is an incomplete coincidence of the identities of the researcher and the studied muslim community. The researcher may not live in the same territorial or temporal boundaries as the group he is studying, may not coincide with it according to nationality, belong to another socioeconomic group, may be a supporter of another ideology, be influenced by another religious tradition.

Some of the above factors may be critical and some may not be of particular interest depending on the flow within Islam. Part of the above factors can not affect the formation of group identity in cases with some muslim communities. The discrepancy of the identity of the researcher with non-critical factors with the identity of the studied group does not lead to a distance from the subject of research in such cases.

At the same time, it is possible to talk about the transitional status of an outsider as an insider, when the researcher relates himself to these people emotionally, not being a member of the studied community, which makes it possible to talk about a kind of "acquired insider". This, on the one hand, inevitably informs
the researcher of the emotional involvement of the scientist in the subject of his research, which is the main condition for trying to move from an outsider / conditional insider to an "insider in spirit." On the other hand, this transition may not affect the expansion of access to internal information (which is typically characteristic of an absolute insider), since the internal self-identification of the researcher may be unnoticed or invaluable to the particular community studied.

The anthropological approach of Islamic studies allows one to see various local forms of existence in a single Islam, which makes it possible to see the difference between the Islam of the modern Tatar community of Russia and between the Islam of the muslim population of Uzbekistan, between the Islam of the followers of the F. Gulen movement and the Islam of Hizb ut-Tahrir members. The concrete society of people becomes the minimum indivisible part and, at the same time, the unit of measurement of Islam.

This approach imposes an impact on the problem of insider and outsider. It is not enough for a scientist to belong to Islam, in order to be a full-fledged insider when using an anthropological approach in Islamic studies. In this connection, it seems important to correlate the researcher's identity with the identity of a particular muslim community, and also the degree of this correlation on a number of factors: religious, based on belonging to a particular religious group, national, territorial, temporal, socio-economic, gender, ideological, the degree / nature of the influence of one or another Islamic tradition. The coincidence of identities for all factors or for the most significant of them indicates absolute insider. Incomplete coincidence of the identities of the researcher and the studied muslim community may indicate conditional or relative insider.

The author writes in conclusion that the view of religion "from within" and "from without" inevitably remains one of the basic methodological issues of religious studies in general, primarily on the problems of objectivity and information content.
of the received knowledge. The anthropological approach allows for the gradation of insiders, and to see different levels of inclusion of the researcher in the studied community.

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Keywords: al-vasatyia, globalism, Islamic economy, world system crisis, neoliberalism, Russia, social and environmental problems, sustainable development, economic security.

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The author analyzes the trends in the formation of advanced ideas and practices of economic, social, environmental and cultural nature through the prism of the fundamental problems of global development. He believes that, first of all, these trends are formed within the framework of the concept of sustainable development, created by UNDP specialists (the United Nations Development Program), as well as in the theory of Islamic economics, based on the Koranic Covenant on justice and moderation in all human relations. These models are alternative to the radical postulates of the neoliberal system of capitalism in many respects and provide guidance for the establishment of a new development paradigm.

The author notes that the manifestations of the global systemic crisis began to be traced back in the last century. It was then, that the world system of the consumer society was formed,
and a materialistic worldview spread that placed economic and social interest above universal morality. At the same time man imagined himself to be the king of Nature. The mass consumer attitude toward life coincided with a rapid growth in the number of non-believers in the last century.

Mankind has rejected the idea of the divinity of the universe, as well as religious morals and ethics. A blind faith in the omnipotence of man and scientific and technological progress has led to the fact that homo sapiens began to rearrange the world according to his schemes, each of them considered to be correct by the adepts. As a result, there were colossal human and natural losses.

Global instability, covering all spheres of human life, is steadily increasing in recent years. The instability of the world energy and financial systems is increasing, militarization is increasing, cultural development and rapprochement of peoples are being thrown back, and serious social and environmental problems are aggravated. In general, the most serious crisis arose in international political and economic relations.

The growing instability of the world system is caused by a number of reasons, but first of all it is connected with a radical attempt to implant the geopolitical and geo-economic model of the world free market into the body of the modern civilization. Since the late 1970s, neoliberal theory and practice have been built on the basis of economic models of the U.S. and Great Britain mainly, and then the countries of the "big seven" followed in their fairways. They seek to consolidate their own economic institutions, jurisprudence and economic practices in the rest of the world up to this day. "Market fundamentalism" is based on the belief that a supranational free world market can solve all the pressing problems of mankind. "Civilization of business" enjoys the military-political protection of the U.S. and its closest partners.

International financial institutions, controlled by them, such as the IMF, the World Bank and a number of other influential
institutions, strongly recommend joining the neo-liberal competition in exchange for assistance to Developing Countries. Those who resist the rule of the natural advantages, enlisted in the enemy camp. The author recalls that initially the neoliberal economic doctrine meant a phased release of the markets of leading economies from the guardianship of the state and from social obligations, as well as the establishment of a new world monetary and financial system. Over time, this project has significantly transformed into a kind of philosophy of development of world civilization. Supporters of the project began to accelerate the reconstruction of the world as soon as the Soviet system was shaken. "Shock therapy", prescribed for the post-Soviet economy, has shown much more stringent reforms than those practiced earlier in other countries. An attempt to force the spread of the neo-liberal project otherwise of globalism followed the collapse of the socialist camp around the planet. Neo-liberal tools were used in the war-ravaged Iraq and Afghanistan after the introduction of the coalition troops there. As a result, the long-term socio-economic and political crises were received. The system based on the erosion of national markets, the neglect of social obligations, unrestrained consumption and accelerated economic growth has generated a critical mass of global socio-economic, cultural, environmental and military problems over the past two decades.

Mainly European countries led by the U.S. and the international financial institutions continue to build relationships with the "second" and the "third" world in the mainstream of the globalist project, contrary to common sense. Countries and credit and investment organizations which form the core of neoliberal capitalism give advice to others which often disprove their own socio-economic practices. The proposed formula for progress for the rest basically comes down to radical steps to privatize state property, minimize state presence in the economy, state social obligations and abolish protectionist measures. It is strongly recommended to follow the rules of monetarism of the dominant
speculative monetary and financial system. Export orientation is encouraged, first of all – the raw materials.

The author believes, based on the available experience, that the implementation of a full set of such councils leads to the opposite from the expected results, cause the processes of their rejection by active social layers and politicians expressing their moods. The rejection of imposed reforms that contain a real threat to social and cultural values of the peoples is accompanied by a revival of left-wing ideology, right-wing conservatism, religious and national movements. Sometimes they radicalized significantly. The growth of radicalism in recent years is noticeable all over the world, including Europe, and its spectrum is expanding. Many modern fundamentalist movements from peaceful to militant ones arise as a response to market fundamentalism.

It is often perceived not only as an economic neocolonialism, but also as a cultural, or rather anti-cultural. National cultures, traditions in the design of the world market civilization are ignored, and even considered as obstacles on the way to it. The production basis of modern transnational capitalism needs the formation of a corresponding superstructure in the form of a world society of unrestrained consumption. The type of "new man", which is called «homo economicus», multiplies in this environment. He is accustomed to think in economic categories mainly, loses his individuality and social ties, hardly understands the culture of his ancestors, past and present cultural values of other peoples, often perceives them as archaic vestiges. Naturally, the masses of such one-dimensional workaholics and consumers are easily manageable in the right direction.

The idea of the global democratization, preached by neo-liberals, is subordinated to the economic tasks of the super-free market in reality and is used as a political tool for its dissemination and selectively. The export of democracy does not extend to allied authoritarian and even obviously despotic,
regimes. The neoliberal system has considerable political, economic and military power. There is an active search for another value and technological paradigm of development, designed to change the consumer attitude to life on the conscious saving of the surrounding world and the human essence in a human being. Serious disruptions in the life of societies are caused by the depletion of ecosystems with intensive consumption of resources. Many socio-economic models, whether developed or developing countries, are beginning to lose perspective. The author believes that the concept of sustainable development worked out by UNDP experts is a unifying antithesis to the neoliberal project. It is gaining the increasing international recognition in recent years, and its individual projects are already beginning to be realized.

The key principle of the concept is the need to balance economic, social and environmental well-being. The scheme of mutually supportive socio-natural evolution through the approval of lean socio-economic models for regulating production and consumption, the introduction of alternative energy, resource-saving and clean technologies, which is commonly referred to as the "green economy", is proposed. It is very important that the new views on the world economic and political system, the role of the state and the market, awareness and education, are formed around this basic goal, the problems of social responsibility of business, and local government are resolved. Serious attention is paid to the issues of support and development of culture, preservation of the traditional spiritual values, their role in approving new vectors of progress.

The Islamic heritage can give a lot of useful on the way out of the global systemic crisis. Millions of Muslims aspire to the main ethical appeals to the teachings of Islam – justice and moderation. Many retain such cultural and psychological attitudes as responsibility for the spiritual and physical health of man, for the present and the future. Islamic doctrine condemns greed and parasitism, unnecessary risks, fosters diligence.
The author emphasizes that recently Quranic precepts about the careful attitude to the surrounding world attracts increasing attention. More and more Muslim social and environmental organizations are emerging, contributing to the common cause of human and nature protection, the number of Islamic ecological Internet resources is growing, and serious works on the theory and practice of sustainable development in the Muslim world are beginning to be published.

Summarizing the main trends in the system of coordinates of the world sustainable development for the foreseeable future, the author believes, it is necessary to single out the planned forced abandonment of the priority of economic growth over social development and environmental safety.

Changes are brewing in the socio-political structures, there is a correction in the direction of inter balance of interests of personality and society in the preservation and dissemination of the basic values of democracy and human rights in the Western and Eastern models of social organization. Russia trustingly followed the rules of the neoliberal globalist project until recently, not quite aware of its own role. But its statehood was strengthened at the same time and consistent defense of their natural interests provoked a strong reaction from the West. But its statehood was strengthened at the same time and consistent defense of their natural interests provoked a strong reaction from the West. However, the pressure of the so-called civilized West is good for Russia. It only speeds up the revision of the goals and methods of development. Most likely, they will have to bring in line with the overall global objectives for the release of a global systemic crisis.

Now there is a tendency to strengthen state regulation and planning of social and economic development in Russia. Movement towards economic stability includes:

Temporary freezing of the process of denationalization of strategic sectors of the economy and privatization of key state assets; The introduction of protectionist measures to protect
economic security, the state monopoly on the use of natural resources; State support of investment and innovation activity; Strengthening administrative responsibility for achieving the set goals, as well as the introduction of currency control norms in order to restrict the export of capital and neutralize speculative attacks against the national currency.

Such steps do not at all threaten the preservation of private property and are not aimed at self-isolation from the world market. They are necessary to keep major sectors of the national economy under control, and to create the financial and industrial mechanism to improve the efficiency of state regulation and socially useful returns from the market system. These measures contribute to the diversification of the economy, its orientation to the domestic market and the increase of competitiveness on the external one.

The development of tools to reduce the inflationary component of economic growth and the transition from a monetarist policy of containing a money supply to a full-fledged banking and financial-investment system occupies an important place in the macroeconomic strategy. It should save the Russian economy from a rigid link to servicing the needs of the world market and the interests of foreign creditors, as well as to meet monetary demand in the real sector of the economy, to expand the purchasing power of consumers.

The Islamic banking system attracts more attention of Russian specialists and the public. It is likely that the testing of Islamic banking will begin within the framework of one of Russia's financial institutions. It is not excluded that the Russian Islamic Bank will start full-fledged work in the future. Islamic banks operate not only in countries with predominantly Muslim populations, but also in Europe, the United States, Australia, Canada, India, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sri Lanka and the Bahamas, in more than 70 countries.

The world financial system that has developed in recent decades is unfairly subjected to increasing criticism from many
economists, including Muslim ones. The author notes that it is isolated from the economy that provides real goods and services. Colossal short-term speculative transactions allow someone to make huge profits without producing a product. The natural connection between finance and the real economy is lost, which in turn leads to unpredictability of the development of world markets. This situation does not match one of the most important principles in the theory of Islamic Economics, according to which business income without the cost of productive resources – labour, material, natural and other – is regarded as unjust.

The author proposes to consider the theory and practice of the Islamic economy as an integral part of the growing popularity of the ethical economy in the world, as some part of the «new, third way», and pay attention to the concept of the median way, developed by Islamic scientists, and known as «al-vasatyia» that covers the important aspects of Muslim life, beginning with theology, law, issues of freedom, responsibility and up to the economy, education and enlightenment. Islamic doctrine does not reject the market economy as such, but requires reasonable and fair regulation. It puts the limits of market society of unlimited consumption, calls for moderation and harmony with the surrounding world, looking for an alternative to destructive «civilization of business». The author suggests calling this alternative "green". Green is the color of life, nature, peace and security, the path to salvation, and it symbolizes resurrection, renewal, hope, wisdom.

A careful and respectful attitude to man and Nature, to harmony between them is laid in Islam. Its sacred color is green. Green color also symbolizes the path to sustainable development, a modern socio-ecological movement, striving for a balanced co-evolution of man and nature. Guidelines for sustainable development and Islamic Economics are complementary to each other and valuable in the development of the new world in their own way. The author hopes that Russia will take a worthy place in it.

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РОССИЯ
И
МУСУЛЬМАНСКИЙ МИР
2017 – 2 (296)

Научно-информационный бюллетень

Содержит материалы по текущим политическим, социальным и религиозным вопросам

Дизайн М.Б. Шнайдерман
Компьютерная верстка К.Л. Синякова

Гигиеническое заключение
№ 77.99.6.953.П.5008.8.99 от 23.08.1999 г.
Подписано к печати 19/VI–2017 г. Формат 60х84/16
Бум. офсетная № 1. Печать офсетная. Свободная цена
Усл. печ. л. 6,9   Уч.-изд. л. 5,7
Тираж 300 экз. Заказ № 77

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по общественным наукам РАН,
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Москва, В-418, ГСП-7, 117997

Отдел маркетинга и распространения
информационных изданий
Тел. (925) 517-36-91
E-mail: inion@bk.ru
E-mail: ani-2000@list.ru
(по вопросам распространения изданий)

Отпечатано в ИНИОН РАН
Нахимовский пр-кт, д. 51/21
Москва В-418, ГСП-7, 117997
042(02)9