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## CONTENTS

<i>L. Skvortsov.</i> Dangerous Symptoms of the Field of Modern Geopolitics .....	4
<i>Viktor Avksentiev, Boris Aksyumov.</i> Conflict-Raising Scenarios in the South of Russia in the Context of Social-Cultural Development of the Region.....	58
<i>Alexei Malashenko.</i> The New President and the “Old” North-Caucasus.....	69
<i>Adash Toktosunova.</i> Problems and Perspectives of Interfaith and Ethnical Dialogue in Kyrgyzstan .....	79
<i>Alexandr Shustov.</i> Will the U.S.A. Get a Military Base in Uzbekistan?.....	92
Contents of “Russia and the Moslem World” Bulletin for 2012 N 1 (235)–12 (246).....	96

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**DANGEROUS SYMPTOMS OF THE FIELD  
OF MODERN GEOPOLITICS**

*“Oh, East is East and West is West,  
And never the twain shall meet,  
Till Earth and Sky stand presently At  
God’s great Judgment Seat,  
But there is neither East nor West,  
Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,  
When two strong men stand face to face  
Though they come from the ends of the  
Earth!”*

Rudyard Kipling.  
The Ballad of East and West  
Transl. by E. Polonsko

During the 2012 presidential election campaign Mitt Romney criticizing Barack Obama for his foreign policy, called Russia the Number 1 geopolitical enemy of America. This statement could not but evoke wide repercussions.

A question arises whether this statement reflects the personal view of Mitt Romney, or it is the permanent view of the American political elite on Russia.

A correct answer to this question is, evidently, quite important. If it is the real political course of the United States, then the world may indeed find itself at “the ends of the Earth,” as Kipling wrote.

Of course, one can ignore Mitt Romney's statement, regarding it a verbal twist in his election campaign without any real political meaning. But this will be an expression of *lightheadedness* inherent in our mentality. Lightheadedness is pleasant in a way since it takes *concern* off our chest. And the *mirages* formed and circulated by information centers and special services in the West actively help to remove this concern.

And how does our intellectual "whoop-de-do" behave in this situation? Its emotional reactions are quite opposite.

Fundamental science should reveal and explain the *real* situation. Inasmuch as *reality* of the situation is related to *virtual* reality, we shall need the *methodology of humanitarian knowledge*.

We need to recreate the geopolitical reality which stands behind Mitt Romney's statement, because modern global political orientation will be impossible without it.

So, is there a real threat that the superpower will adopt geopolitical guidelines?

## **1. Will the Geopolitical Aim Be Preserved?**

Today we can assert, with due caution, that the answer to this question is dual: "yes" and "no."

Mitt Romney's statement shows that there are influential political forces in the United States which stand for the revival of geopolitics toward Russia, and along with it the Cold war policy. However, the influence of sober-minded politicians, who are striving to lead the modern world away from the apocalypse of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, should not be ignored.

Who will win in this confrontation?

Everything depends on the result of the test of creating the field of modern geopolitics. What will "the ends of the earth" mean: general

human catastrophe or the triumph of the “strongest” and the “worthiest”?

And what is “the ends of the Earth” in historical perspective?

The world stood at “the ends of the Earth” during World War II. After it the revival of the geopolitical aim seemed impossible. Mankind has acquired general *wisdom*.

It was imaginatively expressed by Kipling. Kamal, in the spirit of rebellious tribes, steals the pride of a British army colonel – a thoroughbred mare. The colonel’s son, following family pride, pursues the horse-stealer, catches up with him and threatens to burn down his village and kill his tribesmen.

Can the conflict be averted? Adhering to the priority of life, the colonel’s son refuses from vengeance and gives his father’s mare to Kamal as a gift. The feeling of *justice* comes to the fore.

In answer Kamal sends his son mounted on the gift-mare to the colonel’s service. Thus East and West “move from their places to meet.”

The noble feeling of justice is *higher than selfish gain and higher than the honor of family and tribe*.

The reality of humankind as a whole and recognition of the priority of its preservation radically changes the traditional trends of world politics.

But this is a *virtual* change. In reality *concrete private interests* continue to dominate. This concreteness was shattered by the catastrophic casualties of World War II.

As a result, a situation of *uncertainty* has emerged. Uncertainty characterized the mass self-consciousness of Russia. This uncertainty became especially pronounced in the new era, which set in after the *Cold war*.

But uncertainty existed before the new era, too. It was conditioned by the inertia of the Allied relations in the war against Nazism, which continued right up to the notorious speech of Winston Churchill in Fulton, which marked the beginning of the Cold war.

Churchill put the question quite bluntly: what could the global policy of the West be based on? And he gave an unambiguous answer: on global confrontation with the Soviet Union and its way of life. In other words, the policy of the West was directed to a geopolitical socially-oriented channel. Accordingly, before the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries system, the global situation was regarded as the dichotomy of confrontation and rivalry of the two systems. Our assessment of the situation proceeded from the theory of the formation transition of the world from capitalism to communism, transition which should take up a whole historical epoch. In turn, western political analysts put forward the idea of “freedom” as the ideological basis of opposition to communism.

The struggle of the two systems is the starting point of the political thinking of statesmen. In this context the results of World War II and the prospects of a new global confrontation are viewed now.

The problem lies not in how to avoid payment for the “jackal’s dinner” of the threat of a third world war, but in who should pay for it.

In this connection A. Yakovlev wrote the following: “The end of the legal venture of the fascist chieftains is well-known. Hitler was soaked in petrol and burnt like a typhoid louse. The remaining persons of his entourage were hanged. The lesson was quite instructive.

“It could serve as a convincing warning to anyone who would again harbor the idea of world supremacy. However, one of the main

specific features of the class of capitalists is that it is insatiable in its striving for wealth”<sup>1</sup>.

Were these words prophetic? Couldn't research “to prove” that Hitler was not soaked in petrol and burnt like a “typhoid louse,” but had safely retired to the Latin American continent and lived there with Eve Braun for seventeen long years, be explained by the desire to reanimate the very idea of world domination?

Assessments change with time, sometimes very radically. As the great Plato said, “time is omnipotent: just a few years can change the name and image of things, their nature and fate”<sup>2</sup>.

In this context A. Yakovlev assessed the change of his views on the class of capitalists and their role in world affairs. This is a special problem requiring special examination.

Evidently, at the basis of confrontation between the two systems lay definite ideological constructions which camouflaged the real political relations. How did politicians of the West and the Soviet Union understand this reality? Was this understanding identical?

It can safely be said that even if identity did exist, it was very limited. The point is that traditionally the initial aspects of *western politicians' activity were geopolitical ideas which were not shared by Soviet leaders.*

The unwillingness to see western guidelines in politics played a fatal role in determining strategic goals and final results of *perestroika*, which M. Gorbachev offered to the whole world.

The Soviet leaders discarded the communist perspective and switched the country on to the capitalist road. A momentous reconstruction of the entire system of foreign policy began. Russia fell

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<sup>1</sup> A. Yakovlev. *Pax Americana. Imperial Ideology: Sources, Doctrines.* Moscow, 1969. – P. 4–5.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, “Time Is Omnipotent...” // Moscow, 1968. – P. 198.



into the euphoria of waiting for global fraternization with West European countries and the United States. The expensive defense shield of the country now seemed too burdensome, and relations with the socialist allies changed radically.

Russia began to disarm, opened its borders, and moved toward its former ideological opponents. Although there were few people in the West who expected such fantastic gifts, but they were received enthusiastically with loud applause. Eloquent speeches were made and gala receptions arranged. However, there were no real steps to establish fraternal relations of a new type, as expected by the fathers of *perestroika* and reforms.

Speculations concerning the simultaneous disbandment of the military-political alliances NATO and the Warsaw Pact have disappeared immediately after the Warsaw Treaty ceased to exist.

Promises not to spread the NATO forces' activity to the former spheres of influence of the Soviet Union have also been forgotten. As a result, the emerging global situation began to be assessed as the victory of the West in the Cold war against the Soviet Union and its allies.

Instead of a sober analysis of the existing situation and theoretical clarification of the deep-going motives of the policy of the West, the main theorists of *perestroika* have undertaken ridiculous attempts to present this foreign-policy process as a certain "common victory" of East and West. This looked unconvincing and was like a clumsy camouflaging of their professional and political incompetence. Unwillingness to face up to real things created an atmosphere of conceptual darkness, in which it was not possible to see either realities of the past or foreign-policy trends of the future. A legitimate question arises: is an effective policy possible without clear theoretical foundations? Of course, one can and probably should make soothing

speeches and effective gestures of mutual trust. But what for? What stands behind all this?

Evidently, without theoretical substantiations of policy, without objective criteria of its strategy one can easily receive an “invitation card to execution” and harbor illusions of “jointly” adopting political decisions, whereas in reality these decisions are adopted by others. This is what happened to the foreign policy of Russia in the 1990s.

The loss of theoretical and political independence entails the loss of influence in one’s own country. Numerous cunning politicians step up their activity in ideological muddle, striving to draw as much benefit as possible from betrayal of the country’s interests.

This betrayal usually takes place behind the smokescreen of general humanistic harangue.

The foreign camp shows a desire to use the rare opportunity. The point is that Russia’s history demonstrates that the “Time of Trouble” has periodically emerged in the country, and this created an opportunity for “eliminating” Russia as an independent state and turning it into a source of enrichment and exploitation. To do such a thing to a superpower seemed possible, if its population would be drastically reduced and territory divided.

In this context, “moral grounds” begin to be formed for a rapid reduction of the Russian population and the positioning of Russia as a “rotten borough,” whose loss should hardly cause any regret. In this way a geopolitical idea, “brilliant” and simple at the same time, has emerged, which the Russians themselves should realize: Russia the less in size and the weaker as a state, the better” and “richer” Russian citizens’ life would be.

Thus, western politicians have come to the conclusion that they will not have to pay a penny for the “jackal’s dinner.”

Here is what “journalist” and “author” Elena Kolyadina writes in this context: “The authorities like to quote with indignation the words of Margaret Thatcher who once said that 15 million of the economically active population in the U.S.S.R. would be well enough. These words have caused indignation of our patriots. But the stark realities of life are as follows: we need precisely this number of people to work in the oil-and-gas, mining and timber industries, plus the service personnel and families. As to the rest, they are ‘ambrosia beetles’ giving no profit”<sup>1</sup>.

The “benevolent” advice of Margaret Thatcher is welcomed by some of our authors, inasmuch as they know that the leader of *perestroika* Mikhail Gorbachev has become a great friend of Margaret Thatcher. Does this mean that M. Gorbachev was worried by the same problem as Elena Kolyadina, namely, what is to be done with the multimillion Russian “ambrosia beetles” who do not bring any profit?

Elena Kolyadina failed to notice that this problem concerned her own fate. This is a trait of some of our “intellectuals,” who believe that they are always outside the sphere of action of the general rules of life. Perhaps, they might think, all these “ambrosia beetles” should be thrown over the bridge...

The idea of Margaret Thatcher so ardently supported by Elena Kolyadina has become the starting point of purposeful information impact in a definite direction. This is not only a conceptual impact, but one *creating events* which can form public opinion.

Due to this, things can happen which would seem simply incredible from the point of view of common sense.

The global enemies of Russia are taken for “friends” and the history of one’s own country as the history of a civilizatory “enemy.”

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<sup>1</sup> Elena Kolyadina. “How Many Russians We Need? // Newspaper “Metro”, July 11, 2012, No 55.

This new vision of the global reality is facing the fundamental question: Why was it that as a result of the renunciation of the ultimate aim of communist construction and return to the path of capitalist development Russia was not adopted in the “fraternal family” of West European countries and did not become a friendly partner of Uncle Sam in his global policy? M. Gorbachev’s and B. Yeltsin’s embraces of the West were heartily greeted in words, but in actual fact proved futile.

This question has been answered by political analysts playing the key role in the formation of the policy of the West toward Russia.

One of them is Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser of the U.S. President. He admitted quite frankly that the dramatic struggle for the world order was determined by the struggle for Eurasia, that is, the main territory of Russia. 4 He proceeded from the classical premise formulated by the British political analyst Mackinder in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. He wrote that whoever rules East Europe possesses the heart of the Earth, and whoever rules the heart of the Earth possesses the world island of Eurasia, and whoever rules the world island possesses the world<sup>1</sup>.

This position explains many things. The *perestroika* leaders simply did not understand the logic of global policy pursued by the West.

In the interaction of the participants in global policy the priority is given to **the achievement of the greatest benefit**. If the balance of forces allows it, the profit in this interaction can be mutual and it is fixed by proper legal documents. If the balance of forces is violated, conditions are created for gaining **one-sided benefit**. Naturally, it can be camouflaged by cunning verbosity, but this does not change the heart of the matter.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Z. Brzezinski. Great Chessboard. Moscow, 1999, p. 11.

When Russia took the path of its own military-political, economic and cultural disarmament and self-flagellation, this was received by the West as an invitation to a common free cheerful “revel” at the expense of Russian natural wealth. Billions of dollars began to outflow abroad from Russia.

But *l'appetit vient en mangeant*, as the French saying goes. How to turn Russia into a permanent “milch cow” – is another idea, “brilliant and simple,” which emerged in the geopolitical doctrines of the West in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Thus the leaders of *perestroika* have themselves created conditions for reviving the geopolitical concepts with regard to Russia, which seemed to have gone into the past. And when new political figures have come to power in Russia, who saw through the ingenious western charade and did not wish to pretend to be “smart alects,” taking verbal equilibristics for granted, a virtual information war began against them.

Correct understanding of its meaning and aims requires return to its historical sources.

## **2. “Capitalism versus Socialism” – Dichotomy of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century Geopolitics**

The fundamental delusion of the *perestroika* leaders was their idea that the threats of a new world war were allegedly confined to the foreign-policy logic of the dichotomy “capitalism versus socialism.” The desire for war should disappear from Western arsenals, if socialism disappears from the dichotomy.

It would seem that behind this concept stood the entire history of the global confrontation of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. But it contained delusion. The *perestroika*-mongers have boldly entered the foreign-policy field, which was strewn with geopolitical mines under the diplomatic surface.

The concrete elaboration of political, economic, information and military measures in the geopolitical context cannot but be secret. This is the delicate sphere in which political aims and the stages of their realization are elaborated. Secrecy and unexpectedness are the *conditio sine qua non* of their success in world affairs.

At the same time the information mechanisms which work for the achievement of the aims set and their ideological appearance lie on the surface for all to see. This sphere is quite open and is expected to influence the world public opinion. It is important to interpret the meaning of this influence correctly. Here the art of information impact, on the one hand, and the ability of information counter-play, on the other, begin to interact.

The key role in the information impact of modern geopolitics is played by academic research which gives the aims of geopolitics an objectively “scientific” form. And inasmuch as they substantiate and accompany the realization of geopolitical aims, they, naturally, become part and parcel of the geopolitical mechanism.

In this connection a question arises as to how the academic thinking of the West analyzes the meaning of the global dichotomy “socialism – capitalism,” and how it determines the relation of the phenomenon of socialism to geopolitics. The intellectual “tanks” of the West understood full well that the phenomenon of socialism had a direct bearing on the *conceptual basis* of geopolitics. The subject of geopolitics should receive the key **advantage** – political, economic, cultural and ideological, which would ensure its domination over the peoples of the world, including demographic and physiological. As shown by the experience of World War II, the subject of geopolitics creates the means and mechanisms of regulating the population of the globe. These mechanisms presuppose the formation of technology, including turning the human body into a “material for experimenting.”

The results obtained are expected to be used “for the benefit” of the subject of geopolitics. Such geopolitics was purposefully implemented by German Nazism and Japanese militarism.

The ideological foundations of socialism absolutely exclude such meaning of geopolitics. Their existence serves as an antidote in the world of harmful microorganisms: the foundation of socialism is not the domination of one geopolitical subject over another, but international *cooperation* of working people creating material and cultural benefits and gaining advantage from cooperation, but not from domination of one over the other. This meaning predetermined the formation of the global wave of the future, which was received as the inevitability and condition for the elimination of all world wars. The decisive role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazism and the catastrophic consequences of the two world wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century created a specific atmosphere of a positive perception of the internationalist socialist perspective.

The upsurge of socialism narrowed down the spheres of influence of world capitalism. The periodically published reviews of the John Birch Society showed that they began to diminish like the Magic Skin.

At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the socialist system collapsed, and the global wave of socialism rolled back along with it. This movement of the wave brought “life blood” to the seemingly drying and perishing roots of geopolitics.

The backward movement of the civilizatory wave makes it possible to make a favorable comment on capitalism as the “ultimate end” of history, a global phenomenon and, naturally, unfavorable to socialism. Francis Fukuyama gave this conceptual commentary<sup>1</sup>. He

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<sup>1</sup> See: Francis Fukuyama. The Future of History. // Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012, vol. 91. Number 1, pp. 53–61.

pays attention to what would seem a strange phenomenon: the global economic crisis, which began in 2008, did not give rise to American left-wing populism. The most dynamic populist movements were on the *right wing*, whose aim was to support the regulating functions of the state capable to protect plain people from financial profiteers. Similar tendencies are observed in Europe, too, where the left parties were bloodless, while the populist right-wing parties were on a rise. The presidential elections in France in 2012 somewhat corrected this European picture. However, one cannot deny the reality of the global crisis of socialism.

Fukuyama's approach is interesting inasmuch as he tries to determine the **underlying historical sources** of this crisis and finds them in the *growing number and influence of the middle class*. Fukuyama asserts that the imperious ideas which formed human society right up to the past three hundred years bore a *religious* character. Confucianism was the only exception.

Liberalism was the first secular ideology of a worldwide influence, which emerged along with a rise of the trading and later industrial middle class. Fukuyama ranks people between the social top and bottom, having certain real property or business, and at least a secondary education as the middle class.

Fukuyama relates the political influence of the middle class to the Glorious revolution in England in 1688 – 1689, the realization of the fundamental right to protect private property and the activity of British parliament. It should be borne in mind that at its initial period British parliament represented *less than ten percent of the country's population*. Classical liberals, like James Mill, Fukuyama notes, were skeptical as regards democratic values. Up to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the right to vote guaranteed by the government was limited by the size



of property and the level of education. This requirement, Fukuyama emphasizes, concerned *all parts of Europe*.

The historic fate of the middle class and European democracy was largely determined by the essence of liberal attitude to democracy.

Industrial progress predetermined the numerical growth and social influence of the proletariat, the working people who bore the brunt of industry, but had no right to vote guaranteed by the government.

The struggle for the universal right of suffrage, that is, for *consistent democracy*, acquired key importance in determining the legitimacy of the *socialist* workers' movement. The early Marxists, Fukuyama maintains, believed that they would be able to score victory by *simple numerical strength*.

But they began to pose a threat to the hegemony of both the conservatives and the traditional liberals. The ruling classes could not allow the leaders of the organized workers' movement to participate in state management, for this was fraught with the radical change of the economic and political order. The universal right of suffrage led to a political impasse. Fukuyama sees in this the reason for the retreat from democracy in favor of dictatorship and orientation to the direct seizure of power. The emergence of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an instrument of political victory and the construction of a new society, and the birth of fascist dictatorships in West European countries as an instrument of the hegemony of the middle class may be considered a result of the crisis of the universal right of suffrage, which thwarted the realization of a civilizatory compromise.

The turn of the middle class from liberalism to totalitarianism has been substantiated in conceptual constructions of fascism. In this context special mention could be made of Giovanni Gentile's work "The Philosophic Basis of Fascism." (1928).

He proceeded from the premise that political practice and historical movement could be properly directed not on the road of liberal democracy, but only when the chaos of mass movement was consolidated in the *will of the leader*: the nation and the leader should be a single whole. Accordingly, Gentile combined the task of the party and all instruments of propaganda and education in order to make the thought and will of the leader the thought and will of the masses of people. Sacralization of the personal will of the leader is an enormous task, whose solution should begin with small kids and embrace *all people*. As a result of spiritual reconstruction the universal right of suffrage should give the **unambiguous result**.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century fascism practically implemented the system of manipulating mass behavior by creating information images as an expression of the truths of the historical and social life of the *nation*. The truth now coincided with direct participation in mass functions symbolizing the grandeur of the nation and, hence, each participant.

For the defeated nations, for the “humiliated and insulted,” but at the same time having great history, the image of its own greatness as the absolute aim of history could be a remedy for the spirit, and hence, supremacy over other nations. Such image began to be formed on a “scientific” basis.

Information isolation was another key aspect of spiritual reconstruction. The monopoly on information became an effective mechanism of mass indoctrination.

Thus, the thought and will of the leader could become the thought and will of the masses, the thought and will of the *entire* nation, as the initial condition for reaching the absolute advantage of global supremacy by a nation.

The consolidation of a nation on the basis of the idea of global supremacy over “inferior” nations, combined with the technically

perfect militarization of society, creates new conditions for implementing geopolitics. On the one hand, the aim of geopolitics is the expansion of the *Lebensraum* of a nation, that is, the narrow nationalistic aim. But on the other hand, fascism positioned itself as the only possible panacea for saving “cultural” Europe from “barbarous” communism. Thus, it contained the cosmopolitan class essence.

The strategic and ideological calculations of the chieftains of fascism were made on this basis.

Geopolitics becomes open and hidden, crude and flexible, which should ensure it the ultimate historical success.

The information-ideological monopoly of the leader of the nation makes it possible to create any image of the geopolitical enemy No1 of a nation, depending on the aims of geopolitical strategy and the prevailing situation. The future main enemy can be pushed into the background temporarily, if this is tactically expedient.

Gentile asserted that fascism was not a religion and not a political theory, but the adoption of decisions and actions at the necessary time, when favorable conditions were ripe for them. In this interpretation the leader of the nation acquires *absolute freedom* for determining the ways to reach the absolute aim of the nation when adopting nationwide decisions. This is the key premise of the doctrine of Nazism. In this connection attention should be turned to a discussion which developed around the philosophical positions of Martin Heidegger. He is sometimes presented as the chief ideologist of Nazism. This view was expressed in the recent publication of the book by Emmanuel Faye – “Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy, in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935”<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Emmanuel Faye. Heidegger. The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy, in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935, New Haven/London; Yale University Press, 2009.

E. Faye believes that the seminars enable one to assert that Heidegger mobilized his philosophical thinking not only for interpreting, but also legitimizing Hitler's interpretation of "popular revolution" and a "people's state." It appears that Heidegger's philosophy is that of Nazism.

Florian Grosser, an associate of the philosophy department of Munich University, does not agree with this view. He maintains that contrary to his hopes in the mid-1930s, by 1940 Heidegger came to the conclusion that Nazism was not able to overcome the "metaphysical history" of Europe, which enabled him to present the racist and totalitarian views of Hitler as the ultimate version of the "metaphysics of subjectivity," which required a major challenge and rejection<sup>1</sup>.

Hence, a conclusion can be made that the "overcoming" of metaphysics by Heidegger had a hidden anti-Hitler meaning.

This view does not seem absurd. One could imagine that Heidegger came up closely to understanding the fundamental lameness of the *metaphysics of the absolute advantage of a race*.

The openness of Being makes it possible to reveal coincidence of the absolute with nothing, inasmuch as it is precisely nothing that is the absolute and finite "basis" of freedom.

This means that the absolute advantage of world supremacy contains in itself a trap of fundamental ambiguity, which is demonstrated by the crumbling of great empires. Proceeding from his interpretation of the basis of Being upon which metaphysics is fed, Heidegger could assume that history is based on reality which inevitably destroys the discursive plans of achieving racial supremacy. Historical evolution is based on the infinity of Being, which can "reveal itself" in the most unexpected forms.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Florian Grosser on Heidegger. // European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 19, Number 4, December 2012, p. 628.

It is indicative that Florian Grosser notes Faye's fundamental misapprehension of Heidegger's position. In his lecture on Nietzsche, Heidegger characterized *motorization of Wehrmacht* as a *metaphysical act*. Faye interpreted this idea as the legitimization of the domination of Nazism. In actual fact, when Heidegger defined the aggressive and cruel expansionism of Hitler as "metaphysical," it showed his disillusionment of the realities of Nazism. Nazism tried to lend its subjective metaphysics an objective form by using art. Subjectivism in politics acquires an appearance of culture: aesthetics and criminal policy merge into a single whole.

The racist ideological trend of fascist art radically distinguished it from the art of socialist realism. The grandeur of parades, enthusiasm at seeing the destructive power of arms, the feeling of real freedom with the absence of moral and legal restrictions give birth to a *new type of consciousness of the middle class*, which coincides with *mass consciousness*. The middle class can change in spirit, can lose, subjectively, its *class* spirit, and in this form and essence it becomes the foundation of the fascist dictatorship, a state-leader (Fuehrerstaat), homogeneous People's state (Volkstaat).

It is precisely fascism that creates the phenomenon of people as a "*plural subject*," as a human mass turned into mobs in which class, professional and other distinctions acquire the general vector of social, political and ideological life and obey the guiding movements and gestures of the leader. Does this mean the complete destruction of freedom, as some critics of totalitarianism believe? This is a very simplified and ideologically deterministic view of reality.

First of all, it is necessary to answer the question as to how the perception of freedom changes and how its attributes are interpreted. Are the perception and interpretation of freedom of a businessman, hired worker, university professor and crime lord similar? The

ideologists of fascism also gave their interpretation of freedom. *Fascism is freedom of the racist-oriented plural subject.*

The theoretical aspect of the concept of freedom becomes clearer in the process of discussing the subject “Freedom or Concord?” which was placed by Mussolini. He maintained that both notions were *indivisible*, and that one included the other. The authority of the state and the freedom of citizens form an unbroken circle, in which authority presupposed freedom, and freedom presupposed authority<sup>1</sup>. Thus, the point was about the perception of the absolute authority of the leader by the popular masses, and the will of the latter as its free expression. In this context, the problem of freedom is manifested as the problem of the *ideological orientation of the leader of the nation.*

The absolute authority of the leader is ambivalent, inasmuch as it presupposes *legitimization of non-freedom*. The leader becomes the autocrat of the Law. The *Law* from *abstraction* of power becomes the *objective will of the leader* as an expression of the will of the people. This means that political movements which oppose this single will “lose” the *national status* and find themselves outside the freedom of the nation. Consequently, they may be banned and their leaders jailed.

For fascism the state is always in the process of formation. Gentile asserted that the fascist state is *democratic par excellence*. It exists inasmuch as the citizens allow it to exist, all citizens, but not one or another concrete citizen. Then what happens with the consciousness of the middle class in this process? Does it retain its basic value orientations? It turns out that in the totalitarian process the consciousness of the middle class undergoes profound changes. The social and spiritual traditions, which seemed inviolable, crumble. And this destruction process is managed by the one who has mastered the

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<sup>1</sup> See: Giovanni Gentile. The Philosophic Basis of Fascism. // Foreign Affairs. January/February 2012, vol. 91, Number 1, pp. 17–18.

information mechanisms of the formation of mass consciousness. A new look emerges at the realities of society. They can be formed by way of information, along with material realities. And they can become the dominating factor in their impact on mass behavior. This aspect of life realities became decisive in the recognition of fascism by popular masses as the “truth” of life. This aspect had a theoretical interpretation in the doctrine of fascism. For fascism, according to Gentile, the state is completely a creation of spirit. The nation itself is a creation of the intellect, but not a material prerequisite or a natural datum. Under the influence of the doctrine of fascism the middle class with its limited horizon of small business and private property as the basis of its existence “sublimated” in the perception of its power as a global geopolitical force capable not only to establish a new order in Europe, but also to ensure its millennial domination. The theory and practice of Marxism and all socialist movements were virtually turned into a “random” historical phenomenon doomed to disappearance. The working class should have served the aims of the world domination of fascism. The “specter of communism” had ceased to roam Europe. It existed only on the brink of Europe, in Eurasia. And a “cleansing” operation had already been prepared against it, which was elaborated in the “Barbarossa” plan.

Thus, the internationalist wave raised by the October revolution of 1917 had to die down. The geopolitical situation in the world was radically changing. The middle class, trying to save its status and its property, changed spiritually and renounced the principles of classical liberalism, replacing them by undemocratic elements. At the same time it believed in its mission of the master of the world. It accepted the geopolitical doctrine of expanding the *Lebensraum* and establishing the world supremacy of the Aryan race. But it entered into contradiction not only with socialism, but also with realities of the

policy of the Anglo-Saxon countries which continued to adhere to the philosophy of traditional liberalism. Fascism formed an idealistic illusion about the marginal nature of socialism, and ultimately became its victim. The main forces of fascism were defeated by the socialist power on the Eastern front, so that the Allied armies when crossing the English Channel could hope for a successful completion of a very risky operation, that is, the opening of the Second front in Europe, which would have been simply impossible in other conditions than those in 1944, at the final stage of the war. The ringleaders of the Third Reich saw the possibility of salvation in playing the game of class contradictions among the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition. Attempts were made already in the course of the war to find a common language with western politicians, with a view to uniting the efforts of fascism and liberalism in order to stop the victorious onslaught of the Soviet Army. But this game failed through. Racism dealt a blow at Nazism.

Thus, we deal with the *real philosophical experience of the 20<sup>th</sup> century*. Can it be used in our time?

### **3. Liberal Democracy as a New World Order: Erosion of Illusions**

As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the socialist community the idea of liberal democracy has become widespread as the *only* global foundation of a new world order. This virtual order was perceived as the “ousting” and “replacement” of the conceptual image of global communism. The initial basis of this idea was the neo-liberal attitude to man as a *human being whose behavior can be manipulated* and to whom various forms of the imitation of freedom and consumer happiness could be applied, instead of universal moral and social principles. The truth of being is understood as leaving



the individual alone with himself as the condition for his genuine freedom. It is precisely in such a state that man can easily become an object of the impact of manipulations. In other words, he can become *personally anything*.

Fukuyama believes in the global meaning of liberal democracy. He tries to explain the global assertion of liberal democracy by the dynamics of the influence of the middle class. It seems strange that Fukuyama ignores the metamorphoses of the consciousness of the middle class in fascist states and, accordingly, does not draw any conclusions from this experience.

In his view, the middle class has always been, and remains, the “morally pure” bearer of democracy. Accordingly, the postwar democratization processes of the world were connected, in Fukuyama’s view, not with the defeat of fascism and the disintegration of colonial empires, but with the successes of world economic development and the growing share of the middle class in the total population of different countries. He proceeds from the fact that the global function of the middle class is to lend stability to the process of expanding democracy. He does not see “undercurrents” in this process, which change the picture of the evolution of civilization. He singles out a tendency which took shape in the postwar period, the tendency of the growing influence of democracy, and states that beginning from the 1970s, when there were 45 elected democracies in the world, their influence was growing all the time, and so their number reached 120 by the end of the 1990s.

Fukuyama does not see the threat of reanimation of fascism. He proceeds from the premise that “today there is a broad global consensus on the legitimacy, at least in principle, of liberal democracy”<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama. The Future of History. // Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012, vol. 91, Number 1, p. 56.

But what can “ripen” within it? The outward form can camouflage the essence. This was shown by the experience of the Weimar Republic. Fukuyama examines and assesses the events in East European and Latin American countries, as well as the “Arab spring” in the context of the self-consciousness of the “educated class.” The striving for political freedom and participation is not an original cultural feature of the Europeans or Americans, he writes<sup>1</sup>. Perhaps, it would be advisable to have a closer look at the social essence of “new democracy.”

What are the “fruits” of the “Arab spring”? What did the Libyan people gain in the economic, social and cultural sphere as a result of the civil war supported by NATO? How should the assassination of the U.S. Ambassador in Libya be assessed by the freedom-loving insurgents who were supported in their struggle against Colonel Qaddafi by the American administration? This is not a subject for discussion, for some reason or other. Or what are the results of elected democracy in Egypt?

As a result of the mechanisms of elected democracy the country will be ruled by the Moslem Brothers and representatives of the military. Does it have anything to do with the will of the educated middle class? Is it represented in the mechanisms of power? The new authorities *are ready for strategic cooperation with the United States*. How can the U.S. alliance with such theocratic regimes as, say, Saudi Arabia be explained? Can it be regarded as an alliance of democracies? Evidently, to explain *such* phenomena a new theoretical discourse is needed, combining democracy with the principles of the Sharia and Islamic theocracy. Evidently, deep-going changes are taking place in

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<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama. The Future of History. // Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012, vol. 91, Number 1, p. 56.

the world, which can hardly be placed within the liberal framework. This was also felt by Fukuyama.

In his work “The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution”<sup>1</sup> published in 2011, Fukuyama made an attempt to rely on the *historical experience of peoples* with a view to correcting the principles of liberal democracy and coming to a more objective and all-round concept of the foundations of political freedom. Describing the secular triad combining such three elements ensuring political freedom as a well-ordered and effective state, the rule of law, and a government accountable to the people, he notes that there are *few nations which preserve the balance between these three elements*.

Michael Mann, professor of sociology at the University of California (Los Angeles), believes that Fukuyama’s emphasis on an orderly and effective state is an evident deviation from the standard liberal theory with its emphasis on a free market and limited government as a condition of progress and freedom<sup>2</sup>.

Michael Mann mentions Fukuyama’s point of view concerning the theory of social contract, saying that it has no relation to reality, because there has not been a time when individuals isolated from one another interacted through anarchic violence (Hobbs) or in peaceful naïve ignorance toward one another (Rousseau). Perhaps, the most noticeable retreat from the traditional doctrine is in the critical reevaluation of the “tragedy of common property.” Many theorists believed that it prevented economic development. Fukuyama regards this view as a myth. In doing so he refers to the experience of modern China.

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<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama. *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> See: Michael Mann. *Freedom’s Secret Recipe*. // *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 92, No 2, p. 162.

Moreover, he maintains that the best form of freedom is, possibly, a combination of the tradition of China, which created a strong state protecting its citizens from the corruption and “tyranny of nephews,” and the tradition of the caste system of India protecting its citizens from the tyranny of the state. A strong state and strong society are the two centers of power capable to balance and contain each other. In actual fact, it is not so important to what degree the state system of a country corresponds to the principles of traditional liberalism. These principles can be quite loose. For example, one can believe that Britain has created *exemplary* democracy. Why then such democracy should include monarchy as its component?

If exemplary democracy includes monarchy then the United States cannot be considered such democracy. Fukuyama is worried by the fact that the development of modern technologies and globalization undermine the middle class, because only a minority of the population can achieve its status. Fukuyama has to admit that there are many reasons to believe that inequality will continue to deepen and that the elites in all societies use access to power for protecting their *own interests*. The American elites are no exception. The economic crisis has confirmed Fukuyama’s apprehensions.

It would seem that the aggravation of the crisis of the economy and power should lead to the revival of left-wing views. However, new populism often acquires the form of the right, not left, wing. Indicative in this respect is the growing influence of Thatcherism. Fukuyama gives his own appraisal of the ideas of Margaret Thatcher who strove to revive traditional capitalism based on overcoming the postwar doctrines of the Welfare State. It would seem that this political course should have caused active resistance of the working class. But this was not the case.

The key circumstance should be borne in mind that capitalism developed on the basis of its belief in the endlessness of natural resources – energy and raw material, and the relative climatic and other natural stability. This was also a prerequisite of the communist doctrine.

This initial premise has now been called in question. Mankind has confronted the problem of transition to a *qualitatively new type of the evolution of civilization*.

Margaret Thatcher tried to find new protective mechanisms for traditional capitalism, presenting them as the road to preserving the social order in Britain. This determined her political success. The British working class on the whole supported Margaret Thatcher.

David Morley who plays a key role at the Birmingham School of cultural studies, refers to Stuart Hall who explains the success of Margaret Thatcher at the end of the 1970s – beginning of the 1980s by the *cultural factor*. The reason for this lay in that the “authoritarian populism” of Margaret Thatcher was in line with the hopes for stability of the *Anglo-Saxon* working class in Britain, even if the working class of Russia were doomed to extinction.

Most voters from among the British working class supported Margaret Thatcher in her desire to return to traditional “Victorian values” and discard “liberal progressive ideology.” Ideology divided the social classes, and drawing the left-wing voters to one’s side required specific spiritual and information mechanisms.

The understanding of cultural parameters has reached a critical point<sup>1</sup>. In this context David Morley gives his assessment of pop-

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<sup>1</sup> See: Huimin Jin. British Cultural Studies, Active Audiences and Status of Cultural Theory. An Interview with David Morley. // *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 28. Number 4, July 2011. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, p. 126.

culture. He disagrees with F. Jameson and J. Baudrillard who regard it shallow, superficial and meaningless.

Morley maintains that the upsurge of Thatcherism in Britain cannot be understood if the battles going on in the sphere of pop-culture are ignored<sup>1</sup>.

Pop-culture has become a factor of political strategy, and this was clearly revealed during the opening and closing of the 2012 Olympic Games in London.

Despite the primitive nature of pop-culture, the plural subject began to accept and approve the conservative course, the course of Anglo-Saxon hegemony. A question arises as to what traditional values Margaret Thatcher relied on. It's important to understand this in order to explain the subsequent conceptual substantiation of transition to the formation of the modern field of geopolitics.

The shift to the right of the traditionally left-wing voters can be explained by their revived belief in the equality of *opportunities as the counterpoint of the equality of incomes*.

This revival is explained by Fukuyama by the fact that the ideas of the Welfare State have exhausted themselves, while the social democrats cannot offer anything new agenda.

One cannot disagree with this. Masses of people now feel the coming crisis phenomena not only in the economy. A deep crisis can be seen and felt in the spheres of demography, climate, ecology and energy.

*The problem of living space is becoming ever more acute and acquires new aspects.*

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<sup>1</sup> See: Huimin Jin. British Cultural Studies, Active Audiences and Status of Cultural Theory. An Interview with David Morley. // Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 28. Number 4, July 2011. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, p. 140.

People continue to think by inertia. They get to spiritual impasse and find themselves at a loss while realizing their “coveted freedom.” The latter leads to collapse of the family, non-standard sexual behavior, criminal activity, and even suicide. The spiritual crisis struck Christian civilization. Christians by faith begin to behave in anti-Christian manner.

Even if we admit the reality of this spiritual crisis, we seem unable to offer a way out of it.

Anti-Christian forms of behavior are forced onto Russia under pretext of the priority of freedom, democratic standards of life, and human rights.

Civilization finds itself before the threat of self-destruction precisely in the forms of free self-realization of people.

A question naturally arises as to where mass behavior should be channeled to and what mechanisms should be regarded effective enough in this direction. What political forces will lead the popular masses? *This is a problem of cultural hegemony.* But how is this cultural hegemony realized in the epoch of information society? Recognizing the beneficial character of the cultural parameters of contemporary politics, a shift to the right of the traditionally left-wing class forces seems political casualty.

Another question arises as to whether the middle class will want to oppose the new proponents of reactionary geopolitical and racist trends, or it will again make new spiritual sublimation. Evidently, there are dominating impacts on the forms of mass behavior. What is the determining factor here – the impact of objective social circumstances, purposeful information impact, or the real freedom of the subject in assessments of information received?

Some theorists see a solution to the problem of managing mass behavior in the creation of an effective system of *information impact.*

Experience shows that correct understanding of information as *ideological* and at the same time *material* impact on man's consciousness makes it possible to channel his behavior in the prescribed direction.

This impact seems so effective that it allows us to turn "black" into "white" and vice versa for the implementation of political interests. For instance, the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia in August 2008 the western mass media turned into Russia's "attack" against Georgia.

Doesn't such interpretation of events mean a distortion of the very essence of the freedom of self-consciousness as the road to the attainment of Truth? Man is against this. David Morley maintains that the position of such scholars as T.W. Adorno and Horkheimer who believed that the influence of information technologies had an *automatic* and *inevitable effect* are simplistic. He follows an ethnographic concept which does not recognize the adequacy of "big theories," such as economic determinism and psychoanalysis which make man a simple puppet of unconscious external and internal factors. The idea determining the *role of the class structure* in defining the linguistic abilities of the working class and the middle class and distributing cultural capital and cultural competence needs to be corrected. Judith Butler noted that "we do not find ourselves either in class or in gender prison cells." And this is, indeed, so.

Defending the concept of the activity of the subject capable to transform information, Morley rejects the position of the Frankfurt School, in accordance with which the popular masses passively accept the injections of dominating ideology.

On the basis of the positions of Frank Parkin, Stuart Hall tried to prove that there could be *three* hypothetical positions from which the audience could decode information messages: dominating hegemonic;



position of negotiations and discussion of information messages received; opposition, a priori rejection of information message.

Freedom of the subject can be effective within the framework of these three hypothetical positions.

The main role, apparently, is played by the factor which Antonio Gramsci in his time determined as **cultural hegemony**. **It is important to determine** how the changes of the conditions of the formation of cultural hegemony took place at the turning point of centuries.

It should be admitted that the right-wing forces have more actively and timely reacted to the changes of these conditions. The historical experience of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was taken into account, which convincingly proved that the effectiveness of mass influence depended not only on the sum total of information impacts, ideas, and socio-psychological injections, but also on the formation of the *field of geopolitics*, that is, *a sum total of orientations of the life of popular masses determining their dominating intentions in realizing the aims of historical life*.

What becomes the determining factor in the formation of orientations in the field of geopolitics at the turning point of centuries? The determining factor is financial interests and money. The secret of modern geopolitics lies in the system of global financial relations.

#### **4. Formation of the Field of Contemporary Geopolitics**

Finances and money are the hidden factor of creating the field of geopolitics.

What is declared to be world leadership really means the *preservation of the privileged financial system*. Geopolitics is the “shoot-off” of its real or potential opponents. In this lies the anticipation of the future. The state of the Cold war made it possible to

retain psychologically the economically illegitimate financial system as a consequence of the extreme global situation for a long time.

On the surface, legal and ethical motives are positioned as the determining ones. This explains the strange permanence of legal and moral provocations against the Soviet Union and then Russia – the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the Magnitsky List, the unlawful extradition of the Russian citizen Victor Bout to the United States, the information ballyhoo around the Pussy Riot affair, etc.

However, inasmuch as these motives are a form of the forceful assertion of the global ethical and legal diktat, they are neither legitimate nor moral in the exact sense of the word from the very beginning.

For example, Barack Obama put forward the *moral* foundations of the invasion of the armed forces in Libya, namely, America's responsibility for its brothers striving for freedom.

Meanwhile, certain analysts claim that the removal of Qaddafi was predetermined by his intention to transfer paper money on to the gold standard.

Mitt Romney by his geopolitical views does not adhere to an idealistic position. The achievement of geopolitical goals includes the *right* of victory over the geopolitical enemy. This requires soldiers from any *countries* as allies. They do not necessarily strive to become free "brothers." They could be monarchists, Islamists, and even terrorists. The main thing is to achieve success in opposing the geopolitical enemy.

Thus, geopolitics recognizes *different types* of legal and moral *identification* of "one's own" and the "aliens." The determining factor in the choice of identification is the result reached in global *controllability* of the modern world.

What is the basis of the theory of controllability?

Michel Foucault in his interpretation of biopolitics described the behavioral modifications of human being, in accordance with which, by a version of neoliberalism, the affective-rational personality becomes *manageable* by virtue of his systematic reaction to variations of the environment. If the formation of the properties of the medium is not determined by the ultimate aims of history – the idea of world communism or the triumph of liberal democracy and market economy, the question arises as to what comes to replace them.

To replace them is the *elaboration* of a new world order in accordance with the established *hierarchical structure of states*. The establishment of hierarchy is the real aim of the world order. According to this aim, the *information medium* should be formed, which is positioned as the real truth of modern life. The medium coincides with the information description of the present extrapolated to the future. Due to this social reality as it really is “collapses” into information reality satisfying the design process of geopolitics.

One cannot explain the “strange behavior” of the western mass media outside the framework of this process. Their function now is to create the necessary characteristics of the medium. If history has no ultimate aims, then man finds himself in situations changing one another. The truth of his being is the creation of the most convenient and advantageous situation for himself. The absolute advantage is the finite truth of the meaning, and the way to it is the game which should be won. From the point of view of international affairs the heart of the matter is the arrangement of a geopolitical game, where the players are separate states. In order to win the game the geopolitical subject may assume any image, if it brings him victory. The outward image created by moral and legal rhetoric can “civilize” the gloomy abyss of the catastrophic consequences of the “blind fury” of geopolitics. Hidden freedom in the adopted image is the “strategic capital” of the subject.

This position seems adequate to the situation of potential global “catastrophism.” In order to understand it the clarification of the very essence of the construction of the field of modern geopolitics is necessary.

The construction of the field of geopolitics can be viewed as a hypothetical project, as virtual reality, which passes through specific approbation in military operations and in particular forms of political behavior, including “unification” of liberal democracy with monarchic regimes, cooperation between secret services and terrorist organizations, and western state structures with the state structures of the Muslim Brothers. Why such “whateverism” of geopolitics and what determines it?

**The meaning of the field of geopolitics is determined by the metaphysics of the absolute advantage.** This is the motive of its strategy. At the same time the field of geopolitics determines the type of control over mass behavior overcoming its traditional forms. In Christianity control over mass behavior consists of the attitude of the laity to the authority and spiritual guidance of the clergy, and recognition of this guidance as *the way to salvation*. All who believe and follow religious postulates take the road to salvation.

In ideological structures ideological control of mass consciousness is predetermined by the substantiation of the ultimate aim of history, and the struggle for its realization determines the *meaning and truth of life*.

In the conditions of the present-day global crisis trends there is a requirement to determine the *new ways* of adequate mass behavior based on the empirical *knowledge of the mechanisms of life*. The latter is presented as the field of reaching *success, fortune* and survival, and the technology of geopolitics is built on this psychological foundation. Survival is conditioned by *submission* of others to one’s own will. The

technology of geopolitics as a “creative process” is connected with the *creation of situations of inner capitulation and renunciation of sovereign power* with a view to avoiding the destructive military wave. This possibility to save one’s life should be brought to the consciousness and knowledge of the target of geopolitics.

This determines the nature of the pre-occupation psychological impact on the consciousness of the population of the country chosen as the target of geopolitics. The cultural factor plays a special role in this impact, as it forms *friendly feelings toward the subject of geopolitics*. Thus the possibility of the emergence of a mass resistance movement is neutralized.

On the other hand, the population’s self-consciousness is suppressed with the help of “clarifying” the reality of *asymmetrical relations* based on the *threat* of total destruction.

The field of geopolitics can be viewed as a specific variety of information field.

Information field creates *orientations* of human behavior in real life. This is not a reflection of the realities of life, but only *orientations* of behavior. Here is a simple example of information field – traffic light: red light bans movement, green light allows it, yellow light warns for readiness to move or to stop. Information field creates a system of guidelines of survival, vision of real and potential threats, and vision of practical orientations of behavior contributing to survival.

The emerging information field can answer the interests of the population of one or another concrete region. But it can also be formed in accordance with the priority of private interests. Here information field can acquire the quality of the *field of geopolitics*. Its specific feature lies in determining for countries the boundaries of their possibilities to achieve *success*, and also their global function. At the same time the reasons for “*dividing*” global civilization by “*worthiness*”

or “unworthiness” are thus determined. Mankind in the field of geopolitics does not look as a civilizatory whole or as a sum of authentic local civilizations. It forms a hierarchic pyramid whose top is held by the *constant winner* of the geopolitical game.

It should be borne in mind that in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, under the impact of historical experience, there was a radical change of the meaning and functions of conceptual and dogmatic notions which pretended to understanding history and historical life as a whole. Movements “free from dogmas” developed. In this context we should mention again Giovanni Gentile who noticed this tendency.

In the field of geopolitics philosophical theory becomes an *art of construction*. A classical example of the geopolitical art of construction was the *arson of Reichstag* by the Nazis. This act was a public information message containing a reference point of global politics. The burning Reichstag was an objective reality which could be observed by anyone. Consequently, this was the truth.

The art of construction is aimed at creating such prejudices of mass global behavior, which is in line with the strategy of the subject working to establish his exclusive role in the world. The art of construction of the Nazis was aimed at creating conditions for the fostering of the anti-communist spirit of the nation: it had an *introvert character*.

The art of construction in the conditions of globalization has an introvert and extravert character.

In the field of geopolitics the key aim of conceptual thinking is the creation of the situation of voluntary submission with the help of information mechanisms. Information is not only broadcasting and commenting the news, but also materializing the forms of life, which sanction thrills and chills from gambling. The field of geopolitics is created by man, but at the same time it becomes the objective constant

reality *independent* from man. It has an aim hidden in it. In this lies its original “mystery,” which should be unraveled. Information reality created under the influence of geopolitical aims looks on the surface as a sum total of “facts.” Facts are stubborn things corresponding to the requirements of objectivity. Popular masses follow this objectivity without suspecting that they are the object of geopolitical manipulations. The “Truth” in this process becomes a mechanism of the formation of mass prejudices. This process touches on various spheres of life.

For example, if you wish to influence the demographic situation in one or another country, you should switch on corresponding information mechanisms among the broad popular masses, which will ensure a fall of influence of traditional family culture and morality. For this purpose medical information can be used about contraception, about protection from dangerous diseases caused by sexual intercourse, and at the same time about the usefulness of freedom of sexual relations for preventing psychic disorders, etc.

New standards of behavior of man and woman are established. Men can play the role of women and women – the role of men.

The mechanisms of the formation of mass prejudices began to make an ever greater influence on domestic life in various countries of the modern world. The formation of orientations is taking place, which consist of empirical data and actual forms of life creating relations of mass *sympathies* and *antipathies* in the context of constructing a global inter-civilizational game.

Spiritually, this is a civilizational shift “back” to the heathen forms of interpersonal relations, which were surmounted by Christianity.

But this is an evident change, a behavioral game. Man submits to passions of the game irrespective of his social status and educational level.

The rules of the game correspond to the idea of *equality of opportunities*. A chance can choose anybody either for downfall or elevation. Gain does not depend on moral or intellectual qualities of man. In their sum total the individuals entering into the common game form a plural subject *living by the rules of the game*.

The civilizatory shift taking place has made an impact on the outlook of part of the intelligentsia which traditionally positioned itself as the barer and proponent of the “truth of life.”

In this case, the intelligentsia should be regarded not as a class of educated persons who fulfill their professional duty and receive salary for doing this, but the bearers of the “truth of life.” The intelligentsia in this form has been considered a specifically Russian phenomenon. Marxist theory about classless communist society as the ultimate aim of history coincided with the moral tenet and orientation of the intelligentsia. It was not accidental that it was precisely in Russia that Marxism in the form of Leninism scored conceptual and practical political victory.

The disappointment of the intelligentsia in Marxist-Leninist ideas has given birth to an ideological vacuum, which was filled with the conceptual idea of the *absolute value of individual freedom and personal role in this life positioned as the truth for all*. From the Russian intelligentsia formed in the 20<sup>th</sup> century came persons claiming ideological leadership, who began to position the freedom of individualism as the universal “common cause” and the struggle for human rights. The essence of the absolute value of individual freedom had no concrete meaning. This was why man was also freed from his *duty* to his family, his teachers, and all those who gave him life, education, provided him with medical and social service, etc. He became kind of a creature from another planet. Persons who continued to fulfill their civilizatory duty were regarded primitive as *Homo*



*Sovieticus*. The feeling of complete freedom was overwhelming. Thus, a whole big group of bearers of individual freedom came into being, and these people became orientation guides of mass behavior.

The freedom of individual behavior is always a *risky* game. But this game should obey general rules. The sum total of individuals following the common rules of the game forms the **plural subject**, community of various configurations. Here political forms of behavior are intricately intertwined with the forms of daily life, thus showing their psychological community.

For example, observing the behavior of fans during football matches it is easy to understand that the plural subject is a reality connecting individuals of different social position, different education and different cultural level. In the situation of the game man is striving **to win** and *this is his main passion*.

Similar psychology is characteristic of people playing cards, roulette, and any other games. A jackpot winner becomes the universal orientation guide following whom many people can lose whole fortunes. The participant in the game submits to the “logic” of situations and passions, but not the conclusions of a theoretical doctrine. Homo Ludens acquires another, not conceptual and not ideological essence.

The modern information mechanisms allow us to use the art of construction for creating the virtual situation of a *global game*, and organize movements in various countries in order to catch the symbols of luck with which the priority values of life are identified, such as *happiness* and *freedom*. This is “knowledge” in the field of geopolitics.

This “knowledge” can serve different aims.

Francis Fukuyama tries to find in the present global situation the ground for *new ideology*. It will largely be determined by the crisis tendencies in the world economy. In this situation ruling ideology, as

Fukuyama believes, will be populism, beginning with criticism of the ruling elites which allow the few to enrich themselves at the expense of the many. It will also include criticism of Washington's financial policy from which the wealthy gain even more. This situation is not fatal for capitalism, because it can create protective mechanisms of its own.

The intelligentsia, which changes spiritual and ideological orientations and gives the mark of the highest ethical quality to the game of individual freedom, has proved to be the real find for the creators of the global geopolitical game. Immoral geopolitics has received a moral screen.

Whom or what does the ethical screen of universal individual freedom cover? It hides the *rules* of the geopolitical game, which is about to begin.

The political captains steer their ship along the routes on which they are trying to play the geopolitical game submitted to the rules of "predicted freedom." The point is that in accordance with the "rules" of the geopolitical game "**we, or ours**" **should always win**. This means that the game organizer should decide who the geopolitical enemy No 1 will be in the given situation. Victory over it does not lead to the disappearance of the geopolitical opponent as such: its place is taken by a "team" against which a new game will be started.

He who organizes the game has the overwhelming military and economic might for victory. He can choose *any opponent* advantageous for the game at a given moment.

The game should look like games during the world football championship, but with one distinction: the *winner should be determined beforehand*. The players of the global game, who guessed what team will get the status of the *constant* winner, and stand in line to become possible mercenaries of the winning team. Thus, the dynamics of global players and the information-propaganda accompaniment of

this dynamics come into being in the modern world. It is believed that the imitation of moral and theoretical “truth” should always be on the side of the winning team, irrespective of what this team does: the black should look white, and the white – black.

From the point of view of traditional civilizatory and formative ideas such global situation could seem preposterous. However, facts speak of the opposite. For example, after the end of World War II the bombardment by the U.S.A. and NATO of any Christian country in Europe would have seemed simply impossible. But it did take place in Yugoslavia. The main aim of that was to create in the Balkans of “obedient” administrations. Then global “targets” appeared in the oil-bearing regions of the Middle East and North Africa – Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Next came Syria.

World public opinion is preparing for taking Iran as the seat of world evil which should be neutralized by “surgical means.” If the elaborated rules of the geopolitical game are discarded, the motives of aggressive actions will look incredible – “vengeance for insulting behavior toward the father,” punishment for the act of terror against airplane passengers committed many years ago, assistance to the armed opposition which is treated by the government too harshly, etc. It might seem strange and unexplainable why adherents of Islam become mercenaries in the Christian team – the “constant winner,” and begin to fight their brethren in religion.

Here the metaphysics of the absolute benefit begins to act, which proves stronger than religious and ideological convictions. There is another factor which is usually aimed at creating a medium determining the consciousness and behavior of a common man. These are the so-called psychological operations (PSYOPS) which fulfill the functions of the information weapon.

PSYOPS have a global meaning, they are planned for all. At the same time their main aim is to influence the “plebs” of a concrete country, who seems to be able to betray the interest of its state for a bottle of whiskey or a pair of jeans. The sympathies of the “population” are won with the help of these primitive means.

One should not exaggerate, yet the impact of such “information bombs” should not be discarded either. For instance, between 2007 and 2009 during the military operations of the United States in Iraq, 47 million leaflets were dropped from the air on Baghdad. Food packages, toys, bottles with alcohol, portable radio sets, etc. can also be dropped to influence people’s consciousness. Incidentally, radio sets were tuned in to the wavelength used by the U.S. armed forces. These forms of psychological operations should change the attitude of the local people toward the real enemy as toward a “friend.” For example, the U.S. aircraft dropped leaflets along with packages of food on which was written “*hal’al*,” which meant that the meat of the killed animal was cooked in accordance with Muslim laws<sup>1</sup>.

From the psychological point of view, it was the “logic” used by the first colonialists who exchanged glass beads, etc. for precious stones from the aborigines.

The use of modern weapons has also a “moral effect.” In the conditions of the “total war” of the United States in Iraq it was necessary to evoke the feeling of *shock* and *horror*, and this should have influenced the ruling elite and plunge the ordinary population into the state of depression and hopelessness. Thus, conditions were created for suppressing any thought of resistance.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Ben Anderson. Facing the Future Enemy. US Counter-insurgency Doctrine and the Pre-insurgent. // Theory, Culture and Society. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore, 2011, vol. 28, Number 7–8, pp. 217–219.

An example of such impact, especially with the use of precision weapons, began to influence the positions of the ruling circles of other countries. All should be scared. Thus, units of “mercenaries” come into being in modern geopolitics.

The state of total fear and voluntary submission and obedience is *the beginning of a new global life* and the opportunity to manage it through “mercenaries.”

The “mercenaries” of the global game create a medium in the form of a “chorus of spiritual support.” This is a well-known psychological ruse: if a majority asserts that a black ball is white, then the only person who sees that the ball is black will also assert that it is white. The function of the majority supporting the wrong doings of the “victor” is similar. There are experienced fighters among mercenaries most of whom do not have any ideological positions. Instead they are ready to take part in any operations to overthrow legitimate governments, provided these operations are well paid. Thus the field of geopolitics can have various component parts.

But the general character of constructing the field of geopolitics is the creation of a medium ensuring a stop to any resistance and surrender to the mercy of the “victor.” This “logic” is openly demonstrated during military operations. For example, the U.S. air Force in Afghanistan addressed the Taliban fighters as follows: “You are doomed... You condemned yourselves to death... Our helicopters will bring death to your camps before your radars spot them. Our precision bombs can reach even your windows... You have only one choice – to surrender there and then. In that case we’ll allow you to live...”<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Ben Anderson. Facing the Future Enemy. US Counter-insurgency Doctrine and the Pre-insurgent. // Theory, Culture and Society. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore, 2011, vol. 28, Number 7–8, p. 220.

There can be information, economic, political and cultural varieties of this “medium.” But its essence is one, namely, to create the “logic” of supremacy and submission, management and obedience, life or death.

Such “logic” does not eliminate resistance. The latter acquires various forms and ethical motives to oppose *evil*. The resistance movement takes the form of network interaction, sudden actions, self-sacrifice, and acts of terror.

Victory over the resistance movement requires the winning of the *population’s* sympathy. What should be done to achieve this?

It is supposed that the population is *dual* in its sentiments – it can be partly hostile, partly not. Psychological operations have the aim to isolate the resistance movement from the population, make it marginal, and suppress it. But the attitude of the population toward the invader remains indefinite. This uncertainty requires special investigation conformably to the different groups and sections of the population. Psychological operations to influence their consciousness and behavior should be worked out with due account of their specific features.

Without such investigations psychological operations cannot make the necessary effect. For example, during the “Freedom to Iraq” operation 40 million leaflets were dropped before the start of military operations, calling for disobedience to Saddam Hussein. However, the organizers of this psychological operation had doubts as to whether these leaflets exerted any influence on the behavior of Iraqis.

The principles of a democratic electoral system become ineffective in a situation when the sentiments of the population are ambiguous. As noted in the U.S. Army / Marine Corps 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, to achieve success in counterinsurgency operations the support of the *rallied groups of the population* is essential, but not formal election results. The

implementation of geopolitical aims becomes a permanent process coinciding with the state of permanent war. A fundamental question arises whether there is a cause-and-effect relation between the state of permanent war and the rapid coming of a global crisis.

Is the use of military force against the population of an occupied country effective and does not such use increase its resistance? It is not accidental that the above-mentioned Field Manual says that sometimes a more powerful force becomes less effective.

The foreign-policy task of geopolitics has also its paradoxes.

If even one head of a sovereign state *is not frightened*, he can “spoil” the entire geopolitical game.

Francis Fukuyama did not notice the geopolitical aspect of the problem. He examines the problem of the future from the socio-class and ideological positions. But such approach is not in line with the global aspects of the modern historical process now. The problem of future ideology “withers” in the information mechanisms of modern geopolitics. It plays a secondary role.

In the situation of a real geopolitical game the determining role of the “left-wing” and “right-wing” elements, Christians and Muslims ceases to exist. They all become the *instruments* of a geopolitical game, in which a special social role of ideology becomes redundant. The definition of the “alien,” representing a “threat” in a geopolitical game, acquires the key significance. Accordingly, the task is to create his negative image as the “threat” which should be eliminated. Thus, ideology becomes subordinated to the change of the dichotomy of images.

The formation of the dichotomy of images makes an ever greater influence on global life. Due to the real processes of globalization man becomes included, materially and information wise, in the global mortal game. The life of a country and of each citizen of that country is based

on the state of the socio-psychological trans connected with the emerging threat to survival of himself, his family, his relatives and friends, in short, all fellow-citizens of his country.

Global players peer into virtual reality, assess the state of the future and try to determine the most advantageous direction of strategic policy. Modern global play can assume military, economic and information forms. Its essence does not change. Virtually, *all are included in the global game*. Its meaning is the permanent state of war waged by various means against various geopolitical opponents. These opponents are determined by the permanent winner. It is he who has the right to choose another geopolitical target. It is not vitally important whether this target is the real geopolitical opponent. The important thing is *how it will be determined*. This determination will dictate the character of international relations taking shape in the world. The winner of the global game “*takes everything*.” Such is the realization of the metaphysics of the absolute gain. Such is the unspoken basic principle of the game.

However, the preservation of the role of the permanent winner requires the formation of such *medium* which has an impact on the expansion processes of the zones of hostility or friendliness. The metaphysics of the absolute gain begins to acquire a paradoxical quality. It turns out that for the sake of the metaphysics of the absolute gain it may be necessary to make financial sacrifices and create a medium symbolizing a genuine progress – after bombardment and military hostilities on land it is necessary to restore the infrastructure and offer projects to improve life and publicize them not only with the help of leaflets, but also through loudspeakers, ads, and meetings with the population.

Another fundamental question arises: *can the role of the permanent winner be regarded permanent?*



One cannot but see that the positions of geopolitical players, who accepted the rules of the game, differ. The place of the permanent winner may not be permanent. “Mercenaries” also have a strange position. Each one of them tries to follow his correct calculation.

However, correct calculation can prove erroneous. To jump into the boat of the winner does not mean to save one’s life. A situation is possible when the boat’s owner will have to throw “ballast” overboard. Even those demonstrating absolute loyalty can be sacrificed for the sake of “common victory.” Or they can become an object of another game. Apart from that, they can be “guilty” or “inadequate.” When the real situation of a geopolitical game is properly perceived by a mercenary, he can begin a game of his own. And this creates uncertainty in reaching the aim of geopolitics.

Thus, the ontology of a geopolitical game, even when it’s concrete aim is achieved, contains a potential permanent conflict between the population of the subdued country and the foreign and domestic forces oppressing it, between the permanent winner and mercenaries. Due to this the field of geopolitics is subject to periodic radical changes.

This means that the construction of the field of geopolitics contains the potential of *self-destruction*. This is shown by the forced withdrawal of troops from victoriously occupied regions. Historical experience also demonstrates it.

This explains the attempts to evolve a *theory* to determine the *constants* of the geopolitical game against the main global opponents for the observed future.

## **5. Project of a New Geopolitical Dichotomy**

The revealed tendencies of the self-destruction of the field of geopolitics create a threat to geopolitical game demonstrating its

ineffectiveness. And this, as it seems, can call into question the *legitimacy* of the global leadership of the “permanent winner,” and hence, the financial system, which emerged after World War II and allowed to “free” the global currency from its gold backing.

Geopolitical game moves into the background the principal question of *economic legitimacy*. The preservation of this advantageous global situation is the hidden aim of the *permanence* of geopolitical game. Detaching from geopolitics, the problem of the illegitimate character of the financial control over the world with the help of the currency of the superpower which has no necessary gold backing, emerges on the surface of international economic relations.

Coming back to Mitt Romney’s statement in the course of his 2012 election campaign, it would be expedient to suppose that the authors of geopolitical game think of transferring the experience gained in the course of testing its methods on to “permanent opponents.” The inner logic of geopolitical game prompts to do this. But there are certain difficulties.

The geopolitical global game contains *permanent war* as an inalienable component. This permanent war should acquire *attractiveness*, both internal and external. Internal attractiveness is ensured by the fact that it is identified with a *game which will be won* due to the absolute military superiority. Practically, this possibility is put to an evaluation test in real military actions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, and is confirmed there.

*External* attractiveness is ensured by the fact that war is put in the *information wrapping* and is presented as the liberation of the population from the tyrannical regime which protects state sovereignty, but does not observe democratic principles. Psychological operations have an aim to “persuade” the population that support of the U.S. army

will be in its own interests<sup>1</sup>. The population is viewed as a *mixed* object of influence consisting of *enemies* resisting the invader, and possible *friends* receiving active support.

Academic research works devoted to the construction of the field of modern geopolitics contain both its criticism and praise.

Critical attitude to the construction of the field of modern geopolitics is definitely connected with the fact that in historical perspective *any* participant in geopolitical game can become its victim. A question arises whether the strategy of geopolitical game is adequate for international affairs. The adequate strategy of modern international politics can only be based on the principle of security for all, for *the whole of humanity* as the interconnected global *entity*. Salvation lies not in the geopolitical order of life, but in common recognition of the principle of justice based on the equal rights of the sovereign subjects. This means that international security of mankind depends on the *initial principle* of the order of life in the world.

The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century symbolically cleared the situation with the choice. September 11, 2001, set the record straight. The enemy No 1 of global security is *terrorism*, its initiators and strike units.

The efforts of all nations, including Russia and the U.S.A., can be united in the struggle against terrorism.

The situation is quite clear. Russia has definitely stated that it preferred this choice and bolstered it up by practical steps in its foreign policy.

Today we come across not only doubts concerning the definition of international terrorism as the main common enemy of security, but also the attempts to include it in the “*new rules*” of *geopolitical game*. Such is the political background against which present-day academic

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<sup>1</sup> See: Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 28, Number 7–8, 2011, p. 228.

research is carried on. This background influences research which seems far from geopolitical problems. In this context it should be noted that Francis Fukuyama, although he does not examine the problem of ideology of the future in the geopolitical aspect, however, he intuitively guesses its great significance. This can be seen in his assessment of the *Chinese challenge*.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, and along with it the crisis of real socialism, determine the attempts to evolve a new attitude to the global situation from the point of view of the emergence in it of a new empirical counterbalance to liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama singled out the challenge from the East, that is, from China, which combines, quite successfully, authoritarian management with partly market economy. Fukuyama asserts that China began to recommend the “Chinese model” as an alternative to liberal democracy. However, in 50 years the world will not be like China. It should also be said that fifty years later the world will not be like the United States either, although the latter undertakes gigantic efforts to advertise the American way of life. The United States knows that other countries *are unable to repeat the American way of life at home* simply because they have no material, financial, scientific-technical and cultural prerequisites necessary for the purpose. If the American way of life is considered as a sample, then all nations should admit, in one way or another, their “inferiority.” This gives America the right to *judge others*, whereas it should not be on the sheet itself. This is a very important *ethical prerequisite for the implementation of the aims of geopolitics*. The realization of modern geopolitics, in contrast to the policy of Nazism, claims “*high moral standards*.” The imitation of “high morality” serves as a cover for the metaphysics of the absolute gain.

From the position of “clean conscience” China can be regarded as the “team” against which a geopolitical counter play should be

started with a view to belittling the serious challenge to western economic hegemony. However, China today is not a convenient counter-player. A victorious game is ensured by a number of consecutive stages. They include the information destabilization of the domestic situation and economic blockade, fanning up of a civil war, unity of potential allies for the beginning of common, including military actions in order to bring to power a new obedient and manageable administration.

It can be believed that the elaboration of such tactical succession of actions is the practical conclusion made from the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War.

Of course, the choice of the subject against whom a total geopolitical game can be started believing in its victorious end, is of special importance.

China has repeatedly been tested, however, it was impossible to achieve its destabilization. Now that the economy, science and culture of China are on an upswing, it is not possible to rely on its internal destabilization or a civil war. However, the aim of bringing to power an obedient and easily manageable administration still exists. This does not mean that another geopolitical player is forgotten. This is shown by the fact that during the 2012 presidential election campaign Mitt Romney called Russia the Number One geopolitical enemy of the United States.

An information war has long been waged against Russia. It was especially successful in the 1990s. The anti-Soviet sentiments provoked by that war contributed to discrediting the Soviet Union as superpower. Everything Soviet was identified with complete stagnation, and the Soviet man was described as a “nitwit,” unable to understand what the real freedom and happiness meant. As a result, the euphoria of happiness and freedom was identified with mass whoop-de-dos of rock

concerts and promiscuous sex. The anti-Soviet spirit has turned the might of the Soviet Union into something “untrue,” “unreal.” That was the unprecedented success of the information geopolitical war. For a rank-and-file Soviet man it was the process of self-destruction, which greatly influenced his everyday life. For instance, Soviet medicine was one of the most advanced in the world. But now, as Dr Knyazkin asserts, “our country is the world’s leader in self-treatment and self-medication<sup>1</sup>. And so, former admirers of the West begin to criticize sharply Soviet medicine and pharmacology created on the basis of western standards, as well as bureaucrats who organized that system<sup>2</sup>.

The revival of the policy based on common sense causes hysterics. Thus a socio-psychological atmosphere emerges in which the real truth cannot be discerned.

The truth is hidden in geopolitical mechanisms, which should be decoded.

One thing is clear today: as long as Russia has the real possibility to deal a crushing retaliatory blow in case of a military aggression against it, it remains the strongest obstacle in the way of playing a global geopolitical game. This is why the various forms of information-psychological impact on Russia are of priority order. Ben Anderson noted the point of view of such theorists as Mefate and Jackson, Mackinley, Mansoor and Ulrich, according to which each military operation should be accompanied by the attempt to form the “information medium” of the war. In this medium disappointments and hopes, expectations, and other feelings come out as real forces called upon “to modify” the behavior of the population, which consists of potential enemies and potential friends<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Doctor Knyazkin. “As in the West”. Newspaper “Metro”, July 3, 2012, No 62, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> See: Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> See: Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 28, Number 7–8, 2011, p. 225.

An image of Russia's "inferiority" is created. One might think that everything is done by "sinless," "saintly" politicians who teach their invader-soldiers how to smile, shake hands and beg pardon in order to look a highly moral military force. The aggressor should look like the bearer of high morality and culture. Then the object of aggression should look in the eyes of the world public as the quintessence of *Evil*. But what will be the basis of the motive of the "high morality" of aggression? The most convincing for the world public opinion will be the *guilt of unleashing a Third world war*.

The moral foundations for a total war potentially split mankind into two parts, each of which can become the object of *sacrificial offering*. This means that *there can be no universal morality*.

Academic argumentation based on the priority of a system loses its force. The "argumentation" offered by Goebbels in his time to prove that Hitler did not attack the Soviet Union, but simply dealt a preventive counterblow at Stalin's aggression, was regarded quite apt.

Goebbels' experience is now taken on board and polished with due account of the growing global information possibilities.

In this connection mention should be made of the concept formulated by Professor Azar Gat of Tel Aviv University in 2007. Striving to create a cunning propaganda trap, he tended to forget what army had saved his ethnic fellow-compatriots from Hitler's death camps. Who will save them next time? Or will there be nobody to save them?...

Speaking about the challenges which face the global liberal-democratic order, Azar Gat suggests that essential changes be made in the global geopolitical guidelines. First of all, assessments of threats from radical Islam, that is, from global terrorism, should be changed. Azar Gat maintains that radical Islam is not the main threat. It is the *least* of the two existing challenges to liberal democracy. It does not

present a serious military threat, Azar Gat believes. In essence, he proposes to change the orientation to *combining* forces in order to follow the fundamental aims of geopolitics, which should be directed against the *second* challenge.

The latter, a more profound challenge comes not from terrorism, but from the progress of the great powers, the old rivals of the West at the time of the Cold war. They are China and Russia<sup>1</sup>.

Azar Gat sees a threat to liberal democracy in the enormous potential economic and scientific-technical possibilities of China and Russia. He maintains that Nazi Germany and Japan used their internal possibilities for increasing their economic and technical might for military purposes. But these countries were too small in size. And this was why they suffered defeat.

Azar Gat forgot that Nazism had used the resources of practically entire Western Europe, and Japanese militarism – the whole of East Asia. And he asserts, without due reason, that the size and resources of Russia and China were incomparable with the size and resources of Nazi Germany and Japan at the time of World War II. And today it is evident, Azar Gat believes, that China becomes the “real authoritarian superpower”<sup>2</sup>.

The combination of private initiative, market mechanisms and state regulation gives a cumulative effect for the economic and scientific-technological development of China.

Russia has lost much due to its reformers blindly following the premises of the neo-liberal doctrine, and now it has to make up for the opportunities unused in the 1990s.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Azar Gat. The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers. // Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2012, vol. 91, Number 1, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 48.



Azar Gat defines the regimes in China and Russia as “authoritarian-capitalist.” This definition makes it possible to identify “conceptually” modern China and Russia with the authoritarian-capitalist regimes of Japan and Germany which unleashed World War II and played the leading role in the system of international relations right up to 1945. Azar Gat refers the new source of global aggression to Russia and China, although, as it is generally known, these countries have no concepts whatsoever of establishing a new world order and continue to follow the order of global democracy whose manifestation is the United Nations Organization. The U.S. embassies in certain Muslim countries could well evaluate the “effectiveness” of Azar Gat’s recommendations in 2012, when they had to hastily evacuate their personnel. Facts show that the development of China and Russia does not create a military threat to the liberal-democratic order of the West.

The military threat to the modern world is hidden in the structures of new geopolitical dichotomies, which are regarded the *conditio sine qua non* of “normal movement,” preserving the hegemony of the superpower.

The task of the information and conceptual support of this process is to present it as the intention to establish “genuine democracy” all over the world coinciding with the universal feeling of freedom and happiness.

Meanwhile, the ancient proverb “The Road to hell is paved with good intentions” has now acquired a new meaning.

*The article has been written specially  
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**CONFLICT-RAISING SCENARIOS IN THE SOUTH  
OF RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL-  
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION**

The South of Russia as usual remains one of the most problematic macro-regions of Russia.

The division in 2010 of the “Great” South Federal District into two entities and separation from its composition of “the district of concentrated problems” – the North-Caucasian Federal District (NCFD) resulted in the following: the territories being the locomotives of development of the whole South – the Krasnodar krai and the Rostov region – remained in one district, while the territories marked by greater economic and political problems were defined to be in the new district. On the other side, given many negative consequences of this division, it had also its positive consequences.

First, the state sent to society the clear signal, which showed that the North Caucasus presents for it the matter of primary concern and that it is ready to take actions and incur needed losses for stabilization of the situation.

Second, by creating the new district and providing the political representative in the NCFD with the special status and the sphere of powers the federal center made it possible to intensify economic and social-political life of the region.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that at present the NCFD is the only “working” district in Russia. Nevertheless, it was impossible to change the situation for the better. The terrorist acts, firings, attacks

against officials and murders of religious and public figures take place every day in the district. All these events question the reality of the strategy of economic reconstruction of the North Caucasus and the feasibility of big investments in development of tourist-recreational sphere in the region of chronic instability.

### **“Theoretic key” to the prognosis of the situation in the South of Russia”**

In 2005, the scientists of the Southern Scientific Center of RAS started to work out the scenario’s prognoses in the southern macro-region. The elaborated scenarios of conflicts for the first decade of the XXI century turned out to be proved partially. The scenarios were annually corrected and discussed at the meetings with representatives of authorities, and they were subject to discussion at other scientific arrangements (conferences and round tables etc.). Particularly, in 2009 the conclusion was made that at least in the eastern part of the North Caucasus the moderate-negative (from force of inertia) scenario was replaced by the negative scenario.

The prognosis on conflicts for the medium-term period was made on the basis of the expert poll in the South of Russia in 2009.

The experts made the prognosis on the peak of the tension’s escalation in 2012, which was conditioned by the key event, the election of the President of Russia and the postponed consequences of election processes for the 2011. This prognosis was amended on the basis of factual analysis, and the conclusion was made on the next peak of the conflicting situation in 2014: as the XXII Winter Olympic Games in Sochi draw nearer, the conflicting and risky nature of this project becomes more evident.

This prognosis does not signify a de-escalation of regional conflicts and tension. For the second part of the second decade of the

XXI century, the new prognosticated today conflicting factors will come forward. A new election period will take place in some years: in 2016 the next elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation will be held, and in 2018 the election of the President of Russia will take place. The solution of many problems of modernization of the political system will be postponed for the time of these elections, and the elections of 2011–2012 clearly showed the need of solving these problems.

The election process is not the sole conflicting factor, which may be prognosticated for the second half of the current decade. The crisis of the power “drawn to the surface” by elections in 2011–2012 was a portent but still not a part of a probable systemic crisis in Russia. The crisis’ processes in the political sphere were going on against the background of the favorable external economic conjuncture. The prices of oil and gas remained stable and high, however, for the past periods of time the fluctuations in prices of energy resources caused political turmoil.

For the second part of the period of the 2000s, the studies were often marked by predictions that a new extended crisis may turn out to be pernicious for the South of Russia. In 2006, an alarmist conflicting scenario was described by the authors. At the same time, it was said that there were no adequate conditions for such scenario and that under those conditions it was not in all likelihood. Further it was shown that the probability of this scenario might be conditioned by a large-scale crisis of the Russian statehood, an economic collapse and a full loss of geopolitical influence of Russia in the Trans-Caucasus. In the time of “rich years” these prognoses were considered rather abstract and hypothetical, almost unreal.

However, at present the situation is principally different. As A. Rubtsov mentioned, in 2011 the alarmist warnings became quite

ordinary, and the expert community enjoys itself at the fair of signals. The report of the Institute of Contemporary Development “Finding Future: Strategy of 2012” had great repercussions in the first half of 2011; the report contained dark perspectives for Russian society in case of failure of the modernization project. The present politicians in spite of modernization rhetoric failed to ensure consolidation of modernization’s supporters. Meanwhile, the real and not verbal modernization is the last chance of Russia to keep its geopolitical influence for the coming decade.

As a known prognosis it is possible to cite the study of the Center for Macro-economic Analysis and Short-term Prognosis, which points out that the high level of deficit threatening a crisis (2%, 2.1% and 2.2%) will take place in 2017, 2018 and 2019. The year of 2018 may be regarded as problematic from the point of view of stability of Russian society: the coincidence of two mighty conflict-raising factors (the presidential elections and a probable economic crisis) may have a resonance effect.

With due account of likely economic crises in 2017, 2018 and 2019 it is possible to make the prognosis of a resonance effect as a destabilized situation in 2018–2019. Such purely preliminary prognosis is based on one of many economic prognoses. However, in this case as a rather great significance for the second half of the current decade is positioned “the decade of stability”, but it will sooner be the unstable decade.

The prognoses of probable crises at the all-Russian scale represent the key factors for prognoses in the South. The current studies have led to the conclusion, that the long-term systemic crisis in the region is a specific regional embodiment of emerging and unsolved problems of the contemporary Russian statehood.

In the North Caucasus these problems are laid on the real and fictitious, the long-term emerging and artificially created problems in inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relation, on the particular geopolitical significance of the region. As a result of this process there appears a kind of resonance effect: the most problems in various degrees characterized for Russia as a whole are manifested in the North Caucasus as ethnic-political or confessional problems.

It does not mean that the daily work in the North-Caucasian region for the sake of de-escalation of conflicts, the ethnic-political and ethnic-confessional tensions is hopeless or even senseless, if the problems are not solved initially at the federal level. Quite contrary, only the daily work of all constructive forces in the region may prevent its falling away in large scale civil war and development of events according to the worst scenario.

### **The social-cultural factors of instability in the South**

More often they try to explain a great number of conflicts in the North-Caucasian region by economic reasons. However, the results of the existence of the NCFD for the first two years showed that the social-economic determinism is unable to be an explanatory model. Thus, the systemic bases for solving the North-Caucasian problems have been defined not quite correctly at least at the stage of creation of the district.

Having seen inefficiency of the taken measures, the federal power in the name of the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the NCFD A.G. Khloponin significantly changed the directions. At the meeting with members of the Council at the post of the governor of the Stavropol krai on the issues of inter-ethnic relations (19 January 2011) A.G. Khloponin said: “I will never agree with the

conclusion that economy is the key to solving national problems”. Further, at the meeting in the Kabardino-Balkaria state university (11 February 2011), he again made the declaration about re-orientation of the policy carried out in the NCFD. The political representative definitely flatly disproved the version that the aggravation of the situation in the District was caused by high unemployment: “The situation in the Caucasus in this respect is not worse than in other regions”.

In reality, all aspects of life are interconnected, and undoubtedly economic problems and disorder have negative impact on ethnic-political and ethnic-confessional processes. However, the latter are sufficiently autonomic and demand a self-dependent impact of government.

The economic problems in many regions of Russia are not less acute than in the North Caucasus; however, the people there do not take up arms and do not become fighters. The new federal district was created not due to aggravation of economic problems but due to the special concentration of social-political, ethnic-confessional risks for the Russian statehood. The reason of creation of the new district is connected with solving exactly social-political, ethnic-political and ethnic-confessional problems.

At the same time, it is necessary with more details to dwell upon and analyze the cultural-ideological preconditions of conflicts and tensions in the North Caucasus. It is necessary for this sake to use as a generalization the notion of “the Caucasian culture”. The ethnic cultures of the peoples in the Caucasus differ from each other, but these differences are not big enough to exclude the vision of these cultures as a united area. The Caucasian culture comes forward at present as a part of the all-Russian culture, but as a low-integrated and non-organic part of it. And for the post-Soviet period the cultural distance is growing.

The peculiar combination of traditionalism and Islam makes up the basic ideology, values and world outlook, characterized by this culture. Variations of Islam spiritualize the contemporary (just contemporary) Caucasian culture, integrate it from within and at the same time separate from other cultural systems, for instance, from those, which are not based on religious idea.

It is possible to agree with E.M. Primakov, that the wave of Islamization is a global phenomenon. One should take into account the process of inclusion of the Caucasus in the Russian state, which was going on for two centuries under conditions of not the rise but of the abate of Islam. At present, the situation is different in principle. At present, Islam is on the rise, and it would be a mistake to ignore the influence of the rapid rise of Islam, going on in the world, on the situation in the North Caucasus. At present, the Islamic paradigm of values and world outlook transforms into the national idea of peoples in the Caucasus, fixing a special status of this region within the framework of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the ideological unity of all Muslims, their imperative participation in life of Islamic world makes it possible to speak about not only cultural-ideological but also about civilization's isolation of the Muslim North Caucasus. Therefore the difficulties of integration of the region in the all-Russian social-cultural space became understandable.

Just cultural-civilization's non-integration of the region is the most important basis of the systemic crisis in the North Caucasus.

### **Is the conflict of civilizations possible on the scale of the South of Russia**

At the present stage the North-Caucasian region does not blend well with trends of the social-cultural development characterized for other regions of Russia. The high level of conflicts shows the inner



characteristic of regional problems. It concerns primarily the value-ideological sphere, the attitude to religion, the world outlook and mentality. The cultural basis of conflicts and tensions in the North Caucasus makes it possible to question involvement of the region in the conflict of civilizations.

As it is known, S. Huntington, the founder of the conception “conflict of civilizations”, fixing the termination of cold war with its ideological opposition of two super-systems, declared that in the future global and regional conflicts would be conditioned by cultural dependence and, first of all, connected with religion. Actually, the collapse of the be-polar system conditioned the grave conflict among the secular and the religious, the modern and the traditional systems of the world outlook and life.

The report “On Measures for Consolidation of Inter-National Consent in the Russian Society”, prepared by experts for the sitting of the Presidium of the State Council in the beginning of 2011, stresses that the world trend consists of aggravation of inter-ethnic contradictions, rise of intolerance in the countries with high quality of life, against the background of growing migration flows, conflicts between religious and secular paradigms in the secular society, the search in democratic society for the lawful exit from the situation of absolute rights of minorities to the detriment of rights of the majority etc.

On the boundary between XX and XXI centuries, it turned out that some concepts and ideological schemes elaborated by the world’s sociology failed not only to know beforehand but also to explain the inter-ethnic, ethnic-religious and social-cultural conflicts and contradictions of contemporary society.

The world trends have impact also on the situation in Russia, where one may surely fix aggravation of inter-ethnic, inter-confessional

and inter-civilization contradictions. In particular, the thesis of S. Huntington on the culture's conditionality of conflicting contradictions in the contemporary world finds its empirical justification in the North-Caucasian region. For the last 20 years, religious rebirth became the principal tendency of social-cultural development of the region.

While in the better modernized regions of Russia religious renaissance acquired moderate forms, in the traditional regions, particularly in the North Caucasus, the religious rebirth became the most significant factor of development of many processes, which not all may be considered as constructive. In some cases, radicalization of ethnic-confessional identification promoted aggravation of the situation in the region. The religiousness of the population in the republics of the North Caucasus, which had been suppressed for a long time, "suddenly" became the basis of self-definition and behavior both of separate subjects and the whole social groups.

This thesis is proved, in particular, by the results of the sociological research conducted with participation of the authors in autumn of 2009 in four "key" territories – Stavropol krai, Krasnodar krai, in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherchessia, which belonged at that time to the South Federal District. As was proved by the research, the confessional belonging is very significant for the peoples of the Caucasus (67.4% of the respondents noted that it was very significant, 23.5% – significant, thus, in total 90.9%). At the same time, the share of respondents belonging to the Christian cultural area (Russians), who regarded the confessional factor as very important, made up 30.1% and as important – 34.2%, composing the total sum of 64.3%). Although the total result of the Russian respondents' views exceeds 50%, it is much lower than the share of peoples of Muslim culture (the peoples of the Caucasus).

The above results testify to the contradicting tendencies of resistance to clericalism and promotion of clerical influence in society. The essential differences in the respondents' views to a certain extent may be interpreted as the contradiction between secular and religious paradigms of the world outlook. The elements of "conflict of civilizations" are seen rather clearly in this contradiction, which is characteristic for the whole complex of social-cultural relations, the most important sphere of mentality.

### **From policy of tolerance to policy of integration**

The social-cultural policy carried out for the post-Soviet period stressed the formation in the region of the all-Russian identity, and it is possible to regard this project as a whole quite successful. However, the civil identity is very important but relatively not complicated construction: the formal fact of citizenship makes its basis. It forms citizens but does not create the peoples.

The stable high level of ethnic-political tension in the North Caucasus shows insufficiency of civil identity as a basis of national unity and as a factor of overcoming inter-cultural and inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. The representatives of various ethnic-cultural areas as usual feel mutual estrangement and sometimes also alienation. This factor leads to separation of people, who as citizens of one state do not understand the content of their unity and do not see common social-cultural orientations.

The stake on formation of civil identity is correlated today with such strategies of harmonization of the political-cultural society as tolerance and multi-cultural policy.

The principal conception of tolerance consists in recognition of value of differences. In practice this direction often leads to absolute interpretation of differences by omitting and ignoring the common

consolidating factors, which represent the sole basis of forming the united civilization's identity and, consequently, of creating the united people. As far as multiculturalism is concerned, it recognizes firmness of the principle of cultural plurality and, mainly, regarding this plurality as the highest value, already right from the start denies a chance of integration based on distinctions of the unity. The policy of multiculturalism either in the U.S.A. or in the Western Europe always resulted in the priority of distinctions over unity and disintegration over integration.

At present it becomes evident that the stake on forming only civil identity with absolute meaning of sovereignty of civilization's self-definition, of cultural autonomy does not prove its value. The collapse of multicultural policy in many European countries urged on the search by leading Russian politicians for new possible ways of harmonization of inter-ethnic relations, inter-cultural relations and achievement of the true national unity of Russia. In particular, V.V. Putin in his article on the national question in Russia makes the main stress on exactly civilization's identity.

The civilization's identity, V.V. Putin says, is based on preservation of the Russian cultural dominant, and not only ethnic Russians but also people of other nationalities come forward as its carriers. This is the cultural code, which was put to a significant test for the recent years and which was and is subject to attempts to break it. Nevertheless, it was kept intact. At the same time, it is necessary to feed and strengthen it and to care for it.

In this sense, it is evident that the present situation in the North Caucasus shows only one real way out of the prolonged ethnic-political crisis – the passage from policy of tolerance and multi-culture to policy of integration, which supposes formation of the united social-political and cultural-civilization's space of Russia and the North Caucasus.

Integration is urged to promote significance of social-cultural (civilization's) identity, the type of identity, which is able to ensure national unity of the Russian Federation and to reduce the level of ethnic-political tension in the North-Caucasian region.

*“Obozrevatel- Observer”, Moscow, 2012, N 7, pp.5–18.*

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**THE NEW PRESIDENT**

**AND THE “OLD” NORTH CAUCASUS**

The problem of the North Caucasus remains a key problem in the policy of the new president of Russia and his administration. Quite often they speak about the need of a complex decision of “the Caucasian question”, which supposes that the main question is overcoming of economic and social complications. This direction actually “postpones” the most conflicting political aspect. Meanwhile, the political crisis should be settled not only in parallel with solving economic problems but even slightly beforehand. The previous experience demonstrates that the quality changes in economy will need many years (as an example the constant gloomy indexes of unemployment), while improvement of the political situation theoretically is possible in the near future. Therefore in the text below the attention is devoted almost completely to politics. It is important to raise efficiency of all-Russian institutions in the region to formalize relations with the local republicans and to reduce the significance of the factor of personal relations among politicians at the federal level, including relations of the president with the heads of the republics. As a result, the local elites should gradually break themselves of the habit to think about the informal special status of the North Caucasus within the

framework of the Russian Federation and feel themselves more self-dependent; at the same time, this policy should include the region in the all-country political situation decreasing the level of resentment and grudges against Moscow on the part of the North-Caucasian elites.

The restoration of election of the regions' heads would create in the North Caucasus the political strip holding of power at least in some republics (Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cercessia). The emergence of claimants representing ethnic and clannish groups will be unavoidable. Almost all of them to some extent will apply for Islam, particularly for support from spiritual leaders (who actually for a long time became religious-political figures). And one may be positive that leaving aside the irreconcilable opposition nobody will stake the separatist card. Each rival will assure that he presents optimal propositions for creating the right relations with the Federal Center.

In case of elections Moscow in some or other form will take decision and determine the more trustworthy candidate. At the same time, the situation may arise when the Center has the favorable attitude to two candidates, stressing in this way its trust to local preferences. Finally, the elections, despite possible excesses, are able to consolidate the internal consensus, and the new head of the republic will enjoy legitimacy and authority under favorable conditions for solving complicated problems.

Let us leave aside the question of the plenipotentiary representative of the President in the North Caucasus; it seems that it is worth abolishing the institution of representation in the all-Russian format. As far as the North Caucasus is concerned, in this region neither representative has achieved big results. And he could not secure them: first, the local elites prefer to run a business directly with the Federal Center (they are irritated with the intermediate instance considered by them as a supervisor), and, second, any personal

initiative of the political representative demands approval of the Center. The political representative actually may not either “help” or interfere in the regional processes.

The establishment of efficient control over usage of financial means coming from the federal budget is the political question. For the nearest future, the rate of subsidies to the most republics, particularly to Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, will hardly be reduced. It makes sense to establish directly at the office of the finance minister or the premier one group or some groups to keep under confidential control the spending of money from allocation from the federal budget up to the realization of this sum in the local place.

It is necessary to give greater support to small business in order to prevent its amalgamation by bigger players and to exclude opportunity of creation of regional monopolies headed by local officials. It is worth allocating means for various medium-sized and small targeted projects: creation of enterprises, construction of stadiums, cultural centers, tourist objects, as well as to attract to these projects the private capital with due control over targeted usage of the means. All this demands rather political than economic decisions.

The President is obliged to render assistance in improvement of the education system. At the same time, it is expedient to resume the practice of selection and sending for studies in Russian pedagogical higher education institutions of gifted young people in order to send them for several years without fail to work in local education institutions.

It is significant to improve the quality of teaching the Russian language, and for this sake to raise the payment of teachers and to stimulate the arrival to the region of graduates from Russian pedagogical higher education institutions even if for temporary employment.

The reduction of the instability's level remains the concern of the President for his complete term. It will be also for the period of governing of the further head of the state and for the more distant period of time. Finally, the President should agree that the main problem of the regional security is not created by the criminal structures, the bandits, but by the non-systemic opposition, which enjoys the support of a rather great part of the population. This opposition is not monolithic at all. It contains an extremist wing, which due to some reasons (ideological, religious, personal revenge, connections with criminals or external influence) will continue armed struggle under any circumstances. Thus, the new president should not and will not be able to renounce completely the forceful methods of struggle.

The use of force against extremists and their neutralization should be accompanied by open judicial proceedings and open trials concerning criminals. At the same time, it is necessary to punish severely those, who in the course of investigation of criminal acts resort to tortures, kidnappings and putting to fire the houses belonged to families of fighters. Such measures if bringing success for a short time, finally, result in animosity of the local population and provoke revenge.

A greater and particular attention should be given to "the differently minded" people, who are ready for a dialogue, even if they share radical ideas. The number of the discontented young people is increasing; the number of passive and active supporters of the opposition does not diminish and, probably, even rises. Besides, the mass media reports on the number of fighters differ a lot. It is difficult to appraise the information prepared for the president and for the premier, but the new president should demand that the officials of the law enforcement bodies should give him more exact data not only about participants of the opposition but also about their adherence to



extremists, radicals and “fellow-travellers”. Otherwise, it is impossible to set the task clearly: against whom and how to struggle. The important, if only the deciding is the task to stop recruitment of young people to the rows of the opposition, to prevent their radicalization: the people are not borne to become fighters and they become fighters under the influence of circumstances. The attempts “to intercept” the youth from the fighters are being made now, but they are sporadic actions and not coordinated among various structures: the clergy, the officials and the law enforcement officers.

“The interception” of potential fighters remains one of the conditions of normalization of the situation and the outlined process of reconciliation. The need of dialogue with the religious-political opposition was comprehended rather long time ago. In this context, one may recall the Khasavyurt agreement with separatist Chechnya. But at that time it was primarily a political subterfuge of the Kremlin. It is possible to consider to be reconciliation the compromise achieved by Putin in Chechnya, when Akhmat-khaji Kadyrov occupied the post of the administration and further the president of the republic. It was the actual reconciliation with a fraction of fighters creating a kind of precedent.

At present, the question is conciliation between a) the power and the religious-political opposition and b) between traditional Islam and those, who are called Salafites or wahhabites (some terminological differences exist). The official powers comprehend that the internal conciliation, although not attainable in the final form, is the obligatory condition of ensuring stability. The real peace needs mutual compromises, however, at present the power and the loyal to it “traditional clergy” are ready to forgive their opponents only under conditions of their activities’ termination.

At present, the process of conciliation often is formal and is made “just for show”. Nevertheless, of significance is the fact itself, if it is the initiative of the local authorities. The president should perceive the conciliation process not as a political campaign but as a long process of daily work for the indefinite time. The federal power may itself somehow join this process, keep it under its observance and even interfere, if the reconciliation of the parties in the republics of the North Caucasus is at a deadlock. If the parties succeed to maintain the regime of dialogue and conciliation, in the perspective it may be possible in the future to reconsider also the popular among Russian politicians thesis that “in the Caucasus they respect only the force”. In reality, they respect in the Caucasus also wisdom and ability to understand the opponent and to make a compromise.

The needed condition of stabilization of the North Caucasus is the distinct migration policy for Stavropol krai and Krasnodar krai, which would take into account the unavoidable growth of migration, the most conflict raising zones on these territories and would propose to local administrations the recommendations on accommodation of migrants as well as mechanisms for alleviation of inter-ethnic and social tension.

Should this policy not be elaborated for the nearest future, the situation will aggravate over there to the highest degree. At the same time, to work out such policy is a very difficult matter, although also extremely significant for the Russian Federation as a whole.

The strategic task of the president is to prevent “a drift” of the North Caucasus to turn aside from Russia. At present, Russian politicians prefer not to notice the gradual transformation of region into “internal far abroad”, and at least a part of the establishment does not think that it is necessary to hinder this process.

On their own part, the Caucasian elites regard their republics as a part of Russia and resolutely come forward against separatism, but at the same time they prefer to be guided by “the Caucasian laws”, which are based on the clannish, essentially traditional type of society and on the significant role of Islam.

The new president should not simply correct the approach to the North Caucasus (the attempts to make corrections were made not once but failed), but to comprehend it. The ruling power should determine – in which the region it should form its base on the tradition and use traditional laws and rules of social regulation; evidently, this region should remain within the Russian Federation and the framework of the Russian constitution and Russian legislation. The president should also be aware that in the North Caucasus there goes on the process of spreading archaic traditions in society and should formulate his attitude to dissemination of Islam and Shariah in the region.

The federal power should not struggle against Shariah, since here such struggle is doomed to failure. It is necessary de-facto to restore the functioning of the federal legislation on the territory of the region and to start to strengthen the lost confidence in the federal judicial system, which is subject to corruption even more than in Russia as a whole. At the same time, one should not forget that now and in the nearest perspective in the region there will remain traditional law in parallel to the federal law. The existence in parallel of two legal systems in principle is admissible only under condition, when traditional rules do not contradict directly to the federal law.

Russia remains a secular state, and no Russian president will be against it. It should be said that many Muslims are more and more concerned about political activities of the Orthodox Russian Church (ORC). The claims of the ORC for participation in the state affairs and formulation of the national idea cause irritation of the Russian Muslim

community. At the same time, the position of the ORC supposes also for Muslims to follow their own Islamic variant of solving secular problems. In this context, the calls for creation of Islamic state or caliphate in the North Caucasus, where exists the Muslim majority in the population, seem to be understandable and explainable.

At the same time, at present Islam is not simply religion, but it is a political ideology with a clearly expressed element of social protest.

Evidently, it does not cost anything for the new president a priori to refute any Islamic directions spread in the North Caucasus. It would be rather more feasible to display certain tolerance and to direct Muslims of Russia towards the internal Islamic dialogue. It is especially important, as in 2011–2012 the forces declaring adherence to the idea of state building on the basis of Islamic norms and principles come to power in Muslim countries. The North Caucasus is a part of the Muslim world and one may expect emergence on its territory of the same religious-political collisions, which are developing in other parts of the Islamic world. Therefore, the president forming its political direction should take into account the global processes, particularly, the inevitable radicalization of Islam and its extremist displays.

It is worth discussing the problems connected with realization of the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. To the mind of the author, the Olympic Games are a kind of “raffle” with the unpredictable (not only sportive) results. Its success will acquire a political characteristic and will show the ability of Russia and personally of its president to ensure security in the less safe place of the country. On the contrary, the destabilization and terrorist act (acts) on the eve of the Games, the more so in the course of their realization, will depreciate all efforts of the Federal Center in the North Caucasian direction and will hit at the authority of Russia.

The prevention of extremist actions shall be realized in the two directions – by political actions and by means of secret services. The latter is outside the author’s competence. And one remark may be made: although it is necessary to pay attention to the foreign experience, nevertheless, the alien’s experience not always suits Russia: the existing conditions differ, besides being worse, comparing with the situation, for instance, in China, where extraordinary measures were taken to ensure security.

As far as the political aspect is concerned, first, the president will have to convince the residents of the North Caucasus that the successful realization of the Olympic Games corresponds to their interests and that the return from them afterwards will not be felt only once but will be an urge towards the development of the region. At present, many residents of the North Caucasus express concern and even skepticism on the Games. The President has to change radically this attitude by means of the project conditionally named “What Will the Olympic Games Bring to the Common People”. Second, the great attention should be paid to the so-called “Circassian question”, which may become strained on the eve of the Olympic Games. Evidently, the approaches to damp down, if not to solve this problem will be found. It would be wrong or simply stupid to reduce all to the external influence. In the region there exist nationalist forces, which sincerely struggle for both the Circassian autonomy and even for creation of “the Great Circassia”. Obviously, the contacts with them should not be reduced exclusively to “the policy of threats” and the search for a compromise (though very complicated) is needed. The more so, as there exists the probability of a provisional consensus and coordination of the efforts exerted by Circassian nationalists and Islamic radicals, which will lead to formation of a new, formerly unknown “roaring blend”.

The problems directly connected with the North Caucasus are as follows: the migration of the local population to other regions of Russia and tension, quite often also animosity between newcomers from the region and the indigenous Slavonic population in Stavropol krai, Krasnodar krai, in Moscow and other cities and regions of Russia. The Caucasian migration is one of the main reasons of the growth of Russian ethnic-nationalism, results in aggravation of inter-ethnic and recently inter-confessional relations.

In this situation it is necessary to make tougher penalties for ethnic-nationalist actions and to repudiate the practice to qualify them as every day occurrences and hooliganism, like it is done now and then. The idea of Russian identity should be propagated on a larger scale and with greater ability, besides in such way that the civil and ethnic identities do not confront each other.

Taking into account differences and tensions among the republics of the North Caucasus, for the next president as an optimal but very complicated strategy would be the simultaneous use of two approaches: the general, all-Caucasian, and the particular, republican approach, avoiding conflicts between these approaches, since the contradictions between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, complications in relations between Dagestan and Chechnya, Chechnya and Ingushetia will remain for a long time. Therefore it is expedient (there is no other way) to start the discussion of all questions at the local level, i.e. to decide them in particular with Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria etc., to work out certain general compromises; but these decisions, as soon as they have been taken, should become the law for the North Caucasus as a whole, and all participants should observe them, regardless of personal relations of local heads with the federal politicians.

The new president will have to do a lot in order to restore the confidence of residents of the North Caucasus in the Center. However,

at any rate he will not be able to solve all problems in the North Caucasus, the more so, as the process of governing of Russia as a whole for the next president will be connected with many political and other difficulties. The resolute steps should be taken for improvement of the situation in the region, since otherwise the region will for ever remain the most vulnerable place of the Russian state.

*“Povestka dnya novogo presidenta”,  
Moscow, 2012, pp. 53–59.*

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## **PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF INTERFAITH AND ETHNICAL DIALOGUE IN KYRGYZSTAN**

### **1. Kyrgyzstan on the Great Silk Road**

Since the times of the Great Silk Road, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Kyrgyzstan has been one of the most ancient sources of the Eurasian and Central Asian culture and a bridge between religions, cultures and civilizations. The geographical position of Kyrgyzstan has preconditioned convergence and inter-penetration of cultures, traditions and customs of many nations and religions. Today, this region is a unique model of intercultural, interethnic and inter-faith mutual understanding and interaction in the history of the world civilization.

The international trade route passed through the land of Kyrgyzstan, and people exchanged not only goods, but also ideas and views – in ancient times, the early Middle Ages, and Middle Ages. Merchants and warriors ewer often accompanied by a monk or a dervish – Buddhist, Christian, Zoroastrian or Muslim. That is why the peoples living on the route of the Great Silk Road surpassed others in

their cultural development. Nevertheless, when we say that the Great Silk Road was the road of dialogues between peoples, we should not forget that dialogues were waged not only by means of trade transactions and heartfelt talks in caravans, but also by means of swords and battlefields. It was not an idyll; it was a rigorous and sometimes bloody policy, regulated by economic interests.

The majority of countries in the modern world are multiethnic and multi-confessional. As the world experience shows, diversity, including confessional diversity, is an essential condition for the survival and development of societies. As was noted by the Head of the OSCE Office in Bishkek, A. Idil, closed mono-cultural and mono-religious societies are ultimately doomed to stagnation and entropy; the world community realizes the necessity of multi-polarity and multiculturalism.

## **2. Ethnic and confessional composition of the population in Kyrgyzstan**

The ethnic and confessional composition of the population of Kyrgyzstan is very diverse. According to the National census of the Kyrgyz republic in 2009, the population of Kyrgyzstan is 5 million people, represented by more than 90 ethnic groups, 12 of which cover more than 20 thousand people representing different confessions. They are: Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Russians, Dungans, Uigurs, Tajiks, Koreans, Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars, Kazakhs, Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Azerbaijanis, Belarusians and Poles etc. The biggest ethnic groups according to the 2009 census are: Kyrgyz (71%), Uzbeks (14.3%) living in the south of Kyrgyzstan, Russians (7.8%) living in the north of the country and the others (6.9%).

According to statistic data collected by the State Commission for Religion, 80% of the population of independent Kyrgyzstan is Muslim.



The Islamic community is represented by 20 ethnic groups, where: Kyrgyz are 60%; Uzbek 15%; Kazakh, Tatar, Tajik, Dungan, Uigur, Turk, Bashkir, Chechen, Dargin and others are more than 5%. All citizens belonging to “Muslim” nationalities are automatically identified by statistics as Muslims, but among local Muslims one can also meet Russians, Gypsies and Germans.

Orthodox Christians comprise 16%. The Orthodox community includes all Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and representatives of other “Orthodox” nationalities. Orthodox priests in different years have been not only Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, but also German, Chinese, Poles and Moldavians. Other confessions constitute 3%. In Kyrgyzstan, as well as in other countries of Central Asia, ethnic self-consciousness is often identified with confessional consciousness.

During the years of its independence, Kyrgyzstan has implemented certain work on the development of state policies in the field of inter-ethnic relations, including the policy “Kyrgyzstan is Our Common Home”, which is a creation of the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan based on the national cultural centers of ethnic minorities living in the Kyrgyz republic. The Assembly has certainly played a positive role in the formation of harmonious relations between ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan, but it has not worked purposefully for the formation of tolerance and the development of inter-ethnic, intercultural and inter-faith dialogues. Rather the Assembly had a decorative ostensible character and did not have any concrete mechanisms and institutes for implementation. State policy in the field of inter-ethnic relations has not been well-thought-out and systemic, though it should be noted that all ethnic groups have had equal rights in all spheres of social life and there have been no apparent inter-ethnic and inter-faith conflicts.

### **3. Increased influence of non-traditional religious trends and radical Islam in Kyrgyzstan**

Since Stalin's times, Kyrgyzstan has been the place where the central Soviet authorities exiled ethnic groups, members of different sects and religious trends who were out of their favor; which made the country tolerant towards different faiths. After gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan adopted the Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organizations (December 1991). The Law proclaimed freedom of religious beliefs, simplified the procedure for establishing religious associations, and extended the labor legislative norms and property rights to religious cult attendants.

This liberal legislation, on one hand, enhanced religious freedom, mutual understanding and mutual respect. On the other hand, it made Kyrgyzstan one of the most favorable countries for the activities of different religious organizations, including questionable ones, and has attracted all kinds of missionaries from around the world. Along with the existing organizations, many new previously unknown religious organizations started to work actively in the country. In the mid-1990s, there were nine hundred officially registered foreign missionaries; though some religious associations were registered as secular organizations (Moon Church, Center of Dianetics, and others). Today, in Kyrgyzstan there are official education centers of different Christian confessions: The Bible College, Presbyterian education center, etc.

During the first years of independence, the traditional Islam and Orthodoxy found themselves for the rigorous competition on the part of Islamic radicals and numerous sects. Under the condition of the atheistic state, which continued for many years, they lost their experience and skills of missionary activities among different social strata and groups of population. On the contrary, Islamic radicals and different sects and religious associations opposing the existing power

and often using underground methods have prepared their followers, who have rich experience conducting missionary activities.

Traditional Islam can undoubtedly be considered an integrating and uniting factor; though it has intra-confessional diversity, there are no vividly expressed contradictions between its different trends. It should be noted that historical and difficult controversies still exist between Sunni and Shiah, but the conflict is characteristic of other Muslim countries, not Kyrgyzstan. Studies of intra-confessional diversity are of topical importance, especially taking into consideration the fact that it is often the source of conflicts and extremism.

Unlike the moderate Islam in the North of Kyrgyzstan, there is a quite radical Islam in the south of the country. Islamic radicals focus on the propaganda of canonic Islam, thinking that indigenous nations, Kyrgyz in particular, profess incorrect Islam. As it is noted by a leading Islam researcher of Uzbekistan, Bahtiyar Babajanov, the Islamic world is an infinite chain of intra-confessional conflicts which inevitably turn into dogmatic schisms and consequently into political confrontations. “It is natural that some theologians wish to eliminate these schisms so the Umma is not divided. But the history of any new round of “purification of Islam”, its “correction”, or “consolidation” has the same scenario and consequences: those who fight against mazkhab, against Sufism and against “disintegration of Muslims” finally unite into groups, movements and parties, thus multiplying the number of such “parties” and fostering the internal schism”.

In this way, theologians who allegedly fight against schisms, actually themselves stimulate schisms. Parties and movements created by them also facilitate splits, what inevitably leads to political and social conflicts. Thus, for example, the Islamized and nationalistic part of Fergana Valley, the ideas of which are promoted by the Islamic movement of Turkestan (IMT), strives for the unification of Fergana

and the creation of a united Islamic state – Caliphate. The same purpose is pursued by the religious party “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, which uses more sophisticated (peaceful in their opinion) methods. Battles in 1999–2000 in the Batken area of Kyrgyzstan, which killed Kyrgyz military servicemen, followed by the intrusions and terrorist acts of Islamic gunmen in the Kyrgyz cities of Kadamdjay, Jalal-Abad and Uzghen, and the series of terrorist acts in Osh and Bishkek in 2010 certify to the fact that all these movements for the consolidation of Islam and creation of Caliphate lead as a matter of fact to the political and intra-confessional split of the country.

The success of Islamic extremists is fostered by the weakly educated local clergy most of whom are semi-literate self-taught men who cannot effectively oppose professionally prepared radical Islamists from outside the region. In opposing the government, the Islamic opposition dominating in the south of the country seeks to use the factor of regionalism and existing south-north differences. The positions of secular political parties are quite weak in the retarded and more Islamized south of the country. Today, most of the influential religious oppositionists in Kyrgyzstan come from the south of the country.

The danger of Islamic radicalism lies in the fact that unlike other confessions it uses religion first of all as a political ideology and seeks to oust secular governments in Kyrgyzstan and other states of Central Asia and to build here its own Islamic state. Therefore, the religious situation in the south of Kyrgyzstan is currently considered a real danger to successful development, state security, and independence, not only for the country, but also for the whole Central Asian region.

Today, it is difficult to counteract extremists because of the lack of well-prepared professional Muslim spiritual preachers in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Local imams are not competent in Islamic tolerance and

cannot uphold their positions in dialogues with representatives of such extremist radical parties and movements as “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami” (Islam Freedom Party), Wahhabite, and Al Qaida, who openly propagate extremism in the south and have already penetrated into the north of Kyrgyzstan. Imams in mosques support the spread of radical Islam ideas; for example, in June 2010 some mosques were used as storehouses of guns, and imams of mosques provoked Uzbek youth to inter-ethnic conflicts which almost became a fratricidal war.

Under such conditions it is of vital importance to keep inter-confessional and intra-confessional stability in the country. It is of topical importance today to work out peaceful and tolerant Islamic alternatives to radical Muslim fundamentalists. It is necessary to show to Muslims that it is inadmissible and sinful to use Islam for political aims in multi-ethnic and multi-confessional societies. Unlike Islamists, Christian organizations and groups do not divide their potential church members according to their ethnic features.

The “sudden” independence and sovereignty caused aggravation of social-economic situation and mass poverty of the local population of Kyrgyzstan. All this enhanced the efficiency of new religious teachings in sermons; the country has actually turned into an arena for activities of all kinds of foreign missionaries. They provide material support and carry out active spiritual work among all the population groups, focusing on the title nationality. As a result of such work, during recent years, a great number of Kyrgyz people (not only poor ones) have passed to Protestant churches. Today, the number of Kyrgyz who have adopted Christianity reaches from 15 thousand to 40 thousand people, according to different data. This expansion is a result of good “management” implemented by Protestant organizations among the Kyrgyz population; they organize mass publication and

distribution of Protestant religious literature in Kyrgyz language and preached sermons also in Kyrgyz language.

Under the conditions of loyal legislation in the field of religion, there are tens of different confessional communities in the country. There are many cases among Kyrgyz families where members of the same family profess different religions: Islam, Baha'i, Protestantism, and Buddhism. In the south of the country there is a visible trend towards "Christianization" and "apostasy" in the Kyrgyz, but in the south Muslim fundamentalism and Wahhabism are gaining strength, which obviously highlights differences between the north and south of Kyrgyzstan and aggravates inter-confessional relations. Thus, for example in rural areas people who have adopted another religion are considered apostates. They are excluded from "intimaks"(traditional system of mutual assistance) and are subject to public accusations, even beatings and assassinations. The deceased are not allowed to be buried near the graves of ancestors.

The further development of the religious situation in Kyrgyzstan depends on how the official Islam and Orthodoxy can adapt to the new conditions, restore their influence among the local population, and, with the government, jointly oppose the Islamic radicals and totalitarian sects.

In the context of the increased confessional mosaics, which is characteristic of the whole world, it is unrealistic to count on full restoration of former dominating position of the official Islam and Orthodoxy in Kyrgyzstan.

#### **4. Political and religious situation in Kyrgyzstan before and after the April-2010 revolution and the tragic events In the south of the country in June 2010**

In the 18<sup>th</sup>–19<sup>th</sup> centuries the Fergana Valley was the center of the Kokand Khanate, which basically consisted of more than ten Turkic

and Iranian-speaking ethnic groups close to each other in language, religion and culture. In the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the division of the region by nationalities was imposed, which caused destruction of the old habitual types of self-consciousness. It radically changed the ethnographic map of the Fergana Valley and caused, on one hand, mass assimilation and homogenization, and on the other, the formation of rigorous cultural borders between the officially recognized “title” nationalities. The Fergana Valley was divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In each country the mixed population of different ethnic groups continued to live. For example, two Uzbek enclaves – Soh and Shahimardan, and two Tajik enclaves Chorku and Voruh remained in the territory of Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz enclave Barak village remained in Uzbekistan. In the epoch of socialism, with its ideology of a “new historical community of Soviet people” and “friendship of peoples”, this division of the Valley did not present a real danger. But the collapse of the Soviet system has caused not only an ideological vacuum, but also aggravated interethnic and inter-confessional relations. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the border between these three states still remains unclear and undefined. Around the perimeter there remain a number of questionable lands which have become a reason for inter-ethnic conflicts.

Another source of conflicts is the “demographic outburst” – increased over-population in this agrarian region. (The population density in the Fergana Valley has reached 300 persons/square km on the territory of Kyrgyzstan and 425 persons/square km on the Uzbek part). Historically, the northern region of Kyrgyzstan had more intensive socio-economic and cultural development; while the southern region has lagged behind considerably because of the limited land and water resources, underdeveloped economic infrastructure, hard economic and social problems, social injustice, mass unemployment,

and poverty of the population. The northern location of the capital of the country has also enhanced the advanced development of the north compared to the southern regions. Together with the increased religious extremism in the south, the region has become a real "gunpowder-barrel" ready to explode at any moment.

The revolutionary events of 7 April 2010 in Kyrgyzstan were caused by a mass social and political outburst, which probably provoked similar outbursts of indignation in the countries of Arab world in 2011. Kyrgyzstan is the first country in which the unworthy president has been forced to appear before the people or leave the country shamefully. The short period of Bakiyev's presidency was characterized by the unbridled and impetuous privatization of the state properties, the dirt cheap sale of national wealth of a strategic nature, the unjustified increase in prices and tariffs for electric power and household utility expenditures, the creation of unconstitutional state unites for the President's son to laundry his money, and the criminalization of the whole structure of power, etc. To promote this plundering the country by state national security bodies and executive officers, criminals, and Islamic and terrorist organizations, the authorities, persecuted, harassed and intimidated disliked politicians, and closed oppositional mass media. As a result, the situation in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the south, was characterized by absence of firm and consolidated vertical power, the demoralization of legal bodies, and active organized criminal groups, extremists, nationalistic and separatist forces, and persons seeking political leadership.

According to information from the National Commission investigating the tragic events in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, in order to achieve these goals, immediately after the April 2010 events, the President's son Maxim Bakiyev initiated a meeting in Dubai



(United Arab Emirates) with emissaries of the extremist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In early May 2010, emissaries and regional commanders of the “Taliban” movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Tajik United Opposition, including the personal participation of Mullo Abdullo, and two representatives of the Bakiyev family, met in Bakhorak city, Afghanistan, where they reached an agreement for providing assistance in destabilizing the situation in Kyrgyzstan. These destructive forces had the following objectives: 1) to undermine the political, economic and social foundations of the State; 2) to ignite inter-ethnic, inter-confessional and intra-confessional conflicts; 3) to frighten the public.

They failed to ignite conflict in the north, but the south suited them very well. Firstly, the south of Kyrgyzstan has always been a potential source of conflicts; second, it is overpopulated under the conditions of limited land and water resources; third, it has an underdeveloped economic infrastructure; fourth, it has mass unemployment and poverty; fifth, it has increased religious extremism. These problems have always been a potential source of conflicts, a “gunpowder barrel” ready to explode at any time.

The South of Kyrgyzstan has specific features pre-conditioned by the historical development. Previously it was a part of the Kokand Khanate like the whole of Kyrgyzstan. The demographic “outburst” of over-population has been a permanent factor of inter-ethnic conflicts in everyday life, but in summer 2010 these conflicts resulted in tragic events in the south of Kyrgyzstan. The inter-ethnic conflicts in 2010 were provoked by mosque imams and Hizb ut-Tahrir leaders, who called for the abolishment of people who are not devoted to Islam and traditional Muslim rites.

The tragic conflict was made possible by the absence of strong powering the country, the absence of uniting supra-national idea

(system of values), and the low level of inter-ethnic cultural communication and inability or unwillingness to develop dialogue. These factors:

Led to increased trends of discussing inter-ethnic relations (Uzbek-Kyrgyz) in a negative light, increased the potential aggression in society, and passed the negative attitude from the level of everyday consciousness to the political level;

Destroyed the educational system for teaching the culture of inter-ethnic communication and tolerance, due to the absence of relevant ideas and program objectives. (Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union there was a system of international and patriotic education);

Strengthened economic, social, cultural, ethnic and language barriers, due to the isolation of the population living compactly in mono-ethnic regions of the southern capital of Kyrgyzstan. For example, when attending sport clubs youths are divided into sections (Kyrgyz go to one spot hall, Uzbeks go to another hall) and schools and mosques are isolated according to ethnicity; all of which has a negative influence on mutual understanding, dialogue, and integration, and causes the instability to adapt in multi-ethnic communities;

When a state does not develop systematic, well-planned and balanced policies in the fields of culture, religion, education, and inter-ethnic, inter-confessional, intra-confessional and intercultural dialogue, the region becomes a place where the seeds of intolerance, misunderstanding and hatred obviously grow. What is the most terrible – the integrity of the state is threatened not from outside but from inside. Today, the most important task for the Kyrgyzstan people is to overcome the consequences of the inter-ethnic conflict in Osh, which was a great shock for the whole country and for the region. The

polarization of society must be remembered for a long time. The reconsolidation and dialogue of two ethnic groups is not a simple task; it will take many years to heal the wounds.

In order to develop constructive dialogue it is necessary: 1) to analyze carefully the reasons and prerequisites for the conflicts; 2) to develop preventive policies and implement regular and systematic explanatory and educating activities; 3) to resolve continuously problems that increase the potential for conflict; 4) to explain continuously the inadmissibility of any disintegrative steps; 5) to promote and facilitate dialogue regarding “national values and the world experience” that can enhance our multi-ethnicity and multi-confessionalism and which are key factors for ensuring the civilized future of Kyrgyzstan.

The concept of “National idea”, which is understood by Kyrgyz nationalists in its narrow sense, leads to the disintegration of society. The ideology of nationalism leads to fascism. Fascism did not die with the fall of the Third Reich; it has just transformed and continues to exist in spite of the totally false understanding of superiority of one ethnos over another ethnos or Aryan race over other races.

Ishenbay Abdurazakov, a prominent public figure in Kyrgyzstan in noted in one of his interviews: “We must build national policies taking into consideration the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional character of our society. Will we be able to ensure that all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic and religious belonging, consider themselves people of Kyrgyzstan, i.e. a nation in the Western understanding?” The future of Kyrgyzstan is in indivisibility of the destiny of all ethnicities and representatives of all confessions living in the country. Today as never before, the development of harmonious relations between the different ethnicities and confessions is vitally important for

sustainable development and security of the country and the formation of a political nation.

*“World Religions in the Context of the Contemporary Culture: New Perspectives of Dialogue and Mutual Understanding”,  
St. Petersburg, 2011, pp. 130–137.*

**Alexandr Shustov,**

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### **WILL THE U.S.A. GET A MILITARY BASE IN UZBEKISTAN?**

The geopolitical re-configuration in Central Asia following “the Arabic spring” gradually acquires more distinct contours. One of its results may become the transition of Uzbekistan, which recently declared the suspension of its membership in ODKB, to the camp of military-political allies of the U.S.A. And it was made against the background of the continued attempts of Washington to bring to naught the influence of Moscow in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where Russian military bases are located.

For the period from 15 to 17 of August Robert Blake, the Assistant to the State Secretary for Central Asian countries, went on his three days tour. Initially, he planned to visit Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. He supposed to arrange in Astana the presentation of “New Silk Road”, within the framework of the regional integration project, which is being actively promoted by the U.S.A. and aimed at isolation of Russia from the most significant trans-continental communications in Eurasia. However, at the last moment Robert Blake suddenly changed the itinerary of the visit for the benefit of Tashkent. On 15 of August the Assistant to the State Secretary was received by the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov. On 16 of August the third round of Uzbek-American political consultations and the Uzbek-

American business-forum was held in the ministry of foreign affairs. According to the official information, the negotiations were devoted to “a wide circle of questions of bilateral reciprocal action, including cooperation in political, trade-economic and social spheres and also in the field of security”. Leaving aside the marked intensification of trade-economic cooperation, there was no information about any particular agreements. However, as a matter of fact, these agreements, seemingly, were concluded.

The principal intrigue of Robert Blake’s visit to Tashkent became the supposition expressed on the eve of it by the newspaper of Kazakhstan “Liter” on the probable location in Uzbekistan of the military base of the U.S.A. According to the viewpoint of the newspaper, this step corresponds to the foreign policy of Tashkent, which only for a short time after the events of 2005 in Andijan had to establish allied relations with Russia. The newspaper supposed that Uzbekistan would join the group of key allies of the U.S.A. and that this step would provide Uzbekistan with military and financial assistance, as well as “certain guarantees of external and internal Uzbek relations”. At the same time, Tashkent would be able “to slacken the reins” in its relations with neighboring countries quite often marked by disputes about resources”, while the U.S.A., having located its military objects in Uzbekistan, would get a chance to have influence on Russia and China.

To all appearance, the publication of the article in “Liter”, the organ of the ruling party in Kazakhstan “Nur Otan” was not accidental. On 23 of August, Russian newspaper “Kommersant” referring to the sources connected with the ministry of foreign affairs of Uzbekistan informed that Washington and Tashkent started negotiations on creation on the Uzbek territory of the Center for operations respond with the aim of “coordination of activities” in case of aggravation of the

situation after the defined withdrawal of the U.S.A. forces from Afghanistan. According to the source of “Kommersant”, the question is the largest military object of the U.S.A. in Central Asia. The sense of the U.S.A. plans became evident: to give to the region’s countries a part of the military equipment transported from Afghanistan. The biggest part of this equipment will be given to Uzbekistan and will be used for creation of the mentioned Center for operational respond. One part of this equipment will be given to Uzbekistan free of charge and the other part – for provisional keeping.

The U.S.A. has acquired experience in use of military bases in Uzbekistan. The military base named Karshi-Khanabad was located in distance of 10 km from the city of Karshi on the military airport in Khanabad for the period from 2001 to 2005. The status of the base was regulated by the agreement concluded in October 2001. The U.S.A. actually constructed a new airdrome and located there a squadron of airplanes S-130, about ten helicopters Black Hawk and 1500 servicemen. The base in Kharsh-Khanabad was used for the support of military actions of the U.S.A. in Afghanistan. The “honeymoon” in the relations of two countries terminated, when the U.S.A. under the public pressure demanded from the Uzbek authorities to let independent investigation of Andijan events of 2005. In July 2005, Uzbekistan demanded that the U.S.A. should terminate its use of the base in a half of the year, and in November the last American airplane left Kharsh-Khanabad. One part of the airplanes was located in Bagram and the other part – partially was located in the Kyrgyz airport Manas.

The creation of the Center of operational respond mentioned by “Kommersant” supposes a more significant American military presence. A part of American forces, withdrawing from Afghanistan, will move to the north, to the territory of the former USSR. If Americans get such new U.S. base, its place will be designed for

location not only of military air equipment but also of armored units and armored troop-carriers, vehicles and housing for servicemen, stores for foods and military equipment etc. The number of located here military forces will greatly exceed the number of forces located in the airbase in Kharshi-Khanabad. In this way Washington intends to make as its ally the most populated and second in terms of economic capacity country in Central Asia marked by the exceptionally advantageous geographic location. Uzbekistan has borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan and is located near the boundaries of China and Iran. All these countries will turn out to be in the zone within direct reach of the forces and means, which supposedly will be located in the new military base of the U.S.A.

Under these conditions, Moscow could not help taking steps for consolidation of its positions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the middle of August for two days president Almazbek Atambayev and the Russian delegation headed by the first deputy of the chairman of the government of the RF Igor Shuvalov held negotiations in Kyrgyzstan. The decision was taken for signing three agreements on cooperation in the military-technical, economic and energy spheres. It was supposed to sign in September the very important for Kyrgyzstan agreement with the Russian party on construction of hydro-electric station “Kamabarata-1” and of Verhnenaryn cascade of the HES. However, one question was not decided: will the air base of the U.S.A. in Manas continue to function after 2014 or will Almazbek Atambayev, finally, fulfill his pre-election promise and the base will be closed.

The position of Tajikistan is not clear in the new arrangement of forces, and Moscow has not succeeded to conclude the agreement on the period of location of the Russian base N 201. According to unofficial information, the Tajik leaders proposed Moscow to postpone the signing of the new agreement and expressed its readiness to prolong

the term of the existing agreement up to 2016. They say that after 2016 they will be ready to sign the agreement under the conditions, which suit Russia. The question is that for the period of 2013–2014 the presidential and the parliamentary elections will be held in the republic, and a probable change of the leadership is not excluded (there are people, who want to occupy the place of E. Rakhmon, and these people enjoy support, including the Trans-Atlantic support). Therefore it is difficult to say whether the procrastination for four years of decision on the question of the base N 201 will suit the Russian party.

If the Center for operation respond of the U.S.A. really appears in Uzbekistan, Russia will have to undertake principally new geo-strategic tasks. In stead of provisional, as was asserted beforehand, bases earmarked for war supplies of NATO services in Afghanistan, the full-scale American military base will be located for an indefinite long period on the territory, which recently was part and parcel of the united state with the RF. It is the equivalent of the situation, when Russia would have located its military base in Mexico, Nicaragua or Cuba.

*“Medina al’Islam”, Moscow, 2012, N 9, p.6.*

## **CONTENTS OF «RUSSIA AND THE MOSLEM WORLD» BULLETIN FOR 2012 № 1 (235)–12 (246)**

### **N 1**

*Vladislav Lektorski.* What is the Way to Arrange the Dialogue of Civilizations?; *R. Bekkin.* The Islamic Taxes as an Instrument of Solving Social-Economic Problems of the Muslim Population in Russia; *Khasan Dzutsev.* Wahhabism in the Republics of the North Caucasus: Realities and Consequences; *K. Landa.* Dagestan and



Geopolitical Problems in the South of Russia; *Rasim Musabekov*. Azerbaijan between Turkey and Russia; *Irina Zvyagelskaya*. Islamic Revival in Central Asia; *A. Klimenko*. Turkmenistan as a Potential Participant in SCO and its Influence on the Situation in Central Asia; *Elena Ionova*. Development of Russian-Uzbek Relations; *Vladimir Karyakin*. Information-Network Wars and their Role in the Events in the Middle East.

## **N 2**

*Alla Yazkova*. The Socio-Economic and Political Situation in the North Caucasus: Strategic Risks for the Development of Russia; *L. Aristova*. Modern Kazakhstan: Islam and International Cooperation; *M. Shumilov*. The Role of Kyrgyzstan in Realization of the USA Strategic Interests in Central Asia; *Rano Ubaidullayeva*. Society and Family in Uzbekistan Education, Youth and Islam: Growing Popularity of Private Religious Lessons in Dushanbe, Tajikistan; *L. Vasilyev*. The Peculiarities of Struggle against Terrorism in Central Asia under Contemporary Conditions.

## **N 3**

*L. Skvortsov*. Reconstruction of Global (Planetary) Democracy: Civilizational Consequences; *A. Glukhova*. Arabic Revolutions as a Factor of Influence on Internal Russian Policy; *M. Zinchenko*. Depoliticization of Islam as the Basis of Stabilization in the North Caucasus; *M. Kolesnichenko*. Azerbaijan in the System of International Relations; *A. Shustov*. Transformation of Ethno-Confessional Structure of Newly-Independent States of Central Asia; *Georgy Sitnyansky*. Integration in Central Asia: Russian and Turkish Drafts – Rivalry or Cooperation?

## N 4

*Vladimir Putin*. Russia: The Nationalities Question; *Leokadia Drobizheva*. Russian Identity and Tolerance of Interethnic Relations: Experience of Twenty Years of Reforms; *A. Khabutdinov*. Muslim Educational Tradition in Nizhni-Novgorod Region; *F. Kuliyeu*. On Religious Identity of the Peoples of the North Caucasus under Conditions of Globalization; *V. Nikerov*. From Fukushima to Libya: Politicization of Pipeline Rivalry on the Caspian Energy Scene; *A. Klimenko*. Destabilizing Factors in Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; *Khakim Abdullo Rakhnamo*. Islam in Higher Education Institutions of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; *Nurlan Abdulov*. Processes of Regionalization, Integration and Institutionalization in Central Asia “For Many Years We Lived in One State”.

## N 5

*Igor Ivanov*. What Kind of Diplomacy Russia Needs in the 21st Century; *Y. Amelina*. The Federal “Wahhabi Lobby” and the “Stockholm Syndrome” of Intellectuals; *Dugurkhan Kokorkhoyeva*. Institutionalized Development of Political Power in the Republic of Tatarstan; *Leila Almazova*. The Development of Religious Education in Modern Bashkortostan; *Rashid Emirov*. Prospects of Reforming the National-Territorial Structure of the North Caucasus; *A. Klimenko*. Central Asian Republics: Destabilizing Factors in Relations Among them and their Influence on the Situation in the Region; Dmitri Furman, *Sanobar Shermatova*. The Reasons of Downfall “Short Cycles” and of Renewal of Authoritarian Regimes in Kyrgyzstan; *Rakhmon Ulmasov*. Tajik Migration: History, Consequences and Lessons; *A. Chuliyeva*. The Activities of Western Non-Governmental Organizations in Central Asia.

## **N 6**

We are 20; *Andrei Semchenkov*. Prevention and Neutralization of Foreign Threats to Political Stability of Russia; *Natalya Muhametshina*. Moslem Community of Russia under Influence of Migration Processes (on the Example of Samara Region); *K. Gadzhiyev*. The Nature of Political Regimes of National Republics of the North Caucasus; *Dmitri Kotelenko*. Islamic Factor in the Context of Security of the North Caucasus; *Nikolai Silayev*. The Post-Soviet Path of Azerbaijan; *I. Iskakov*. The Specifics of Political Institutions and Processes in Central Asia; *A. Rakhnamo*. Transformation of Political Culture “Political Islam” in Tajikistan; *Igor Filkevich*. Contemporary Development’s Trends of Turkmenistan; *Evgeni Borodin*. Kyrgyzstan: in Search of its own Way of Development; *Victor Korgun*. The Afghan Conflict and Central Asia

## **N 7**

*Alexei Bogaturov*. The Disintegration of the U.S.S.R. Has Changed International Relations, but Did Not Make Them More Harmonious; *Yuldash Yusupov*. Traditional Islamic Trends in the Public Life of Modern Bashkortostan; *Asiet Ashkhamakhova, Irina Yakovenko*. The Present State of Religious Consciousness of Russian Citizens (on Example of Adygea); *E. Baboshina*. The Confessional Factor in International Relations (the Republic of Dagestan as an Example); *I. Khubiyev*. Ethnopolitical Processes in Post-Soviet Karachay-Cherkessia: Lessons and Conclusions; *A. Areshev*. The Contemporary Caucasus: Unstable Periphery of “Great Near East” as a Naturally Determined Result of the Post-Soviet Development; *Sergey Zolotukhin*. The Russians in Kazakhstan; *N. Almamedova*. The Specifics of Political

Culture of Women in Central Asia (the xample of Turkmenistan);  
*A. Manoilo*. Revolutions in the Near East and the North Africa:  
Political Pragmatism and Controlled Chaos Technology.

## **N 8**

*Nikolai Shmelyov*. Russia in the East – West Dichotomy 0 Years Later;  
*Igor Kotin*. Islam in Russia and Perspectives of Christian-Muslim Inter-  
Faith Dialogue; *A. Yunusova*. National Policy and Ethnic-Confessional  
Processes in Bashkortostan in the Context of “Strategy of National  
Security of the Russian Federation till 2020”; *Laura Erekesheva*.  
Aspects of Contemporary Development of Islam and Christianity in the  
Republic of Kazakhstan; *S. Sushchi*. The Contemporary North  
Caucasus – Systemic Crisis or Development from Force of Inertia;  
*Aleksey Malashenko*. Tajikistan: Civil War’s Long Echo/

## **N 9**

*Valeri Stepanov*. The Demographic and Social Picture of Russia: the  
Results of the Decade; *Azamat Buranchin*. Contemporary Society of  
Bashkortostan under Conditions of National Identity Crisis; *Andrei  
Lukiyenko*. Cultural and Ideological Aspects of Growing Tension in the  
North Caucasus; *Aleksei Malashenko*. The White Steamship of  
Kyrgyzstan Amid the Ice of Post-Soviet Authoritarianism; *Elena  
Kuzmina*. Turkmenistan at the Present Stage: Problems and  
opportunities of Development; *Munzifon Babajanova*. Polycultural  
Education in Tajikiustan: First Steps.

## **N 10**

*Marietta T. Stepanyants*. Islamic Factor in Post-Soviet Russia’s  
Processes of Identification; *L. Izilyaeva*. Analysis of Regional Security  
as Seen in Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Republic of Bashkortostan;

*A. Nabiullina.* Formation of National Self-Consciousness of Individual in Poly-Ethnic Region of Tatarstan; *V. Merkuryev.* Terrorism and Criminal Gangs in the North Caucasus; *Anatoli Kulyabin.* Restoration of Monarchies in the Post-Soviet Space?; *A. Saliyev.* The contemporary Role of Islam in Social and Political Space of the Kyrgyz Republic; *Lyudmila Maksakova.* Appraisal of Labor Potential of Uzbekistan in Terms of Migration Perspectives; Influence of Religious Factor on the Socio-Political Situation in the South of Russia.

## **N 11**

*Mikhail Khazin.* The World on the Threshold of New Epoch; *Rashid Emirov.* The Islamic Tangle in the Context of the National Security of Russia; *Gebek Gebekov.* The Islamic Factor in Post-Soviet Culture of Dagestan (1992–2006); *Yu. Azikova.* Strategic Approaches to De-Politicization of “Circussian Question”; *Georgy Tsagolov.* The Sources of “The Kazakh Miracle”; *L. Manyakin.* The Complex Interests of Russia in Central Asia for the Beginning of the XXI Century.

## **N 12**

*L. Skvortsov.* Dangerous Symptoms of the Field of Modern Geopolitics; *Viktor Avksentiev, Boris Aksumov.* Conflict-Raising Scenarios in the South of Russia in the Context of Social-Cultural Development of the Region; *Alexei Malashenko.* The New President and the “Old” North-Caucasus; *Adash Toktosunova.* Problems and Perspectives of Interfaith and Interethnic Dialogue in Kyrgyzstan; *Alexandr Shustov.* Will the U.S.A. get a Military Base in Uzbekistan?

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