

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENTIFIC
INFORMATION
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

**RUSSIA
AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2011 – 12 (234)**

**Science-information bulletin
The Bulletin was founded in 1992**

**Moscow
2011**

Director of publications L.V. SKVORTSOV,
Deputy Director of the Institute for Scientific
Information in Social Sciences
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)
Founder of the project and scientific consultant –
ALBERT BELSKY
Editor-in-Chief –
ELENA DMITRIEVA

Editorial board:

OLGA BIBIKOVA
(First Deputy Editor-in-Chief),
ALEXEI MALASHENKO,
DINA MALYSHEVA,
AZIZ NIYAZI
(Deputy Editor-in-Chief),
VALIAHMED SADUR,
DMITRY FURMAN

CONTENTS

<i>Andrey Zubov.</i> What kind of modernization does Russia need?.....	4
<i>Iohan Galtung.</i> The ten trends changing the world.....	15
<i>R. Bekkin.</i> The institution of waqf in modern Russia.....	29
<i>Sabina Garashova.</i> The geopolitical aspects of the USA strategy in the Caspian region	38
<i>Diana Borovik.</i> The Caspian oil monarchy	48
<i>Elena Ionova.</i> The situation in Kyrgyzstan	52
<i>Khalimakhon Khushkadamova.</i> National rites in contemporary Tajikistan	60
<i>Arkadi Dubnov.</i> The authorities of Turkmenistan consolidated the control over the situation in the republic.....	64
<i>L. Vasilyev.</i> The specifics of contemporary terrorism in the Central Asia.....	66
Contents of “Russia and the Moslem World” bulletin for 2011 № 1 (223)–12 (234).....	79

Andrey Zubov,

doctor of historical sciences

**WHAT KIND OF MODERNIZATION
DOES RUSSIA NEED?**

How should we correlate ourselves with the world, how should we shape our foreign and defense policy, in what direction should we carry on, if at all, the modernization of the way of life of modern Russia? As a historian I'll try to answer these questions from a historical point of view.

I shall begin by saying that in terms of civilization and culture Russia is not some peculiar Eurasian or Russian civilization, as certain people here are wont to say, but a periphery, an outlying province of the western world. This thesis can easily be proved. The pattern of our state and cultural life originates from the pre-state and non-literal condition at the end of the 10th century A.D. It was formed by the Eastern Roman Empire. Suffice it to look at the circle of reading, the style of architectural structures and fine art, and legal institutions.

Christianity and the way of life, which came to our country from Constantinople, were adopted by a barbarous people which had for a long time been in a state of complete cultural degradation. Academician Boris Rybakov, despite his sincere desire and painstaking efforts, could find very few monuments of the pre-Christian period in the vast expanses of the East European plain. Rus was neither Greece, nor

Egypt, nor the Roman Empire with their rich and millennia-old pre-Christian cultural past. Russia is a very young culture largely induced by ancient Mediterranean civilization in its Christian form. This is precisely why Russia, measured by time and space, is a distant periphery of western civilization.

The Beginning of History – Detachment from the Cultural Center

Civilization differences between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean regions in the epoch of Christianization of Rus were not too great, and people living there at the time took them just as our contemporaries regard present cultural differences between, say, Germany and Italy. Another periphery zone of western civilization is the North-West of Europe – Scandinavia. To assess the development way of Russia it would be necessary to have a reference group in history. And the North-West of Europe, which is very similar to Russia in its historical development, can be such group.

In the very distant past, the fourth millennium B.C., two cultural centers of the prehistoric continent emerged in the area now occupied by Russia and North-West Europe. Between the Vistula and Ural rivers the Indo-European cultural center came into being, in the view of most scholars, and at the end of the third millennium the Indo-European people began to move in all directions, except the northern one, and gradually reached Xinjiang in the east, Punjab in the south-east, the Atlantic Ocean in the west, and the Mediterranean in the south-west. We should keep in mind that Greece, the Roman Empire and Armenia were Indo-European communities. The future Slav and Baltic peoples remained where they lived from time immemorial – in the East European plain. The North-West of Europe (southern Scandinavia,

British Isles, Brittany) was the megalithic civilization which spread up to Egypt and Syria in the 3rd – 2nd millennia B.C.

Beginning from the 2nd millennium B.C. both ancient centers were running wild, but the center of culture emerged in the Mediterranean region – in Egypt, then Crete, Greece, and Etruscan Italy. It is important to remember this in order not to feel the inferiority complex. In other words, we are the children of good parents without whom the present cultural world would have been unthinkable, but due to various reasons, we ran wild and remained in the state of cultural degradation outside the boundaries of civilization for about two millennia. During this time the Mediterranean world had traversed a great path of cultural development, whereas the Germans of Scandinavia, while the Slav and Baltic people of the East European plain had deteriorated even compared to their ancient state at the time of the Indo-Arian community. But the second acculturation within the same civilization is always easier than the implantation of alien civilization. The latter process is, as a rule, ineffective.

Both Russia and North-West Europe were *again* included quite simultaneously in the uniform cultural field of the West only at the end of the 1st millennium A.D. along with Christianization. The introduction of Christianity to Scandinavia and Rus took place at the end of the 10th century: Prince Vladimir baptized Rus in 988 and his close relative Konung Olaf Tryggvason, after visiting Vladimir as guest, baptized Norway in 993–995.

Scandinavia accepted the western form of Orthodox Christianity, uniform at the time, through Rome, and Rus – the eastern form through Constantinople. But the form of Christianity, contrary to the idea of Pyotr Chaadayev, did not mean anything in actual fact for the civilization development of these two regions. And the church remained actually uniform, as practically all historians admit, not until

1054, but until 1204, that is, the destruction of Constantinople by the crusaders. Orthodox Christian Byzantium actively interacted with Europe, and was even in the lead both technologically and intellectually right up to the 13th century. Just remember scholastic debates around Areopagitica in the 9th – 10th century, and Isihast arguments in the 11th – 14th century, which gave rise to Gothic in the west and Palama theology in the east of Europe, -- they were common to the entire Christian world. The Byzantium or Roman versions of Orthodox Christianity were of little importance for the cultural matrix. They meant something to certain individual aspects, but not to the level of modernization. Constantinople and Thessaloniki in the 14th century were no less “modern” than Rome or Paris and understood each other quite well at all levels – from theology to military art, because all of them were the centers of uniform Mediterranean civilization.

The main thing for a periphery is not a difference in cultural details, but the intensity of intercommunication with the cultural center. This is a very important aspect. *It is not the type of culture that is crucial, but the intensity of intercommunication.* The intensive intercommunication of Scandinavia with the western cultural center, that is, the Mediterranean, and even broader – with the entire area of the Ancient Roman Empire never stopped after its inclusion in a civilized area. The Christianization of Scandinavia was taking place along with the entire Catholic world. Later Scandinavia switched over to the Lutheran Church, just as the entire Northern Europe. University education, Gothic art and theology and municipal self-government began to take root in Scandinavia some 40 to 80 years later than in western cultural centers in the south. After the Reformation in the 16th century this lag disappeared altogether. Peasants retained personal freedom and their own land to a greater degree in Norway and Sweden. In Norway, for example, landlordism was negligible, and in Sweden,

where this type of ownership of cultivated land had increased from 22 to 60 percent from the mid-16th to the mid-17th century, the “reduction” of ownership under the 1655 law gave back to peasants and townfolk part of their plots of land taken away from them, and by 1700 landowners possessed no more than one-third of all land. Civic freedoms of the Swedish “fourth estate” had never been alienated., and its liabilities to the state and landowners were strictly determined by the royal legislation and could not be increased.

The situation in Russia was quite different. The Mongolian and Tartar invasion of 1237–1240 was not an irreparable blow and did not cut Russia from the outer world as did the Turkish invasion to Byzantium in 1453. The point is that, first, Rus remained a vassal, but not a completely conquered state. Secondly, North-West Rus (Pskov, Novgorod), which was the most westernized, and the Polotsk and Turovo-Pinsk princedoms, also oriented to the West, were not occupied. They had to pay tribute to the invaders, and that was all. The 14th century was the time of Russia’s active connections with western cultural centers, and the western part of Russia was regained from Tatars by the Russian-Lithuanian forces in the latter half of the century (Olgerd’s victory over the Horde troops at Siniye Vody in 1363). Thus Russia’s connections with the western cultural center through Poland and Hungary were fully restored. Right Reverend Sergius of Radonezh carried on intellectual dialogues with the Bulgarian Metropolitan Cyprian and the Greek Patriarch Philotheus Kokkinos on equal terms and they, in turn, had talks with Italian theologians. Works by Grigory Palama were almost immediately translated into the Slavonic language, and Russian learned scholars could boast of profound knowledge of Greek. The uniform cultural field was preserved at the time, but, as before, within the “center – periphery” system. The Greek icon-painter Theophanes taught the Russian genius Andrey Rublev his art, and as a

result Russian masterpieces came into being only 50 to 80 years later, as against those originated from the main cultural centers of Europe.

In actual fact, the dramatic separation of Moscovy Rus took place in 1448, when the Russian Church refused to accept Metropolitans from Constantinople (self-proclaimed autocephaly), and especially in 1459 when the Moscow bishops, on orders from Metropolitan Jonas, swore to preserve the independence of the “Sacred Moscow Church” as the supreme treasure. From then on all contacts of Rus with the rest of the world were stopped for 120–150 years. The Greeks would regard the Moscow Church as schismatic and self-proclaimed. As to the Catholic world, it did not recognize it at all. The conquest of Novgorod by Ivan III and the destruction of Novgorod and Pskov by his grandson Ivan the Terrible completely closed the gates to Europe and virtually eradicated Europeanized North-Russian culture.

The dramatic 150 years (from the mid-15th to the late 16th century) were the period of maximal stagnation for Rus, whereas the West made a great cultural leap forward during that time. It was a period of Renaissance and scientific revolution, of William Ockham and Meister Eckhart, Erasmus and Luther, Michaelangelo and Leonardo, Copernicus and Kepler, Galileo and Francis Bacon. The West made a great progress in mathematics, mechanics, medicine and philosophy, while Russia remained outside it, and cut from the European cultural centers by its secular and ecclesiastical rulers. The natural result of intellectual progress in Paris, Rome or Oxford was viewed in Moscow as a miracle, a gimmick, something like nanotechnological wonders at present.

As a result, when the problem of the freedom of will was discussed in Europe in the 16th century (discussions between Luther and Erasmus), Russian clerics were thinking of how they should carry the Gospel around the altar stand – sunward or against the sun.

By that time Scandinavia had become an integral part of the western world. Rene Descartes felt completely at home in France, in Holland and in Sweden in the 17th century, despite a host of differences in those countries. However, German and other foreign visitors to Moscow felt quite differently. The unfortunate graduate of Padua University, Orthodox Christian Mikhail Trivolis (known in Russia as Maxim the Greek) was forced to live in underground cells of monasteries near Moscow during many years for his attempts to raise the intellectual level of Moscow.

This was why modernization in the 17th century took place either through Ukraine, the only part of Rus open to the West, inasmuch as it was included in Poland, or directly through Lefortovo neighborhood in Moscow, which was inhabited mainly by Germans. But this modernization bore a simulation character, because Russian modernization was not a result of the conscious development of people as in old Europe, but a result of the simple borrowing of certain technical, military and political innovations. Tsar Peter the Great ordered his boyars to shave off their beards and put on European clothes. Naturally, they looked like dolls, but did not (and could not) become Europeans. Russia needed people from Germany, and so many Germans were invited to the country or were included in it along with the Baltic provinces. Our modernizers could not do with mummer Russian boyars. Simulation modernization is definitely a negative phenomenon. It creates an illusion of culture, but not culture itself.

We shall not dwell on the alternative to Tsar Peter's modernization, which emerged at the end of the 17th century. It was a plan of reforms mapped out by Princess Sophia and Prince Vasily Golitsyn; they were slow-going reforms aimed at essential modernization. But Sophia was thrown into prison and Vasily Golitsyn was exiled by Peter the Great. The essence of Peter's reforms was not

to open a window to Europe. It was just a crack in the thick wall through which the noble elite could go to the West and back within the system of simulation modernization. And ninety-five percent of Russian people were completely isolated from modernization processes. The road to education, especially to European education and civic freedoms, was closed for the overwhelming majority of Russians. Actually, they continued to live in the 16th century and were prohibited to change for the better. Peter's decrees of 1711 and 1719 virtually turned the greater part of the Russian population into slaves, without any hope for any acculturation. This is a remarkable and significant fact: the modernization of the elite took place largely by the naturalization and plundering of the basic mass of the people. As some of our scholars say, two subcultures emerged: a westernized and modernized elite whose representatives even forgot how to speak Russian (not more than 2–3 percent of Russian people) and mass subculture of people growing wild in comparison with the European common people.

West European absolutism in the 18th century proclaimed “To rule without the people, but for the people.” By the end of the 1700th almost all population of Prussia, France, Austria, England and Sweden was literate. Local self-government bodies functioned everywhere, serfdom was abolished or existed in symbolic forms (week's labor-rent for the lord). Peasants in Russia were not considered citizens from the time of the reign of Elizaveta Petrovna, Tsar Peter's daughter, they had no property, no right to marry or to apply to court with complaints against their masters, and they were not taught to read and write. In fact, they were virtual slaves of their noble masters. Of course, there could be no word or thought about their modernization. Russian absolutism was the rule without the people and not for the people, but for the thin layer of the elite *at the expense of the people*.

It was only after the liberation of the serfs, the great reforms of the 1860s, and the opening of entire Russia for the West, but not only of a thin layer of the elite, that new modernization began in the country. Everybody knew how swift and powerful it was. During the 50 to 60 years of this modernization, especially in the last two decades of tsarist Russia's existence, an unprecedented economic and cultural leap forward took place. A new modernized layer of society emerged, which included both Slavophiles and Westernizers, Pirogov and Mendeleev, Tchaikovsky and Leo Tolstoi, Klyuchevsky and Sikorsky. But due to the fact that this modernization had bad, rotten roots, it ended not in the emergence of modern Europeanized Russia, which Pyotr Stolypin was dreaming of, but in a Bolshevik nightmare. The modernized section of the Russian people reached 10–15 percent of the country's population by the time of World War I. But the savage majority of the furious people instigated by the Bolsheviks and imatiated by the terrible war swept over and washed away new Russia in the five-year-long Civil war, which was actually a war of two subcultures.

Impasses of Simulation Modernization – Is There a Chance?

After a short period of openness brought about by the New Economic policy (NEP) Russia became completely closed again from 1929. Within the next ten years of the “red terror” the thin layer of the modernized Russian society was utterly destroyed. Its representatives were either killed or driven out of Russia. From one to one-and-a-half million of Russian citizens who left Russia before World War II were the most modernized, cultured and knowledgeable part of Russian society.

And so we were again doomed to ever greater lagging behind advanced countries. Stalin's modernization was largely simulation and

took place mainly in the technical and military spheres. The view that Soviet Russia was a new great civilization and power was largely erroneous, in my view. It was erroneous because there were still old, pre-revolutionary specialists and their pupils (they lived and worked up to the end of World War II and the emergence of the reactionary trends propagated by Zhdanov and Lysenko), and research work continued with certain success. But in the fields where there were no in-process stocks of pre-revolutionary time, for instance, genetics and cybernetics, we lagged behind from the very beginning. As a result, the Soviet Union had to resort to scientific and industrial thefts in the crudest way during the 1950s – 1970s. Could we create our nuclear and missile might without Peenemunde or Bruno Pontecorvo? Having failed to carry out essential modernization, we returned to simulation modernization. Sweden and Norway of the 1980s and the U.S.S.R. of the epoch of late stagnation – such was the result of the one-thousand-year-old modernization race of two periphery European regions. The victor of the race is quite evident.

Finally, the opening of Russia to the outside world in 1990 and the lifting of totalitarian pressure have caused chaos and, as a result, a certain degradation of society even compared with Soviet times. This is quite understandable. But this period is passing. We all see now that society is being stabilized and changing its attitude to social values. It is open to the West. The Internet, travel to foreign countries and life there are having their effect. Young people, those who will rule the roost in the country tomorrow are changing especially rapidly, Russia is beginning to regard itself part of great civilization. In this situation all talk about the creation of an autarchic political model and orientation to the East, but not to the West, say, to Far Eastern countries or the Moslem world as the main source of cultural contacts, is irresponsible, irrational, and even dangerous. Today any attempt to fence off Russia,

build a new wall between it and the West as in the epoch of Emperor Paul I or Czar Ivan III will mean a new, fourth, stagnation, which the country will not survive. The present, exceptionally rapid development of world science and technology makes self-isolation especially pernicious, and the purchase of modern knowledge for oil, that is, a new spiral of simulation modernization, will help our society no more than an injection of morphine to a person dying from cancer.

Essential modernization is a difficult and long process requiring profound political experience. It does not mean that we shall soon become a great power again, all the more so, superpower. But this modernization will give us a chance to return to the company of civilized societies, close to us in spirit, and jointly with other nations similar to us culturally, to deal with common challenges and tackle common problems.

I think that after what we have gone through we have a chance to become a western country with a developed and responsible civil society. Or, on the contrary, fencing off from the West try, for the umpteenth time, to go along the road of simulation modernization and create a powerful state with people growing wild and suppressed by the immoral elite, a colossus on the legs of clay doomed to crumbling, sooner or later. In my view, there is only one way out of this alternative – to open ourselves to the West and reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are unable to be in the lead now (for too many people who were among the best representatives of our society, lost their life during the 20th century) and, playing the role we deserve, to enter the community of western powers. There is no other way for Russia worthy of our long-suffering people.

“Trudy po rossieyavedeniyu”, M., 2010, p. 171–184.

Iohan Galtung,

political analyst

THE TEN TRENDS CHANGING THE WORLD

We live in the epoch of great change, and after termination of the transitional period started after collapse of the Soviet Union the world will become quite different. The ominous auguries last out and one of them became the double terrorist attack in Norway in July (about it – later). It is impossible to predict its appearance, but the growing trends before our eyes make at least mark the contours of probable changes. It is possible to see ten main trends. Five of them are spread in the global space among the states and the regions, and the other five – in the social space among the groups of people. They are as follows: 1) the global trends: the twilight and fall of the USA empire, the twilight of the West, weakening of the states and strengthening of the regions, the rise of “the rest” and the growth of China; 2) the social trends: the consolidation of the nations, the consolidation of the civil society, the growth of activities of the youth, the rise of the role of women, the aggravation of the inequality and mutinies.

As a result, we become witnesses of the large-scale changes comparable with the passage of the Greek-Roman antique period to the Middle Ages and further to early Renaissance and the contemporary epoch (1789) in the West. These changes occurred under conditions of globalization of Christianity, while the contemporary reforms are carried out under conditions of globalization of capitalism and global warming.

Five global trends may be perceived as the confirmation of the theory of communicating vessels: when one vessel becomes empty, the other – fills. The West “becomes shallow” – “the rest” rise, the USA weakens – China strengthens. All these trends are connected with each other, but at the same time they are displayed not less clearly and

evidently also as five independent phenomena, when one of them develops according to its own social logic.

The fall of the American empire had its own causes and consequences comparable with the known history of the fall of other empires. The twilight of the West in total is connected with this phenomenon but has its own motivation when the USA for other, primarily the social-economic, reasons comes forward in the part of the West, which can not afford sustainable development, paradoxically as a underdeveloped country, where American dream transforms into American nightmare.

The twilight and final fall of the empire – are different processes connected with inevitable logic of development of empires as organisms from their birth, growth and achievement of ripeness to aging and death. Using the thoughtful organization and high payment of the local elites the center is able to achieve the situation of distant regions' great economic dependence, to create the atmosphere of their fear of a probable use of force, to create their intention to identify themselves with the center and to ensure their submission. But it is possible only up to certain time: the empire falls as a victim to its own success overestimating its capacity and/or underestimating the capacity of the power, which is its counterbalance. The period of expansion terminates and is followed by a long period of status-quo when the extreme injustice conserves in all four aspects of force.

The empire is the arch-type of an unjust force, since it strives for dependence and pretended obedience disseminating fear and installing collaboration elites. Sometimes the periphery merges with the center. If the question is the relations with neighboring geographic regions, this process often is named as “construction of nation”. Just this process was going on in Spain, France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia and China.

The experience presented by the British, French and other West-European and Soviet empires should convince the United States to start production of goods and not to live at the expense of unequal trade and putting on sale “the world currency”. It is necessary to concentrate on the internal defense, having liquidated numerous military bases and having terminated wars all over the world, to start dialogue with other cultures and negotiation on political compromises and forget about the urge towards dictation of its will to all.

In spite of the growing number of the lost wars and attractiveness of other cultures (Islamic countries, Japan, China) and of the growing insubordination, the economic exploitation may not weaken for some time, since it is built on the basis of the unequal international trade structures, where the resources and the labor cost extremely little. Certainly, there will exist a known share of distributive justice in the form of assistance for development called upon to cover the transfers in the opposite direction extracted by exploitation, flee of capital and corruption. And what is more, the economic means of financial incentives cover a much more significant sociological effect of western assistance in development. The scholarships are given to the perspective young people, who later are summoned to enter the rows of the post-colonial elite. Other transfers are also summoned to place this group into an advantageous position. Kwame Nkrumah (the founder of contemporary Ghana and a prominent representative of the African anti-colonial movement) exactly defined the similar policy as neocolonialism.

The unstable balance was accessible up to the time, when the West enjoyed monopoly for manufacturing industries. Japan became the first non-European country, which challenged this situation. It was followed by four small “dragoons” and further by four big countries of BRIC. The former balance was broken, and it was one of the factors

of twilight of the West. These first signs soon will be followed by “the rest”, which also will start production unless export but at least for ensuring wellbeing of their elites.

The supply rising all over the world might correspond to this fast growing demand, if there was no aggravation of inequality in the West, when 30–50–70%, representing the population of “the bottom” lacks purchasing power to buy goods with high share of added value. One should supplement this existence – due to inequality – with such anomaly as the cash flow to the upper classes, which gives them no other choice except speculation. They possess many new financial instruments like derivatives for the fast purchase-sale, a kind of game of chance. As a result of it: the boom of financial economy + the frozen real sector = the collapse. The more so, as it was promoted by economists, who are unable or unwilling to predict or to foresee such outcome. If “the rest” and China, like India, are trapped, their consolidation will come to end as it happened with Japan.

The formula of the West recovery is as simple as unfeasible: not to fulfill with liquidity the banks unable to survive, to regulate rigidly the financial sector and further to stimulate people starting with the strata of the population in need. It is necessary to promote small companies, agricultural cooperatives, polyclinics with medicines-generics for treatment of common people, schools for education of all sex and age groups of people. But the ruling classes of the West are ready to protect rather bankers than common people. The Chinese formula “capitalism – communism”, raising people from “bottom”, alleviating their hardships and involving them in real economy, might perform a miracle in the West. However, the stumbling-block would become the evident class distinctions, which exist not only in the USA. Hence, the last social trend – the aggravation of inequality and mutinies.

If the main key to development and progress is the rise of purchasing power of the population surviving “at the bottom” of society, more and more countries, including India, will imitate China. This result will have an influence on the self-respect and the sense of self-dignity of citizens of the West and will cause a growth of psychic illnesses. The repetition of suicides epidemic, which marked the twilight of Habsburg Empire, is not excluded.

The main reason of inevitability of the trend to the twilight of the state and consolidation of regions is simple to a great surprise. Marx wrote about the means of production but not on the means of communication and transport. Thanks to SMS and rapid movement all processes in the world go on in the regime of real time, and the sizes of the most countries reduce considerably. Only the mightiest will survive – BRIC, the USA and some others; the other countries will be involved in the orbit of regions, which differ in geographic closeness and cultural relative ties. As a result we will get as follows:

- the secular-Christian European Union,
- the mixed African Union,
- the Hindu-Muslim Association of regional cooperation of countries of the South Asia (SAARC),
- the mixed Association of states of the South-East Asia (ASEAN),
- the secular-Catholic Latin America,
- the Muslim Organization Islamic Conference (OIC), extending in the
- space from Morocco to Philippines,
- the Buddhist-Confucian Eastern Asia,
- the secular-Orthodox Russian Federation, where Chechnya has the same autonomy as the Netherlands in the European Union.

The United Nations Organization (UN) will most likely be replaced by the Organization of United Regions (OUR).

The state is the territory, which is kept under control of the power concentrated in the same organization – “state”. The nation is a cultural group characterized by four signs: the common language, the religion-ideology, the time – common perceptions on history, the past, the present and the future – and the space, i.e. the common territory and geography. In the world there are two thousand nations and about 200 states, but only 20 of them are the national states with one prevailing nation. Only in four of 180 multinational states there is no prevailing nation (in Europe – Switzerland, where several nations coexist equally, as well as Belgium disrupted by problems of international relations, while in Asia – linguistically Federal India and Malaysia). As far as other countries are concerned, the truest prognosis is the struggle marked by force. The nations being in shadow will struggle for a place in the sun – either for full independence, for autonomy within the framework of the federation or for other types of sovereignty.

The process of the national consolidation is deeply rooted in history, and the definition of the nation as “the citizens of one state” founded in the past in France does not convince many people. The line of division where is readiness to kill and to be killed coincides rarely with the state borders – it goes on between the nations, religions, languages and territories. The type of war changes, but the formula “from inter-state conflicts to internal state disputes” is too superficial and does not endure critic. The nations sometimes occupy territories of various countries, while many countries represent a common home for many nations. This fact results in establishment of numerous different confederations. However, the regions may play the role of certain

adapted “umbrellas” as soon as the flow of people crossing state borders makes them come nearer.

The states are eroded by mighty forces from above, such as regionalism and globalizing capitalist transnational corporations and banks. And below one can see nationalism and non-state and non-capitalist civil society, which inspires people for solidarity and creates new self-independence and identity: enlarged families, clans, tribes, trade unions, cities and villages, religious groups and insurgents. The states shrink, but they will still exist for some time.

At present, except ordinary states there exist many territories, and our maps colored in four main colors and used for designation of various countries turn out to be not a good guide for contemporary world. Nevertheless, the USA is hypnotized by this guide and irrationally adheres to the reality, which disappears before our eyes.

Many new phenomena appear. Probably, the proletariat in Marxist understanding lost its vigor after emergence of the social democracy and the collapse of socialism of the Soviet and Eastern European types. But in society there exist other lines of brake except opposition between the buyers and sellers of labor force: age, gender, race and nationality in its wide cultural aspect, including language and religion. Speaking about age, one should remember four main categories: childhood, adolescence in need of education, adults’ period, when they need work, the time of pension. The revolt of the youth and students started in Latin America in 1963. In 1968 it started in Europe and further in the USA and Japan. Later this movement spread to the countries of the Near East and North Africa as well as to Spain as Movement M 15 (the movement of social protest against the measures taken for overcoming economic crisis). This movement will be supported everywhere in the countries, where unemployment exist,

where higher education is not ensured by employment, where autocracy and kleptocracy exist (certainly, including corruption).

Since the aging (consequently, less productive population) is regarded as a problem and not as a source of experience and even wisdom, we will see augmentation of mutinies not only of the youth but also of pensioners. Some people will demand to give them back the pension funds, lost as a result of speculations, the others will insist on their right for social useful working activities and will not subordinate to the dictatorship of middle aged people, who say to elders “go away!”

The countries to some extent resemble the people; they also go through the process analogous to the development of the mankind. The 1960s gave birth to a number of countries-children looking for their own identity. They are encircled by the countries-adolescents with negative self-definition, which protest and question status-quo. There exist also the adults-countries realizing a lot of projects, for instance – BRIC. And, finally, there are countries-pensioners, and their main task is – to keep status-quo and to survive. China is a former country-pensioner, which at present goes on the way from childhood to adolescence and adult state.

It is necessary to make the addition of the revolt of women – the revolutionary and epochal trend – the American revolution of the 1970s–1980s with the consequent reaction to it. The women possess a vast potential in the field of culture and education, easily excelling lazy men thanks to their diligence and endeavor. The mutiny spreads to all countries delivering the strike to the patriarchal family (only one fifth of all American households represent the married pairs with children), and today women claim for occupation of the half of all posts.

This process is accompanied by the last trend – aggravation of inequality and mutinies. Injustice leads to inequality, and inequality

raises mutinies. The other question is – whether these mutinies grow into revolutions turning society up down? The colossal inequality, like in the USA, when 1% of the population keeps under its control 40% of the wealth, radically reduces a relative mobility of generations and has its impact on the situation both in the country and among them. Some years ago the rise of the gross world product (WGP) made about 2.8% and inequality, while the correlation of purchasing power between the richest and the poorest 20% of the population reached 3.2%. The growth of WGP did not alleviate the position of the fifth part of the poorest population. And at present, “the bottom” of this “bottom” departs at a speed of 125 thousand people per day: 25 thousand people pass away due to hunger and 100 thousand people die because of illnesses, which are subject to successful medical treatment in case of preventive measures and possession of money. Billions of people are sure that we live in the malicious and unjust world.

Does the analogous abyss exist in military, cultural and political spheres? In terms of inequality of force do we not see the sole superpower proclaimed to be the mightiest power, which exceeds by its might all others?

If it is true, why then the USA fail in one war after another? First it happened in Vietnam, further in Iraq and Afghanistan, while at present – in Somalia, Yemen and Libya – probably, because it is unable to cope with the forces, which balance its superiority, such as insurgents’ actions, terrorism and non-forceful methods of struggle? It would be stupid to attack the world superpower, such the USA, or a regional imperialist power, such as Israel with its own mighty arms, particularly if you rely on tanks, like Saddam Hussein in 1991 in the course of operation “Storm in Desert”, or the rockets of near distance, which were used by HAMAS against Israel. It is easier to fix the

balance of forces than the balance of wealth. The South Asia showed the way to the last aim, but it is easier to attain the balance of forces.

As far as cultural inequality is concerned, the gap between the light for the peoples and the black holes in the Universe, which at best consume light but do not radiate it, the former stars gradually extinct. The four countries of “Great Eight” (the USA, Great Britain, Italy and Japan) propagating their cultural Gospel all over the world stay in the situation of decay and involution. And what is more, these countries – “black holes” – may be marked by internal life, obtaining energy from rich cultural resources, including their knowledge of the West – for the good and for the detriment of itself. In reality, they might radiate light for some thousand years, but the trouble is that it was transferred by the wave’s length indiscernible for the eyes of western common people. However, in the beginning of the former century the Japanese model of development was suddenly accessible to the West, although Japan itself did all to extinguish the super-new star as fast as it was formed. The Japanese model is being replaced by the Chinese model. China is a too big country to be defeated, and it is also able to capture minds of millions of people.

When we speak about political inequality, democracy comes forward and makes the people’s majority confront the elite’s minority, if the latter does not succeed to change the rules of game, for instance, the principle “one man/one vote” by the principle “one thousand dollars/one vote”. The USA, Great Britain and other NATO countries collect their last strength to keep power in United Nations Organization, resisting the urgent democratic intentions of UN, such as Unification for Peace or hindering recognition of Palestine. In other words, United Nations Organization has only one choice: democracy or death.

Under conditions of sabotage tactics against democracy the people or the country find the way out of it by means of new axis of

reciprocal action, such as cooperation South-South, cooperation in the humanitarian direction etc. They will reduce economic dependence, create their own alliances, such as Shanghai Organization of Cooperation, will inspire each other accepting the best ideas of the West and will take their own decisions. In other words, they will rely on their own forces and capacities and will refuse to cooperate with antidemocratic elements or countries, which in great number are themselves at the stage of “pension infirmity and survival”. They go the way of Gandhi striving for self-dependence, look for their own originality and without fear make experiments and are in raptures of “svaraj” or self-government.

What consequences should be expected in the nearest years? We do not prefer either global or social trends - they supplement and strengthen each other. For instance, the “Arabic spring” in the Near East and the North Africa represent an evident mutiny against crying political and economic inequality, inspired mainly by the youth and women, who in this way declared about their consolidation into the leading social forces. However, the mutiny is directed also against the imperial pair the USA/Israel, which imagines itself to be chosen by God, and they see their mission in creation of local elites all over the world and to rule their Empires by means of corrupted dictators. The “Arabic spring” weakens these elites and Empires, which for a long time were eroded by various processes, which forced them to use disproportional force causing, in its turn, mutinies in response.

The American and the Israeli Empires, probably, will fall down by 2020, but the USA and Israel will come through, if they pursue a wise policy and agree to a compromise. Within the borders of 1967 Israel might be admitted to the community of the nations in the Near East together with five Arabic neighbors, like Germany within the framework of the Rome agreement, starting from 1957. The USA,

having stopped wars and interventions, having closed military bases outside its territory and having repudiated policy of dictate, might become a full member of the North-American community jointly with Canada and Mexico. The present American presidents will draw on their country much greater dishonor and disgrace, if they use force and behave unwisely and to the very uttermost stick to the dying Empires. It concerns also the successors of the present leaders of Israel and the USA (A. Liberman and S. Pailin?). But the successors of the successors, probably, will start to carry out a more realistic policy

Having repudiated the hopeless and fruitless foreign policy, the West actually might start the social-economic restoration. However, as a matter of fact, consolidation of China and of “the rest” may go too far, and the restored western countries would hardly be able at that time to reckon on the space, to which they were accustomed.

The vast territory of the Russian Federation will be marked by a flourishing, which might be promoted by “Russian spring” resembling Arabic one. The youth and women will play the leading role and maybe will invent a better Communism in 2017...

The probable events are not excluded also for China, but much has been already done within the Communist party of China. The dynamics of the country seems to be sustainable both in terms of growth (annual growth in 26% for the last 30 years in the economic zones, where Dan started his epochal reforms in 1980), having engendered the colossal inequality in the level of wealth, of power and the access to natural resources, and in terms of “openness”. About 30 million Chinese annually leave the country and go back to the Motherland, where individual freedom becomes more and more real.

There are much more problems in India, where half of the population lies in the distant regions with strong caste prejudices, which represent themselves a heavy burden for life in the whole peninsula.

Naksalits, probably are only the heralds of such forms of struggle, as guerilla war, terrorism and non-forceful forms of resistance. Maybe China with its national problems will master Indian linguistic federalism, while India with its caste-class problems will be able to imitate the Chinese kind of “capitalism-communism”. Is it possible that these two countries with the largest rate of population density in the world will render assistance to each other to achieve freedom?

Africa with the population over one billion will, probably, be shaken by mighty mutinies against the elites educated in the West. Libya is located on the shore of a freshwater “sea” (the so called Great artificial river – the biggest in the world pipeline system of 4 thousand km, which pumps fresh water from reservoirs under Sahara at 600–800 m below in depth), which would be able to irrigate the largest part of Sahara. The territory located to the south of Sahara possesses the sufficient resources, including fertile soil, to feed itself under condition, if women are responsible for distribution of wealth. Latin America experiments with economy oriented to fundamental needs, for instance, exports meat and imports energy carriers, exchanging them for services in health care.

The mutinies will take place also in the West. Movement M15 in Spain attracts a great interest. The point is that its leaders should not demand that the ruling classes, keeping status quo, should start reforms, since it would be a great mistake. They might form companies “from below”, i.e. to develop small business, mentioned above. The cooperative saving banks might make investments in real economy, instead of arrangement of speculation in the financial sector, with due account of high level of education and health care, as well as a great number of pensioners, who could make their contribution of experience and wisdom in the course of coming revolt of elderly people and pensioners (by 2015?)

There are events, which are connected by many threads. The catastrophe in Norway on 22 July 2011 may be regarded as an act of maniac Breivik. It would be the simplest way. But it would be a seduced outcome and a very limited interpretation, and one should not agree to it.

Let us see it in the wider vision. On the one side, there is an individual Islamophob, who was connected with some groups, which represent European neo-fascism. Would it be able to call him a madman, the political color would disappear. He would have become *causa sui*, i.e. the reason of himself. In this case Norway should learn America's experience after 11 September: How to pronounce speeches about "absolute and unmotivated evil". On the other side, there is group Ansar al-Jihad al-Alami, which allegedly assumed responsibility for the terrorist acts in Norway, which might become for bankrupted Washington a good pretext to demand new investments for "the struggle against terror". And in the middle is Breivik, the phenomenon of its time, for whom the situation in Libya was at some moment a cover, while he himself turned out to be almost the weapon of revenge. Is it the cooperation by agreed silence?

Breivik intentionally killed social democratic participants of the youth camp, saying he was eradicating Marxism and left ideas... But why did he select just these victims, since the Labor Party of Norway has no more relations to the left ideas and Marxism than the Party of progress, whose member was the killer, had relation to the right ideas. Both parties voted for bombardment of Libya and both supported purchase for extremely high prices American planes F35. Ideology has nothing to do in this case.

The prime minister was right, having said: nothing will turn Norway out from democracy. But democracy is not simply a

conglomerate of individuals closed each in his ideological cell. Democracy is a dialogue, a challenge, a confrontation with other people, but not the calculation of voters once in four years at the elections. Breivik should have had contacts with a great number of people, and we all would benefit it. The parliament and the citizens should publicly discuss any problems.

“Rossiya v globalnoy politike”,
M., 2011, vol. 9, N 4, July-August, p. 8–18.

R. Bekkin,
scholar of the Orient
**THE INSTITUTION OF WAQF
IN MODERN RUSSIA**

Waqf is property relinquished by the state or by an individual for religious or charitable purposes in accordance with Muslim law. After relinquishing certain property to *waqf* (or after announcing it) this property ceases to be the property of the founder of *waqf*, but at the same time it does not become the property of the person receiving *waqf* and managing it in the interests of *waqf* beneficiaries. The property transferred to *waqf* should only be used for a definite purpose stated by the *waqf* founder.

However, Muslims and Muslim spiritual leaders in Russia do not always clearly understand the real purpose of *waqf* and tend to forget that *waqf* property is not turned into the property of religious organizations and that they can only use the income from it.

In the Volga region *waqf* is sometimes confused with other Islamic institutions: tithe, as well as incomes received from holding such religious rites as prayer meetings for the deceased, funeral ceremonies, etc. Sometimes *waqf* is regarded as a fund for financing

various current expenditures of mosques and the Muslim clergy. Evidently, it is quite difficult to carry on a constructive dialogue when the supporters of the *waqf* system do not know well enough what it really is.

It is interesting to note that after the destruction of the Kazan Khanate by the army of Ivan the Terrible, most *waqfs* were abolished in the Volga region. Their revival began only in the mid-19th century.

It should specially be noted that cash *waqf* was widely used in czarist Russia (especially in the Volga region), which boiled down to the *waqf* founder allocating a definite sum of money to charitable purposes and placing it for interest which could be used by beneficiaries (mosques, Muslim clerics, pupils of religious schools, etc.). Thus, one premise of Muslim law was observed, while another, more important one formulated by the Koran, was violated, namely, ban of usury.

After the October revolution of 1917 the *waqf* institution in various regions of Russia was gradually abolished. These institutions remained for quite a long time in the Northeastern Caucasus. Only ten years later, on January 23, 1927, the Communist party and government authorities in the Daghestan Autonomous Republic issued a decree on the nationalization of all *waqf* property.

In the recent history of Tatarstan the *waqf* problem has repeatedly been discussed at a high level. One of the first meetings of this kind took place in 1993. Representatives of the Muslim clergy of Tatarstan discussed the problem with the then President of the Republic M.S. Shaimiyev in the context of using the *waqf* system for the construction and maintenance of mosques and madrasahs and the publication of theological literature. As a result the President issued an order to set up a special commission to study the problem of organizing

the *waqf* system. Experts were sent to Turkey to gain experience in the matter.

At the uniting congress of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan in 1993 the post of Chairman of the *waqf* institution (having the rank of the first deputy mufti) and the department of *waqf* at the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan were instituted. The very concept of *waqf* was introduced in the modern Russian legislation for the first time in the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” in 1999. The premise on *waqf* property and its non-alienability contained in the law was only a declaration of intentions, but not a legal provision fixing the existing order of things. However, some time later it gave rise to questions about its conformity to the federal legislation. The republican Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” was soon revised, but the premise on *waqf* property remained intact.

Realizing that without necessary changes in federal laws all efforts to create legal foundations for the functioning of the *waqf* institution, which were yet non-existent, were meaningless, the deputies to the State Council of Tatarstan put forward an initiative to include “*waqf* property” in the Russian legislation. Earlier, similar proposal was made by the Chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan Gusman Iskhakov. But there was no reaction from the federal authorities.

The question of the need to introduce the concept of *waqf* in the federal legislation is also quite significant in the context of the problem of the restitution to Muslims of *waqf* property alienated after the October revolution. For example, reference to the *waqf* institution which existed in the Crimea at the time of the Russian Empire is one of the arguments put forward by Crimean Tatars claiming their land lost in Soviet times. As has been mentioned earlier, work on finding *waqf*

property which existed in the Volga region before the revolution has been carried on by legal experts and historians in Tatarstan. However, even if we assume that the *waqf* concept is introduced in the federal legislation, this will give no guarantee that the *waqf* property confiscated after the 1917 revolution will be returned to Muslims – most documents on the institution of *waqf* have been lost.

At the same time, despite the absence of the concept of *waqf* property in the federal legislation, those wishing to reintroduce the *waqf* system have many other legal means to do this. In connection with the attempts of the Tatar supporters of *waqf* to introduce this concept in the federal legislation, it would be worthwhile to remember a funny episode which my colleague told me about recently. Some time ago the monument to the Soviet soldier-liberator in the Bulgarian city of Plovdiv (it is called “Alyosha”) was about to be dismantled. Then an old lady – the city resident compiled a will in accordance with which her executors were obliged to lease her apartment after her death and transfer the rent to the maintenance of the monument. The noble old lady would have been very surprised if she had learnt that she had instituted *waqf*. For instance, to initiate the so-called cash *waqf* it is not necessary to set up any institutionalized body.

As to the real estate, after the State Duma adopted amendments to the Land Code on September 24, 2004, ecclesiastical organizations which own buildings for religious and charitable purposes have received plots of land in their possessions free of charge. If religious organizations are not the owners of the buildings they occupy, plots of land can be granted to them for free use during the entire duration of their stay there. Evidently, these amendments have been made above all in the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church, however, other confessions have also received tangible benefits from the new law.

Thus, from the legal point of view there is no *waqf* problem in modern Russia, just as under the previous legislation. It is important to find the most adequate institution in the present Russian legislation at.

At first glance an agreement of trust management is the closest to *waqf* in its essence. However, it should be borne in mind that in contrast to *waqf*, this agreement is not permanent and is concluded for a term not longer than five years. Besides, the present legislation does not contain a premise concerning the management of trust property, if its manager is not an entrepreneur or a non-commercial body. In our view, Article 582 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation dealing with benefactions will better serve the realization of *waqf* in the Russian conditions. It envisages the case of the benefactor conditioning the use of the donated property. Religious organizations are mentioned as beneficiaries. The law actually protects the will of the potential founder of *waqf*. If the donated property is not used in accordance with the purpose stated by the benefactor, or the rules of this Article are violated, the benefactor or his heirs or legal successors have the right to withdraw the donation. In other words, the Civil Code envisages one of the principal features of *waqf*, namely, non-alienability. The *waqf* agreement contains a clear-cut description of the rights and liabilities of the parties to it.

But a real obstacle on the development way of *waqf* is the loss of Muslim legal culture not only in the Volga region, but also in other Muslim regions of Russia.

Thus, in the 1990s a number of rural administrations in North and Central Daghestan, contrary to the Russian legislation, transferred part of *waqf* estates given them prior to collectivization to newly opened mosques. This transfer was registered as long-term lease. In turn, mosques began to sub-lease these plots of land to their community members.

The Supreme Soviet of Daghestan discussed the question about the inclusion of the premise on *waqf* in the constitution of the Republic in the first half of the 1990s. However, the results of the first republican referendum on June 28, 1992, showed that 83.7 percent of those taking part in it were against the division of collective farm lands into private holdings. Thus, the revival of the *waqf* system in the Republic was given up as a lost case.

It is indicative that the legal rules regulating the problems connected with *waqf* property revived in the rural districts of Daghestan in the 1950s – 1980s, and were gradually adapted to the new conditions of life. The material collected by the Russian scholar of the Orient V. Bobrovnikov and by Daghestan ethnographers confirms that mountain dwellers in some districts of Middle and Northern Daghestan continued to receive incomes in cash and kind from former *waqf* property. Of course, there can be no talk of the emergence of new *waqf* property. But a small part of *waqf* property, which merged after collectivization with personal property of collective farmers was secretly used, with silent approval of collective farm chairmen, for religious and charitable needs of collective farm communities. From 1960s there have been cases of the illegal lease of former *waqf* fields and pastures.

Analyzing the modern experience of the revival of *waqf* property in Daghestan, where few *waqf* holdings began to appear in some mountain districts, V. Bobrovnikov came to a conclusion that there were no special prerequisites for the development of the *waqf* system in this most Islamized republic of Russia.

Similar conclusion can be made concerning Tatarstan, where the *waqf* system ceased to exist even earlier than in Daghestan.

Does this mean that the *waqf* system has no real prospects in modern Russia? No. In our view, the fact that Russia has lost this

system, which existed before the 1917 revolution, should be regarded positively, rather than negatively. In our day Tatar historians often turn to the experience of the functioning of the *waqf* system in the Volga region in the mid-19th century. However, they tend to forget that a considerable part of *waqf* property was used with the violation of the fundamental Islamic premise on banning loan interest. A great part of incomes from *waqf* in the Volga region was a result of usurious operations. This means that Russian Muslims have an opportunity to begin from scratch the process of creating a new *waqf* system answering the challenges of the 21st century, one of which is the need to finance small and medium-size business belonging to Muslims.

It looks likely that the first serious step in this direction has already been made. In February 2010, more than ten years after the publication of the rules and regulations on *waqf* in the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” in 1999, an official announcement was made in Kazan (capital of Tatarstan) about the foundation of the Muslim religious organization “*Waqf*”. This organization is actually the manager of plots of land granted by Tatarstan’s authorities as *waqf*.

The first *waqf* managed by this organization was a plot of land with an area of 10,280 square meters in Kazan. It was a complex for sacrificing animals during the celebration of “Id al-adha” (Kurban Bairam), storing meat and distributing it among people. Evidently, the state will act as the founder of more than one *waqf* property in the future, at least those based on real estate.

The institution of *waqf* in our days will inevitably change. There is a possibility for a broader interpretation of the premises of the Koran and *sunna* dealing with charity.

In view of the fact that the problem of *waqf* is often raised by the Muslim clergy and people close to it, the concept of *waqf* is interpreted in Russia not in a charitable, but in religious meaning.

As far as we imagine, direct *waqf* is ignored in modern Russia, although it is an example of anonymous help to the poor. Even if we deal with a *waqf* in the form of a public library, the latter can serve, in the conditions of high prices of books, as almost the only opportunity for the poor to raise their social status by acquiring new knowledge.

It is known that the income from *waqf* can be given over to those who are unable to earn their livelihood themselves (children and the disabled), and also to those who want to implement concrete projects.

However despite the fact that the main task facing the *umma* of Russia is the development and promotion of charitable *waqf*, one should not forget other philanthropic bodies whose aim is to offer various types of service, but not to draw income. It is difficult to deny the importance of *waqf* in the form of a public library where visitors, apart from books, will also get free access to the Internet and, consequently, to scientific and popular science material. As it was said earlier, an agreement on the foundation of *waqf* and benefits from it can be concluded and used not only by Muslims.

The institution of *waqf* can also demonstrate its effectiveness in such a sphere as help in the adaptation of migrants from Muslim countries in Russia. As is known, a considerable number of people from the Central Asian republics of the former U.S.S.R. are working in Russia today. For instance, according to certain data, from 500,000 to one million citizens of Tajikistan are now living and working in Russia temporarily. Most of them speak Russian from bad to worse and do not know the basic laws of Russia, etc. Migrants from the former Soviet republics have been drawn in small and medium-size business. Their higher educational level will unquestionably contribute to greater

effectiveness of their business, which in turn will have a favorable effect on the revenue of the Russian state budget.

In order to help Muslims from other countries to adapt themselves to the Russian conditions it is necessary to organize a non-governmental center in which migrants could study the Russian language, legislation and, possibly, to learn a new trade. Such *quasiwaqf* could also pay grants to poor Muslim students. This center can be set up by a legal entity, or several physical persons. Evidently, such center should work in close contact with the Federal Migration Service.

Real assistance to small and medium-size business belonging to Muslims is rendered by their coreligionists in Moscow and other regions of Russia. Taking into account the high rates of rent in the sphere of commercial real estate, some owners and leaseholders of buildings give them over to small and middle entrepreneurs free of charge. For instance, there are cases of publishing houses, which print Islamic literature, getting premises to be used for quite some time free of charge to sell books and other printed matter.

In other words, assistance to small and medium-size business should not necessarily be in cash, it can also be given in the considerable lowering of expenses of small and middle entrepreneurs. Information and consulting services financed by *waqf* or *quasiwaqf* can be of invaluable help.

As to the spiritual boards and mosques, the most effective source of financing Muslim religious organizations in Russia has so far been *sadaka*, but not *waqf*.

Islamskaya ekonomicheskaya model i sovremennost,”

M., 2010, p. 292–299.

Sabina Garashova,
candidate of political sciences
(Baku State University)

**THE GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE USA
STRATEGY IN THE CASPIAN REGION**

For the whole post-Soviet period the Caspian region attracted attention of the leading world and regional powers. It was determined not only by the reserves of hydrocarbons concentrated there but also by the geopolitical specifics of the region. Its location in Eurasia, the political structure and the connections with the adjacent powers can not help influencing its geopolitical significance in the epoch following termination of the cold war. The above mentioned factors constitute the basis of the multi-vector geopolitical rivalry started in the Caspian region after termination of the bipolar situation. The USA as the sole superpower could not be aside of the geopolitical struggle in this most important region of Eurasia for the post-bipolar period. The author will try to give the answer to the specifics of its interest, the corresponding activities and the mechanism, which are mostly applied in this direction.

The new century is characterized by the risen attention of the world and the regional powers to the water basin of the Caspian Sea and the adjacent territories. The exhaustion of world reserves of oil and gas was one of the most evident global trends, which promoted it. Under these conditions, the internationalization of these reserves in the Caspian region liberated recently from the Soviet control became the aim of strategic priority of the energy dependent western countries in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, the RF demonstrates its interest in regional domination, since it considers the control over the region rather as a chance to monopolize all hydrocarbons' flows going to Europe from the post-Soviet space. The regional policy of other

powers (Turkey, Iran and China) is also motivated to a large extent by the access to the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian region.

The Caspian oil and gas region is as follows: the Caspian Sea and the adjacent territories of Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. The share of the Caspian Sea in the world oil reserves accounts for 15–20 billion tons (almost 10%), some Russian analysts think. At present, Kazakhstan is the leader in the oil reserves and in their extraction, followed by Azerbaijan, while Turkmenistan concentrated its attention to development of gas deposits.

Analyzing oil and gas geopolitical trend in the region after termination of the cold war, one may stress the activities of certain countries and the specific interests of such activities in relation to regional hydrocarbon resources. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan considered as their main aim solving economic problems by export of hydrocarbons, while the countries of the European Union and further the CPR strived for extension of external resources of energy by import of the Caspian oil and gas. This issue originally was much more politicized for Russia and the USA.

Moscow and Washington regarded the Caspian region rather as a chance to solve their geopolitical problems in Eurasia. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Moscow used the process of monopolization of the regional oil and gas capacity for raising its geopolitical status in Eurasia. Washington regarded diversification of the pipeline system in the post-Soviet space as a means of creating more extensive and stable external resources of energy supply for its allies in Europe as well as a means of preventing a probable restoration there of the imperial system able in the perspective to challenge the leading role of America, using words of Z. Brzezinski.

For the beginning and the middle of the 1990s, due to weakness of the central power and the lack of clear strategic line relating to the

Caspian region the activities of Russia were mainly the responses to initiatives of the Caspian neighbors in the CIS or the agreements with the interests of national oil extracting companies (Lukoil, Yukos and others), which often did not coincide with the state interests. V. Putin coming to power radically changed the situation. Since 2000s the Kremlin activities were concentrated mainly on the intention to control a probable great amount of hydrocarbons exported by Caspian states. It was supposed, in particular, to make Gazprom the monopolist in transportation of gas from the Central Asia both to the west and east directions and to extend as much as possible participation of Russian corporations in implementation of projects of gas and oil extraction in the Caspian region, particularly in the Caspian sector of Kazakhstan.

The interests of Turkey in development of the pipeline system connecting the Caspian region with the EU space through its territory (projects Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, Nabucco) were motivated not only by the profits thanks to the transit of resources but also by political advantages thanks to its transformation into the most important energy distribution point in Eurasia, which might be used by Ankara to solve the prolonged issue of Turkey's membership in EU.

Probably, Iran was less than other countries interested in development of hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian region by western companies. First, due to existing tension of relations between Iran and the USA Tehran should have been afraid of appearance of elements of military-political influence of the USA and NATO, which could follow western corporations. Second, from the point of view of oil and gas profits the zone of the Persian Gulf was the principal area, since the biggest gas deposits and oil fields subject to development were situated exactly there. Correspondingly, the Iranian regional policy for the post-Soviet period was oriented to creation of the most advantageous conditions for ensuring security of its northern borders by

means of development of relations with the Caucasian and Central Asian states as well as with its historic competitors in the region – Russia and Turkey. Tension in relations with the USA forced Tehran to look for the way of rapprochement with Russia as the most perspective counterbalance to the extension of American influence in Eurasia. And what is more, Iran regarded Russia to be the main supplier of military technique and technologies. In order to realize its oil and gas interests Iran strived for maximum use of its advantageous geopolitical location and for development of its transit capacity. The question is the probable transit of Caspian hydrocarbons to the Persian Gulf and the South Asia.

Out of all Caspian new independent states (CNIS) Kazakhstan possesses the biggest oil fields. The main transportation route of this oil is laid through the Russian territory (the oil pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and pipeline Atyrau-Samara). One should note that Russia and Kazakhstan were the first Caspian states, which regulated completely the issues of division of the sea bottom; and this fact promoted regional stability and investment attractiveness of Caspian oil projects. At the same time, this situation limited self-dependence of Kazakhstan, since Russia regarding its interests may unilaterally regulate the amount of oil pumped via its territory. Given the fact that Kazakhstan is a Russian competitor in the world energy markets, this device of pressure may be actively used. Therefore, since the end of the 1990s Astana urged towards diversification of oil export routes both in the western (via sea port Aktau and oil pipeline BTC) and in the eastern (oil pipeline Atasu-Alashankou) and in the southern directions (probable oil transportation line from Aktau in Kazakhstan to Iranian port Neka). Such diversification reduces dependence of Kazakhstan on Russian oil pipelines and gives Astana great chances for political maneuverability. At the same time, Kazakhstan justifies its choice of routes for its oil transportation by the long-term economic and

political interests with due account of current events in other Caspian states.

Turkmenistan occupies the third place in terms of reserves of liquid and gas hydrocarbons and, being deprived of a free access to the world market, is interested very much in development of a wide network of export routes. The principal route of transportation of Turkmen gas is laid through the Russian territory, and Turkmenistan, like neighboring Kazakhstan, urges towards probable diversification of gas export routes. In 2009, the gas pipeline for delivery of Turkmen gas to China was commissioned (Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-CPR). Turkmenistan displayed its interest in transportation of energy raw resources via the Iranian territory. Diversification in the western direction is hindered for Ashgabad by the lack of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline and by tension in relations with Azerbaijan concerning disputable oil fields in the Caspian Sea.

Azerbaijan carries out an active foreign policy and uses the oil factor to maintain close relations with the leading states of the West. This country uses also its abilities for transportation of Caspian oil round Russia. Having obtained its independence in the end of 1991, Azerbaijan turned out to be in the center of the so called geopolitical triangle of crossing interests of Russia, Iran and Turkey. For the beginning of 1990s, the highest leadership of the country confronted the choice of foreign policy orientation: it was necessary to choose one of these competing centers of force. Finally, the pro-western strategy was selected with the stress on close reciprocal action with Turkey and the leading powers of the West.

Recently, Azerbaijan confronted new development trends of the geopolitical situation in the region of the Caspian Sea: a marked rapprochement of positions of its rival – Russia with the positions of its main ally – the USA. As a result, Baku had to look for new ways of

arrangement of mutually beneficial cooperation with Moscow, including the oil and gas sphere. At the same time, as marked president I. Aliyev in his book “The Caspian Oil of Azerbaijan”, it is possible to suppose that in the perspective Azerbaijan will be able to play the mediator role in relations among big powers. The location of the republic in the junction of several biggest geopolitical and geo-economic structures makes it possible to be friends with all and to reconcile all with all, to become the initiator of rapprochement of the West with the East, I. Aliyev thinks.

The list of actors interested in development of energy and transport-commercial projects in the Caspian region may be enlarged at the expense of the states, which are primarily oriented to get dividends from transportation of the Caspian energy resources via their territories. The question is the position of Georgia, Ukraine as well as some countries of the Central and East Europe – Romania, Bulgaria (since 2007 – EU members), Greece. The existence of oil and gas resources is not the sole matter, which defines the significance of the Caspian region. Of great importance is its location on the border between Europe and Asia – in the junction of perspective inter-continental transportation communications. The control over this space provided the corresponding power with the significant advantages in the geopolitical competition started in Eurasia after collapse of the USSR. The factors connected with this fact were not less important for the USA than the probable access to the Caspian hydrocarbons.

Under geopolitical conditions created after disintegration of the USSR and creation of CNIS, the USA should have been supposed to be a rival with other actors trying to get points in the region, particularly Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The EU and China tried to carry out their own policy in this region. Since the middle of the 1990s, the USA tries to establish its own control over the main transport and energy

objects in the Caspian region (project TRACEKA, oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, in the perspective – oil pipeline Nabucco), to construct the geopolitical line Balkans-Caucasus-Central Asia. The main direction of the USA foreign policy in the Eurasian space became the following idea: to support the existed geopolitical pluralism and to prevent Russian domination in the whole Caspian region. The USA also paid attention to the existed conflicts in the Caucasus (Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, south Ossetia) as well as the activities of Turkey and Iran in the North Caucasus.

Since 1997, the Caucasian region was proclaimed to be the zone of the American national interests. The USA plans aimed at development of the Caspian region correspond to the American national energy strategy, which foresees the establishment of the American control over the main oil extraction regions of the world officially named as the control over global energy balance. Of great importance for the USA are its geopolitical interests in the Caspian region. The geographic location of the region, particularly its adjacency with the main geopolitical competitors of the USA in Eurasia (RF, CPR and Iran), contributes to the rise of this interest.

The main components of the USA policy in the Caspian region are as follows: consolidation of statehood and independence of the region's countries going on the way of market democracy and weakening their connections with Russia; extension of commercial advantages for the USA; settlement of regional conflicts inter alia by means of strengthening political, economic and military ties among new countries of the region; formation of special troops and protection forces along the energy transport communications laid from the Caspian region in the western direction; consolidation of energy independence of the USA at the expense of the Caspian energy carriers as well as the reduction of dependence of the region's states on Russia

by ensuring the guaranteed free flow of Caspian oil and natural gas to the world markets. Of special significance is the growth of military-political and military-technical cooperation of the USA and NATO with the states of the region. In the context of the known events in South Ossetia in August 2008, such cooperation with Georgia acquired a particular intensified characteristic.

In terms of oil and gas resources the Caspian region is regarded by the USA rather as a reserve basin of hydrocarbons with strategic significance. Washington is interested not so much in extraction as in installation of its control over big oil fields of the region. The regional policy of the USA is marked by a wide specter of ways and methods. Since 1996 Washington carried out a great work in order to involve in its orbit of influence Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as well as Armenia in the situation, which in 2008 was characterized by an intensified American-Russian rivalry.

For the last two decades, the significance of the region for the USA increased so much that the American Administration started to regard the problems of the Caspian region as a separate direction of its foreign policy. In 1999, in time of presidential term of B. Clinton, the Caspian Financial Center (CFC) was established to render assistance in financing oil and gas projects in Turkey, in the South Caucasus and in the Central Asia, as well as to raise to maximum the American commercial participation in implementation of the adopted projects. The Center became for Washington a convenient mechanism for penetration in the region, for raising its influence in its separate countries and for creating a starting point for the future.

Creation of an extensive structure of pipelines occupies the most significance place in American strategy in the Caspian region. The new routes should not be laid through Russian and Iranian territory. Turkey is supposed to be a kind of bridge for the exit of Caspian oil to western

markets. In this connection the main stake was made on pipeline Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan. By means of pipelines in the direction from the Caspian region-Turkey-Europe, the USA intended to get certain geopolitical advantages, including new orientation of new independent states of the Caucasus and the Central Asia to the West, intensification of consolidation of European NATO allies and Turkey, more rigid isolation of Iran as well as a chance to reduce access of CPR to the region, particularly to its hydrocarbon resources. Washington is interested also in greater internationalization of communication projects in the Caspian region: participation of a wide circle of countries, including mainly western countries, is expedient not only economically but makes it possible to present the issue as an international actual problem.

The USA in the course of carrying out its strategic policy, apart from its traditional allies (Turkey, Israel and EU countries) relied on some new independent states in the region. In particular, in various periods of time the stake was made on Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. At present, a rather convincing idea seems to be the supposition that the efforts exerted by Washington to create and to develop the consolidating vector of GUUAM were connected primarily with the American geopolitical interests in the Caspian region. At the same time, the USA makes repeated attempts to tear away from the Kremlin its closest military-political ally in the region – Armenia. The process of Armenian-Turkish normalization, intensified since 2008, should have been used for it.

Due to existing tension in relations with Iran, the USA did not support the energy transportation projects with participation of Iran, including the route of hydrocarbon transportation to the Persian Gulf via Iranian territory. Meanwhile, this direction is considered as the most advantageous routes from the economic point of view, and some American oil corporations insist on exactly this vector of diversification

of energy communications in the Caspian region. It seems that for Washington the economic advisability in this question for a long period in future will be forgotten in favor of geopolitical intentions of America, since it is impossible to speak about normalization of American-Iranian relations up to present time, and the stake on isolation of Iran, including trans-regional oil and gas projects, remains an instrument of American strategy in the Caspian region.

* * *

The Caspian region as a place of concentration of big hydrocarbon resources and as a significant space from the point of view of geopolitical confrontation in Eurasia after termination of bipolar epoch, probably, should be taken into account in the process of appraising the current significance of the region for external actors. Analyzing the USA policy in the Caspian region for the post-Soviet period, it is necessary to stress the evident connection with the both factors. At the same time, the geopolitical factor remains to be the dominant, and the issue of access to hydrocarbons continues to be subject to consideration by Washington from the prism of geopolitical processes in Eurasia. The Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, the reset of American-Russian relations after Obama Administration coming to power, the rise of Islamic trends in Turkey and its probable distance from geopolitics of the West, the lack of settlement of energy security issues of American allies in Europe, as well as the evident next stage of tension in relations of the USA with Iran, seem to predict in the near future the rise of American activities in the Caspian region. At the same time, it is possible to expect certain tactical corrections of American strategy in the region with due account of dynamics of geopolitical and geo-economic processes.

*“Kavkaz i globalizatsiya”,
Baku, 2010, N 4, vol. 3–4, p. 33–40.*

Diana Borovik,
journalist (Ukraine)
THE CASPIAN OIL MONARCHY

The Aliyevs clan must be called the Caspian oil monarchy. Geydar Aliyev, a former KGB chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR further was the continuous president of sovereign Azerbaijan for many years after disintegration of the USSR. His son Ilham, a lover to squander money in Moscow casinos in 2003 became the real successor to the throne.

Geydar Aliyev was the epoch-man, the unique living picture of all created by him for the XX century democratic notion – the Azerbaijani. As a professional secret agent Geydar Aliyev was always marked by a special skill to insure himself in good time, and thanks to it he succeeded every time to come through unscathed out of big maelstrom of revolutionary changes. And what is more, just he became the father of the Azerbaijani nation.

Geydar Aliyev was born on 10 May 1923 in the family of a railways worker in Nakhichevan. The return of Aliyev to the post-Soviet policy was further connected with this autonomous region of Azerbaijan separated by Armenia from the other territory of the country. For the beginning, Aliyev achieved a great success in the secret service of the Azerbaijan SSR. In 1969, he became the first secretary of the CC CP of Azerbaijan. Aliyev occupied high posts in the Soviet nomenclature. They connect with him the economic growth in Azerbaijan for 1970s–1980s, the amelioration of life of many city residents, the emergence of national intellectuals with higher education received in Moscow and other academic centers of the USSR. It was considered that he might become the Secretary General of the CP of the country, and probably therefore he fell into disgrace in time of

M. Gorbachev. At that time Aliyev said that all republics could not be sovereign within one sovereign state.

Using the first chance, he flew to Nakhichevan and was immediately elected the chairman of the Supreme Majlis. By law he was the deputy chairman of the Azerbaijani parliament. He did not go to Baku, since his rival from Nakhichevan – Elchibey was the president of Azerbaijan and the leader of the National Front.

In January 1990, when the military troops entered Baku and dozens of residents were killed, he was one of the first citizens of the country, who expressed his public courageous protest against it. In 1993, Aliyev came back to power in Azerbaijan. He ruled rigidly, showing refined firmness of purpose. He was able to get the upper hand in the struggle against the nationalist opposition and adventurer S. Guseinov, who was the prime minister. Aliyev skillfully chose the way between the influence of the USA and Russia in the region, using the interest of western corporations in Caspian oil. He succeeded to stabilize internal situation in Azerbaijan by suppression of all rivals, he signed the agreement on termination of military clashes with Armenia in Nagorny Karabakh and concluded the oil contract of the century.

The myth relating to G. Aliyev resembled the Turkish myth about Ataturk. Aliyev made Huj, having visited Mecca. His portraits were printed in textbooks. In Azerbaijan it was the personal cult surpassed only by the medieval Asian leaders. G. Aliyev established stability, but democracy was left undeveloped. Azerbaijan continued to be subject to criticism for the issues of human rights and freedom of speech and democracy of elections.

G. Aliyev's methods of governance were not simple. As a rule, he liked to have contacts with ordinary people. Usually, in different distant settlements – new schools, kindergartens and houses were constructed. G. Aliyev made friendly contacts with common people

but treated officials in a severe way. In the middle of the 1970s, he personally ordered to start judicial proceedings against some secretaries of district party committees for incorrect, exaggerated data on cotton harvest. It caused big scandal, but Aliyev himself stayed aside of it.

G. Aliyev had influence on sub-consciousness of ordinary citizens. For instance, the airplanes of Azerbaijani company “AZAL” were equipped with TV, which translated speeches of G. Aliyev for the period of even short flights Baku–Nakhichevan for 55 minutes. The passengers had no chance to switch off the TV, while the speech was transmitted four times.

G. Aliyev died on 12 December 2003 far away from his country, in famous hospital in Cleveland (state Ohio), where he was treated. The information on the death of the president of Azerbaijan was like a bolt from the blue. The strong-willed leader was able to make his citizens believe in his immortality. However, they underestimated his wisdom. For a long time, he prepared his son Ilham for the post of the president of Azerbaijan. As a result of election on 15 October with the support of the state apparatus and the assistance of business, despite some difficulties in vote calculation, according to western observers, Ilham Aliyev became the president of Azerbaijan. His political credo is continuation of the father’s work.

Aliyev junior since his childhood was surrounded by his father’s glory. He studied in Moscow Institute of International Relations. However, after “dispute” of G. Aliyev with Gorbachev Ilham automatically became an enemy of the country, he was discharged from the institute. He had to start his own business first in Moscow and further in Stambul. As soon as G. Aliyev came back to power, Ilham returned to his father and started his carrier. In his inauguration speech I. Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan could become a powerful state

and that it was necessary to continue in the country the policy of G. Aliyev.

Ilham Aliyev and his wife Mekhriban Pashayeva were married for 28 years. They have three children: two daughters – Arzu and Leila and son Geydar. On 1 December 2008, Leila became mother of two boys. Ilham Aliyev in his interview to magazine “Baku” highly appreciated the close relations in his family, which he considered as the greatest value. He said that family was the basis of society. The upbringing of children in the family can not be replaced either by school or higher education institution, he stressed.

The year of 2010 was a year with troubles for Ilham Aliyev. The question was that many foreign mass media started investigation of the property of the ruling dynasty of Azerbaijan. For instance, a publication in “The Washington Post” on the property of the ruling family turned out to become a real dramatic discovery for users of social networks in the country. To all appearance, the access to Internet-resources was limited due to the fact that users of social networks actively discussed the published information on the property of the president’s children and on the sources of this property: a school boy Geydar Aliyev bought in Dubai nine private residences on the sea shore for \$ 44 million, where nearby stay girls Leila and Arzu. The total value of their real estate in Dubai accounts for \$ 75 millions.

The publication actually did not contain anything significant for the readers in Azerbaijan, since they are not so naïve to believe in the sum of only \$ 75 million, while embezzlement of public property in Azerbaijan is counted in billions of US dollars. Of great significance was the article itself and the fact that taboo on personal information of Ilham Aliyev and his family had been violated.

The imperial business of the president of Azerbaijan grows like baker’s dough. His junior daughter became the co-owner of one of the

biggest bank and of a service company for air travel. The political elites prefer to use their friends and family members to keep their position in the most valuable assets of the country. It takes place despite the legislation, which regards nepotism as a crime subject to punishment up to twelve years of imprisonment. Ilham Aliyev likes to possess everything in the family. His wife Mekhriban is a member of the parliament and a distinguished political personality.

Ilham Aliyev gets his official presidential annual salary in the size of \$ 230 thousand. However, he keeps under his rigid control the oil resources of the country; formerly he occupied the post of the president of the state oil company of Azerbaijan. The property of Ilham Aliyev accounts for dozens of millions of US dollars. Neither he, nor his wife declared their own capital, which contradicts the laws of Azerbaijan. The national legislation forbids officials to have business. However, it does not apply to the members of Ilham Aliyev family.

“Semya”, Mariupol, 2011, N 34, p. 7.

Elena Ionova,

candidate of historical sciences

(MEMO of the RAS)

THE SITUATION IN KYRGYZSTAN

After termination of the ten years period since the last political crisis in Kyrgyzstan it is possible to make some review of activities of the new leadership of the republic. By the end of 2011 the term of powers of president R. Otunbayeva expires, and she herself, as she said, intends to demonstrate a peaceful and legal transfer of powers by means of open and honest elections. Meantime, the lack of stability and unpredictability of events in Kyrgyzstan make an impact on the whole

way of political processes in the Central Asia, which conditions greater attention of experts to the situation in the republic so much, as in 2011 many observers predict the rise of political tension in the whole space of the CA.

In March 2011, the first Eurasian congress of political scientists, held in Astana, paid great attention to the situation in Kyrgyzstan. Many representatives of the expert community came to the conclusion that there existed all pre-conditions for a new revolution in the republic. In April 2010, the part of the elite oriented to a great extent to the West, primarily the USA, came to power.

The change of power was followed by an attempt to create in the republic of parliamentary democracy, and the corresponding amendments were made in the constitution. However, actually the change for the parliamentarian republic did not take place, according to Kyrgyz political scientist N. Omarov, and this experiment failed. At least for the next ten–twenty years such project in the CA region will not occur. The third revolution will evidently take place, and with due account of great dissolution of the population in democratic values, either representatives of the law enforcement bodies or religious extremists will come to power, Omarov asserts.

This point of view seems to be substantiated. The economic situation in the country is unstable, and the country lacks resources to restore economy, which is based on foreign financial assistance. Like Bakiyev, R. Otunbayeva came to power with the promise to get rid of the corruption. However, corruption as usual increases having only changed the names.

In January 2011, F. Kulov, the leader of the parliamentarian opposition presented to the public opinion a review on the situation in this sphere. The document, prepared by a group of experts of the party “Ar-Namys”, headed by him, contains several dozens of typical

schemes of illegal cash and non-cash turn over, means of grafts and “payments” to officials taking decisions, the illegal actions in the course of tenders and purchases and many other ways of embezzlement. According to the document, by means of corruption schemes \$ 300 millions have been withdrawn from the state budget (20% of it).

The re-division of property is going on in the republic for the benefit of the ruling elite, and the nationalized objects are sold to new owners. The nationalization of some foreign enterprises with participation of foreign capital decreased the already low rating of economy in Kyrgyzstan. A great corruption scandal was connected with the biggest operator “Alfa-Telekom” working under the brand of Russian company “Megakom”.

The acute problem – the inter-ethnic relations is left unsolved, having changed the acute problem for the latent one. It is caused by the unsettled issue of relations between the “title nation” and Uzbeks, Omarov thinks. This point of view is shared by the chairman of OSCE minister of foreign relations of Lithuania A. Adzhubalis after his visit to Bishkek and Osh in March 2011. He said that he was concerned mainly about discrimination, persecution, forceful actions and rude violation of human rights in Kyrgyzstan. He pointed out that the authorities did not eliminate the basic reason consisted in aspiration of the title ethnos for domination in political and economic spheres of the republic, which causes the responded reaction of non-Kyrgyz population of the country, primarily of Uzbeks. The smoldering conflict made the situation in the country particularly explosive on the eve of presidential elections, since it could be used by various political forces, including extremists.

For the spring 2011, the tension in the south of the republic was growing, and the threat of resumed inter-ethnic clashes, like in Osh in 2010, was growing, R. Otunbayeva mentioned it herself. The dangerous

situation in the south of the republic was discussed at the meeting of commanders of border guard forces of the Central Asia and Russia, held in March 2011.

The corner-stone of policy carried out by Otunbayeva was her stake on external economic and political support. The leadership of the republic had constantly to maneuver between Moscow and Washington competing there. It concerns first of all the military sphere, particularly existence on the republic's territory of USA and RF military bases. The activities of the president of Kyrgyzstan were analyzed by A. Knyazev, a Russian expert of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the AS. To his mind, R. Otunbayeva became the head of the country in the period of troubles, and the question was not whether she could keep the situation under control but the question was that there was no aim at all. The aim of the USA was to put "its own person" at the head of Kyrgyzstan, and the USA achieved this aim.

The USA strives for keeping and enlarging its base in the airport "Manas" (Bakiyev renamed it as the center of transit deliveries, but it did not change its functioning) and for establishing there new points of its military presence. In July 2010, Otunbayeva as the leader of the provisional government by her decree without participation of the parliament extended the agreement on the lease of this base in the airport of Bishkek for one year, which provided the Kyrgyz budget with \$ 60 millions. Most experts share the meaning that in spite of Moscow's discontent Americans will stay in "Manas" for a long time.

In March 2011, Otunbayeva, having come back from her trip to Europe and the USA, where she was awarded by the USA State Secretary H. Clinton to the international prize for woman's courage, made public the plan for creation of a new military American center in Batken region. At the request of Otunbayeva, a special training base for American forces should be installed there. At the same time, she

publicly said about the need of extended cooperation with NATO to strengthen security of the country. Being in Washington, Otunbayeva asked for the USA assistance in fortifying the state border to prevent invasion of terrorists. In the context of the initiatives of Otunbayeva in Washington, one should agree with the meaning of Knyazev, who considered that the awards of the USA State Department to her were a kind of honorarium for the services. At the same time, it is noteworthy that Bishkek officially in parallel conducted negotiations with Moscow on creation in the south of Kyrgyzstan of another ODKB base.

Bishkek intends in its relations with Moscow to get economic assistance, since Washington prefers to support its interests by political actions. At present, Turkey and China are significant donors of Kyrgyzstan. Ankara expressed its readiness to make investments of \$ 450 millions in economy of Kyrgyzstan, including \$ 150 millions for extension of activities of Kyrgyz-Turkish University “Manas”. R. Erdogan, the prime minister of Turkey during his visit to Bishkek in 2011 promised to render financial assistance in the amount of \$ 24 millions, to abrogate by the end of the year the visa regime with Kyrgyzstan and to enlarge quota for Kyrgyz students getting education in Turkey, to continue to provide Kyrgyzstan with military equipment. Turkey expects in return to get the shares of military plant “Dastan” (formally promised to be given to Russia), which produces high speed torpedoes. The Turkish premier expressed his interest as well to company “Kyrgyzneftegaz”. At the same time, Bishkek gets direct financial assistance and beneficial credits from Beijing.

Moscow, striving for keeping stability in the Central Asia, is ready to give economic support to Kyrgyzstan. In Bakiyev time, the RF wrote off the Kyrgyz debt in the amount of \$ 180 millions but in return did not get the promised benefits. Further, a new stage of rapprochement was marked in Russian-Kyrgyz relations. A. Atam-

bayev, the prime-minister of Kyrgyzstan on 23 March 2011 at the forum on economic cooperation stressed in his speech that Kyrgyzstan would not be able to overcome its economic crisis without assistance of Russia. He admitted that Kyrgyzstan was to blame for inadequate development of bilateral cooperation. He said: “We should not put to the test forbearance of Russia. We should not deceive someone, it is necessary to see that it is the hand of the friend and of the brother. Up to the present time, they try somehow to push off and to split us.”

The prime-minister of Kyrgyzstan, being a candidate for the presidential post, visited Moscow and had a meeting with V. Putin; Kyrgyzstan was promised to get a new credit of \$ 30 millions (following repayment of the previous debt of \$ 14 millions) as well as the credit of \$ 106 millions from EvrAzES for payment before the presidential elections. At the same time, the parties agreed that Moscow would provide Kyrgyzstan in 2012 with the credit of \$ 3 billions for construction of Kambartin hydroelectric station.

For ten years the idea of this GES construction as the most expensive joint project of Russia and Kyrgyzstan was discussed without results. It was caused by such factors as the long-term repayment and the high cost (the initial cost in \$ 1.7 billion was raised twice), the negative attitude of Uzbekistan, which was afraid of negative consequences for its own hydro-energy. The joint development of hydro-energy resources under the agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed in February 2011 should provide further for construction of four other big stations in the upper flow of the river of Naryn.

The activities of “Gasprom” in Kyrgyzstan are subject to extension, given its free of custom deliveries of petrol. It made the population economize \$ 400 million annually and represent a significant help for the period of agricultural works. However, in April

2010 “Gasprom” revealed the facts of re-sail by false firms of this petrol at higher price to American base “Manas” and introduced the export taxes. In February 2011, the RF in response to the request of Kyrgyzstan at the meeting of the bilateral governmental commission agreed to abrogate the taxes, under condition of delivery of aviation kerosene to American base “Manas” directly by “Gasprom”. For this sake the joint Russian-Kyrgyz company was established with 51% of shares belonged to the RF.

It was supposed to invite Russian companies to start the geological exploration of gas and oil deposits in Kyrgyzstan. Roskosmos planned to form an enterprise for production of silicon to make photo-elements. Bishkek counts on Moscow in benefits for export of goods from Kyrgyzstan and informed about its intension to enter the Custom Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The share of the three countries in the trade turnover of Kyrgyzstan makes 44.9% (Russia – 26.9%, Kazakhstan – 16.8%, Belarus – 1.2%). It was supposed that Kyrgyzstan would ratify the agreement on joining the Union by September 2011. According to experts, the agreed joining by Kyrgyzstan of the Union is conditioned by its geopolitical location.

The expertise of the prospects in Russian-Kyrgyz relations is as follows: Bishkek will comply with its obligations to give Russia 49% of shares of enterprise “Dastan”, to settle disputed issues on the property rights of communication company “MegaKom”, to sell 75% of “Kyrgyzgas” to “Gasprom”. Kyrgyzstan will not fulfill its obligations in good time, the experts think. However, Moscow is not yet ready to introduce the visa regime for Kyrgyzstan, since payments of the Kyrgyz migrants working in Russia to their own country in 2010 made \$ 1.250 billion, which is comparable with the budget of the republic.

There are some doubts concerning conclusion of the agreement on creation of ODKB military base. Officially Bishkek supports the

idea of creation of the second Russian military center (planning to raise the price for it from \$ 4.5 million to 20 million for the objects protecting Russian interests in the republic). The local pro-American elite hinder extension of military presence of Russia in the republic and keeps significant positions in the system of state power.

The joint struggle against narcotic traffic from Afghanistan is one of directions for extension of cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan; 30% of Afghan narcotics come to Russia through southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. The situation became much worse after liquidation by Bakiyev of the anti-narcotic republican service (later it became known that narcotic flows were controlled by former chiefs of law enforcement bodies). In March 2011, the protocol on technical and financial assistance of Russia to Kyrgyzstan was signed in order to create a special police for struggle against narcotics traffic. ODKB planned to establish in Kyrgyzstan a center for struggle against narcotics traffic.

As a whole, it is possible to say that Russia takes real steps to render assistance to Kyrgyzstan and to keep stability in the republic, which is threatened by a split in case of aggravation of internal political situation. The latter is fraught with dramatic consequences for the whole Central Asian region and for national interests of the RF, since, according to some experts, it is impossible to exclude completely Kosovo variant, i.e. the attempt to solve internal inter-ethnic conflicts with participation of military forces of the USA and other NATO countries.

“Rossiya i novye gosudarstva Evrazii”,
M., 2011, N II, p. 89–95.

Kalimakhon Khushkadamova,
candidate of sociological sciences
(Moscow bureau of NIA of Tajikistan “Khover”)

**NATIONAL RITES
IN CONTEMPORARY TAJIKISTAN**

For the 1990s, the social reforms in the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) had impact on traditions, custom and rite practice in the country, which affect in particular re-production of traditional roles of men and women. The paradox of the situation consisted, on the one side, in extension of free display of various elements of ethnic-cultural heritage and, on the other side, in bigger financial demands for more extensive ceremonies. In Tajikistan compliance with traditional ceremonies as a form of national identification is explained not only by personal adherence to cultural traditions but also by the low self-estimation and the pressure of communal opinion. The woman was and is the party, which is subject to suffering. The conditions for sustainability of custom and rites of the population are kept just owing to the commune and traditional institutions. For instance, the social institutions, such as “mashvarat” (the meeting of the elders, who do not occupy official posts but have influence on communal life), “jamomad” (the meeting, the feast of men connected by relatives’ or neighbors’ relations), “avlod” (clan) – the group marked by blood relationship, “makhalla” (community).

The sociological studies show that the traditional rites keep large extension, particularly in rural districts. For the post-Soviet period, according to publications and personal author’s information, the number of men and women, who comply with Islamic rules and traditions, increased: they keep the fast, offer daily prayers, visit mosques etc. Women carry hijub openly. The number of polygamic and early marriages, redemption in various forms and exchange of presents

increase every year. At the same time, some rites are subject to eradication from daily life of the population: “gakhvorabakhsh” – match-making of babies, “ziefati dukhtar” – parting of female friends, “chomaburon” – ceremony of cutting out the bride’s dress.

The family occupies a significant place in personal life in the countries of the Central Asia as in the East as a whole. The preparation of marriage, its consecration and execution is of special importance among many cultural and religious ceremonies, which maintain sustainability of society, prove rightfulness of its stratification by sex, age, social status etc. According to research of expert G. Makhamova, devoted to the marriage rites, the respondents to questions put to them in some districts of RT experienced difficulties in dividing the rites as religious, traditional or secular. In Tajikistan, like in other Muslim countries, socialization of an individual, ideology, moral of traditional society to a large extent are based on religion. “Nikoih” is the religious sanctification of marriage. The interviews with women and mullahs prove it. The “nikoih” rite is described in Koran and contains obligatory conditions of its performance. Marriage may be regarded as both a religious and a traditional rite – all depends on its arrangement. Each rite has its own scenario of performance. Both in the south and in the north of the country marriage consists of the main equal stages: match-making, betrothal and additionally bride-show and invitation of the bridegroom to the house of the bride’s parents. The marriage performance is marked by greater number of participants and more expensive presents in the northern part comparing with the southern part, where marriage rite takes place only in one day.

Marriage is considered in Tajikistan as an obligation for the parents, and consequently by tradition they are liable for economic ensuring of marriage. Under present difficult economic conditions of Tajikistan, potential bridegrooms themselves earn money for the

marriage ceremony. It seems that just due to the growth of external labor migration and the rise of corruption in post-Soviet Tajikistan the number of different rites performed at high cost was increased. According to G. Makhamova's research, the respondents noted a lot of rites and the aimlessness of some of them. To the mind of participants of these rites, the corresponding existing problems aggravate stratification of society.

Many people are unable to arrange expensive rites for a lot of their participants. This fact caused an internal conflict: on the one side, these people "try not to be worse than others", but, on the other side, they lack the needed resources. According to the research, the respondents proposed to improve the traditional rites as follows: to borrow money and to arrange the marriage by established traditions; to reduce the number of invited persons but to conduct all performances; to combine certain rites and to reduce the number of invited persons; to reduce the number of presents and the cost of dowry. This method is used by mid-level and low-level provided families, which prefer execution of all rites. It should be taken into account that, apart from marriage, many other rites demanding a lot of expenses are performed in Tajikistan. Due to their mentality the people, who lack the needed resources, have to make big expenses and turn out to be in debt.

For the end of the 1990s – the beginning of the 2000s, more people started to draw attention of society to the need of putting into order the arrangement of national rites and custom. The highest officials discussed the issue. Mass media started to convince the people to reduce lavishness of various festivities, marriages and religious ceremonies. On 8 June 2007, the law on regulating traditions, festivities and rites in RT was adopted. Mass media of foreign states interpreted the putting in order of rites as violation of human rights. The law was amended a year later. It concerned in particular the number of guests

(up to 156), the time of performances (not more than 2 days, on Sundays – from 8 to 23 hours) and reduction of the number of presents. The marriage cortege should consist on not more than four cars, while marriage expenses should be covered equally by the parties of the newly-married couple.

The commission for regulation of traditions and rites, created by law, installed the control for compliance by citizens with the adopted norms. The needed amendments were made in the Criminal Code and the Administrative Code. For nine months after adoption of the law 24 violations became subject to judicial proceedings. The fines were imposed according to the decisions. The Administrative Code of RT provides for payment of the following fines: the physical persons – 100 minimum salaries, officials – 250 minimum salaries, legal entity – 500 minimum salaries. For the same period, in the course of four main rites the number of slaughtered cattle decreased by 35 thousand comparing with the nine months preceding adoption of the law. The number of rites was increased by twelve thousand as a result of lower expenses for their arrangement. The population saved more than one million somoni. The realization of the law contributed to protection of interests of the population under conditions of price rises for food and implementation of strategic policy for reduction of poverty from 83% to 56% of the population.

To the author's mind, for Tajikistan, where greater part of the population lives under the poverty line, it was a progressive document. As the analysis of national publications shows, while the author has seen it herself, the law is being supported by the population and is being developed with due account of specific features of the regions. For instance, the morning dish pilaf "oshi nahor" presented before marriage was not supported by mountaineers in Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region; and in the interests of the region's population the

law was amended, and it was decided to increase the number of guests invited to the marriage by 50 persons. It means that the law takes into account the local national and regional specifics.

Summing up, it should be said that the reviewed custom, rites and rituals represent only a part of such events connected with marriage and regulated by law. The law improves the situation of the population, particularly of women, liberates them from unneeded expenses and from physical and psychic overloading. This document may be appraised as an example of successful modernization of national rites.

*“Sots Is: Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya”,
M., 2011, N 5, p. 78–81.*

Arkadi Dubnov,
political observer

**THE AUTHORITIES OF TURKMENISTAN
CONSOLIDATED THE CONTROL
OVER THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC**

The image of the regime in Turkmenistan and of its leader in the world press corresponds exactly to the widely spread stock phrase of tyrannical governance. It is as follows: the leader, who has usurped power and divided it among representatives of his clan, the oppressed people, the mass propaganda of the cult of personality, the low level of living, the complete lack of democratic freedoms and independent mass media, the high level of xenophobia implanted in society. But Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov remains a quite adequate person for the world community. However, as the experience of Arabic troubles shows, in no way it guarantees either stability in the uninhabited country very rich in hydrocarbons or loyalty of the West in case of crisis.

The Turkmen president of 53 years old is the youngest person among the Central Asian autocrats in terms of age and period of presidency. The preventive measures taken by him to prevent the undesirable troubles make impression. After the first news about the troubles in the North Africa Berdymukhamedov in February 2011 started regularly and “suddenly” to visit distant auls formulating the demand that officials should “take urgent measures to put everything in order”. The information about his care for the people is regularly transmitted by Turkmen TV.

The much more rigid control was established over all people coming from abroad, particularly from Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. It is evident that the authorities tried to “catch” those, who left Egypt and the Near East as a whole in time of the troubles. In agreement with the Turkish authorities, all citizens of Turkmenistan with expired visas were deported from Turkey. The regime in the prisons for men, particularly for those, who were sentenced for crimes in group, i.e. for the people able to be organized in communities, redoubled its vigilance.

The needed measures were taken to extend control over religious Islamic communities living in separate settlements in the west of the country. A special attention is paid to the families and the clans connected with the Turkmen community in Iran. For the recent period of time, this community was radicalized to a great extent and took an active confrontation position against Iranian Shiites as well as made attempts to disseminate “pure Islam” to the territory of Turkmenistan.

Finally, president Berdymukhamedov took extraordinary measures to raise the level of personal security. In time of movement of the presidential cortege the city traffic is stopped in the streets of its direction as well as in the crossroads. The residents living in the streets qualified as “protocol route” are ordered to pull curtains on the

windows, are forbidden to invite guests in time of the cortege passing by, according to the special schedules.

It is evident that the regime expects significant threats in the external factors. Ashghabad maintains rather tense and different relations with Baku, Moscow, Tehran and Tashkent. All these events force the Turkmen leadership to look for support of the West, step by step making concessions in the negotiations on the conditions of selling Turkmen gas to Europe.

*“Rossiya v globalnoy politike”, M., 2011,
vol. 9, N 2, March-April, p. 138–139.*

L. Vasilyev,

political scientist (the IDV of the RAN)

THE SPECIFICS OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM IN THE CENTRAL ASIA

The extremist and separatist movements in the Central Asia more often use terror as a main means of political struggle. It is promoted in the Central Asian states by a number of internal political reasons, which may be divided into two main groups and which create in society the social environment providing constant support to activities of terrorist organizations. They may be divided into social-economic and ideological reasons subject to a more detailed consideration.

As social-economic reasons may be mentioned as follows: the economic and social crisis, unemployment and impoverishment of a great part of the population; the sharpened feeling of social disorder and the lack of protection of the majority of the population; the fall of the power's authority due to inefficiency of economic reforms; the essential rise of social stratification of society; the de-industrialization of economy and connected with it unemployment and marginalization of a

great part of the population, which first of all had impact on the youth under conditions of high birth rate; the problems related to payment of pensions and subsidies, support to education and health care systems.

The ideological reasons may be regarded as follows: the estrangement of people from the state and society, elimination of their participation in governance of their own life; the loss by many people of ideological and spiritual orientations in life, the destruction of moral values, falsification of provisions of traditional Islam and rise of significance of its radical trends; the disintegration of the region into separate countries causing creation of border, visa and other barriers within the former united space, which promoted national isolation of peoples of these countries; the ethnic and religious conflicts, radical changes in the world outlook, caused by great social troubles; the contradictions between secularism of temporal regimes in the states of the Central Asia and the political Islam; the repressive actions of the governments against opposition activities of the political Islamic movements in the region.

The appraisal of activities of terrorist, extremist and separatist organizations in the Central Asia at the present time and under the shaped conditions in the region makes it possible to come to some general conclusions.

At present, the biggest terrorist organizations in the CA have similar strategic aims as well as worked out multi-variant tactic of their achievement. At the same time, the autonomy of their arms component, the strength of networks and sustainability of cells and the technical equipment are subject to constant rise and geographic extension of actions and circle of people taking decisions for their execution.

Under current conditions, the population of the Central Asian region, if not giving support to terrorism, at least justifies terrorism as a method of struggle for a dignified life. It is caused by disillusionment

with the existing situation and the lack of essential changes for the best, as well as by the unsuccessful search for justice.

The peculiar feature of contemporary terrorism in the CA region, like in the whole world, is its close connection between terrorist and criminal structures. Formerly they only in parallel settled mutually beneficial local issues and further went apart, but at present observers see a rising symbiosis of these two dangerous trends. Meanwhile, their joint activities multiply the capacity of each of them, since they make a terrorist cover its activities as an ordinary criminal, while the reciprocal services increase efficiency of actions of both of them.

Terrorism in the Central Asia, like the whole contemporary international terrorism, to a large extent is the way of life of the great strata of the population of a number of countries. It does not show concern about the final outcome, since new aims will follow the achieved ones. Therefore, overcoming the circumstances creating and promoting terrorism represents the long-term struggle to achieve this aim, and only the combined efforts exerted by the whole world community could ensure its achievement, while the forceful methods are not the decisive factor of success.

Discussing the trends in dynamics of the terrorist activities in the region of the Central Asia, it is possible to expect as follows:

- the intensification of activities of separatist and extremist groups and the spread of their activities to new territories; striving of extremist movements for consolidation with preservation of their governance autonomy;

- the further politicization of Islam and consolidation of its radical trends' influence on the population resulting in rise of their ideology to the detriment of traditional teaching;

– the emergence of new forms of extremist and terrorist actions; the appearance in the region of the movement of people committing suicide-shahids;

– the continued integration of extremism and terrorism with criminal structures, consolidation of their connections and reciprocal action against the background of rise of narcotics traffic; the rise of illegal arms traffic;

– the extension of women involvement in extremist and terrorist activities.

The described general characteristics and tendencies of development of contemporary terrorism in the Central Asia are marked by their specific displays under particular conditions of different Central Asian states.

Kazakhstan. At present, the specifics and means of terrorist activities in Kazakhstan are determined by several factors.

First, although Kazakhstan is also in the sphere of activities of international terrorist organizations, they regard this state not as a zone for active terrorist actions but as a kind of base of clandestine work for preparation of subversive acts in neighboring states, primarily in Uzbekistan.

Second, the rise of terrorist danger is marked there in spite of trustworthiness of the above said. It is connected with intensification of efforts exerted for involvement of Kazakhs in activities of international terrorist organizations. The recruiting is carried out mainly among unsettled and poor young people. It is based on their religiousness and consists in propaganda of radical trends of Islam.

Third, this phenomenon is regarded by secret services as a probable and even growing threat of terrorist acts against diplomatic and commercial offices of foreign countries on the territory of the

country, first of all those which represent the USA, Great Britain and Israel, like, for instance in Uzbekistan.

At present, radical Islamist organization “Khizb-ut-Takhrir” is the most active in Kazakhstan. However, up to present, this organization limits itself with propaganda of its ideas and with expression of opposition to the official policy of the state by using leaflets and literature of certain contents. The activities of this organization are concentrated mainly in southern regions of Kazakhstan, where the share of the indigenous population of the republic is particularly great and the level of dissemination of Islam is high. However, this organization has already taken root on the territory of Kyrgyzstan putting its activities at the inter-state level. Formerly, mainly poor people joined this organization, but recently its emissaries strive for recruiting to it state officials, including officers of law enforcement bodies, wealthy businessmen, intellectuals and students. They try to establish contacts with mass media and to penetrate actually into all spheres of society. In November 2004, some members of organization “Jamaat of mojaheds” were arrested, who were supported by Al-Qaeda. According to secret service of Kazakhstan, this organization is an underground terrorist group. For two years of its activities it recruited 70 members (50 Uzbeks and 20 Kazakhs). Some of them were involved in terrorist acts in July 2004 in Uzbekistan. The arrested group of terrorists comprised also 20 members of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 14 representatives of Uigur separatist organizations and an emissary of the Kurdish Workers Party, who arrived to the country with a secret mission.

Kyrgyzstan. For the recent period, the state officials noted an evident rise of activities of supporters of “Khizb-ut-Takhrir”. The main directions of their activities are as follows: the dissemination of religious literature with calls for change of the existing order, the

propaganda of their ideas within the strata of the population. The agitators paid special attention to state officials, including officials of law enforcement bodies, and servicemen. They made attempts to organize mass meetings with anti-constitutional direction and used anti-American slogans.

To raise the attractiveness of the Party's activities among the common people its leaders have worked out a special social program called upon to ensure their positive attitude to the party allegedly waging the struggle against corruption and illegal actions of local officials. As an example of implementation of this program may be regarded the demonstrations in support of the rights of consumers of electric energy, the assistance rendered to young families in new housing construction, the assistance given to residents of Kochkor district damaged by an earthquake, the arrangement of annual festivities "Kurban" and "Orozo Ait".

It is worth mentioning a number of specifics in activities of "Khizb-ut-Takhrir" on the territory of Kyrgyzstan under contemporary conditions: 1) its activities are carried out under conditions of systemic crisis and transformation of economic and public-political life of the republic; 2) the integration and trans-border characteristic of its activities, particularly in Fergana valley, makes it possible for internal and external forces to use for their own interests some members of the organization; 3) the versatility of tactic in the organization's activities and dynamic reflection to all-state events; 4) the subversive activities occupying great place in its functioning; 5) for the recent period, intensification of its activities among Gastarbeiters in the places of their communal settlements.

The activities of "Khizb-ut-Takhrir" are supported mainly by ethnic Uzbeks living in compact settlements in southern regions of the country. It is caused, in particular, not only by religious but also by

nationalist agitation of this organization. The adepts of other organizations, according to the Service of National Security of Kyrgyzstan, carry out their activities on the territory of the republic, including “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, “Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan” and in the south of the country – the preachers of radical trends of Islam from Saudi Arabia, Iran and other states. They agitate mainly for creation in the Central Asia of a united Islamic state in the Central Asia, enjoying great financial support. They propagate in two thousand mosques constructed in the south of the country for the last years by foreign sponsors. The events of the years 1999, 2000 and 2005 were the most dangerous for the state.

For the period of 1999 and 2000, the armed groups of IDU arranged assaults to Batken and Cho-Alay districts with the aim of creating in the south of Kyrgyzstan the springboard for terrorist and subversive acts in Uzbekistan. For this sake they explored the locations, worked put the routes, acquired and fabricated the needed documents, arranged talks with local residents to convince them that the members of the bands were protectors of Islam and irreconcilable enemies of only the ruling power in Uzbekistan. It should be said that a certain part of the population supported them. The assaults of Islamists to Kyrgyzstan did not intend to involve it into war against Uzbekistan, contrary to some remarks made otherwise. They aimed at destabilization of the situation in Uzbekistan. By terrorist acts and subversive assaults they tried to intensify protest actions of the Uzbek opposition and to provoke troubles and to cause, as was supposed, state repressions. By such means they intended to come to power in the state. However, this course of events with great probability would not have been limited with the borders of one country. For that period, the talibs, having seized power in Afghanistan, proclaimed the course of “talibanization” of the whole Central Asia, and just they were behind

the back of Uzbek extremists. Fortunately, they failed to implement such plans.

Tajikistan. As a result of the civil war for the period from 1992 to 1997, which caused 50 thousand victims and the economic damage in the account of \$ 7 billion, the central power turned out to be weakened so much that it was unable to keep under efficient control either the borders or the territory of its own state. It allowed various radical organizations almost without obstruction to create their bases and camps in the country and in adjacent districts. Consequently, the tension was growing both in Tajikistan itself and in the neighboring republics. In 1997 the military actions stopped, and the united Tajik opposition signed the general agreement on peace and national consent, while some its representatives became members of the government. E. Rakhmon, the president of Tajikistan started to stabilize the situation and to consolidate his power, having achieved certain success in it. The defeat of talibs in neighboring Afghanistan promoted this process. However, for the last years “Khizb-ut-Tahrir” started to carry out its activities in Tajikistan on a larger scale. For instance, in February 2004 only in one (Sogdi) region the law enforcement bodies detained 22 members of this organization, including several officials of these bodies. A lot of publications and leaflets of extremist contents were confiscated from the detainees.

On 12 April 2004, the law enforcement bodies in Isfarin district of Tajikistan detained 20 persons suspected of committing heinous crimes based on racial and religious enmity. In particular, they were accused of assassination in the beginning of 2004 of S. Bessarab, the leader of the local Adventists, as well as of setting fire to some mosques, where their clergymen expressed loyalty to the government of the republic. In the course of detainment, the criminals offered armed resistance, and big depots of arms were discovered and confiscated in

their houses. The investigation and judicial proceedings established that these persons were members of new extremist organization “Bayat” (in Arabic – “oath”), including some of them being former supporters of talibs and participants of war in Afghanistan. According to indirect evidence, “Bayat” had connections with IDU. On 15 May 2009, the government of Tajikistan started operation “Mak-2009”, which officially was aimed at extension of the struggle against opium cultivation and narcotics trade in Rasht valley at the distance of 150 km from Dushanbe. Meanwhile, according to some experts, the operation was actually caused by the return to the value of known field commander M. Abdullo, who participated in the civil war and further was hiding in Pakistan and who returned to Tajikistan with one hundred fighters. After conclusion in 1997 of the peace agreement M. Abdullo left for Afghanistan and later had to go to Pakistan following the beginning of the USA military operation.

Turkmenistan. Actually there were no changes in internal and external policy of Turkmenistan after death of president S. Niyazov in 2006. The republic in terms of stability as usual is the calmest state in the region. Some experts predicted “popular revolution”, military junta coming to power and the inter-tribal clashes and chaos. Fortunately, it did not take place. New president G. Berdymukammedov made Turkmenistan a more open state for the external world, rehabilitated some people sentenced by the former regime, abrogated a number of unpopular decisions of the preceding president; however, he kept in force the provision, which considers as traitors to the Motherland those, who disseminates “doubts about rightness of the president’s policy”. Thus, the changes occurred in Turkmenistan do not concern substance of the republican political system and in the nearest future will hardly result in aggravation of the situation in the state. However, the violation of human rights occurring everywhere, corruption of the leadership and

complicated ethnic structure of the country in future may create preconditions for negative development of events.

Uzbekistan. For recent time, Uzbekistan occupied the first place in terms of activities of terrorist organizations among other countries of the Central Asia. In March 2004, in Tashkent and in some other districts of the country as a result of arranged explosions and attacks against militiamen there were assassinated several dozens of people. Some time later, on 30 July of the same year, the terrorist committing suicide organized three explosions in Tashkent near embassies of the USA, Israel and the office of the General Attorney. Four members of the law enforcement bodies in charge of protection of these objects were killed and nine people were wounded. Two terrorist groups (“Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” and “Islamic Jihad”) assumed the responsibility for the explosions in Tashkent and Bukhara in March and July 2004 in response to support of war in Afghanistan by Uzbekistan. Many observers connected the explosions in July with the judicial prosecution of participants of terrorist attacks in Tashkent in March, though. In any case, the situation in the country was aggravating on the eve of Andijan events in 2005. Unlike events in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the events in Andijan, to the mind of many analysts, represented a direct mutiny, which was prepared beforehand by internal and external forces. The capture of the military detachment’s building and the attack against the prison, the fire set to some public and administrative buildings should be qualified to be a mutiny. Its suppression was a direct duty of the state, and the adequate fierce reaction of the power seems to be quite justified. Unlike Bishkek, Tashkent demonstrated the force and determination in readiness to protect the Constitution of the country by all means.

Analyzing the reasons of the spread of terrorism in the Central Asia one should mention the peculiarities of the present structure of power and of the system of governance in the Central Asian states connected with mentality of their civil societies. It is common secret that actually in all of the region's states the ruling central and local elite is formed on the clannish basis. In Kazakhstan the representatives of the north of the country occupy the central posts, and the elite of other regions have to unite in "democratic opposition". In Uzbekistan the elite of Tashkent and Samarkand pushed aside from power the people from Fergana valley. In Kyrgyzstan after removal from power of A. Akayev family the struggle between residents of the southern and northern regions of the country goes on, and the Uzbek Diaspora participates in it. In Tajikistan the united Islamic opposition confronts the ruling elite.

At the same time, in these states the membership in certain clan has a deciding influence on a chance to join some or other elite. The complicated hierarchy of relations and rigid discipline reigns within them, while the ties with other clans are subject to strict regulation. Under these conditions, the social, ethnic and confessional groups of the population infringed in their rights use the existing extremist trends to express their dissatisfaction and impatience. The ruling elites, in their turn, use the threat of extremism and terrorism to intensify the pressure and to consolidate their own position. All this prevents stabilization of the situation and creates a threat of its change to the worse. The destabilization of the political system even in one country will inevitably raise tension in the whole region related to the need to install a more rigid border regime, will hinder implementation of joint economic projects, will complicate the trade turnover regime etc.

At the national level, all this will lead to limitation of political freedoms, infringement of human rights and loss of personal security, cessation of dialogue between society and state. It will result in rise of corruption and criminalization of society, including narcotics business, trade of arms and of people, as well as such dangerous phenomena as extremism and terrorism, which is fraught with loss of national governance.

Summing up discussion of activities of terrorist organizations in the region and of the conditions promoting these activities, it is possible to make some general conclusions.

This activity is inherent in trans-border characteristic, since it covers the territory of actually all Central Asian states, and it is coordinated by international terrorist centers. For the sake of achievement of the above mentioned general aims this activity is being carried out in the following directions:

- the destabilization of the general situation by terrorist and other subversive acts as well as physical elimination of representatives of the highest leadership of the region's states;

- the use of the territory of these countries as a kind of basis for training the reserve of active fighters and execution of subversive actions in adjacent states;

- the ideological-propaganda work among the masses of the population inter alia for recruitment of potential executors of terrorist acts.

The statistics prove that in comparison with other regions of the world the activities of terrorists in the Central Asia are relatively not high. However, it should be taken into account that terrorist and extremist acts were marked there actually since the moment of proclamation of independence and take place at present. This period of time was characterized by the change of methods of waging struggle:

from unleashing civil war in Tajikistan, through armed attacks of fighters against Kyrgyzstan and the mutiny in Andijan to the extensive actually semi-legal agitation for creation of the World Islamic caliphate. At the same time, the specter of extremist and terrorist organizations continues to be recruited by new and more notorious organizations and groups of fighters.

In spite of the measures taken in this sphere by the authorities of the region's states, they may not be regarded to be adequately sufficient. The number of pre-requisites promoting emergence and facilitating existence of separatist, extremist and terrorist organizations in the Central Asia increases and therefore creates conditions for preservation of problems connected with their activities.

It should be stressed that the international terrorism in the Central Asia comes forward as an instrument, which will be used in future for the change of political order of the Central Asian states. The radical intensification of activities of extremist, separatist and terrorist organizations will most likely take place for the transitional period, when the ruling elite will be changed in the states of the Central Asia.

The world financial crisis may be a catalyst of the rise of extremist and separatist feelings and consequently cause the intensification of terrorist activities. At the same time, the radical reduction of labor market may have an impact on the flows of illegal migration, criminality and other unlawful actions, which may result in rapid destabilization of the situation in the Central Asian region.

“Mirovye derzhavy v Tsentralnoy Azii”,
M., 2011, p. 195–208.

CONTENTS OF “RUSSIA AND THE MOSLEM WORLD” BULLETIN FOR 2011 № 1 (212)–12 (223)

N 1

O. Savchenko. Russia in the changing world (analysis of geopolitical processes); *Eldar Kasayev.* Politicization of Islam in Russia; *Vladimir Semenov.* Trends of ethnic consciousness development of peoples of Russia; *L. Birchanskaya.* Immigration to Moscow: new reality; *Sergey Slutsky.* The terrorist underground in Ingushetia; *Khushkadamova.* The women in the system of political power and management in Tajikistan; *S. Luzyanin, E. Safronova.* Hydrotechnical “attack” of China in Central Asia: consequences for Kazakhstan and Russia.

N 2

Aleksey Kiva. Russia: A way to catastrophe or modernization?; *D. Mukhetdinov.* The main problems in the moslem education development in Russia; *Vladimir Semenov.* Islam and national renaissance in Tatarstan for the boundary period between millenniums; *S. Slutsky.* The impact of confessional factor on recruitment of cadres for the terrorist underground in Dagestan; *Kamaludin Gadjiyev.* Nationalism and Islam in the Caucasus: ideological measuring; *N. Fedulova.* The Caspian region as a zone giving rise to conflicts: a threat to Russia; *Dina Malysheva.* Central Asia in the light of the Russian-American “reloading”.

N 3

Aleksey Kiva. Russia and countries of the East after collapse of real socialism and disintegration of the USSR; *E. Novikova.* External and

internal migration: what migrants are needed in Russia; *R. Nurullina*. Confessional system in Tatarstan; *A. Krylov*. Azerbaijan on the way of post-Soviet development; *R. Bekkin*. The Islamic financial model implementing in Kyrgyzstan; *Georgy Rudov*. The worth of sovereignty and the genesis of power in post-Soviet states of the Central Asia; *Robert Landa*. Islamism in the Central Asia and Russia; *M. Savushkina*. Russia and the Arabic world: cooperation and antagonisms.

N 4

Vasiliy Grishaev. Struggle against corruption in Russia: Historic overview and modern problems; *A. Salagaev*. Is Tatarstan typical or unique at the background of the Russian regions?; *Elman Rustamov*. Modernization specifics in Azerbaijan; *R. Bekkin*. Achievements and perspectives of the Islamic banking system in Kazakhstan; *Parag Hanna*. Kirghizstan and Tajikistan: independent but powerless; *A. Kurtov*. Turkmenistan: Chinese priority; *Elena Ponomareva, Georgy Rudov*. The knot of contradictions in the Middle Asia; *Tiberio Graciani*. Strategy of the USA in Eurasia and problem of narcotics in Afghanistan; *A. Volodin*. Pakistan: Relations with India against the background of internal instability.

N 5

G. Stankevich. Political Islam and contemporary Russia; *Alan Jioyev*. Extremism and security in the North-Caucasian Region; *Diana Chelpanova*. The protest's activity of the population in the North Caucasus; *Z. Amirova, A. Magomeddaev*. The political Islam in Dagestan: The external influence role; *Elmira Muratova*. Teaching Islam in the Crimea; *Gusein Bakhar Vagif*. Azerbaijan in the sphere of world; Diplomacy; *R. Sharipov*. The problem of ethno-political

processes in the post-Soviet Central Asia; *Parag Khanna*. Kazakhstan: A lot of pipelines bring in good fortune.

N 6

O. Kuropatkina. Religion and policy in modern Russia; *S. Sergeev*, *A. Salagayev*. Transformation of the provincial Soviet Tatarian nomenclature into the regional ruling elite of Tatarstan; *E. Burla*. The religious situation in contemporary Adygeya; *Aleksandra Takova*. The ethnic-political processes in Karachaevo-Cherkessia in 2005–2010; *V. Manatova*. Will the assertion about existence of local civilizations in the North Caucasus go beyond the talking stage?; *Arif Yunus*. Azerbaijan has become a factor in Islamic global war against the West; *V. Gelbras*. Kazakhstan after crisis; *A. Bolshakov*. The foreign policy of Kirghizstan in the context of conflicts' change in the post-Soviet space; *Khakim Rakhnamo*. The place and the role of Islam in the history of Central Asia (view from Tajikistan).

N 7

Roman Silant'ev. The Islam-Christian “dialogue” in Russia; *G. Ovrutskaya*, *Yu. Sinyavskaya*. Conflict potential of the modern diasporas in the receiving societies (by the example of Rostovskoy oblasti); *Marina Gugova*. Formation of political pluralism in Kabardino-Balkaria in the end of the XX century; *Sushchy S.* The Russian population in the republics of the North Caucasus for the beginning of the XXI century; *Parag Khanna*. Azerbaijan: The cork in the Caspian bottle; *Baidarov E.* The resource factor of nationalism in Kazakhstan; *Elena Kuzmina*. The change of power in Kirghizstan: A new turn in Great Game; *Nikolay Kosolapov*, *Marina Strezhneva*.

The post-Soviet space: Conventionality or reality? *Pain Emil*. The community slaves.

N 8

Yuri Bocharov. Who can judge? (On ratings of Russia in the world); *V. Shapovalov*. Renaissance of Islam and the needs in Islamic education; *R. Mukhametshin*. Formation of confessional policy in Russia: The experience of Tatarstan; *Renat Bekkin*. The Islamic financing methods in Azerbaijan; *Askar Akayev*. Kyrgyzstan: Disturbing premonitions; *Arkady Dubnov*. Tajikistan: The new opposition to the old president; *Alexander Skiperskikh*. The intellectuals and development of the democratic institutions in the post-Soviet Uzbekistan.

N 9

Leonid Openkin. From the past to the future (The social order of new Russia in the context of national historic experience); *P. Chuprikov*. The Islamic higher education institutions and state universities of Russia; *D. Lavrinenko*. The conflicting processes in Karachaevo-Cherkessia (2008–2010); *Aleksey Malashenko*. Will the Caucasus stand the last chance in 2020?; *Elena Petrenko*. Construction of national statehood. in Kazakhstan; *M. Shevchenko*. Energy security of Turkmenistan as a factor for its international position strengthening; *Arkadiy Dubnov*. Uzbekistan: Worn-out and subtle stability; *S. Mitrofanova*. The Islamic factor and the international Olympic movement.

N 10

P. Dutkiewicz, J. Goldstone. A new world order: Dialogue, integration and understanding; *Al'bina Mikhaleva*. A regional perspective of the

Islam identity in Russia (it's exemplified in perm territory); *Zamir Dumanov*. The North Caucasus: From separatism to the radical Islam; *Andrey Kazantsev*. The republics of the Central Asia: The foreign policy in many vectors and geopolitical uncertainty; *Zhyldyz Urmanbetova*. Kyrgyzstan: A look at the present and the future; *E. Borisova*. Tadjikistan – Uzbekistan: The struggle for water resources; *Dina Malysheva*. The Central Asia in the context of the Afghan situation; *Andrey Baklanov*. Bin Laden – a phenomenon in contemporary politics; *I. Goryushina*. The impact of the Near East on the Caucasian extremism.

N 11

L. Skvortsov. Reanimation of racism: Sources and variations; *Guzel Makarova*. The dynamics of Russian, regional and ethnic identities in Tatarstan; *Stanislav Chernyavsky*. Russia and Azerbaijan in the post-Soviet period; *Dina Malysheva*. The international-political links of Central Asian states and the Islamic factor.

N 12

Andrey Zubov. What kind of modernization does Russia need?; *Iohan Galtung*. The ten trends changing the world; *R. Bekkin*. The institution of waqf in modern Russia; *Sabina Garashova*. The geopolitical aspects of the USA; strategy in the Caspian region; *Diana Borovik*. The Caspian oil monarchy; *Elena Ionova*. The situation in Kyrgyzstan; *Khalimakhon Khushkadamova*. National rites in contemporary Tajikistan; *Arkadi Dubnov*. The authorities of Turkmenistan consolidated the control over the situation in the republic; *L. Vasilyev*. The specifics of contemporary terrorism in the Central Asia.

**РОССИЯ
И
МУСУЛЬМАНСКИЙ МИР
2011 – 12 (234)**

Научно-информационный бюллетень

Содержит материалы по текущим политическим,
социальным и религиозным вопросам

Гигиеническое заключение
№ 77.99.6.953.П.5008.8.99 от 23.08.1999 г.
Подписано к печати 22/XI-2011 г. Формат 60x84/16
Бум. офсетная № 1. Печать офсетная. Свободная цена
Усл. печ. л. 5,25 Уч.-изд. л. 4,9
Тираж 300 экз. Заказ № 196

**Институт научной информации
по общественным наукам РАН,
Нахимовский проспект, д. 51/21,
Москва, В-418, ГСП-7, 117997**

**Отдел маркетинга и распространения
информационных изданий
Тел. Факс (499) 120-4514
E-mail: market @INION.ru**

**E-mail: ani-2000@list.ru
(по вопросам распространения изданий)**

Отпечатано в типографии ИНИОН РАН
Нахимовский пр-кт, д. 51/21
Москва В-418, ГСП-7, 117997
042(02)9