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**STRUGGLE AGAINST CORRUPTION  
IN RUSSIA: HISTORIC OVERVIEW  
AND MODERN PROBLEMS**

**Introduction**

Russian corruption has been a struggle for numerous generations. It comes back to previous centuries. Russian aristocracy, a vast gathering of men of noble birth with titles, tsars, emperors, general secretaries and prime ministers, honest ministers and governors have been struggling against corruption. Great Russian poets and writers such as I.A. Krylov, A.S. Pushkin, N.A. Nekrasov, N.V. Gogol, M.E. Saltykov-Shedrin as well as actors of various artistic genres made a bigger contribution into that fight. Artists also have been implicated in depicting immoral behavior.

In effect, it seemed that massive attack on the corruption would have resulted in its disappearance from the Russian people's life and professional activity.

Attitudes towards corruption in a historic perspective could be seen as the struggle against its manifestations. One can compare them with the poisoned crown of the antiar, the tree of poison. Its deepest roots are spreading suckers just after the stem having been cut. The greatest Russian poet, A.S. Pushkin, described antiar growing in a hot

and dry desert. He visualized the scaring tree as an alone and violent guard in the universe. Corruption, in contrast, is sprouting on a fertile soil, in the center of civilization.

### **Point of view**

Corruption appeared to be an unavoidable societal phenomenon within the institutionalized state structures and formations. The reason is: no one attempted either to erase or eradicate its preconditions.

Despite the intention to get rid of corruption, it is still alive. What is more, its vitality can be easily explained by the fact that multi-layered structures of all kinds of officials are interested in it. The ordinary citizens of the country are also interested in it. The point is: they ought to support corruption because of the severe circumstances. In order to solve problems they have to get corrupted.

There is a growing list of definitions of corruption as a phenomenon in the dictionaries. The Big Dictionary for Lawyers defines the concept of corruption in a very strict and concise form. It's stated that "corruption is a dangerous societal phenomenon in the sphere of politics or state governance. It is displayed in intended use of profits and advantages in any possible way by the functionaries and those who are in power, as well as giving bribery to them" (Big Dictionary for layers, 2000:288).

Authors of the new Big Academic Dictionary of the Russian language have loaded the concept of corruption with emotional and extremely negative attitudinal flavor, having defined it as "direct, shameless, fierce use of power and authorized rights and opportunities in order to get easy money; venality of officials and politicians" (Big Dictionary, 2007:498).

Nevertheless, the former definition can not be seen as an absolute prerequisite to affirm the readiness of the majority of state officials to keep corruption preserving.

In our opinion, the recruitment of policy and as a consequence, placing of personnel, mainly on the personal employer's preferences basis, is pivotal in the concept of corruption. All other concomitant factors can't be taken into a serious consideration.

To build a team spirit for efficient management on the state level, it is necessary to use particular staffing strategies on the mentioned above basis. That is a major argument in favor of the personal devotion.

One can ask a question whether it is worth building a team when it is impossible to question and judge on the leader's honesty, sincerity and opinion.

Making wrong decisions by such a team is most probably to have drastic consequences for the society. Russian population have been fiercely affected by and slowly survived from them.

Nowadays campaign of struggling with corruption has coincided with the starting career steps of the current president Mr. D.A. Medvedev. It has dynamically accelerated and entered the front stage of social and political life of Russia.

Politicians and lawmakers in the State Duma have actively and energetically contributed aiming at struggling with corruption. They have approved and rectified piles of anti-corruptive documents and regulations. The only problem is: the content of papers and documents is closed for a wider population. Moreover, neither knowledgeable lawyers nor social scholars are intended to comment on them.

Short overview of all anti-corruptive actions of the previous year highlights the following ones: toughening punishment for bribery, abuse of power and confidence aiming at personal enrichment.

It seems paradoxical but the results of so-called anti-corruptive activity turned to be harmful but not useful one for the majority of the

Russian citizens. They are to pay bigger money to bureaucrats for being provided with allowable services than ever before.

Having started more than a year ago, the anti-corruption campaign added a substantial workload to the third power branch. Office of Public Prosecutor representatives, Ministry of Domestic Affairs, courts, tax offices of all levels had been involved into various activities that have resulted in completed search and disclosure of corrupted power officials of the middle echelon.

Mass media have published details about notorious corrupted characters as well as about their unmasking and punishment.

In order not to be trapped, top state and political circles of Russia took in advance all the possible precautions and warnings for legal and controlling authorities. They have remunerated for their job and got a guaranteed pension security. It's worth noting that such an incentive pay plan is many times fold pension of those Russian pensioners whose professional career was far from the power structures of the post-soviet period. One can easily assess such decisions as a particular bribery and prepaid scheme for the corruption fighters. The plan has not worked well. There is a proverbial saying that there is never enough money. The time for so-called "militiamen werewolves" has come. Both high and low rank officers including lieutenants, colonels and even generals got involved into corruption acts. Not only should-straps but judges' gowns turned to be dirty.

A growing set of corruptive bargains are being revealed and punished.

There is another widely spread form of so-called "concealed corruption". For the most of cases its exposure is hidden. Corrupted officials are exchanging their services, acting in accordance with the principle: scratch may back and I'll scratch yours. It is next impossible to prove that it is a corruptive act.

Further climbing a career ladder and reaching the apex of the power pyramid becomes a reality due to such “barter” activities. It is unlikely to be risk-taking. A “bunch” of mates and friends guarantees rescue.

One can compare corruption with a monster that is getting engrained into the modern Russian society. Another strong metaphor strikes the mind: it is deteriorating the society from inside and finally it could be compared with terrorism.

According to Georgy Satarov besides destroying the moral basis of the society corruption ruins economy and leads to unfair distribution of social benefits as well as to dangerous growth of social stratification.

Massive corruption came into existence during the period of privatization that was called by the talented Russian people “wild gangster privatization”. It was the time of properly redistribution resulted in a big amount of imposing monuments in the majestic corners of the Russian cemeteries and inherited by the descendents.

Later period of privatization turned to be more civilized. The time of loans-for-shares auctions has come. As a common rule auditor’s report on the privatized enterprises of the board of Mr. Sergey Stepashin stated validity and reasonableness of privatization procedures. Fines in favor of the State were rare. Some auditors of the Controlling Board were granted with bigger rewards by the owners of the privatized property. They could afford bribes because extremely expensive property belonged to them. They had paid nothing for it. It goes without saying that such reports made some people calm. Partly, the owners suffered from lack of self-confidence. They felt they knew for sure that they could not entirely possess their ownership. They got it illegally.

In order to comfort Russian tycoons and their overseas partners, authorities and governmental circles did their best. They have kept



lulling: “It does not make any sense to get worried. Nobody expects privatization reviewing”. Such formal and public affirmation meant that there was not any obstacle on the way of corruption.

Moreover, under the world financial crisis inflation and unemployment are rising in Russia. Production growth rates, export tax revenue have drastically reduced.

Ironically, at the beginning of the current year mass media announced that Russia was not anymore a world leader in terms of number of oligarchs. Russia has lost one-half of them. Tycoons of all calibers were sliding into poverty. Some of them had many billion debts.

Having heard that, “God fathers” of oligarchs started a rescuing campaign. In order to not to be late and to be in the right place on time tycoons also contributed into setting written communication channels: they started scribbling enquiry letters and asking for subsidiary payouts from stabilization fund.

On the 18-th of February the newspaper “Izvestiya” published the editorial under the title “Let’s help billionaires”. The article was full of details concerning some well-known Russian oligarchs’ behavioral patterns under the crisis, as well as the Russian government readiness to respond to their queries for help. It’s not a secret but with intention not to pay taxes, their firms were registered in off-shore places: in Cyprus, in the Netherlands and Luxemburg.

The editorial rhetorically asked a delicately wrapped question: “Should the State stop playing off-shore games and not pay for their assets?” The delicate strategy of the newspaper is more than transparent. One can easily anticipate prosecution for fomentation of hate for oligarchs.

In 2009 the economic and financial crisis has greatly affected the population of Russia. Under these conditions struggle for surviving

turned to be on focus. Struggle against corruption has been slowly shadowed. At the same time it has got overt that corruption could cover those social and political spheres that traditionally have been free from its destructive effects. The amount of corruptive deals of power circles and suddenly “broken” tycoons and bankers blatantly demonstrate this assumption. The Russian society infected with the virus of corruption has attained the epidemiologic edge. The population needs sanitary and healthcare inspection. It has to escape from the forthcoming catastrophe.

Firstly, Russia should change the vector of the political system development from the authoritative model onto the democratic one. It, undoubtedly, allow selecting the managing corpus of all possible levels on the democratic and competitive basis among honest, decent and conscientious highly educated professionals. They should be experienced in working for the power structures. They should have credentials of their relevance. They should be strong and ready to combat and remove from officers arrogant, perky and cheeky contenders whose career motto is: “What do you want, my boss?”

To avoid from the second category of officials and bureaucrats is, in fact, next to impossible. Therefore, the struggle with corruption under the authoritative political system can’t lead to positive results.

On the one hand, the democratic and competitive way of shaping the managing corpus among gifted and decent Russian people will be possible if only dirty tricks so-called “administrative resources” and intended deceit of inexperienced voters would have been excluded from the electoral campaign. As a rule the voters see quite different elected personalities who are political “weathercocks”, viewless demagogues. In order to get benefits and get privileged or to reserve assets they do need power. Those who are striving to be elected for the presidential post should take part in debates.

On the other hand, in order to minimize banning or, in contrast, prescriptive legal acts and regulations one should replace them by the advising ones.

The remaining and necessary for secure life of the Russian people banning and prescriptive acts and regulations should be explicitly meaningful and be gradually implemented. There are critical points for corruption. There will be no rooms for usury. Only those functionaries who have been poisoned by the virus of kleptomania would have been caught for usury. In other words, all can worsen for corrupted officials because of the shrinking opportunities.

There will be isolated isles, the dark corners of the state full of corruptive activities. They will not jeopardize the morale of the Russian people.

Thirdly, thorough systematic work aimed at configuring of the civil society and legal institutions and mass media, reporting to it, should run.

Fourthly, one should lose stereotypes. There is prejudice that only obedient, devout and loyal to their leader team players and mates can rule efficiently in all levels: from the central up to the local ones. One should escape this dangerous misconception. It is necessary for those who are in charge of building teams of managing staff and executives of all levels.

The activity of the “leader of all nations ever” on the Soviet political arena can serve a bright example of the two decade uncompromising struggle with dissenting people. Stalin wanted to build a team of mates in all the powerful structures in the Soviet Union.

To attain this aim several millions of nonconformists labeled as “enemies of the people” have been shot or exiled to GULAG.

Wise and far-seeing leader ordered “faultlessly”, helping bury several millions of soldiers and officers of the Red Army.

He didn't change his strategy after the Second World War. Having won the War, the Soviet people kept suffering from Stalin's outrageous tyranny. For the sake of preventive measures several thousands of the Soviet people were shot in 1950–1951. They were prosecuted under so-called "the Leningrad case". They were said guilty because they had been at war, they had seen death and they had survived in a 900-day blockade of Leningrad and have resulted in independent judgments on the after-war life. They lost their fear under the Stalin's punitive policy. Besides, several millions soldiers and officers have been coming home from the fronts. They gave freedom and peace to the European countries from the Nazi occupation.

They were considered to be a potential danger for the Stalinist totalitarian regime. They could blow up the regime. But, unfortunately, they did nothing. There was not any socio-political explosion. Stalin did know the history of Russia well. He was wiser and more provident than the liberal emperor Alexander I who had not been able to prevent the rebellion of the Decembrists. Having come back to Russia from their European campaign, officers set up covert societies, aiming at deposition of the monarchy. In December 1825 in the period of interregnum, they entered the Senate square taking up arms.

I.V. Stalin didn't keep waiting when the hotbeds of opposition against his entire power would come into emergence. In 1946–1948 just after the Second World War the powerful ideological campaign has started. It was the struggle against potential opponents of the totalitarian political regime. The best scientists, artistic professionals, well-known writers, poets, composers, philosophers, historians, economists, linguists, cyberneticists and geneticists have been demonized, triggered and later morally defeated. The "Leningrad case" turned to be a top moment of the struggle against the after-war dissenting personalities. It was a true present for Stalin's jubilee. Several thousands of the

Communist Party members, trade union activists and young communists were shot and morally ruined.

Nowadays some well-known writers, publicists and political scientists argue that Stalin with his associates have been destroying corrupted officials and the so-called “fifth file” in the Red Army.

What if to support them? Nowadays the struggle against corruption is a rather dangerous idea. This struggle can result in serious consequences. Not only true corrupted officials can inevitably suffer but several thousands of the Russians who are to get corrupted due to the existing circumstances. Is it worth doing? Perhaps, it doesn't make any sense to initiate the struggle against corruption to find out corrupted officials in the power circles and to reveal their names or to toughen the punishment. Is there any certainty that corrupted officials will be afraid of further involvement into bribery activity? This very scenario will lead to the endless fight with corruption. Would it better to get restricted and struggle with its manifestations?

It's fair to say that the top power echelons with the president D.A. Medvedev in the head have finally understood the essence of corruption, its danger and the crucial necessity to minimize its destructive consequences. In July 2008 mass media witnessed that Mr. President had chaired a meeting on the formation of the personnel reserve for top – heavy managing staffing structures. Representatives of the Federal executives, educational authorities, scientific circles, political parties and non-governmental organizations entered the committee.

A paradoxical situation is being framed: corruptive officials supplied with the top bosses' orders decided to fight corruption.

The rich and educative history of Russia witnesses the analogy with the modern situation. As it's well known at the beginning of the 60-s of the XIX century in accordance with the Emperor's Alexander II

initiative the landholders seigneurs (pomeshchiks) “abolished” the servage, i.e. passed the so-called Emancipation Edict. According to the data more than 3212 peasants’ bloody riots took place in the period of 1861-1863. Moreover, the Emperor who had freed the people ended his life tragically. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1881 Alexander was deadly wounded and passed away several hours later.

A delayed-action mine that has been prepared by the landlords-liberators detonated in 1917. The Russian Empire crashed. On the contrary, corruption survived.

As a result under the total corruption the Presidential committee found 172 qualified experts. According to mass media they are originated in Russia not “exported” from countries that are safer and free from corruption. No one knows the technology of the experts corpus configuring. God knows. It was a hard slog for them: to choose 1000 people among 1211 contenders for the top staffing managing reserve.

At the starting point of the experiment 100 pretenders were chosen as the trial ones. They were introduced to Mr. President. It was a kind of a “viewing of the bride”. No one knows who the favorites are. A further “bride-show” for the Prime-minister is coming. If the experiment with the top 100 is being succeeded the next 990 pretenders will be introduced to both the President and the Prime-minister.

Generally speaking the President and his anti-corruption board have got an agenda: there are plenty of plans to implement. A rotation of the managing staff of all levels from the federal one up to the local ones is being expected. More than 20000 specialists will be involved into the procedure.

It’s worth emphasizing the criteria for the presidential elite hundred of contenders. Among them the following personal and

professional qualities are listed: ability to be successful, managing abilities, strategic thinking capacities, reputation and competences.

Is not that a team portrait of all kinds of corruptive officials? Are not their major personal and professional qualities? It's next to impossible to climb a career ladder and to be assessed by authorities without these credentials. The problem is: experts accidentally forgot to include to this list such prerequisites as honesty, decency and ethics. Who knows they could forget these qualities intentionally. Perhaps, they could not find clean pretenders for the presidential reserve. They have been searching. They couldn't find. They stopped and finally got calm down.

The major difference of a decent official from a dishonest one is the following: the decent official is able to accept blame for wrong solutions. He gets dismissed. The second type of official searches and then nominates the guilty people for every single failure.

Within the frame of the struggle with corruption the widely advertised campaign of income declaration for top managers, party and governmental circles and their families, initiated by the President D.A. Medvedev, provokes serious thoughts. As one can feel this campaign is more than ambiguous. It asks a question whether it could lead to the efficient means of struggling with corruption.

Might it be a sign for the corrupted officials? Might it mean that it's a crucial moment for getting rid of their favorite activities and to hide their wealth that was earned in a criminal way? The majority of the corrupted officials managed to do that in advance. Those who didn't do it they have got enough time for doing that. The legislative bodies provided all with a time-out. The official income declarations will be compulsory only in 2010!

At the time-being family income declaration are voluntary. The president D.A. Medvedev and the prime-minister V.V. Putin were the

first who had declared their accumulated family income. They have been tailored by their vices.

The regional and local authorities are likely to declare their family income in the nearest future. One can predict that the majority of the Russian citizens deprived because of the worldwide financial crisis will assess the information containing the life and income details of the authorities with irritation and indignation. Due to the lack of a civil society in Russia they will not flood streets with demonstrations; they will not require impeachment for the president. Moreover, no one will be surprised by the fact that there would be found poor and underprivileged officials.

There is pretty sure assumption that this notorious campaign of income manifestation will not contribute positively to the reputation of power circles among the population of Russia. The minor population having studied the income declaration content of the official elite will be likely to queue aiming at getting the presidential staffing reserve and all the privileges of the officials' life in their own purposes.

Do we need such a queue for those who are eager to get power? The answer is: NO!

It's needless to say that it would be better to search talented and decent executives who are able to serve and contribute for the sake of the Russian people's wealth, in the working teams and convince them to change their job and get a bigger and significant position.

Perhaps, the presidential campaign is aimed at different foci and different objectives? May be the major purpose is to find out who is who in the power circles of the Russian state? Just to find out in order to trigger both the so-called "honest" corrupted officials and those ones who will show phony information. The "honest" corrupted officials can submit true information concerning their income and property including those ones of the corruption act origin. They can hope that the very



sense of declaration is a hidden form of amnesty. On the contrary, those corrupted officials who submit fake information do hope that their money is secure.

Finally, the “honest” and not “honest” corrupted officials will be “triggered” by the ruling tandem. It will manipulate with the loyal team-players for a long time.

The history of Russian witnesses one authentic fact. The great inquisitor A. Vishinsky was alive because the chief (Stalin) knew all the sins and wrong-doings of his subordinate.

Only those corrupted officials who will declare non existent incomes due to their arrogant and vogue ambitions may sleep well and not to be scared stiff of repressions.

The rest of corrupted officials will be a bit anxious and uncertain for some period of time. They will live under psychological discomfort until they understand the sense of the “black lists” for the ruling tandem. In the era of Stalin such lists were the major arguments for shooting.

The former head of the KGB (Security service of the USSR), Mr. Y.V. Andropov, has collected for 15 years of his duty an impressive archive of information about corrupted officials: party leaders, ministers, their vices, directors of enterprises, departments stores and supermarkets, heads of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes, shadow entrepreneurs and others. Having got the post of the general secretary of the Central Committee of the communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andropov for only one year exiled to the corrective labor institutions and detention centers several thousands of corrupted officials. For the period of 15 months of his duty he resigned 18 ministers and 17 first secretaries of the regional committees and the first secretaries of the Central Committees of the former Soviet

republics. There was no such a staff rotation of the top executives in the notorious 1937.

At the same time the corrupted officials from the Ministry of Interior and prosecutor's office, in revenge, managed to prepare false evidence and frame up cases resulted in imprisonment of several hundreds of the Soviet and party officials who had disturbed bribe taking. There is a proverb: "Splinters will fly when the axe you ply". The only problem was: several hundreds of non-guilty people having been obstructing corruption were seen as "splinters".

### **Resume**

Who can foresee the results of the struggle with corruption nowadays?

Firstly, one can assume the growing rates of bribery.

Secondly, there will be a full list of the corrupted officials up to the 2010. The declaration information will likely to be fake.

Thirdly, all kinds of anti-corruption committees, boards and panels will not guarantee the problem solving. It's well known that in order to buy a reasonable suggestion it's fairly enough to make a committee.

Fourthly, due to the fact that corruption is a part and parcel of the modern power system it's impossible to rely on the struggle with it without changing this very system. One can precede success just in the struggle with its manifestations. It's possible to find out corrupted officials and even to punish them. New appointees from the presidential staffing reserve more gifted and young will take the vacant positions.

I firmly recommend to the freshmen who are on their way to get a plethora of corrupted officials to study thoroughly an idiosyncratic book by Robert Grin "48 Laws of Power" (Grin, 2001). It may be viewed as a bench book for those who are eager to polish up skills to manage people, to exploit their weaknesses in order to attain power.

Having learnt the theory one feels confident and strong enough to climb a corruption tree. This is a very comfortable seat for the top corrupted circles of Russian state. Ironically, the state announced the anti-corruption war and started swinging a stem of the tree of poison and ulcer.

It does make any sense for getting troubled. Top authorities will not cut their favorite tree. The only advice should be suitable: beware of falling down! It is easy to fall downwards the peccable ground and be caught by guards, stuffed with handcuffs; finally, be imprisoned.

The results of this study have definite implications for both corrupted officials and for those who broke an anti-corruption war. Everyone should be aware of a destructive nature of corruption. It ruins moral, political and socio-economic basics of the Russian society.

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**A. Salagaev,**

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## **IS TATARSTAN TYPICAL OR UNIQUE AT THE BACKGROUND OF THE RUSSIAN REGIONS?**

Many new actors of a political process – the regional political communities, elites, political systems and etc. – could be more exactly called as “demonstration” but not as the appearance in Russia at the turn of 1980-1990-ss. But this variety couldn’t be demonstrated in full

though the regions of Russia differed from each other including a political aspect (in contrast to the parties).

Strengthening of the regional identity in Russia of 1990-ss was also a response for the soviet identity crisis whereas the Russian identity was being in the process of establishment. It's possible that a process of a regional differentiation and decentralization in 1990-ss had gone too far and so the inverse process changed it in the next decade. One can suppose that the processes of recentralization and decentralization, the regional constituent increasing or decreasing in the public consciousness will change each other during some period of time like ebbs and flows until achieving some optimal balance at that moment.

What are the sources of a regional variety? As it seems it can be turned into the main four groups of factors. Firstly, it's a population of the region being characterized with specific quantitative and qualitative features. The quantitative characteristics are, first of all, the population size; the qualitative characteristics are ethnic, confessional and other kinds of the identity distributed in the region.

The second important source of the regional variety is the physical-geographic peculiarities of the region defining its economic specialization. Oil production and petrochemistry are prevailing though Tatarstan's industry keeps a diversified structure inherited in the soviet period of time and the territorial poly-centric. They became the leading branches in 1990-ss whereas production volume of machinery-building was reduced in 1,5 times. A number of the factors promoted to petrochemistry's and oil production's success. Oil industry workers were the political allies and the regime support and only Tatarstan's oil was in demand at the external market – with few exceptions. The republic directorate was practically split at the turn of 1980-1990-ss because of sovereignty policy supporting.

The directors of the defense plants oriented only at allied center but the republican leadership managed to attract the oil industry workers. The representatives of oil industry workers took the important place in the regional elite during 1990-ss and take it now.

If to compare two republics being similar enough in the minerals availability and economy structure – Tatarstan and Bashkortostan one can note the importance of the first factor in comparison with the first one. Petrochemical and oil producing plants of Tatarstan rank N 10 and N 14 among the biggest companies of Russia but Bashkortostan – 35, 44, 229, 315 and 319. The energetic company “Bashkirenergo ranks N 72 but “Tatarenergo–79. “Kamaz” ranks N 46 but Ufimskoe motor works -309. Nevertheless, it’s evident that just 3–4 above-listed branches of the industry prevail in the both republics.

However, one shouldn’t hurry to make conclusions that “oil curse” is economic basis of “authoritarian situations”.

The ethnic population structure differences of the republic as it seems influenced on the structure of the ruling elites of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The problem is that the Bashkirs are not a dominating ethnos in turns of numbers in Bashkortostan (29,8% in 2002). So, the social basis was less steady in comparison with M. Shaimiev but a reaction to opposition demonstration was tougher. As a result in 2000 M. Rakhimov had to come to the great terms for the federal center: the Bashkir “neftyanka” passed under the control of AFK “System”.

The third source of the regional variety is the peculiarities of a social and a political development being as a result of “historical way” (path-dependent). First of all, M. Shaimiev’s group relying on the agrarians and oil industry workers excluded the party managers from the republican political forefront and then neutralized the directorate of the industrial plants. After that the fate of the opposition (or half-opposition) political movements – democrats, communists and the

Tatar ethno-nationalists – was predetermined. In the middle of 1990-ss they are excluded from the political forefront and marginalized.

And at last, the fourth factor is unpredictable but inevitable chances which can be quickly accumulated in the complex and super-complex systems according to the chaos theory even if there were their initial similar parameters. Occasional fluctuations quickly make the systems unlike each other being developed independently. In particular, the internal structure of the regional ruling elite at the turn of 1990-ss – 2000-ss was, to our mind, the result of a number of chances in many respects. The structure of the late-soviet regional elite was in many respects based on the trade and hierarchical principles (but the main groups were the party managers of the republican level, the soviet managers of the republican level, directorate, agrarians, the municipal managers) but by the end of 1990-ss these principles were changed with a principle of a personal loyalty but the trade groups – with the personal “clans”.

It's in many respects accidentally that just those figures headed the above-mentioned groups. If these figures were elsewhere the similar sub-elite groups were headed by somebody else and the political spectrum within Tatarstan's elite was the same structurally but it looks different personally.

So, is Tatarstan unique or typical? Tatarstan is unique like any Russian region because of singularity of those initial components forming socio-cultural portrait of the region, those components determining multidirectional and conflicting processes being a socioeconomic, political and cultural life of the region. One can't name the other Russian region where two ethnic communities would so peacefully and friendly coexist during many centuries. One should mention relative economic good of the region based in many respects

on oil production and petrochemistry, million-plus city having a rich history and culture and uniqueness of these criteria will unquestionable.

However, Tatarstan is also typical. And it doesn't concern the internal heterogeneity of ant regional community as the experts of Perm suppose. Only those value orientations are typical for Russia which were demonstrated during the mass inquires.

It's important that today that impulse of the social activity, of "will for the changes" Russia was spread at the end of 1980-ss seems to be completely exhausted. The country fell into "sleepiness" having given itself up to the social passiveness. In some regions like in Tatarstan it happened earlier, in the other – a little bit later.

The social passiveness also makes the modernization difficult: even the most active and well-to-do citizens (one-third) believe that the results will be positive owing modernization campaign. Almost 60% of the citizens don't know which groups can be a moving force of innovations but 23% are sure that there are no such groups at all. Why? It's so because the majority of the Russian population doesn't rely on its own resources and consider that the situation can be changed only from above. Those who rely on their own resources wait for nothing good of these changes from above. The results of public opinion poll in Tatarstan demonstrated vividly the same public mood – paternalism of the weak social groups and individualism of the powers.

*"Sociokulturny portret Respubliki Tatarstan", Kazan, 2009, p. 199–124*

**Elman Rustamov,**  
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**MODERNIZATION SPECIFICS IN AZERBAIJAN**

The essence of institutional modernization of Azerbaijan – the country, characterized by developing economy and by rich natural resources, may be briefly described as a process of evolutionary formation of the institutional environment, which would make it possible to create the national diversified and sustained economy for the historic definite period (doctrine “Azerbaijan-II”).

The successful realization of institutional modernization is connected with determination of an optimal correlation of the efforts exerted for the sake of achievement of two tasks: a) construction and development of universal mechanisms of coordination in economic and public-political spheres in a group of countries; b) use of competition advantages based on cultural traditions of various nations and determining behavior of economic actors.

The unbalanced decision by itself creates threats to the stable development of the country. The consideration of several factors, which have an impact on modernization process in Azerbaijan, is presented below.

The ethnic identity should be mentioned. The identity may not be a final outcome, since it is in the process of changes, as was noted by E. Renan: “the nation is a constant plebiscite”. At the same time, many elements making the kernel of the national (ethnic) identity of Azerbaijanis have been formed already. Thus, the introduced in Soviet times official territorial ethnic community “Azerbaijanis” has been mainly adopted by society. The Azerbaijani relatives-family relations as a feature of national character have been better kept than, for instance, in some other post-Soviet republics. The stable family and relatives ties in total remain a value to be appealed. The respect to elders and to



women is maintained in all strata of society and is not questioned by anyone. The preservation of these relations is of great significance in the system of social security of the republican population, in rendering assistance to the old people, children and disabled persons. And it is an essential element of the social capital of reforms.

At the same time, Azerbaijan, like China, may not ignore the modern systems of pension security and social insurance putting this burden on the family-relatives institutions. The level of their preservation and the characteristic of their functioning in Azerbaijan is nearer to the European norms than (for instance, characteristic for many peoples of the southern part of Europe) than to the norms, existed in China. The small families in Azerbaijan often are subjects of economy primarily in the sphere of small business, and there are good conditions in the country for further development of family business. However, such business may not be of such significance in Azerbaijan as in China and in some countries of the South-Eastern Asia.

The wide network of patriarchic families has almost disappeared in Azerbaijan, unlike the situation in the East Asia; and the functioning of large families is mainly limited with rendering to them daily assistance. The level of autonomy and emancipation of the individual is much higher than in China and other countries of the East Asia, while the most active part of the youth is characterized by its western orientation. It should be said that “the network’s capitalism” and a peculiar type of social mutual assistance, not based on the state structures, is typical for the agrarian countries. More than half of the population of China lives in the country, in the agrarian regions. Azerbaijan is an urbanized country with the corresponding structure and type of family-relatives relations.

At the same time, the family relations in Azerbaijan are kept and cultivated, and they play a significant role in the system of everyday

mutual assistance. For instance, neighbors traditionally take upon themselves a wide circle of obligations in arrangement of funerals. It is a common public view that it is possible to use as a social capital of modernization some features of social life, being proud of them. And the features of social life, described below, are mentioned more often.

Patriotism and love for the native people and country is quite significant. It is said that the Azerbaijanis as members of the Diaspora do not sever connections with the native country and are ready to render assistance to it for construction of the better future.

Readiness for the united and common actions is important. The Soviet past experience was accepted well by the mentality of Azerbaijanis, since it contained the collectivist component.

Tolerance, hospitality and peaceful disposition are displayed by society. These features let arrange relations in the contemporary world plurality, participate in multinational projects and initiatives, maintain business relations with any partners.

Entrepreneurship, knowledge to see the benefit and to find out the means to derive creates competitive advantages for Azerbaijanis in business under other equal conditions.

Religious identity makes it is possible to determine the common features of the religious impact on modernization processes, basing on the results of scientific research. According to R. Motika, in Azerbaijan over 93% of residents consider themselves as Muslim believers, but only 3–4% of the population may be regarded as “active” believers, who comply with various dogmas of Islam. At the same time, the religious norms have their impact on almost all spheres of everyday life of society in Azerbaijan. They are displayed in family etiquette, in marriage relations, in reciprocal relations of gender groups. Most funerals in Azerbaijan are based on religious rituals. Islam in Azerbaijan functions in the ethnic-cultural sphere and is closely

connected with Azerbaijani identity. Side by side with the official Islamic structures there exists as well the phenomenon of “people’s Islam”, which, for instance, is displayed in pilgrimage to various holy places, as well as in local associations of believers, headed by the charismatic figures, who lack religious education. It is evident that any modernization projects in Azerbaijan should take into account these factors. At the same time, the Azerbaijani model permeated with religious traditions and norms is highly susceptible also to the best western values.

The civilization and national-state identity should be mentioned. The historic-cultural research shows a limited combination in national culture of Azerbaijanis of both European and Eastern features, of both secular and Islamic self-consciousness. The synthesis of western and eastern origins was rooted in national identity of Azerbaijanis, and therefore the displays of painful search for self-identification are quite rare in society of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijanis are Europeans with Islamic mentality. They may work as Europeans and behave as Muslims at home. This is a characteristic example of the self-description of the contemporary Azerbaijani.

The level of determination (the lack of conflicts) of national self-consciousness, achieved in Azerbaijan, is a rather rare example in the post-Soviet world. The disintegration of the Soviet Union almost everywhere was the reason of the identity crisis. This crisis had old historic pre-conditions in some new independent states. In Azerbaijan the intellectuals, appeared in the middle of the XIX century, personified for instance by M.F. Akhundov, was at once oriented to the synthesis of cultures of the East and the West. Polish scientist T. Sventkhovsky rightly characterized the elite as a supporter of modernization and mentioned that the aims of Azerbaijanis modernists of the XIX century were concentrated primarily in the sphere of enlightenment.

Modernization in Azerbaijan is based on a rather old historic tradition, while the ideals of the elites in charge of modernization were concentrated mainly on the tasks of people's enlightenment, development of culture in the limited sense of this word (the rise of level of education, development of art, promotion of spiritual searches etc.). In Azerbaijan, according to T. Sventokhovsky, the notion "intellectuals" originally meant the people, who had mastered Russian culture. Since the end of the XIX century, the Turkish influence gained in strength; however, it did not change the mainly cultural orientation of modernization processes and only fixed in mass consciousness the idea of synthesis of cultures.

The high level of education, of enlightenment of the population in Azerbaijan, like a high level of Azerbaijani culture, is perceived also today as a high value and an important modernization resource. The personal authority in Azerbaijani society to a large extent is based on the actual level of education, while this criterion is more important than the status of the older person. The prestige of the educated person was high both in the pre-Soviet period and at the present time, when education and enlightenment go on to be regarded in society of Azerbaijan as a priority for the wide masses of the population. They continue to play the role of an important resource for vertical mobility, while the higher education institutions are the social lifts. The aspiration for getting education is perceived and may be interpreted as a feature of national culture.

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What are the integral parts of national peculiarity of the Azerbaijani way of modernization? The present stage of modernization in Azerbaijan is characterized by the more favorable conditions of its development. The most active part of society pins its hopes on modernization to ensure the favorable future. There are no opponents to

the idea of modernization. The modernization in Azerbaijan does not confront resistance of the traditions; on the contrary, the remained traditions may themselves become its social-cultural capital. There have been discovered two main perceptions on a probable correlation of traditional and innovation elements of the social-cultural capital in the institutional transformation of society.

The modern institutions, “contemporary” means and forms of communication, governance and actions may and must be used in the sphere of official relations – in work, in business, in office. The space of their localization shall be public and external.

The preservation of traditional, national forms and common occurrence, i.e. non-formal institutions should be promoted in the private space, in the milieu of personal and informal relations – in everyday life, in family, in friendly associations.

The local and traditional features may and must be included in contemporary practice. They may contribute to its success. As far as possible, it is necessary to create the institutions based on combination of western and eastern, modern and traditional, European and national original features. The combination of modern and traditional features in the new institution may be regarded as a symbolic modernization capital. At the same time, the issue of probable support on tradition should be clarified. To the author’s view, the most essential part of the modernization’s social-cultural capital is connected with local rural traditions. The chances for their use in Azerbaijan are much less than in some Asian countries due to the fact that society in Azerbaijan is urbanized and modernized to a greater extent. The actual competitive advantages of Azerbaijan and its original way are connected with the other type of traditions – with the century-long tradition of modernization itself. It is really unique at least for the Islamic world. In Azerbaijan owing to a complex of historic circumstances:

- the more consolidated synthesis of eastern and western original features was shaped;
- the development of the secular society was and remains at the higher level;
- the historic orientation of Azerbaijani modernization to cultural development, education and science is also quite peculiar to a large extent, creates a foundation for chances of Azerbaijan’s passage to the post-modern stage of development.

*“Ekonomicheskaya modernizatsiya Azerbajjana: Vyzovy i resheniya”, M., 2010, p. 275–280.*

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**ACHIEVEMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES  
OF THE ISLAMIC BANKING SYSTEM  
IN KAZAKHSTAN**

Only in the beginning of the 2000s the banks of Kazakhstan started to pay greater interest to Islamic financial services. The first experience of Islamic methods of financing in Kazakhstan took place in 2003, when “Bank Turan Alem” obtained and attracted to Kazakhstan the credit corresponding to the demands of shariat, based on murabakh mechanism. In total, the bank succeeded to receive \$ 250 million. In 2006, the other banks of Kazakhstan – “Center Credit” and “Alliance Bank” – followed the example of BTA and availed themselves of the opportunity to get credits from Islamic banks.

By October 2009, “BTA Bank” occupied the second place in Kazakhstan in terms of assets’ amount and continued to remain the leader for creating the banking system on the territory of the CIS countries. The network of the banks-partners of “BTA Bank” includes

Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Kirghizstan and Turkey. The BTA offices function in Russia, Ukraine, China, UAE and the Great Britain. For the period of years before the crisis, about 25% of accumulated financial resources were used by the banks of Kazakhstan for expansion to the neighboring markets.

In 2008, the leadership of the bank projected to make it one of the biggest private banks in the CIS, but the world financial crisis corrected this project. In the beginning of 2009, the government of Kazakhstan accepted the proposal of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on regulation and control over the financial market and financial organizations concerning redemption of the controlling block of shares of “BTA Bank”. At present, 81.5% of the bank’s shares are held by the Foundation of National Welfare “Samruk-Kazyn”, owned by the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The bank continued functioning under operating conditions after the change of the shareholder. All projects, based on the Islamic financing methods, “BTA Bank” implemented jointly with the IBD and Islamic banks of the countries of the Persian Gulf. For instance, in August 2007 “BTA Bank” and IBD concluded a framework agreement on the financial support by “BTA Bank” of the projects in the sphere of small and middle business with the use of istisna mechanism. At the same time, “BTA Bank” and “Emirates Bank Group” signed the memorandum on cooperation. According to this memorandum, “BTA Bank” should promote Islamic financial products not only in Kazakhstan but also in other CIS countries.

For the period before the crisis, the Russian press not once published information on the intention of “BTA Bank” to enter the market in Russia proposing Islamic banking products. However, these proposals resembled rather a PR campaign than a thoughtful

plan on development of Islamic financial services in the post-Soviet space.

In Russia “BTA Bank” obtained big stocks of shares in “Volga-Kama Joint-Stock Bank” and in “Slavinvestbank”. The latter in December 2007 started negotiations with some banks in Muslim countries of the East on syndicated credits and financing support by means of Islamic instruments, such as murabakh and sukuk. The main reason of the interest paid by the banks of Russia and Kazakhstan to Islamic financial products was as follows: the banks of the Near East and of the South-Eastern Asia, unlike the banks in the West, up to the beginning of the world financial crisis in 2008 demonstrated the excess of liquidity. Confronting the problem of financial shortage, the banks of Kazakhstan had to look for financing sources in the internal market and in the countries, which were not aware of the liquidity crisis. The second way was more preferable, since the amount of the resources, accumulated from physical and legal entities, turned out to be inadequate to satisfy the needs of the banks in capital.

The issue of preparation of the normative-legal basis, needed for development of Islamic banks, was settled in a maximum short period of time. On 12 February 2009, president N. Nazarbayev signed the law “On Additions and Amendments in Some Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Organization and Activities of Islamic Banks and for Arrangement of Islamic Financing”. In accordance with this law, the changes and additions were made in the Civil Code, in the law “On Banks and Banking Activities”, the Tax Code, the law “On Investment Foundations” etc. The unique feature of the situation was in the adoption of the law in time, when there were no Islamic banks and Islamic “windows” within the traditional banks in Kazakhstan. According to the law, the Islamic bank is “the bank of the second level, carrying out banking activities in compliance with the principles of



Islamic financing...on the basis of license, given by the authorized organ” (article1, paragraph 2, point 2 of the law). It is mentioned in particular that the Islamic bank is not a participant of the system of the obligatory guarantee of the deposits and that the deposits in the Islamic bank are not guaranteed by the system of obligatory guarantee of deposits (article 1, paragraph 2, point 2 of the law).

This article, like a number of other provisions of the law, makes it possible to assert that a dualistic model was actually realized in Kazakhstan.

In contrast to Russia and a number of other countries, where the Islamic banks have abstained from making a show of their essence, the law in Kazakhstan ensures that “the name of the Islamic bank should contain the wording “Islamic bank” (article 1, paragraph 2, point 6 of the law). And what is more, it is prescribed that the Islamic banks should “clarify to the clients the specifics of the banking operations realized with compliance with the principles of Islamic financing” (article1, paragraph 2, point 10 of the law).

The shariat council, called by the law as the Council for Principles of Islamic Financing, is the organ nominated by the general meeting of the shareholders of the bank according to the recommendation of the Council of directors or by the Council of directors according to the decision of the general meeting of the shareholders; the shariat council should be created to execute the control over compliance of the bank’s activities with the principles of Islamic financing.

The Islamic banks should ensure for their clients transparency of the means applied by them. For instance, at the client’s request “the Islamic bank shall submit its report on the use of money for the investment deposit”.

The law considers in detail a number of main contracts practiced by Islamic banks: murabakha, musharaka, idjara etc. The terms, known in law of Kazakhstan, are used for definition of these contracts: murabakha is characterized in the law as an agreement on the commercial credit, idjara – as a lease (rent), musharaka – as an agreement on partnership etc.

Obviously, the adoption of this law creates more favorable conditions not only for the banks, which want to become Islamic banks, but also for traditional banks as receivers of financial means from foreign Islamic banks. Following adoption of the amendments in the legislation, the leadership of the country reckoned on the initiative for creation of the first national Islamic bank not only on the part of foreign Islamic banks but also on the part of local businessmen. However, the business community of Kazakhstan took a wait and see position. In full swing of the crisis there were not many businessmen, who were ready to take a risk and to experiment from null with a series of innovated banking products

As a result, a new bank – “Al-Khilal” from Abu-Dabi, founded on 18 June 2007, possessed by the Council for Investments at the government of this emirate, became the initiator of this process. On 17 March 2010, bank “Al-Khilal” (as a branch of this bank in the UAE) got the license for banking operations as an Islamic bank – according to the agreement between the governments of Kazakhstan and the UAE, signed on 11 June 2009. As was expected, the bank concentrated its work in contacts with corporate clients. As far as the retail sector is concerned, the activities of the bank were reduced to operation services and deposit products for VIP clients. In the future, the bank intends to extend its sphere of retail banking products.

Evidently, existence of one Islamic bank is not a sufficient condition for a valuable development of the market of Islamic banking

services in the country. It should be supposed that for the nearest future the regulating organs will stimulate appearance of Islamic “windows” in traditional banks.

At the same time, even after creation of Islamic banks in the country the traditional banks in Kazakhstan will continue to act as loan-subscribers and obtain loans from the IBD and other Islamic banks. The cooperation with the IBD in the sphere of investments projects and trade financing promotes achievement of the task, set by the president of Kazakhstan in 2006 – to join the group of 50 most competitive countries of the world. The world financial crisis delayed the time of fulfillment of this objective. The large-scale devaluation of the national currency questioned fulfillment of the plans relating to the issue in Kazakhstan of Islamic securities nominated in tenge. In case of successful implementation of this project, Kazakhstan will have a fair chance to become the second country following Malaysia, where the IBD issued Islamic securities in the national currency.

For the time being, investors in Kazakhstan have to use Islamic structured bonds sukuk emitted by BNP Paribas in February 2009. The size of the three years accumulated sum of sukuk amounted for \$ 20 million. The main minus of the indicated sukuk consists in the fact that they are issued for financing not the local but the foreign project connected with the group of several sovereign and corporate sukuk in Bahrain, Kuwait and UAE, while Kazakhstan itself is in a great need of investments. The ministry of finance of Kazakhstan projected to issue sukuk in the amount of \$ 500 million.

In 2009, the first Islamic broker’s company – a participant of the Regional Financial Center of Almaty (RFCA) – was registered by name “Fattakh Finance”. In its turn, this company declared about creation of the first shareholders’ speculative investment fund – “Islamic Foundation “Aman”. In its investment strategy the foundation patterns

its behavior primarily on direct investments, particularly – investments in real estate and participation in the capital of companies in Kazakhstan.

*“Islamskaya ekonomicheskaya model i sovremennost”, M., 2010, p. 266–270.*

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**KIRGHIZSTAN AND TAJIKISTAN:  
INDEPENDENT BUT POWERLESS**

For an external observer most new countries after two decades of proclamation of their independence seem not to be excelled from each other. It does not matter, whether it refers to Kirghizstan or Tajikistan; these micro-states of the third world finally will be put under the imperial carpet, which implacably is being rolled out over the whole Central Asia. Being located in distant regions of the Central Asia, where the borders had been marked arbitrarily, they are not so much the states as the border zones between empires. Again, like a hundred years ago, “the Big Game” is being arranged at the peaks and in the shadows of Tyan-Shan and Pamir mountains.

Tyan-Shan mountain range divides literally in two the Russified northern part of Kirghizstan and the densely populated southern cities Osh and Jalalabad, which belong to Islamic culture of Fergana valley, where they are located. Ten hours of difficult travel by mountainous routs separate the capital of Bishkek from the city of Osh. Kirghizstan as a stable and united country could be able to develop tourism near the borders of the lake Issyk-Kul. However, formerly closed for foreigners country will be most likely the picturesque pass in the restored “Silk

Route” between the East and West, guided by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and China.

Impoverished Kirghizstan is an object of permanent military dispute between its more powerful neighbors; and Kirghistan tries to carry out the policy characterized by “non-exclusive friendly relations”. For the beginning of the 1990s, when China insisted to acquire a mountainous part of Kirghizstan accounting for several hundred square km and when the government had to sell this land to China, disturbances took place in the country. When Uzbekistan ceased to ship its gas to Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan replaced it as a gas supplier but at the same time closed its own route to the lake Issyk-Kul to protect Kazakh tourists from grasping Kirghiz policemen. The Russian and Chinese companies buy metallurgical and food enterprises; as a result, the majority of the population remained, like in the past time, rural residents. In Bishkek “lavish looking” restaurants are only small cafeteria for western diplomats, while local women may only propose service of Asian massage to the hotel residents.

President Askar Akayev declared that he would make Kirghizstan a Switzerland in the Central Asia, but instead of it he sent his own family to Switzerland, said with irritation the minister of foreign affairs of Kirghizstan Rosa Otunbayeva. Some historic events, known as revolution, do not deserve this name. For instance, “Tulip revolution” in 2005 actually was an internal overthrow within the ruling elite and did not change anything. The USA provided financial support to small business and to the media group, and the latter arranged the protests against Akayev, who fled to Moscow but left the door open for the corrupted regime of K. Bakiyev. As political analysts noted, many people supported the opposition against Akayev, but it was an absurd to expect that Bakiyev would overcome corruption.

Since the time of acquiring independence, the lack of legitimacy of all Kirghiz governments hindered stability of the country. The uncontrolled process of revolutionary events may lead to quite opposite results, since replacement of democracy even in its fiction form by something unpredictable allows Chinese and Russians to manipulate the fable leaders of this country. The only best solution for China and Russia, comparing with unstable and compliant Kirghizstan, would be the existence in general of the lack of any governing organs in the country. In time of “Silk Route”, the travelers crossed the borders and did not notice them. It is not important for China, who keeps Kirghizstan under control because it restores the former situation.

The PRC restores the passes in the old “Silk Route” used before Islam came there after Talass battle in the year of 751 and forced Chinese to retreat home. The famous Torugart pass on the Chinese-Kirghiz border has been transformed into a highway used by trucks via Kirghizstan to Uzbekistan. The trade with the Central Asia countries is not very important for China, while the Chinese presence over there is very significant for Kirghizstan and Tajikistan. The main part of export from Kirghizstan is shipped to China, and the markets in Kirghizstan are full with Chinese goods. The trans-border trade resulted in Kirghizstan even greater than in Kazakhstan growth of Chinese communities. The China towns represent the main feature in almost all big cities, while Lenin prospect has been renamed Dan prospect.

As long as the USA extends its strategic plans outside Afghanistan to ensure security for the pipelines and to keep China under its observation, Kirghizstan returns to its former role of an observation point for the period of “Big Game” The great powers try to locate their military bases in this region, and these bases occur to be dislocated close to each other. The Russian army has not abandoned its claims for Kirghizstan but it had to evacuate the former Soviet base in

Manas near Bishkek, which is occupied now by the USA forces. At present, the USA and Russia watch secretly each other by means of salesmen on the same border, where in 1969 the military conflict between China and the USSR took place. When the USA asked for permission to locate in Kirghizstan the reconnaissance aircrafts AVACS, China forced the government of Kirghizstan to refuse to do it. It is the convincing evidence that the American military bases do not resemble flowers in the pod, as they are called by Pentagon, within the flood of Chinese commercial and infrastructure activities, being a real instrument of influence on developing countries. The USA is able to reach this region by its supersonic aircraft, but what will the USA do afterwards?

The USA is unable to push Chinese out by economic means. China will easily graft and win over any regime in Kirghizstan and block Americans on the territory of their military bases. If promotion of democracy is as usual reduced to rendering assistance to the autocratic regimes and to payment of consultants' services, these regimes will exist by selling themselves to the more generous buyers, who fixed the highest price for strategic stability.

The analogous micro-policy of building roads and of arranging communications is going on in Tajikistan, which is dangerously located on "the roof of the world" in Pamir mountains among Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Kirghizstan and China and is being transformed into another stop in the "Silk Route". This state, characterized by many Islamic specifics, runs the danger of imperial wings. The Party of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan is the sole Islamist party, which officially carries out its activities on the territory of the former Soviet Union. For the 1980s, it became the uniting force for all Tajik nationalists just in time, when the Communist elite in the capital of Dushanbe underestimated the anti-Soviet mutiny in Afghanistan, which

led to the collapse of the USSR. For the beginning of the 1990s, almost 150 thousand people perished in the Tajik civil war, which, like the civil war in Yugoslavia, showed the danger of a national distinction in the Communist world. The group, headed by E. Rakhmonov, was supported by Moscow, but had to take up arms to come to Dushanbe even after “the victory” gained at “the elections” in 1992.

Over three thousand earth tremors and earthquakes are registered annually in Tajikistan. This is a good metaphor also for political life in the country. The corrupted regime of Rakhmonov actually depends on Moscow. About 20 thousand Russian servicemen are located in the country; the Russian firms are in charge of management of the strategic hydroelectric stations, getting profits by selling electric energy to neighboring Uzbekistan. In accordance with canons of the third world, the money transfer, made by Tajiks from Russia, surpass the state budget of Tajikistan. The Aga Khan Foundation, the World Bank and the EU render charitable assistance to the country, but still over 80% of the population live as usual below the level of poverty. Tajiks use narcotic trade on the territory located across the state border with Afghanistan in order to survive.

Tajikistan is the most significant bridge also for the Chinese-Iranian trade routes, which gain the importance and connect Sinkiang, Osh, Dushanbe and Gerat (Afghanistan) with Iran connected with Tajikistan by ethnic and language relationship. Iran gives financial support to construction of the tunnel in the Fansk mountains to connect two principal cities of Tajikistan – Dushanbe and Hujand and for the first time to ensure uninterrupted communication between them and to enlarge a new Chinese-Iranian energy and trade corridor. “We have the state border with China and Afghanistan. We do not have a border with Russia. We would not be able to travel in our own country, if the



Chinese have not built this road”, a young soldier of the border point uttered his thoughts.

The new pass of “the Silk Route” does not look so much romantic as in the past, but it is a modern speed way. However, this auto-route at once was transformed into a channel of narcotic trade, a way of penetration of infection illnesses and extremist ideologies. China and Russia approve American and European efforts exerted for the sake of stabilization of the buffer zone adjacent to Afghanistan, which is not possessed by Russia any more.

China started to imitate the learned steps of the West in relation to the border missions arranged by ShOS and even made a step forward, having elaborated a strategy of joint management of water resources. The intensification of political, economic and strategic connections goes on daily along the restored parts of “the Silk Route”. In this way, a kind of filter is being formed, which delays influence from the North and may help the USA to consolidate its grip on the territory to the south of the post-Soviet “camps”, exactly in Afghanistan – the grave-digger of the USSR.

*P. Hanna. “Vtoroy mir”, M., 2010, p. 140–152.*

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## **TURKMENISTAN: CHINESE PRIORITY**

For the 1990s, China started to pay particular attention to Turkmenistan. The Chinese oil corporation in charge of technique and development started its activities in Turkmenistan soon after its declaration on independence. Since 1994, it established close cooperation and partnership relations with the oil and gas complex of Turkmenistan. The corporation exports to Turkmenistan the Chinese oil

and gas equipment: drilling rigs, elevator aggregates, plugging complexes, drilling pipes, drill bits, fountain armature etc.

At present, several Chinese service centers function in Turkmenistan for the sake of repair, services, delivery of spare parts and many other purposes; all this is of great significance for daily functioning of the Chinese equipment.

Further, the financial ties with Chinese companies were developed. On 20 July 2005, the framework agreement between China and Turkmenistan was signed, and Turkmenistan got the credit for the amount of 200 million Yuans.

For many years, the Chinese national oil-gas corporation as well as company “Exxon Turkmenistan (Amu-Darya Limited)” carried out research to determine the probability of implementation of the project and the hydrocarbon potential of perspective Turkmen territory on the bank of Amu-Darya. The project was aimed at finding out the feasibility of construction of the Trans-Asian gas pipeline in the direction to China. The new gas deposits were discovered near Kyzylkum in 2000, particularly on the territory “Garagoy”. According to “Exxon”, the project could be realized in case of shipment of 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The gas shipped from the Chinese territory also might have contributed to this amount of gas, experts thought. Turkmenistan should have the guarantee of the annual delivery of 33 billion cubic meters of gas for 25 years (including 3 billion for functioning of compressor stations).

In November 2005, president Niyazov promised to ship to China 30 billion cubic meters of gas via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Chinese factor became one of the central vectors in foreign policy of Turkmenistan since 2006. By that time, 36 inter-state agreements were signed between two countries. In Turkmenistan there were registered

37 investment projects with participation of Chinese companies for the sum of \$ 382.6 million and 360 million Yuans.

The signed contracts provided for delivery from China to Turkmenistan of railway cars, diesel locomotives, equipment for textile factories and communication enterprises, which formerly were purchased in Russia. The biggest contract was the agreement with the Chinese company “Capital Long” for the amount of \$ 128.6 to deliver railway cars to Turkmenistan. President Niyazov in the course of his visit to China in 2006 confirmed the policy of “one China” supported by Turkmenistan and declared that Taiwan was an integral part of China. Turkmenistan condemned separatism of the organization “Eastern Turkestan”. Beijing, on its part, supported the policy of neutrality carried out by Ashghabad. The parties signed even a special agreement on cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism.

The most significant document, signed in the course of this visit, became the General Inter-state Agreement on Realization of the Gas Pipeline Project Turkmenistan-China and the agreement on the sale of natural gas from Turkmenistan to China. China took the obligation to buy annually 30 billion cubic meters of gas for 30 years from the date of commission of the pipeline in 2009. As a resource basis of the gas shipment was determined the right bank of Amu-Darya, where exploration and extraction of gas deposits should be executed jointly by both parties. However, the agreement included the provision on gas shipment to China from other deposits of Turkmenistan. This provision proved the conclusion on competition of a number of foreign powers in Turkmenistan.

Although the Chinese vector of foreign policy of Ashghabad got additional stimuli in August 2008, nevertheless China occupied only the fifth place in the list of main trade partners of Turkmenistan. This

situation may change essentially in the nearest future. In Beijing the new president of Turkmenistan G. Berdymukhamedov made the declaration about greater capacity of the gas pipeline under construction. In the end of August this decision was fixed by the framework agreement. It provides for raising the capacity of the pipeline from 30 to 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year. However, the issue of the price for the gas to be shipped to China remains unsettled. Probably, Ashgabad intends to make the last decision, having used the contradictions among the partners wishing to get the gas. It is not clear whether Turkmenistan will be able to ensure the whole amount of natural gas deliveries to China.

The year of 2009 was marked by a fast step forward of China to the space of Turkmenistan and the Central Asia, in general. The expansion of China was rising for the period of 2007-2008, when the mutual trade of China with Turkmenistan was increasing twice annually. China exported to Turkmenistan the products of electronic, metallurgical and light industry and imported mainly raw materials and agricultural products. The big Chinese companies maintained mutual cooperation with the Turkmen entities in the oil and gas industry, chemical, textile and communication spheres.

In June 2009, the contract on purchase of natural gas by Chinese company "CNPC International Ltd." was signed with company "Bagtyryarlyk" on the right bank of Amu-Darya within the principle of division of production, while the resources would be realized on the border of Turkmenistan by the other Chinese company "Petro-China International Company Limited". The agreement on the credit in the sum of \$ 4 billion was signed with the State Bank of Development of China in order to accelerate development of the deposit "Yuzny Yolotan-Osman".

Exactly the Chinese credits became the main reason of the rigid position of the government of Turkmenistan relating to Russian company “Gasprom”. Ashghabad needed the financial support for development of new natural gas deposits in order to raise the gas export to China and to increase its profits. China provided Turkmenistan with the financial means and got the essential price reduction for the gas to be shipped for 2010 (the official data is not accessible, since it is the commercial secret); the price of the Turkmen gas for China, according to mass media information, accounts for \$ 120 per one thousand cubic meters, for Iran – it is \$ 170, while for Russia – \$ 190 for the same amount. Thus, the authorities of Turkmenistan abrogated the principle, proclaimed by them beforehand: the same price for all partners.

In December 2009, when the pipeline was commissioned to ship gas in direction of China, the president of Turkmenistan noted that comparing with the year of 2000 the trade turnover between China and Turkmenistan was raised 40 times and was closer to \$ 1.5 billion. In the republic there have been registered 35 enterprises with participation of the Chinese capital; and 53 investment projects for the total sum of \$ 1 billion and over 1.4 billion Yuans were registered. The pipeline was commissioned on 14 December. By the year of 2012 the pipeline will attain the full projected capacity, according to official Turkmen data. The total length of the pipe on the Turkmen territory is 184.5 km, on the territory of Uzbekistan – 490 km, Kazakhstan – 1300 km, China – 4500 km.

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**THE KNOT OF CONTRADICTIONS  
IN THE MIDDLE ASIA**

The politicians, characterized by strategic thinking, always paid special attention to the countries of the Central Asia (CA). The growth of interest to this region for the last months was connected primarily with the events in Kirghizstan logically resulted in the parliamentary elections on 10 October 2010. The geopolitical consequences of the elections fixing a wide split among the voters had many aspects. Some experts say that both the USA and Russia are the losers. In the historic perspective with due account of the long-term game arranged in the region by Washington and Beijing each observer should be ready to come to the complicated conclusions.

But the authors had to analyze the situation in the region not only due to the last information pretext. There is a direct evidence of prolongation of subtle political game and simultaneous rigid struggle for the Eurasia as a needed attribute of global leadership, where the Central Asia will become the principal geopolitical prize.

It is possible to win finally the struggle for Eurasia by depriving Russia of the footings in the Eastern Europe (Byelorussia and Ukraine) and in the Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Turkmenstan and Uzbekistan). The situation relating to the CA has good cause to be concerned about probable possession/loss by Russia of its geopolitical influence in the region and consequently of its role as a world force center.

The question is that since the end of the XX century for the first time in history the USA, a non-Eurasian power, became not only the

principal arbiter in relations among Eurasian states but also the mightiest power of the world. Under conditions of the global world, America regards Asia as a vitally important center of its economic development and growing political influence. The world supremacy as a realization of American vital interests is not only proclaimed from all possible places, starting from scientific conferences and finishing with UN, but also is executed in a planned way. By means of military-political (NATO, PRM), financial (IMF, WB), economic (TNC, WTO) and public (mass media, NGO etc.) structures the USA succeeded not only to connect the most developed and influential states of Europe with America but also to penetrate in the protected zone of Russian influence – in the near abroad. However, the Trans-Atlantic politicians see well that the global supremacy of America directly depends on the answer to the question – for how long and to what extent efficiently there will be kept its supremacy in the Eurasian continent. The latter may be kept by the control over the geo-strategic centers, namely – Europe, Russia, China, the Middle East and the Central Asia (CA). Some reasons should be marked concerning the CA.

– First, the new states of the region possess vast mineral and energy resources.

– Second, not only the ruling groups of these countries but also a great part of the population, under conditions of existing social-economic tension, may evaluate to Islam, which is one of the main opponents to the western system.

– Third, the geo-strategic position of the region, in case of location in this region of NATO bases, makes it possible to “cover” the whole territory of Russia and Big Asia.

– Fourth, it is a very significant transit zone, which may be used for different aims, starting from delivery of humanitarian cargoes and finishing with narcotic traffic.

The resource factor determines the situation in this case. Actually, Kazakhstan as the largest state in the region occupies the sixth place in the world in terms of reserves of natural resources, while only explored natural resources are evaluated for the sum of \$ 10 trillion. The natural resources include oil (the extracted amounts make 2.7 billion tons), gas, titanium, magnum, tin, uranium, gold, non-ferrous metals etc. Kazakhstan occupies the following place in the world in terms of deposits: tungsten – 1<sup>st</sup> place, chrome and phosphor – the second place, lead and molybdenum – 4<sup>th</sup> place, the total amount of ore (16.6 billion tons) – 8<sup>th</sup> place. In Kazakhstan there are 14 perspective basins located on the whole territory of the country, where already 160 oil fields and gas deposits have been explored. With due account of the explored and prospected (by experts) oil fields make over 6.1 billion tons, the gas deposits make up 6 trillion cubic meters; the annual production is as follows: 25 million tons of oil and 8 billion cubic meters of gas, while the national needs account only for 18–20 million tons of oil and 16–18 billion cubic meters of gas. At the same time, there exist in Kazakhstan about 300 big gold reserves, including 173 explored ones. There are in the republic the explored deposits of gem-quality diamonds. Over 100 coal deposits have been explored, including Eskibastus brown coal deposit and Karaganda coal basin with the deposit of 50 billion tons of coking coal. The colossal size of deposits of iron pyrite allows production of sulphuric acid and other chemical products significant for economy. It should be said that it is not the whole amount of riches in the republic!

On the territory of Uzbekistan there have been discovered over 2700 deposits of various natural resources, including a hundred types of mineral resources, including more than 60 resources involved in production of various industries. The explored 900 deposits are estimated for the sum of \$ 970 million, while the total mineral capacity



is estimated for more than \$ 3.3 trillion. The vast gas deposits and oil fields are located in the republic, and 60% of its territory is estimated as perspective for their extraction and development. Uzbekistan has also big coal deposits. The republic occupies the following rating in the world in terms of deposits: gold – the 4<sup>th</sup> (the 7<sup>th</sup> – its extraction), copper – 10<sup>th</sup>, uranium – 7<sup>th</sup>–8<sup>th</sup> (the 11<sup>th</sup> – its extraction). By present, the republic has explored 40 deposits of precious metals, 20 – of marble, 15 – gabbro and granite. Many deposits of decorative stones represent the unique biggest natural reserves in the whole Eurasian zone.

Tajikistan has big hydro-energy resources and occupies the 8<sup>th</sup> place in the world in terms of absolute water reserves (the 2d place in the CIS after the RF); water is the most significant strategic natural resource. The biggest hydro-electric stations are located in the republic: Nurekskaya, Sangtudinskaya, Ragunskaya. The dependence on water may have a significant impact on the political situation in the region. For instance, Uzbekistan imports 50% and Turkmenistan – 75% of the needed water resources. For the nearest decade, it is possible to make a prognosis for the serious struggle for Tajikistan as a main source of water in the CA.

Since 1975 Tajikistan started to produce the primary aluminum on the basis of cheap hydro-electricity. The republic itself used 20% of the produced aluminum, while the rest was transported to other regions of the USSR. The mine and coal industry is developed in Tajikistan. The most profitable among them remains the Shurabskoye deposit of brown coal. The gas is extracted from the deposits located in Vahshskaya and Gissarskaya valleys. At the same time, Tajikistan possesses unique deposits of silver (Bolshoy Kanimansur), gold, lead, zinc, uranium, bismuth, mercury, tungsten, molybdenum, antimony, fluorite, carbonate natural resources for chemical industry, boron. In

total, there are approximately 400 deposits of natural resources in the republic.

Turkmenistan is a vast subterranean treasure of oil and gas. The country is one of the main producers and exporters of energy carriers (natural gas – 61.8 billion cubic meters, oil products – 5.9 million tons, electric energy – over 12.8 billion kW/h) and occupies the 4<sup>th</sup> place in the world in terms of gas deposits after Russia, Iran and Qatar. Since 1999 Ashghabad annually increased the amount of extraction and export of gas. For the last years, new gas deposits were explored, big gas extraction and gas production complexes as well as gas transportation enterprises were constructed. The complete gasification of the country was finished, while the population shall obtain the “blue fuel” free of charge.

In total, 149 gas and gas condensate developed deposits with 4.97 trillion cubic meters, including 139 land deposits and 10 deposits in the Caspian shelf; 54 deposits with reserves of more than 2.6 billion cubic meters are in the process of development; and 11 deposits are prepared for development, 73 deposits are subject to exploration, and 11 deposits are put in prolonged storage. The state concerns “Turkmengas”, “Turkmenoil” and “Turkmengeology” are in charge of development of the black and blue gold. “Turkmengas” produces over 80% of the total amount of gas. The modern drilling rigs are able to ensure sinking of deep boreholes (up to 6000 m).

However, despite a great size of exploration works, the territory of the country remains rather inadequately explored; only the upper layers of oil and gas deposits have been well explored. Taking into account the fact that only 25% of hydrocarbon resources have been explored and developed, there are great chances to transfer the prognosticated and perspective resources into the categories of industrial reserves. The eastern part of Turkmenistan (180 000 sq. km)

is the main region of gas extraction. Over a thousand exploration drilling rigs make up almost one third of the whole amount of republican drilling rigs. Over 60 gas and gas condensate deposits have been explored in this region, including gigantic deposit Dovletabad with capacity of 4.5 trillion cubic meters, as well as big deposits, such as Malay, Shatlyk, Odjak, Samantepe and others. The prognoses of scientist-geologists on vast hydrocarbon deposits in the south-east of the country (Mary velayat) have been proved. Just this region will become the main resource base for development of gas production for the next 15–25 years. The state corporations and concerns have projected to drill about 1300 operation and exploration boreholes.

For the next decades, the perspectives of the oil and gas national industry's development are primarily connected with development of the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea. According to the results of exploration works, the big deposits of hydrocarbon resources are concentrated at the depths from 2000–7000 meters: 12 billion tons of oil and 6.2 trillion cubic meters of gas, which accounts for more than a half of natural oil fields and about one fourth of gas deposits in Turkmenistan. The new deposits are located mainly in two oil and gas basins – in the middle and southern parts of the Caspian Sea.

Exactly the gas resources of Turkmenistan determined the activities of China in establishment of contacts with the leadership of the Central-Asian republics, terminated by implementation of the large-scale project. After commission on 14 December 2009 of the gas pipeline Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China, namely its integral part Samandepi in the north-east of Turkmenistan, it is possible to speak about the change of the situation relating to the gas resources in the Middle Asia and of the geopolitical situation as a whole. Turkmenistan commissioned the “alternative” gas pipeline to China. The length of the gas pipeline makes 7 thousand km: Turkmenistan –

188 km, Uzbekistan – 525 km, Kazakhstan – 1293 km, China – 4860 km. The projected capacity of 40 billion cubic meters shall be achieved only in 2012. The participation of the Chairman of the CPR in the ceremony of commission of the pipeline stresses the importance of the pipeline for the CPR.

Finally, Turkmenistan has colossal deposits of ozokerite (earth wax), mineral construction resources (gypsum, anhydrides, clay and loams, construction limestone, magma rocks, facing materials, stones for hand-made articles and others).

Kirghizstan has much lesser natural resources than other CA countries; however, it possesses hydro-energy capacities, rare-earth metals, local deposits of coal, oil and gas, nephelinum, mercury, bismuth, lead and zinc. According to recent data, rather great deposits of uranium were discovered which indirectly proves intensification of the struggle among different groups of interest since April 2010. Under conditions of gradual aggravation of world competition for mineral resources, the struggle for influence in this region will become more acute. The trend to “internationalization” of resources according to the Balkan scenario will rather go on. It pre-supposes the following sequence of actions: destabilization of the former united state (by means of overthrow of the ruling regime, intensification of separatist trends or by direct military interference); installation of de facto external governance for the sake of preventing (actually – maintaining) the chaos by means of foreign loans, by these countries joining the transnational structures, by raising the demands of democratization etc., and later by privatization of the resources and of the industrial bases through transnational companies and uncontrolled exploitation of resources.

Transformation of new states into a resource base has a direct impact on the general social-economic climate in the region, leads to

the catastrophic stratification and destitution of the population. The contemporary situation in the CA countries in terms of the number of people living at the level of living below the poverty line may be compared only with the initial period of capitalism for the beginning of the XX century: in Kazakhstan – 12.1%, in Kirghizstan – 40.0 %, in Tajikistan – 60.0%, in Turkmenistan – 30.0%, in Uzbekistan – 26.0%. The exit out of the “funnel” of neo-colonialism is only in the way of restoration of industry in the region’s countries, by means of integration with Russia. Just Russia makes the proposal on the multilateral cooperation in the industrial, technological and communication spheres.

However, the geo-strategic significance of the CA for the world hegemon is determined not only by the resource component. And only the change of this space into a channel of narcotic traffic may be worse than the uncontrolled pillage of natural resources. The narcotics represent a direct threat to the national security of Russia. Russia may get rid of this challenge to its existence only by means of close cooperation with the countries of the Central Asia.

### **The traffic of narcotics as a way of struggle for the space**

The elaboration of the new, the most convenient and cheap routes of narcotics’ transportation was the appropriate consequence of the collapse of the USSR and liquidation of the united system of border guards. Exactly on the debris of the Soviet Union there appeared the new, “northern” way of narcotics’ shipment from the South Asia countries through the territory of the post-Soviet states to Russia and Europe.

For the second half of the 1990s, according to the expertise, the route was corrected. Particularly, the place of Osh in Kirghizstan was changed in its significance for Tajik Khudjandu (former Leninabad), which became a new focal point of narcotics’ traffic. The criminal

groups of different countries started to create their transnational structures and to divide the territories. The intervention of NATO to Afghanistan, which lacked industrial production of opium beforehand, marked the second significant change of the main routes for narcotics' traffic for the decade. It is significant that most narcotics, shipped from Afghanistan, are officially confiscated on the borders with Tajikistan and Kirghizstan.

The disclosed networks showed that representatives of state organs and law enforcement bodies were included in the process of illegal trade and transportation of narcotics; and the lesser part of the general cargo was stopped in the Tajik and Kirghiz direction. Particularly, the crossing point of the borders of Iran, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan was considered as vulnerable even in the Soviet times. Since 2003, the illegal channel of narcotics' traffic was mastered via Serahs, Kushka (villages near the border with Iran), Mary, Tedjen, Ashghabad and Turkmenbashi port in the Caspian Sea in the direction to Azerbaijan and Russia. The other route is laid through former Chardjou and further along Amu-Darya through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. The Uzbek route goes from Termez via Karshi, Bukhara, Urgench to Nukus and further to Kazakhstan and Russia. But the main part of narcotics comes to Uzbekistan from the territory of Tajikistan.

In 2010, the UN report on narcotics mentioned that the shipment of narcotics from Afghanistan to Russia might be executed via Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. According to the available data, narcotics mainly are shipped from Tajikistan to Osh and further by transit via Kazakhstan come to Russia. The illegal turn over goes on mainly by personal and commercial automobile transportation, for instance, sometimes in relatively small quantity.

Out of the CA countries only Kazakhstan has the border with Russia, and therefore the only land route to bring narcotics to Russia is laid through its territory. Over 90% of marijuana and over 85% of hashish and 80% of opium come to Russia via Kazakhstan, according to official data. The consumption of narcotics in the CA countries accounts for 11 tons per year, according to UN data. Of great significance is information on confiscation of narcotics: in the CA countries – 5 tons per year, while in Russia – only 3 tons, given consumption of 70 tons. In Afghanistan the confiscation makes only 1.3% of narcotics' traffic (for comparison: in Columbia this indication attains 37%). It is evident that the vast flows of narcotics may be maintained only via the zones of a weak state, the zones of military conflicts marked by different intensity. Thus, the maintenance of instability corresponds to the interests of international criminal structures.

There exist only two options for development of the present situation. The first option is as follows. The continuing destruction of the governing structures, criminalization of the authorities will result in creation in the region of the narcotics-terrorist states, which will resemble Afghanistan. Just this scenario will allow a great part of the population to be dependent on narcotics and to be satisfied with living in misery, while TNC jointly with international organizations (OPG) will be in charge of development of natural resources. It should be said that this scenario may be realized only in case, if Russia leaves this region.

The second option based on close integration of the CA countries with Russia, on full mutual understanding and conviction that they may survive only together, keeping the good gene-fund of their peoples, and will result in creation of the zone of sustainable development of sovereign states in Eurasia. Probably, the nearest Russian “partners”

(EU, the USA and China) are not interested very much in this option. However, Russia has the unique chance to preserve its presence in the region and to protect its national interests thanks to its cultural-historic influence. Its loss will mean a great change in the struggle for the “World Island”.

### **The historic-cultural factor of integration**

The CA region represents not only a complicated geopolitical and ethnic-confessional knot of contradictions, which in terms of influence of national and religious feelings on the political development of the world system may be compared with the same situation, which exists in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Of particular significance for Russia is the fact that the CA countries have relations with the numerous Russian speaking population within their territories; at the same time, this space may and should be kept as a zone of cultural-historic influence of Russia. With due account of the strategy of the countries of the West, mainly of the USA, directed to destabilization of “New World Balkans” and aimed particularly at the Central Asia, the particular attention should be paid not only to the relations among title nations (Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Turkmens and Uzbeks) and the Russian speaking population but also to the conflicts between Diaspora of the peoples of the adjacent countries.

The events in June of 2010 in the south of Kirghizstan became another justification of the fact that in case of efficient guidance of chaotic processes in the CA countries it would be possible to explode the whole Central Asian region. The ethnic-confessional and cultural-linguistic situation in the region’s countries shows the chance for Russia in the quite natural way, first, to realize the principle “it is impossible to leave – to stay”, ensuring in this way not only the all conceivable assistance to compatriots, but also to consolidate the position of the Russian world as a network structure of the XXI



century; second, to keep its political and economic presence in the CA as a geo-strategic center in Eurasia. Several facts may be cited to justify this statement.

All new states in the CA have the poly-ethnic composition of their population with different shares of national segments. According to the official data, the representatives of the title nations make up: in Kazakhstan – 56%, in Kirghizstan – 64%, in Tajikistan – 79.9%, in Uzbekistan – 80%, in Turkmenistan – 77%. The data of the CIA do not change the picture to a great extent: Kazakhstan – 53.5%, Kirghizstan – 64.9%, Turkmenistan – 85%, Tajikistan – 79.9%, Uzbekistan – 80%.

According to the perceptions of the international legal self-consciousness, fixed mainly by activities of Freedom House, three out five CA states (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) should be considered as mono-national states, since the title nation exceeds two thirds or is more than 67% of the population. However, the specifics of this region is connected not so much with predominance of the title nations as with the historic heritage expressed in existence of compact ethnic-confessional settlements, which, like the title nations in a number of cases, are the aborigines or mixtures of cultural Diaspora.

For instance, the share of Russians settled mainly in the northern districts of Kazakhstan makes 30.0%; in Kirghizstan – 12.5%, in Turkmenistan – 4%, in Uzbekistan – 5.5%. According to different data, the share of Uzbeks accounts for 14-20% of the population in Kirghizstan, while their share in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan makes correspondingly 15.3% and 5%. It refers only to the greatest national segments, leaving aside Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Uighurs, Tatars, representatives of other peoples and nationalities. In this situation, the Russian language is significant not only as an element providing connection with the Russian world culture but also as a sole means of

inter-ethnic communication and, consequently, integration with the political-cultural field of Russia.

The language policy in Kazakhstan is realized in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the law “On Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan” (11.07.1997) as well as the state program of functioning and development of languages for 2001-2010, adopted by the decree of the president of the republic N 550 on 07.02.2001. The strategy of the state program determines achievement of three main tasks: extension and consolidation of social-communicative functions of the state Kazakh language; preservation of the general cultural functions of the Russian language and development of languages of the ethnic groups. According to these program documents, the state status of the Kazakh language is realized in practice, while the Russian language remains the language officially used by the state bodies, by the local organs of self-government, as well as the language used in the system of education, science, culture and other spheres of public life.

It should be admitted that in Kazakhstan the corresponding measures are taken purposefully, although slowly, for extension of the sphere of use of the Kazakh language, of codification and modernization of its content. The migration processes started after disintegration of the USSR and resulted in radical changes of the ethnic composition of the republic’s population have a great impact on the general cultural climate. For instance, the number of Germans decreased almost three times (by 62.7%); the Kazakhs, who accounted for one third of the population 30 years ago, at present make the majority, while the number of Russians reduced by 1.6 million people only for the first years of independence. Nevertheless, the Russian language, as usual, keeps its significance. The Russian language is used by 95% of the population officially and in the communication sphere,

according to the information of western agencies. The Kazakh experts cite the lesser share – 84.75%, which, however, is an impressive data.

The number of Diasporas in different regions of the republic, like other factors, has an impact on the general cultural climate and the feature of diffusion of the Kazakh-Russian and the Russian-Kazakh bilingualism. The internal migration as a mass social phenomenon results always in preservation of the sustainable status of the Russian language. For the period of ten years, the rise of the population was raised more than twice, which explains the preservation of bilingualism as a very important means of internal communication. At the same time, just the Russian language allows to leave the political limits of the country and to integrate into the regional space by means of institutions, such as EvrAzES, ODKB, ShOS and some others.

In Kirghizstan the Russian language is not only the native language for the Russian speaking population of the republic living traditionally in the north-east of the country and in big cities, primarily in Bishkek, but it is also the official language (article 5 of the Constitution of Kirghizstan, the law on the official (Russian) language of Kirghizstan, adopted in 2000). The vertical education in Russian is kept in the country, although the share of children getting education in Russian was reduced from 41% (1991–1992) to 24% (2005–2006). At the same time, at present, the native Russians make only about 20% of students in the Russian speaking classes in Kirghizstan, which makes it possible to say that the prestige of the Russian language is still kept in the country. The people, who know well the Russian language, make up 38% of the population, while 98% of residents mainly in rural districts in the country understand it to some or other extent. It is connected first of all with popularity of Russian mass media. In Kirghizstan, unlike Kazakhstan, most people speaking Russian are native Russians. They are mainly bilingual Kirghiz as well as Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Dungans,

Koreans, Kalmyks, Uighurs, Tajiks, Turks and others, using this language as a main means of communication.

Thus, Kirghizstan bears with Kazakhstan the palm in terms of level of knowledge of the Russian language among the CA countries. At the same time, for the last decade the linguistic problems were becoming more acute.

First, the first problem is connected with the intensive outflow of the Russian population, which results in gradual weakening of significance of the Russian language in Kirghizstan.

Second, the administrative sphere of use of the Russian language gradually reduces within the framework of policy of the so-called rooting of office work and administration in the republic. It is evident that destabilization of the situation in the country since April 2010 will lead to the next rise of the number of Russian speaking migrants.

In Uzbekistan the process of de-Russification is directly connected with the political course of the country and the perspectives of development of this republic. According to a number of analysts, having “wrecked” the Russian language, the authorities in Uzbekistan confronted the fact that the Russian language pulled with it to the bottom the Uzbek language as well: the meaning of the state language as a language of inter-national communication was greatly exaggerated by the reformers.

The experience of the reforms for the 1990s showed that there was no alternative to the Russian language as a means of inter-national communication and as a main way of integration into the world economy, politics and culture in the whole post-Soviet space; and it should be said that there will be no other way for achievement of this aim in the observed future. Of great significance is experience of Uzbekistan, where this process began within the political framework of the USSR. The Uzbek language was declared to be the state language

and the Russian – as a language of inter-national communication (by the law on the state language adopted in 1989). The Russian language was not mentioned either in the new version of the law in 1995 or in the amendment to it in 2004; at present, the Russian language as one of the foreign languages is included in the curricular in the general schools and higher education institutions.

The policy of de-Russification became one of the reasons of the outflow of the Russian speaking population from Uzbekistan, where the number of ethnic Russians was reduced almost by three times. The Russian speaking language is still kept in big cities, while in the rural districts they speak local dialects and hardly know the Uzbek language. The professors in higher education institutions have to organize the course of the Russian language for new students, coming from rural districts, to ensure teaching of the main subjects of the curricula.

The reform, dated in 1993, of converting the Uzbek language from the Cyril alphabet to the Latin alphabet resulted in the situation, when many children can not read Uzbek texts in the Cyril alphabet, while the grownups can not read the texts in the Latin alphabet. In practice a part of the population turned out to become illiterate. The passage to the Latin alphabet has resulted in deterioration of the education process in Uzbekistan. The question is that the Uzbek literature and scientific works since the years of the 1940s, leaving aside the textbooks, were published in the Cyril alphabet. Nobody intends to re-publish the accumulated for fifty years scientific and cultural experience. The general level of science, culture and even literacy deteriorates rapidly.

Under conditions of such “reforms” and with due account of the fact that representatives of over 100 nationalities live in Uzbekistan, one may assert: the Russian language remains the principal means of inter-national communication and access to the world culture. The three

groups of people use Russian in daily life, according to the expertise. The first group includes Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, for whom Russian is the native language. For the end of the 1990s these peoples made up approximately 15% of this population. The second group (35%) consists of the Russian speaking representatives of other nationalities: Tatars, Koreans, Armenians, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turks, Jews, Georgians and others. As a rule, the representatives of this group know their native language much less than Russian, The Uzbeks, having received education in Russian and knowing the Uzbek speaking language, may be included in this group. These people received education before the reform of the Uzbek language. The third group consists of the so-called bilinguals, the people speaking both Russian and Uzbek; they comprise approximately 30–40% of this population.

Thus, despite a very complicated internal political situation in Uzbekistan, just Russian and not Uzbek and all the more English language was and is the language of inter-ethnic communication. Since it is impossible to get higher education and a prestige and highly paid work without knowledge of Russian, many Uzbek strive for sending their children for studies to the schools with education in Russian. As a result the number of such schools ceased to reduce.

And what is more, according to the data of the foundation “Eurasia Heritage”, the broadcast in Russian rose in the republican TV. Most publications of the past time continue to circulate. The new cultural publications with ideological inclination are published in Uzbek with the state support. The information, advertising, commercial and entertainment publications, on the contrary, are originated “from below” on the commercial basis and are published in Russian. The Russian language occupies a stable place in commercial publications. The Population of Uzbekistan is in great need of the Russian language, while the state does not satisfy it. The Russian language may not only

become the most significant means of achievement of the consensus within the Uzbek community but also may efficiently promote advancement of Russia in the region.

The Russian language in Tajikistan is in a rather difficult situation, while a great part of the republic's population ensures its living tanks to the work of its migrants in Russia. According to the Constitution of the Republic, adopted in 1999, the Russian language was recognized as a language of inter-national communication, and the office work in the state institutions could be carried out in two languages: the Tajik language, being the state language, and the Russian language. For the period of 2007–2009, the Russian-Tajik relations were marked by certain difficulties just due to the linguistic question. Despite the evident situation, when knowledge of Russian was a vital necessity for economic migrants of the republic, since most of them, being rural residents, leave for work to Russia and Kazakhstan, while the business sector of the republic functions primarily in Russian, the president of the republic E. Rakhmon took a special political step and deprived the Russian language of the official status.

In October 2009, the republican parliament adopted a new law on the state language (only the Communist fraction voted “against”), which was signed by E. Rakhmon shortly afterwards. Under the new law, it is possible to apply to the state bodies, using only the state language – the Tajik language. At the same time, the law has no provision on the status of the Russia language as a language of inter-national communication, which was fixed and kept in the Constitution. However, the law contains the provision that the conditions for the free choice of the language for studies shall be created for other nations and nationalities, living in the country.

In October 2009, E. Rakhmon in the course of his state visit to Moscow declared that the Russian language was not subject to any infringement or to reduction of its sphere of use in response to concern expressed by President of the RF D. Medvedev about the situation relating to the Russian language. At the same time, he assured that the decisions and acts of the president and of the government were taken and publicized both in Tajik and Russian, that dozens of newspapers and magazines were published in Russian.

The above said corresponds to the practice. Although Russian is the native language for only a small group of the Tajiks (about 3%), it is widely used as a second language by all nationalities living in the republic. Thus, the communicative effect in this republic is being ensured just thanks to the Russian language.

The Russian speaking population confronts most difficulties in Turkmenistan. According to the data of the last national population census, held in the end of the 1980s, the number of Russians occupied the second place after Turkmen; but, according to the data of the population census of 1995, the share of Russians made 6.7% of the population in the country. The last official data on the composition of the population were made public by the ex-president S. Niyazov in 2001: Uzbek made 3% of the population, the share of Russians accounted for 2%; the title nation – the Turkmen made up 91% of the population. The CIA data was principally the same: Uzbeks – 5%, Russians – 4%, the Turkmen – 85%.

And what is more, in 2003 a new wave of re-settlers took place, caused by the unilateral withdrawal of Turkmenistan from the agreement with Russia on double citizenship. The government fixed the period of two months to take the decision and determine the citizenship by the people with two passports. The people, who kept their Russian passport, were deprived of their apartments: by law, foreign citizens



have no right to possess real estate in the country. It is difficult to examine the actual situation in Turkmenistan. The researchers lack transparent statistics or other data. Therefore it is possible to assert that at present there is no definite information on the number of Russians living in Turkmenistan.

However, the actual liquidation of the Russian language is caused not only by the small number of the Russian speaking population in Turkmenistan. The policy of the leadership of the country has played the decisive role in de-Russification of the country. For instance, in the middle of the 1990s the broadcasting of Russian radio channels was terminated. Radio channel “Mayak” stopped its broadcasting in 2004. Since the middle of the 1990s, the Russian schools started to terminate their functioning. Only one Russian A.S. Pushkin school exists in Ashgabad. Some Russian classes were remained in big cities, but their number continues to reduce. Up to 2007, only the graduates of the high schools, having passed the exam on the knowledge of the spiritual guidance for the Turkmen – the book “Rukhnama”, written by Turkmenbashi, were admitted to the higher education institutions; the diplomas of foreign, including Russian, higher education institutions were not recognized. This circumstance was used as an additional pretext to dismiss Russians or representatives of other nationalities, who received education outside Turkmenistan, including former Soviet republics.

The sole Russian theater – A.S. Pushkin dramatic theater is subject to constant pressure on the part of the authorities. In 2004, the old building of the theater was demolished. The theater occupies the building of the former club of the closed textile factory. The sole Russian newspaper “Neitralny Turkmenstan” is published in Russian. The Russian newspapers and magazines are brought to the country almost illegally, and they are not sold in kiosks. All four TV channels

broadcast in Turkmen and include only short information programs in Russian. Most residents in big cities use dish-shaped aerials to watch Russian channels. It is impossible to buy Russian books. Many people have to use their old books in their personal library at home. Turkmenistan is a closed country. However, it is possible to find out a common ground even with the leadership of this republic.

The principal essence of the analysis of the national-linguistic component of the Central Asian region is as follows: the experience of the most complicated transitory years of creating the statehood of former Soviet republics proved the inability of the new states' existence without their involvement in the political, economic and cultural orbit of Russia. And what is more, their internal consensus is possible to be achieved on the basis of Russian culture and Russian language. The unique great destiny of “the grand and mighty” – should be used for stabilization the situation in this heterogeneous region and for promotion of influence of Russia in countries of the Central Asia.

### **The Central Asia and national interests of Russia**

The CA countries as a region marked by rich natural resources and advantageous strategic position in the center of Eurasia, possessing a complicated knot of economic, social, ethnic-confessional and political problems, turn out to be in the center of struggle for the global leadership. And the outcome of its results depends not only on the leading world players – EU, the USA, China and Russia, but also on the politics, aims and interests of the countries and the peoples of the region.

The position of Russia, fixed in the founding foreign policy documents (Conception of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, Strategy of national security up to 2020), consists in development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with member-states of the CIS. Russia is ready to build friendly relations with each of the CA states on

the basis of equality, mutual benefit and respect and due account of reciprocal interests, while the relations of strategic partnership and alliance shall be developed with the states which display willingness to do it.

Russia urges not only towards intensified cooperation with the CA countries in economic and humanitarian spheres but also towards perfection of systemic ensuring mutual security, including common counteraction against challenges and threats, primarily international terrorism, extremism, narcotics' traffic, transnational criminality, illegal migration. The difficult situation in the region demands primarily neutralization of the terrorist threat and the threat on the part of narcotic traffic from the territory of Afghanistan, as well as prevention of destabilization of the situation in the Central Asia.

For this sake Russia calls upon its Central Asian neighbors to realize further the CIS potential as a regional organization, as a forum of multilateral political dialogue and mechanism of many-sided cooperation with the priorities in the spheres of economy, humanitarian reciprocal action, the struggle against traditional and new challenges and threats, to exert further efforts for creation of the united economic space, to take measures for further consolidation of EvrAzES as a kernel of economic integration, mechanism of promotion of implementation of big water-energy, infrastructure, industrial and other common projects, to consolidate the Organization of Mutual Collective Security (ODKB) as a key instrument for maintaining stability and ensuring security in the CIS space.

The above said means that Russia may and is ready to carry out the pragmatic, balanced foreign policy strategy, physically (in terms of economy and civilization) being present in the region. The representatives of the power structures should understand it and should pursue foreign policy of Russia, proceeding from national interests,

security and well-being of the citizens. Given the great ideological and emotional burden of the contemporary stage of development of the CA states for the wide public circles, particularly for the ruling politicians, it should be quite evident that Russia will not be able to achieve its national interests by avoiding problematic zones and by leaving the region. It is necessary to work thoroughly and jointly with the representatives of political and economic republican elites, to advance its cultural values into wide strata of the population, to consolidate its political and economic presence. Russia has objective grounds for the success of this work in the region and, consequently, for preservation of its influence in Eurasia.

*“Svobodnaya mysl”, M., 2010, N 10, p. 30–46.*

**Tiberio Graciani,**

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Review of Geopolitical Research”

**STRATEGY OF THE USA AND PROBLEM  
OF NARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN**

The ideologically unbiased and honest appraisal of the problem relating to narcotics’ production and corresponding international problems is a must for determination (at least schematic) of the geopolitical structure and a more profound comprehension of some notions usually taken as well known and generally accepted.

Afghanistan jointly with the Caucasus and the republics of the Central Asia represents a vast territory marked by activities of some main global subjects (the USA, Russia, China and India), which differ in their geographic position in two unlike regions – America and Eurasia – primarily by their might and geo-strategy. The destabilization of the situation in this region serves the purpose of the USA, i.e. the

political player, which is external in relation to the Eurasian environment. In particular, the destabilization of this vast zone creates for the USA at least three geopolitical chances: a) the rising penetration into the lands of Eurasia; b) deterrent of Russia, c) creation in the continent of “a painful sore”.

The USA, located between two oceans, is an island, which is outside the Eurasian continent, by H. Kissinger definition. From the geopolitical point of view, exactly such location determined the main vectors of the USA expansion in the world. Primarily, the control was established over the whole western hemisphere (North and South America), and further the race for hegemony in the European and African lands, in other words, in the Eastern hemisphere was started.

It is worth recalling that the penetration of the USA into the Eurasian continent was started in the course of the First World War by means of interference of Washington in international disputes among European states and Empires. Its penetration was going on during the Second World War. In April 1945 the so-called “liberators” occupied the western part of Europe up to East Berlin. Since that time, Washington and Pentagon regarded Europe, i.e. the western part of Eurasia only as a springboard of the USA, created in the Eurasian space.

The USA imposed the same role on the other occupied state – Japan, which closed from the east the Eurasian arch. From the Eurasian point of view, just the North-American “pincers” became the real outcome of the Second World War. In the end of the 1970s, one of the most important pillars of western geopolitical architecture headed by the USA was demolished by ayatollah Homeini coming to power in Iran. The shah Pehlevi dynasty could be easily used as a pawn in the struggle between the USA and the USSR. Its disappearance forced Washington and Pentagon to ponder on a new role of the USA in world

politics. New Iran, having become an independent state, caused emergence of new combination in the regional geopolitical “game of chess”, and, probably, this event promoted a deep crisis of the “strong” bi-polar system.

The new “the one-polar” geopolitical era replaced the bi-polar era. However, the new one-polar system was doomed to a short life and terminated in the beginning of the XXI century, when Russia proclaimed itself as a strategic player, which was ready to set at defiance the global affairs; at the same time, two Asian giants – China and India became the economic and strategic powers. It is necessary also to take into account the rising significance of some Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Venezuela. The rather important relations of these countries with China, Russia and Iran seem to obtain a strategic significance and create a prototype of the new multi-polar system with two main supports – Eurasia and Latin America.

From the geopolitical point of view, Afghanistan represents an evident crisis zone, since the ancient time marked by conflicts among big powers. At present, this territory, named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is “governed” by the government entity, created and functioned with the support of the USA armed forces, although by the old tradition the Pushtu tribes keep their dominance over other ethnic groups (Tajiks, Hazars, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Beludgis).

After the Soviet soldiers left the Afghan “chess-board” the Taliban movement started to play a more significant role in the region. At least three factors determined the situation: a) the ambiguous relations with some components of the Pakistani secret services; b) the ambiguous relations with the USA (a kind of “heritage” left by former contacts between the USA and some participants of “mudjahed” movement maintained in time of the Soviet-Afghan war; c) wahhabism as an ideological-religious platform serving directly the interests of

Saudi Arabia in terms of projection of such zones, as Bosnia, the Near East and the Caucasus (namely – Chechnya and Dagestan).

Thanks to these three factors the Taliban movement was able, on the one side, to consolidate its position on the Afghan territory and to obtain the rising capacity in military (creation and strengthening of the so-called shelters) and economic (namely – the control over the narcotics' trade) spheres. On the other side, they hindered it to become an autonomous organization. In essence, due to penetration of agents of the USA, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the Taliban movement, it should be regarded as an organization guided by the external players.

It is common knowledge that the production of narcotics in Afghanistan has risen by 40 times after occupation of its territory by NATO forces. The estimation of the decisions, taken by the USA forces for the sake of reduction of narcotics' trade, in the general context of geopolitical practice of the USA, may be interpreted as a lost time: production and spreading of narcotics in the southern part of the country go on in full swing. The large-scale production of narcotics would have been impossible in case of military actions.

But the USA forces concentrated their strategic interest in the northern part of the country. They have constructed roads and bridges, connecting Afghanistan with Tajikistan, as well as the way to Russia via Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan and Azerbaijan. These activities clearly show genuine intentions of Pentagon and Washington: to commission and open transportation communications to Russia, starting from Afghanistan and the CA republics. In essence, NATO and other western forces do not actively struggle against production and trade of narcotics. They are engaged in rhetoric and are not marked by real facts.

At the same time, the struggle against Taliban movement seems to be dependent on the general strategy of the USA in Eurasia. At

present, this strategy consists in location of military bases of the USA and its allies along the belt from Morocco via the Mediterranean Sea to the CA republics. The main aims of these military detachments are as follows: separation of Europe from the Northern Africa; installation of the control over the North of Africa, the Near and the Middle East (particularly, the territory of Turkey, Syria and Iran, using the base Camp-Bondstill, located in Kosovo); deterrent of Russia and to some extent of China; an attempt to divide the Eurasian continent into two parts; the extension of “the crisis arch” up to the territory of the Central Asia (the definition of this region by Brzezinski as “the Eurasian Balkans” means rather to be a program than a description of this zone).

The creation of the geopolitical spit in the Central Asia, i.e. of “the painful sore” in Eurasia, is able to lead to hostility and enmity among other main players in Asia – Russia, India and China. In this case, the USA would become the sole advantageous player. Trying to divide Eurasia by the arch from the Mediterranean Sea to the Central Asia, the USA (since 2008) after creation of the African Commandment of American Forces (AFRICOM) created a joint military mechanism in charge of common security in Africa with the aim of extending it to the Near East and the Central Asia.

Appraising the outcome of the international forum on production of narcotics in Afghanistan (Moscow, 9–10 June 2010) with the aim of finding out “common decision” of the Afghan narcotic question in the context of “international community”, the analysts have to stress that instead of “international community” it is more feasible to speak about the actual players (actual and probable participants), who have chosen the Afghan zone as a sphere of their activities.

For the sake of analysis it is feasible to cite the three following categories of such players: the external players; the local players and



the players, which potentially might become the participants in the Afghan context.

As the external players should be considered the USA and NATO – the international forces promoting security (ISAF), except Turkey, since they are alien to any specific geopolitical region even in its extended meaning.

The local players are represented by the bordering countries (Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, Pakistan), the tribes, the insurgents, the talibs and the “government” entity headed by Karzai.

As the players of the third category may be regarded the Organization of the Treaty of Collective Security (ODKB, the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation (ShOS), i. e. the main Eurasian organizations with great experience in decision of questions, connected with border control and narcotic trade on the territory of the Central Asia, as well as the Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES). It is necessary to mention UN, particularly the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

In order to be able to settle the narcotics’ issue in Afghanistan the potential partners should possess at least the following abilities: the knowledge of local dynamics in ethnic, cultural, religious and economic features of life; the recognition of the local population as a component of the same cultural context (the notion in the broad sense); the will to take collective actions without bias and internal reticence within the framework of any Eurasian program.

The stabilization of the Afghan zone is the most needed requirement of any plan with the aim of solving the problem of production and sale of narcotics. In this respect, the forces of the USA and NATO are not the acceptable candidates due to their clearly

displayed geopolitical practice aimed at hegemony on the territory of Eurasia.

The genuine players able to ensure stabilization are, without any doubt, the countries having the border with Afghanistan and the Eurasian organizations. Iran as a country contiguous with Afghanistan might play a special role. It is the sole country, which clearly displayed the definite security of the Afghan-Iranian border particularly in relation to the narcotics' trade. At the same time, Moscow and Beijing assume the significant function to stabilize the situation in this region and to struggle against narcotics' trade, since Russia and China, as it is worth recalling, are the leading powers in the mentioned Eurasian organizations.

The strategic axis between two “lungs” of Eurasia, balanced by the Central-Asian republics and India, might present a long-term solution for stabilization of the situation in this region and, consequently for decision of the narcotics' question. The dialogue with local tribes and with the insurgents' movements, which definitely are not governed by external players, is possible only within the framework of the common Eurasian plan aimed at stabilization (perceived and performed by the Eurasian players).

*“Vestnik analitiki”, M., 2010, p. 25–29.*

**A. Volodin,**  
orientalist

## **PAKISTAN: RELATIONS WITH INDIA AGAINST THE BACKGROUD OF INTERNAL INSTABILITY**

In 1980, Hindu ambassador in Pakistan and later former foreign minister of India K. Natvar Singh described the relations between two countries as “awfully complicated”. Thirty years later, this appraisal of

the Pakistani-Hindu relations has not at all lost its actuality. The conflict in relations between two countries is determined by many factors: historic memory, native and acquired prejudices, lack of regulation of territorial contradictions, acute competition between state ideologies, constant feeling of being exposed to the neighboring country etc. The elites of both countries keep mutual distrust; the forced hostile feelings relating to the neighbors aim at consolidation of the political class and political system in their own country particularly in time of crisis.

The mutual mistrust has an impact on dynamics of public opinion in both countries. In September 2009, according to the poll of social-political orientation of citizens in both countries, over half of Hindus regarded as a serious the threat coming from Pakistan, while 46% of Pakistanis expressed the same opinion relating India.

Many Hindus have a determined meaning that only “qualitative reconstruction” of the Pakistani state (primarily repudiation of its aggressive, anti-Indian ideology) may actually improve the bilateral relations. At the same time, Hindu political analysts remark that the “ideological state” in Pakistan keeps its capability owing to existence of significant negative problems in the social structure if Pakistani society. The substance of these processes is determined by the following tendencies.

The excessive demographic growth (at present, the population of Pakistan makes 175 million people, while by 2030 it will reach the number of 240–250 million people, according to some experts) results in the extension of the social stratum of city and village poor people, who easily accept simplified versions of ideology, primarily political Islam.

The quality changes in ideological-political life of Pakistan became the indirect outcome of demographic dynamics. At present, the

uncompromised ideological trends, primarily wahhabism, intensively force away “liberal” models of ideology, including traditional historic-cultural heritage of Indostan. The Pakistani scientists, taking a sober point of view, characterize this process as “the change of the South-Asian identity for the Arabic Muslim ethic, which dominates in the sands of Saudi Arabia”.

The process of politicization of Islam, started for the end of the 1970s by general Ziya-ul-Khak (supported by the administration of R. Raigan), acquired the sustained momentum and transformed Muslim radicalism into the social-political force, which calls in question the leading role of the army in Pakistani society. In this context, the assertions of political scientists in Pakistan and India concerning “the decorative feature” of the democratic power in the country, headed by A. Zardari, seem to be quite logical.

The inability of the power (civil and military) in Pakistan to execute modernization of society in the interests of the people resulted in the search for compensatory mechanisms able temporary to ensure the social unity in the country. One of these mechanisms became a new version of Pakistani identity based on the nuclear program and historic animosity to India, while these feelings still “work” in the mass strata of the country.

At present, the military-civil establishment of Pakistan in its foreign policy considerations proceeds from: the geopolitical “exhaustion” of America under the burden of the Near and Middle East problems; the transformation of China into a significant geopolitical force in the region of South Asia; the readiness of the USA to agree to the “peacemaking” role of China in the South Asia , primarily in the Pakistani-Hindu relations (as it is known, Deli strongly objects against any (both American and Chinese) mediation in the bilateral relations.

Evidently, China is the invisible participant in the Pakistani-Hindu relations. By means of further development of its relations with Islamabad Beijing simultaneously pursues several aims:

- to stop “the overflow” of radical Islamists, including their military detachments, from Pakistan to the “troubled” territories of China, primarily the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous region;

- to reduce the influence of the USA in the Central and South Asia;

- to keep under its more efficient control the shipment of energy carriers from the Persian Gulf to the South-Chinese Sea for its own needs;

- to deter influence of India in this region by means of the system of the allied relations with the adjacent as well as with distant (Sri-Lanka) states of the South Asia.

In essence, the rivalry between China and India for the spheres of influence in South Asia promotes the uncompromised policy of Islamabad in the Pakistani-Hindu relations. Some Hindu political scientists notice the very weak position of the Pakistani elite’s representatives, who come forward for development of external economic, scientific-technical and cultural bi-lateral relations. At the same time, India is vitally interested in preservation of unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan. The ethnic conflicts and probable “balkanization” of Pakistan may result in the uncontrolled flow of refugees to India, in the intensified trade of narcotics and arms, the chaos of state governance and finally the radical deterioration of its investment attraction, as they think in Deli. At the same time, the India’s foreign policy analysts are convinced in the following: the availability in both states of nuclear arsenals will deter development of conflicting situations and will limit a possible chance of military actions, taken by two countries.

Probably, prime-minister M. Singh and his colleagues pursuing their strategic line relating to Pakistan proceed from the rapid change of Pakistani society under the impact of the systemic-structural crisis. The deep economic and political flaws, in spite of massive external assistance (China, Saudi Arabia, the USA), demand radical changes in the state course, particularly a “strategic change” in relations with India. Delhi is ready to support these new trends in policy of Pakistan, including by the tactic of “unilateral steps”. However, the new tactic does not change the triune approach of India to the bilateral relations: keeping high fighting efficiency and “deterrence capacity”; involvement of Pakistan in joint business projects; readiness of Islamabad for changes in key aspects of bilateral relations, including the so-called “Kashmir problem”. However, it should be remembered that “the corridor of chances”, possessed by Delhi, for compromises with Islamabad is very limited. The opposition in India (from Communists to Bharatia Jana Party) has already disapproved the compromising approach of M. Singh in relation to Pakistan, justifying its position by “protection of political sovereignty” of the country.

Nevertheless, the government of India continues to pursue the “compromising” line relating to Pakistan, which was clearly displayed by the reserved reaction of official Delhi to the tragic events in Mumbai in the end of November 2008. The designation of Shiv Shankar Menon to the post of an advisor to the prime-minister for affairs of national security is regarded as a significant step on the way of realization of strategy of compromises in the Hindu-Pakistani relations. Sh.Sh. Menon, who lived in Tibet as a school boy, shares the unbiased point of view without having a dread of China; he is considered as a matchless master for making compromises with neighbors, the experts in Delhi say. In this connection, the following question arises: what considerations will finally determine the strategic line of India in

relation to Pakistan? It seems that there are some closely interrelated considerations.

First, the ruling circles of India seem to proceed from the loss by Pakistan of a great share of its international subjectivity due to a long-term development of destructive-disintegrative trends within the country. The India's establishment is not led astray either by availability by the neighboring state of the nuclear arsenal, or the massive foreign assistance rendered to this country (by Saudi Arabia, China and the USA), or the forced development, with the support, given by the PRC, of the transport infrastructure in Pakistan, including strategic port Gwadar. Evidently, Delhi proceeds from the supposition that, given the impact of objective circumstances, Islamabad sooner or later will start to "unfreeze" bilateral relations with India.

Second, the "strategic elites" in India do not consider as "perfection" the role of the army as a main political force in Pakistan. From time to time, the press in India informs about tensions in the Pakistani army, for instance between the officers from Punjab and Pushtuns. Besides, the viability of this institution is undermined by connections of some military detachments with Taliban movement.

Third, official Delhi relies on the exhaustion of the chances for development of Pakistan on the basis of foreign assistance and militarization of economy. The Pakistani elite approaches a kind of "moment of truth", when it will have to determine clearly the foundations of social-economic policy and the priority directions of external economic relations. The elite of India is convinced that the natural geographic closeness of two countries will dictate the imperatives of bilateral economic ties especially as premier M. Singh, unlike most of his predecessors, enjoys support of business society as a professional economist. The main organizations of entrepreneurs – the Federation of the Trade-Industrial Chambers and the Confederation of

Industry of India will definitely give their support to M. Singh in his Hindu-Pakistani economic initiatives.

Fourth, Deli seems to come to the conclusion on the inevitable split between the civil and the military elites, since neither of them is able at least to stabilize the situation in Pakistan. Under the existing conditions the “peaceful” line of M. Singh in relation to Pakistan looks quite logical. Proposing Islamabad “peacemaking” initiatives and stressing by all means its will for compromise, Deli urges towards elimination from the Pakistani public-political discourse of the rhetorical image of “perpetually hostile” India and in this way to deprive the Pakistani elite of the chance to unite the country on the negative anti-Indian basis.

It is quite probable that this strategic line in relation to Pakistan will be pursued further at least by the present government. The present state of the Pakistani-Hindu relations provides Russia with certain chances for consolidation of its geopolitical positions in the South Asian region, starting to play the ever-rising role in transportation of energy resources from the zone of the Persian Gulf to the Far East and in prevention of political Islam expansion to the Central Asia, which is a vitally important region for Russia. In this connection it will be feasible to intensify the foreign policy activities of the RF in the region in the following two directions.

The vigorous return of Russia to the South Asia (i.e. to the Soviet foreign policy of the 1960s; let us recall the India-Pakistan summit in Tashkent under the aegis of A.N. Kosygin), including the assistance rendered by the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation (ShOS) and discussions on general problems of security of the Central and South Asia. Of great significance for relations between Russia and India is the use of mechanisms of ShOS, since Deli regards ShOS as an “adjunct” of the foreign policy of China. The involvement in ShOS at the equal



basis of India and Pakistan will definitely respond to the strategic interests of Russia.

It seems that it is high time for Russia to respond to the activities of the USA in the South Asia. The question is the restoration of relations with India to the “Soviet” level and “return” of Russia to Pakistan. India and Pakistan share these aims, proceeding from their specific interests. China plays a significant role in this region. It seems that the PRC not less than Russia is concerned about the intensified geopolitical activity of the USA in the South Asia and in the adjacent territories. Beijing, in particular, considers that the events in Tibet and in the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region may be regarded as a part of American strategic plan of “circling” China. Under existing conditions, the consolidated cooperation in the format of four states (India-Pakistan-China-Russia) may reduce dissemination of the destabilizing ideas and practice in the South and Central Asia.

*“Sever-Yug-Rossiya”, M., 2010, p. 132–136.*

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