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**RUSSIA AND COUNTRIES OF THE EAST AFTER  
COLLAPSE OF REAL SOCIALISM AND  
DISINTEGRATION OF THE USSR**

After disintegration of the USSR and collapse of real socialism the new political elite of Russia concentrated its attention on the western countries and in particular on the USA. Not only the elite but also a rather great part of various strata of the population perceived the relations Russia-West as a new stage in Russian history. “The West will help us” – these words could be heard in different auditoria. These expectations emerged in time of reconstruction, proclaimed by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU M. Gorbachyov, and were based on some rather big steps, made by the new Soviet leadership in the interests of radical improvement of relations of the USSR with western countries and primarily with the USA. The new Soviet leadership stopped the arms race, reduced the nuclear rockets potential, including liquidation of the most powerful and sophisticated rockets SS-20 (“Satan”), able to overcome any anti-rocket defense of the enemy. The Soviet leadership agreed to the unification of two parts of Germany (actually to absorption of GDR by FRG) and to liquidation of the military bloc of the socialist countries – Organization of Warsaw Treaty (OVD). At the same time, it believed the verbal promises of the western

leaders that NATO would not extend at the expense of the countries-former members of OVD. Gorbachyov and his closest circle proclaimed as their aim the liquidation of all hindrances in the way of integration of the USSR into the European Community – “the admission to the All-European House”.

President of the RF B.N. Yeltsin went further. With active participation of the pro-western intellectuals and unconcern for it of wide strata of the population, disillusioned in real socialism, he was actively engaged in destruction of “the red empire” – the socialist order, as was called the USSR in western countries. Not only western liberals of the new elite but also many ordinary citizens seemed to believe that the West was obliged to help Russia to realize conversion and to change the state planned economy for market economy with lesser expenses, since Russia as a principal construction element of the USSR itself liquidated the state and social order hostile to the West. This faith was so strong in the environment of the president of the RF B. Yeltsin that it resulted in reformation of Russia according to the model, created in the USA with active participation of American advisors headed by J. Saks, a professor of Harvard University, who himself wrote for president Yeltsin his decrees, as it became known later. After failure of the reforms Saks said as follows: the American advisors were in the situation of the surgeon, who saw inevitability of the surgery; however, the surgeon, having started his operation, was amazed at the picture: the structure of the patient’s organs differed from the usual structure of his former patients. If it is not a symptom of slyness, it shows rather the inexperience of the surgeon than the peculiarities of “the patient’s” anatomy.

For some reason Yeltsin and his assistants did not understand a simple evident thing: America was not interested in the successful reforms in Russia in order to prevent its transformation into a center of

unification of the CIS countries and of creation of a more consolidated union resembling the USSR. A Canadian journalist told the author candidly about it: “the West does not want to allow the formation of a new super-power on the bases of the disintegrated USSR. The key question for the West is to prevent rapprochement of Ukraine with Russia”. It is evident that following the economic depression and the budgetary deficit, according to this plan, Russia would be obligated to plead for help from western financial centers, which would dictate what to do. The International Monetary Fund actually did it.

(The Yeltsin team started to comprehend the situation only after the decision of the West to extend NATO to the East and after public declaration on intention of the USA “to develop the post-Soviet space”, i.e. to hinder the integration process in the CIS aiming at liquidation of Russia’s influence in the countries, which had been its integral parts for many centuries. The aggression of NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999 gave up for lost another myth of the leadership of the post-Soviet Russia – that allegedly Russia had no external foes.)

Exactly the orientation only to the West, to its assistance and advices concerning reformation of the country during the last years of the USSR existence and further for the time of new Russia’s existence resulted in reduction of its ties with the countries of the East, in loss of positions won at the high price, sometimes at the cost of blood. Actually, Russia fled from the countries of “the third world”, including the countries, where Russia invested dozens billions of the USA dollars and had wide and mutually beneficial relations with great strategic significance. Russia lost many friendly regimes, which supported it in time of counteraction between two social systems and two military blocs. If Russia had supported the moderate Najibullah regime in Afghanistan, the situation could have been different in this country. The same refers to some other friendly regimes. Russia left the Kamran

military base in Viet-Nam, although nobody pushed it out. The trade-economic relations with India were reduced to a very small size. The Russian authorities were forced to look in the direction of the East in order to prevent a total destruction of the military industrial complex.

The advanced countries of the East were not less significant from the point of view of their economic modernization's experience. The Gorbachyov reformers and the Yeltsin democrats did not see a simple idea. Scientists and experts in western countries, with rare exception, are not aware of the stages in the passage from the state to the market economy. Even the past experience has been forgotten. The personal author's experience as a visiting professor in a scientific institute of the FRG convinced the author of this conclusion. Only some elder scientists remember that West Germany after the war built its economy by step to step process with certain state regulation. There were no rash privatizations at a price of penny. There were no plans, like in France or Japan, but there were "recommendations" of the central powers to the subjects of economic process, followed by law-abiding Germans. But the radical liquidation of the state unprofitable enterprises in GDR was not a successful experience. It engendered grave economic, social and spiritual-moral problems in "new lands" (former East Germany"), demanded big investments on the part of "old lands" (former West Germany) and hampered a fast rise of united Germany for a long time.

The needed experience existed in Japan, South Korea, India and particular in China, where market economy was created in similar (with Russian) circumstances of dominance of the central planned economy. Already in time of Gorbachyov reconstruction prominent Russian economists proposed to the authorities to apply the experience of China, where reforms were started in the end of 1978 and resulted in colossal success for the first ten years. The similar model was proposed by academician of the RAS, economist V.Polterovich; expert in China

academician V. Myasnikov invited to Moscow Chinese economist Chen for a meeting with economists in the Kremlin; Dan, having come to power, liberated Chen from prison, where he had been put for “bourgeois deviation”. Exactly Chen played the most important role in creation of the Chinese model of reforms.

However, the efforts exerted by Russian scientists proved to be useless. The so-called “conservatives” (supporters of E. Ligachyov) regarded the Chinese model as a “retreat” from Marxism-Leninism, while “the reformers” (adherents of M. Gorbachyov, E. Shevardnadze and A. Yakovlev) were afraid of failing to please “the western friends” and western public opinion, which criticized the Chinese leadership for its anti-democratic policy. The liberal-democrats, supporters of Yeltsin (E. Gaidar, A. Chubais and others) without a trace refuted the experience of the countries of the East. However, the financial-industrial groups of Japan and South Korea accumulated a lot of valuable experience in the methods of stimulating foreign trade and technical progress, ensuring inflow of advanced western technologies. India carried out a thoughtful step by step privatization and financial-banking policy, which prevented outflow of the capital.

Quite another model was needed to prevent the collapse of economy, of social sphere and of scientific-technical infrastructure, to avoid an explosion in the spiritual-moral atmosphere, an aggravation of the demographic problem and emergence of “super-mortality”. Russia needed a rather prolonged stage of state capitalism, which was passed by actually all “new industrial countries”, and it was not necessary to demolish barrack-like or “destitute” (called like that in Poland) socialism; it was necessary to transform it into a society of social-democratic type following the example of Scandinavian countries.

For the years after the disintegration of the USSR and the collapse of the socialist world, the diverse events took place in



countries of the East, which should be mentioned without any logical enumeration.

First, the countries of socialist orientation disappeared from the political arena, but a reduced influence of the socialist idea remained in society of countries of the East. The same parties keep power in some former countries of socialist orientation. Many parties of the Afro-Asian world, including ruling parties, are affiliated with the Socialist International. China, Viet-Nam and Laos have not abandoned the socialist idea. It is quite probable that the idea of socialism in various forms (“new socialism”, “third way” etc.) in the Afro-Asian world will obtain a second wind in the nearest future. This process takes place in Latin America. It is difficult to say whether this trend will appear in other continents owing to the influence of the crisis.

Second, the differentiation of Afro-Asian countries in terms of the level of development has accelerated. The process of globalization promotes it a lot. China, still named as a developing country, demonstrated a rare (in world history) tempo of development for the last 30 years: the GNP annual rise of 10% and the annual industrial growth of 15%. In India the annual growth of GNP accounts for 8-9%. Indonesia, having survived a deep financial and political crisis, has achieved rather great success and joined the list of “new industrial countries” of the third generation. The Republic of Korea increases each year the amount of high tech production, having joined the club of developed countries. The rapid growth is characteristic for all “new industrial countries”. Only several Asian countries, for instance Myanmar (Burma) goes on through the period of economic depression.

The countries of the Persian Gulf, possessing big oil fields, primarily Saudi Arabia and United Arabic Emirates (UAE), demonstrate a great progress, skillfully having used high prices for oil to accelerate their development. The successes of Saudi Arabia in

economic development (multiplied for big oil reserves) ensured it a place in “the Group of Twenty” (G20), where it is only one Arabic country. At the same time, a number of Arabic countries (Algeria, Yemen and others) as in the past confront acute social-economic problems, which undermine their stability.

Unexpectedly for many observers of the African continent, the South-African Republic, marked formerly by the apartheid regime racial discrimination, turned out to become one of the rapidly developing countries. In 1991, the last white president F. De Clerk displayed his wisdom and repealed the law on segregation, while N. Mandela displayed his wisdom and adopted the policy aimed at formation of multi-racial society in the SAR. In 1993, both of them were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Having been elected in 1994 to the post of the president, N. Mandela did not infringe upon economic and social interests of the white minority (as it was done, for instance, in Zimbabwe). On the contrary, he actively carried out his policy aimed at formation of the multi-racial society; T. Mbeki, who replaced N. Mandela on the presidential post in 1999, successfully continued this policy. As a result, the SAR became the only African country in “Group of Twenty” (G20).

The guerilla movements, terrorist organizations and particularly terrorist acts characterize the situation in the countries, such as Algeria, India, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey and other countries. Some authors express a dubious idea that the national-liberation movement grows into this brutal form. According to the same logic, it is possible to assert that the national-liberation movement “flows” to the developed countries. The riots of immigrants from former French colonies, arranged in suburbs of Paris and other big cities in autumn of 2005, accompanied by senseless setting cars to fire and destruction of social structure objects, are also an inverted struggle

for their rights in the center of empire. The riots of Arabic Muslim youth were spread to some other European countries with lesser extent, though. In spring of 2007 the riots took place again in the suburbs of Paris at the lesser extension. But their repetition is quite probable in future.

A share of truth is evidently both in the first and the second assertion. However, the world is inseparable, and the troubles in former colonies will repeat themselves (and do it already!) in the centers of empire and in developed countries as a whole. Even given the reduction of the immigration flows from former colonies, the number of newcomers from “the poor South” will inevitably grow thanks to a higher birth rate of these groups of people comparing with the indigenous population. If “the rich North” wishes to keep the present political and social stability, it should, on the one side, turn its face to “the poor South” and, on the other side, cope with the problem of integrating newcomers from “the South” in all structures of society and in the perspective should form a multi-racial society in some countries, following the example of the USA.

Third, under conditions of accelerated globalization, the greatest successes are achieved by the countries, which by means of using their natural advantages (the rich reserves of raw resources, the developed infrastructure, the qualified and/or cheap labor force, the century long handicraft, the advantageous geographic location etc.) actively join the global economy and occupy their niches in the world division of labor. “The Asian dragons” grew on the basis of these principles. The “economic miracle” of China actually was based on the same principles. The growth of the innovation sector in India was also based on these principles.

At the same time, globalization as an objective process, directed by the more developed countries, stresses and pays greater attention to

the compatibility of technologies, goods, services, national economies in general. In these circumstances, the less developed countries turn out to be in a very difficult situation. They are unable to find out for themselves an adequate place in the world division of labor. Not all of them have the natural advantages, which will allow them to form the competitive industries, leaving aside the competitive economies. The remained mono-cultural orientation of economy may be overcome only with assistance of developed countries.

### **Challenges for Russia in the XXI century**

As it is known, in the course of the presidential election campaign president D. Medvedev advanced the idea of modernization of the country composed of four “i”: institutions, innovations, infrastructure and investments. Later the fifth “i” appeared – intellect, i.e. knowledge. It promoted the start of the discussion of national modernization by public and particularly scientific circles. Having been elected as the president, D. Medvedev called up the scientists of the RAS to make public their ideas on the national modernization’s problems and charged the Institute of Contemporary Development (ICD), created under his guidance, with elaboration of proposals in this sphere. And in his Internet-article “Go Russia!” published on the official presidential site on 10 September 2009, Medvedev presented the detailed picture of reforms, which should finally transform Russia into a contemporary flourishing democratic state. The brief substance of the article is presented below.

First, the president raised a question on the complex modernization of Russia, including not only economy but also the political system: the gradual, step by step modernization, which will not hinder the stability in the country. Its final aim is the construction of a flourishing and open democratic society on the basis of innovation economy.

Second, in contrast to what was said by the government and the leadership of the State Duma relating to the rapid national economic growth, Medvedev stressed the difficult situation in Russian economy, which actually was not developing for the last twenty ears, not mentioning the GNP growth at the expense of enormous high prices for the exported raw resources. He also mentioned the reasons of the actual lack of the country's development.

Third, the president said that modernization of Russian democracy, formation of new economy were possible only in case of use of intellectual resources of the post-industrial society without any complexes, openly and pragmatically. Russia needs money and technology of the countries of Europe, America and Asia. No other high official had spoken about it so candidly and honestly before Medvedev did it.

Fourth, the president in a new way raised a question of the way to be used by the state to carry out its foreign policy, which should exclude animosity, susceptibility, arrogance, inferiority complex, nostalgia etc., but should be based on the strategic long-term aims of Russia's modernization.

The article stimulated the discussion on the ways and methods in order to get the raw resources national economy going the innovation development. Up to that time, the officials, determining the economic course of the state, practically always ignored the meaning of the most prominent scientists of the RAS, which had catastrophic consequences for the country, as at present has become evident for everybody. The ruling class consigned to oblivion the idea of development in its search for division of property, created by three generations of Russians, and further for the easily obtained money after sale of hydrocarbons. The thing, which was considered by us as an economic growth after 1999, actually was the time of lost chances, R. Nigmatulin, an academician of

the RAS mentioned. Russia lost the engineering industry, the air craft industry, the production of mass consumption electronic goods, the production of medicines etc. Russia started to lag behind the countries, which formerly had been given support from the USSR in the economic and technical fields. In terms of efficiency Russian economy is at the level of the West Europe in the end of the 1960s and of South Korea in the beginning of the 1990s, said academician A. Dynkin, the director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

There are many obstacles on the way of Russia's modernization. If this problem is considered in the paradigm "for" and "against" or better first "against" and further "for", president Medvedev will need courage, resoluteness and persistence. The raw resources lobby is numerous and very influential. Corruption sickness has deeply penetrated into the state organism and in the body of society itself. Not only dishonest oligarchs and corrupted officials but a part of intellectuals, a lot of image makers, PR technologists, political scientists, showmen stultifying the people etc. are nourished by the juices of social decay. The people behave as if they are zombies and do not see what will happen with the country, when the incomes from sell of raw resources disappear.

And "for" is personified by the principal leader and the Constitution, which has not only serious mistakes in the separation of powers but also the provisions, which in critical moments in life of the country may play an exclusively positive role, if the state leader in charge of highest power considers the national destiny higher than his personal destiny. Briefly speaking, president D. Medvedev has the vast constitutional powers and, if he has the political will, may dismiss any official, if the latter does not cope with his liabilities or performs his own program, and may form the team, able to lead the country on the way of good development. Nobody can hinder him! And the tradition

by us is as follows: if the principal leader is able to show his firmness and demonstrates not a fictitious but actual care for the people, he will enjoy the mass support.

The president is also able to make the state mass media, including electronic mass media, carry out their activities for the benefit of the people, for the future of the country and not the interests of the raw resources oligarchs, its lobby in the state power and the corporate interests of bureaucracy. Modernization will not take place, if mass media do not support it.

*“Vostok: vyzovy XXI veka”, M., 2010.*

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**EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL MIGRATION:  
WHAT MIGRANTS ARE NEEDED IN RUSSIA**

The reciprocal action in the sphere of culture was always an urgent problem in the course of adaptation of migrants. It acquires a particular significance in contemporary Russia. The flows of migrants rush to Russia from the CIS countries; however most migrants are not Russians and are not aware of Russian culture or do not confine themselves to it. The social-cultural differences are the foundation of many conflicts related to migration (it is sufficient to recall recent events in France). Of great significance for analysis of social-cultural aspects of migrants' adaptation are the factors, such as the cultural values, aims, religion, ethnic-cultural consciousness, cultural signs and symbols, rituals.

In the course of research of the social-cultural aspects of migrants' adaptation it is necessary to take into account also the

specific features of migration in Russia at the present stage, which may be defined as follows.

First, the main motive of migration is aspiration for work and wage, i.e. it is the economic migration, which is not connected with other motives. The motivation for migration is a wider phenomenon in terms of its value composition in the world practice. Apart from economic factors it may include political, ethnic, family, religious and other values. Most migrants from the CIS countries leave for Russia to earn money to support their families, left at home, and they do not feel the need to assimilate with the Russian people, to assimilate with Russian culture, its values and custom. They often are not aware of even the Russian legislation.

Second, migration itself – both internal and external – is not a typical phenomenon. Up to the middle of the 1990s, migration was typical mainly for the youth without family ties. The students left for studies and further went to find a job, while young specialists went to other cities with the aim of professional carrier etc. At present, migrants are mostly the middle-aged people with families and children, and they have to migrate. They would have preferred to have adequate jobs and wages in the regions of their residence.

Third, the internal and the external migration are connected with the social-cultural differences. The Russians, living in rural regions, leaving for work to big cities, confront the sub-cultural differences in the sphere of communications, daily culture etc. The greater differences exist between the indigenous population of Russia and the migrants from the CIS countries, particularly from the republics of the Middle Asia and the Caucasus.

The knowledge of the Russian language is one of the most significant factors of social-cultural adaptation of migrants. The research shows that many young migrants, born after disintegration of



the USSR, speak Russian much worse than their parents. The bad knowledge of the Russian language is the barrier for the migrants' children to get Russian education. It hinders further adaptation of migrants and their children in Russian society.

It is necessary to take into account also the differences in claims of the different generations. If elder migrants do not claim for getting education in Russia and occupy the jobs for low-qualified workers (sellers, unskilled laborers etc.), their children often want to make a career and to get highly paid jobs with high status, which supposes the need to have highly qualified education.

The objective divergence of needs and means is accompanied for migrants (and not only in Russia) by the absolute of ethnic consciousness. They express unfounded ideas of persecution of migrants, of infringement of their rights comparing with indigenous population. In its turn, it engenders claims for getting education and chances to communicate in their own language. Migrants demand the formation of special schools on the ethnic-cultural basis, formation of groups of children by their nationality ("Azerbaijani", "Georgian" classes etc.), creation of TV and radio channels broadcasting in their languages.

The analysis of the values, making the basis of cultural adaptation of migrants, shows their contradictory features. On the one side, the Russian citizenship and permanent place of residence is a positive value for many migrants. On the other side, many migrants aspire for living in Russia according to culture and values of their Motherland.

Many authors note the absolute and local meaning of ethnic values, the separation of people for "one's people" and "aliens". Migrants often do not know Russian laws and have a low legal culture. However, if the sanctions are applied to the migrants-lawbreakers, in

the migrants' consciousness this fact is reflected as a persecution of "one's people" on the part of "aliens", i.e. the indigenous population of Russia. At the same time, it does not matter what crime is committed by "one's people". The slogan "one's people have been attacked" forms directly a protest and protection reaction. The absolutist meaning of ethnic consciousness contains in its foundation many conflicts between migrants and the indigenous population as well as between separate groups of migrants.

The exaggeration of ethnic values by migrants has an impact on communications and behavior in the labor market. The migrants' communities create in Russia the enclave labor markets on the ethnic-cultural basis, where only representatives of a definite ethnic group have the right to get a job. There exist enclave labor markets, kept under control by communities of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan etc., where other nationalities are denied the entry. The separation of the spheres of influence may be so deep that the representatives of the same ethnos but from another region are transformed into rivals. They do not let each other penetrate their business, their local labor markets.

Such rigid orientation to the ethnic-cultural consciousness objectively prevents to establish normal relations of migrants with the indigenous population but also with other groups of migrants. The absolute of ethnic consciousness has a negative influence on the quality of labor force.

According to the made research, migrants prefer to communicate with representatives of their own ethnos. There exist in Russia the regions of compact settlement by migrants of one region and one country. The sustainable systems of mutual relations are being shaped among representatives of one ethnos, among former compatriots. The newcomers are met by the representatives of communities, which prepare for them temporary housing and jobs. If the communication by

telephone or by post turns out to be inadequate, the system of couriers is put into effect. As a result even the migrants, settled in distant places, get information.

Migrants from Ukraine and Byelorussia permit marriages with the Russians; however, migrants from Asia and the Caucasus prefer marriages with representatives of the relative ethnos. In some national communities they demand the permission for the marriage with a person of other nationality. The formal marriages with Russians are rather widespread with the aim of getting citizenship.

The absolutist ethnic consciousness of migrants from the CIS countries to a large extent is explained by the difficulties of life in Russia. According to international law, the host country shall provide migrants with work, housing and medical care.

But in Russia, particularly in distant regions, the indigenous population lacks work, and housing in Russia is an acute problem especially for young families. Many Russians do not have access to the quality medical care. The district hospitals in rural regions lack medicines, and medical services and pharmacies in villages are being closed. In big cities medical care has become a commercial service and is not accessible for many Russians. Many Russians lack a chance to get free education. The number of state-paid places in universities has been reduced, and they lack hostels for students. Many Russians can not afford the paid education, and it is not affordable for migrants' children, since their parents occupy low qualified and low paid jobs. Therefore, confronting social-economic problems, migrants in Russia have to look for different ways of getting assistance from their compatriots and national communities.

The internal migration in Russia is a significant source of receiving the needed labor force. At present, many residents of distant regions aspire for getting jobs in big cities. The advantage of this labor

force is its cultural identity, mobility, needed qualification supported by Russian education. But the main advantageous effect of internal migration is its demographic feature.

While migrants from the CIS countries export money from Russia to their countries often without paying taxes, the Russian labor migrants take part in internal economic relations. The means, received from internal labor migration, create a great multiplicative effect. Russians spend money to support their families, to ensure education of their children, to buy housing. To the author's mind, exactly the internal labor migration needs the state support.

*“Demograficheskie problemy Rossii v obstanovke krizisa i puti ih resheniya”, M., 2009, p. 77–81.*

## **R. Nurullina, CONFSSIONAL SYSTEM IN TATARSTAN**

Peculiarities of Tatarstan's historical development define the confessional model of this republic, the role and Islam's position. Volga federal district is traditionally the region of close cooperation between the Turk-Moslem and the Slavic-Christian cultures. According to census in 2003 the Tatars amount to 52,9% and the Russians -39,5 of the republic population. The confessional policy is carried out within the framework of supporting balance of interests and all the religion equality before the law having the secular values as a priority because of the existing situation and according to the law “On religion freedom” adopted by the Russian Federation government in 1990. The given approach corresponds to the principles of religious tolerance formed within the framework of the European civilization.

The confessional model of the republic Tatarstan is recognized both in our country and in the world community. In due time the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Aleksey II noted:” Rich experience of effective cooperation between the representatives of two traditional religions – the Orthodoxy and Islam is accumulated in multiethnic Tatarstan owing to far-sighted policy of M. Shaimiev”. The first president of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev was presented with the international prize named by the king Feisal. It was noted that the president of Tatarstan “strengthened high Islamic values in the soul of his folk having made the republic as the symbol of the peaceful social coexistence and religious toleration”. In October 2009 the state secretary of USA H. Klinton visited the republic who laid down the purpose of her trip in the capital of Tatarstan in the following way:” I’ d like to know more about Kazan’s experience on tolerance strengthening and the international dialogue using”.

However, this confessional model using being very attractive in the eyes of the international community faces to many difficulties in its path caused by the objective reasons: multicultural society isn’t harmonic by definition. There are concepts “Dar al’ Islam” (the Islam sphere, the Moslem state having the legitimate authority) and “Dar al’ Kharb” (the war sphere, the countries under the authority of “unfaithful” and therefore, irregular rulers). There emerges the problem of the secular (and generally non-Islamic) state legitimization within the framework of the Moslem community.

The data of sociological studies indicate that the Moslem attitude towards the western democratic values as a whole is also contradictory especially among the students and the teachers of the Moslem institutions in Tatarstan. On one hand, it concerns their compatibility as the both go back to the common Abrahamit tradition. 62% of the respondents consider that the western values (democracy, the human

rights, pluralism and a civil society) are compatible with Islam and “generally Islam doesn’t contradict the democratic values”. On the other hand, for 40% of the respondents the West is embodiment of immoral and amoral way of living accompanied with the family institute degradation being very important for the Moslems. One passes an opinion that:” There is a terrible crisis in the West: social, moral... It’s the result of their way of living... Europe itself sounds alarm because the people are growing older and they have to find the labor force in the world of Islam...”

When it concerns the practical implementation of the international tolerance ideas the real situation can also not meet expectation in full. According to the Kazan researchers E. Hodjaeva and E. Shumilova based on data of sociological studies of the Orthodox and the Moslem clergy in Moscow and in Kazan one can speak only about the middle or low level of tolerance of the both. Respondents state more important status of their religion and at the same time they either are ready to cooperate with the representatives of the other confessions or admit neutral possibility of peaceful harmonious coexistence. The Abrahamit tradition doesn’t provide for religion equality regarding to spirituality and ideology, at the best – regarding to legislation and significance in the society. According to the western tradition separation of religion from State promotes to its changing into the constituent of the civil society. However, from the end of 1990-s there emerges evident Unitarian trend in the Russian state policy and as a result of it the central and the regional authority become more active in controlling the religious life. Today the researchers very often consider separation of the religious schools of the Moslems from State as a declaration because “the role of public organs is very important in the life of the Moslem communities”.

Islam is of great importance in Tatarstan concerning a political and cultural identification of the region within the framework of the Russian Federation. The Islam revival at the beginning of 90-s was interwoven with ethno-cultural renaissance of the Tatars; the activists of the national movements consider it as the important constituent of the ethnic identification and the national self-consciousness. The researchers consider that the first religious institution emergence in the republic is the result of these organization activities. However, the activity of the foreign missionaries played the important role in the Islam revival because of the lost of own religious traditions so the Moslem's position in Tatarstan in the national problem is contradictory enough.

For some Tatars Islam is, first of all, a world religion initially not united with the concrete national tradition but if only united then probably with the Arabian one but not with the Tatar. "Two eliminations threaten the Tatar original identity: one embodies the Unitarian trend of the state policy but the other – above-ethnic Islamic challenge. But the both neglect the Tatar language and culture depriving them of development prospect".

In literature one also discusses widely the problem on the role the Moslems of the republic Tatarstan can and must play in the world Islamic umma. Jadidizm and euro-Islam were considered as the unique contribution of the Tatars in the common-Islamic cause at different times. However, their modernist orientation, according to some experts, can bring to "watering down" the Islamic tradition.

Recently the theologians of Tatarstan actively promote the Hanafi-legal school being traditional for this region having a high degree of tolerance in comparison with the other schools. So, the historical position of the Republic Tatarstan, on one hand, belonging to the European civilization periphery but on the other hand - to the

Moslem civilization - caused those problems the regional leadership faces with when realizing its confessional policy.

Tatarstan is the point of several approach impact and interaction: the Western, liberal, All-Russian, national, the Tatar, ethno-national and Islamic and international.

*“Vlast”, M, 2010, N 9, p.113–115*

**A. Krylov,**

publicist

### **AZERBAIJAN ON THE WAY OF POST-SOVIET DEVELOPMENT**

After disintegration of the USSR Azerbaijan, possessing big natural resources, found itself in the adjacent region in the most advantageous position. Its main source of income became the export of energy carriers to the world markets, and up to the present time the economic growth of the country is based on the extensive use of energy resources.

Owing to its geographic location and the oil and gas reserves Azerbaijan was and remains for the USA a country of greatest priority in the post-Soviet space. The USA rendered Azerbaijan great assistance in the field of military and navy construction, actively promoted intensification of relations between Azerbaijan and NATO.

The USA and EU proclaimed as their most important ask overcoming an excessive, from their point of view, dependence of Europe on Russian energy carriers. The construction of a new pipeline system was started via Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and further to Europe. The oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum were constructed. The Administration of



B. Obama continued the course of the previous Administration aimed at construction of “Southern energy corridor” round Russia and Iran.

The leadership of Azerbaijan demonstrated its interest in joint development with the USA and EU in the sphere of energy. It declared repeatedly that cooperation of Azerbaijan with NATO is characterized by strategic aims and that the country made its choice for the benefit of “genuine democracy” and “Euro-Atlantic values”. But this choice did not mean that Baku renounced its own sovereignty and would blindly follow the direction of American policy.

President Ilham Aliyev repeatedly said that the contemporary relations between Russia and Azerbaijan might be an example of mutual actions between two neighboring states. On the basis of the present mutual understanding at the high level and the coincidence of positions on many problems of global policy, according to I. Aliyev, the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan attained the level of strategic partnership. Moscow as well does not spare compliments addressing official Baku. The representatives of the ministry of foreign affairs of Russia not once also declared that the Russian-Azerbaijani relations attained the level of strategic partnership.

The Russian authorities keep away from internal political events in Azerbaijan. The Kremlin prefers to abstain from public declarations concerning approval or disapproval relating to activities of different political forces in Azerbaijan. But its sympathy is quite evident.

The present representatives of the opposition are regarded as followers of the adventurous and anti-Russian course of A. Elchibey and therefore may not be supported in Moscow. In time of the Aliyevs father and son, the situation in Azerbaijan became again stable, and the economic relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were restored and further developed. And this circumstance for the Russian leadership is much more significant than the authoritative regime and violation of

human rights and similar “shortcomings” of the present ruling regime in Azerbaijan.

The similar “restrained-contemplative” position relating to current events in Azerbaijan is occupied by the USA, EU and actually by all states personifying present western democracy. In spite of permanent critic remarks addressed to Baku from western capitals, in Azerbaijan there were no massive interference in internal affairs and no actual support given to the opposition, in contrast to the previous events in a number of post-Soviet states. And it is evident: the own national interests in international relations are much more important than the interests of “promotion of democracy” in other countries.

The USA regards Azerbaijan as an adequate strong point to extend political and military presence in the Caspian-Black Sea region, as a transit country for export of energy carriers from the Central Asia and as a significant exporter of energy carriers. For the European Union is important not so much the military-political component as the role of Azerbaijan as a transit country and an exporter of energy carriers to Europe.

Russia appreciates Azerbaijan as a valuable trade partner and as a significant part of new transport corridors North-South, which connect it with Iran and the countries of the South Asia. Moscow does not regard that the extension of military-political presence of the USA will consolidate stability in the Caspian-Black sea region. Drawing Azerbaijan into a military operation against Iran contradicts the interests of Russian national security, since it creates a threat to destabilize the situation on the southern borders of Russia.

Evidently, transformation of Azerbaijan into a transit country for export of the Central Asian energy resources to the world markets contradicts the interests of Russian energy monopolies and would result in weakening positions of the RF in the CA region and in the South

Caucasus. The Russian leadership succeeded to neutralize this threat by the developed mutually beneficial cooperation in the sphere of energy with the CA countries (transit to external markets by existing pipelines, purchases of oil and gas etc.). In 2009 Russia started to buy gas also in Azerbaijan. Up till that time, Georgia and Turkey were the main exporters of gas from Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijan's exports make up annually 6.3 billion cubic meters of gas shipped to Turkey from "Shah Deniz" deposit, according to the contract for 16 years. These deliveries started in 2006. Under the contract, since 15 April 2008 Azerbaijan had the right to raise the price, which was three times lower than in Europe. But the Turkish company "Botas" refused to do it, although it purchased fuel from "Gasprom" at the price, which was three times higher than the price of gas in Azerbaijan. The contradictions in the sphere of energy were aggravated after establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia, and this event caused the unprecedented cooling of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The ministry of foreign relations of Azerbaijan declared that signing of the protocol contradicts the national interests of Azerbaijan and cast aspersions on the brotherly relation between Azerbaijan and Turkey, which have deep historic roots.

Passions became heated, when in the course of the football play between Armenian and Turkish teams in Bursa on 14 October 2009 it was forbidden to use Azerbaijani flags, and officers of the Turkish police tore to pieces an Azerbaijani flag and threw it into a refuse bin, according to mass media. The mass media in Azerbaijan were enraged with reports on "warm embraces" of the presidents of Armenia and Turkey and on the fact that the Turkish president's wife allegedly herself prepared dinner for Armenian president, who spent a night in the bedroom of the Turkish president.

The mentioned information provoked the anti-Turkish feelings in Azerbaijan. The emotional debates on the incident with the Azerbaijani flag were arranged in the parliament. The crisis in the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey and the unclear perspectives of export of gas from Azerbaijan to Europe forced Baku to look for alternative export markets. On 16 October 2009, I. Aliyev declared that Azerbaijan would consider alternative variants of gas export since the Turkish-Azerbaijani negotiations on transit of blue fuel failed. He accused Turkey of making obstacles for achievement of agreements, proposing unacceptably low prices for Azerbaijani gas.

The transit capacity of the gas pipeline connecting Azerbaijan with Russia makes 7 billion cubic meters per year. Azerbaijan has a chance to sell two thirds of produced gas to Russia. The leadership of Azerbaijan declared about its readiness to sell Russia as much gas as it needs.

Iran may become another important customer of Azerbaijani gas. After disintegration of the USSR, Azerbaijan and Iran came to the agreement on gas deliveries on the basis of reciprocity. Gas is delivered from Azerbaijan to the Iranian provinces contiguous with the state borders, while Iran ships the same quantity of gas to the isolated from the rest territory of Azerbaijan – to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (NAR).

It is probable that the gas of Azerbaijan will become a significant component of the project “Peace Pipeline”, which is subject to discussion and would be laid from Iran to Pakistan and India. This project is summoned to play a great role in consolidation of stability in the region and in its economic development, the participants of the project stress. In the opinion of some Azerbaijani experts, “the simpler and cheaper option” for the country would be an agreement on export

of the gas from Azerbaijan to Asia than the expectation of implementation of “ephemeral Nabucco” project.

The western partners reacted in a negative way to the change of Azerbaijan’s energy policy. In January 2010, the special representative of the State Secretary of the USA for energy affairs R. Morningstar visited Azerbaijan. Following his return to Washington, he expressed his disillusionment with the lack of agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey on gas deliveries. He also excluded any chance for participation of Iran in “South Corridor” and said that that this project might turn out to be lacking vital capacity, if there would be not concluded a feasible from the commercial point of view and mutually beneficial agreement on the terms of gas shipment.

The vice-chairman of the sub-committee for human rights of the European parliament and representative of the Conservative party of Great Britain for foreign policy Ch. Tannok warned Azerbaijan about probable negative for it consequences. To his mind, in case of difficulties through Azerbaijan’s fault relating to implementation of “Nabucco” project, it might put an additional obstacle for Azerbaijan in its intension to join the European-Atlantic economic and security structures. Simultaneously, the western countries exert their pressure on Turkey with the aim of taking decision to settle the issue of transit of Azerbaijani gas via Turkey.

The existence of the gas pipelines, constructed in Soviet times, promotes development of energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and neighboring countries – Russia and Iran. The gas pipeline Gazi-Magomed-Astara-Bind-Biand with annual gas capacity of 10 billion cubic meters connects Azerbaijan and Iran.

The position of Azerbaijan in the course of its negotiations with Turkey was reinforced thanks to the rapid diversification of gas deliveries. Having signed the contract on deliveries of Azerbaijani gas

to Russia, I. Aliyev declared that Azerbaijan would not agree to the Turkish proposals on gas prices and transport tariffs for transit. He accused Turkey of taking actions which impede export of Azerbaijani fuel to Europe.

It is evident that should Turkey go on to drag out the conclusion of the agreement about the acceptable for Azerbaijan gas prices and tariff cost, the energy cooperation between two countries may be reduced to a minimum scale. However, this perspective would hardly become a reality: it is not to Baku advantage to be excessively dependent on one of his customers – Turkey, Iran or Russia and it would be too dangerous to strain relations with the USA and EU.

The policy carried out by Baku is aimed primarily at development of energy sector and therefore makes it possible to get political and financial advantages, but it has become the reason of inadequate diversification of economy and its dependence on the situation in the world energy market. At the same time, the Azerbaijani energy resources are limited, and it is possible to predict with good reason that the amount of raw resources extraction will be reduced in the nearest future. For the time being, the elite of Azerbaijan is not concerned a lot about dependence on “oil needle” and lacks adequate stimuli for political and economic modernization. The situation in the country is marked by existence of the authoritarian model of the governed or imitated democracy. The ruling regime keeps under its complete control political life in the country and is able to ensure the needed election results even irrespective of actual votes cast by the people. According to the official data, 88,73% of voters supported President I. Aliyev at the elections in October 2008.

On the initiative of the ruling party “Eni Azerbaijan” (“New Azerbaijan”), the constitutional referendum took place in the country in March 2009. According to official data, over 90% of the participants

approved the proposed amendments in the constitution, including abrogation of the limit concerning election of the same person more than twice. It means that I. Aliyev may remain in power after expiration of his second presidential term in 2013.

The changes of the political system actually have transformed the country into the inherited monarchy, to the minds of the leaders of opposition movements. The opposition having called up to boycott the referendum refused to recognize as valid its official results. However, the actions, taken by the opposition, had no impact on the course of referendum and its results, they were not received any international support. The mission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) noted that the referendum demonstrated readiness of the Azerbaijani people to extend elements of stability and democratization. The head of the mission, a Belgian deputy stressed that the referendum had passed in a quiet situation and was marked by a high activity of electors.

The mission of observers of the CIS also recognized the referendum to be free and open, corresponding to the norms of the existing state legislation and common methods of preparing the national voting of all people. And what is more, the mission ascertained that the referendum was a significant factor for further democratization of public life in Azerbaijan, consolidated the foundation of sovereignty and became the reflection of stable and prospective social-economic development of the state.

The recognition by the countries of the West of legitimacy of the inherited power by its passage from the father to the son and later the agreement for the unlimited term of I. Aliyev governance resulted in the crisis of the political forces, oriented to the western model of democracy. The split pro-western opposition, deprived of foreign

support, actually has no chances to change the regime by achievement of success at the presidential elections.

It is quite probable that president of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev (or at least the Aliyevs clan) will hold power for a long time. The lack of perspectives to change the ruling regime by the constitutional way under conditions of the social-economic systemic backwardness and of a great gap in levels of income between the elite and the rest of the population result in the growth of social tension. It creates favorable conditions for activities of the extremist forces, which urge towards usage of Islam for political aims and towards seizure of power with its assistance in Azerbaijan.

*“Vneshnie svyazi stran Prikaspiya v usloviyakh globalnogo krizisa i interesy Rossii”, M., 2010, p.103–108.*

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### **THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL MODEL IMPLEMENTING IN KYRGYZSTAN**

In April 2006 the counselor to the then President K. Bakiev and the Manager in the Islamic development bank from the Kyrgyz Republic Sh. M. Murtazaliev had serious words with the author of these lines about short-range plans on Islamization of the total sector of Kyrgyzstan. Such declaration couldn't but set wondering. In spite of the fact that 84% of the Kyrgyz population are the Moslems the Islam influence in the republic isn't so much as, for the example, in the neighboring Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. The fact that the most part of the Kyrgyz population don't employ bank services is evidence of not so much ethnically-oriented economic behavior of the country citizens as a poor financial culture of the society as a whole. For the most part of the



population Islam is a moral factor influencing on value creating in the society.

According to the inquiry in 2003 by the Kyrgyz expert Chotaeva the Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan show the maximum consistency in performing the Islamic duty. The second group of the most religious respondents is the representatives of the national minorities: the Dungans, the Uigurs and etc. The third place is for the Kyrgyz: only 25,9% of the respondents declared that they always observed the religious rules. Since the situation had changed little.

It's clear that the number of mosques isn't also the absolute index for the religious population. In 1991 there were 39 mosques but in 2003 – 1600 in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time according to inquiries in the different regions of the country carried out in 2003 54,5% of the Kyrgyz declared that they don't go to mosques. Nevertheless, the words of the Manager in the Islamic development bank from the Kyrgyzstan on introducing the Islamic finance methods in the bank sector weren't only good intentions. On 16 May 2006 one signed the Memorandum on mutual understanding between the Republic Kyrgyzstan, OAO "EkoBank" (from 2010 this bank is called as EkoIslamic Bank) and the Islamic development bank. The memorandum contains the regulations establishing cooperation mechanism between Kyrgyzstan and the Islamic development bank in banking developing in the country.

One planned to introduce the Islamic finance methods in the country in four stages according to the article II of the Memorandum.

1. The first stage included the Steering Committee forming on the memorandum implementation, the definition of the necessary minimal changes in the legislation to realize the Islamic banking and forming a special unit on the Islamic banking in the structure of "EkoBank".

2. The second stage was “EkoBank” recapitalization and the necessary measure taking to ensure a possibility to participate of all the interested structures in its capital including the Government of the Republic Kyrgyzstan, the Islamic development bank and the other financial institutions of the countries-members of the IDB.

3. Within the framework of the third stage one supposed to adopt normative legal documents being necessary for developing the Islamic financial services.

4. The fourth stage provides for that the Steering committee gave its conclusions and recommendations for the parties having signed the memorandum about perspectives to change the capital of the Republic Kyrgyzstan – the town Bishkek- into the center of the Islamic finances in the region in case of a successful fulfillment of the tasks planned in the course of the first three stages.

At the present Kyrgyzstan is on the third stage of the plan implementing concerning introducing the Islamic methods of financing in the country. Basic normative legal treaties are adopted creating equal conditions for the Islamic and traditional finance institution work. So, on 3 April 2009 the President of Kyrgyzstan signed the Laws “On making additions to the Law of the Republic Kyrgyzstan “About banks and banking in the Republic Kyrgyzstan”, “About making changes and additions to the Law of the Republic Kyrgyzstan “About the National bank of the Republic Kyrgyzstan” and others. These amendments open possibilities to use the Islamic methods of financing by the Islamic and the traditional banks having the Islamic “windows”. In September 2009 the government of Kyrgyzstan approved “Regulations on insurance according to the Islamic principles (takaful) and “Regulations on stock issued according to the Islamic principles of financing (sukuk)”. So, the legal basis is prepared for the developing not only the Islamic banks but also the other Islamic finance institutions and instruments.

The foreign experts give a high assessment for Kyrgyzstan's achievements in the Islamic finance sector development. So, according to the former director of the regional representation of IBD in Alma-Ata, Nick Zainal Abidin, less than two years Kyrgyzstan worked its way which takes more than 10 years for the other countries.

On 12 July 2006 the president K. Bakiev signed the decree N 373 "About pilot project for introducing the Islamic financing principles in Kyrgyzstan" after two months of having signed the memorandum. It was approved to develop the Islamic finance sector parallel with the traditional one. In other words, a dualistic model of economy development was given preference over. All the existing banks in the country were offered a choice: whether to continue realizing interest operations or becoming transformed into the Islamic banks.

The above-mentioned "EkoBank" was selected as the field of the experiment to introduce the Islamic methods of financing or rather its affiliated branch located in Bishkek. The given affiliated branch was practically granted a status of the Islamic "window" in the traditional commercial bank. The state isn't a shareholder of the bank but its leadership was in close relations with the ex-president K. Bakiev and the government. As it's known it's a key success factor in such region as Central Asia. It's difficult to foresee what effect the change of power in Kyrgyzstan will have on the position of "EkoIslamicBank".

In December 2006 the National bank of Kyrgyzstan permitted to use the Islamic methods of financing within the framework of a pilot project of "EkoBank" according to Regulations "About the Islamic principle realization in Kyrgyzstan within the framework of a pilot project". The special committee having worked over the Islamic "window" in "EkoBank" prepared for more than 20 documents associated with the Islamic finance using in economy of Kyrgyzstan.

In July 2007 the president of the country K. Bakiev and the president of IDB, Ahmed Mohammed ‘Ali, were present at the official ceremony of the Islamic “window” project opening.

From May 2008 not only the legal but also the physical entities had a possibility to open savings account kard hasan where the interest isn’t added for the remains. In August of the same year the bank began depositing sums till calls for based on a treaty of keeping and fixed investment deposits based on mudaraby. Today “EkoIslamicBank” offers many banking services for its clients (both physical and legal entities). Income on some of them (in particular, on investment deposit based on mudaraba) exceeds income on the traditional deposits in the other banks of Kyrgyzstan.

**Comparative table on the income on the Islamic deposits and the traditional deposits in the banks of Kyrgyzstan (for 1.02.2009)**

Term	The Islamic deposits in “EkoBank”		Average rate of interest in the main commercial banks of Kyrgyzstan	
	In terms of soms (% per annum)	In terms of US dollars (% per annum)	In terms of soms (% per annum)	In terms of US dollars (% per annum)
6 months	10,01	10,01	8,92	7,44
12 months	12,52	12,52	12,02	10,73
18 months	15,02	15,02	13,37	12,02
24 months	17,52	17,52		

Nevertheless, one should hardly expect that introducing the Islamic methods of financing in the banking sector of Kyrgyzstan will be mass. The most optimistic scenario is creating of the Islamic “windows” by the traditional commercial banks.

The intention of “EkoIslamic Bank” leadership to transfer its experience on financing introducing according to sharia beyond Kyrgyzstan, in particular, in the other states of Central Asia and Russia gives rise to doubt because “EkoIslamicBank” has no enough resources. Bishkek will be hardly give a good run for Alma-Ata’s money as the regional center of the Islamic finances when Kazakhstan’s becoming active at the market of the Islamic finance services, i.e. to put the fourth stage into practice foreseen by the above-mentioned memorandum on the mutual understanding between Kyrgyzstan, “EkoBank” and the Islamic development bank.

As for the other states of Central Asia then Tajikistan is tipped to achieve success in the market development of the Islamic finance services. There is the working group under the National bank to study and introduce the Islamic financing in the Republic. IDB actively supports the working group. A special unit specializing on developing the Islamic finance products is in one of the leading Tajik banks – “Agroinvestbank”.

*“Islamskaya ekologicheskaya model’ I sovremennost”*,  
M, 2010, p. 272–276.

**G. Rudov,**  
**THE WORTH OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE GENESIS**  
**OF POWER IN POST-SOVIET STATES**  
**OF THE CENTRAL ASIA**

From the time of declaration of independence and disintegration of the USSR, the states of the Central Asia (CA) go through a difficult

period of statehood, directly connected with stability of the whole region. They continue the course in search of orientations relating to their internal and foreign policy, formation of their own political direction, determination of their place in the world system subject to transformation.

One should notice that these processes are complicated by the need to solve at once, instantly the social-economic, military-political and confessional problems. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the meanings of some analysts and experts that the Asian countries, the former republics of the USSR, objectively turned out to be less prepared for adequate perception of new realities and democratic forms of state power. The countries of the region are characterized by the great influence of Islam on social consciousness, by stereotypes of claniship and localistic tendencies, authoritarian rule and even feudal mentality. Taken together, these factors (with due account of remained elements, principles and forms of the Soviet-Party leadership and cadre policy) up to present remain the basic norm, which ensures, rather strangely for adepts of neo-liberalism, the adequately efficient functioning of new power structures and allows as a whole to solve the problems of political and economic stability.

The similar genesis of power with various options is characteristic for all states of the Central-Asian region. The enumerated features are marked particularly clear in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and they are seen as well in Kazakhstan. The purposeful policy of creating an image of “the chief” and “the father” of the nation personified by the present leaders is carried out in these republics. The attempts to disassemble the formed power structures had not enjoyed the wide public support. And what is more, as the experience in Tajikistan showed, they result in the national crisis fraught with not

only disintegration of the state but also with destabilization in the whole region.

In essence, the sole alternative to the party-clan authoritarian rule is Islamic fundamentalism, which, in its turn, foresees a rigidly regulated power structure, headed by one leader. It should be recalled that the Central-Asian region was and is a particularly significant zone of national-state interests of Russia. It is very important for Russia that the Central Asia should be a zone of stability and dynamic development, not burdened by any internal and adjacent points of tension, a zone, which is opened for mutually beneficial international cooperation. It is significant to ensure that both Russia and the CA states themselves as well as prominent states of the region and of the West are interested in intensification of such mutual action.

Up till present, for all states of the region without exception Russia remains the most significant partner and neighbor. It is the recognized guarantor of regional stability and security, despite the presence there of the coalitional anti-terrorist forces. The multilateral (within the framework of the CIS) and bilateral military-political and economic agreements with Russia create the conditions for preservation of internal stability in the region and for continuation of the peaceful state construction. At the same time, it should be remembered that at present the CA turned out to be in focus of attention paid to it by the global and leading regional powers, the international financial-economic structures, became the sphere of cooperation of a wide specter of participants, the arena of rivalry among non-regional forces. It is conditioned by the geo-strategic significance of the region, by its vast oil and gas and other mineral resources. The states went through rather painful period of adaptation to new geo-political conditions of forming foreign policy conceptions and defense doctrines, which adequately take into account the realities and complications of behavior

in the world of many ties with former allies and new partners. These processes are complicated with consequences of the inefficient economic policy of new independent states, which failed to adapt to new conditions of autonomous economic governance. For the first half of the 1990s, their economic hardships were aggravated by the new orientation to the far abroad countries. Even by the beginning of the XXI century the trade turnover of Russia with the CA countries made up only one third of the trade turnover with former CA republics within the framework of the USSR. Having liberated itself from the burden of “donor” for the CA states, Russia lost an essential part of its attractiveness for them. Evidently, due to the loss by Russia of its dominant position in the CA and due to the purposeful aspiration of the third countries “to push out” Russia, as well as due to the crisis in Russian economy and public life and the upsurge of nationalist feelings in the CA countries – all these events could not help undermining the authority of Russia in “the Central-Asian distant region” and instigating the local elites to be less attentive (and sometimes behaving in a slighting tone) to Russia. It was especially evident in the example of Uzbekistan in time, when the former leadership of Russia actually ignored the requests and appeals of the head of the biggest state, in terms of the number of its population (25 million people) and economic capacity, the state which claimed for the role of the regional leader.

This situation was noticed both by the closest Asian neighbors, “good friends” from the West and by various Islamic structures propagating ideas of nationalism and Pan-Turkism. One should recall the explosions in Tashkent, arranged by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU), military actions of fighters, marked by seizures of hostages and human losses in the south of Kirghizstan in 1999 and in 2000. Later IDU again made the declaration on its wish to overthrow the secular regime of Karimov: in spring of 2004 in Tashkent and



Bukhara the terrorist acts resulted in massacre and numerous victims. President I. Karimov on 31 August 2004 declared that the extremist movement “Hizb ut-Tahrir” had organized these revolts with the view to create a caliphate on the territory of Muslim states. The leadership of Uzbekistan pointed out that the ideas of this extremist organization represent a significant threat to stability of the country and to its neighbors. The activities of the radical extremists were not stopped even by big joint training exercises against terrorism arranged by member-states of ODKB on the territory of Kirghizstan.

Appraising the events in Uzbekistan, vice-president of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Colonel-General L. Ivashov said clearly: “It should be taken into account that the phenomenon of shahids is rather non-traditional for Uzbekistan. But the situation changed, when the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan established close contacts with talibs, who took under their wing the IDU headquarters. The experience was transmitted, while the social milieu was maturing for these years”. P. Zolotarev, a deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, thinks: “This is a component of the general process of the international terrorism and the consequence of the events in Iraq, as well as of the USA actions in Iraq...In is time, Moscow warned Washington that the operation in Iraq, characterized by its evident anti-Islamic direction, will explode the situation in the region, including the Central Asia, will result in intensification of the world terrorism...The attempts to keep the USA from taking the erroneous step failed, and at present it is to reap the fruits...”

The task of ensuring of security in the south of Russia is directly connected with the problems of stability in the CA countries, and therefore the Central-Asian region was and remains an exceptionally significant zone of Russian national-state interests. The need to keep here the dominant role of the RF is determined by the unsettled internal

political and social-economic issues in the CA countries, by existing latent, including inter-ethnic and territorial, contradictions among them. The emergence of the first conflict in Tajikistan and further in Uzbekistan and in the south of Kirghizstan in total with the continued fire in Afghanistan and the big fire in Iraq make this region be very unstable and explosive with a great potential of probable ethnic-political conflicts. Under these conditions, the presence of Russia – political, economic and military – in essence is the sole factor able to guarantee here peace and stability. The departure of Russia will result in an unpredictable avalanche of events, fraught with disastrous consequences. As a result, there will appear the probability of interference of the third countries, motivated not only by the malicious intent but also by the instinct of self-preservation, by the interests of ensuring their own security.

At present, the Central Asia has become an object of the targeted political, economic and ideological external ascendancy primarily on the part of Muslim states. There are two mutually connected trends: the rise of interests by the Central-Asian countries themselves in intensive development of political and economic ties with foreign states and the urge of such countries as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia towards exclusion of Russia from this region and installation of their dominance. The problem of regional mentality is stirred up permanently in the CA countries. The phenomenon of the term “regional” consists in its narrow direction, which makes it closer to “the Central-Asian idea” uniting the peoples of the Central Asia with the peoples of Iran, Afghanistan and the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous region of the PRC.

For the post-Soviet period, the process of re-perception of national history and its inclusion in the world system was going on in the CA republics, which was expressed in the essential correction of

views on the historic past. The most evident example of this process was seen in Turkmenistan. The first president of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Turkmenbashi in his book “Rukhnama” wrote: “It was my destiny to become the leader of the Turkmen people on the boundary between two millenniums. I had an important responsibility to lead my people from misfortunes and failures of the dismal epoch of its past history to the acmes of the third millennium...My doctrine is Rukhnama. Rukhnama is a direct systemic line of world outlooks, going by their substance to the national self-consciousness of the Turkmen. Rukhnama is the method of their realization under specific conditions of the started process of self-realization of the Turkmen nation...”

The president of the neighboring to Russia state, who sticks to “positive neutrality”, trying to keep a certain distance from Russia and simultaneously making advances to the West, the USA and Muslim states on the basis of the biggest oil fields in the Caspian Sea, tried without any reservations indirectly and directly to accuse Russia and Russians of all past and present misfortunes of “his people”. It is worth citing the following passage from “Rukhnama” to see the way of education of the contemporary Turkmen generation: “...for the XIV-XVI centuries the divided Turkmen people started to lose their former might...The Turkmen famous dynasties akgoyunly and gargoyunly were at loggerheads with each other... The struggle between them accelerated after Russians reached the borders of Khasars ...Russia installed on the Turkmen territory the governance, which depended on it, unleashed religious propaganda and carried out its own cultural policy...It must be confessed that for the years, which we spent within the USSR, we reconciled ourselves to the characteristics that the Turkman was an uncultured, uneducated nomad and cattle-breeder, living in a black yurt, more precisely yarlyk. Those, who had their own

meaning, were declared enemies of the people, were humiliated and discriminated... We lived in this condition for 74 years, which were the years of anguish and low spirits, lack of faith in the day of tomorrow...”

It is amazing that the leader of the state, having received higher education and started his professional work in Leningrad and having raised to the highest stages of the party nomenclature after his return to the republic perceived his life in this way. It is not necessary to cite numerous speeches of S. Niyazov at the congresses and meetings of those times, when he loaded and sang his praises relating to the socialist reality and community of “the Soviet people”. Really, did Russia and the Russian people fail to bring something valuable to Turkmenistan and other CA countries? Let us recall the reconstruction of Ashghabad from ruins after the disastrous earth brake in 1948, the construction of Tashkent after the earth brake in 1966. It is impossible to forget that all republics of the Central Asia became the zone of complete literacy. The traditional southern diseases were liquidated, electricity was accessible even in small auls, the network of schools and medical points was created, the irrigation was practiced, in big cities and small towns there were built plants and factories, the higher education institutions and the high professional schools. It should not be forgotten that “Rukhnama” was translated into dozens of languages of the world and may be read by hundred thousand people of Europe, Asia and Latin America, who might ponder over the phenomenon of “Russian bear”, getting all and everything under itself. The western mass media continue to cry from the house-tops about “the threat” on the part of Russia. One would like to hope that time will show the truth, and the people will adequately appreciate the input of Russia in development of the republics, the present sovereign states of the Central Asia. It should be stressed that the mentioned words, spoken by the state head do not promote

consolidation of relations between the peoples and the long-term security in the unstable region of the world.

As A.D. Shutov correctly mentioned, “the leaders of Georgia and Uzbekistan regard not Russia but the USA and NATO as their closest friends and strategic partners, “unselfish sponsors” and benefactors and with reckless hurry are ready to provide or provide already the territory of their states for location of foreign military bases...” Therefore the thesis “the CIS – the priority of Russian foreign policy” should remain unshakeable. It should be recalled that since the old times the Central Asia and particularly Fergana valley were and are characterized by poly-ethnicity and multy-confession. The CA was the place of co-existence of many peoples, of mutual exchange of cultures and traditions. For many centuries different religions co-existed, were propagated and disseminated there. The dissemination of Islam was started since the VII century and continued till the XIX century. Many traditions and rituals of the region’s peoples were formed under the influence of this religion, which is very significant for shaping national mentality of the peoples. This fact forces the leaders of all CA countries to pay attention to spiritual education according to the needs of the peoples. The leaders of the CA countries are interested in Muslim mentality of their peoples. But in no circumstances they will wish to share their powers with the religious organizations, which urge towards a special place in public and political life of the country. Proceeding from the above said, it is possible to make the following conclusions.

For the period of state sovereignty, obtained by the CA republics, their leaders often presented Islam as an expression of national mentality, and they use it for consolidation of their position and for opposition to Russian influence. At the same time, the justified wish of Russia to keep its presence in the region and its authority is interpreted as a continuation of its expansion, which might be opposed by Islam.

Therefore the aspiration for constructing national economy is accompanied by restoring Islamic norms.

The present leadership of the CA republics formerly belonged to the high and middle nomenclature of the CPSU and the Soviet State. It is evident that they do not want to create a religious society. These leaders are not ready to reconcile with the political demands of any religious groups. It is proved by the pressure by the president and its circle against religious groups in Uzbekistan and by liquidation of party “Alash” in Kazakhstan. The participation of the state leaders in religious feasts and their encouraging statements on religion are the actions within the framework of activities aimed at using Islam as a factor promoting shaping and consolidating national identity. The analogous phenomena are characteristic also for the Muslim regions of contemporary Russia.

The external threat to security of the CA states became less dangerous as a result of “defeat” of talibs. The risk was reduced to the use by international terrorism of the regional territory to undermine security of Russia. The situation on the border between the CA countries-members of the CIS and Afghanistan was ameliorated. However, it remains dangerously explosive for a seen perspective depending on narcotic traffic – the main source of financing terrorism in all its forms. At the same time, a principally new geopolitical situation emerges in the CA. The military-political presence of the USA acquires a rather prolonged characteristic, and consequently it will mean expansion of NATO to the Trans-Caucasus.

The Central Asia becomes a center of attraction of multi-polar vectors of force: “the northern” (CIS and Russia), “the western” (NATO and EU, the USA and Turkey as the main directive “mentors” for the region’s countries), “the eastern” (China), “the southern” (OES, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Muslim countries). These

countries, as well as others, have or wish to have their interests, intend to get their niche in this difficult but perspective region for the period, marked by weakening of Russia. On the basis of the century-long cooperation of Russia with the CA countries in the course of elaboration of Russian foreign policy in this direction it is necessary to take into account its various aspects and to remember that the period of undivided rule of Russia as an “elder brother” and the mightiest neighbor in the Central Asia has come to end and that in future Russia will have to carry its policy under conditions of rigid competition.

With due account of the rise of the geopolitical significance of the CA (big natural and human resources, the factor of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Caspian oil, the restoration of the routes between the East and the West within the framework of Great Silk Way etc.), the efforts exerted by various external forces for penetration in the region will be extended in all directions. Russia, possessing its limited financial, economic and military capacity, will experience more difficulties to keep its influence and presence there. It will be difficult to form an efficient regional security system with due account of interests both of Russia and the CIS as a whole without elaboration of an extensive scientific-theoretical strategy of national security. It is necessary to comprehend clearly that consolidation of only national security without taking into account of interests of neighbors will only promote emergence of instability and mutual distrust.

The probable change of political elites in the nearest future is a significant factor. For the last years, the young generation of politicians, educated in the elitist education institutions of the USA, EU, Japan, Turkey, leading Muslim countries gradually penetrates the state governance at all levels. And not only the change of state leaders but also the change of the political course of the CA countries will be quite probable. In this case, the politicians, connected with Russia by their

education and friendly relations, will be probably replaced by the new generation of politicians and managers, free from Soviet aspirations and oriented to “democratic values” in their western perception and interpretation. This course of events may lead to the change of the political course of the CA republics and to their orientation to the West. The national opposition and western analysts stress that the present leaders of the CA states have exhausted all their resources and chances for reformation and development of these countries and that the existing authoritarian regimes provoke revolutionary processes. With due account of this point of view, one should not exclude the turn of some CA countries to the side of radical Islam.

The analysis of the 15-years practice in relations of Russia with the CA republics shows that they are conditioned by the mutual action of diversified objective and subjective factors and makes it possible to mention some conclusions and suppositions.

The prognosis may be made that the Central-Asian region will be an active zone of “instability and friability” for the mid-term perspective.

It should be remembered that the USA and its allies regard the CA and the Caucasus as a united oil and gas province and that they have come to the region for a long time, thoroughly arranging the situation for themselves and being able to raise their material inputs.

The USA, Russia, China and the EU are objectively the main significant countries, which will form the climate of security for the XXI century in the Central Asian space. At the same time, for all countries of the CA Russia will remain further the most significant partner and neighbor by all parameters. It is a recognized guarantor of stability, sustainability and security.

For the future, Russia should also concentrate its attention to the development of perspective integration trends both within the



framework of the Community of Independent States and with the countries, which appraise the CIS itself and its structures in a different way.

The Russian economic interests should be given a priority and should be protected by specific actions in all spheres and primarily by the counter actions against foreign penetration and the support given to the presence of Russia. The traditional cooperation with the CA countries of Moscow, St-Petersburg, of the subjects of the RF in Siberia, Ural, in the Caucasus as well as of the Central Russia represent a significant reserve on this way.

It is necessary to determine the policy, which should be clear and comprehensible in Russia itself and for the external forces relating to all post-Soviet states of the CA. A significant attention should be paid to the substantiated appraisal of the hierarchy of internal and external threats. The military cooperation of Russia in the CA region should be directed first of all to ensuring the strategic interests of the Russian Federation itself, to consolidation of its national security by further intensification and extension of reciprocal action both within the framework of the CIS and on the bilateral basis.

For elaboration of the position of Russia it is significant to take into account both its long-term national interests and the needs of the countries within the zone of Russian influence (ensuring their security, maintenance of the balance of forces in the region, promotion of development etc.). The policy of different “pressures”, “peremptory shouts” and “deterrence” showed its lack of perspective and proved its inefficiency by events of the last years of this century. This task may be achieved only by a complex of economic, political and military measures.

For the coming second decade of the XXI century Russia should elaborate its policy in the CA with due account of the following

directions: Russia-the USA-China, Russia-India-Pakistan; taking into account the activities of the anti-terrorist coalition - the USA-Russia-Iran-Iraq-Afghanistan with inclusion in this list of Japan, the leading Arabic oil producing countries and other Muslim states of the East. At the same time, while shaping the policy and practical steps in mutual relations with the CA states it is necessary to take into account that the influence of three prominent religions and of five great cultures remains significant: Islam, Buddhism, Orthodoxy and Islamic, Chinese, Slavonic, Mongolian and Iranian cultures. After disintegration of the USSR, the western culture and European values are presented in the region in a peculiar way by means of special etalons of democracy and human rights. At the same time, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia by many ways (and rather successfully) try to indoctrinate their ideas in the south and in the east of the Central Asia, particularly in Fergana Valley and in the Caspian Basin. The strategic aim of Russia should be subordinated to the most significant task to achieve preservation of the Central Asian countries in the zone of Slavonic culture, which, evidently, will promote stabilization of the whole region.

*“Krah dugi nestabilnosti:  
Balkany-Tsentrlnaya Aziya”*,  
M., 2010, p. 176–189.

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**ISLAMISM IN THE CENTRAL ASIA  
AND RUSSIA**

Some experts in religion regard Islamism of today as a simple pseudonym of nationalism. It is both correct in one sense and incorrect in the other sense. The contemporary Islamism is a definite stage of

development of Islam, which has a rather great influence also on non-Muslim peoples, and one may agree with this by observing the present situation in Russia and western countries. This influence covers not only the sphere of national consciousness but also shows aspiration to prove its historical-civilization identity and religious specificity, to protect its traditions and rituals, the originality of its social life and daily habits, threatened by expansion of adepts of other religious views, called in the past the Crusades and later the epoch of colonialism, while today it is known as the globalization.

This position, which is conservative-protective by its form and patriotic-ground by its essence, is called usually fundamentalism; but it would be quite groundlessly to equate it with extremism. The experts in Islam have proved and justified long time ago that fundamentalism is the ideological and cultural phenomenon, that it is an attempt to express the originality and inimitability of Islamic civilization and a peculiar form of self-assertion of Islam as a social-cultural system. It is worth citing the meaning of prominent expert in Islam academician E. Primakov, who in time, when he occupied the post of the foreign minister, said: “We do not equate Islamic fundamentalism with Islamic extremism”.

Extremists represent within fundamentalists a flashy minority, propagated by its adepts. But the main force of fundamentalism is in taciturn majority of its followers. These “moderate” Islamists do not accept the extremes and are ready to advance their ideas by peaceful means. Jointly with those, who in general do not support fundamentalism, they occupy the dominant positions in Islam. But radicals try to win them to their side. It is impossible to isolate extremists in any Muslim community without comprehension of this fact.

One should take into account that Islam always was an alien to politics and considered theocracy as its ideal. The contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is already the third wave of the rise of Islam for the last 150 years. Its first wave was Pan-Islamism, which tried to unite Muslims, at least Sunni in the Ottoman Empire, against colonial expansion of Europe. The second wave after collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Pan-Islamism became nationalism, which attained for the 1920s-1960s the political liberation from the colonial yoke. Since other aspects of colonialism remained and even aggravated, the Islamic ideologists unleashed an offensive “against nationalism” in order to change it for Islamism. It became a kind of “phenomenon of the second half of the XX century”. At present, politicization of Islam is caused by the whole burden of aggravated social-economic contradictions in the Muslim world and the difficulties of not always successful modernization, being often contradictory to dogmas of Islam, caused by the demographic pressure and technological backwardness, which deepen the gap between the West and the East, inherited from the past. This situation should be supplemented by the effect of the western flourishing, which irritates the rising in numbers and more active Muslim Diaspora in Europe and the USA.

The all mentioned processes had their features, specifics and tempos of development as well as their results. On the territory of the disintegrated Union Islam tried to fill by itself the vacuum of ideas appeared for the period of the 1990-1991. From 1 January 1991 to 1 January 1993, for instance, the number of mosques and religious Muslim organizations in the Russian Federation increased from 870 to more than 4 thousands. The same process was going on in Muslim republics of the CIS, where for the same period the number of Islamic institutions and mosques increased in Azerbaijan – from 84 to 300, in Kazakhstan – from 136 to 150, in Kirghizstan – from 58 to 150, in

Tajikistan – from 75 to 300, in Turkmenistan – from 54 to 115, in Uzbekistan – from 300 to more than 1 thousand. Various institutions of traditional Islamic education – medrees, special higher education institutions and universities were founded, while many new Muslim newspapers and magazines were published and many new publishing houses were founded. The representatives of Muslim clergy started to take part in political activities, were elected to the parliaments and local official organs. All this was absolutely normal especially after the long period of violation of the believers' rights, persecution and repressions. At the same time, the beginning of the 1990s was marked by the expansion in the whole post-Soviet space of the leading circles of the Muslim clergy, of banks, private and states structures of Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which used the new chances in all CIS republics, including Russia, and constructed mosques and Islamic centers, sent educators and preachers, financed implementation of different projects, accepted for training the youth from the countries of the former USSR, primarily, to the strictly religious higher and high education institutions.

The rise of protest feelings in Muslim regions of the former Union stimulated also the ideas of nationalism, separatism, mutual non-acceptance and alienation among ethnoses and confessions, suppressed for the previous time (or skillfully hidden for some time), while the accumulated experience of mutual action and cooperation was thrown away as an allegedly useless and doomed to oblivion phenomenon, jointly with the red banners and ideals of socialism and other values of “Soviet” civilization. All social-political forces urged towards usage of similar ideas in the post-Soviet space, including Muslim regions in the Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus, where the aggravation of “all-Union” economic and moral problems was supplemented by local specifics, determined by A. Malashenko as a restoration of the historic-

cultural essence of Soviet Islam and its re-integration in Islamic community. However, Islam seems not to abandon its historic-cultural essence either in Russia or especially in other regions of the USSR even in times of the most rigid restrictions, while its reintegration in the community was also rather conditional, as was shown by the last decade of the XX century.

The retrospective appraisal of the events, related to Islam in the whole space of the CIS, shows that Islam became less self-dependent and separated from the state and political power in the sovereign republics of the Central Asia and in Azerbaijan, where democratization of society confronted greater hindrances and was marked by much bigger losses than in Russia itself. The circumstance that Islam was the religion of the great majority of the population determined a special and delicate attention to it. Everywhere Islam filled (as it became evident later only partially) the vacuum of ideas after collapse of Communism and was a rather dangerous weapon in political struggle. For the beginning, the political elite of the Central Asia considered as a needed action the concessions, made to the prevailing views of the Muslim clergy and to some publicly declared rebellious demands of Islamists, but later the situation changed.

It should be admitted that the leaders of the CIS Muslim republics did not aspire for disintegration of the USSR, but they quickly reconciled with it, since they saw its causes and also did not want to be responsible for the great burden of mistakes, failures and somewhere of crimes committed in Soviet times. The new political elite, grown mainly within the CPSU, had to get rid as soon as possible of its Communist past and the corresponding image. The rapprochement with Islam was one of the steps in this direction. At the same time, already before the year of 1991 it was a common knowledge that impoverishment of many Muslims due to ecologic disasters (drying up

of the Aral river, the consequences of nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk, degradation of the soil in the cotton-growing districts), the forced migration to the zones of thoughtless industrialization, the weak adaptation of rural residents to the conditions of life in cities became a significant social condition of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and “anti-Moscow” feelings. Since the beginning of the 1990s, this ideological phenomenon played a greater and greater role in life of Muslims in the CIS countries, where Muslims represented the majority of the population.

The fundamentalists considered in the USSR as their enemies the state officials and everybody, who was connected with them, including the Muslim clergy. The Muslim clergy, educated in Soviet times, including the last decades, formed a peculiar category of preachers, who disseminated, according to western experts, the most conservative type of Muslim jurisdiction with the view of keeping the most archaic forms of Islamic culture. In this way they froze spiritual and religious-social life of Muslim communities in the USSR, neutralizing, on the one side, a potential opposition and, on the other side, ensuring stability of their position. The most numerous faction of the clergy was supported by most intellectuals in Muslim regions of the USSR, including its new cadres, educated after 1917. As a rule, they originated from the peasantry and the former “privileged” classes (the bourgeoisie, the nobles and the clergy), were actually depoliticized by purges and persecution of Communists and judids (liberals-renovators) for the 1920s–1930s; according to some western authors, they were closely connected with the generation of their parents and seemed to be conservative people, who respect habits and family traditions of the past, called “aksakal views”– exaggerated reverence to the elders. Owing to the connections with them the conservative part of the clergy was able during the crisis of the 1990s to keep its control over the

prevailing mass of believers, held in check (mainly) the impact of the young (not experienced) fundamentalists and (principally) prevented to use Islam as a banner and as a weapon of the mass struggle against the former local Soviet state apparatus. As a result, the state apparatus got time and chance to be renovated and to prepare better for the struggle to come to power.

The traditional Sufi leaders (hodjis, ishans) both officially and non-officially being preachers of Muslim cult in the Central Asia (like in the North Caucasus) and enjoying authority among many believers resolutely supported the conservatives in their opposition to fundamentalism. As a rule, they skillfully synthesized shariat with people's custom (adapt). The fundamentalists tried to use this circumstance against them and demanded to be guided only by Koran and Sunna. However, it is difficult to say how fortunately was the choice, made to support this argument: Islam actually does not function anywhere "in pure form", without addition of adapt. Besides, Sufism is rather influential and in many cases is perceived by believers as a usual and traditional form of "people's Islam". The fundamentalists succeeded a lot by criticism of the Soviet order, of Communism and of "bureaucrats in turbans" but were unable to undermine influence of Sufism .

And what is more, there failed the efforts, exerted by them, including the efforts within the framework of the Islamic Party of Revival (IPR), aimed at winning political power in the USSR by means of the parliament and the projected unification of Islamic republics in a peculiar confederation. Everywhere nationalism turned out to be more potent than Islamism, while the former state and party nomenclature was more cunning and realistic than fundamentalists, who lacked either political skill, or psychological persuasiveness, or breadth of views liberated from dogmatic blinkers, or comprehension of interests of the



main participants of the social-political struggle for the beginning of the 1990s.

It was shown by the failure of the Tajik branch of the IPR (IPRT), which existed for only several years. It was founded in October 1990, and one year later about 15-20 thousand people became members of this party. For the beginning, having participated in turbulent events for the period of the 1990s-1992s, the IPRT acted vacillatingly and even did not put the demand to establish “the Islamic state”, came forward for founding “a legal secular democratic state”. The attempt of the fighters of the IPRT to proclaim in Karategin (the zone of its greater influence) creation of the Garm Islamic Republic in autumn 1992 was suppressed by the coalition government of Tajikistan in February 1993; as a result, 60 thousand people fled from Tajikistan to Afghanistan, and up to 5 thousands of them became the fighters of the party Movement of Islamic Renaissance. In June 1993 the IPRT was forbidden, since it had joined the bloc of the opposition forces. It is significant that the IPRT, participating in the coalition government of the country, was unable either to make other fractions of the political elite listen to its proposals or to ensure the united tactic of its supporters. The behavior of the latter was determined even not so much by ideological considerations and non-acceptance of conjuncture evolutions of the ruling elite as by the clannish or regional belonging. At the same time, the opposing forces, primarily the People’s Front of Tajikistan, which were also not alien to the influence of clans and regional considerations, however, were oriented to the all-national interests and took into account the disinclination of the majority of the population of the country (both Tajiks and ethnic minorities, which made 35%) to experience the destiny comparable with destiny of neighboring Iran and Afghanistan.

It was quite logical therefore that the authorities of the Muslim republics of the CIS, which for the 1991–1992 years had to reckon with the Islamists (“Adolat” Muslim organization, close to Muslim Brothers, in Uzbekistan, the Turkic-fundamentalist party “Alash” in Kazakhstan, the Islamic center, headed by S.Kamalov, in Kirghizstan), by the end of 1992 actually everywhere started to suppress the opposition like in Tajikistan. However, stability was attained not only by means of repressions against the opposition and by consolidation of new state apparatus (to a large extent by the old training) but also by systematic counter action of radical Islam against tolerant Islam, of fundamentalism against nationalism, and nationalism (if the opposition used it) against regionalism, personified by “enlightened authoritarian rule” and charisma of the national leader able to propose the exit from chaos in all republics of the former USSR for the beginning of the 1990s. The past events proved the impossibility of either solidarity of all CIS Muslims or even only Islamic fundamentalists in the circumstances when nationalist feelings got the upper hand almost in all Muslim republics of the former Union, while regionalism turned out to be stronger than nationalism in some of them. It was proved, particularly, in 1992 by the leader of democrats in Tajikistan Shodmon Yusuf, who said that “the tribal consciousness recognizes the right for survival only for the representatives of a given tribe”. The evidence of this is preservation up to present of the problem of “dominance of northerners” and “rebellion mood of southerners” in Kirghizstan, where they usually make a thorough calculation of the share of representatives of different regions in all state institutions from top to bottom.

Regionalism, clanship and traditions (both of the pre-revolution and of the Soviet periods) actually everywhere plaid and play now the not lesser role than Islam and even nationalism. One should also take into account the growth of authoritarian trends practically in all Muslim

republics of the CIS, having made conclusions from events in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, as well as from the explosions of the people's dissatisfaction in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan for the last years of the Soviet period. The old elite of the state and party nomenclature rallied with officials of the state apparatus and with intellectuals and (which is especially important) with the majority of the Islamic priests, with army officers and officials of other law enforcement bodies. All of them wanted to prevent disturbances, provoked by aggravation of economic and ecological difficulties, to cope with the social and political crisis, to avoid ethnic-political chaos "in Afghan way" and domination of fanatics-clericals "in Iranian way".

By the beginning of 1993, the fundamentalists of the Middle Asia actually everywhere sustained defeat. Nevertheless, their organizations, which carried out underground and semi-underground activities, grew and consolidated regardless the will of the official clergy and new national bureaucracy. For the same time other local Islamic parties started to appear (for instance, the Islamic Party of Turkestan characterized also by Pan-Turkic orientation), and they tried to maintain contacts with external forces, which intensified their activities after the fall of Nadjibulla regime in 1992 and its replacement by the power of Islamists. The attempts of external interference (especially in internal affairs in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan) took place also beforehand. However, since 1993 they became more and more persistent.

This process was facilitated by disintegration of the USSR and by the events in the Soviet space as a whole: the rapid aggravation of the economic situation due to disruption of inter-republican ties and the flight of the non-title (not only Russian) population, by the enormous rise of criminality, the uncontrolled dispersal and use of arms, by the wild outburst of arbitrariness and terrorist arbitrary rule in the street, in

offices, in enterprises. The people are tired of repeated fights, clashes, forced acts, robbery and the assassinations made to order, claims of numerous people full of lust for power and of inter-ethnic quarrels. Probably, all parts were to blame. However, most of them accused mainly Islamists and democrats of the going on events. They were confronted primarily by former officials of the law enforcement bodies, the poorest strata of the population, who saw the rescue in return to the former order and in general to cessation of chaos by all means, as well as, however paradoxical it is, the most propertied groups, connected mainly with those, who had ruled before the 1991. At the same time, the fear of the rising wave of Islamic extremism in neighboring countries, evidently, was of importance for all strata of the population in the Central Asia.

The new elite of the Muslim republics of the CIS, which came to power being at the head of ethnic-centrist and national-separatist movements, gradually comprehended that as long the numerous contradictions, caused by the deep crisis of the Soviet society on the boundary between the 1980s and the 1990s, would interlace into a tight knot, the danger of further spread of Islamism within various opposition forces will grow. It meant simultaneously their more clear orientation to external Islamism both of Iran and of more bellicose Afghanistan supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, not speaking of their sponsors in the West. Therefore both new rulers of the CA states and the modernized groups of the population (intellectuals, employers, state employees and qualified workers of modern enterprises) took all possible actions, under complicated conditions of the 1990s, for regulation of all (political, military and inter-ethnic) conflicts and for extenuation of the ideological, regional and personal contradictions, which stimulated the conflicts.

For all contemporary forces of these states, created in Soviet times mainly by successes of the USSR, the victory of Islamists might mean only the loss of cultural, spiritual, technological and intellectual ties with Russia, the Russian language and of education received in this language, the loss of chances to use their qualification with preservation of industrial-economic, technological, military, financial-credit, trade and other cooperation with Russia. To a great surprise, for a rather great part of the moderate fraction of Islamists, irrespective of their belonging to any clan or region, their compromise with their opponents and the agreement with Russia turned out to be more profitable than the absolute (and rather questionable) victory of radical Islamism. The latter option would have meant the inevitable social and economic degradation of the country having agreed to this variant, the push backwards for 60-70 years behind the present time, the transformation into a second-rate variant of the Afghan nest of narcotic business and Islamic extremism with different ties of dependence on the southern neighbors and rather rigid forms of enmity to those, who would in this case inevitably double their resistance against the aggressive terrorism covering themselves by religious banners.

The events in the Muslim regions of “near abroad” for the end of the XX century make it possible to show clearly the situation of Islam in the post-Soviet Russia. Evidently, for the first years of its existence as a sovereign state the Russian Federation confronted many other problems. But the situation of Islam and the role of Muslims in Russian society were quite important problems. At the same time, the political, ideological and social-economic crisis, which caused disintegration of the USSR, was a hard experience for Russia and conditioned a special attention of Russians to the events in the CIS republics, including Muslim republics, which had separated from it. One should not forget also about the hard conditions of life of the Russian and the Russian

speaking population outside the territory of the RF, suddenly having become a national minority with infringed and at least reduced rights. At that time of the 1980s-1990s, this population made up as follows: almost half – in Kazakhstan, one third – in Kirghizstan, 13% – in Turkmenistan, 11% – in Uzbekistan and 10% – in Tajikistan.

Further, the share of this population declined steadily, while its position became more complicated, since the new ruling elites of the post-Soviet states at first regarded it only as a undesirable “heritage of the Soviet period”, which was subject to be get rid of as soon as possible. The representatives of this elite (sometimes intellectuals) in their public talks deprived Russians even of the right to have their own point of view on history of mutual relations between Russia and Muslims, asserting that “our history may be written only by our intellectuals”, that Russians, including Russians, living in the CIS republics, “impose their imperial ambitions”. In case of interpretation of the events, particularly of tragic events, in history of the peoples of the USSR, one might rarely hear that “the historic facts should be interpreted in the way, which does not separate the peoples but, on the contrary, promotes consolidation of friendship of the peoples”.

All this not only stimulated polemics, formally – scientific and in essence – politicized, when all its participants usually displayed their subjective, intolerable and uncompromising views, explained by the tide of nationalistic passions, throughout the whole post-Soviet space since 1991 and sometimes earlier. The disputes covered a wide circle of subjects –from the numbers of losses suffered by the peoples in Soviet times to the type of the elites ready to enter “the colonial distant area of the imperialist empire”. The hot disputes on problems of history, ethnology and cultural problems usually resulted in nothing, since their aim was not the settlement of scientific issues but exclusively the justification of the political rightness of the discussions’ participants.

These discussions usually became more politicized, if representatives of foreign powers took part in them, striving in most cases for raising the level of nationalistic anti-Russian feelings.

Not less than 6–7 years should have passed after disintegration of the USSR, when its negative consequences were determined quite definitely to promote in mentality and scientific works of Muslims of the post-Soviet space, side by side with former dominant particular-separatist tends, the appearance of the aspiration for uniting with Russia and of comprehension of peculiarities of the centuries-long, particularly for the Soviet times, of “the society of common destiny” marked by “multilateral mutual action of two religious communities and not of their parallel co-existence”. F. Mukhametshin noted in 1998 that “already in the XIX century on the territory of the Russian Empire there formed Eurasian civilization, a “special cultural-historic system”, which was reflected both in mentality of peoples in Russia and in political culture of the Russian elite, in the main political institutions”. Abroad they also wrote about “close relations” of ancestors of Muslims and Russians, “having influenced on historic evolution”, simultaneously noting that “asymmetric” relations between Moscow and, for instance, Kazan were influenced after 1991 by the received by the latter of economic and political advantages, particularly much bigger allocations from the state budget of Russia to the budget of Tatarstan and the right to maintain direct trade relations with the world. This circumstance was not ignored in the Central Asia, which maintains with the co-religionists in the Volga Basin regular, particularly cultural-religious ties.

At the same time, given the influence and capacity of the social-political, historic and traditional local forces opposing in the Central Asia Islamism, especially radical Islamism, the danger on its part still remains. For the 1990s, only in Fergana valley not less than ten

extremist organizations exerted their pressure on parishioners of at least 800 mosques. For some time past, in various districts of the Central Asia the groups of fighters periodically intensified their activities; they were connected with the branches in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir of international Party of Islamic Liberation, established in Jordan in 1950, as well as with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which recently changed its name for the Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT). All of them enjoy support of Islamists, who fled from the CA states, as well as of numerous foreign Muslim charitable foundations, cultural centers, various education institutions and other organizations propagating Islamism and often being a refuge for the fighters, who interrupted their activities for some time.

The social-political logic is broken sometimes by the complexity of contemporary life, which is displayed by activities of Islamists even in the places, where they lack the sustainable and evident influence. It occurs most of all due to the external influence and is connected either with reinforcement of flows of narcotics trade from Afghanistan via the Central Asia or with the contacts of some Afghan Islamists with their relative ethnic communities across the northern borders of the country, or with common corruption, including a part of the population indifferent to the ideas of Islamists but involved in smuggling and receiving good payment in hard currency for shelter and food given to the fighters. Of some importance are also the mistakes of the authorities, which either are lulled into complacency (“we lack wahhabism”) or go too far in persecution of “wahhabism”, suspecting quite often groundlessly thousands ordinary believers of wahhabism. In both cases Islamists get a chance to use the situation in their interests.

*“Vostok: yzovy XXI veka”, M., 2010, p. 9–22.*



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## **RUSSIA AND THE ARABIC WORLD: COOPERATION AND ANTAGONISMS**

The Middle East and the Arab world were and will always be the zones of the vital Russian interests. In other words, our country is interested in the armed forces lack of the third countries in this region and also the lack of the nuclear weapon and its delivery means there. During the USSR existence the most part of Magrib's and Mashrik's countries including Egypt were financed by the USSR and also defense and technical materials. The soviet specialists took the active part in the industrial infrastructure building of the Arab countries but the soviet military personnel actively participated in some combat operations on the side of the Arab allied regimes.

The ideological ties between the USSR and the organizations in the Arab region especially in the South Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Alger, Libya, Syria and other countries sympathized with the USSR promoted the soviet-Arab relation developing. It's also necessary to remember about the cultural and the scientific cooperation. The USSR actively supported the Arab countries fight for independence. The Soviet government refused to recognize England's mandate for Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan but France's mandate for Syria and Lebanon. The Soviet Union was the first to declare about the Saudi Arabia's recognition having noted that the diplomatic relations between them are normal. Besides, the USSR and the Arab world were economically tied. So, the powerful hydropower complex As-Saura built with the help and assistance of the USSR on the river Euphrates is called as Syria's pride.

After the USSR's dissolution the relations with the given region were becoming worse. The foreign-policy course of Russia's leadership directed at exaggerated development of a cooperation with

the West brought to the new barriers on the way of the Russian – Arab cooperation. The cooperation between Russia and the Arab countries was slackened; there were the great changes in the development of these countries having brought to the knowledge lack of tax, tariff, legal and other aspects of the Arab legislation. So, at the present the maximum specific weight in the foreign policy of the Arab countries is for the western states. The main countries-exporters of the industrial enterprise production are USA, the European countries and also the countries of the Asian region. Today taking into account Russia's practical absence in this region one can speak only about a limited cooperation between the Russian companies with the Arab countries.

Besides, one should also note the political antagonisms. Saudi Arabia is a particular case. The barrier of fifty years enmity separated Russia from this kingdom and for some reasons Moscow initially didn't have hopes for consolidating its grip on there.

– Firstly, all the contemporary history of Russia was characterized with the political position lack in Saudi Arabia. The local ruling circles didn't forget the USSR's hostile attitude towards their country. But in Russia Saudi Arabia is associated, probably, with the radical Islam – which the Russian party confronts to in the North Caucasus. The Saudi public opinion, in its turn, appraises the actions of the Russian authorities in this region of the Russian Federation very negatively.

– Secondly, the Saudi elite and the society as a whole traditionally orienting at the west didn't use to work with the other partners.

Today Russia supports the relations with all the Arab countries and also by means of the Arab intra-regional intergovernmental organizations. The economical, political, scientific and cultural spheres of cooperation unite Russia and the countries of the Arab region. The

cooperation in the military and technical sphere and high technology industries such as telecommunications, aircraft and space industries, nuclear power engineering, bio-and nanotechnologies and etc. is also of great importance.

The global problems facing to the mankind are: ecological problems, economic problems for environment preserving, demographic explosion and its control, the natural resource supply for the mankind including oil and gas, the most rational use and preserving of water being very important for this region, the international terrorism problems, non-distribution of weapons of mass annihilation, epidemics and many others. A coordination of Russia's and the Arab countries' actions can be also effective. The Arab economists understand that today price development at the world market depends on Russia's oil policy.

The Arab countries supported Russia's desire to enter the Organization "The Islamic conference" as the observer. Owing to it Russia and the Arab world had a possibility not only to emphasize their positions relatively processes going on in the world but to work together over unified approach forming for inter-civilization and inter-confessional dialog. The former major of the town Kazan, Iskhakov, is the permanent representative of the Russian Federation under Organization "Islamic conference". The problem is that not only Russia as a whole but its different regions cooperate with the Arab countries and Tatarstan plays a special role here because of ethnic, religious and cultural likeness and owing to the traditions and Tatarstan's being one of the oil-bearing oblasts of Russia. Tatarstan has the remarkable personnel of oil industry workers, organizers of oil business who can use their skills in the Arab world. The representatives of "Tatneft" try to work with the Arab colleagues actively.

Besides, there are good possibilities in Kazan for the Islamic banking system developing which have the good perspectives in the Russian Federation. The given market is attractive for Islam as there are no the Islamic banks in Russia. In support Summit devoted to the Islamic finances takes place in Kazan in the last two years; its participants are the representatives of finance organizations, investors, businessmen, the representatives of state power bodies and the scientists from the CIS countries, Europe, the countries of the South-Eastern Asia and the Middle East.

The Russian Islamic University was opened just in Kazan where the specialists in the field of the Islamic finances will be trained. The department of the world economy will be opened from 2010 where a concrete intellectual and personnel ground is already being prepared for understanding the Islamic economic model.

Moscow positions itself as the main mediator in “dialogue of civilizations” but Tatarstan – as the republic of the Moslems. Besides, Kazan isn’t randomly chosen. The thousandth town is known with its scientists for the Arab world – Al’-Marjani, Musa Bigiev, Riza Fahretdinov and many others, the Arab-language books, the university oriental studies and the most northern outpost of Islam. Kazan is at a crossroads of the eastern-western civilizations.

The historical experience of Russia and the Arab countries can prove a possibility of a peaceful civilized co-existence and people’s communication having the different national and religious belonging. The Arab countries were the main economic partners of the Soviet Union in the developing world by the moment of the USSR’s dissolution.

At the present when the state departed from the former ideological guidelines in the foreign policy and could cope with the main crisis situations in the field of the national policy Russia has a

chance to return in the given region again in the new capacity. There are good prerequisites both for mutual advantageous relation development continuation with the countries – the old allies and these relations aggravating with the new partners in the region. The impressive perspectives for cooperation in the different spheres will be opened owing to foreign-policy course of Russia adjustment going on now and the Russian-Arab relations “improvement”.

The Arab region importance for Russia as the important market continues to be vital in our days. Many potential projects are both in the sphere of a direct export of the Russian production and for more flexible types of cooperation like joint ventures organizing and investment cooperation developing within the framework of the Russian enterprises work at the Arab markets. Russia and the Arab world are the important economic and political centers in the modern world which must be multi-polar and open for the most extensive cooperation.

*“Vestnik TISBI.”, Kazan, 2010, N 3, p. 151–159.*

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