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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

ALEXEY KUZNETSOV. THE CRISIS OF COUNTRY STUDIES
IN RUSSIA: REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES

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economics and politics of foreign countries;
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Abstract. The article shows that foreign country studies, although rooted in geography, should be considered as a interdisciplinary social science that allows comprehensive study of modern countries. In Russia, the contribution of economists, political scientists and historians, especially orientalists, to the

development of foreign country studies is very great. At the same time, over the past 100 years, regional studies in our country has been greatly transformed. Exceptionally, due to subjective reasons and the general crisis of fundamental science in the country, multi-volume publications that provided a great material for comparative studies have become a thing of the past. The theoretical baggage of foreign country studies accumulated in the second half of the 20th century is almost not used, linguistic training in a number of areas has been curtailed. In modern Russia, the "supply" of scientific regional products due to the small-scale nature of geographers, the fascination with global issues of political scientists and economists, as well as the general shortage of specialists in the countries of the post-Soviet space and some other macro-regions does not meet the existing "demand". But the state and big business, which should form a solvent and long-term demand, also fail to cope with their role. As a result, regional studies are in a deep crisis, the exit from which it is necessary to look for as soon as possible, while the traditions of such studies are still alive. The lack of a precise practical orientation of scientific country studies has a detrimental effect on Russia's positioning in the world economy and the system of international relations.

In the 20th century, at least in Russia, there was a genuine boom in country studies, hundreds of monographs on different countries were published, including several well-known series dedicated to the whole world or its large macroregions. The post-socialist transformation in Russia, especially the opening of external borders for the majority of citizens, and the change in the world order after the end of the cold war, of course, had to change the requirements for country studies. However, in the 1990s, it was difficult to predict that instead of adapting country studies to solving new problems, there would be an increase in the training of relevant specialists in universities, and the authorities would rarely turn to professional consultants for

help, eventually making repetitive mistakes in the implementation of their policies. In-depth country studies are ever more often replaced in Russia by the preparation of guidebooks on foreign states, the production of low-quality journalistic reports, etc.

In this article we will offer our own view of the place of this complex science in socio-humanitarian research. Next, we will note the most significant achievements of the Soviet period in terms of a comprehensive study of a large range of countries (which are currently almost not conducted) and we will point out the main problems of modern country studies in Russia. Our concrete proposals aimed at meeting the “supply” and “demand” for knowledge about foreign countries and regions in modern Russia complete the work.

The Place of Country Studies in the System of Sciences

There is still no generally accepted classification of sciences. For example, anthropology (in the sense of socio-cultural, coupled with ethnology and ethnography) as an independent science appears in the UNESCO classification [UNESCO, 1988], but is absent in the OECD classification [OECD, 2007], representing a section of History (as well as in the list of specialties of the Higher Attestation Commission of Russia or the classifier of Russian Science Foundation). There is no country studies in these classifications at all, and the only widely used classifier where it found a place is the international bibliographic database *Web of Science: Area Studies* and *Asian Studies* are designated as separate categories (as a side note, the main competitor of this database – *Scopus* – does not have such headings). To some extent, these are analogs of country studies and oriental studies in the Russian scholarly tradition (but then the terms *Country Studies* and *Oriental Studies* would be correct).

At the same time, country studies are traditionally perceived as “their own discipline” by representatives of

economic geography (now usually called socio-economic or economic, social and political, and to be more precise - public one). Outstanding Russian economic geographers considered country studies one of the main directions of geography. It is enough to recall the book published in 1928 by Veniamin P. Semenov-Tian-Shansky (1870-1942) "District and Country", the second part of which begins with the chapter "Conditions for the Independence of Geographical Science or the Science of the Country" [Semenov-Tian-Shansky, 2017, p. 28]. The famous scientist proposed in this work his own view on the boundaries and structure of the entire geographical science, known for its synthetic nature (after all, there are still disputes whether socio-economic and political geography should be attributed to the social sciences or defined in the rest of geography in the category of natural sciences). In a narrow sense, only chapter 21st, "The Sequence of the Geographical Study of the Country", of the book is devoted to the study of the country itself. The analysis of approaches and achievements of famous thinkers and explorers begins with ancient and arabic names, and ends with representatives of historical geography and anthropogeography, which by the beginning of the 20th century led to the need for a "complete geographical synthesis on the basis of country studies" [Semenov-Tian-Shansky, 2017, P. 233-255]. Perhaps even more important is the position of the "foremost" leader of the national economic geography, Nikolai N. Baransky (1881-1963), who spoke about the role and place of country studies in 1946 on the pages of the then leading Soviet geographical journal, marking the beginning of the institutionalization of this science. However, Professor Baransky wrote about country studies as a third branch of geography which should fill a large gap between economic and physical geography for regional studies. He stressed that specialists in country studies should be trained in universities within geographical faculties but with comprehensive foreign language training and special courses in philosophy, politics, history and economy of separate countries. He offered

establishments of special departments (“chairs”) for research of 1) the United States, 2) the British Empire, 3) China, 4) Slavic countries, 5) Middle East (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan) [Baransky, 1946, pp. 14–17].

On the website of the Department of Economic and Political Geography of Capitalist Countries founded at Moscow State University in 1934 by N.N. Baransky together with Ivan A. Vitver (1891–1966) (now – Socio-Economic Geography of Foreign Countries) it is said that it is the leading center of scientific country studies in Russia.¹ The “Great Russian Encyclopedia” confirms the geographical affiliation of country studies. This is natural, since the author of the article about this subject was the head of this department. According to him, it is “a geographical discipline that comprehensively studies nature, population, economy, culture, social organization and features of the historical development of countries” [Fetisov, 2016].

Country studies abroad was also originally the “patrimony” of geographers first of all (although it should be clearly understood that before the beginning of the 20th century, the attribution of certain travelers or even armchair scientists to a narrow scientific discipline was rather conditional). As a vivid illustration, I mention the fundamental work “The Study of Europe”, written by the famous German scientist Alfred Hettner (1859–1941), a methodologist of geography and one of the creators of the chorological conception² and the second edition of the book, showing the new look of Europe after the First World War, literally in a few years after the publication, was translated into Russian (the first edition of the *Länderkunde von Europa* was published in 1907, the second – in 1922) [Hettner, 1925]. However, it is impossible to agree with such a “geographocentric” approach, especially if it is “Foreign country studies” that is understood by country studies (although, thanks to my basic university education, it is the achievements of geographers who are best known to me). First, in the 20th century, few domestic geographers studied oriental languages

(the exceptions were mainly related to Japan and China), so that the domestic oriental studies, which was engaged in country studies in Asia and Africa, can name only a few dozen geographers among many hundreds of researchers [Miliband, 2008]. Secondly, the complex nature of country studies presupposes deep knowledge not only of the geography of the country of study, but also of its economy, history, politics, culture, etc. Since scientists with different basic education may have a broad outlook, it is hardly surprising that there are not only orientalists, but also well-known researchers of Western civilization countries, along with country-studying geographers with a major specialization in the economy or the recent history of a particular state. Again, we will limit ourselves to just a few examples of those domestic country scientists whose authority is truly indisputable among specialists in the relevant countries: if the Americanist Leonid V. Smirnyagin (1935–2016) was a Doctor of Geographical Sciences, then the Indlogist, the winner of the J. Nehru Prize, Glery K. Shirokov (1930–2005) was a Doctor of Economics, and Robert G. Landa (1931–2021), an Arabist, the largest expert on the Maghreb countries, was a Doctor of Historical Sciences.

Of course, it was geography by the end of the 20th century that offered the most thought-out program of country studies, which is perfectly illustrated by the posthumous publication of the book “Complex Country Studies” by Yakov G. Mashbits (1928–1997). However, the author is more interested in the phenomenon of a comprehensive study of countries as a guarantor of the “integrity of Geography”, its “core”, and History, Ethnography, Economics Demography, Sociology and Political Science are assigned the role of “related disciplines” [Mashbits, 1998, pp. 24–51]. The outstanding Doctor of Geographical Sciences is not bothered neither by the fact that the country studies as a more or less established science at the time of writing the book remained only in Russia and Germany, nor by his own constant appeal to the analysis of his own, and not

foreign countries in the chapter “Supporting elements of complex regional characteristics” (with 18 maps of the USSR and its parts, there are only 4 maps of foreign countries and 5 maps of the world in the text) and much less the lack of dominance of geographers among the authors of the hundreds of regional monographs on foreign states mentioned by him, published in 1950–1990. After 20–25 years, the situation aggravated. There were almost no consolidated regional communities of scientists left in Russia, but those that have remained, even if they study Western countries, are almost not represented by geographers. For example, in the collection, which was published following the results of the 2nd All-Russian Scientific Conference of French Studies, organized jointly by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the RAS, the Institute of Europe of the RAS and the Higher School of Economics, there were 24 authors of the article, but no one with a geographical academic degree – only economists, historians, lawyers and political scientists [Klinova et al., 2018]. At the Institute of Latin America of the RAS, several employees, including the director, have a university geographical education, however, if you look at the academic degrees of the members of the Academic Council of the organization, there is not a single Candidate or Doctor of Geographical sciences among 15 people – only 6 economists, 5 politicians and 4 historians³.

In our opinion, “Country Studies” is a complex interdisciplinary science that allows a comprehensive study of modern countries. Again, it is emphasized that we are talking about a “Foreign Country Studies”, because the goals and methods of studying one’s own country will be different. The study of “others” in the general sciences is not identical to “self-knowledge”. The scope of application of the findings also differs in practice at home and abroad. The landings of the local representatives of the district school of geography, who tried to help some developing countries organize their space in an optimal way for the development of the economy, have

remained in the past. Now Russia is more interested in the critical borrowing of foreign experience in carrying out its own institutional transformations, as well as comparative studies that allow a deeper understanding of the fundamental historical processes going on everywhere, but having a bright "country" coloring (the changing role of the capital in the development of the country, modernization of socio-political structures, separatism, etc.). Undoubtedly, there remains the function of "understanding" partner countries to build constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation with them. At the same time, "modernity" should be understood as a temporary category, i.e. it should cover the current period and the necessary retrospective to understand the processes taking place in the country, their forecasting. In other words, almost everything that related to country studies, for example, in the 18th century, has long been transferred to the subject of historical science. Considering that the 20th century became the "golden age" of country studies, it is necessary, in our opinion, to include relevant studies of countries and macro-regions of the world since the turn of the 18th-19th centuries up to the present day in geography, economics in a broad sense (including demography), history, political structure, legal system, and culture.

Of course, there are certain research traditions that force us to draw rather arbitrarily the real boundaries of country studies as a science. In particular, its "legal" branch has never been considered by anyone as part of country studies, which is explained, first of all, by the well-known isolation of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, comparative law, as we see it, is a full-fledged discipline of country studies, which can be successfully developed only at the junction of other areas of country studies and legal sciences.

The linguistic and cultural approach deserves special mention. On the one hand, studying a country without knowing the language is flawed (although there are supporters of a different approach). On the other hand, the philological sciences

themselves have been developing apart from country studies for quite a long period. However, in the 1990s, a new science of “regional studies” began to be constructed in Russia in order to add additional value to linguistic specialties in higher education institutions in market conditions. Although by the end of the 2010s, the most widely cited textbook was a work written by famous geographers [*Gladki, Chistobaev, 2016*], the discipline “foreign regional studies” in the end was reduced mainly to the synthesis of studying a certain foreign language and mainly “politological” branch (students are taught translation of thematic texts about the socio-political structure of the corresponding country, about the main milestones of its history and art, etc.) or is generally aimed at preparing specialists for the tourist business. Not by chance in 2000 at St. Petersburg State University, where the Geographical Faculty was established for the first time in Russia (in 1925 as part of the General Geographical, Ethnographic and Anthropological departments), there was set up the Department of Country Studies and International Tourism along with the departments of Economic and Social Geography and Regional Policy and Political Geography (now all three are part of the Institute of Sciences of the Earth, representing the public geography) [*Sevastyanov, Grigoriev, 2015*].

At the same time, we emphasize that such a “practical” turn of country studies was not due to the previous development of this science. Among many other social sciences in the 20th century, country studies have always been one of the most focused on practical needs. In the first half of the last century, domestic country scientists provided the leadership of the country; first of all, with the necessary map of potential military opponents and allies, later the tasks of accumulating comprehensive knowledge about different countries of the world for the development of relations between the Soviet Union and them were added. Separately, it is necessary to note the role of domestic country scientists in the intellectual support of the fight

against colonialism and its consequences. Centuries later, relatively short for world development, a but very dramatic socialist experiment in Russia in a positive way will remain, probably, only as an impulse to de-install the colonial world order and the transition of the global world order to a fairer polycentric system, and without the help of Soviet specialists, many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America would be unable to ease the severity of at least some of their postcolonial problems. The study of foreign countries made it possible for our country not only to borrow positive experience in the 1980s–1990s or to avoid other people’s mistakes, but also to work out on the material of a separate state a methodology suitable for fundamental research of other countries too, which was perfectly manifested, for example, in approaches to the zoning / regionalization of society [*Smirnyagin, 1989*]. However, by the beginning of the 21st century, we have to talk, rather, about the crisis of country studies in our country.

The Largest Projects of Soviet Country Studies

Country studies have often been accused of being overly enthusiastic about describing the countries under study in the absence of a deep conceptualization. To a large extent, this is an unfair reproach if we are talking about studying countries in leading universities and academic organizations. The main problem, in our opinion, was the inability of the leaders of the scientific discipline to consolidate the professional community around themselves (through scientific publications, associations, other institutional structures) and clearly articulate the dual nature of the country studies. After all, on the one hand, country studies begins with an in-depth study by the relevant scientists of one or several neighboring (usually having a common historical background) states. On the other hand, a thorough knowledge of only one country provides little material for science, which can remain the property of military strategists

during the cold war and representatives of the recreational country studies in peacetime. Long before the collapse of the bipolar system, solutions to this dilemma were found: V.M. Gokhman and Ya.G. Mashbits proposed the concept of problematic country studies [*Gokhman, Mashbits, 1976*], despite the fact that within the framework of large research programs, it is possible to identify and analyze common problems for countries of a certain type.

The approach to the global problems of mankind, proposed later by a number of economists-geographers, would seem to have consolidated the dominant role of geography in country studies, but in practice, this did not occur. The progress in the consolidation of the Russian scientific community looks particularly strange, given the historically high territorial concentration of relevant research and educational centers. The provision of information about the countries - foreign economic partners (and even more so potential military opponents), as well as the analysis of foreign experience - for the implementation of some achievements of other countries in domestic legislation and administrative practice with the general centralization of science in the USSR predetermined the "metropolitan" nature of country studies as a science. Almost all specialists were concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg (Leningrad), with the latter gradually losing importance as political, scientific and educational functions were concentrated in Moscow, and only separate centers of research were allocated outside the two capitals, mainly in border cities (for example, in Vladivostok or Kaliningrad).

If we talk about domestic geographical education as the basis of country studies, then first of all it is necessary to note the creation in 1918 by V.E. Den in the Northern Capital of a department now bearing the name of the Department of Economic and Social Geography of St. Petersburg State University - the foundation for country studies was created there primarily in the 1930s by the efforts of a Doctor of

Economics Sciences, the sinologist Viktor M. Stein (1890–1964), who for several years also headed the Eastern faculty⁴. Until the 1940s, Leningrad remained the country's leading center of Oriental studies in the sense of studying philology and history of various countries and regions of Asia. But already in 1929, the Department of Economic Geography of the USSR was organized at Moscow State University (even before the creation of an independent geographic faculty), where country studies courses were taught, and in 1934 the country's first department of economic and political geography of capitalist countries was dissociated from it. Until 1956, the department was headed by I.A. Vitver, and the next two years – Isaac M. Mayergoz (1908–1975). The desire to study in more detail the countries that chose the socialist path of development after the Second World War lead to the division of this department into two parts – the Department of Economic Geography of Socialist Countries (which in the 1960s was thought of as having great prospects, and therefore was headed by I.M. Mayergoz) and the Department of Economic and Political Geography of Capitalist and Developing Countries (it was headed by a young expert in the countries of Latin America Viktor V. Volsky (1921–1999), who later became Director of the Institute of Latin America and a correspondent member of the USSR Academy of Sciences).

MGIMO became the second scientific and educational center of foreign country studies in Moscow since the mid-1940s. The departments of economic geography of the Western countries and the economic geography of the countries of the East were established there; however, already in 1958 they were merged into the Department of World Economics.

At the same time, it is necessary to remember about the actual joining to MGIMO in 1954 of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies (created as a result of the integration of the Lazarev Institute and other educational institutions of Oriental studies in 1921). Thus, by the 1960s, MGIMO shifted the focus in

the country studies to the study of economics and history, and later also political science.

In the 1950s, there was also a consolidation of Oriental studies education within the walls of Moscow State University: in 1956, on the basis of the Oriental departments of the Historical and Philological Faculties, the Institute of Oriental Languages was created as a special faculty (some Oriental languages were also taught at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages by that time, but neither there, nor at MGIMO preparation of scientific cadres was practiced). Since 1972, this faculty of Moscow State University has been called the Institute of Asian and African Countries (IAAC), apart from the Historical and Philological departments, the Socio-Economic Department was established, despite the fact that since 1956 the Department of Economics and Economic Geography of Asian and African countries had already been functioning. In 1953, in order to consolidate country studies at the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow State University, two departments were created - the Department of Economics of Capitalist and Colonial Countries and that of Economics of Native Democracy Countries, but already in 1955 they were united into a single Department of Economics of Foreign Countries. With the help of the IAAC, language training for geographers and economists specializing in China, Japan, and Arab countries was carried out at Moscow State University.

In addition to universities, which, although they conducted scientific research, were still more aimed at training highly professional personnel, in the 1950s-1960s, several country studies institutes were created in Moscow within the framework of the USSR Academy of Sciences: Institute of Sinology (1956-1960s, since 1966 recreated as the Institute of the Far East which received new name in 2022 - Institute of China and Modern Asia), the Institute for African Studies (1959), the Institute for Latin America (1961), the Institute for the United States of America (1967, since 1974 - the Institute of the USA and Canada), to which the Institute of Europe was added at the end

of 1987. Country studies were actively developed in a number of multidisciplinary academic institutions: the Institute of Geography, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences, the Institute of World History, the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute of Slavic Studies, and the Institute of World Socialist System Economy (under various names it existed since 1960, in 2005 it was integrated into the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences). Reputable scientific journals were founded on the basis of these organizations, most of which have survived to this day and are at least included in the RSCI database ("Russian shelf" on the Web of Science platform): "Soviet Oriental Studies" (since 1955, after several renamings since 1991 is called "East. Afro-Asian Societies: History and Modernity" / *Oriens*, 12 issues per year), "Asia and Africa Today" (since 1957, 12 issues per year), "World Economics and International Relations" (also since 1957, 12 issues a year, although for the sake of entry into the Web of Science and Scopus databases, the journal had to abandon the dominance of specific country studies articles in favor of general topics that could get more citations), "Latin America" (since 1969, 12 issues per year), "USA: economics, politics, ideology" (since 1970, since 1999 - "USA and Canada: economics, politics, culture" , 12 issues per year), "Problems of the Far East" (since 1972, now 6 issues per year). It was only in 1994 that the magazine for Europeanists "Current Problems of Europe" was added to them, and in 2000 - "Contemporary Europe" (on the basis of INION RAS and Institute of Europe RAS, respectively). In fact, among RSCI journals in the 21st century newcomers with a regional profile did not appear in Russia, except for the partial repurposing of the journal "Outlines of Global Transformations" after 2017, as well as the appearance of the only "status" non-Moscow journal "Baltic Region" (published in Kaliningrad jointly by Kant Baltic Federal University and St. Petersburg State University since 2009).

Separately, we mention the only ongoing publication that does not even have the status of a VAK (Higher Attestation Commission) journal, but has been published since 1971 by the Department of Social Economic Geography of Foreign Countries (until the end of the 1990s, together with the Institute of Latin America) and claimed a pronounced regional profile, – Issues of Economic and Political Geography of Foreign Countries. However, if in the first 22 years 13 issues were published, then after the resumption of publication of collections in 1999, only 7 issues were prepared⁵. In addition to powerful country studies directions for individual macroregions, presented by numerous articles in specialized journals and dozens of scientific monographs, the country studies of the Soviet period became famous for projects that are unique in scale. First of all, let us note the 20 volume edition *Countries and Peoples* [*Countries and Peoples*, 1978–1985], awarded the State Prize of the USSR in 1987. The editorial board was headed by the outstanding Russian ethnographer Academician Yulian V. Bromley (1921–1990). Among the leaders of individual volumes there were such famous scientists as the economist and Latin American geographer V.V. Volsky, European geographer V.P. Maksakovskii, ethnographer P.I. Puchkov specializing in Oceania, Afghan and Pakistani historian Yu.V. Gankovsky, arabist historian N.I. Proshin; etc. Nowhere in the world has it been possible to repeat such a comprehensive and, moreover, relatively time-limited series of 18 books with a geographical, ethnographic, historical, socio-economic and political description of all countries of the world, including the republics of the USSR (two more volumes are devoted to general issues: the first to the origin of man, the settlement of the Earth and the modern geography of the world economy, and in the latter – to global problems of humanity). More than 250 scientists worked on the publication, all books are supplied with a rich cartographic material of unique quality. At the same time, modern criticism of the 20-volume book (easily accessible to readers, for example,

thanks to Wikipedia) about the focus on the negative sides of capitalism and the idealization of the communist system can be regarded as motivated (if not envious) by anyone who has actually read this outstanding scientific work.

The second largest project is two series on socio-economic and political development and topical issues of developed capitalist countries, released respectively in 1972–1973 and the early 1980s. The first, 7-volume series, received the general subtitle “Economics and Politics of the Countries of Modern Capitalism”, and the second, already 8-volume series, was subtitled “Modern Monopolistic Capitalism”. To separate books on the USA [*Anikin*, 1982], Japan [*Pevsner, Petrov, Ramses*, 1981], the Federal Republic of Germany [*Shenaev, Schmidt, Melnikov*, 1983]⁶, France [*Diligensky, Kuznetsov*, 1982]⁷, Great Britain [*Madzoevsky, Hesin*, 1981]⁸ and Italy [*Vasilkov, Kholodkovsky*, 1983], as well as small countries of Western Europe [*Yudanov*, 1984]⁹ a volume about Australia and Canada as the two most characteristic countries of highly developed migrant capitalism was added [*Lebedev*, 1984]. In each monograph, the research was carried out according to a similar scheme – the country’s place in the modern world, characteristics of the productive forces and structure of the economy, concentration of capital and leading companies, state-monopolistic regulation of the economy, foreign economic relations, aggravation of socio-economic contradictions, social class structure, the situation and struggle of workers, party-political structure and internal political struggle, pivotal problems of foreign policy. This scheme was close to the one proposed by the geographer Ya.G. Mashbits in the program of problematic country studies, where special attention was paid to the pivotal problems of the studied countries (place in world economic relations, resource security studies, structural problems of the economy, social inequality, etc.), with the exception, perhaps, of issues of settlement and inter-district contrasts (however, we emphasize that in the country studies

series of IMEMO RAS, the role of geographers in the author's collectives was minimal).

Special attention should be paid to the work of country scientists on the preparation of popular scientific publications (for example, from the booklet series *At the World Map* which has been published for decades), as well as writing of encyclopedic articles, especially comprehensive country studies descriptions for the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. We will single out separately, both due to the pioneering nature and the depth of the research work presented, the two-volume encyclopedia "Latin America", published at the Institute of Latin America [Volsky, 1979-1982].

At the same time, in the second half of the 20th century, the Russian country acquired its own theoretical foundation, which allowed conducting comparative studies (although, it seems, some country scientists expressed regret about the lack of a more extensive set of concepts, without which, in fact, many scientific disciplines are successfully developing). First of all, we are talking about the typology of countries according to the level of development of capitalism by V.V. Volsky, which was first proposed for more than half a century in the back [Volsky, 1968], but noticeably modified by the end of the 1990s [Volsky, 2009, pp. 251-282], which allowed it to be successfully used in the post-bipolar period of world development. However, it is necessary to recognize the poor knowledge of this typology by domestic social scientists, as well as the cessation of its refinement in the 21st century, although a number of methodological problems have long been overdue, in particular: a clearer definition of the phenomenon of economically medium-developed countries, criteria for classifying countries as small ones, conducting a full-fledged study of African countries. Unfortunately, the achievements of V.V. Volsky's opponents, who proposed the concept of models of economic development as a foundation for country studies (for example [Gutnik, 2002;

Mikulsky, 2003–2005]), also by the 2010s had ceased to be popular with those who should have been engaged in country studies.

Problems of Modern Russian Country Studies

Unfortunately, in the post-Soviet period, in practice, representatives of any science did not try to lead complex country studies in the context of methodology. First of all, this function really should have belonged to economic (social) geography, since the country scientists of another educational tradition (primarily economists and historians) had the opportunity to combine the obtained achievements with a rich theoretical baggage of “their” sciences. In addition to the role of the consolidating personality in history (or rather, its absence among domestic geographers in the 1990s), the departure of economic geography from the bosom of social sciences in Russia was most likely a fatal blow (which, by the way, contradicted the experience of many foreign countries). The misunderstood unity of geographical sciences in modern Russia means that a geographer in a university diploma is determined as a specialist in geography (this is something consisting of landscape studies, geomorphology, glaciology, economic and social geography)¹⁰. A postgraduate student of economics and geography defends a thesis according to the rules of natural sciences, publishing his / her works in geographical journals, which, within the framework of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the mandatory numbers of which are delivered not to the INION RAN, but to the Library of Natural Sciences of the RAS. A successful specialist in social geography wins the competitions of the Russian Science Foundation (RSF) under the heading “Earth Sciences” (07), and not in the humanities and social sciences (08)¹¹. Of course, one can cry out about the need for interdisciplinary research, but the time of scientists-encyclopedians has passed, so, in fact, in the field of social sciences, Russian country studies had to rely mainly on economists and orientalists (mainly historians). But

here the country studies suffered an evil fate too. At the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University, the Department of Country Studies was transformed into the Department of World Economics (moreover, there are now many such departments in various universities throughout the country, but their employees are engaged in common problems of world development and foreign economic relations, usually poorly representing the specifics of the countries involved in trade and investment relations). In the field of historical sciences, after the death of Yu.V. Bromley, on the wave of integration with the modern American and Western European mainstream, ethnography with its understandable research tools, potentially easily combined with country studies, gave way to socio-cultural anthropology and ethnology. The Oriental studies of historians suffered losses due to problems with their linguistic training. On the one hand, the teaching of basic Oriental languages has expanded (first of all, the UN languages – Chinese and Arabic, as well as Turkish – due to the relative ease of learning and Turkey’s close ties with Russia). Training in three dozen state languages of Asian and African countries is maintained (albeit with an admission of students once in several years): MGIMO University even entered the Guinness Book of Records, offering students programs in 53 foreign languages, including more than 20 eastern ones.¹² About 20 languages are offered to students of IAAC at the Moscow State University. On the other hand, the teaching staff is rapidly growing old, so that the teaching of several languages has already been curtailed. The imbalance is increasing between language training and training of specialists in the field of economics and modern history.

The general deplorable state of academic science in the post-Soviet Russia could not spare the country studies. For example, in the early 2000s, an attempt was made to produce a new country studies series, similar to two multi-volume publications of the IMEMO RAS, taking into account modern realities, having studied the place of the economically leading

countries of the world in the global economy and world politics, national models of economic development and the specifics of state regulation, the peculiarities of the political life of countries. However, the project with the addition of a volume about China and the replacement of a consolidated monograph on small countries of Western Europe with a book where the reader could compare in more detail the characteristics of three such countries (Spain, Sweden and Ireland) failed, because for the publication of books initiated by the famous Europeanist Vladimir P. Gutnik (1954–2009) the research program of the Russian Academy of Sciences simply did not have the money. Subsequently, some developments related to the study of European countries were used by the Institute of Europe of the RAS to issue country studies monographs in the series “Old World – New Times” initiated by academician N.P. Shmelev (primarily on Spain [Vernikov, 2007] and Great Britain [Gromyko, 2007], and partly also small countries of Western Europe [Schweitzer, 2009], despite the fact that without the participation of IMEMO RAS employees who produced relevant country studies independently, some other books were published – on France [Rubinski, 2007], Germany [Belov, 2009], etc.). However, having found the money for the first books (including in RHSF), the Institute of Europe of the RAS quickly transformed the series into a brand for any fundamental books about Europe published in this organization. Thus, at the beginning of the 2020s, we can only talk about the revival of the 40-year-old socio-economic and political development of the leading countries of the world almost from scratch – now it is reasonable to make at least a 10-volume project (the Group of Seven Countries, China, India, Brazil), but it would be interesting to add, in our opinion, also an analysis for Spain, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Australia and Indonesia.

Perhaps one of the failures of post-Soviet country studies was the inability to deploy qualified research on the former republics of the USSR as foreign countries. Unfortunately, the

illusion of the absence of linguistic and cultural barriers predetermined the penetration of a huge number of amateurs into this field of research. It should also be noted that in the 1990s, the scale of training of specialists in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was significantly reduced, although their experience was very much in demand in the first two decades of market reforms in Russia. It cannot be said that the situation is completely catastrophic, since the actual liquidation of the corresponding department at the Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University (in its place in 1991 the Department of Geography of the World Economy was organized and only Professor E.B. Valev continued to train geographers with Eastern European specialization) was not accompanied by similar processes at the Faculty of History of Moscow State University (the Department of the History of the Southern and Western Slavs is still preparing specialists necessary for the country) or at MGIMO.

The problem of concentration on narrow subjects has become common for many areas of country studies. Most likely, this is due to the general negative trends in the Russian higher education and R&D sphere, usually justified by intellectual rapprochement with the West. In fact, in modern Russia, there is an unwillingness / inability of universities to train specialists in country studies on popular topics, and as a consequence, there is a shortage of teachers in country studies courses and vacancies of researchers in country studies in academic institutes that are not occupied by specialized specialists. This problem is already beginning to arise even when preparing comprehensive encyclopedic articles on individual countries for the "Great Russian Encyclopedia" and its electronic version on the scientific and educational portal "Znania (Knowledge)".

**Instead of a Conclusion.
How to Meet the Current and “Hidden” Demand
for Regional Knowledge in Russia?**

In my opinion, there is a painstaking work to be done to revive domestic country studies, and it should be done without delay, until in Russia there is still a sufficient number of specialists, even if they are often already of advanced age. Most likely, it is necessary to start with the parallel intensified development of two branches – “Western country studies” and “Oriental country studies” – but with their close interaction. The basis for “Oriental country studies”, most likely, can be the IAAC at the Moscow State University, although we should not forget about other Moscow, as well as St. Petersburg and other regional universities.

The problem of the base of the “Western country studies” is more complicated, but three metropolitan universities undoubtedly have the potential: Moscow State University (although at the moment no faculty is likely capable of solving such a task independently), MGIMO and the Higher School of Economics. The training of specialists (at first, apparently, at the master’s level, taking into account the existing diversity of geographical, historical oriental bachelor’s educational programs, as well as possible partnership with academic institutions) should be carried out with an eye to their employment in the specialty, for which the heads of faculties and departments should at least be interested in the needs of employers from the scientific and the expert-analytical sphere. You can also recall the Soviet practice of training specialists with a broad outlook on a particular country but with a deep knowledge of some subject area (for example, a Germanist is an energy specialist or a French specialist is a specialist in automotive engineering).

The demand for serious regional expertise is indicated, in particular, by the constant problems of modern Russia in a

number of areas of foreign policy and world economic relations. There is an obvious shortage of personnel trained to analyze the internal political situation in the post-Soviet republics and predict the change of elites, as well as the changes in relations with Russia itself associated with this process. The inability to take into account the specifics of numerous small and medium-sized countries of the global South regularly leads to the inability of our country to ensure the support of its initiatives in the international arena. Ignorance of potential economic partners in large developing countries, ignoring the real interests of local business-elites, including regional ones, leads to the fact that Russian business, even offering interesting conditions of cooperation, often loses out to rents. However, it would be naive to think that this demand can be satisfied only by the efforts of the scientific community with the passivity of officials: many issues, and this was perfectly illustrated by Soviet practice, are successfully solved only with the proper coordination of diplomats, intelligence services, representatives of large enterprises (and in market conditions their role has increased many times) and scientists. Unfortunately, both the government and business in Russia do not want to “play for a long time” yet, and the existing planning with a horizon of several months to 1-2 years, of course, will not be able to compete with the country studies education and the study of foreign countries at a high professional level.

At the same time, the entire infrastructure directly for the development of scientific activity in the domestic country studies is preserved: at least five specialized academic institutes (and even more organizations with country studies departments), a dozen journals with an index in RSCI, the presence of suitable items in the passports of several scientific specializations of the Higher Attestation Commission of Russia, etc. Rather, it is a question of incentives for truly revolutionary steps. In particular, how can a large Russian transnational business co-finance the systematic training of country studies specialists with specific

knowledge of the economic and political realities of countries where domestic companies seek to expand their presence in the market by winning the competition with the Americans, Chinese or Western Europeans? How to institutionally implement major country studies programs – both according to the proposals made in the previous section of the article to study a significant number of countries under a single program, and for a comprehensive study of countries that have now become *terra incognita* for Russia? For example, why do we have almost no specialists in Russia for the development of economic ties and knowledge of the domestic political situation in countries such as Indonesia, Iran, Taiwan Island, Thailand or Australia (and even in Europe there are “white spots”, such as Belgium and Ireland)? It is not clear what prevents Russian researchers from building a closer dialogue with scientists from the countries under study – from presenting our capabilities, as China does, for example, when conducting forums on cooperation with Africa¹³, to implementing joint research (including grants from the Russian Science Foundation under the section “humanities and social sciences”).

Of course, a lot of efforts, not related to the direct organization of publication of scientific papers will be required from the scientific leaders of country studies as a complex interdisciplinary field. First of all, we must note the tasks of convincing officials of the need for organizational and financial support for the study, to identify the “hidden” and at the same time solvent demand for country studies expertise from large Russian companies, and finally, to establish closer ties with partners in the countries studied.

Notes

1. Department of Socio-Economic Geography of foreign countries // Geographical Faculty of Lomonosov Moscow State University // <http://www.geogr.msu.ru/cafedra/segzs/>, accessed 01.12.2021.

2. Apparently, this concept became one of the arguments for the Leningrad country scientists who organized the translation of the book by the German scientist. According to A. Gettner, the main essence of geography is to clarify the spatial distribution of phenomena on Earth and explain the causes of such distributions, their significance for the country. To understand the current distribution, of course, some knowledge of their past is necessary, but such an understanding also gives some key to foreseeing the future, i.e. geography connects the past and the future, as it were. At the same time, the new country studies are reduced mainly to the distribution, interpretation and description of geographical landscapes (not only natural-scientific, but also cultural-historical and economic). All those objects of the earth's surface that reveal local features that can influence other areas and series of phenomena are subject to chorological study. In addition to geography as a chorological science, there is history, a chronological science, whose task is to identify the distribution of phenomena over time. Finally, the essences of the phenomena themselves and their classifications relate to the tasks of special, systematic sciences (geology, botany, etc., including meteorology studying atmospheric physics and other parts of physical geography) [*Berg et al.*, 1925, P. 4-7, 33-42; *Hettner*, 1925, P. 3, 14].
3. Page of the Scientific Council of ILA RAS: <http://www.ilaran.ru/?n=19>, accessed 01.12.2021.
4. In 1925-1934, at the Faculty of Geography of the Leningrad University, created as a result of joining the Geographical Institute to Leningrad State University, there was a separate department of country studies, which was created and headed by the future academician Lev S. Berg (1876-1950). At the same time, country studies (along with landscape studies) were understood by him in a chorological sense - as the fundamental principle of a unified geography, which naturally ended with the accession of the Department of country studies of the Leningrad State University to the Department of Physical Geography in 1934.
5. Publications of the department // Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov // <http://www.geogr.msu.ru/cafedra/segzs/nauchd/pubs/>, accessed 11/30/2021.
6. M. Schmidt headed a team of co-authors from the Institute of World Politics and Economics of the GDR, whereas in the first series of the FRG it was completely written by Soviet scientists [Shenaev, 1973].
7. It should be noted that only in the case of France there was a change of the head of the author's team in ten years: in the early 1970s it was headed by Yu.I. Rubinsky [Rubinsky, 1973].

8. S.P. Madzoevsky is one of the pseudonyms of the famous Soviet intelligence officer Donald McLane, a former high-ranking British diplomat who lived in the USSR since 1955.
9. In 1973, the proposal of the famous economist Yu.I. Yudanov, who defended his doctoral dissertation on the capital investments of small Western European countries in 1967, to consider not only the leading, but also small countries when characterizing modern capitalism was revolutionary for Soviet science [Yudanov, 1972].
10. It is easy to get acquainted with the directions of training of modern domestic geographers on the website of the leading geographical faculty in the country – at Lomonosov Moscow State University: <http://www.geogr.msu.ru/education/vo/mag/>, accessed 30.11.2021.
11. Russian Science Foundation Classifier: <https://rscf.ru/contests/classification/>, accessed 30.11.2021.
12. Teaching foreign languages at MGIMO (schools) // MGIMO // <https://mgimo.ru/languages/teaching/>, accessed 30.11.2021.
13. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Research Institutes // http://www.focac.org/eng/lhyj_1/yjg/, accessed 30.11.2021.

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

IGOR DOBAEV. THE CAUCASIAN MACROREGION
IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS

*Keywords: Abkhazia; Azerbaijan;
Armenia; Georgia; South Ossetia; Russia;
North Caucasus; Islamism; geopolitics;
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Abstract. The article examines the geopolitical processes in and around the Caucasian macroregion, identifies the interests of the world and regional centers of power in the Caucasus in historical retrospect and at the present stage. The significance of the region for Russia in the past centuries and at the present time is analyzed. The dynamics of foreign and domestic policy in the post-Soviet period of sovereign and

partially recognized states of the South Caucasus is considered. Groups of conflict-causing factors in the North Caucasus are identified, the role of the federal center in overcoming them is determined.

The important strategic and commercial position of the Caucasus (North and South) put it at the center of the struggle between the great powers from earliest times: Ancient Greece and Persia, Rome and the Bosphorus kingdom, Sassanid Persia and the Arab caliphate, the Khazar Khaganate and Byzantine Empire.

In the 14th-17th centuries the Caucasus turned into an object of rivalry between the Persian Empire and the Ottoman one and its vassal - the Crimean Khanate. Russia, being in a weak military and economic state, built its policy in the Caucasus, playing on Persian-Ottoman contradictions. A qualitative change took place at the beginning of the 18th century, during the Caspian campaign of Peter I in 1722. During this period, the Caucasus turned into the most important foreign policy problem for Russia, and the task of joining the Caucasus to Russia came at the fore.

For Russia, the Caucasus has always been an entity, first of external and then of internal geopolitics, but at the same time it was an extremely controversial conglomerate of peoples and territories with various socio-economic and cultural levels of development, polyconfessionality, mentalities, and the severity of social intra-ethnic and interethnic struggle.

The Russian-Ottoman wars of the second half of the 18th century led to the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the transition to the sphere of influence of Russia of part of the Caucasus and the Northern Black Sea region. The victorious Russian-Persian and Russian-Ottoman wars for Russia and the Patriotic War of the first half of the 19th century predetermined for the Russian Empire the status of a superpower of that time. The conclusion of peace treaties with Persia and the Ottoman Empire (Bucharest - 1812, Gulistan - 1813, Turkmanchay - 1828, Andrianopolsk -

1829) secured the transition of the Caucasus under the jurisdiction of the Russian Empire.

The furious reaction of Great Britain to the annexation of the Caucasus pushed Russia to the forced establishment of control over the region and the introduction of military and civil administration of the empire here. This became one of the reasons for the Caucasian War (1817–1864), in which Russia had to militate not only against the imamate of Shamil and the Adyghe of the North-West Caucasus, but also the intervention of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, Polish, Hungarian and other European revolutionaries and adventurers. The situation was especially aggravated during the Crimean War of 1853–1856, when external forces sought to use the Caucasian issue to implement plans to dismember Russia. However, the goal, despite the military defeat of Russia, was not achieved, which was reflected in the decisions of the Paris Congress of 1856, which recorded the belonging of the Caucasus to Russia as an international legal reality. Another attempt by the Ottomans and the British supporting them to solve the Caucasian issue by force (1877–1878) ended in failure for their initiators. Thus, the Caucasus issue for Russia has shifted from a foreign policy problem to a state of domestic geopolitics. This was contributed by the successes of the Russian Empire in the South Caucasus.

In 1783, Tsar Kartli and Kakheti (the eastern territories of present-day Georgia) Heraclius II signed the treaty of Georgievsk, calling Russia for help in the fight against Persia, thereby ensuring the protectorate of the Russian Empire. In 1801, this kingdom was abolished. Other territorial entities in Georgia became part of the Russian Empire on their own, including Abkhazia. Gradually, the entire territory of Georgia became part of Russia as the Tiflis province.

As for Azerbaijan, it should be noted that in the 18th–19th centuries a number of state entities appeared on the territory of modern Azerbaijan, Armenia and Persian Azerbaijan (mainly khanates with Turkic dynasties). Totally there were 24 of

them, including Baku, Derbent, Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Erivan and other khanates.

After the accession of parts of these khanates to Russia (except for the Persian province of Azerbaijan), Baku, Elizavetpol and Erivan provinces appeared on the territory of modern Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The revolutions of 1917 and the ensuing civil war changed significantly the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus. In Transcaucasia in 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was proclaimed (mainly on the lands of the Baku and Elizavetpol provinces and the Zakatala district), the Armenian Republic, the Georgian Democratic Republic. Nationalists came to power: Musavatists in Azerbaijan, Dashnaks - in Armenia, Mensheviks in Georgia. During the same period, British troops intervened in the region.

However, already in 1920, parts of the Red Army entered the territory of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the process of Sovietization of Georgia began a little later, in 1921.

In December 1922, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia formed the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, which that same year became part of the USSR. In 1936, the TSFSR was abolished, at the same time union republics were formed - Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Thus, the borders of all Transcaucasian republics were formed in Soviet times.

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991, three sovereign states appeared in the South Caucasus - Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The region moved to the zone of foreign geopolitics of Russia, and the North Caucasus remained part of the Russian Federation. The total area of the states of the South Caucasus is a little more than 185 thousand square kilometers, and the total population is about 17 million people.

Nationalists come to power in the states of the South Caucasus. In Azerbaijan, after a short period of rule by the former communist functionary Ayaz Mutalibov, in June 1992, the leader of the nationalist Popular Front of Azerbaijan Abulfaz

Elchibey appeared, during this period of time there was a fierce Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the same time, Azerbaijan suffered a military defeat, and Nagorno-Karabakh and a number of Azerbaijani regions, wholly or partially, come under the control of Armenia.

In 1993, Elchibey was replaced by the former Soviet functionary Heydar Aliyev, in 1994 peace agreements on Nagorno-Karabakh were signed in Bishkek. However, under the control of Armenia, as it was already noted, not only the territory of Karabakh remained, but another 7 regions of Azerbaijan (2 of them partially), which amounted to 12% of the territory of this state. After the death of Heydar Aliyev in 2003, his son, Ilham Aliyev, became president.

In Armenia, the first president was the liberal-minded Ter-Petrosyan, then he was replaced by representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh – Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan.

In Georgia, the first president was the nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who held a course for the construction of a state – an ethnonation. As a result, in 1991–1992 the South Ossetian war, and in 1992–1993 the Georgian-Abkhaz war took place, which ended in the defeat of Georgia. In 1993, Gamsakhurdia was killed, and in 1995, the former Soviet functionary Eduard Shevarnadze became president. He, in turn, was overthrown in 2003 during the so-called “rose revolution,” and the pro-Western politician of the new formation, M. Saakashvili, became president. As a result of his military adventure against South Ossetia in August 2008, the Georgian army was defeated, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia finally seceded from Georgia, becoming partially recognized states.

Serious changes in the political systems of the states of the South Caucasus occurred in the second decade of the 21st century.

In Azerbaijan, since 2016, the top-down governance has been strengthened. The results of the referendum, held on September 26, 2016, allow the president to be elected an unlimited number of times. Several posts of vice president were

introduced, as a result, Aliyev's wife Mehriban (Pashayeva) became first vice-president. Thus, the alliance of the leading Azerbaijani Aliyev-Pashayev clans was strengthened. Even earlier, many Western and pro-Western NGOs and NPOs were liquidated, and their leaders went to prison, and then some of them were expelled from the country. All this, along with positive economic indicators, has improved the situation in and around Azerbaijan (relations with Russia, Turkey). However, relations with Iran were mostly uneven, once again they were complicated in the fall of 2020 due to the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, initiated by Azerbaijan with large-scale and diverse support of Turkey. The Turkish Republic is the main partner of Azerbaijan, acting on the basis "one people - two states".

In Armenia, on the contrary, in recent years, the weakening of the top-down system has been marked. Serzh Sargsyan, hoping to keep power, started to change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary. As a result of this process, a "velvet revolution" took place in Armenia in 2018 and a representative of the non-systemic opposition, Nikol Pashinyan, who took office as a prime minister, came to power with the support of the West, primarily the United States. Given the unsatisfactory economic situation in the republic, social protests brewed up, there was launched a serious strike against country's armed forces. Therefore, Armenia's decisive defeat in the next war for Nagorno-Karabakh is not surprising. Russia's positions in Armenia are provided by a military base located in Gyumri. However, in general, we can talk about the turbulence and instability of political processes in this republic. The reasons for Armenia's defeat in the last war are diverse: political - including the leadership's orientation towards the United States, the deterioration of relations with Iran and to a certain extent with Russia, the military, economic ones, etc. It should also be mentioned the current effective system of power in Azerbaijan and the flawed in Armenia. The consequences of the defeat of

Armenia in the war for Nagorno-Karabakh may worsen in the near and mid term.

In Georgia, M. Saakashvili, after two terms of the presidency, as well as later in Armenia, decided to reformat the republic into a parliamentary state. However, in the 2013 elections, the United National Movement party led by him lost the parliamentary elections to the opposition bloc of Georgian Dream parties led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. In November 2020, the elections are again won by representatives of the Georgian Dream. In reality, the republic is led not by parliament with the prime minister and president, but by oligarchs led by Ivanishvili. The socio-economic situation in Georgia is complicated, and the leadership continues its course towards joining NATO and the EU. Accordingly, the main “ally” of Georgia is the United States.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, after the defeat of Georgia in the five-day war in August 2008, were recognized by the Russian Federation and then by a limited range of other states, thus becoming partially recognized states. The territories of these countries are small and the population is small. However, they have serious geostrategic significance. South Ossetia is a territory located in the central part of the South Caucasus, and Abkhazia has access to the Black Sea, occupying about 200 km of the coastline. The national security of these states is ensured by the Russian Federation, deploying its military bases here.

At the same time, the socio-political and socio-economic situation in the republics is far from ideal. This is especially true of Abkhazia. 14 years have passed since the recognition of this state, but the socio-political and socio-economic situation in the Republic of Abkhazia is still replete with turbulent processes. The main reasons, in our opinion, are as follows: a multi-ethnic population in Abkhazia, all the authority of political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of the Abkhazians. In turn, this indigenous people are divided by political preferences, economic interests, orientation towards certain

leaders, etc. As a result of the internal struggle of the Abkhaz elites, the political situation in the republic is not stable, and the violent, in fact, change of leaders does not lead to positive results. Thus, we can talk about the turbulence of Abkhaz domestic political processes. In addition, it should be borne in mind that for centuries Abkhazians adhered to pagan beliefs. Until now, there are priests in the republic who perform priestly (profane) rites. They enjoy authority in the Abkhaz environment and have a certain influence on the dynamics of political processes in this state.

It can be safely said that turbulence is an integral part of the political processes in Abkhazia. Relatively calm periods are accompanied by protest activity of opposition forces. One of the reasons for these shocks, in our opinion, is the archaic structure of socio-economic and political life, which is a factor in the self-regulation of Abkhaz society, since the “façade” power institutions cannot function effectively and ensure the well-being of the state.

In the South Caucasus, it seems that there is no leader state. In this regard, any regional integration is hardly possible here. The states of the region are not, and will not be able to become subjects not only of global, but even of regional geopolitics. In reality, they act as objects of ongoing geopolitical processes. There is a struggle for geopolitical dominance between global (Russia and the West, mainly the United States) and regional centers of power (Turkey, Iran, as well as an unconventional player in this field – Saudi Arabia and some Gulf monarchies in the footsteps of its foreign policy). Russia maintains allied relations with Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the United States is strengthening its influence in Georgia, for Turkey Azerbaijan is the main geopolitical partner. As for the KSA, it is trying to strengthen its position in the region by stressing on the Islamic factor.

Another part of the Caucasian macro-region is the North Caucasus, by which, in an abbreviated form, we will mean the

territories of the national republics that are part of the North Caucasus Federal District (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia-Alania, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia) and the Southern Federal District (Adygea). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, separatist processes were recorded everywhere, the apogee of which was the famous events in Chechnya.

Currently, after the collapse of separatist projects supported by external forces, the situation in the North Caucasus has improved markedly. Nevertheless, albeit with less destructive potential, the following blocks of conflictogenic factors continue to exist: political (until the end, not resolved ethno-political conflicts, ethnoethatism and ethnoclanism, the presence of divided peoples, etc.), socio-economic (falling industrial production, high unemployment and, as a result, many social problems) ethno-confessional (politicization of ethnicity, outflow of the Russian population, the emergence and development of a radical Islamist movement that has grown into religious and political extremism and terrorism, hiding behind Islamic creed) and demographic-migration (as a result of increased demographic activity, there is an increase in migration flows, both within a particular republic and beyond the framework of the North Caucasus region). Of course, the potential of these conflictogenic factors in recent years, thanks to the policy of the federal center, has been steadily declining, but they have not disappeared anywhere, becoming only latent.

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KSENIA ATAMALI. RELATIONS BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND TURKEY: GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS.

Analytical review

Keywords: Turkey; Azerbaijan; Caspian region; foreign policy; post-Soviet space; regional policy, energy policy; conflict; pipelines; oil; gas; second Karabakh war; Contract of the Century.

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Abstract. The review primarily analyzes the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the field of energy, geopolitics and economics.

Turkey's policy in the Caspian region and bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey are considered. The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, disputes between Turkey and Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea and the role of Azerbaijan and Turkey as a resource base and a transport and logistics hub are also discussed.

Introduction

The collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War presented Turkey the opportunity to implement a more active foreign policy, allowing it to shape energy policy towards the Caspian region. The first years of the Justice and Development Party rule marked Turkey's rapprochement with the EU and the countries of the Middle East. Over the next few years, Turkey intensified its activities in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan plays an important role in Turkey's policy, seeking to reach new markets in order to sale its energy resources through Turkey. Turkey, to a certain extent, is dependent on Azerbaijan in the energy sector. Azerbaijani state-owned company SOCAR is contracted to supply aviation fuel to the largest Turkish airports, and also practically controls oil refining in Turkey which creates opportunities for Azerbaijan to influence the economy of Turkey, and potentially its domestic politics. Due to a series of pipeline projects with Azerbaijan and Georgia, Turkey gained access to the resources of the Caspian Sea. Turkey is interested in expanding its presence in the energy sector on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, namely in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The review also discusses projects on development of oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea and the construction of trans-Caspian pipelines.

Turkey's Energy Policy in the Caspian Region

S. Zhiltsov [1], PhD in Politics, Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, examines Turkey's

energy policy in the Caspian region after the collapse of the USSR. He notes that during that period, Turkey launched the development of various pipeline projects that focused on delivering future hydrocarbon resources to foreign markets. In the early 1990s, it was mainly about the transportation of Azerbaijani oil, and potentially of Kazakh oil. Turkey hoped to get a reliable access both to the western and eastern coasts of the Caspian Sea. Investments and pipelines became key tools for implementing Turkey's plans. The 1993 agreement on the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was the first outcome of the talks between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Economic interests of Turkey were closely connected with geopolitical ambitions, i.e. the desire to enhance its presence in the Caspian region. In addition, Turkey planned to expand its influence on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, particularly in Kazakhstan. Turkey failed to fulfil its ambitions due to the lack of economic strength, among other things. Turkey also expected to develop trade and economic relations with Georgia.

The author notes that in 1993-1994, it became clear that, despite the best efforts, Turkey's energy policy failed to achieve its goals due to the lack of geopolitical weight and economic opportunities. Also, Azerbaijan was primarily focused on the US, not Turkey. In September 1994, Azerbaijan signed a contract with major oil companies to develop oil fields on the Caspian shelf (the 'Contract of the Century'). The choice of the direction of export of Azerbaijani hydrocarbon resources was greatly influenced by this agreement. In the mid-1990s, Turkey tried to assume a leading position among the Caspian Sea area countries. In addition to hydrocarbons from Azerbaijan, Turkey was interested in Tengiz oil produced in Kazakhstan. In the future, Turkey planned to channel Azerbaijani and Kazakh oil into one pipeline. However, the West became the main export route for Azerbaijani oil. Despite the US dominance in the region, Turkey did not abandon its plans.

In 1997, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan route was referred to as Main Export Pipeline (MEP). The geopolitical interests of the US and the EU dominated over the decision-making process regarding new pipeline projects. At that time, Turkey promoted cooperation with Kazakhstan, hoping to use Kazakhstan’s interest in a reliable route for the export of its hydrocarbons, which was at odds with the Kazakh side. However, Turkey focused on Azerbaijani hydrocarbons due to various circumstances. Accordingly, Turkey’s energy policy was intended to implement the Baku–Ceyhan project. In 2005, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline was constructed. Turkey’s energy policy was in line with the US long-term interests, and Ankara wished to connect Kazakh oil to the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline project. In January 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding on the project of establishing an oil transportation system, designed for the tanker export of Kazakh oil through the Caspian Sea, was signed in Astana.

In 2007, the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline was built, thus allowing Turkey an opportunity to export Caspian hydrocarbons. Turkish policy was aimed at gaining access to hydrocarbon resources produced by the littoral states on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. Ankara’s ambitions were at odds with the interests of Russia and Iran. Also, China was highly interested in the oil and gas of the Caspian states, implementing a gas pipeline project that allowed Turkmenistan to export its resources eastward. For this reason, Turkey supported a pipeline project initiated by the EU in 2011. The project was designed to boost the political influence on Azerbaijan and expand energy cooperation with Turkmenistan. The subsequent difficulties with the project and Azerbaijan’s interest in additional exports of its gas to the foreign market resulted in the drafting of a new pipeline project. In 2011, Azerbaijan and the EU signed a declaration regarding the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor project; in 2012, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed an agreement on the construction

of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP). The TANAP gas pipeline project was backed by the EU, which planned to diversify the sources of gas production. In subsequent years, the Southern Gas Corridor project was consistently implemented by Azerbaijan and Turkey with the political support of the West. In 2016, the European Commission (EC) approved the construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which was completed at the end of 2020. In May 2018, TANAP was launched. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania and Italy were part of the Southern Gas Corridor project. Azerbaijan was now able to transport gas to European countries, namely Greece and Italy. Moreover, the construction of the Southern Gas Corridor benefited Turkey, granting it additional means to control gas supplies to European countries. So far, Azerbaijani gas supplies through the constructed gas pipelines are still insignificant. The increase in capacity depends not only on the level of hydrocarbon production in Azerbaijan, but also on the level of gas consumption in European countries.

The author points out that Turkey and Western countries have stepped up their efforts regarding the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. In 2020–2021, the project was promoted by the US, whose policy facilitated political dialogue between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Turkey welcomed the developments, since it supported the promotion of the gas pipeline project. In January 2021, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan settled a dispute over a controversial field in the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan has already expressed its interest in receiving Turkmen gas; Turkey's political interests are behind Azerbaijan's energy policy, which is aimed at opening the gates for Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey.

The author concludes that, like thirty years ago, the attention of extra-regional states is again focused on the Caspian hydrocarbon resources. Turkey, the EU and the US promote the idea of creating a new energy route that will ensure the delivery of hydrocarbons to the European market from both the western

and eastern coasts of the Caspian Sea. In this matter, Turkey pursues a proactive policy, which is consistently strengthening its position as the major transit country of Caspian resources.

Factors of the Energy Sector Development of Azerbaijan and Turkey

V. Novikov [2], PhD in History, Institute of CIS, discusses energy infrastructures of Azerbaijan and Turkey, which are relevant not only for these countries, but also for the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Azerbaijan is the largest regional exporter of hydrocarbons to Europe, while Turkey is a transit corridor for the export of Azerbaijani energy resources. The article describes the major trends in the energy sector of Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey, as well as the changes associated with the Second Karabakh War. Azerbaijan creates an image of a transit country and exporter by participating in railway projects and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and by being part of the system of interstate transportation of oil and gas to Europe. Experts believe that Azerbaijan is gradually becoming a new 'hub' not merely of a regional scale, but also of a Eurasian dimension. The author emphasizes that the Azerbaijani oil and gas transit infrastructure is significant not only for Baku, e.g. the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is also used for the transit of Kazakh oil.

However, the discovery of new large and highly profitable oil and gas fields remains in question, existing reserves are being depleted, and there is a looming problem of Azerbaijan's import dependence on liquid fuel. As a result, there would be a reduction in funding for other sectors of the economy. In addition, in the latter half of the 2010s decade there was a decline in oil and gas production, contrary to forecasts of most experts for an increase. After Azerbaijan became a gas importer, there have been predictions about possible problems with the major pipeline fill rate, i.e. the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-

Supsa Pipelines. Two major international oil corporations – Chevron and ExxonMobil – withdrew from the Contract of the Century due to unfavourable forecasts for production rates, along with a number of other factors. The Azerbaijani side began to actively look for new markets, primarily in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. Another activity of SOCAR was building cooperation with Belarus. Moreover, Vietnam also became a promising partner, owing to the need to support the growth of the Vietnamese economy with oil products, the lack of geological exploration and the Sino-Vietnamese dispute over the South China Sea shelf. Thus, the Vietnamese oil industry is struggling with the lack of raw materials.

The author notes that Azerbaijan had to slow down the rate of oil production in 2020 due to COVID-19 pandemic and the need to address the issue of declining oil prices under the OPEC+ deal. The second Karabakh war, which lasted from September 27 to November 9, 2020, did not appear to have an impact on the energy system of Azerbaijan. It did not result in attacks on the oil and gas transport infrastructure, and, therefore, on current contracts for energy supply to Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus. The war showed the need for significant financial investments. It is known that there are non-ferrous metals in the Karabakh subsoil, and according to forecasts, there are also deposits of hydrocarbons that could amount to 250–300 million tons. At the moment, the territories are under the control of Azerbaijan, and it is possible that the alleged presence of hydrocarbon reserves may facilitate attracting foreign investment to the former ‘security belt’ areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless, the issue of pipeline fill rate of transport and logistics projects involving Azerbaijan (TANAP, etc.) is more relevant for the country. The key partner is Turkmenistan, although there are substantial hurdles to successful cooperation. The Azerbaijani state company SOCAR and the Dutch oil trader Vitol are competitors for the transit of Turkmen oil. In 2019, Vitol ousted SOCAR, since its Turkmen

partners refused the services of the Azerbaijani state-controlled company. Having received a monopoly on Turkmen oil, Vitol started to use Russia's Makhachkala port and the pipeline system of the state-controlled company Transneft, which was beneficial to the Russian side. However, Vitol's monopoly on the export of Turkmen oil struggled with the problem of its limited tanker fleet. In the result, the supply of Turkmen oil was reduced by half and SOCAR regained its positions in the export of Turkmen hydrocarbons in late 2020, squeezing out Russia.

The author believes the division of the Caspian Sea shelf to be major conflict potential in the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. In addition, there was a fundamental unresolved issue concerning the Dostluk field. In January 2021, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed a memorandum on joint exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources of this field. Hydrocarbon deposits are split 30 percent for Azerbaijan and 70 percent for Turkmenistan; the transportation is set to be carried out via the energy transportation system of Azerbaijan. Thus, in recent years, Azerbaijan has been steadily shifting away from the Contract of the Century towards other transport and logistics projects, primarily with the participation of Turkey.

The author points out that transport and logistics capabilities are Turkey's advantage in the energy market. It should be noted that Turkey, represented by the state-controlled Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), carries out exploration and production of oil and gas, holds interests in the production and distribution of petrochemicals. For instance, the company is involved in oil exploration on the Black Sea shelf, and in the operation of the BTC oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).

According to the experts, Turkey's demand for energy resources is steadily growing. In 2005–2015, the country's energy consumption increased by 46 percent (45 million tons). The energy balance of Turkey is diversified: oil (30 percent), gas (30 percent), coal (30 percent) and renewable energy sources

(10 percent). It should be noted that the Azerbaijani-Turkish political and economic partnership suggests Turkey's leadership. At the same time, the Azerbaijani state company SOCAR is an investor in Turkey's economy, primarily in the energy sector, thus granting Azerbaijan influence on Turkey. In addition, Turkey and Azerbaijan are equally concerned about the fill rate of the Southern Gas Corridor. Turkey counts on Azerbaijan and its possible projects in collaboration with Turkmenistan as a means to rectify the raw material deficit. The complex situation around the Mediterranean gas shelf is one of the issues for Turkey's energy sector, since the border of the sea shelf between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus has always been disputed. With the discovery of gas reserves, the situation has deteriorated. In fact, a coalition between Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel and France has emerged, which opposed Turkish claims in the region.

In 2019, Turkey concluded a separate agreement with the Government of National Accord (GNA), the interim government for Libya headed by Fayeze al-Sarraj. Under the treaty on the delimitation of maritime borders, the Greek islands and Cyprus lost their economic zone. The deal fuelled a sharp growth in discontent with Turkish policies on the part of regional powers. Turkey sought to address its problems by reorienting the Israeli deposits of Tamar and Leviathan from a possible Turkish-European direction to the Egyptian one. The author notes that Chevron, the investor of the new gas pipeline project, earlier participated in the Contract of the Century in Azerbaijan.

The author concludes that Chevron's withdrawal from the Contract of the Century and the shift of the Leviathan and Tamar fields to the Egyptian market will probably undermine the Southern Gas Corridor initiative and Azerbaijan's ambition to compete with Russian gas supplies to Europe.

Azerbaijan in the Coordinate System of Turkish Foreign Policy

Z. Sarimsokov [3], Master in International Relations, RUDN University, analyzes Turkey's regional policy towards Azerbaijan. After the collapse of the USSR, Turkey has become more active in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where it is still held in high regard. Azerbaijan plays a particularly important role in Turkey's regional policy. Both states border with Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Iran in the Caspian basin, which indicates the common interests of these countries. The countries are connected not only by geographical borders, but also by linguistic, religious and cultural affinities. Turkey and Azerbaijan refer to each other as 'fraternal countries'. In 1991, Turkey was one of the first to officially recognize the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan. After the newly elected President of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey oriented the country's foreign political course mainly towards Ankara, a new era in relations between the two countries began. In subsequent years, such a policy contributed to the trade in energy resources between two countries, making it one of the priority areas in bilateral relations. Turkey acts as a transit country between Azerbaijan and the West. Armenian occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) of Azerbaijan and internal instability have brought the country even closer to Turkey. President Heydar Aliyev promoted the principle 'one nation, two states'. In addition, relations between the two countries were boosted by the victory of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party; AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the Turkish parliamentary elections at the end of 2002. Turkey also endeavoured to rebuild relations with its neighbours in the region, which contributed to a thaw in relations with Armenia. Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan were further expanded after 2007, when the AKP won the elections for the second time and became the ruling party. The two countries

signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance. The Strategic Cooperation Council assembled five times between 2011 and 2016. The main purpose of these meetings was to advance bilateral political relations and increase trade between the two countries to \$15 billion in 2023; during this period, 30 agreements were signed in various spheres.

In recent years, significant steps have been taken to promote diversified cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Today, the foreign trade volume between Turkey and Azerbaijan is a little over 2 billion dollars. Overall, the export of Turkish goods to Azerbaijan prevails in the total trade turnover between the two countries. It should also be noted that the two countries have been slow to realize their foreign trade potential because of high customs duties. In this sense, one can say that Russia has the upper hand in terms of Azerbaijan's imports, since it exports duty-free goods. The total investment cost of Turkish companies in Azerbaijan is \$9 billion. Over 2,600 Turkish companies operate in Azerbaijan, creating more than 25,000 jobs. It is also worth mentioning that since 2004, Turkey has extended bilateral development assistance to Azerbaijan totalling \$320 million. Speaking of economic relations, the tourism industry is of particular importance.

The visa regime between the countries used to be the major hurdle for development until it was lifted at the end of 2020. Military partnership between the two countries was restored by the agreement on cooperation in military education signed on November 3, 1992. This agreement had a great influence on the creation of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan. The second significant agreement on training, technical and scientific cooperation in the military field was signed on June 10, 1996. It included training of the Azerbaijani army, military assistance, purchase of weapons and ammunition, joint production of weapons and military relations between the two countries. In addition to bilateral cooperation, Turkey supports Azerbaijan in international platforms and strongly promotes its interests. As one of the

major NATO member states, Turkey does a lot to develop relations between Azerbaijan and NATO, supporting any initiatives in this regard. Turkey uses every opportunity to demonstrate its support of Azerbaijan in relation to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh is complicated by the claims of the Armenians regarding the events of 1915. The author emphasizes that Davutoğlu's Zero Problems with the Neighbours policy and Turkey's activities in the region have paid off in terms of Ankara's relations with Yerevan.

The author believes that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the determining factors of Turkey's foreign policy in the region. Also, the Karabakh conflict is aggravated by the fact that Turkey's stance on this issue depends on Azerbaijan's position on Cyprus. The two countries are pragmatic about the Nagorno-Karabakh-Cyprus problem and refrain from any statements that might have negative consequences. Turkey provided large-scale military assistance to Azerbaijan, enabling Azerbaijan to regain some territories in Nagorno-Karabakh. It should be noted that the return of the territories was proclaimed a victory in both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The author points out that Turkey and Azerbaijan have close and fruitful cooperation within the framework of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Organization of Turkic States, the United Nations (UN), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), and etc. During the reign of the AKP in Turkey, a new era in relations with Azerbaijan has begun, leading to the creation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms focused on regional peace, stability and well-being of the people of the two countries. However, at the moment, relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are still below expectations, mostly in the field of trade and economy.

The author concludes that the recent events in Nagorno-Karabakh have shown that Azerbaijan remains one of Turkey's major partners not only in the region, but also in the world. In turn, Turkey has proved to be a strategic partner and elder brother of Azerbaijan. The unresolved issues that both countries have with Armenia impede the development of the existing potential between the two countries. The author underlines the growing role and importance of Azerbaijan in maintaining stability in the Caucasus, serving the interests of not only Turkey and Russia, but the entire world community.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Turkey, the EU and the US are paying special attention to the production and transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian region to the external markets. Turkey is working to become the main transit country for Caspian resources. In recent years, Azerbaijan and Turkey have been expanding cooperation in the energy sector, with Turkey as a transport and logistics hub, and Azerbaijan as a supplier and transit country of hydrocarbons. The political and economic alliance between the countries is aimed at diversifying Russia's energy supplies, challenging Russian companies operating in the energy sector. It is not only about global competition in European markets, but also about regional competition, for example, in the Caspian Sea. At the same time, it is obvious that currently the major problem of the Azerbaijani-Turkish alliance is the fill rate of transport and logistics routes. The issue of shrinking resources of Azerbaijan could be solved through cooperation with a third party, namely Iran or Turkmenistan, as well as through the development of the Mediterranean shelf.

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ELENA DMITRIEVA. TURKMENISTAN: AT THE TRADE ROUTES CROSSROADS

Keywords: Turkmenistan; Central Asia; transport corridors logistics infrastructure; international cooperation.

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Abstract. The article discusses the main directions of the state policy of Turkmenistan on the implementation of large-scale transport and logistics projects, taking into account the favorable geopolitical position of the country and the development of the infrastructure accompanying them.

The Caspian region today is a powerful transport and logistics hub of the international level, which in the context of the sanctions policy of the West opens new opportunities for the development of geo-economic relations in the Eurasian space.

Turkmenistan's advantageous geographical position at the crossroads of the region's trade routes allows the country to successfully realize its transport and logistics potential to ensure the transit of goods between the markets of Europe and the Asia-Pacific region through the territory of Central Asia. Cargo traffic on this route will significantly reduce the distance and travel time.

The North-South and East-West transport directions are considered a priority in Turkmenistan, special attention is also paid to the Central Asia - Persian Gulf (Turkmenistan - Iran - Qatar) and the Caspian - Black Sea (Turkmenistan - Azerbaijan - Georgia - Turkey) transport corridors. Significant transport arteries for the project of the Turkmen transport and logistics corridor are: the railway from Kazakhstan to Iran running through Turkmenistan, expressways built recently, automobile and railway bridges over the Amu Darya River, international as well as local airports, the largest international seaport in Turkmenbashi and other facilities.

Particular attention is paid to the construction of cross-border railways. Railway line Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran is the eastern part of the North-South transport corridor. Thus Turkmenistan participates in the revival of the Silk Road and has access to countries of Persian Gulf and inland railways of China. Previously, cargo transportation from China to countries in the Persian Gulf, mainly by sea and taking a month in time, and by rail, the travel time was reduced to two weeks. China has shown great interest in this route and has become one of the main suppliers of cargo in this direction.

An interesting direction is the railway project Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan, which Turkmenistan is actively implementing, unlike Tajikistan. For example, the first stage of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway, which will pass through the North of Afghanistan, has already been commissioned. This project is the initial stage of the inclusion of Afghanistan in the transport and logistics system of Turkmenistan and through it - of the entire region. It is possible that in future

this railway line may be reoriented to China against the background of Tajikistan's not too active participation in the project.

An important role in the transport and logistics system of Turkmenistan is played by the seaport in Turkmenbashi. The logistics center created there is universal, year-round and designed for maintenance of all types of transport around the clock: sea, rail, road and air. The trade route from Baku to Turkmenbashi along the Caspian Sea allows to shorten the way of cargo delivery by 1400 km compared to the overland route through Iran. This is the shortest logistics route for road cargo transportation from Turkey and the Caucasus countries to the Asian region, which provides the best conditions for European countries to access the markets of the Near and Middle East, the states of the Indian Ocean basin, significantly reduce distance and time for large-scale cargo transportation. Seaport in Turkmenbashi is also a major railway hub for highways coming from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and China. It is often called the "Sea Gate" connecting Europe with Asia.

Much attention is paid to the development of the national communications system when implementing logistics routes (an artificial communication satellite created in France and launched in the U.S. in 2015, development of telecommunication system according to international standards, next-generation communication systems (NGN), etc.). A new stage of modernization of communication systems in Turkmenistan until 2024 provides for the development of mobile communications in the country including 3G, 4G, 5G high-speed Internet. With implementation this project, coverage across the country will be 100%. This is the way Turkmenistan is trying to organize modern high-quality provision of means of communication of transport and logistics chains, their interaction and coordination in the movement of commodity flows.

Turkmenistan has large reserves of natural gas and has a developed system of gas pipelines, providing supply of raw

hydrocarbons to consumers. To date, the following gas pipelines operate in Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan - Uzbekistan - Kazakhstan - China, Dovletabad - Deryalyk, Korpedje - Kurtkui, Dovletabad - Serakhs - Hangeran and East-West. The Turkmenistan - Uzbekistan - Kazakhstan - China gas pipeline with a total length of more than 9,000 km delivers gas to the main industrial centers of China, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hong Kong. Dovletabad - Deryalyk provides delivery of natural gas from the eastern and western gas producing regions of Turkmenistan in the northern direction to the borders with Kazakhstan. Gas is being transported to Iran via the Korpedje-Kurtkui and Dovletabad-Serakhs-Hangeran gas pipelines.

The East-West gas pipeline connects the large fields of the East Turkmenistan with its western regions. It will be possible to deliver natural gas through this pipeline to any desired point on the territory of Turkmenistan.

The creation of an extensive transit transport system that meets modern logistics requirements and broad participation in regional and international cooperation has become a priority for the country's leadership. That's why the state policy of the leadership of Turkmenistan on positioning the country as a strategic crossroads the Eurasian transport corridors should also assume an exit of Turkmenistan from the policy of isolationism, carried out especially actively in the first years of independence. Isolationist politics will be an obstacle to the development of trade and economic ties necessary for the implementation of the plans of the country's leadership aimed at the transformation of Turkmenistan into a transport and logistics crossroads of not only regional, but also international scale.

Modern transport and logistics infrastructure is a system that combines resource sources, production facilities and labor potential into a single chain. The future belongs to the combined transport system, which includes the largest international and regional pipeline, rail, road, water (sea and river), and air hubs.

In these conditions, the development of transport infrastructure is one of the main priorities of the state policy of Turkmenistan. The transport and logistics network with many railway, sea and air terminals created by the country's management can become one of the main elements in the international transport system on the Eurasian continent, and Turkmenistan may become one of the crossroads of trade routes.

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VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP OF THE STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA. *Condensed abstract*

Keywords: Russia; China; Central Asia; the US; SCO; EU; integration; geopolitical confrontation; COVID-19; strategy; competition.

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R.K. Alimov [1], professor emeritus of the Taihe Institute (China) believes that the developments in the early 21st century confirm the predictions about the shift of the center of global development towards Asia. The political significance of Central Asia, now more commonly referred to as the “heart of Asia”, is noticeably increasing. Both China and Russia have close historical and geographical connections with this region, and their interaction here has a nature of a strategic partnership. One example of such partnership is the SCO - an inter-State association of a new type, whose priority is to combat international terrorism, extremism and separatism.

The author notes that the connection between Russia and Central Asia has deep historical roots, which were closely intertwined during the Soviet period, e.g. the unified national economic complex is still functioning to date. Russia seeks to maintain political stability in the region by:

- working to resolve conflicts in the post-Soviet space;
- establishing an effective system of cooperation in the field of security within the CSTO framework;
- fostering economic cooperation, including that within the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA) framework;
- creating favourable conditions for labour migration from the countries of Central Asia to Russia; today, over 4 million permanent labour migrants from Central Asia produce about 10 percent of the country's GDP.

Moreover, Russia is the largest investor in Central Asia. International terrorist organizations and the crisis in neighbouring Afghanistan pose security threats to the countries of Central Asia. The presence of Russian military there remains the guarantor of security in the region.

The author points out that following the creation of the SCO and the beginning of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, Japan was the first to suggest a dialogue format for regular meetings between the heads of foreign ministries. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU initiated interaction with the countries of Central Asia through the TACIS programme. In 2007, Korea hosted the first cooperation forum "Republic of Korea – Central Asia". Central Asia remains keenly interested in Korea's experience of economic development; functioning of special economic zones; advances in science and technology; 'green' energy; agriculture; medicine and healthcare. In 2012, India put forward 'Connect Central Asia' Policy aimed to improve trade and economic partnership with the countries of the region and expand security cooperation, including consultations on Afghanistan.

In 2011, the US announced its own New Silk Road initiative, which did not receive wide support in the region and was replaced by the 'USA and Central Asia' project in the dialogue format. The US Strategy for Central Asia for 2019–2025 states that during the past 25 years the US has provided over \$9 billion in assistance to the countries of the region and funded over 40,000 student and professional exchanges. In 2020, the US declared its intention to be present in the region and continue to defend sovereignty and independence of the countries of Central Asia.

The author notes that China was among the first to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the new states of Central Asia. The settlement of the border disputes with the Central Asian countries opened up vast opportunities for China. Central Asia is strategically instrumental in ensuring national security of modern China. Russia, its Central Asian partners and the SCO work together to combat drug and arms trafficking, as well as other transnational criminal activities. Practical cooperation has been established to jointly counter various threats and challenges in the information space. Such dangers became apparent during the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. China and the countries of Central Asia efficiently took advantage of their geographical position when recreating the Silk Road. Cooperation in the fields of transport and energy, geological and mineralogical exploration and production, as well as in the area of agriculture, telecommunications and infrastructure had a synergistic effect. Over the period from 2001 to 2019, trade between China and the countries of the region increased 30-fold, and the direct Chinese investments in the region amounted to \$20 billion (\$9.27 billion in Kazakhstan, \$1.39 billion in Kyrgyzstan, \$1.95 billion in Tajikistan, \$0.31 billion in Turkmenistan, and \$7 billion in Uzbekistan).

O.G. Karpovich and S.A. Kondakov [2], Professor and Senior Researcher at the Institute of Current International Problems of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, respectively, examine the role of Russia in Central Asia

through the prism of the evolution of integration approaches. In October 2020, the Statement by foreign ministers of the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation on strategic areas of cooperation was adopted at the online meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of five countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and Russia. The document highlights the following strategic areas of cooperation: politics and diplomacy; security; trade and economics; transport sector; environmental protection and adaptation to climate change; energy sector; sanitary and epidemiological well-being; migration and humanitarian situation.

The authors emphasize the importance of establishment of a diplomatic format, similar to the C5+1 diplomatic summit created earlier by the US. Despite the superficial similarities of these formats, their content and modality differ profoundly from each other. This is largely due to the geopolitical rivalry between the superpowers: Russia, China and the US. Researchers believe that the Russian diplomatic format for Central Asia emerged in response to the American one. The implicit and explicit differences in the goals and content of the two formats create a dilemma for five countries of the region. For Russia, this means evolution of its approach to the Central Asian region. In the past, Russia either developed bilateral ties with five countries, or interacted with them within the framework of integration associations in the post-Soviet space: the CSTO, EAEU and CIS. The statement on the strategic directions of cooperation published by six ministers can be considered a policy document and Russia's new foreign policy strategy in Central Asia of sorts. Russia expects that the states of the region will not lend their territory, sea and air space for military needs of extra-regional powers, primarily the US.

A large part of the strategy is devoted to collaboration in ensuring sanitary and epidemiological well-being. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia assisted to five countries by

providing test systems, reagents, medical supplies and teams of doctors. Negotiations concerning the supply of Russian vaccines to the countries of Central Asia are underway. In the future, the countries of the region and Russia intend to step up their work on joint projects and share the results of research activities in regard to prevention and combating infectious diseases.

The authors believe that Russia should strengthen its position both globally and regionally. Russia's influence in the regions has been traditionally strong, especially in Central Asia, which is now a battlefield of the largest superpowers. As a means to hold back Russia and China in their aspiration to shift the world to a multipolar one, the US tends to include the Central Asian region in its strategy to a larger extent. The C5 + 1 format, created to discredit the existing formats of cooperation in Central Asia, proves to be the most important source of influence for the US in the region. The project is aimed at hindering integration of the Central Asian states into the associations promoted by Russia and Kazakhstan (the EAEU, CSTO and CIS), and China (The Belt and Road Initiative), as well as interaction within the SCO. Being in need of new markets and resources, especially energy, China is working hard to become a leader in Central Asia by employing predominantly economic tactics. For instance, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan enter multiple joint ventures with Chinese capital.

The authors conclude that strengthening of the positions of main geopolitical players may pose serious challenges for Russia's borders in the future, thus posing a threat to geopolitical status of the country as a leading Eurasian power.

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

KANYBEK KUDAYAROV. INTRODUCTION TO TURKEY'S DEFENSE POLICY. *Analytical review*. (The ending, opening in the previous issue)

Keywords: Turkey; defense policy; defense industry; armament; military conflict; security.

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Abstract. The review analyzes the publications of nine Turkish specialists who give an idea of the modern defense policy of Turkey, the main stages of its development and implementation. The authors provide comprehensive theoretical and practical information for a better understanding of the processes taking place in the military sphere. Much attention is paid to the domestic and foreign policy processes that predetermined the further development of the Turkish defense policy, the ultimate goal of which is to transform the Republic of Turkey into a strong regional power. Strategic autonomy, which official Ankara seeks both in the field of military-industrial production and in other sectors of the state's life, is an indispensable condition for achieving this goal.

The studies described in the review claim to make an important contribution to understanding the logic that the Turkish leadership adheres to in implementing its regional policy.

Defense Planning

Mehmet Hilmi Ozdemir and Nursima Shankulubey Baikal, representing the Ankara company “Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret A.Ş.”, define the term “defense” as a comprehensive concept that can be interpreted differently in relation to different disciplines. From a military point of view, “defense” can be defined as a kind of service that includes the concept of “security”, which is provided by the armed forces to protect / eliminate threats using available resources. When considering “defense” from a political point of view, it implies generalization of the concept (instead of discussing specific events or details), which contributes to a departure from the original meaning of this term. Turning to the definition of the term “defense planning”, it should be said that it implies an effective way of using the resources allocated to defense to protect national interests, the ultimate goal of which is to ensure the desired level of security. According to the authors, at a time when the concept of an “asymmetric threat” was out of the question, the main goal of the armed forces was to outnumber the enemy in manpower and weapons. For example, the Pentagon’s long-term defense planning during the Cold War was very simple: it involved studying which systems were in service in the USSR, after which mass production of similar weapons systems (aircraft, aircraft carriers, tanks, etc.) was launched.

Review of defense planning. Changes in defense planning are associated with important historical and geopolitical events, with regional and global processes that increase uncertainty in the world. These include the Second World War, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold

War period, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the collapse of the Iraqi regime, the events of the “Arab Spring” and much more. For example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Americans declared that the USSR no longer poses a threat to Western Europe and that the planning of NATO's armed forces should be considered in the context of crisis management [4, p. 128].

Experts believe that today we are in an environment where changes and transformations, especially in technology and real politics, are taking place at a fairly rapid pace, leading to a parallel change in the security environment and an increase in uncertainty. Defense planners should understand that the approaches they use should be aimed at creating flexible and elastic plans. Defense planning should be conducted taking into account the analysis of the lessons of the past and the realities of the present.

New Defense Technologies

Argyment Karapynar (Ankara Scientific University, Ankara, Turkey) rightly emphasizes that progress in science and technology is largely due to defense needs. The development of various technological solutions based on cybernetic, quantum, space, bio- and other technologies has seriously advanced defense projects to a qualitatively new level. With the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the regulatory role of the industrial sector has reached a high level. The development of defense technologies has changed the understanding and capabilities of states in the field of design. Karapynar is confident that in this new era, artificial intelligence (AI) will reach unprecedented sizes, especially due to the combination of machine learning, unmanned systems and robotics. At the strategic and operational levels, AI will increase the clarity of intelligence, evaluate minor changes in large databases and reduce human influence on plans and decisions [5, p. 146]. Decision-making processes will change

as systems become more autonomous. Artificial intelligence systems and autonomous systems will also change the use of human power. As technology evolves, more and more developments will bring innovation with them. It is important for a state to raise awareness about the development of defense technologies and, accordingly, to have high-level defense technologies.

Turkish Defense Industry in the Period before 1974

Husny Ezlu (National Defense University, Istanbul, Turkey) analyzes the history of the Turkish “defense industry” of the last century, when the most important events that determine the dynamics of the Turkish military industry took place. The Ottoman state maintained its military and technological superiority until the end of the 17th century. However, since the 18th century it begins to lag behind Europe and only since the 19th century begins to pursue a policy of active development of the defense industry. The 20th century seems to be the most dynamic in this regard, which accounts for the zigzag development of the Turkish defense industry, which was directly influenced by foreign policy factors. For example, the rapid growth of military production in the early twentieth century was followed by its reduction (prescribed as part of the conclusion of the 1918 Mudros Armistice). Nevertheless, the further creation of military factories in Anatolia is associated with the beginning of the national struggle of Turkey led by Ataturk against the occupying forces. These plants subsequently came under the control of the General Directorate of Military Factories of Turkey, established in 1921. Due to the conditions prevailing after the Second World War in the defense sector, a new (leading) organization was created - the Corporation of Mechanical Engineering and Chemical Industry (MECC). By 1940, significant progress had been made in the defense industry, but assistance under the Marshall Plan and the Truman

Doctrine led in most cases to the closure of Turkish military enterprises, while a smaller part of it was repurposed. Thus, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Turkish defense industry practically ceased to exist, since within the framework of American military assistance, on the one hand, military equipment was replenished, but, on the other hand, this hindered the development of Turkish military factories, reducing domestic orders and creating a burden on the budget. Under these conditions, in 1968, the aircraft factory producing the TNK-5A light transport aircraft had to be transformed into a textile factory. The same fate befell many other military enterprises.

It was only after the Cyprus events (1974) that the countdown to the revival of the Turkish defense industry began. The Cyprus peacekeeping operation and the arms embargo imposed on Turkey after this operation revealed the need to develop a defense industry based on national resources [6, p. 175]. Despite the numerous difficulties that stand in the way of the development of the defense sector, Turkey has managed not only to make significant progress in this direction and achieve 75% import substitution of military products, but also to move to the export of its military products.

Turkish Defense Industry from 1974 to the Present

Expert Merv Saren (Bayezid Lightning University, Ankara, Turkey) examines the situation of the modern Turkish military-industrial complex, the foundations of which were laid in the mid-1970s. As you know, due to the assistance provided by the United States to Turkey in the 1940s and 1970s, by the 1960s the latter had turned into a country dependent financially, economically and militarily on the United States and NATO. However, since the 1960s, despite all the opportunities and advantages that Turkey and its allies offered each other, problems began to arise in relations between them. Frustrations about the policy pursued towards Turkey by the United States

and partners in the North Atlantic Treaty began to accumulate in the country. The first case of the Turks falling into some kind of frustration was associated with Washington's withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey without notifying official Ankara. The second unpleasant moment for the Turkish authorities was the disagreement with the Americans during the Cyprus events of 1963-1964, in which the United States categorically opposed Turkey's use of US military assistance to resolve the Cyprus issue (military intervention in Cyprus). The crisis in Turkish-American relations has become an incentive for the revival of the Turkish defense industry. Further actions of the United States contributed to the complete reversal of Turkish policy towards supporting its own military-industrial complex. For example, the US embargo on arms supplies to Turkey for the period 1975-1978 not only once again exposed the problem of supplying Western-style weapons, but also actualized the issues of lack of own resources for their production. Despite the existing problems, it was in the 1970s that industrialization, which was carried out under the "Erbakan" motto "let's make our own tank and engine", noticeably accelerated. In 1973, the company TAI (Turkish Aerospace Industries) was established, in 1975 - Aselsan and Tümosan.

A series of important events taking place since the late 1970s, including the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and other events, have increased the geopolitical and geostrategic significance of Turkey in NATO, which allowed the resumption of military assistance to Turkey [7, p. 208]. However, since the 1990s, there has been another crisis in these relations caused by differences in the definition and approaches to solving Turkish security problems, since Turkey's struggle with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal immigration has not received sufficient attention and support from the EU and NATO.

Since the early 1980s, Aspilsan, Tusaş and other defense enterprises have been established. Despite the state monopoly in the defense sector, since the mid-1980s, private companies have been encouraged to invest in the military-industrial complex. In 1985, Law No. 3238 was adopted, aimed at the production of various types of weapons, tools and equipment for Turkish needs. For the development and modernization of the military-industrial complex, the Defense Industry Development and Support Department (SAGEB) was created. The Turkish defense industry has made a big leap forward with the creation of defense enterprises on a project basis [7, p. 211].

In the last two decades, the understanding of Turkish defense and security has been based on three basic concepts: the “internal concept”, the “national concept” and the “concept of strategic autonomy”. The main feature of these concepts is to meet internal military needs at the expense of their own resources. Great progress has been made in the development and inventory of domestic and national products, such as the ATAK helicopter, the Hürkuş general purpose helicopter, the Altay tank and the Milgem. The list of TAF (Turkish Air Force) includes ground, air and sea platforms, such as armored vehicles, UAVs, training aircraft, air defense systems, etc. The Turkish defense industry has begun to transform into a new structure that focuses on such procurement models as “joint production / technology transfer”, “original design” and “R&D”, instead of the previously practiced “smart procurement” and “licensed production”. The level of satisfaction of Turkey’s domestic needs has increased from 25% in 2002 to 70% by 2020. At the same time, the processes of research, development, and production of complex technological products are continuing, the number of which has grown rapidly from 66 (in 2002) to 667 (in 2018). In proportion to the development of the domestic military-industrial complex, their financing is also growing, expressed in the allocation of 60 billion dollars from the state budget in 2018, of which for R&D needs accounts for 1.45 billion

. The volume of Turkish exports in the defense and aerospace industry increased from \$248 million (2002) to \$2.2 billion (2018). The number of companies operating in the defense industry has increased from 56 to 1,500. It is also a great achievement that 7 Turkish companies (Aselsan, Havelsan, Roketsan, TAI / Tusaş, STM, BMC, FNSS) were able to get into the international rating “Defense News Top 100”, where one hundred leading manufacturers working in the defense industry are represented.

Turkey’s Defense Strategies and Policies

Murat Aslan (Hassan Kalyonju University, Gaziantep, Turkey) believes that Turkey’s security and defense strategy was actually determined by the requirements dictated by international structures during the Cold War, and was suitable in conditions of conventional or nuclear war. Turkey's modern security strategy is outlined in the “National Security Policy Document” (MGSB), also known as the “Red Book” (because of the color of its cover). As for the strategy of waging a regional war, it was developed taking into account the experience of the Cyprus problem in the 1970s [8, p. 230]. However, since the 1990s, the threats of separatist terrorism have come to the fore as part of this strategy.

While defense policy defines the priorities, principles and goals of defense, defense strategy refers to the method of policy implementation. The defense policy is reflected in the document entitled “National Policy of Turkey” [8, p. 238]. The Turkish National Military Strategy (developed by the Ministry of National Defense and approved by the President) defines the basic principles of a military-political nature in accordance with the priorities defined by the MGSB. The “Document on National Security Policy” is being developed by the National Security Council under the President of Turkey and covers the theoretical basis. This process includes 3 parts: protection / defense planning, protection management and its implementation.

Defense management is the systematic implementation of the processes of planning, organization and staffing, orientation and monitoring / supervision aimed at achieving the goal [8, p. 244]. Defense planning is conducted at the headquarters of the Ministry of National Defense. Protection management is carried out by the Supreme Defense Industry Coordination Council (SSYKK), which ensures coordination between ministries. There is also the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSIK), which finances purchases and makes management decisions, and the Defense Industry Directorate (SSB) under the President, which coordinates the supply chain. The procurement process of SSYKK, SSIK and SSB focuses on the capabilities required by the military strategy in accordance with the MGSB. The ten-year procurement and supply program is being prepared / updated in accordance with the Operational Requirements plan of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the strategic target plan prepared with reference to the Turkish military strategy. Thus, the MGSB, where Turkey's security strategy and the national military strategy, which determines defense policy are being developed, form the basis of defense management efforts.

Turkey's Policy in the Field of Military Partnership and Defense Cooperation

Ryfath Yengel (Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey) believes that during the Cold War, Turkey sought to join NATO in order to obtain long-term security guarantees. However, the Turkish application to join NATO was rejected twice because of the special position of Great Britain, which did not want to lose its influence on Turkey, as well as because of the unwillingness of the Scandinavian countries, who were afraid of drawing the Alliance into unnecessary conflicts if the Turkish state was accepted [9, p. 265]. Turkey's participation in the Korean War on the side of the United States, other foreign policy actions of official Ankara, as well as the United States' own

foreign policy interests, contributed to Turkey's inclusion in NATO. The Americans believed that the loss of Turkey (and Greece) would lead to the loss of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey was seen as a leading country in preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East. However, Lyndon Johnson's letter to Ismet Inen (1964) severely undermined bilateral relations. The USSR took advantage of this and began to provide Turkey with great material assistance. The Joint Agreement on Defense and Cooperation signed in 1969 (Ortak Savunma ve İşbirliği Anlaşması, OSIA) limited Washington's powers and transferred ownership rights to many bases built jointly by the Americans and Turks to the Turkish side, the remaining ones were identified as NATO bases. The agreement also prohibited the US military presence in Turkey outside of NATO missions.

The next crisis in Turkish-American relations was caused by the arms embargo imposed by the Americans (1975–1978) due to the Cyprus peacekeeping operation of Turkey in 1974. Turkey, for its part, also suspended the operation (OSIA). This severely limited the ability of the United States to monitor the formation and movement of Soviet troops. On the other hand, the actions of the United States forced the Turkish government to think about diversifying the sources of arms supplies and reducing dependence on American military technologies. Purchases of weapons began in Italy (fighters, helicopters, air-to-air missiles), Germany and France (anti-tank weapons, battle tanks, training aircraft, torpedo boats and mine protection ships) [9, p. 275]. Turkey has realized the importance of creating its own defense industry to ensure its security. To achieve this goal, the Turkish authorities began to take certain steps, among which the Turkish-American agreement of 1980, which provided for American assistance in this direction (Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması – SEIA), played an important role. As part of this assistance, TAI founded Turkish Aerospace in 1984. TAI's goals were the production, system integration and flight testing

of F-16 aircraft. In this context, TAI worked from 1987 to 1995. Throughout the 1980s, Turkey was the third country in terms of military aid received from the United States (after Israel and Egypt). When Jimmy Carter was President of the United States, he lifted the arms embargo imposed on Turkey. However, this was largely due to the events in the Middle East, which seriously increased Ankara's geostrategic importance in the eyes of the United States and NATO. The overthrow of the Shah's regime in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused new security problems for Turkey and the United States, creating a security vacuum in eastern Turkey. Existing bases were modernized and new military bases were opened in the east and south-east of Turkey.

The collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the Russian threat had serious consequences for Turkey's security. The Turks' need for Americans and "NATO" decreased, and Turkey began to pursue a more independent foreign policy. After the Cold War, NATO turned from a collective defense organization into a collective security organization. Since 1994, Turkey has been participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) programs, and TAF has been performing important duties in NATO operations in the Balkans. Nevertheless, different perceptions of the threat, different mentality, cultural and civilizational differences and much more made it difficult to implement various aspects of Turkish-American cooperation. This was subsequently repeatedly reflected in the form of difficulties in purchasing American weapons for Turkey, in the creation of which Armenian and Greek congressmen played a major role. Despite these facts, cooperation on the modernization of F-16 fighters and other military equipment continued.

Turkey's Military and Defense Strategy: Objectives, Supporting Elements and Results

Murat Eshiltas (Ankara University of Social Sciences, Ankara, Turkey) believes that Turkey's new military and defense strategies have undergone significant changes since the "Arab events" began to change the regional order in the Middle East and North Africa. The proliferation of non-state armed groups, the weakening of traditional state sovereignty, attempts to revise the borders of nation-states in the region, power struggles and proxy wars between countries throughout North Africa and the Middle East have shaken the security environment and forced Turkey to adopt a new military strategy. This strategy has manifested itself in Turkey's rapidly developing cross-border military operations, as well as in its rapidly growing defense industry. The transformation of its strategy is influenced by a number of domestic, regional and international events. Without going into details, we just note that as a result of the intense political struggle between the Turkish government and the army, the former managed to win over the latter and transfer the military and defense sectors to the civilian government. The new foreign policy vision initiated by the Government began to determine the priorities of the defense industry, and eventually the armed forces had to come to terms with the government's course and adapt to new conditions. At the first stage of the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (2002-2008), the army was the only entity that made decisions independent of the government on Turkey's foreign policy, taking into account its own strategic vision focused on protecting the republican (Kemalist) regime [10, p. 298]. However, in the following years, the AKP changed the balance in favor of democratizing civil-military relations. The military-industrial policy in Turkey, the attempted military coup on July 15, 2016, were a turning point in the history of civil-military relations in Turkey. After the failed coup d'état militaire, the Ministry of Defense became the highest

authority in the military decision-making process, one of the first decisions of which was the reorganization of the TAF structure. Thanks to the transition from a parliamentary system of government to a presidential one (after the 2017 referendum), the President has become an influential player in civil-military relations and the defense architecture of Turkey. The defense industry has begun to be perceived and developed as an integral part of Turkey's instruments of hard power to gain greater strategic freedom of maneuver against security threats in the region. Turkey's new strategy, combining a strengthened defense industry and military activity during the security crisis, paved the way for a more decisive position in the field of the armed forces and defense. The deterioration of diplomatic relations, as well as the growth of tactical and strategic differences regarding the Syrian conflict and other regional crises have led to the fact that Turkish leaders have lost confidence in partnership with Western countries, while this has had a significant impact on Turkey's military and defense strategy. In the context of the Syrian conflict, the growth of terrorist organizations - the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and ISIS, the strengthening of the YPG (Kurdish People's Self-Defense Units in Syria, which are a branch of the PKK) - have created a serious strategic problem for Turkey's national security. This situation forced Turkey to adopt a more decisive military strategy to prevent the expansion and military activity of the PKK-YPG. The second dominant dynamic at the regional level was the deep geopolitical hostility between the major regional Powers, creating a very restrictive security environment in which all regional players make strategic commitments focused on security. Some players used direct military intervention in other states, while others used an asymmetric strategy of conflict and war. Another consequence of instability in the vast geopolitical field, including the Middle East, Central Asia and the Maghreb region, was the emergence of three geopolitical axes: 1) Turkey-Qatar; 2) Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE-Israel; 3) Iran-Syria. At the

same time, Russia, as the author believes, has changed the rules of the game in the Syrian crisis, jeopardizing Turkey's main security priorities. In addition to the geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics in the Mediterranean, the regionalization of the Libyan conflict has also made certain changes in Turkey's strategic orientation. Competition at the local and regional level, including for hydrocarbon resources, has forced Turkey to reorganize its military and defense strategy.

And finally, the third factor, which manifests itself at the international level, where geopolitical competition is increasing and the race of great powers is resuming, prompted Ankara to adopt a decisive strategy in both foreign and security policy, which, of course, changed Turkey's defense preferences.

Strategic autonomy. The concept of strategic autonomy is not new. It appeared in the defense industry and for a long time has been the main strategic goal determining defense and security issues. Strategic autonomy means the ability of a state to pursue its national interests and implement its preferred foreign policy without restrictions from other states. The goals of strategic autonomy are also an integral part of Turkey's regional geopolitical vision, which opens up a second dimension of the goals of the new military and defense strategy. Turkey is trying to prove itself as one of the dominant players in its region, seeking strategic autonomy. This foreign policy goal has become prevalent in Turkey's regional strategic orientation since 2002. In the absence of security after the "Arab Spring", Turkey's desire to become a regional power has acquired a new strategic orientation. Its military and defense strategies have been restructured in accordance with these goals, new for the Turkish state. While important investments in the defense industry have been directed to ensure a more resolute military position, Turkey's military activity has become even more noticeable in the context of its regional policy.

To ensure security, preparation for military service and combat readiness, the ability of the armed forces to fight and

perform assigned tasks are of great importance. One of the most important elements here is combat readiness, which means the management of the armed forces and their components and formations, warships, aircraft, weapons systems or other military equipment and equipment that will be used during military operations or in accordance with the purposes intended for them. The second no less important thing is the support of Turkey's military and defense strategy - the presence of a preventive structure and strategy, especially in the fight against terrorism. The final element of the military and defense strategy is the demonstration of military deterrence. Its characteristic is the projection of force, which is defined as the ability of a state to use certain elements of its military power to effectively and quickly deploy and support its forces in order to strengthen regional stability and assist to deter and respond to crises [10, p. 321]. Given Turkey's desire to become a regional power and a certain level of deployed power, Turkey's military power projection missions can be divided into two categories: operations using "soft" military force and operations using "hard" military force. The tasks of the "soft power" projection included: protection of maritime communications, evacuation of civilians in the event of a crisis, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations after natural disasters. The tasks of projecting "hard power": a symbolic military presence demonstrating interests, the use of the threat of the use of military force to deter potential enemies, the use of punitive or offensive force and military intervention. According to the author, Turkey's forward military deployment strategy is the most important and concrete strategic step in projecting power and should be considered as an integral part of its strategic priorities in the areas adjacent to it. For example, Turkey's military mission in Somalia is an instrument of "soft power", while Turkish policy in Qatar and Libya are manifestations of its desire to become a regional power.

Conclusion

In order to overcome security problems and geopolitical challenges, Turkey has strengthened the military component in its foreign policy actions and switched to active military operations in areas of Turkish vital interests. In many ways, this became possible thanks to the development of the domestic defense industry. The strategy chosen by Turkey, aimed at solving short - and medium-term foreign policy tasks, is quite justified so far. Nevertheless, it should be understood that Turkey's military and defense strategies should not incur serious political, economic and other costs to the state itself. At the same time, it is also important to support the current course for the development of high-tech production and provide the necessary resource base for this. The dynamics and geography of military operations should in no case go beyond the limits acceptable to the Turkish side. Since this can, on the one hand, deplete the material and technical base, without which the mobility and activity of conducting further military operations will be greatly hampered. On the other hand, the restoration of military equipment of Turkish military units seems to be very costly. According to the author, it is important to regulate the relationship between foreign policy and military strategy, based on the nature of the conflict, the number and composition of participants involved in the crisis, as well as the characteristics of the military operational environment.

After the "Arab events", Turkey's strategic environment was an arena of conflicts, competition and restrictions, where state and non-state actors fought with each other. Under these conditions, Ankara's resolute military strategy is assessed as the best way to ensure its security and resolve geopolitical problems. However, Turkey's reliance on the military component in its policy as the only tool to overcome its geopolitical problems will inevitably lead to the formation of a coalition against Ankara. And this seems to be another serious challenge for Turkey. The

counter-coalition is a natural consequence of military and geopolitical rivalry. Turkey's resolute military and defense strategy also opens the way for various types of counter-coalition movements that can lead to high strategic costs. They are capable of causing serious damage to Turkish interests in its geopolitical environment.

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OLGA BIBIKOVA. HARKI - A NON-HEALING WOUND OF THE ALGERIAN PEOPLE

Keywords: Harki; Algerian immigrants; colonial heritage; Evian agreements.

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Abstract. The French government finally decided to fulfill its obligations to the descendants of the Harki, Algerians who served France during the colonial period. We are talking about the implementation of the Evian Agreements (03/18/1962) and ensuring the rights of the descendants of the Harki living in France.

On February 23, 2022, France adopted a law recognizing its obligations with respect to Harkis in accordance with the Evian Agreements. These agreements were signed between France and Algeria on March 18 1962 in the town of Evian-les-Bains on the southern shore of Lake Geneva to commemorate the end of the Franco-Algerian War (1954-1962).

An uninitiated person will certainly be surprised that an interstate document signed 60 years ago is being corrected and supplemented only now. Algeria is celebrating the sixtieth

anniversary of its independence this year. The fact is that the provisions of the new law provide for compensation for damage caused by Harkis, as stated in the document, "due to non-compliance with the conditions of their admission in France."¹ The history of these people remains one of the main problems of collective memory associated with the Algerian War of Independence and the colonial presence of France in North Africa.

In Algeria, Harkis are a category of the local population who, during the period of French colonization, worked in administrative bodies, voluntarily or involuntarily served in various units of the French army.

The problem discussed in the article is known to countries where colonialists were present for a long time or there was foreign domination, because after independence, people who served the colonialists were almost always subjected to repression.

* * *

The French conquest of Algeria began in 1830 under the pretext of fighting North African pirates². In fact, the reason was the deterioration of relations that began after France refused to pay for food (bread, corned beef), as well as leather, which were supplied on credit from Algeria to revolutionary and Napoleonic France. The conflict between the ruler of Algeria Hussein the 3d³ and the French consul in 1827 became the culmination. In response, Paris staged a three-year naval blockade of the Algerian coast. This was not enough, and then France sent troops to Algeria.

As noted by Y. Rubinsky, head of the Center for French Studies at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, "in most of its colonies, Paris was limited to the creation of a French administration. Algeria was a completely different matter"⁴. The fact is that the local population did not

want to submit, but the French managed to bribe the local feudal lords. Some of them have embraced French culture and even adopted Catholicism. This population group was called “evolves”, i.e. “evolved”.

For the convenience of managing the controlled territory, the French attracted Algerians who, due to impoverishment, agreed to serve in administrative bodies. Police units were also created to maintain order. As a rule, they were subordinate to the local administration.

Helene Aldeger, a researcher on the fate of Harkis, notes that the reasons for Harki’s work in the French administration and service in military units “are diverse and do not indicate absolute support for the idea of French Algeria.”⁵ That is, we are talking about the fact that people served France, to put it mildly, not always voluntarily. What motivated the Algerians to cooperate with the French colonial authorities? It must be remembered that the French, having come to Algeria, stayed in this country for more than 100 years – from 1830 to 1962. In 1834, France annexed Algeria, it officially became part of France. Therefore, several generations of Algerians born under the French colonial regime perceived the situation as the status quo and adapted to the prevailing conditions. This was evidenced by the fact that French, without having the status of the official language of the country, is still necessarily studied in the country’s schools. And today it is spoken by more than half of the population of Algeria.

In France, the word Harkis is pronounced as “arki” or “arkis” (Harkis – “H” is not read). The term was formed from the Arabic word هاركا - haraka - movement (in the sense of “mobile group”). This term is used to describe all North Africans (mainly Algerians) who were forced to cooperate with the French during the colonial period. Harkis are auxiliary formations that include moghaznis - local police detachments, self-defense groups, territorial units and special detachments of reservists.

Subsequently, they were involved in the French army in the period from 1957 to 1962.

In Algeria, the term Harkis has become synonymous with traitor and accomplice. Therefore, this word is often used in a negative way⁶.

According to the law adopted in 1865, Algerians were conscripted into the French armed forces. As a result, already in the First World War, there were special Algerian units in the French troops - tirailleurs, gums, tabors, spags⁷. Subsequently, these troops were used in Indochina.

* * *

During the Second World War, demands for autonomy or independence intensified in Algeria. Gradually, the protest against the foreign government spread throughout Algeria. The brutality shown during the suppression of the riots shocked the country. Until 1954, several uprisings took place in Algeria, on November 1, 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) was established, whose goal was to achieve the country's independence by armed means.

Against the rebellious people, France threw its army, which included Algerian militias. The resistance of the local population was accompanied by periodic rebellions. The fact is that land was taken from the local population and transferred to European colonists. During the period from 1850 to 1934, more than 40% of cultivated land became the property of Europeans⁸.

Over time, especially after the Second World War, anti-colonial sentiments grew stronger, resistance to foreign presence took on organized forms. As former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981) wrote, "France, seized by the throat by the events in Algiers and having lost all hope of regaining control of them,"⁹ was forced to admit the collapse of its colonial empire. On September 16, 1959, the President of France recognized the right of the Algerians to self-determination. Under

these conditions, during 1960, the French colonies gained independence: Eastern Cameroon, Togo, Madagascar, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Senegal and Mauritania. On January 8, 1961, a referendum was held, which approved the policy of President de Gaulle, aimed at the self-determination of Algeria. On March 18, 1962, the Evian Accords were signed, and on July 3, the independence of Algeria was proclaimed. The conclusion of the Evian agreements provided for the withdrawal of French troops from Algeria. General Ailleret, commander of the French forces in Algiers, advocated the repatriation of the Harkis. He was supported by many of the military, who understood that if they remained in Algeria, the Harkis could be subject to retribution from the side, primarily the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), which led the resistance to the French colonialists. However, Paris rejected a proposal for mass repatriation of the Harkis, who were traditionally called "collaborators" by the French left, who were generally in favor of Algerian independence. On April 15, 1962, the French Ministry of the Armed Forces ordered the disarmament and disbandment of all Harki units. In fact, only about 60,000 Harkis were able to leave for France. The Evian Accords forbade the French military from interfering with the Harkis repatriation process, but some military officers facilitated their departure. On May 16, 1962, the Minister of State for Algerian Affairs ordered the punishment of those who facilitated the repatriation of Algerians. The French government did not want to burden itself with taking care of the Harqis, especially since the number of Harkis in Algeria increased significantly towards the end of the colonial period. Naturally, only those who worked in the administration were able to leave for France and knew how not to miss this opportunity. Prominent Francophiles, politicians and military professionals were repatriated without problems.

60,000 Harkis were able to cross over to the metropolis, along with those who were called "pieds-noirs" (black-footed),

repatriates of European origin. This name meant Franco-Algerians, i.e. immigrants from France of different ethnic (French, Italian, Spanish, Maltese, Jewish, etc.) origin, whose ancestors once settled in this French colony. Subsequently, for many of them, born in Africa, moving to France meant a radical change in lifestyle. Living in Africa, they, being distanced from the local population and protected by French laws, nevertheless made a great contribution to the development of the Algerian economy. Their rights were guaranteed by a special decree adopted on October 24, 1870. The so-called Crémieux decree provided for the granting of metropolitan citizenship to non-Arabs (Europeans and Jews) living in French Algeria. In the 21st century historians have appreciated this decree as another means of France's colonial strategy. It was important for the colonizers to "prioritize, segment and divide the Algerian population in order to better control and subdue it"¹⁰. The Jews were the indigenous inhabitants of the North African countries; for a long time they lived without conflict in a Moslem environment. But after the proclamation of the Jewish state of Israel, there was a surge of Moslem anti-Semitism in almost all Arab territories. Subsequently, famous personalities came out of the Franco-Algerian environment: economist Jacques Attali, Nobel laureate and writer Albert Camus, Marshal of France Alphonse Juin, fashion designer Yves Saint Laurent and many theater and cinema figures.

The departure of the French from Algeria took place in the context of a clash of different opinions of the indigenous population. Some were in favor of supporting the National Liberation Front and, consequently, for the independence of Algeria, others believed that Algeria had already become part of France, so the departure of the French from the country would negatively affect its development. Among a significant part of the French colonists, as well as the military, it was widely believed that de Gaulle thus "betrayed France."

The consequence of the French withdrawal from the country was that between 55,000 and 75,000 Harkis were disarmed and left to fend for themselves in Algeria. Later it became known that on October 29, 1961, during secret negotiations with representatives of the FLN in Basel, France put forward the principle of non-retaliation, according to which the Algerian state would refrain from any sanctions against Moslems loyal to France. The Algerian side did not fulfill its promises. As a result, "they became victims of mass repression ... were marginalized, were ostracized, became victims of racism ... France renounced them, was ashamed, using them for its own purposes."¹¹

A mass of illiterate village boys from disbanded military units remained in the country, not suspecting that they (and their families) would be punished by their compatriots.

In April 1962, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, wishing to prove itself, published a directive regarding Harqis, according to which they should be controlled locally and registered on a "black list". Already on July 5, the hunt for Harkis began. These people were first arrested, then sent to detention centers, tortured, and then executed. The local population took part in the repression, humiliating, torturing and lynching those who helped the French. *Le Monde* of November 13, 1962, reported the killing of 10,000 Harkis between March 18 and November 1 alone. In total, as historians have stated, at least 80 thousand people were killed.¹²

* * *

Having moved to France, repatriates from Algeria, *piéds-noirs*, Algerian Jews and Harkis gradually began to move on to the search for identity, but soon a heterogeneity of arrivals revealed itself, for in fact they were connected only by Algeria and 1962. Those Harkis who managed to move to France were placed in special settlements where barracks were hastily built or those

camps that remained after the German occupation. Characteristically, the authorities sought to disperse families from one village in order to avoid creating any social structures. In 1963, there were 75 villages, mostly located in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur region. The authorities sought to disperse the Algerians, settling them in 25 families in a remote province. Most of the Harkis were involved in the system of the National Forestry Administration, where they were engaged in the maintenance of forest areas: planting and cutting trees and shrubs, fighting forest fires, protecting the environment.

It is believed that today the number of descendants of the Harkis, still living in camps in southern France, is about 500,000 people. Since 1974, the younger Harki generation, already born in France, began to hold hunger strikes and protest marches in order to draw the attention of the authorities to the plight of this category of the population. Their parents had difficulty integrating in France. The common man equated them with North African immigrants, although their former compatriots rejected them, despite the fact that the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, stated in 2005 that "Harki children are not responsible for the actions of their parents." Earlier, in December 1999, criticizing their living conditions in France, he ruled out their return to Algeria, stating that "Algeria is not their country"¹³. The law of 1974 secured the status of war veterans for the Harkis living in the French Republic. Ten years later, 15,000 ex-Harki families were paid 110,000 francs each as a one-off compensation¹⁴.

In the summer of 1975 there were uprisings among the inhabitants of the Bia and Saint-Maurice-l'Ardoise camps, as well as in several logging villages. The authorities took action: the activists were resettled in other camps for Harkis. However, the dispersal policy did not help. Eventually, in August 2003, the government declared Harkis Remembrance Day on September 25th. On that day, President Jacques Chirac acknowledged that in 1962 "there were massacres committed in Algeria, which

affected both the military and civilians, women and children, and which will forever leave the mark of barbarism. They must be recognized.”¹⁵ Since then, on September 25, France pays tribute to the role played by the Harkis during the Algerian War. During the reign of President Chirac, a memorial plaque in honor of Harkis was opened in the Hall of Honor of the House of Invalids. A similar memorial plaque was installed in 27 French prefectures. Another step towards meeting the rights of the Harkis was taken in 2005 when the Harkis Benefit Act was passed.¹⁶ The Law of 23.02. 2005 set out conditions for compensation to the Harkis in gratitude for their service and recognition of their suffering. However, Harki public organizations did not agree with some of the wording of the law. Nicolas Sarkozy, the 23rd President of France, went to the Rivesaltes camp in April 2012 (a month before the end of his presidential term), where since 1962 several thousand Harkis have lived. To his credit, he was the first president to visit a Harkis’ camp. His rival François Hollande, who also fought for the presidency, solemnly promised in one of his election speeches to recognize (if he would be elected) France’s responsibility for the fate of the Harkis.¹⁷

F. Hollande fulfilled his promise on September 25, 2016, by recognizing the responsibility of the French governments for this sad episode in the national history. He stated abandoning Harkis by the French governments, the result of which was a massacre of those who remained in Algeria, and those who managed to move to France found themselves in inhuman conditions.¹⁸

At the end of September 2018, the Secretary of State under the French Minister of War J. Darriès announced the allocation of 40 million euros as material assistance to the Harkis and their descendants for the next four years. E. Macron, in turn, ordered to award more than twenty veterans of the Harkis with the Order of the Legion of Honor.

However, the social status of Harkis, unemployment, low level of education contributed to the fact that this category of the

French population remained at the very bottom of the social ladder. The increased self-awareness of the new generations of Harkis, already born in France, strengthened the solidarity of the Harkis living in different localities. This led to the creation of organizations that primarily sought to prove the role of their ancestors in the history of France.

All researchers of this situation note that the morbidity of this problem is fed by the hostility that exists between the Harkis and Algerian immigrants. The conflict between the Harqis and the Algerians is passed on to the next generations. In Algeria, the problem of Harkis is also not forgotten. President Bouteflika (09/2/2005) recognized the practice of killing the relatives of those Harkis who served the French as a mistake. Somewhat earlier (06/16/2000), during an official visit to France, Bouteflika stated that the people of Algeria were “not yet ready” to accept the return of the Harqis to Algeria.¹⁹ In 2012, the Algerian newspaper *El Watan* published the results of a survey, according to which more than 84% of Algerians supported the point of view that “it is impossible to forgive the Harkis...”.

In an open letter published on 07/04/2021, Republican MP Julien Aubert and 32 other MPs called on Emmanuel Macron to “make a decisive gesture of gratitude to the descendants of those who gave their lives or dedicated themselves to France” and pay the Harkis and their descendants special compensation in addition to the already existing allowance. In response, Macron promised to introduce a bill recognizing the responsibility of the state to the Harkis and providing for “damage” for the fate which they have suffered for decades.

Sixty years after the end of the Algerian War of Independence, on March 23, 2022, the French Senate approved a bill (No. 2022-229) that formally apologized to the Algerian Harki soldiers who fought on behalf of the French colonial army. This paves the way for compensation for thousands of family members and descendants²⁰ who were forced to live in appalling conditions upon their arrival in France. This decision was the

culmination of measures taken by President Emmanuel Macron, who asked of the Harkis for forgiveness at a ceremony on September 20, 2021: “France has not paid its debt to the Harkis, their wives, their children after the war,” he said, adding that ... the Harkis gave their strength, shed their blood for France.²¹

Notes

1. Macron announced the law on “recognition and reparation” for veterans of the Algerian war. 09.20.2021 // https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/12457715?utm_source=yandex.ru&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=yandex.ru&utm_referrer=yandex.ru .
2. Moslem piracy in the Maghreb has existed since the occupation of the region by the Arabs in the 7th century, after the reconquista in the 16th century the ranks of Mediterranean pirates were replenished by Moslems expelled from the Iberian Peninsula.
3. Hussein III, (c. 1765–1838) – the last Algerian day (ruler for life).
4. *Knyazev S.* “Economically profitable enterprise”: how France occupied Algeria. 06/14/2020 // <https://russian.rt.com/science/article/754465-190-let-okkupaciya-alzhir>.
5. Qui sont les harkis? // <https://orientxxi.info/va-comprendre/qui-sont-les-harkis,5546>.
6. The famous French footballer of Kabyle origin, Zineddine Zidane, who was repeatedly called this word by his enemies, always explained that his parents moved to France back in 1952, i.e. before Algeria gained independence.
7. The names of the various types of troops of that period: arrows, light cavalry, etc.
8. Algerian War of Independence // https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War_of_Independence.
9. *Giscard d'Estaing V.* The French. Reflections on the fate of the people. M., “Ladimir”, 2004. P. 24.
10. Why was the Crémieux decree (granting Jews living in French Algeria the French citizenship) voted? // <https://www.quora.com/Why-was-the-Crémieux-decree-granting-Jews-living-in-French-Algeria-the-French-citizenship-voted-Why-did-it-not-include-the-other-indigenous-communities>.
11. Les harkis qui etaient ils? // <https://histoirecoloniale.net/les-harkis-qui-etaient-ils.html>.
12. The exact number of executed Harki in Algeria does not exist. According to some estimates, as a result of violent repression at the hands of the Algerians

themselves, who sought to avenge their relatives, from 75,000 to 150,000 people died.

13. Bouteflika: l'Algérie a été injuste avec les familles des harkis // <https://histoirecoloniale.net/Bouteflika-l-Algerie-a-ete-injuste.html>.
14. Macron announced a law on "recognition and reparation" for veterans of the Algerian war 09/20/2021 // https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/12457715?utm_source=yandex.ru&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=yandex.ru&utm_referrer=yandex.ru
15. Harki, those forgotten soldiers of France whose integration was difficult - // <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/09/25/01016-20160925ARTFIG00156-les-harkis-ces-soldats-oublies-de-la-france-dont-l-integration-a-ete-difficile.php>
16. Harki, those forgotten soldiers of France whose integration was difficult - // <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/09/25/01016-20160925ARTFIG00156-les-harkis-ces-soldats-oublies-de-la-france-dont-l-integration-a-ete-difficile.php>
17. Harki, those forgotten soldiers of France whose integration was difficult - // <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/09/25/01016-20160925ARTFIG00156-les-harkis-ces-soldats-oublies-de-la-france-dont-l-integration-a-ete-difficile.php>
18. François Hollande reconnaît "l'abandon des harkis" par la France. 09/25/2016 // <https://www.marianne.net/societe/francois-hollande-reconnait-l-abandon-des-harkis-par-la-france>.
19. Bouteflika répond à Chirac le Parisien.fr, 18.07.2000.
20. The law specifically stipulates the rights of women who accompanied their husbands to emigration. Widows are entitled to survivor benefits, including those who have settled in an EU country.
21. Le Sénat français officialise ses excuses aux harkis algériens et à leurs familles. 16.02.2022 // <https://www.dutcheastindiacompany.in/le-senat-francais-officialise-ses-excuses-aux-harkis-algeriens-et-a-leurs-families/>

SWETLANA POGORELSKAYA. GERMANY. INSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES OF INTEGRATION OF ISLAM ON THE EXAMPLE OF
THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF GERMANY

*Keywords: Federal Republic of
Germany; Islam; integration; Islamic
Conference of Germany.*

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*Abstract. The integration of Islam and its bearers into the system
of social relations of a country that has never had an indigenous
Moslem population is a complex, multilateral process that includes
institutional, political, legal, cultural and social aspects. In this article,
attention will be paid exclusively to the formal side of the issue, i.e. the
institutions of integration, the main of which is the Islamic Conference
of Germany under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Germany.*

More than ten years ago, the German Federal President (at
that time he was Christian Wulff, CDU), reflecting on the
“Christian-Jewish history of Germany”, mentioned along the
way that Islam in Germany had already become German Islam,
became part of the country, belongs to it¹. The controversial
phrase, which caused a lot of criticism, sounded like a statement
of fact, but in fact it did not express it at all. It was rather a

slogan that outlined the ambitious goal of Angela Merkel's government, starting from her coming to power: to overcome the shortcomings in the relationship between the state and mass, "immigrant" Islam, admitted by all previous German governments and led to the fact that the religion professed by a significant part of the population functioned practically without any significant contact with the institutions of the German state, but in close connection with the religious (and sometimes state) institutions of those countries from where the bearers of Islam and its preachers arrived in Germany.

After almost half a century of history, during which German politics stubbornly turned a blind eye to the growth of the Moslem diaspora, convincing itself and German citizens that Islam for the most part is the religion of migrants, refugees, guest workers, i.e. temporary contingents of the population that did not need integration, the authorities decided to bring Islam, as far as possible, into the same administrative relationship with the institutions of the German state, in which there are also other large confessions represented in it. In Germany, the relationship between the state and the confessions represented in it is regulated at the level of official treaties. The so-called concordats (treaties with the Vatican) are concluded with the Catholic Church, Protestant churches and other large religious communities recognized by the state enter into agreements directly with the state. Relations with churches and religious communities are the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.² The condition of such agreements is the status of a denomination precisely as a "recognized religious community", which gives its organizations the right to receive the status of "subjects of public law"³. Islam has never been a "recognized religious community" and for a long time did not even claim this status.

The integration of Islam and its bearers into a country that previously did not have a native Moslem population is a multifaceted task, it includes institutional, political, legal,

cultural and social aspects. In this short article, attention will be paid exclusively to the formal side of the issue, i.e. integration institutions, the main of which is the Islamic Conference of Germany (IC) under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Germany⁴.

A Few Words about the Current State of the Moslem Diaspora

Islam began to turn into a religion practiced by a significant part of the population only during the recovery of the West German economy in the 50–60s of the 20th century and its heyday during the “economic miracle”, when Germany received significant contingents of Turkish guest workers, mainly from rural, conservative and religious Anatolia.

Before the Second World War, there were only about three thousand Moslems in the country, mainly from the well-to-do strata. Now there are more than five million of them (the total population of the country is 82 million), 38% of Moslems with migration roots from Islamic countries have German citizenship (previously it was 45%, but their share decreased during the mass entry of new migrants from the Arab space into the country in 2014–2015).⁵ More than half of Moslems are thus foreign nationals, and the issue of their integration is closely linked to their religion.⁶

About 63% of Moslems are Turks, and most of them are progeny of guest workers loyal to Turkey. Refugees of the Moslem faith arrived in the country mainly from Arab countries, from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Kosovo. During the migration crisis of 2015, the proportion of Syrians increased. Accordingly, Turkish Sunnis prevailed in the directions of Islam in the country, they were followed by Shiites (Alevis, Iranian Imamis, Turkish Shiites, Ishmaelites), Sufi groups. Geographically, the diaspora is concentrated in large industrial cities of the former “West Germany”.

To protect its interests, the diaspora created an extensive structure of unions and associations. However, it did not have a single parent organization: Moslems of various denominations did not see the possibility of uniting even in the interests of interaction with the state, which would bring them a solution to many issues of daily religious life.

In the 80s, two Councils were created and each claimed to be the head. The Islamic Council of Germany united 37 predominantly Turkish-Sunni organizations, and the Central Council of Moslems of Germany united 21 organizations, mostly Arab and multi-ethnic. The Coordinating Council established in 2007 tried to establish itself over them, however in fact, influential unions preferred to interact with the state without intermediaries.

The number of active members of the unions is about 20%, however, a Moslem does not need to formally be a member of the organization, it is enough to sympathize with it.

The Germans, like other European states, began revising their positions in relation to Islam after the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001; however, it was taken up "in earnest" with the coming to power of Angela Merkel in 2005. It became obvious that the uncertain legal status of Islam had long been in conflict with its real domestic political power.

It should be noted that in Germany by that time the so-called "liberal" Islam was also represented, open to Western values and believing that Islam as a religion, in its main directions, could well get along with them and is able to function in democracy and with democracy. However, it is represented mainly by intellectuals, often liberal Islamic scholars from Moslem countries, who are in Germany due to persecution in their countries, a considerable part of them are politically close to the German Greens.⁷ The number of its supporters was negligible compared to the mass of the people, which was "herded" by the imams sent from Turkey and from the Arab countries. Liberal intellectuals had no influence among Moslems living in Germany. In the country, mainly due to migration

processes, the proportion of traditional, and sometimes radical Moslems, grew more and more, but their religion was not linked to the system of legal, social and cultural relationships to the extent that Christianity or Judaism were integrated into it. The reason was only partly in the organizational features of Islam, excluding integration into centralized structures of hierarchical subordination, but to a large extent also in the state, which did not burden itself with attempts to systematically interact with this denomination.

The so-called. "parallel societies" began to take shape back in the days of guest workers, as families and kinship arrived to them, began to intensify as the country received Moslem refugees, however, at the beginning of the new millennium, these "societies" tried to legally arrange their lives in Germany with the maximum of their religious conveniences (for example, lawsuits by Moslem teachers to allow the wearing of the hijab, lawsuits by Turkish parents against schools regarding the exemption of girls from physical education classes and overnight trips, etc.). Islam, in all its confessional diversity, became socially offensive and began to pose a threat to social stability, making it clear that without being integrated into the system of state relations, it integrates them for itself, for example, in matters of the effectiveness of Sharia.

Realizing that "Islam belongs to Germany", and the country is responsible to the German population for those whom it brought to itself, but did not integrate, German politics wondered how to regulate relations with this religion. The main task for the "state of political parties", as the German democracy officially calls itself, was to develop a single, supra-party strategy in relations with the Islamic community of Germany, represented in associations and unions.

The way out was found in the creation of an institution of constant interaction and dialogue between the state and Islam. In it, on one side were represented: the federation (represented by the Minister of the Home Affairs and the resource headed by

him), as well as lands and communes, and on the other, influential and massive Islamic unions. Participation in this institution was seen at the same time as an encouragement for these unions, a reward for moderation and recognition of their right to represent the Moslem population in its relations with the state.

The initiative to create an institution called the German Islamic Conference belonged to the experienced Christian Democratic politician Wolfgang Schaeuble, who received the post of Minister of the Interior. It started working in 2006.

For the reasons of political correctness, the state invited to participate not only the strongest, the so-called. "head associations", like the Turkish DITIB, which indeed brought with them a lot of unresolved problems, but also liberal organizations and even individual intellectuals of Moslem origin living in Germany, who are persons of public life, as a rule, secular-minded and quite critical of Islam. Thus, the state wanted to emphasize: for it, Islam in Germany is not limited to conservative religious associations and, from the point of view of the state, liberal European Islam and secular Islamic intellectuals are as much a part of the Islamic life of Germany as the organizations of immigrant German Islam.

In the early years of its work, the Islamic Conference of Germany functioned as a permanent working forum, whose tasks included the identification of loyal Moslem organizations with a view to further integration, as well as the political and social marginalization of radical trends of Islam. The Islamic Conference of Germany is a tool for the integration of Islam, capable of integration. Organizations that gravitate towards radicalism did not participate in it, members of their communities were deprived of the advantages that unions cooperating with the state had.

The second task was to identify and search for solutions to such problems relevant to the Moslem diaspora, which could not be solved without the state (for example, teaching Moslem schoolchildren "Islam" within the framework of the school

subject "religion"). It was assumed that the permanent and loyal participants of the Islamic Conference would eventually be able to obtain the status of a "subject of public law", which would give these Moslem associations the opportunities provided by church law.⁸

The conference was held in rounds, in thematic circles, both on general issues (secularization, gender issues) and on special ones, such as teaching Islam in schools, training imams in Germany or building mosques.

Unfortunately, time has shown a significant disadvantage of this institution, associated with the peculiarities of the political culture of Germany as a state of political parties. The course of the Islamic Conference, the nature of the topics discussed showed a strong dependence on the positions of the changing interior ministers, and consequently on the political parties in power. Thus, Thomas de Maiziere (CDU), who replaced the initiator of the Islamic Conference Schaeuble in his post, turned the fight against terrorism into one of the main topics of the negotiations, which led to the withdrawal of some influential Moslem associations from the conference. All subsequent years, the work of the conference, and the very fact of its existence, despite the declared supra-party nature of this institution, was instrumentalized by political parties. As a result, German politics has so far failed to develop a unified concept of the relationship between the state and Islam, free from inter-party competition.

Nevertheless, conceptually, the Conference is perhaps the only option for integrating immigrant Islam in a democratic country with such a variety of its directions as Germany. Currently, the unions represented in it have already managed to coordinate, for example, the teaching of Islam in schools or the training of Moslem preachers in Germany. Ten German universities have already introduced the subject of "Islamic theology" at theological faculties, which trains teachers for school classes. These classes have already been introduced in federal lands with a large proportion of the Moslem population,

about 600,000 schoolchildren are already taking part in them in more than 900 schools.⁹ At the last rounds of the conference, it was possible to agree even partial participation of the state in salaries for German imams.¹⁰

There is a Special Islamic College in Osnabrück

It is difficult to underestimate this achievement. Previously, Moslem children studied Islam in schools of the Quran at mosques belonging to the relevant Moslem organizations, from preachers sent to them from the respective countries. The mosques of the Turkish "DITIB" (a powerful union of Turkish Sunnis loyal to Turkey), for example, focused on supporting the ties of former compatriots with Turkey, sometimes outspoken Islamists preached in the mosques of other unions, which led to the radicalization of Moslem youth.

Therefore, the work with Moslem youth is now being carried out by the state. In the course of its work, the Islamic Conference has created a youth branch, a Young Islamic Conference, which is held on the eve of the annual forums of the Islamic Conference.

The Islamic Conference is the brainchild of the "Merkel era", which lasted 16 years. After Angela Merkel left the chancellorship and the coalition of the SPD, Greens and Liberals came to power, there were concerns about the further activities of this institution. Indeed, in previous years, it was the Greens who were the main critics of the conference, expressing dissatisfaction with the insufficient, in their opinion, number of free critical intellectuals represented there, ethnically coming from Islamic countries. In addition, more recently, a prominent Green politician, the head of the Baden-Württemberg land government, Winfried Kretschmann, caused negative reactions from Moslem intellectuals and politicians (not to mention organizations and unions), saying that "Islam in Germany is not integrated enough", should be reformed and demanding that

Moslems of Baden-Württemberg if they have German citizenship, consider Kretschmann as their representative, and not Islamic organizations and unions.¹¹

However, in May 2022, the situation became clearer. The new Minister of Internal Affairs, Nancy Feather, during the Conference, speaking to representatives of more than 40 participating Moslem parent organizations, confirmed the continuation of the work of this institute.¹² She proposed three thematic complexes on which work will be carried out: "Support for public cooperation", "Prevention of organized conflicts" and "Strengthening the structures of Moslem self-organization". If critical voices were still frequent at the initial stages of the IC, according to which this institution is unsuitable for one or other parameters and should be abolished, then over the past years too significant results have been achieved through it to abandon it. Islam in Germany remains in the phase of active integration, and the IC will remain the main institution of this process. The German state continues the course it has taken: to integrate the loyal, to isolate the non-integrated. Special emphasis, as practice has shown, will continue to be placed on the "Germanization" (but not on the liberalization)¹³ of immigrant Islam, so that it is taught to Moslem schoolchildren by teachers educated at German universities.

Notes

1. Wulf Ch. "Der Islam gehört zu Deutschland". - Handelsblatt 3.10.2010, S. 3 - Mode of access: <https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/wulf-rede-im-wortlaut-der-islam-gehört-zu-deutschland-seite-3/3553232-3.html>
2. For example, the Christian Church takes part in public life, expresses its position on important issues of state policy, Easter and Christmas are days off, in federal lands with a predominance of Catholics or Protestants, their holidays are also days off. The state collects a church tax (about 9%) from citizens, and the churches pay the state for this procedure. In all federal lands, except for Berlin and Bremen, the subject of "religion" is included in the school curriculum, schoolchildren study it according to the confession they profess. In universities, in the departments of theology, the churches

have a decisive say in the appointment of professorships. The state treaty at the level of the Bundeschancellor, on the one hand, and the Central Council of Jews, on the other, has also been concluded with Judaism.

3. Some religious communities are recognized only at the level of the federal lands and there they conclude agreements with the state authorities. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses sued the federal lands for this status.
4. Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK). – Mode of access: <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/>
5. Muslime mit Migrationshintergrund nach Herkunftsregion und Staatsangehörigkeit- Mode of access: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1232542/umfrage/muslime-mit-migrationshintergrund-nach-herkunftsregion-und-staatsangehoerigkeit/>
6. See: BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) – Integration. Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland 2020 – Mode of access: <https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/ProjekteReportagen/DE/Forschung/Integration/muslimisches-leben-deutschland-2020.html?nn=283560>
7. Liberal Islam in Germany has been organized into several unions, and since 2017 has its own mosque in Berlin, the Ibn-Rushd-Goethe Mosque.
8. The Ahmadis (Ahmadiyya Moslem Jamaat) were the first to receive such a status in 2013 at the land level and the level equivalent to it (the land of Hesse and the Hanseatic city of Hamburg). The Islamic Conference is an instrument for the integration of integrable Islam. The same Islamic organizations operating in Germany, which gravitate towards “universality” and towards radicalism, are supposed to be infringed on the legal paths, and if this is not possible, then to isolate them politically and neutralize socially, excluding them from cooperation and thereby depriving the members of these organizations of those conveniences possessed by unions cooperating with the state.
9. Islamischer Religionsunterricht (IRU) in Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von Religion, Bildung, Politik und Gesellschaft- SpringerLink – Accessed date : <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41682-022-00120-5#refCR24>
10. Der Staat könnte Imame bezahlen - Herder Korrespondenz Hefte Heftarchiv 2022 Heft 4/2022, S. 25.
11. *Kretschmann W.* Der Islam ist nicht wirklich integriert in Deutschland – SWR Aktuell, 2022. – Mode of access: <https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/baden-wuerttemberg/was-tut-deutschland-fuer-die-integration-von-muslimen-100.html>
12. Innenministerin Nancy Faeser will Islamkonferenz weiterentwickeln. – Herder Korrespondenz, 6/2022 S. 36. – Mode of access: <https://www.herder.de/hk/hefte/archiv/2022/6-2022/innenministerin-nancy-faeser-will-islamkonferenz-weiterentwickeln-muslime-in-deutschland/>

13. The state does not plan to influence Islam in terms of its substantive liberalization. Liberal Islam exists by its own community, which has little overlap with traditional Muslims, and its activities, being the pride of the authorities (Berlin announced that it is proud of the Ibn-Rushd-Goethe mosque), are more than controversial for the mass of Muslims living in Germany. For example, in July 2022, on the eve of the LGBT Christopher Day in Berlin, this mosque flew a pride rainbow flag under the slogan "Love is Halal", which caused criticism from a number of Islamic associations. -- See: Month P. Berlin: Erste Moschee Deutschlands hisst Regenbogenflagge. - Berliner Zeitung. Mode of access: <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/pride-month-berlin-erste-deutsche-moschee-hisst-regenbogenflagge-li.243843>

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2. Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK). - Mode of access: <http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/>
3. Innenministerin Nancy Faeser will Islamkonferenz weiterentwickeln. - Herder Korrespondenz, 6/2022 S.36. - Mode of access: <https://www.herder.de/hk/hefte/archiv/2022/6-2022/innenministerin-nancy-faeser-will-islamkonferenz-weiterentwickeln-muslime-in-deutschland/>
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daten/studie/1232542/umfrage/muslime-mit-migrationshintergrund-nach-herkunftsregion-und-staatsangehoerigkeit/

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9. Red.: Der Staat könnte Imame bezahlen. - Herder Korrespondenz Hefte Heftarchiv 2022 Heft 4/2022, S. 25.
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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

OLGA NOVIKOVA. MIGRATION AND TERRORISM: DYNAMIC
INTERACTION

*Keywords: migration; terrorism;
migration policies; refugees; human rights.*

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Abstract. The paper addresses the issue of the migration-terrorism intersection. Research indicates that immigration does not unconditionally promote terrorism in European countries but the article also draws our attention to the problem of radicalisation of immigrants in receiving countries. At the same time, it is reported that the fear over immigrants made them targets of terrorist attacks by far-right natives. It is specially noted that the ‘securitization’ of migration is potentially counterproductive. It is stressed that a balanced approach to migration and counterterrorism migration policies is needed.

The problem of mutual real or imaginary determinism of migration and terrorism in the 21st century has led to the formation of polemical knots in public discourse and scientific literature. The simple scheme of accusing migrants of terrorism, which exists in the public mind, has been subjected to careful analysis. The inconsistency of reducing complex things to a primitive has been proven. The problem of the connection between the phenomenon of migration and the phenomenon of terrorism began to be detailed and acquired a qualitatively new content. The migration crisis of 2015–2019 gave a new impetus to the study of this issue, and the problem has not lost its relevance today.

When various types of disasters occur, people react differently depending on whether the disaster is man-made or natural. If natural disasters occur that are not controlled in principle, and where there can be no culprits – earthquakes, floods, droughts – the society is mobilized, examples of mutual assistance are of a massive nature, despite social, national and religious barriers. When a man-made disaster occurs, the reaction of the community is different. People wonder why this happened and who is to blame, they are haunted by a sense of anxiety and danger. Fear does not go away for a very long time, vigilance grows, suspicion develops, a desire appears to find the guilty from among members of the community who are not similar to themselves, tension between groups of the population grows. In the context of the growing number of refugees and the presence of large ethnic diasporas, terrorist attacks in European cities resulted in the securitization of the problem of migrants.

Labor Migrants and Terrorism: Is the Danger Real?

Consider a group of labor migrants who come to their destination country not because of political violence, wars, or general instability in their home country, but because they want to achieve a higher income and standard of living. The number

of Moslem economic immigrants who came to Europe to work or study from 2010 to 2016 was 2.5 million [Hackett C.]. Very often these are skilled workers from developing countries or unskilled home service workers. As for the immigration of highly qualified specialists, their arrival not only does not contribute to the growth of the terrorist threat, but with a high degree of probability reduces it, since this group of immigrants is more likely to integrate into the societies of the destination country, thus they have less motivation to resort to violent actions. This position finds its confirmation when we study the difference between the American and European models of the original immigration policy. The US policy was aimed at accepting immigrants with a high level of education or students, while Europe mainly accepted immigrants who took the places of low-skilled workers [Bandyopadhyay S., Sandler T., p. 122]. At the same time, the ideological motives for protecting one's religious and cultural identity persist, so we observed that there are well-educated people among the members of Islamist terrorist organizations. There is another reason that some highly qualified specialists join terrorist organizations: they, as immigrants, do not always receive remuneration (or promotion) in the host country, corresponding to their level of education and skills. Such immigrants consider this discrimination.

The wealthy host states of Europe see migration as a tool to accelerate their economic development, i.e. their immigration policy is economically oriented. It also takes into account the low birth rate of the indigenous population, the lack of jobs in the low-wage service sector, and the high energy of incoming newcomers. But this is at the state level of assessing the benefits that a policy that encourages immigration provides. The question arises, and as for the local population, can labor immigrants annoy them, for example, because of competition in the labor market? After all, any migrants arriving in the country of destination create a serious burden on the social sphere, this somewhat changes the ethnic balance and intensifies

competition. However, studies have shown that, while contributing to an increase in labor productivity, immigration does not have a negative impact on the level of employment [Peri G.], and the impact of migrants on the level of wages within the country is extremely insignificant [Hijzen A., Wright P.]. Therefore, residents of European cities are afraid not so much of increased competition in the labor market and rising unemployment as the threat of terrorism.

More Migrants, more Danger?

In this regard, it is necessary to understand whether the increase in terrorist activity is really associated with migration, and if so, what kind of connection this is.

First, it would be necessary to determine whether there is a relationship between the number of migrants living in different countries and the number of terrorist attacks in these states. Such a study was conducted by German scientists and published in 2020. After collecting and analyzing data for thirty years - from 1980 to 2010 in 20 host countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and in 183 countries of origin, the researchers found that more migrants corresponds to more terrorist attacks. But at the same time, it was found that with an increase in the number of migrants, attacks carried out by both migrants and representatives of the indigenous population, directed against migrants, became more frequent, moreover, in comparable quantities. Thus, a cyclic interdependence of terror is formed. The study refutes allegations that terrorism appears in developed countries along with immigrants from countries with a Moslem majority or from those states where terrorist organizations operate. The authors of this work provided evidence that the increase in the number of terrorist attacks is due to an increase in the number of immigrants and does not depend on the country of origin [Dreher A., Gassebner M., Schaudt P., p. 1737].

Forced Migrants and the Threat of Terrorism

Since the fear of the indigenous population is caused not so much by labor migrants as by forced ones, we will dwell on them in more detail. At the end of 2020, there were 82.4 million forcibly displaced people worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations, or events that seriously disrupt public order. 48.0 million internally displaced persons (source: IDMC). 26.4 million people are refugees. 4.1 million people are asylum seekers [UNHCR]. It was the forcibly displaced persons who found themselves at the center of discussions about the connection between migration processes and terrorism.

The topic of suspicion of refugees in terrorism began to be widely discussed after the events of September 11 in the United States, although not one of the 19 terrorists was a refugee [Zard M.]. During the migration crisis of 2014–2019, a whole series of terrorist attacks occurred in Europe. Public opinion in European countries unequivocally linked this not only with the activities of Moslem terrorist organizations or “lone wolves” radicalized under the influence of Islamist ideology, but also with migrants from Moslem countries in general. The majority of respondents in eight of the ten European countries where the research was conducted believed that the influx of refugees increased the risk of terrorism in their homeland [Wike R., Stokes B., Simmons K.]. A particularly negative attitude towards immigrants in general and towards refugees in particular is observed in homogeneous societies with a small number of immigrants [Nussio E., Bove V., Steele B.].

The danger associated with the flow of refugees from the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq was also mentioned in works devoted to national security. There were suspicions that foreign terrorist fighters, mixed with refugees, would infiltrate the West [Changes in Modus ...]. It was feared that terrorist organizations such as ISIS would send their fighters to Western countries and

they would try to request the status of political asylum seekers. ISIS activity has been observed in refugee camps in Syria. Insufficient development and analysis of the activities of Syrian extremists compared to Iraqi and Afghan ones was noted [Jones. S.G., p. 5]. This vision of threats, shared by both American and European security agencies, has led to tougher legislative decisions in target states.

In the case of foreign terrorist fighters, who are by definition migrants, in 2015 EU law enforcement agencies noted only isolated cases of foreign terrorist fighters from the Middle East and North Africa returning via refugee routes. True, two of the suspects in the November 13, 2016 attacks in Paris entered the EU as illegal migrants [Migrant smuggling ..., p.12]. It would seem that these are isolated cases, but terrorist attacks in European capitals - Paris, Brussels and Berlin - contributed to the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment. Most of the criminals were born in Europe, but being Moslems, they were always perceived by the natives as outsiders. The rejection of the Euro-Moslem Ummah, alienation, its non-integration into the social fabric of European societies, along with other factors, contribute to its radicalization. However, European fears about the "Islamization of Europe" due to the influx of refugees seem unfounded. Even if all 5 million Syrian refugees came to Europe, this would increase the Moslem population of Europe by 1 percent, since it was 4%, and it would become 5%. Of the five million refugees from Syria, only 350,000 tried to get to Europe. Moreover, Turkey received 2.7 million people, Lebanon - 1.5 million Syrians, 1.3 million are in Jordan. Thus, the Middle Eastern states accepted 95% of Syrian refugees [Zunes S.]. After the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan received 780,000 and 1.5 million Afghan refugees, respectively [Mehra T.L.L.M., Wentworth M.]. And the United States, according to information from the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security, evacuated 65,000 Afghans [Afghan Refugees...].

But in general, it is no secret that the vast majority of refugees (86%) are taken in by developing countries and not by prosperous Western democracies [Figures at a glance ...]. Developing countries are less able to cope with all the problems associated with the flow of refugees, most often from neighboring countries. Their influx can cause tension within the host countries, while sharply limiting the avalanche of refugees can provoke an escalation of conflict and an increase in the terrorist threat in the country of origin, since the cornered person is known to either flee or resort to violence. European countries, having significant economic potential, have generally been able to establish a system for providing proper services to refugees. What is now clear is the need to direct significant funds to help developing country host states to increase their capacity and resilience. At the same time, sometimes states, even having certain resources, are not willing to spend them. Thus, the full capacity of the state implies a combination of the resources that are at the disposal of the state, with the desire to provide them. However, prosperous countries do not always express their readiness to show solidarity. Within the framework of the UN, documents were adopted that justified the refusal to grant refugee status to asylum seekers on the basis that they could have links with terrorists in other states. Moreover, these connections could be very distant or not proven at all [Zard M.]. In addition, it is known that the terrorist threat, as a rule, comes not from the refugees who have just arrived, but from the descendants of immigrants who were born in Europe and radicalized there.

Radicalization of Migrants

To reiterate, migrants going to Europe are only rarely radicalized (with the exception of foreign terrorist fighters who have been previously indoctrinated when returning to Europe from war zones). For the most part, migrants are radicalized

upon arrival in Europe, and even then not in the first generation, because first generation migrants are less prone to violence than second and third generation migrants. The fact is that first-generation migrants and refugees came to European countries, dreaming of a better life, believing in a wonderful future. They still remembered the hardships they had endured in their homeland. In addition, migrants faced great difficulties in finding work and settling in a new place. It took all the time and effort. Trying to identify the reasons for the radicalization of second and third generation migrants, some researchers suggested that they are people with a more distant cultural past, with an unstable cultural identity and therefore marginalized, which makes them vulnerable, susceptible to radicalization, and facilitates their recruitment into terrorist organizations [Lyons-Padilla S., Gelfand M.J.,...]. One can accept this argument, but it is far from exhaustive. Many migrants of the second and third generation, living in the West, began to realize rejection from the indigenous population, the impossibility for themselves to accept Western values and way of life, moreover, they were imbued with sympathy for their brethren suffering from “the modern crusades in the Middle East”, sharing their religious and cultural identity.

Thinking about the origins of forced migration in the last decade, one can state that one of the main reasons is the conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, provoked by the interventions of Western countries, and the protest movements of the Arab Spring, short-sightedly supported by them. Supporters of terrorist organizations, in particular, Al-Qaeda, believe that the participation of European countries in interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the arrests of Islamists in Europe violated the terms of the security agreement between Europeans and Moslem immigrants [Nesser P.]. The passionarity of European Moslems – the growth of political self-consciousness and self-identification of a part of Moslems in the countries of the developing world – a phenomenon that was natural in itself, had

a negative side – it took on a power character. Thus, the acute sense of shared identity – along with deprivation – are the most important reasons for the radicalization of European Moslems. In addition, the lack of deep cultural, economic and social integration of migrants has become apparent, not to mention assimilation, which involves the elimination of cultural identity, which migrants tend to resist. Nevertheless, among Western researchers, the belief prevails that it is precisely assimilation that can hinder the radicalization of migrants and prevent them from joining terrorist organizations [Böhmelt T., Bove V.]. At the same time, there is evidence that immigrants from countries where the culture is close to the population of the host countries integrate faster, and their assimilation is more likely [Ibid.]. The fairness of this provision is obvious, although one cannot help but recall that the principle of cultural diversity is strongly supported by the UN, there is even a “World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development”, which is celebrated on May 21. In addition, it has long been known that cultural diversity is the most important factor in shaping economic growth. However, we see that in the case of migrants moving to European countries, the cultural distance between migrants and the indigenous population erects barriers to social and economic interaction between communities, creates tension in society when the local population sees migration as a threat to their own identity. And at the same time, this cultural disunity contributes to the radicalization of some migrants, we repeat, mainly in the second and third generation.

As for refugees, their behavior and propensity to radicalize are largely determined by the reason for their flight from their homeland. If they are fleeing natural and ecological disasters, then a feeling of depression and helplessness prevails. If armed confrontation takes place in the homeland of refugees, in countries of origin, and they do not feel connected to either side of the conflict, such refugees are not prone to violence. If they are persecuted in their homeland because of their religious or ethnic

affiliation, as well as for political reasons, and if they flee from conflict zones where the armed forces of foreign countries have invaded, then there may be a desire for revenge. They may be internally prepared for violent action. But such self-radicalization of refugees rarely leads them directly to the execution of terrorist attacks. What is important is the narrow social environment with which they interact in a foreign land. Initially, these are refugee camps, where they often become radicalized, especially if the camps are located near the war zone and, moreover, are overcrowded. In such camps, criminal activity often takes place and conflict situations are created that are fraught with violent manifestations. Further, the refugees enter the diaspora, which takes on a special significance, since the current refugees see Europe not as a temporary refuge, but as a new permanent place of residence. If in refugee camps it is about meeting the basic needs of immigrants, then when considering their life in the diaspora, there are questions of ensuring equality and opportunities for integration.

The Role of Diasporas

In the conditions of marginalization of incoming migrants and Moslems already permanently living in Europe, their isolation and the formation of closed communities, peculiar forbidden zones, are taking place. However, it should be noted that only representatives of the authorities, and not ordinary non-Moslem townspeople, can meet hostile attitude towards themselves in these enclaves. Nevertheless, the existence of such zones increases the social distancing of Moslems from other citizens, exacerbates intercultural contradictions and makes diasporas vulnerable to the penetration of the ideology of terrorism.

The role of diasporas in the radicalization of migrants is widely discussed. It is no secret that terrorists often turn to their relatives, members of the diaspora, for help.

And those bound by a common ethical and / or religious affiliation cannot refuse to support them, at least in providing asylum, transferring money. However, the influence of diasporas on their members who are potential terrorists is ambivalent. There are a number of studies by Western authors who, such as J. Piazza from the University of Pennsylvania and G. LaFree from the University of Maryland, USA, agree that diasporas, taking part in terrorist movements, at the same time restrain the criminal actions of Islamists, persuading them to carry out attacks with fewer victims, apparently fearing a response from the authorities [Piazza J.A., LaFree G.]. This last provision does not correlate with the conclusions of the leading Russian researchers L. Fituni and A. Abramova about the growth of radicalism among the Eastern diasporas. Of undoubted interest, explaining this trend, is the statement of these two authors about the “relative (in comparison with other ethnic and religious groups) deterioration in the situation of the Moslem diasporas in the EU and their increasing social alienation” [Fituni L., Abramova I., p. 13]. We should not forget that the explosive growth in the number of migrants leads to a sharp increase in the size of diasporas, which, in conditions of discrimination, leads to the spread of protest moods.

A special case is the support of terrorist organizations by *transnational* ethnic diasporas. It contributes to the survival of terrorist organizations and gives them stability [Piazza J.A., p. 632]. There is even an opinion, supported by statistical data, that neither the geographical proximity to the armed conflict, nor its intensity, nor even the flow of refugees play such a role in the spread of violent actions as ties with ethnic groups in conflict zones [Buhaug H., Gleditsch K.S.]. In the context of the transcontinental expansion of terrorism, it is important to determine what kind of support, other than material, can be provided by transnational ethnic diasporas to terrorist organizations. Among the relatives of terrorists in foreign diasporas there are people who can lobby for policies that benefit terrorist movements, build relationships

with sympathetic organizations, and try to build public support for terrorist activities. However, it should be taken into account that “while about 56% of terrorist organizations associated with transnational diasporas received material support from relatives abroad, only 17% of organizations were associated with related diasporas that provided political support” [Piazza J.A., p. 627]. However, it must be taken into account that political support, contributing to the growth of sympathy for the ideas of the radicals, is capable of increasing material flows of assistance to terrorists. In addition, the contribution of transnational ethnic diasporas to increasing the viability of terrorist organizations objectively hinders the involvement of these structures in the peace process. An example is the transnational diaspora of Pashtun refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan (more than 2 million people). By supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, it helped stand up to strong-arm counterterrorism efforts and helped harden their negotiating position.

Victimization of Migrants and Tightening of Migration Legislation

Considering the problem of the connection between migrants and terrorism, it must be recognized that, while acting as a threat in the eyes of the European community, migrants at the same time often become victims of terrorist manifestations. The right-wing forces in Europe took an anti-immigrant stance, and their rhetoric was reflected in the formulation of the political programs of the right-wing parties, which laid the blame for the outbreak of violence on immigrants. At the same time, in just one year (from 2014 to 2015) in Germany, the number of crimes motivated by nationalistic, xenophobic beliefs, religious, cultural and ethnic intolerance increased by 117% [Implementation of Selected..., p. 13]. All these people are united by the idea that terrorism comes from immigrants. Anti-immigration sentiments

have spread in European society, which has led to a tightening of the states' migration policy.

When developing a more restrictive migration policy, legislators began to take into account the geographical proximity of countries that have become targets of terrorist manifestations. Caught under the pressure of public opinion, frightened by terrorist attacks in neighboring countries, the ruling elites prefer to restrict the rights of foreigners to a greater extent than the indigenous people – their voters. Often such policies are aimed at gaining support from right-wing voters. The leadership of almost every European country monitors changes in the immigration laws of neighboring countries, fearing to develop migration rules less stringent than neighboring states did, thus providing potential terrorists with more favorable conditions for exercising criminal activities in their countries.

What exactly is meant by tightening migration policy? First of all, these are restrictions. These restrictions can be, for example, quantitative, which reduce the number of people receiving migration rights. There are restrictions on the composition when criteria are developed for the entry and stay of a certain category of migrants. There are procedural restrictions, when complicated procedures are provided for certain groups of migrants. Sometimes measures are developed that limit the freedom of choice for migrants. And, finally, measures are being introduced to increase the level of control over immigrants when crossing the border and within the country [Bove V., Böhmelt T., Nussio E., p. 197]. The tightening of migration policy also includes the creation of a situation where the immigration policy of the host country strictly determines the dependence of economic incentives for immigrants on the degree of their integration into the host society. And this can cause the reaction reverse to the desired, up to manifestations of extremism and even terrorism.

There is another classification of measures to restrict migration [See: Choi S-W.]. The first category of restrictions

includes *border regulations*, on the basis of which the decision to enter the country of destination is made. Host states reduce the entry of migrants from countries with a high level of terrorism, increase the time for checking documents, impose a ban on the entry of migrants of a certain nationality¹, introduce selection criteria based on qualifications or wealth, suggesting that one of the reasons for radicalization is a low standard of living and lack of education, and therefore rich and highly skilled people are less prone to terrorism. There may be restrictions on entry under the family reunification program.

Another category of restrictions is of the legal nature. It includes the deprivation of citizenship, the reduction of opportunities to own land, conduct business, and limit access to the social security system. All of these measures, designed to protect the country of destination from terrorism, may, on the contrary, increase the vulnerability of migrants to radicalization and provoke their recruitment by terrorist organizations.

The third category is *law enforcement* policy. The main tool for enforcement of immigration laws is deportation. At the same time, sanctions are imposed on employers for violating the rules for hiring immigrants, on carriers of illegal immigrants. There are border patrols, sometimes border barriers are built, which, however, often leads to a tense situation on the border and embitters the refugees². The migration policy of the state is designed to ensure control over those immigrants who can allegedly become terrorists. However, the restrictive immigration policy applies only to first generation immigrants and does not apply to second and third generations who were born in Western countries and have citizenship.

How does the tightening of migration and integration policies and the tightening of laws regarding residents born abroad affect the increase in terrorist activity in the host country? Contrary to the expectations of politicians in the Western world, the restriction of rights does not, as they hope, result in increased security. The repressive policy towards migrants living in the

country leads to the alienation of significant groups of the population, which does not reduce, but increases the risk of terrorist manifestations [Dreher A., Gassebner M., Schaudt P., p. 1739]. This means that a sharp tightening of migration policy can carry a certain threat to the national security of the state.

Restrictive immigration policies reflect changes in human rights practices in host states due to the perception of immigrants as a threat to national security. The security forces are charged with monitoring the inclusion of migrants in the social life of the host society and providing protection against right-wing violent manifestations. Anti-immigrant sentiments, widespread in European societies, are fraught with unrest. The application of restrictive measures against migrants, as well as their protection, place an additional burden on the security forces and the police, who, not fully coping with the additional workload, may resort to excessive use of force, which ultimately inevitably affects the situation of human rights in the state. As for the public, for the sake of safety it is ready to give up its rights and freedoms [Avdan N., Bsisu N., Murdie A.].

Conclusion

In modern Europe, there is a widespread belief that immigration contributes to the growth of terrorism in the host countries. The term "Trojan horse of terrorism" has appeared in the scientific literature and the media, which refers to immigrants who arrived in Europe from conflict zones. We are seeing the virulence of the idea of a terrorist threat posed by refugees. The highly developed states, which control 60 percent of the world's wealth, accepted only 15 percent of the refugees. This disregard for human rights and asylum principles is justified by references to national security. In essence, the migration policy of Western countries speaks of the gulf that has formed between the proclaimed liberal values and impotence in the field of their implementation in the context of growing

nationalism and the general swing of European society to the right. As a result, governments are allocating an ever-increasing amount of resources not only to tighten measures to limit migration³, following the mood of the indigenous population, who are worried about their real or imagined security, but also to combat far-right violent extremism directed against immigrants. It is difficult for any state to resolve issues related to the risks of terrorism that arise in reality and in the minds of its citizens in connection with the massive displacement of the population. However, it turned out that the interdependence of terrorism and migration is non-linear. In addition, it turned out that restrictive anti-immigration measures do not automatically lead to the prevention of terrorist attacks, and the closure of borders is fraught with humanitarian consequences.

Notes

1. President D. Trump has banned citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the country.
2. For example, the situation on the border between Belarus and Poland in autumn 2021.
3. Especially if immigrants are carriers of other cultural and religious traditions – Author's note

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RAZIL GUZAEROV. RUSSIA AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: YOUTH COOPERATION

Keywords: international youth cooperation; Russia; Islamic world; youth policy; Republic of Tatarstan.

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Abstract. International youth cooperation is beginning to play an increasingly important role in the process of promoting the country's image in the international arena. The youth policy of Russia has a long and difficult path of formation and is still at the stage of transformation. However, this fact did not prevent gaining good experience in youth cooperation with other countries. The Republic of Tatarstan plays an active role in this process, which has been building international youth cooperation with the countries of the Islamic world for a long time. The experience of the Republic should be extended to other regions of Russia for the uniform development of the country.

In the modern era, youth are beginning to play an increasing role in the development of the state, which requires a carefully developed state youth policy. One of the significant areas of youth policy is international cooperation. Active international youth cooperation is becoming a factor in increasing the competitiveness of states in the international arena, the stability of the state and the formation of high potentials. In Russia, special attention is paid to this aspect by some regions, whose positive experience in establishing international youth cooperation can be used as a guide for the development of this direction of youth policy.

Youth policy of Russia: Legislative and Institutional Framework

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began to search for a new format for conducting youth policy. Many options were proposed from preserving the Soviet system to giving youth complete freedom, or the need for systematic work in the field of youth policy was completely denied. During this time, more than 10 federal bodies responsible for youth policy were created. The constant transformation of approaches to state youth policy, the change of institutions led to a lack of continuity in the activities of these bodies.

Currently, the following bodies are responsible for youth policy:

- The Department of State Policy and Educational Activities of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia, which develops the state policy and legal framework in the field of youth policy, supports the development of youth public associations and the implementation of their initiatives, promotes international youth cooperation, etc.;

- The State Duma Committee on Youth Policy ensures the consideration of draft laws in the field of youth policy and prepares them for consideration in the State Duma, holds

parliamentary hearings, analyzes the practice of law enforcement. The introduction of the Committee includes issues of supporting youth initiatives, promoting social activities, supporting youth associations, promoting international cooperation, etc.;

- Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh) - federal executive body. Rosmolodezh provides public services in the field of youth policy. The agency's powers include the development and implementation of measures aimed at supporting talented youth, the development of civic activity of young people, and the protection of their social and legal interests. Rosmolodezh develops international youth cooperation, involves young people in international projects;

- An important role is also played by state authorities of the constituent entities of Russia, local self-government bodies, various associations, for example, the National Council of Youth and Children's Associations of Russia.

The legislative framework in the field of state youth policy is fragmentary and does not have a common conceptual framework. Activities in this area are regulated through "point" regulation on the basis of decrees of the President of Russia, resolutions of the Government. At the moment, the foundations of the youth policy of Russia are determined at the disposal of the Government of the Russian Federation "Basic Principles of the State Youth Policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025." The strategy is aimed at creating long-term goals for youth development, finding answers to challenges before youth development issues, determining the parameters for investing public money in youth projects, etc.

The main challenges for the implementation of youth policy are the following problems:

- reduction of the total number of young people in Russia;
- outflow of talented youth;
- high incidence of youth;
- growth of xenophobia, nationalism, marginalization of youth, etc.

The last point is especially important in the context of Islam and Russia's interaction with the Islamic world. A survey of the Public Opinion Foundation conducted in 2015 showed the following results:

- 9% of respondents associate Islam with terrorism, bandits, 7% as an alien religion, 5% with hostility;
- 26% of respondents would have reacted negatively to the fact of the adoption of Islam by close acquaintances (positively 16%);
- 18% refer negatively to Islam;
- and among 10% the attitude towards Islam has deteriorated over the past year;
- for 32%, Islam in Russia plays a negative role, and for 40% negative one on a global scale.

Even despite the large number of Russian citizens professing Islam, a negative attitude towards Islam remains in a part of society. There is a risk of Islamophobic sentiment rising. At the same time, fear of Islam is born in society due to banal stereotypes, which is manifested primarily in everyday Islamophobia. This fact seems to be one of the facts of limiting contacts with the Islamic world. From this point of view, the development of international youth activities in the direction of Russia - Islamic World is becoming important. The expansion of youth ties with the countries of the Islamic world not only allows foreigners to be introduced to the culture and existence of Russia, but also helps Russian youth to know this world. Such experience is necessary for the younger generation to build intercultural and inter-civilization dialogue in the future to establish harmonious relations with these countries.

Experience of the Republic of Tatarstan in Youth Cooperation with Islamic Countries

The Republic of Tatarstan has extensive experience in international youth cooperation. Tatarstan is one of the leading

regions of Russia, forming a unique synthesis of Islamic and Orthodox cultures. For a long time, the republic's authorities have been developing ties with the countries of the Muslim world. Cooperation takes place, among other things, in the youth sphere.

In 2006, on the initiative of E.M. Primakov and M.S. Shaimiev, the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group was created. As part of the meetings, the Group discusses a wide range of problems in the Middle East and the entire range of relations between Russia and the Islamic world.

Since 2018, under the auspices of the GSV, the International Summer School in the city of Bolgar has been organized annually. The goal of the school is the development of an international platform for the dialogue of civilizations, learning by foreign participants of the rich culture of Russia. During panel sessions, foreigners get acquainted with the Russian point of view on the development of the Muslim world and its interaction with Russia. Communication with peers from Russia allows them to understand Russia better, get rid of stereotypes. Traditionally, participants from Turkey, Iran, Syria, etc. arrive at the School.

In 2019, the All-Russian model of OIC was organized. The purpose of the event was to familiarize international students with the principles of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. During the work of the committee, the most significant issues for the organization were discussed, options for a solution were proposed and a general resolution was drawn up on the agenda.

Using this experience, in the same year, the First International Model of OIC - Eurasia was organized in Kazan. It was attended by more than 100 participants from Russia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Azerbaijan and other countries. They discussed topical issues on the international agenda, participated in the modeling of OIC meetings. In addition to developing certain diplomatic knowledge, skills, such models contribute to active intercultural dialogue. A common resolution is created during debates, discussions and participants get

acquainted with the views of representatives of other countries, broadening their horizons. In addition, young international students are working out the necessary competencies to work with the structures of the OIC, representatives of Muslim states. All these events include a cultural program, introducing foreigners to Russia.

The Kazan Forum of Young Entrepreneurs of the OIC countries, which has been held annually since 2014, has become traditional. The forum brings together developers from Russia and the OIC countries who are interested in investing in the implementation of their startups. During the forum, more than 1000 representatives from 50 countries took part in it, and the amount of investment amounted to \$2 million. Participants listen to lectures by startup executives, venture capitalists, technology firm executives. Later, they work together with mentors who help them work out their ideas. As a result of absentee participation, the authors of the best thirty startups come to Kazan, where they present their ideas to experts.

In 2020, the Project Office of International Youth Cooperation in the direction of "Russia - Organization of Islamic Cooperation" was created in Kazan. The agreement on the implementation of such a federal project was signed by the head of Rosmolodezh A. Bugaev and the head of the Ministry of Youth Affairs of the Republic of Tatarstan D. Fattakhov. The initiative to create an office was actively supported by the Russian Foreign Ministry. The main goal of the office is to promote projects through Russia - OIC in the youth sphere.

At the same time, the Office conducted the Educational Intensive course Russia - OIC. As part of the it, participants from Russian universities presented their projects to develop youth cooperation with the countries of the Islamic world. In the future, the presented projects fell into the calendar of events of the Project Office, and the participants of the intensive course became the asset of the office. Thus, such a project allows initiative youth to implement their own ideas.

At the moment, the Project Office has held two international events: the International Youth Festival of Modern Muslim Culture and the International Youth Camp "Russia - OIC." The festival brought together cultural figures from Russia and the countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 100 participants from 10 countries. The participants were divided into six areas: theater, cinema, music, choreography, etc. Participants were able to demonstrate all the beauty of their culture, its authenticity and splendor. Foreigners, in turn, plunged into Russian culture. Such a cultural dialogue between young people removes barriers to intercultural interaction and contributes to the popularization of Russian culture abroad.

There were 100 people from 19 countries in the international camp, including Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Tunisia and others. The main theme of the camp was project management. Participants underwent online training in advance and within the framework of the section worked out this topic in the field of volunteering, education, entrepreneurship and tourism. Such a topic is associated with the desire of the office to launch cooperation with similar projects in the countries of the Muslim world. Camp participants, using all the bundle of the knowledge gained at the event, will be able to facilitate this process. At the same time, this activity should be accompanied by expert control of the departments of the Russian Foreign Ministry, public figures and businessmen. The creation of similar offices in foreign countries will contribute to the close coordination of public organizations, NGOs and others wishing to implement measures in this area. More importantly, in this way Russia will have the opportunity to implement its own initiatives abroad, actively working with the youth of Muslim countries.

Also, an international economic summit "Russia - Islamic World: Kazan Summit" is held annually in Tatarstan. The summit acts as a negotiating platform for representatives of Russia and the countries of the Muslim world, strengthening trade, scientific, social and cultural ties between them. Each summit doesn't do

without the participation of young people. Students participate in the event as attachés, translators, volunteers and even organizers. Thanks to this, the younger generation learns to interact with representatives of politics and business of Muslim countries, gain new skills and the necessary experience for future professional activities.

Within the framework of the Summit, the Forum of Young Diplomats of the OIC countries is organized. Within the framework of the forum, an informal horizontal dialogue is being built between the younger generation of diplomats and experienced representatives of diplomacy and power. The dialogue of young people, who in the future will determine the policy of their country, is necessary to establish a trusting relationship between young diplomats, which will contribute to the close interaction of countries. Within the framework of the session, representatives of Muslim countries explain Russia's position on the most important issues of state interaction. The Forum promotes the interests of Russia abroad and contributes to strengthening ties between countries. According to E. Primakov, the forum is one of the most effective platforms for discussing a wide range of issues related to Russia and the Islamic world.

Such efforts on the part of Tatarstan in working with the countries of the Islamic world were justified. In 2022, Kazan was declared the youth capital of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. A similar status is awarded by the board of the OIC Youth Forum. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov, the fact of awarding such a status to Kazan serves as evidence of progressiveness in the dialogue between Russia and the OIC and the development of relations in all areas.

During the year, Russia-OIC events are planned in the Republic: cultural festivals, youth forums, a global youth summit, scientific conferences, e-sports competitions, etc. The events will cover the entire range of international youth

cooperation and will open up new opportunities for young people of Muslim countries to know Russia.

In addition, activities within the framework of the status of the youth capital will be aimed at intergovernmental cooperation. New agreements have already been signed in this area with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Active work is underway by relevant departments to expand relations along the parliamentary line.

Thus, Tatarstan has developed clear mechanisms for interaction with other countries in the field of youth cooperation. Traditional and annual events are complemented by new formats of interactions, the authors of which are often students themselves. All this helps to maintain the creative potential of students and promote a positive image of the country abroad.

* * *

With transformation of the international system and transfer of the center of international relations to the East, Russia should increase activity in the Islamic world. In addition to traditional trade and economic, political ties, it is necessary to develop cooperation in the youth sphere. Holding youth events in Russia provides an opportunity for young people from Islamic countries to discover the country from the inside, establish a dialogue with its youth, and see all the opportunities revealed in cooperation with it.

This way, the experience of interaction between Tatarstan and the states of the Islamic world in the youth sphere deserves attention. The republic was able to establish active cooperation in the inter-parliamentary line with public organizations. During the events, participants are introduced to local culture, lectures explain Russia's position on significant issues.

Certainly, Tatarstan was able to seize leadership in this area and the bulk of the events in the line Russia - Islamic World is taking place in the Republic. However, it is necessary to

expand the geography of events. There are many regions in Russia with a large number of Muslim populations that can become a center of attraction for young people. An increase in the number of events and their geography will improve the situation in the field of youth policy in the regions. In addition to the constant improvement of the necessary infrastructure, these same events will make it possible to attract more Russian youth to international activities. In addition, these formats can be adapted for other regions of the world. Russian students in the regions will be able to become part of the international activities of their country, contributing to it. The youth of the Muslim world, visiting Russia, will discover it from a new perspective, which will have a positive effect on the country's international image in the future.

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