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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. ETHNIC AND ETHNO-
CONFESSIONAL CONFLICTS IN MODERN RUSSIA. *Condensed
abstract.*

*Keywords: ethno-national extremism;
ethno-national conflicts; interethnic
harmony; Islamist extremism; terrorism;
migrants; Russophobia; anti-Semitism;
interethnic and interfaith relations;
xenophobia; socio-political audit; social
technologies; harmonization of relations.*

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1. Naydenko V.N. Expert assessment of negative
manifestations that cause ethnic and national conflicts in modern
russia // *Sociologicheskaya nauka i socialnaya praktika*. 2020. Vol. 8.
№ 3 (31). P. 149–164.

2. Gimaev I.Z. Socio-political audit of interethnic and interfaith relations // *Ufimskij gumanitarnyj nauchnyj forum*. 2021. № 3 (7). P. 151-160.

Naydenko V.N., [1] DSc(Law), Institute of Sociology, FCTAS RAS, Moscow, RF, determines the probability of the emergence and development of ethno-national conflicts in Russia in the coming years. A negative factor in the socio-political life of the Russian Federation is modern ethno-national extremism, which includes the ideology and practice of using violence and inciting hostility and hatred on a national, racial or ethno-religious basis. Ethno-national extremism is most often integrated with political or religious extremism. Features of the development of ethno-national and confessional relations in the regions of Russia with a population professing Islam have caused the emergence of a specific trend in extremism – ethno-religious (Islamist) extremism. The combination of national and religious principles in Islamist extremism enhances its potential, increases the danger of ideological and psychological impact on the participants of the extremist movement and its social base, sacralizes the most acute forms and methods of extremism (including terrorism).

The results of a sociological study conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2017 showed that although there is an understanding of the need for interethnic harmony in the public consciousness of Russians, at the same time, there is also hidden interethnic tension, which under certain conditions can result in readiness for the use of spontaneous methods of resolving interethnic conflicts, including violent one. The following factors have a destabilizing effect on the socio-political situation in Russia, the formation of ethnic tension and the development of ethnic conflicts: the crisis state of the economy, the low standard of living of the population, corruption,

migration, the struggle of elites and ethnic groups in national formations for resources, as well as the activities of foreign states.

Ethno-national conflicts, depending on the actors involved, include the following main types of conflicts: 1) between different ethnic groups; 2) between nations (including in the international dimension); 3) between an ethnic group and a nation; 4) between an ethnic group and a state (separatism). These conflicts occur mainly in the struggle for resource potential through separation, confrontation and clashes of participants in solidarity with one of the parties to the conflict on ethnic grounds.

Islamist extremism and its most dangerous form - Islamist terrorism - pose a serious threat to the ethnonational security of the Russian Federation in modern conditions. The author of the article relies on the materials of: a survey of experts; sociological research, analysis of media publications characterizing modern negative manifestations that produce ethno-national conflicts in the Russian Federation.

In February - May 2020, a survey of twenty experts was conducted, including questionnaires and interviews. The interviewed experts were asked the question: "How do you assess the degree of probability of negative ethno-national manifestations that generate ethnic conflicts and pose a danger to the Russian state and society in the next five to seven years?". Islamist extremism and terrorism received the highest assessment of the probability of negative manifestations in Russia in the coming years. The analysis of media publications on the most resonant cases of suppression of terrorist activities of Islamist structures in 2019-2020 confirms the objectivity of expert assessments about the high degree of danger of attempts to destabilize the socio-political situation in the country. The experts gave an average assessment of the degree of probability to a group of the following negative manifestations: the local population in relation to foreign cultural migrants from the republics of the North Caucasus; the local population in relation

to foreign cultural migrants from Central Asian states; in relation to Russians in the national republics of Russia.

The All-Russian monitoring study of the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, conducted in the fall of 2017, shows that conflicts often arise between the local population and migrants from other ethnic groups. It is no coincidence that 28 percent of respondents support the forced eviction of representatives of any nationalities from their city /village. Russians approve of eviction more often than people of other nationalities.

The All-Russian survey conducted by VCIOM in October 2019 showed that the formation of a negative attitude towards Russians is influenced by a fairly high level of ethnic xenophobia in Russian society. So, the question "Are there contradictions in our society, hostility between Russians and people of other nationalities?" was answered: rather there is - 44 percent; rather not - 49 percent; found it difficult to answer - 7 percent. Experts also included in the probability group of negative manifestations with an average rating of "3", manifestations in the regions directed against the policy of the federal government and against the policy of regional authorities; manifestations caused by the increased influx of migrants from China, and in relation to migrants from Ukraine.

According to the results of the Levada Center survey published in September 2019, more than half of Russians (53 percent) are in favor of limiting Chinese migration: 28 percent of respondents are ready to let Chinese people into the Russian Federation only temporarily, and 25 percent are in favor of a complete ban on Chinese citizens coming to the country. Only 19 percent of respondents are ready to see immigrants from China among the residents of Russia, and 10 percent are ready to see them among their family members or close friends.

The experts' low assessment was given to the likelihood of manifestations of anti-Semitism and Russian nationalism, negative manifestations of regional elites in relation to the federal

government and its representatives, as well as negative manifestations of the local population in relation to Russian citizens in foreign countries.

The research results presented in the article indicate the presence of ethnic tension and negative ethno-national manifestations in Russian society. In these conditions, the emerging ethnic and national conflicts may pose a threat to the political stability and public security of the Russian Federation. The actions of Islamist extremism are recognized as the most likely negative manifestations. Experts noted the increasing danger of radical Islamists associated with the anti-Russian activities of the ethno-religious terrorist organization "Islamic State" and extremist structures affiliated with it. The analysis of the probability of negative manifestations generating ethno-national conflicts, the conclusions of experts are confirmed by the assessments of sociological surveys, the arguments of scientists.

Gimaev I.Z., [2] PhD(Sociology), Institute for Strategic Studies of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Ufa, RF, examines the current state of interethnic relations and the state policy of the Russian Federation carried out in the field of normalization of interethnic relations.

According to the data of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VCIOM), since 2010, Russians have been recording an increase in tension in interethnic relations. 49 percent of the surveyed citizens are concerned about tension and intolerance in the sphere of interethnic and interfaith relations. If the indicator of tension in the sphere of interethnic relations has been increasing in recent years, then, accordingly, the indicators of tolerance, on the contrary, are significantly reduced.

Despite the state's close attention to interethnic issues and the national policy pursued by the state, interethnic and interfaith conflicts and clashes have always arisen and are arising with varying intensity and severity of consequences. In order to normalize national relations, prevention and prophylaxy of

interethnic conflicts, the leadership of the Russian Federation adopted the Strategy of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025, formed the Council on Interethnic Relations – an advisory and consulting body under the President of the Russian Federation. The Federal Agency for Affairs of Nationalities was established, whose main task was to develop and implement the state national policy, normative and legal regulation, and ensuring interethnic harmony.

According to the researcher, the adoption of a regulatory framework, strengthening the mechanisms of interaction between public authorities and local self-government, the implementation of strategic goals and objectives of the state national policy are insufficient for the harmonization of interethnic relations and conflict prevention. In modern conditions, the mechanism of such harmonization of the current situation can be the development of social technology in the field of interethnic relations. In the sphere of interethnic relations, social technology represents a system of consistent actions of ethnic groups and governing bodies in order to achieve a specific result. This is a managerial and organizational process aimed at establishing relations of harmony, mutual understanding, cooperation and friendship between ethnic groups, as well as the development of a culture of interethnic relations.

The most general technology of social management in the field of interethnic relations can be presented in the form of a management cycle. Its theoretical justification and practical use are important for the rationalization of the management process and the formation of a socio-technological culture of harmonization of interethnic relations. The social technology of harmonization of interethnic relations is carried out in several stages. At the first stage, mutual understanding and agreement between ethnic groups is established. At the second stage, there is cooperation between ethnic groups in all spheres of public life. At the third stage, the goal of implementing social technology is to achieve friendship between ethnic groups, mutual tolerance of

historical heritage and modern trends in each other's development. At the fourth stage, social technology is directed to the formation of a single cultural field, modern civilized relations between ethnic groups.

The growth of managerial activity in modern conditions requires the development of technology for positive social construction. The socio-technological approach to the problem of regulating interethnic relations and conflict prevention involves structuring the "stages of the management cycle". The first - target stage - includes such procedures as identifying the main problem, formulating goals, analyzing the situation that has arisen, and its initial description. The second stage of the managerial decision-making cycle is descriptive. The task of a social technologist in the array of information received is to isolate significant data, that allow the most complete description of the conflict situation that has arisen. The third stage is the development and decision-making. A management decision is defined as a social act prepared on the basis of a variant analysis, adopted and having a directive binding value. The fourth stage is the implementation stage, when the developed decision takes organizational force.

The harmonization of interethnic relations, the author emphasizes, is a delicate, sphere of socio-technological activity. The achievements of social technologies make it possible not only to study and predict interethnic relations, but also to actively influence their development.

Under the influence of social attitudes prevailing in a particular environment, the level of culture and education, the formation of national identity of an individual can be accompanied by an increase in national prejudices, ethnocentric ideas that create the ground for the emergence of chauvinistic and nationalistic views. The socio-political audit of this problem leads to the conclusion that the forms of manifestation of chauvinism and nationalism are diverse. This is the cultivation of national narrow-mindedness, praising the merits and virtues of

one's nation and neglecting others; defending reactionary customs and traditions under the guise of national peculiarities; idealizing the past and obscuring social contradictions in the history of one's own people; neglecting national feelings, ignoring the national peculiarities of other peoples, etc.

The essence of national policy is of fundamental importance in the harmonization of interethnic relations. One of the ethno-political factors that generate disharmony of interethnic relations and conflicts are mistakes in politics and practice associated with the desire to change the existing ethnic stratification. State structures act as a consolidating mechanism that resolves conflicts, but they are often used to aggravate them. In recent decades, the role of international and regional interstate and public structures in their resolution has significantly increased. It is necessary to strengthen the work of the state with public organizations whose activities are related to the preservation and development of national traditions, way of life, language, i.e. aimed at national self-identification and self-determination. Social technology in interethnic relations provides not only for the reproduction of strong intra-system ties, but also for the creation in national-territorial entities of their own management structures, institutions that give the social organism the character of a self-governing system. One of the proposed mechanisms for implementing the national strategy and ensuring the country's security is the creation of an institution of commissioners for the protection of the rights of national minorities and indigenous peoples in the regions.

In order to apply new technologies in interethnic relations, the researcher notes, it is necessary to study the experience of other countries and peoples, the activities of their parties, public organizations, religious leaders. As society was reformed, a deep connection between the idea of the priority of the panhuman values and the democratization of public life began to manifest itself, embodied in the pluralism of opinions, the desire for

consensus, the rejection of the forceful solution of social and interethnic conflicts.

KSENIA ATAMALI. ISLAM AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE. *Analytical Review*

Keywords: religion; Islam; Christianity; interreligious dialogue; intercultural dialogue; morality; society; tolerance.

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Abstract. The review is based on the analysis of articles dedicated to the dialogue between religions and related to a wider range of issues: relations between religions, society and the state. The researchers focus on the problem of the relationship between Christians and Moslems and the specifics of the dialogue between the two religions, and also discuss ways to achieve mutual understanding through interreligious dialogue.

Introduction

Religious and cultural dialogue is one of the fundamental issues in the modern world. The authors of the articles address theological topics, which should not be a source for an argument; issues of traditions and innovations; moral issues related to religious and moral education of coming generations; prevention of extremism among young people; development issues of the

day faced by both religions and society as a whole. Researchers review the views of those scientists of the 20th and early 21st centuries, who wrote about Islam in the context of interreligious dialogue. Having studied the concepts of Islam with regard to interreligious dialogue, the authors present their philosophical understanding of Islam in connection with issues of tolerance and understanding of an individual in different cultures.

The Modern World: Post-Secularity and Dialogue

Rawil Gaynutdin [1], PhD(Philosophy), Grand Mufti and Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims discusses post-secularity that emerged in the beginning of the 20th century. The author notes that on the threshold of the millennium, the global community was still partly in the illusion of secularism, since in a world that is becoming more scientifically and technologically progressive and profit-oriented there is seemingly no place for faith in God. In 'post-Christian' Europe, people started to consider themselves as empirical beings without a prospect of immortality and Divine supervision: neither atheists, nor believers, but mundane beings with their own will. Since then, however, religion has made a grand return to the spiritual and intellectual arena; the voice of world religions, and in particular Islam, has been growing stronger. Humanity is reviving half-forgotten and centuries-old traditions. In Russia, there has been two major scientific conferences on the problem of post-secularity: "The Sacred in the Post-Secular World" in Rostov-on-Don, 2017 and "The Religious Situation in the North-West: Religion in the Post-Secular World" in St. Petersburg, 2019. This proves that religion is becoming a subject of considerable discussion. Also, expanding contacts with people of other faiths and people raised without religion is necessary, since we all live in the same social space. There are slightly different pictures of the world and understanding of God in different religions, so these distinctions call for dialogue and

'translation' of meanings, even if people speak the same language.

The author starts with a discussion about Islam and Christianity. Since the Abrahamic religions have the same origins, on the one hand, it is easy for believers to find common ground, and on the other hand, it is rather complicated, because sharp disagreements among relatives are common. Muslims and non-Muslims must follow the principle *Love what is yours and respect what is others'*, since only respect can be the key to successful interaction, partnership and friendship, productive negotiations and joint efforts for the benefit of the whole society.

The author notes that people rarely think about a dialogue itself. Dialogue is a conversation between two people. A discussion involving several people is a polylogue. A political discourse where there is often neither dialogue, nor polylogue is a bad example of the inability to listen and hear the interlocutor. Dialogue between religions and traditions is a conversation where both sides are able to listen to and consider someone else's opinion with due respect and provide an adequate, amiable response. A different culture and a different faith should be valued from the start. Each religion is a bright flower woven into the fabric of the world created by Allah, and for each and every believer the flower of his own faith is the most beautiful. This is how Islam views other faiths. This kind of approach means that interreligious dialogue requires highly intelligent people and a delicate attitude towards a different faith. Everyone should understand early in life that we are all different, that we are not animals fighting for the upper hand in society. The author considers Muslims and Christians to be spiritually close, united by the belief in one God, allied in the desire to show kindness, generosity and forgiveness. Interreligious dialogue thus requires openness, trust and thorough knowledge of both religions. The history of interactions between religions has taught us many times that the separation between us and them was brought about by mutual ignorance and slander, leading to discord,

hatred and conflicts. The author believes that it is necessary to enlighten adherents of other religions about the ideas, traditions and rituals of Islam. Muslims would also be interested in studying Christian theology and ethics. Only knowledge gives understanding and rules out lies and slander. The history of Islam, as well as Christianity, is tortuous and complex, full of cruelty and injustice against different groups of people. Ability to forgive is an invaluable human characteristic. It is vital to forgive the history of your own and other people's delusions and mistakes, so that we can start over and enter into a dialogue. Any religion as a mundane social institution is translated into the deeds of imperfect people who can be ruled by their passions, and everyone who studies both their faith and religion of others should keep it in mind.

Interreligious dialogue is conducted at different levels. Neighbours of different religions talk about holidays and customs on a day-to-day basis; and at the conceptual level, educated theologians join in the conversation. It is essential that the interlocutors do not start an argument about whose faith is better. This kind of dispute only leads to an urge to disparage the views of the opponent and establish the precedence of one's own convictions. This kind of dialogue cannot result in agreement, since it is incorrect in the first place. Even general conversation on everyday topics should not be an argument, because the truth can emerge not from a dispute, but from a dialogue where there is an attempt to find mutual understanding, and the interlocutor's beliefs are taken seriously. Dialogue takes place primarily 'in a horizontal plane', both between spiritual leaders and ordinary believers. The whole process is conditioned by 'vertical linkages', since leaders set the tone and nature of intercultural conversation for their flock. The author notes that in Russia interlocutors in addition to differences have much in common, since they are citizens of the same state with similar background. Interreligious dialogue thus extends beyond solely doctrinal issues and touches upon general civil problems,

becoming a cultural dialogue in a broader sense. It should be noted that dialogue may take many forms, including newspapers and magazines, religious and educational television programs, various interfaith conferences, forums and organizations, etc.

The author notes that interreligious dialogue involves not only believers, but also non-religious people. They are inevitably engaged in conversation about moral and educational issues, customs, holidays, as well as legal, economic and political issues. The involvement of non-believers in the dialogue of religions is not propagandistic in the slightest; however, thanks to the amiable conversation between adherents of different faiths, a person might convert to one or another religion.

Discussing the types and topics of dialogue, the author begins with theological dialogue, which deals not only with some doctrinal issues, but also with the pressing problems of mankind in the context of each religion. The first topic is the features of religious ideas and their theological interpretation, and the second one is the modern world seen through the prism of a particular faith and in general. The author quotes Pope Francis, pointing out his acceptance of the attitudes of spiritual leaders of other faiths and ability to find common ground with them on the issues of interaction, friendship and brotherhood. Theological dialogue is not a prerogative of theologians but also involves ordinary believers who listen and read the messages of their pastors.

Traditions and innovations in the context of changing society and culture is another important topic of interreligious dialogue. It is also started by religious leaders who see social and cultural shifts clearly. Life molds both Christian and Muslim ideas to fit modern realities, which call for some acceptable changes in moral, ethical, social and ritual questions. Due to globalization, Islam can no longer be viewed in isolation from Western realities and the dialogue of cultures. It is crucial that interreligious and intercultural dialogues not remain in

retrograde positions, but also not deviate from the fundamental foundations of faith in favour of modernity.

The author emphasizes that Christian and Muslim traditional ideas on morality are extremely close; apart from faith, morality in both cases is closely associated with sympathy, generosity and magnanimity. Both faiths preach to all peoples of the world, and therefore rule out the idea of "God's chosen people" of any particular ethnic group or culture. Both faiths praise similar human qualities such as humility, honesty and courage, loyalty and striving for justice, kindness and mercy; and condemn falsehood and betrayal, narcissism and aggressiveness, drunkenness and drugs. Thus, representatives of the two major religions have no fundamental contradictions regarding their views on morality. Christians, Muslims and non-religious Russians value traditional humanistic culture of Russia, which opposes the ideas of absolute individual freedoms and permissiveness. The traditional Russian spiritual and moral values unite a multinational and multi-confessional country. The values are also included in the presidential decree on the national security strategy, thus promoting a productive conversation about modern education and preventing any manifestations of extremism based on the separation between us and them. Despite the fact that people usually correlate radicalism with Islam, Christians have also shown zero tolerance for adherents of other religions. There has been atheistic terrorism in the past as well. Dialogue on the prevention of radicalism is, therefore, another major task of interreligious communication. Both religions promote peace and encourage peaceful settlement of any problems via their representatives and organizations.

Dialogue on religious and moral issues touches upon a number of issues related to modern life, for example, the upbringing of children and their religious education. It should be noted that the moral aspect of intercultural and interreligious dialogue is relevant to the education and upbringing of both children and adults, since moral development lasts a lifetime.

Sometimes the experience of believers of another religion proves to be helpful and invaluable, and a sincere and open conversation reinforces the desire to repent and make a difference in one's life.

The author concludes the article by discussing the evolution of interfaith dialogue into a joint dialogue between religion, society, the state and business. By strongly linking financials and immorality, Pope Francis notes that some powers are working to create a new culture that serves the elite, and thus playing into the hands of financial speculators and raiders. Since Islam forbids usury, Muslims are hard-pressed to accept the fact that financial capital has become prevalent in the modern world. Therefore, Muslims should raise public awareness on curbing financial expansion and offer spiritual support in the medical and educational fields. It is impossible to halt informatization and digitalization in the modern world, and therefore the joint mission of Christianity and Islam is to ensure that future generations are not enthralled by social networks. Mutual agreement between religions on these matters paves the way for a joint struggle for spirituality.

Muslim View on Interreligious Dialogue

A.K. Toksanbayev [2], a post-graduate student of St. Petersburg State University, devotes the article to existing views of scientists of the 20th and early 21st centuries, whose area of interest is the attitude of Islam to interreligious dialogue. The author notes that the term "dialogue" originates in Ancient Greek and can be translated as "conversation" or "discussion". Socrates viewed dialogue as a Q&A format of conversation, while Plato used dialogue as a philosophical and literary form. Equality of interlocutors is the fundamental prerequisite for a dialogue. The author offers several views of scholars on the concept of dialogue, but notes that there is no precise definition. Thus, Austrian and Israeli philosopher Martin Buber believed that life is a dialogue between man and God, and man and the world, which manifests

itself in keeping the Lord's commandments. Russian philosopher M.M. Bakhtin maintained that to live means conducting a dialogue.

Many states and societies participate in interreligious dialogue, which has four types depending on its purpose, i.e. dialogue on peacekeeping matters, polemical discussion, cognitive and partnership dialogue. Peacekeeping interreligious dialogue seeks to resolve problems of social, cultural and religious nature; there are both grass-roots meetings between ordinary citizens and high-level dialogue between leaders of religious denominations, states, etc. Multiple forums and congresses provide a platform for high-level dialogue, for example, the Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, which has been held once in three years in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan since 2003. Pope John Paul II, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, King Abdullah II of Jordan and many others have taken part in the Congress.

During polemical discussion each party seeks to prove validity and superiority of their dogma over the others. Thus, polemical dialogue is tantamount to missionary work, since the main objective is to spread the dogmas of one's religion. Muslims, Christians and Jews have had such meetings and disputes throughout history, and have been criticizing the other two Abrahamic religions on theological issues. The next type is cognitive interreligious dialogue with the purpose of getting acquainted with other religions, their dogmas and spiritual practices. The reasons for cognitive dialogue are frequently attributed to intellectual curiosity, the desire to understand spiritual experience and communicate on variety of topics. For instance, Catholic monks who take part in the spiritual practices of Hindus and Buddhists enter into cognitive dialogue. In Western Europe, Muslims invite religious leaders of various faiths to festive dinners during Ramadan, further familiarizing them with Muslim culture. The fourth and last type of interreligious dialogue is partnership dialogue, which is aimed at

combating global problems such as poverty, crime, extremism, terrorism, war, etc. In order to achieve their goals, believers of various faiths put aside theological dogmas and historical grievances.

The author cites the opinions of scholars on Muslim view on interreligious dialogue. Thus, Ismail Raji al-Faruqi, an American-Palestinian researcher and philosopher, promoted the idea of Islamic approach to the establishment of relations between religions and cultures. He developed the concept of a 'true religion' (*Din Al-Fitrah*), which suggests that all people have an inner hidden religiosity and are part of a global religious brotherhood. Al-Faruqi believed that we should build relationships not on the religious basis, but on the basis of rationality; he maintained that the main goal of dialogue is to get to the truth. Al-Faruqi considered ethics to be a more suitable and universal topic for discussion in order to avoid theological disputes. The author discusses the concept of "dialogue of civilizations" proposed by the theologian and former President of Iran Mohammad Khatami at a UN meeting in 2001. The concept came as a response to the "Clash of Civilizations" theory by famous American scientist Samuel Phillips Huntington, who believed it impossible to avoid conflict between the Western and Muslim worlds. According to Huntington, dialogue demands openness and sincerity between the participants, ability to hear and listen to the interlocutor, desire to achieve mutual understanding and get to the truth. When it comes to the dialogue of civilizations, the participants should refrain from imposing their own way of life, culture, worldview, etc. on each other, and the main condition for a successful dialogue is tolerance. Khatami believes that scholars, politicians and intellectuals should study cultural and spiritual foundations of all humankind, and convey the knowledge to every nation. Some Muslim scholars also criticize "The Clash of Civilizations", pointing out that all the qualities needed for dialogue are an integral part of Islam. Thus, the Quran encourages people to take

interest in the traditions and way of life of others, and in the Sunnah the Prophet Muhammad engages in dialogue with Jews, Christians and even the Quraysh of Mecca.

In France, the researcher Merad Ali actively engages in dialogue between Muslims and Christians and encourages the two communities to bridge the gaps in order to resist a mechanistic society. He fears that interested groups may spur conflicts between Muslims and Christians with the aim of enrichment. The only possible solution is a dialogue built on mutual respect and tolerance. Speaking on the relations between Muslims and Christians, the author cites Mahmoud M. Ayoub from the Department for the Study of Religion at the University of Toronto, outlining the main pattern that has created animosity between the two faiths throughout history. Thus, Muslims accused Christians of misinterpretation of the Gospel, and Christians viewed Islam as a heresy, thus giving rise to hatred, mistrust and fear. Religious wars and colonial domination also had a great impact. For interreligious dialogue, Muslims and Christians should leave the history of their relationship behind and make an effort to understand what God says to Muslims through Christianity and to Christians through Islam.

The author discusses the approach to building interreligious relations offered by the Turkish researcher A. Betül. He views comparative theology and reflection on the Holy Scriptures as modern forms of interreligious dialogue. Despite all the benefits of studying the sacred texts of other religions, the Turkish scholar believes that focusing on texts and ignoring the rituals is the major oversight. He argues that an attempt to understand another religion through the prism of one's own faith is a mistake and impossibility, and therefore the interlocutors should clarify the concepts of their religions.

Prominent modern Russian scientists and researchers have also discussed Islamic view on interreligious dialogue. For example, the First Deputy Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims Damir Mukhetdinov notes that an

appropriate Muslim approach to religious diversity calls for an unbiased analysis of each religion and an effort to find divine dimension in it. Mukhetdinov points out the unique Eurasian religiosity in Russia, which, among other things, combines sincere search of God, spiritual temperance, pansacralism, flexibility, peacefulness and tenderness.

Quranic Approach to Interreligious Dialogue

The paper by A.M. Kakhaev [3], a postgraduate student of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, is devoted to analysis of the Quran and the Sunnah, which establish a dialogue between different religions and cultures. The purpose of the study is to show the importance of developing interfaith relations and to introduce the reader to the Quranic approach to interreligious dialogue based on religious tolerance. The author emphasizes the attitude towards representatives of other faiths during the early period of Islam.

The idea of interfaith dialogue emerged in the international arena in the 1930s. According to the author, interreligious dialogue means amiable communication and joint activities of representatives of different faiths in aspiration to reach an accord between religions and bolster the spiritual and moral foundations of society on the basis of brotherhood, unity, justice and religious tolerance. The main goal of the dialogue is peaceful coexistence and interaction between adherents of different religions, which is a must for a multi-confessional society. The author examines the accounts of religious tolerance and humane attitude towards representatives of various faiths provided by the Quran and the Sunnah. Thus, one of the verses declares the recognition of all one hundred four sacred books granted to the prophets, including the Quran, Torah, the Gospel and the Psalter. The Quran encourages Muslims to show kindness to all peaceful people regardless of their religion. Muslims' relationships with representatives of other faiths are basically guided by justice. The Quran affirms the

need to show initiative in interreligious dialogue between Muslims and the People of the Book (Christians and Jews). The dialogue with representatives of other religions is governed by ethics, wisdom, tolerance, reason and reliance on evidence.

According to the Quran, all people are created by Allah and are family descended from Adam. Differences between people are one of the reasons for meetings, acquaintances, cooperation and knowledge-sharing. The Quran acknowledges the close relationship between Muslims and Christians, calls for cooperation with the followers of other faiths for the benefit of justice and security. The Treaty of Hudaibiyyah between the Prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh polytheists of Mecca is one example of interfaith dialogue in the Sunnah. The Prophet also drew up the Constitution of Medina, which regulated relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and called for ending the hostilities with the Jews. In other words, different religions should not hamper the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The analysis of the relationship between Muslims and representatives of other faiths suggests that the Quran calls for respect for religious freedom. The Quran speaks of the imperative of interreligious dialogue and points to the unanimity between Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The life of the Prophet Muhammad shows the peaceful, ethical and respectful attitude of Muslims towards non-Muslims.

Conclusion

Throughout the existence of mankind, cultures and religions have formed various relationships with each other: there have been war and peace, theological disputes and persecutions, etc. Due to rapid technological progress, the world has changed over time and affected countries to a great extent, eliminating monocultural communities. Global processes have not bypassed the religious sphere. Dialogue between religions and cultures is essential, since certain interested circles politicize

religion for material gain, giving rise to radical extremist movements that seek to establish their own world order. Interreligious dialogue is studied in many countries worldwide.

Scientists work to find common ground with representatives of other religions, but at the same time stick to their own religious dogmas. There are various solutions ranging from organizing round tables between politicians and religious figures to studying each other's religious doctrines from the Holy Scriptures. The researchers conclude that tolerance is essential for a successful interreligious dialogue, and that result is closely dependent on the academic and political elites, which have a great influence on ordinary citizens.

Having studied Muslim view on interreligious dialogue, the authors come to the conclusion that Muslims are open to communication based on profound respect, where interlocutors are interested in each other's traditions, dogmas and the Holy Scriptures. Rational thinking is also essential for building effective communication between religions. In international practice, however, certain interested parties often politicize Islam and promote radical views, leading to a negative impact on the relationship between religions and cultures. Dialogue based on mutual respect and tolerance is the only way to prevent such situations.

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

ZAID ABDULAGATOV. PROBLEMS OF POLITICS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE NEWSPAPER AS-SALAM READERS'
INTERESTS

*Keywords: As-Salam; newspaper;
readers; readers' interest; political processes;
Islam; Russia; Moslem countries; rubric.*

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Abstract. The article presents the main results of a sociological survey conducted by the author among the readers of the As-Salam newspaper, popular in Russia and abroad. The main purpose of the article is to show the peculiarities of readers' informational interest in covering political processes in general, their relations to issues of Islamic political activity, in particular. It follows from the text that the readers of the newspaper have a low level of interest in the issues of Islamic political activity. At the same time, there is an interest on their part in

political processes in general, especially those taking place abroad. The results of the survey give grounds to the conclusion that believers want to see religion not as a political force, but as a spiritual support.

Introduction

Islam is a religion that regulates all aspects of life, both of an individual Muslim and the entire Islamic Ummah. In past decades, the political aspects of Islam have become relevant not only for Muslims, but also for society as a whole. There are sensitive issues of interfaith relations (Salafi and Sufi Muslims, and Sunni and Shia Muslims); relations between the state and religion (the state and Islamic radicals); and interstate relations (Syria and Russia, Syria and the US, Syria and Turkey, Yemen and Saudi Arabia). In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, both in Russia and globally, the most problematic aspect of Islam was politics.

One of the popular Islamic newspapers published in Russia is *As-Salam*, which discusses the issues of Islamic culture in its various dimensions and offers insight into the history of Islam and contemporary problems. The newspaper is being published in twelve languages, including English, Azerbaijani, Tajik and Turkish. In 2022 its circulation accounted to 245,500 copies, from which 68,000 copies were sold in Dagestan, a number that is several times greater than combined circulation of all print media in the republic. It should be noted that *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, founded by the Russian Government, sells less than 112,000 copies.

The author note that at the initiative of the editorial office of the *As-Salam* newspaper, a sociological survey about information and educational work of the newspaper was conducted among its readers.

A snippet of the study regarding the readers' information interest in the coverage of political processes related to Islamic political activity is provided below.

Sampled data of the sociological survey

The survey was conducted in all federal districts of Russia.

Central Federal District – 46 people;
Northwestern Federal District – 60 people;
Southern Federal District (Crimea) – 53 people;
North Caucasian Federal District – 287 people;
Volga Federal District – 104 people;
Ural Federal District – 65 people;
Siberian Federal District – 28 people;
Far Eastern Federal District – 35 people.

A total of 678 people were interviewed, with the maximum margin of error of 3.8 percent.

Who reads the *As-Salam* newspaper?

Among the respondents, 96.3 percent identified themselves as Muslims; 1.5 percent of the readers were Orthodox; 4.2 percent considered themselves believers; and only 0.2 percent found it difficult to answer the question about their faith. The sum of the percentages exceeds 100 percent because a small part of Muslims ticked two boxes (both 'I am a Muslim' and 'I am a believer').

According to the poll, the distribution of the readers according to age is following:

Aged 15 to 18 – 4.2 percent;
Aged 18 to 25 – 9.8 percent;
Aged 25 to 30 – 17.2 percent;
Aged 30 to 45 – 36.9 percent;
Aged 45 to retirement age – 20.3 percent;
Old-age pensioners – 11.6 percent.

Figures for different age groups of the readers indicate that young people – aged 15 to 30 – read the newspaper less often than the older generation (31.2 percent compared to 68.8 percent).

There are more than twice as many male readers than female ones in the sample (67.3 percent compared to 32.7 percent).

As to social status, the majority of the respondents were workers (42.9 percent), pensioners (13.3 percent), housewives (11.6 percent) and private entrepreneurs (9.4 percent). Thus, ordinary people, i.e. workers, pensioners and housewives, made up the bulk of the respondents (67.8 percent).

People with higher education accounted for 38.4 percent; people with secondary specialized education comprise 25.8 percent of the respondents; and number of those with secondary general education reached 18.1 percent. There were 13.0 percent of the respondents who received a religious education.

Readers about political issues in the *As-Salam* newspaper

The readers of the newspaper were asked the following multiple choice question (MCQ): "Do you think the newspaper should discuss political processes taking place: a) in the world; b) in Muslim countries; c) in Russia; d) in your region? First of all, the author draws attention to the nature of the question. It does not touch upon Islamic political activity or processes in particular, but concerns political processes in general. (See Chart 1)

The results of the survey show that:


- The readers are interested in information about political processes published in the newspaper.

- The readers are moderately interested in this information.

- The readers are more interested in political processes that take place not in the region where they live, not in Russia in general, but in Muslim countries. Apparently, this may be attributed to the fact that Muslims of Russia may find out about the processes of such a nature from various secular printed media.

Chart 1

Distribution of answers to the question: "Is there a need for the newspaper to analyze ongoing political processes?". (Multiple answers can be selected). Russia. N-678.



As far as individual social groups included in the sample of this sociological survey are concerned, the answers to this question differ. The results of the survey that reflect age groups are given in Table 1.

Table 1

Is there a need for the newspaper to analyze the political processes taking place: a) in the world; b) in Muslim countries; c) in Russia; d) in your region? (Multiple answers can be selected). Youth / Older generation. Russia. (in percent). N-678.

	The Youth	The Older Generation	Total
Yes, in the World	39.9	39.1	39.7
Yes, in Muslim countries	48.7	30.6	40.4
Yes, in Russia	48.3	30.6	33.8
Yes, in your region	33.7	23.8	26.1

The author emphasizes that the younger, rather than older generation shows greater interest in reading about political processes. This differentiation is even clearer from the questions regarding political processes in Russia. At the same time, young people have a keen awareness of political processes in Muslim countries. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that young Dagestanis actively fight for IS, religious and political movement banned in Russia. According to the FSB director A. Bortnikov, over four thousand Dagestanis were confirmed to be fighting for IS and other armed formations [1]. Russian ethnologist A.I. Arlykapov believes that there were at least five thousand fighters in Syria [2]. To varying degrees, this has happened in other Islamic regions of Russia [3].

The readers of the newspaper were specifically asked about the coverage of issues of Islamic politics. Answering the question “Would you like the newspaper to write about issues of Islamic politics?” the majority (34.1 percent) of the respondents answered “No, the newspaper should be writing only about Islamic religious life, no politics”. Almost as many respondents (32.7 percent) answered “Yes, Islam and politics are inseparable”. In general, readers’ views on this subject vary; younger people showed greater interest in articles about Islamic politics, supporting such publications in *As-Salam*.

The author notes that the *As-Salam* newspaper has over 30 regular sections. The scope of the audience of the politics section was of particular interest for the research. Readers were asked to choose their favourite sections (no more than five) out of 26 primary sections of the newspaper, including those of a political nature.

The rank of the sections in decreasing order is as follows:

1. Q&A – 30.7 percent.
2. Family – 30.7 percent.
3. Islam in the World and Other Countries – 26.5 percent.
4. History of Islam – 26.5 percent.
5. Health care – 26.1 percent.

6. Islam in Russia – 24.9 percent.
7. Spirituality – 23.5 percent.
8. Women’s Page – 18.6 percent.
9. Sermon – 17.6 percent.
- 10.Children’s Page – 16.4 percent.
- 11.Edification – 13.1 percent.
- 12.Everyday Life of the Muftiate – 11.8 percent.
- 13.Muslims in the Regions – 11.4 percent.
- 14.Know How – 10.9 percent.
- 15.Education – 10.5 percent.
- 16.Identity – 10.0 percent.
- 17.We Are Muslims – 8.1 percent.
- 18.Analytics – 7.5 percent.
- 19.Culture of Different Nations – 6.6 percent.
- 20.Reader’s Digest – 5.5 percent.
- 21.News – 5.5 percent.
- 22.Interview – 4.9 percent.
- 23.Event – 4.7 percent.
- 24.Social – 4.4 percent.
- 25.Politics – 4.1 percent.
- 26.Art – 3.8 percent.

The politics section was next to the last popular section, ranking 25th place. The most popular headings of the newspaper were (in descending order): Q&A, Family, Health Care, Islam in Russia, Spirituality, Women’s Page and Sermon. Essentially, all these sections have something to do with understanding, comprehension or regulation of the social life of a Muslim. The answers to this question, in fact, clearly demonstrate the desire to see in Islam not a political force, but a spiritual support.

In the study, there was a question of how well the sections of the newspaper cater to diverse reading interests of Muslims in Russia. In this regard, the readers were asked to express their feelings about potential new headings of the newspaper. The respondents were offered six new headings, including ones of a political nature. (See Table 2)

Table 2

What would your reaction be if the following regular sections appeared in the *As-Salam* newspaper? (Percentage of the total number of respondents)

	City	Countryside	Men	Women	Total
Islamic Philosophy	23.6	17.4	23.5	19.7	22.1
Islamic Political Thought	10.1	8.7	12.1	5.2	9.7
Modern Science: Problems and Achievements	17.8	17.4	17.4	20.2	17.7
Salafi Islam	10.3	2.5	8.7	7.5	8.4
Shia Islam	5.6	3.7	4.6	7.0	5.2
Countering Extremism and Terrorism	30.9	29.8	33.3	26.3	30.7
Hard to Answer	15.3	18.6	15.3	16.9	16.1
Have a New Heading?	6.2	7.5	8.0	3.8	6.5

The author points out that the 'Countering Extremism and Terrorism' section turned out to be the most popular among urban and rural residents, men and women, as well as in an overall sample (30.7 percent). Even though it is of political content and popular with the readers, it does not mean that they approve political activities in Islam. The heading holds their interest solely because it discusses the issues of peace and social stability. A possible new 'Islamic Political Thought' section was the least to inspire enthusiasm in the readers (9.7 percent). Rural residents (8.7 percent) and female readers (5.2 percent) expressed the least support of the potential new heading. This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that the respondents are not particularly interested in reading about 'Salafi Islam' (8.4 percent). The Salafi movement is strongly associated with interfaith conflicts and political confrontations in the history of Islam.

The author notes that the question of whether the newspaper should analyze political processes in the world and developments in its regions, including Russia, is multidimensional. In particular, this is a question about what the respondents think about political activities of the clergy. The

author included the question about political activities of clerics, muftiats and churches in one of the sociological surveys conducted in mosques and churches in Moscow, Kazan and Dagestan in 2002. In total, 1000 people were surveyed, 460 of whom in Dagestan. The question was worded as follows: "Do you believe that it is acceptable for a church (mosque, spiritual administration) to be involved in some kind of political activities?" The majority of the Muslims and Christians (64.6 percent) had a negative attitude towards the involvement of religious organizations in any political activities; only 23.4 percent of the respondents considered that a possibility. A poll in the Cathedral of Makhachkala showed that Orthodox Christians in Makhachkala were set against the participation of the church in politics even more (83.3 percent). At the same time, this survey confirms that the readers' interest in political processes in the world and its regions is of independent significance.

Conclusion

The author concludes that many readers of the *As-Salam* newspaper generally take an interest in learning about political processes. They particularly care for updates on political events taking place in Muslim countries.

Speaking about interest in the subject of politics, young people are much more eager to read about it than the older ones. Given the vast involvement of young people in the activities of various extremist and terrorist groups, and their greater exposure to influence of information, content of the largest circulated newspaper in Russia requires objective and responsible assessment. Considering the prevailing interest in Islamic countries, such assessments are crucial in the analysis of interfaith relations in the Islamic world in accordance with the principles of Islamic moderation.

The interest of readers of the *As-Salam* newspaper in politics in general is accompanied by low rates of interest in Islamic political activity. Based on this study and earlier researches conducted by the author, it could be concluded that faithful choose to see religion not as a political force, but as a spiritual guidance that supports them throughout their lives.

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VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN INTERFAITH RELATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN. *Analytical review.*

Keywords: Republic of Bashkortostan; believers; Moslems; Orthodox; confessional identity; interfaith relations; state-confessional relations; missionary work; religious organizations; Central Spiritual Governance for Moslems of the Russian Federation; CSGM of the Republic of Bashkortostan; ROC.

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Abstract. 160 nationalities and ethnic groups live in the multi-confessional and multi-ethnic Republic of Bashkortostan. There are about 20 different religions and religious groups represented there. Islam and Orthodoxy are the most numerous, their associations make up more than 90 percent of all religious organizations. The articles on the basis of sociological surveys consider interfaith relations in the republic, positive and negative trends in their development.

Introduction

The Republic of Bashkortostan is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious subject of the Russian Federation. According to the 2010 Russian Census, 160 nationalities and ethnic groups live in Bashkiria. The most numerous are: Russians (36.0 percent), Bashkirs (28.8 percent), Tatars (24.8 percent), Chuvash (2.7 percent), Mari (2.6 percent), Ukrainians (1 percent), as well as Mordovians, Udmurts, Belarusians, Germans, Latvians, Jews. About 20 different religions, denominations and religious groups are represented in the republic. The largest ones are Islam and Orthodoxy. Their associations make up more than 90 percent of the total number of religious organizations: about 70 percent are Muslim, 20 percent are Orthodox. Protestant formations (Baptists, Adventists, Pentecostals, Mormons, etc.) and other beliefs (Old

Believers, Buddhism, heathen beliefs) – about 10 percent. In the articles researchers refer to interfaith relations in the republic.

Believers of the Republic of Bashkortostan

Doctor of Political Sciences R.M. Mukhametzyanova-Duggal, chief researcher at the Institute of Ethnological Studies of R.G. Kuzeev (Bashkiria, Ufa) [1] analyzes the ethnic composition, attitude of members of Orthodox and Muslim religious organizations of Bashkortostan to traditional faiths and new religious movements (NRM). The article presents the results of a survey of the republic's believers on ethnic composition and identity; a comparative analysis of the characteristics of active members of the Orthodox and Muslim communities of Bashkortostan associated with interfaith relations is given.

Surveys of believers carried out by the IES USC RAS in 2017 and in 2019 contained questions regarding the ethnodemographic composition of respondents [gender, age, education, marital status, nationality, employment, volume and structure of family income, national identity (nationality of the respondent, his/her spouse, mother, father, etc.)], religious behavior and religious consciousness (including religious education), religious tolerance, the influence of religious organizations on various aspects of public life. Surveys were conducted in the city of Ufa (128 people) and in small towns and settlements of the republic – Buzdyak, Davlekanovo, Neftekamsk (49 people).

The selection criteria for the sample representing the “core of believers” of the Orthodox and Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan were 5 indicators of religious behavior - visiting a church / mosque, confession and communion, reading the Gospel / Quran, prayer, fast.

Islam and Orthodoxy are leading faiths, their associations make up 90 percent of the total number of religious organizations: about 71 percent are Muslim, 19 percent are

Orthodox. (Protestant formations (Baptists, Adventists, Pentecostals, Mormons, etc.) and other beliefs (Old Believers, Buddhism, heathen beliefs) - about 10 percent.) As a result of the processing of personal data, the following ethnic composition of respondents was obtained: Muslims - Tatars 52.8 percent, Bashkirs - 37.5 percent, Russians - 0.9 percent, Orthodox - Russians 80.8 percent, Tatars - 8.2 percent, Bashkirs - 1.4 percent.

Thus, among Muslims, the most numerous groups are Tatars and Bashkirs, among Orthodox - Russians and representatives of other nationalities. Gender composition: Muslim believers, mainly men - 87.5 percent of respondents, Muslim women - 12.5 percent; Orthodox believers, on the contrary, are dominated by women - 69.8 percent of respondents, men make up 30.1 percent.

Religious identity among Muslims ranks foremost (80.8 percent). The same place is occupied by confessional identity among the Orthodox - 78 percent consider themselves Christians. The second after confessional is family identity - 13.7 percent among Orthodox, 45.2 percent among Muslims. Civil identity is in third place among the Orthodox - 32.9 percent, among Muslims - ethnic one - 28.8 percent. The fourth place among Orthodox respondents is dedicated to professional identity - 24.6 percent, among Muslims - civil (31.7 percent). The fifth place among the Orthodox is occupied by ethnic identification (34.2 percent), among Muslims - professional (38.5 percent).

The answers of believers in Bashkortostan showed that the unifying principles for Muslims are: religion - 42.3 percent, traditions and customs - 41.3 percent, common land - 31.7 percent, language - 23 percent, mentality - 21.2 percent, history - 14.4 percent, political views - 5.8 percent, good - 1.9 percent, family ties and state protection - 0.9 percent. For the Orthodox, the unifying principles are: traditions and customs - 38.4 percent, common land - 35.6 percent, religion - 34.2 percent, history - 27.4 percent, language - 15.1 percent, mentality - 10.9 percent, political views - 1.4 percent, good - 1.4 percent. The

author points out that 89.1 percent of Muslims and 84.6 percent of Orthodox Christians do not have a negative attitude towards traditional religions, 8.9 percent of Muslims and 15 percent of Orthodox Christians demonstrate it.

According to respondents, the most acute problems in Bashkortostan are socio-economic ones: drop of morality is in the first place for both Muslims (56.7 percent) and Orthodox (69.8 percent), in the second - corruption (55.8 percent among Muslims and 41 percent among Orthodox), in the third - economic difficulties (43.3 percent among Muslims, 32.9 percent among Orthodox). In fourth place among Muslims - religious extremism, among Orthodox - interethnic relations. The problem of interfaith relations among Muslims is in eighth place (0.9 percent), among Orthodox - in sixth (9.6 percent).

Muslims put negative value upon the diversity of brands in Islam - half of the respondents (49 percent), almost the same number of those who found it difficult to answer or are neutral (44.3 percent), a small number of respondents have a positive attitude (5.8 percent). The attitude of the Orthodox to other denominations of Christianity (Protestantism and Catholicism) is largely neutral - 54.1 percent, positive - 21.2 percent, negative - 16.4 percent, and 5.4 percent were undecided.

The research results demonstrate a negative attitude towards new religious movements - neopagan, eastern and mystical religious sects (MRS) in more than half of the respondents: 65.3 percent in Muslims and 67.1 percent in Orthodox. 18.3 percent of Muslims and 16.4 percent of Orthodox people are neutral to MRS. Muslims have 2 times more positive attitudes towards MRS (2.9 percent) than Orthodox (1.4 percent). The data obtained by the IES USC RAS indicate the importance of traditional religions; religious needs and feelings are expressed in institutionalized Russian religions. They correlate with the results of sociological studies of the state of interethnic and interfaith relations conducted annually by the Center for Humanitarian Studies of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of

Bashkortostan (CHS MC RB). According to the Center, relations between representatives of various religions in the republic were estimated as positive by the majority of respondents – 91.1 percent in 2017 and 90.2 percent in 2018.

In the article of A.N. Klyashev, Candidate of Historical Sciences, and R.R. Mukhamadeeva, Associate Researcher of the Institute of Economics of the IES USC RAS [2], there were identified the main trends in the choice of religious identity among regular members of religious communities of the Republic of Bashkortostan living in various types of settlements.

The research results demonstrate that the largest group among Muslim respondents are believers who came to Islam on their own, with 34.2 percent and 48 percent in 2017 and 2019, respectively; those whose adoption of Islam was influenced by parents – 22.8 percent and 24 percent and friends – 21.5 percent and 8 percent, relatives contributed to the coming to faith – according to 16.5 percent and 16 percent of respondents.

The role of spouses and personally unfamiliar Muslims is insignificant – respondents who became Muslims with their assistance, 2.5 percent and 4 percent, respectively, in 2017 and 2019. Thus, relatives play a significant role in the process of adopting Islam (including parents and spouses – 41.8 percent); personal existential searches are in second place (34.2 percent), friends are in third place (21.5 percent). 69.6 percent of Muslims surveyed in 2017 and 70 percent in 2019 believe that they have always been Muslims – 22.8 percent (2017) and 20.0 percent (2019), former atheists account for 5.1 percent (2017) and 4.0 percent (2019). The large contribution of relatives (including parents and spouses – 41.8) to the adoption of Islam and the significant number of respondents who identified themselves as believers who have always professed Islam (69.6 percent), according to researchers, testifies to the significant role in the religious choice of permanent members of Muslim religious communities in Bashkortostan primary agents of socialization – parents, under whose direct influence the adoption of social

norms and attitudes of religion takes place. Religious mobility as a change during the life of an individual of one religion to another under the influence of various factors (intra and non-family) is less characteristic among representatives of the “religious core.” Islam is an ethno-confessional marker, in the opinion of the authors, it is referred to a deeper involvement in the implementation of religious practices. This conclusion is confirmed by data on the ethnic composition of Muslims of the Republic of Belarus: Tatars 57.0 percent, Bashkirs 30.4 percent, Russians 1.3 percent (1 respondent), another nationality 8.9 percent, no options 2.5 percent. 87.4 percent are Turkic-speaking respondents – Tatars and Bashkirs, considered by ethnological science as carriers of Islam. 34.2 percent of respondents who came to Islam on their own turned in their existential searches to the traditional (Tatar or Bashkir) denomination for their ethnic group.

The results of studies of regular members of Orthodox religious organizations in the territory of the Republic of Belarus revealed that relatives play the greatest role in the process of their adoption of Orthodoxy (including parents and spouses – 42.8 percent in 2017 and 62.5 percent in 2019); personal existential searches are in second place (34.2 percent in 2017 and 29.2 percent in 2019), friends are in third place (approximately 12 percent each in 2017, 2019). 53.1 percent of respondents have always been Orthodox Christians in 2017 and 78.3 percent in 2019, they believe that they have always been Orthodox – 28.6 percent of believers, former Muslims and atheists account for 6.1 percent, former Protestants – 4.1 percent.

From the point of view of researchers, Orthodoxy, like Islam, is also (although to a bit lesser extent) an ethno-confessional marker for Russians, of which 81.6 percent (Tatars 12.2 percent, Mordovians 4.1 percent, Bashkirs 2.0 percent) – the number of respondents who identified themselves as believers who have always professed Orthodoxy is 53.1 percent (among Muslims – 69.6 percent). In this case, according to the authors,

this is mainly about deep involvement in the implementation of religious practices. At the same time, a slightly larger percentage of Orthodox respondents who previously practiced Islam, Protestantism and were atheists, testifies that the adoption of the Orthodox direction of Christianity is largely the result of transformations of religious identity.

According to the research of the Institute for Socio-Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISPS RAS) 2004-2012, the structure of the religious population of Russia consists of the following subgroups: the "core of believers," which most fully carry out religious practices in their lives (including those visiting the temple/mosque once a month and more often), the number of "core of believers" is 10-15 percent of the population, of which Orthodox less than 10 percent, the rest are Muslims and representatives of other faiths. Around the "core" there are 30-35 percent of believers identified as "periphery," of which 30 percent are Orthodox, they exercise their rights to religious freedom to a somewhat lesser extent, however, they believe that religion plays an important role in their lives. The rest of the group of respondents can be defined as "cultural Orthodox and Muslims" - for them, religious identity is an ethnocultural marker, and religious values are not identifying in life. The materials of the IES USC RAS concern respondents who make up the "core of believers" who most fully implement religious practices in their lives. 93.7 percent of respondents are Muslims and 69.4 percent of Orthodox people visit mosques and churches weekly and more often, 5.1 percent of Muslims and 22.4 percent of Orthodox people - once a month and more often.

The data provided in the article allow us to draw preliminary conclusions regarding the main trends in the choice of religious identity among carriers of Islam, Orthodoxy and Protestantism in the Republic of Bashkortostan: - for Muslims, coming to Islam in most cases it means deeper involvement in the implementation of religious practices (transition from the category of "cultural" or "peripheral" Muslims to the "core"), as

well as conversion in their existential searches to the traditional for their ethnic group (Tatar or Bashkir) denomination; - for the Orthodox, there is also a predominantly transition from the category of "cultural" or "peripheral" Orthodox to the "core," however, a significant percentage of Orthodox respondents who were previously Muslims, Protestants and atheists indicate that the adoption of Orthodoxy to a greater extent than the adoption of Islam, is the result of transformations of religious identity. The religious choice among both Muslims and Orthodox is primarily determined by the primary agents of socialization - by mother and father, as well as first-degree relatives. The primary choice of religion by an individual is conscious and not conscious. Secondary religious choice can occur under the influence of various internal and non-family factors, but may not occur throughout the life of an individual; - the religious identity of an individual in the 20 century was a choice (or lack of conscious choice) of religion once and for life; - the religious identity of an individual in the 21 century as a result of globalization, the mobility of social groups sometimes represents a set of religious choices, which requires further religious studies.

R.M. Mukhametzyanova-Duggal and R.R. Mukhamadeeva [3] on the basis of sociological data analyze value and moral ideas about the role of religion in the life of believers of the Republic of Bashkortostan, consider state-confessional relations, spheres of cooperation of religious organizations with the state, as well as the problem of missionary. The authors rely on the materials of a study organized and conducted by the Department of Religious Studies of the IES USC RAS in 2020-2021. The article shows the results of a survey of believers of the Republic of Bashkortostan (active members of religious organizations), summarizes ideas about the role of religion, gives an assessment of state-confessional relations; a comparative analysis of opinions on these issues among representatives of Orthodox and Muslim communities of the Republic of Bashkortostan was also carried out.

Islam in the republic is practiced by the two largest ethnic groups – Bashkirs and Tatars, Orthodoxy is mainly adhered to by Russians. The selection criteria representing the “core of believers” of the Orthodox and Muslims of Bashkortostan were five indicators of religious behavior: visiting a temple / church; confession and communion; reading the Gospel / Quran; prayer; fast.

Researchers note that the principle of secularism, general approaches to understanding the optimal model of state confessional policy continue to be at the center of modern scientific and public discussions. According to surveys of active members of religious associations, the overwhelming majority of believers (Muslims – 82.3 percent, Orthodox – 71.0 percent) recognize that cooperation between religious organizations and the state in various fields would be desirable. More than half of the respondents (59.8 percent of Muslims and 50.6 percent of Orthodox) believe that religious organizations should influence government decision-making. At the same time, among the “core of believers” there are also supporters of the principle of secularism, who believe that religious organizations should work only in the field of meeting the religious needs of (believers) people (40.7 percent of Muslims, 40.0 percent of Orthodox) or should not interfere in public life at all (13.7 percent of Muslims, 14.8 percent of Orthodox).

The aspects given in the article on the scale of the Russian population, divided into 4 groups (followers of Orthodoxy, Islam, non-denominational religious persons and atheists), were studied as part of an all-Russian survey by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2014–2015. According to the results of this survey, 30 percent of Russians (28 percent Orthodox, 24 percent Muslims, 46 percent non-denominational believers, 42 percent atheists) are supporters of the principle of secularism. Among the areas in which the activities of religious organizations could be the most positive, the believers of Bashkortostan put the spiritual and moral education of people, as well as mercy and charity in the first place; in third place: among Muslims – the

resolution of interethnic disagreements, among Orthodox – the preservation of cultural heritage; on the fourth: among Muslims – preservation of cultural heritage and education, among Orthodox – education. The scale of priorities in determining the areas of positive activity of religious organizations among Muslims and Orthodox practically coincides.

As for the assessment by believers of the republic of state confessional policy at the federal level, the answers demonstrate that more than half of the respondents of both Muslims (65.5 percent) and Orthodox (52.2 percent) consider it positive, neutral or tolerant. The study also examined the problem of missionary and proselytism as an activity to spread and convert to one religion or another, including in regions where this religion is not traditional for people. According to 56 percent of believers – regular members of religious organizations, there should be no obstacles to the spread of the religious worldview, and the worldview choice is a personal matter of everyone, while both Muslims and Orthodox agree in answering this question. At the same time, 14 percent of respondents adhere to the point of view that the spread of non-traditional religions is associated with increased conflict. Both Muslims – 15.3 percent and Orthodox – 11.8 percent demonstrate concern about this problem.

Civilizational priorities when choosing a country's development strategy reflect answers to questions from a couple of judgments: “Russia is a special civilization, it will never implant a Western way of life” and “Russia must live by the same rules as modern Western countries.” The perception of Russia as a special civilization is typical for 82.6 percent of Orthodox and 62 percent of Muslims, only 5.6 percent of Orthodox and 10.9 percent of Muslims support the idea that the Russian Federation should follow the rules of Western countries. A study by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences emphasizes that from 2005–2015 two-thirds of Russians demonstrate their perception of Russia as a special civilization. These findings testify to an important role for universal values,

shared history and historical memory, shared traditions and value landmarks. The latter include love for the native country, land, family, peaceful and good relations with neighbors. In multi-ethnic and multi-religious Bashkortostan, such ideas reduce the risks of conflicts on religious grounds and social tensions.

The noted trends are confirmed by the results of studies conducted in Bashkortostan by the Department of Religious Studies of the IES USC RAS on interfaith relations. According to them, the overwhelming number of Muslim respondents (89.1 percent) and 84.6 percent of Orthodox respondents do not have a negative attitude towards traditional religions. The presence of conflict potential is demonstrated by 8.9 percent of Muslims and 15 percent of Orthodox. Answering the question: "What are the most acute problems in the Republic of Bashkortostan, in your opinion?" the respondents mainly noted socio-economic problems: a drop of morality, corruption and economic difficulties.

Thus, the results of the polls reflect the following trends: religious associations of Bashkortostan are striving to influence various spheres of public life of citizens; active believers determine socially significant areas of activity of religious institutions - this is spiritual and moral education of people, mercy and charity, the cultural sector and preservation of cultural heritage, as well as education. At the same time, a significant part of believers supports the principle of secularism and, in general, positively assesses the state's policy towards religious associations. The perception of Russia as a special civilization reflects the belief in the unity of the multicultural space of the republic, based on universal values, common history and historical memory, common traditions and values within the updated National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, approved in July 2021, where, among the priorities, in addition to the need to improve the defense potential and development of the country's economy, special emphasis is placed on the importance of preserving and protecting traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, culture and historical memory.

Religious organizations of Bashkortostan

The article by R.R. Mukhamadeeva [4] examines the dynamics of registration of religious organizations of the Republic of Bashkortostan (according to the Ministry of Justice of Russia), as well as the ratio of religious organizations by type of denomination, belonging to the administration of Muslims, the eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, type of settlement, districts and cities of the Republic of Belarus, districts of Ufa in the total composition of all religious organizations registered on the territory of the republic.

The research results given in the article demonstrate that a fifth of religious organizations registered today in the Republic of Bashkortostan officially registered their activities in 2003; Muslim religious organizations made up 72.3 percent of all registered ones; the predominance of Muslim religious organizations among other religious organizations annually registered in the republic remains. The overwhelming number of Orthodox religious organizations belongs to the ROC MP, among Protestant religious organizations of Pentecostal more than half about 61 percent (60.5 percent).

During the work, data from the website of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, in particular, the information portal on the activities of non-profit organizations, were used. The obtained information formed the basis of the database of religious organizations of the Republic of Bashkortostan created with the participation of the author of the article, registered from May 7, 1999 to September 23, 2019, reflecting the information according to the following criteria: 1. Confessional affiliation of a religious organization: Islam, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Catholicism. 2. Spiritual Administration of Muslims: Central Spiritual Administration of Russia (CSAR), Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan (SAM RB). 3. Eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church: Ufa, Salavat, Neftekamsk, Birsk. 4. Type of Protestant religious

organization: conservative, late, Pentecostal. 5. Type of settlement: city, rural community, village, urban- village, closed administrative-territorial entity (CATE). 6. Cities of the Republic of Bashkortostan.

As of 23.09.2019, 1,683 religious organizations are registered in the Republic of Belarus. The author states that a fifth of the religious organizations registered today in the republic formalized their own activities in 2003. One of the reasons for this phenomenon was the enactment of the Law "On State Registration of Legal Entities and Individual Entrepreneurs" on July 1, 2002, which changed the procedure for registering companies. Almost 60 percent (58.7 percent) of religious organizations registered in 2003 were Muslim religious organizations, 31.4 percent were Orthodox, and about 10 percent were Protestant. In subsequent years, the predominance of Muslim religious organizations among religious organizations annually registered in Bashkortostan remained. The statistics of the Ministry of Justice correlate with the data of sociological studies, during which it was revealed that most of the population of the republic shares Islam.

In general, Muslim religious organizations, then Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic ones, occupy a leading position in the structure of all religious associations registered in the Republic of Bashkortostan. Muslim religious organizations made up 72.3 percent of all registered religious organizations, 41.7 percent belong to the CSA of the Russian Federation, 56.3 percent to the SAM of the Republic of Bashkortostan.

The author considers the dynamics of registration of religious organizations in the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Bashkortostan from 1999 to 2019. According to sociological monitoring data, about 42 percent of all religious organizations registered in the cities of the Republic of Bashkortostan are in Ufa, 8 percent in Sterlitamak, 6 percent in the cities of Neftekamsk and Oktyabrsky, other cities amounted to less than 5 percent. Of all religious organizations registered in

the regions of the Republic of Bashkortostan, the majority is located in the territories of Baymak (4.6 percent), Abzelilovsky (3.9 percent), Tuymazinsky (3.5 percent), Karmaskalinsky (3.1 percent), Ufa (3.0 percent) districts; the least of all registered - in the Kiginsky and Mishkinsky districts (0.6 percent).

Information on the dynamics and structure of religious organizations is the basis for understanding religious organizations as a social phenomenon, they are necessary for the interaction of state authorities and religious organizations, building a concept for the development of religious organizations in the Republic of Bashkortostan, as well as understanding the problems and causes of the activities carried out by religious organizations.

State-confessional policy of the Republic of Bashkortostan

In the article of the adviser on state-confessional relations under the Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan, senior teacher of the Bashkir State University R.D. Karamyshev [5], the mechanism of the state-confessional policy implementation of the republic is considered. As of 01.01.2020, it has 14 religious centers, 2,050 religious associations of various faiths, including 1,686 religious organizations and 364 religious groups. On the territory of Bashkortostan there are 1,433 Muslim religious associations that are divided between two spiritual centers: the CSGM of Russia, headed by the Supreme Mufti Talgat Tajuddin, unites 644 communities and the SAM of the Republic of Bashkortostan (mufti Ainur Birgalin) includes 789 communities. On the territory of the republic there are 1,057 standard mosques and 181 buildings adapted for mosques, 228 standard Orthodox churches and 92 buildings adapted for churches, 45 religious buildings and adapted places of other faiths. In total, without taking into account small single groups, there are 20 different religious directions in Bashkortostan.

State-confessional relations (SCR) in modern Russia suppose the presence of relations between state (federal and government bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation) and municipal institutions (local self-government bodies), ministries and departments with believers and their religious associations. As the author notes, state-confessional relations still do not have a single concept, despite numerous attempts to develop it. From a legal perspective, the model of SCR in Russia can be defined as a separation, i.e. religion is separated from the state. But, being an important regulator of public relations, religion cannot be separated from society and, from the point of view of modern political realities, the model of SCR in Russia is increasingly approaching the model of cooperation. The state today considers religious associations loyal to it, as its allies and colleagues, in the implementation of social and domestic policy, including: in organizing and supporting positive social action, working with the poor and needy, young people, military personnel and those deprived of their liberty, in preventing and combating negative social phenomena (alcoholism, drug addiction, crime), as well as extremism, terrorism and radicalism in a religious environment.

The main goals of modern state-confessional policy in the republic are: - compliance with federal and republican legislation on freedom of conscience and religious associations; - organization of the necessary interaction of state authorities and local self-government with religious associations, development of state-confessional cooperation; - preservation of interfaith peace and harmony, harmonization of interfaith relations.

At the present time, the state continues to play the greatest role in the confessional sphere of Bashkortostan through the implemented domestic policy. Issues of the implementation of state-confessional policy are addressed by the Council on State-Confessional Relations under the Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan. Among the main tasks of the Council: strengthening interfaith harmony; formation of equal attitude of

state bodies and officials towards religious organizations of different faiths; organization of methodological and advisory assistance on SCR issues to state authorities, local self-government and religious associations. One of the main activities of the Council is to increase the efficiency of state policy in the field of SCR and expand interaction with religious associations. The tasks of the Council are also: conducting systematic work with the clergy, providing assistance in the development of religious education, participation in advanced studies courses for state and municipal employees on improving the SCR, support for religious and social media covering the history, culture and activities of religious associations, supporting specialized scientific research, countering the manifestations of extremism, terrorism and the spread of radical ideologies in the religious environment on the territory of the republic. The Council constantly analyzes and monitors the religious situation in Bashkortostan, participates in the organization of interdepartmental interaction. In framework of implementation of the state-confessional policy, the Council relies on the Commission on Public-Confessional Relations and interaction with religious associations operating in municipal districts and urban districts (a total of 70 Commissions). The Commissions, along with representatives of faiths, include employees of state authorities, law enforcement agencies, the media, scientific communities, education and culture, enterprises and organizations. The main areas of work of the Commissions are the organization of cooperation between religious associations and believers with the authorities, countering the spread of xenophobia and extremism on religious grounds, prevention, peaceful resolution of conflict situations in the field of intra-denominational and inter-religious relations.

The Council implements a three-level system of religious monitoring and prompt response to confessional conflicts according to the following scheme: Commission - Head of the municipality - Council for the SCR - leadership of the Republic of

Bashkortostan. In addition, the Council pays special attention to gathering information on the religious situation through experts, opinion leaders, the scientific community and other sources, including the results of the FANA monitoring system in the field of interethnic and interfaith relations and early prevention of conflict situations. Interfaith relations still remain in the area of special attention of the state, since these relations can have a significant impact on the state of society, and during periods of their aggravation can be a factor in both stabilization and destabilization of the socio-political situation.

In the Republic of Bashkortostan, interfaith interaction in the field of cooperation with state and local authorities is developing in line with the Agreement on Social Partnership signed in 2015 between the Republic of Bashkortostan and the main faiths, which today are filled with real content. Spiritual leaders of the (main) faiths are given the opportunity to speak regularly on television, republican electronic and print media. The spiritual and educational television projects "Road to the Temple," "Yoma," "Al-Fatiha" are released on the BST TV channel.

The language of interfaith dialogue and cooperation has been developed and supported in the republic. Annual international, all-Russian and republican conferences are held, organized with the active participation of the main faiths: "The Ideals and Values of Islam in the Educational System of the 21st Century" (CSGM of Russia), "Tabyn Readings" (Bashkortostan Metropolitanate of the Russian Orthodox Church) and others. Youth confessional organizations jointly perform in significant social projects. During the period of restrictive anti-epidemiological measures (according to the COVID-19), "Orthodox Volunteers" of the Bashkortostan Metropolitanate of the Russian Orthodox Church, volunteers of the MSA RB and the CSGM of Russia, took part in the republican actions "We are together" and "Our care," and also organized targeted assistance to those in need. In 2019, the project "Development of volunteer

movements of youth departments of the MSA RB and the Ufa Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church” began within the framework of which training seminars and meetings of youth activists are held. In 2020, events were held dedicated to the “Day of Commemoration and Veneration” in the republic. By the forces of volunteer movements of the SAM of the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Bashkortostan Metropolitanate of the Russian Orthodox Church, volunteer clean ups were organized at general and religious cemeteries, special attention was paid to the burials of participants in the Great Patriotic War. At the initiative of the Council, three interfaith youth forums were held in the republic, with the participation of delegations (up to 100 people) of faithful youth (Orthodox, Muslims, Jews). The forums discussed topical issues of the volunteer, sports, military-patriotic movement, the prevention of radicalism and extremism, held competitions, discussions, mutual visits to temples and mosques.

In recent years, there have been carried out interdepartmental lectures on the prevention of extremism and radicalism in the religious environment in the republic on the basis of the Bashkir State Pedagogical University named after M. Akmulla. The work of lecture groups during 2015-2019 annually covered 15-20 municipal districts and cities. The lecture groups were attended by priests of the Russian Orthodox Church, teachers of the Russian Islamic University and imams of the SAM RB and the CSGM of Russia. According to the author of the article, the most effective in the context of maintaining interfaith peace and harmony in the republic are the forms of direct interaction between clergy and believers in various forums, actions, events and everyday life, which must be positively covered in the media and the Internet space. As a result of the analysis and constant monitoring of the religious situation in the republic carried out annually by the Council, it can be stated that there are no tensions in the field of state-confessional and inter-religious relations among residents and clergy of the main faiths

in the republic. This conclusion is confirmed by the results of scientific research in recent years. Scientists record a high level of tolerance and trust among believers of the faiths of the republic (in 2013 – 80 percent of Orthodox and 79.9 percent of Muslims). In 2018, many believers understand the need to live in a common country, the percentage of interethnic marriages is high (20 percent). The absolute majority of the surveyed residents of the republic (91.1 percent) in the course of sociological studies of the GAI “Center for Humanitarian Studies” of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Bashkortostan in 2017 assessed relations between representatives of various religions as positive (25.5 percent – friendly, 65.5 percent – normal, conflict-free). In 2018, 90.2 percent of respondents positively assessed interfaith relations, and in 2019 – again 91.1 percent. In 2020, the results of research by the IES USC RAS also demonstrate that the overwhelming number of respondents (Muslims – 89.1 percent, Orthodox – 84.6 percent) do not have a negative attitude towards traditional religions.

The author emphasizes that in interfaith and state-confessional interaction, relations are built largely on the basis of the medium- and long-term development prospects. The very nature of spiritual power exists in longer distances of social time, and the power of hierarchs is usually lifelong. The subjective factor of the relationship between spiritual leaders among themselves and with the officials responsible for the SCR in the region is of great importance in these conditions. That is why the degree of qualifications of employees, their knowledge and skills are significant, special training and continual improvement of competencies are needed.

The implementation of state-confessional policy, the researcher concludes, requires constant attention, serious sociological and analytical work, coordination of the activities of state authorities and various departments, the organization of the necessary interaction with religious associations and continues to

be a fairly dynamic, significant tool for the implementation of domestic policy at the regional and federal levels.

Conclusion

The Republic of Bashkortostan is in line with all-Russian trends, such as the revival of spirituality and respect for historical memory; the recognition by society of the important role of religion in the lives of many people; stabilizing the growth rate of the number of believers and religious communities; increasing the level and importance of general civil identity; close cooperation between the state and religious associations. Research results indicate that the overwhelming number of respondents (89.1 percent of Muslims and 84.6 percent of Orthodox) do not have a negative attitude towards traditional religions. However, the presence of conflict potential is demonstrated by 8.9 percent of Muslims and 15 percent of Orthodox, and this causes some concern. A significant number of respondents (65.3 percent of Muslims and 67.1 percent of Orthodox) have a negative attitude towards new religious movements.

An important role is played by work on the prevention of negative trends, as well as on the further improvement of state-confessional relations. It is necessary, the authors believe, to improve the qualifications in the field of state-confessional and interfaith relations for both believers, clergy, and civil servants, government officials, primarily municipal authority, because they are currently responsible for interethnic and interfaith peace and harmony at local level.

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ELENA DMITRIEVA. THE IMPACT OF THE SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN UKRAINE ON THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION IN THE CASPIAN REGION.
Condensed abstract.

Keywords: Russia, security, Caspian region, post-Soviet space, geopolitics, Special military Operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, national interests, USA.

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Dmitry A. Belashchenko, PhD(Hist.), Associate Professor and Vladimir V. Sikirazh, undergraduate, Institute of International Relations and World History of Lobachevsky University [1], analyzing the situation in the post-Soviet space in the 21st century, note its significant change associated with both the development of internal processes and the influence of external factors. The authors believe that the region is faced with fragmentation and a de facto split based on the confrontation of European and Eurasian integration projects (the “dilemma of integrations”), with numerous color revolutions, with the escalation of frozen conflicts and the emergence of new “hot spots”, with territorial changes and other serious shocks.

According to the authors, with the development of the crisis in Ukraine and the new stage of the “dilemma of integrations”, Russia's space for maneuver in the post-Soviet space was seriously narrowed and it faced the choice of a further model of behavior in the region. In the first variant, ignoring the constant interference of non-regional actors in the traditional geopolitical and geo-economic spheres for Russia (the Caucasus, the Caspian region, Central Asia, etc.) would eventually lead to the “resignation” of Russia without the prospect of their further

restoration. The second option assumed active resistance to the expansion of the collective West.

Russia's actions demonstrated that a bet was placed on the gradual implementation of the second option. However, this process was significantly complicated by the impact of the crisis in Ukraine, which aggravated the split of the post-Soviet space, and also affected the positions of the leadership of Moscow's key partners – Belarus and Kazakhstan. First of all, it concerned the perception in these countries of the events in the Crimea and Donbas, since the elites of the post-Soviet states have traditionally been wary of any geopolitical changes in the region.

In general, there are two key areas in which Russia has intensified its activities in the post-Soviet space. The first was directly related to the Ukrainian crisis, in which Moscow acted as one of the main actors, while not formally being a party to the conflict in the Donbas. The second direction of Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space was the implementation of the Eurasian integration project with the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. The intensification of the construction of the Union State of Russia and Belarus at the end of 2020 also deserves special mention. In addition, Russia has strengthened cooperation with its strategic non-regional partners within the SCO and BRICS, which also contributed to strengthening the status of the leader of the post-Soviet space.

Based on the analysis, the authors conclude that with the beginning of the Special military operation of the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine, the “stakes in the game” in the post-Soviet space were maximized. Both the future status of Russia and the balance of power in the post-Soviet space and in the current system of international relations as a whole largely depend on the outcome and final results of the current stage of the Ukrainian crisis. The prospect of the existence of the post-Soviet space as a single region depends precisely on the results of the SMO.

The article by Vladislav V. Kondratyev, Post-graduate student, Astrakhan State University. [2] dwells on the key aspects of the impact of the current events in Ukraine on the geopolitics and security of the Caspian region. The author believes that with the beginning of the Special Military Operation (SMO) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, the global world order that developed after the Second World War entered the stage of radical restructuring. Russia is moving from words to deeds, gradually increasing its activity to defend national interests along the perimeter of its borders. The first serious step in this direction was the 2008 operation in Georgia, and six years later Moscow did not allow the hostile political regime in Kiev to establish its presence on the western Russian borders. In 2020, Russia provided support to the leadership of Belarus during an acute political crisis. And in January 2022, the CSTO forces led by Russia did not allow destabilizing the situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan, with which Moscow has the longest land border in the world. In this regard, the actions of the Russian side in Ukraine in 2022 are a logical and predictable step in response to the hostile actions of the Ukrainian authorities.

In the emerging realities, according to the author, it is important to understand how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will affect the situation in the Caspian region - one of the most important and complex from the point of view of geopolitics and geo-economics. If from the middle of the 18th century to the 1990s of the 20th century. Russia, and then the USSR, together with Iran, actually "controlled" the Caspian region, then as a result of the appearance on the world map of "new" independent Caspian littoral states - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - the transformation of the Caspian geopolitical space took place. The Caspian countries faced a number of unresolved problems: the international legal status of the Caspian Sea, a complex of national and regional problems of political, economic, social and environmental nature, an increase in the conflict potential of the

region, the processes of militarization of the Caspian Sea due to the active rearmament of the naval forces of the Caspian states.

The new stage of hydrocarbon production in the Caspian Sea, which began in the first half of the 1990s, aroused geopolitical interest among the world's leading countries. American companies were among the first to come to the Caspian region. Further, the European Union, China, India, Turkey, Arab countries, etc. showed interest in the region.

Ukraine also had a certain influence on the geopolitical situation in the Caspian region. After the aggravation of Russian-Ukrainian relations in 2013–2014, the well-established transport and logistics ties between Ukraine and its trading partners in the post-Soviet space were disrupted. Ukraine was no longer able to use Russia's transport infrastructure to supply goods to the Central Asian and South Caucasus countries, and its trade with Iran was also significantly hampered. Kiev was forced to step up the search for new areas of trade with its partners that would exclude the need to use Russian territory. At that time, Ukraine had high hopes for relations with Iran, from which a number of sanctions were lifted at that time. The trade turnover between Iran and Ukraine has started to grow steadily. Transport, energy and agriculture have become the most dynamically developing spheres of cooperation between the states.

With the participation of Ukrainian and Iranian transport companies, the development of a number of promising international transport corridors (ITCs) has begun. As an example, the South-West corridor created by India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Poland can be cited. This project is a direct competitor to the North-South ITC passing through Russia. At the same time, the Ukrainian side took measures to become a member of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which involves the development of trade and economic ties between China and the European Union countries by transit through the territory of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, bypassing the Russian territory. Ukrainian officials

have begun work on cooperation between the railways of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine to develop a railway route from China to Europe via the Caspian Sea. With the help of Azerbaijani ferries in the Caspian Sea and Ukrainian ferries in the Black Sea, it was supposed to develop a single route and send all cargo from the Caspian Sea through Ukraine.

The Ukrainian side also pinned certain hopes on cooperation with Turkmenistan, whose leadership in recent years has been actively working on the development of transit transport infrastructure designed to deliver goods to the countries of Central and South Asia, primarily to Afghanistan. However, the SMO, which began in February 2022, nullifies in the foreseeable future all Kiev's efforts to integrate into the scheme of transport and logistics routes on the Caspian Sea.

Another important issue in the context of Russia's conduct of the SMO in Ukraine is the prospects for the development of relations with partners in the Caspian region. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia will contribute to the deepening of relations between Moscow and Tehran. The spiritual leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, indirectly expressed understanding and support for the motives that prompted Moscow to make the decision to conduct the SMO in Ukraine. And following the results of the Iranian President's visit to Moscow at the end of January 2022, it should be expected that Russia and Iran will significantly increase trade in the near future.

As for Russia's immediate neighbors in the region, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, further cooperation should also be expected here. Moscow's recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics did not become an obstacle for the head of Azerbaijan to sign a Declaration on allied cooperation with Russia. Kazakhstan has taken a neutral position in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but the country's authorities do not refuse further cooperation with Moscow in the Caspian Sea in the field of extraction and processing of Caspian oil and gas resources.

When analyzing the impact of Ukrainian events on the situation in the Caspian Sea, one should also take into account the factor of the US regional policy, which is likely to be used to enhance cooperation with the countries of the region in the trade and economic sphere, as well as on security issues. A few days after the start of the SMO, on the initiative of the American side, a high-level online meeting was held in the C 5+1 format with the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan M. Tleuberdi, the heads of the Foreign Ministries of Kyrgyzstan R. Kazakbayev, Tajikistan S. Mukhriddin, Uzbekistan A. Kamilov and US Secretary of State E. Blinken. The details of the discussion were not covered, however, according to the Kazakh Foreign Ministry, the parties discussed topical issues of the international and regional agenda, including the situation in Ukraine and its impact on the Central Asian region. It is possible to get an idea of the tone of the negotiations based on the assessments given by American experts on the Caspian region. A former American diplomat, and now a member of the Board of Trustees of the Caspian Political Center R. Hoagland said that the independent countries of the Caspian region are in danger of extinction, need immediate protection and the moment has come when the US government should show them support and, against the background of the events taking place in Ukraine, should take real actions to strengthen its political and economic positions in the Caspian.

Summing up the above, the author of the article draws the following conclusions:

Firstly, the armed conflict in Ukraine draws a line under Kiev's efforts to gain a foothold in the Caspian Sea as a trading partner of the countries of the region.

Secondly, the events in Ukraine are likely to contribute to a significant deepening of Russian-Iranian cooperation, both in the Caspian region and in other areas.

Thirdly, Russia's traditional partners in the region – Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan – can benefit from the large Russian business that has fallen under sanctions, which will

be interested in new major economic projects with the Caspian countries.

Fourth, it should be expected that the United States, in order to preserve the geopolitical positions created in the Caspian Sea over the past three decades, will intensify contacts with the countries of the Caspian region, the South Caucasus and Central Asia on economic cooperation and security issues to prevent their transition into the sphere of influence of Russia.

VALENTINA SCHEMSNOVICH. SOCIO-POLITICAL
INSTABILITY IN KAZAKHSTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN.
Condensed abstract.

*Keywords: Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan;
socio-political instability; Islam; elite splits;
opposition; development forecasts;
destabilization; economy; labor migration;
interethnic conflicts.*

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E.A. Ivanov and S.Yu. Malkov [1], researches from HSE University, analyze socio-political situation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and offer scenarios of future developments. For the medium term (2021–2025), the authors expect further socio-political destabilization in the countries of the former USSR, where political and economic modernization fails to keep pace with world leaders. It is obvious that the change of generations of political elites and the transformation of regimes are followed by developments in other areas.

Today, a controlled transfer of power is ongoing in Kazakhstan. Having stepped down from the Presidency, Nursultan Nazarbayev retains the key control levers in the country, thus ensuring political stability for the time being. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan faces new challenges, which may require original solutions and fundamental changes in the country. Kyrgyzstan lacks Kazakhstan's political stability and the ability of the elites to achieve a lasting consensus. Kyrgyzstan should consolidate its statehood. The issues of distribution of power should be addressed not by means of 'street democracy', but through established institutions and practices. Among other things, the economy of Kyrgyzstan lacks Kazakhstan's margin of safety.

The authors note that the political systems of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan received a modernization impulse while still part of the USSR. However, further development was hampered by the transition period from a planned economy to a market economy, from Soviet semi-isolation to openness, and from an analog technological practice to a digital one. The political regime of Kazakhstan is based on the policy of centralization and stability. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan is a state with a fragmented society and highly turbulent political processes. The authors consider major division lines, which can cause socio-political destabilization in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the coming years.

Since the mid-2000s, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have managed to reduce income inequality. Despite this, in Kazakhstan, a segment of wealthy businessmen has been formed

due to resource rent. There are fewer entrepreneurs of this magnitude in Kyrgyzstan, though in terms of GDP its economy is 20–30 times smaller than Kazakhstan's.

The authors emphasize that due to complicated global political and economic situation, a sharp decline in the standards of living is expected in many countries. There are various possibilities for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to counter negative trends. Kazakhstan endeavors to equalize life in urban and rural areas, to implement better targeted assistance, but has not yet yielded the desired results. In Kazakhstan efforts are winding down due to the fact that the republic's economy is largely dependent on the export of hydrocarbons and metals. Moreover, today these countries can hardly qualify for international assistance. Central Asia is not a priority region for Western countries, and assistance from China is fraught with aggravation of long-term credit obligations. This situation, however, provides an opportunity for the Arab Gulf countries to strengthen their influence in Central Asia, though in return for their assistance the Gulf monarchies will demand Islamization policy, which is fraught with social and ideological difficulties.

Considering the division between Islam and secularism, the authors note that in the post-Soviet period, many people retained certain religiosity, even though ideology and materialistic approach crowded out religious consciousness; some centers of Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and other religions survived all the repressions. During the period of active de-secularization, two major dissensions began to take shape. In the 1990s, the first rift was between Soviet atheists and supporters of clericalization; it was more common in Central Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The second rift was between the 'old type' believers and the adherents of new interpretations of religious precepts; it greatly affected the states and regions where most of the inhabitants are so-called ethnic believers. These communities retained vestiges of their own religious traditions, e.g. Muslim traditions; having survived the Soviet period and merged with local traditions, this

version of Islam has become 'folk religion'. Having had the opportunity to be educated in world Islamic centers, i.e. Egypt, Syria, etc., the younger generations came into conflict with the older generations back home, whose understanding of Islam was regarded by the youth as a wrong one.

In Kazakhstan, Islamization proceeded at a more subdued pace than in Kyrgyzstan, which at the state level proved to be unable to contain spontaneous Islamization and the spread of radical and extremist ideas that followed. For a long time, organizations that were recognized as extremist in a number of countries, including Russia, continued to operate in Kyrgyzstan. The rise of Islamic State (IS; banned in Russia) in Syria and Iraq has exposed the depth of these problems. Many citizens of Kyrgyzstan – some of them labor migrants who worked in Russia – were recruited by IS supporters and left to fight in the Middle East. The outflow of radicals from Kazakhstan to IS was not large, but it showed that there were radical cells and lone radicals in the country. The western and southern regions are at greatest risk, since that is where imported radical ideas infiltrated the country. In addition, in Kazakhstan, there are two types of youth: moderately religious/non-religious urban youth, looking up to the West or developed countries of Asia; and religious youth involved with world Islamic centers, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. Therefore, in Kazakhstan, the rift between secularism and religion (Islam) may be deeper than in Kyrgyzstan, where the level of Islamization is higher. At the same time, in Kyrgyzstan, the risks of destabilization associated with radicals and extremists are significantly higher.

Researchers also examine intra-elite splits. By 2021, Kazakhstan had been in a state of a controlled 'soft' transfer of power for two years: from a personalistic regime headed by Nursultan Nazarbayev to different patterns of configuration of political institutions and elite groups. As president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev supports moderate changes of the political regime with respect for the legacy of N. Nazarbayev. In order to

make the transfer of power smoother and allow the opposition to vent, the Tokayev administration is conducting targeted political liberalization. For the time being, Tokayev retains the foundations of the established political system, working to revitalize it through personnel replacements and introduction of new management approaches. However, the authors are not sure whether Tokayev's presidency is a transitional period or whether it is a foundation for the entire future political system.

In 2020, there was the third revolution in Kyrgyzstan, this time in October. Sixteen political parties took part in the parliamentary elections, many of which were in opposition to the current government and enjoyed widespread public support. Following the announcement of the preliminary election results, protestors began to gather in the center of Bishkek. The storming of government buildings resulted in clashes with the police and the subsequent escalation of violence. Politician Sadyr Japarov, who was leading the protests, and his supporters managed to cancel the results of the October elections, forced Sooronbay Jeenbekov to resign from the presidency and secured new presidential and parliamentary elections. In the near future, the stability of the political system of Kyrgyzstan will depend on compromises between local elites.

As far as the issues of foreign policy are concerned, the authors note that Kazakhstan carries out a balanced foreign policy. Russia remains the main trading partner of Kazakhstan, ahead even of China, which continues its active expansion in world markets. The authors believe that Kazakhstan should stay the course, viz. diversify the range of foreign partners while maintaining positive relationships with everyone. In the medium term, Kazakhstan might become a state dominated by ethnic Kazakhs, for whom independence and self-sufficiency of their country is a priority.

The authors point out that the choice of foreign policy is of great importance for the people of Kyrgyzstan. The authors conditionally outline three main parties, as follows:

– The ‘party of migration’, which promotes the idea of Eurasian integration with Russia and Kazakhstan. In general, citizens of Kyrgyzstan support rapprochement with Russia: over 80 percent of respondents are positive about the EAEU.

– The ‘re-export party’ or ‘smuggling party’, whose economic basis is made up of entrepreneurs and businesses related to the import of goods from China in violation of the law.

– The ‘Liberal Democracy Party’ or ‘NPO Party’ leans towards the West, primarily the US and the EU. Representatives of this party make an extensive use of the media to create an ideological platform for a loyal segment from among the most active and educated part of society.

In conclusion, the authors speak about the peculiarities of the socio-political situation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and offer some development forecasts. There is a large potential for socio-political destabilization in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The split in Kazakhstan is mainly caused by socio-economic and intra-elite factors.

In Kyrgyzstan, the situation is different from the one in Kazakhstan. If in Kazakhstan splits have practically no effect on the public political field, in Kyrgyzstan around each split there is a coalition of interested players, i.e. politicians, parties and their sponsors. At present, there are two major splits in Kyrgyzstan: a regional one (North vs. South) and an intra-elite one (clans of the North vs. clans of the South). Apparently, Kyrgyzstan is going to remain a pocket of instability until the country manages to achieve political and economic balance and sustain it for the next 10–15 years.

M.V. Sharueva [2], PhD(Law), Russian State University for the Humanities, examines the economic consequences of coups d’état in Kyrgyzstan; the predominance of the clan system and distinction between northern and southern political elites; the policy of maneuvering, which Kyrgyz leaders have resorted to on many occasions when forced to seek a compromise between various pressure groups within the country and abroad. While emphasizing the importance of interethnic relations for steady

economic development, the author points out the risk factors that Kyrgyzstan has to face.

The thirtieth anniversary of independence (1991) represents the opportunity to draw some conclusions. The author analyzes economic achievements and losses of the country, as well as identifies the main trends of social and economic development of Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s–2010s. Hundreds of plants and factories in the country were closed because the goods manufactured turned out to be redundant in the new conditions. Only extractive industries survived, since oil, gas and metals were in high demand abroad. In December 1998, Kyrgyzstan became the first post-Soviet country to join the WTO. In order to expedite the entry procedure, the authorities of the republic made unprecedented concessions in the sphere of trade in goods and services, including banking. This allowed international companies and organizations to actually capture all niches in the country's national market. Foreign investments were much less than anticipated; moreover, the authorities of the republic were no longer able to protect the national market and manufacturers failed to compete with cheap and high-quality imports.

The author notes that there still were achievements in the 1990s. In no time, high-tech plants and factories were built with the use of foreign investments. The economy gradually adapted to the market rules, but steady development of the republic was impeded by political events. The state entered an era when presidents were changed as in a game of musical chairs; each new president canceled all the reforms of his predecessors, sometimes even efficient ones, and introduced yet another development path. Interethnic contradictions, along with corruption, organized crime and political and economic uncertainty, have caused serious damage to the national economy. The south of Kyrgyzstan, home for about 1 million ethnic Uzbeks, can be explosive in terms of ethnopolitics; typically, interethnic conflicts are caused by an economic factor. Since the Uzbeks control local businesses, they enjoy a higher standard of living than the

Kyrgyz. The mutual grievances of the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz result in multiple conflicts with a large number of dead and wounded on both sides. Sometimes it even comes to military clashes on the border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

In the future, the situation in the republic might be further aggravated due to geopolitical factors. The Taliban (banned in Russia) have already instigated several armed conflicts with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the immediate neighbors of Kyrgyzstan; the republic itself might fall prey to the subsequent expansion of the Taliban.

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

VLADIMIR AVATKOV, VASILY OSTANIN-GOLOVNYA.
RELIGIOUS FACTOR AND MOSLEM PILGRIMAGE IN
RUSSIAN-SAUDI RELATIONS

*Keywords: Saudi Arabia; Russia;
Post-Soviet East; religious factor;
Russian-Saudi relations; Hajj.*

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Abstract. In the 21st century, the religious factor began to play an increasingly significant role in world politics. This can be seen both in global and regional processes, and at the level of individual countries. The relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia are a confirmation of

this thesis. Despite certain differences on a number of issues, Moscow and Riyadh have maintained close contacts since the early 1990s. The religious factor played an important role in the development of Russian-Saudi relations. After the collapse of the USSR, the Moslem peoples of Russia and the post-Soviet East were given the opportunity to make pilgrimages to the holy places of Islam in Saudi Arabia, which was directly reflected in the state policy of both countries.

At the present stage, Saudi Arabia is among the “heavyweights” of the Middle East and is one of the contenders for regional leadership. At the same time, the kingdom, on the territory of which Mecca and Medina, sacred to Islam, are located, positions itself as the natural center of the “Moslem world”. With an emphasis on economic potential, Riyadh develops its foreign policy, according to these logics, through two vectors: *regional* (striving for the status of the leading state of the Arab East and the hegemon in the Persian Gulf zone) and *general Moslem* (strengthening the image of the “homeland of Islam” and the main defender of Islamic values in the world)¹. In the second direction, special attention is paid to countries where the vast majority or a significant part of the population is represented by Moslem peoples. Russia is among such countries too: according to official data, more than 6 percent of citizens in 2022 consider themselves followers of the Moslem faith², and at the end of 2019 more than 19 percent of registered religious organizations in the Russian Federation belong to Islamic confessions³). And although today Russian-Saudi relations are actively developing in many areas, the religious factor plays a special role in them.

Relations between the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia, by historical standards, have a short, but very interesting and complicated history. Formally, they began in 1926, when Soviet Russia was the first in the world to recognize the independence of the kingdom of the Al Saud dynasty, which fought for the unification of Arabia. In fact, bilateral relations between Moscow and Riyadh were actively developed after 1991,

since in the period from 1938 to 1990 the USSR and the KSA did not maintain direct and permanent diplomatic contacts. The formation of political interaction took place in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, which were marked by a series of "crises" against the background of conflicts in the North Caucasus and the Balkans. After the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, the Gulf monarchies were able to interact directly with the Moslem communities of certain regions of the Russian Federation and the new independent republics. Naturally, this interaction took place not only at the official level, along with the construction of mosques and spiritual centers with Saudi money, the penetration of various Islamist structures adhering to extremist ideology began.

Not only the Caucasus, but also the Moslem communities of the Turkic peoples of Russia fell under the blow of those who were dubbed "fundamentalists" courtesy of journalists, as a result of which an increase in anti-Moslem sentiments began to be observed in the country. In his monograph, R.G. Landa states that in 1992-1993, 60 percent of respondents in Moscow considered Islam a greater threat than the expansion of the West⁵. With the beginning of the First Chechen campaign of 1994-1996, the first difficulties began in Russian-Saudi relations due to the opposite positions on the situation. Riyadh was accused of spreading "Wahhabi" ideology and sponsoring separatists in the North Caucasus, which was especially aggravated against the background of the KSA's concern about the "fate of Kosovo Albanian Moslems" during the Yugoslav wars⁶.

Isolated cases of the kingdom's subjects participating in hostilities on the side of extremists and separatists certainly took place. However, by and large, anti-Saudi alarmism was superficial and one-sided. This is evidenced, at least, by the fact that the activities of the Islamist movement of Fethullah Gulen, which had truly impressive scales in the post-Soviet space during the 1990s-2000s, remained practically ignored⁷. Moreover, the influence on the Moslem republics of the Post-Soviet East was

exerted through the official state structures of Turkey. The Department of Religious Affairs “Diyaneet”, whose activities are regulated by Article 136 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey⁸, has also actively promoted the popularization of Islam among the Turkic peoples of Russia and Central Asia since the collapse of the USSR.

* * *

For historical reasons, the political course, image and very essence of Saudi Arabia are inextricably linked with Islam, because its very statehood arose thanks to the alliance of the Al Saud clan with the theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (the founder of the Hanbali-Salafi (Wahhabi) trend), which was concluded in 1744/45⁹ after the proclamation of a single kingdom in 1932. Saudis and the family of descendants of M. ibn Abd al-Wahhab created a kind of ruling “tandem”, where political power belongs to the first, and the leading role in religious and theological affairs belongs to the second¹⁰. Islam has had and is having a direct impact on the political course of Saudi Arabia, but it can be accused of sponsoring international terrorism at the state level only for indirect and rather dubious reasons. After the terrorist attack with the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979 by a group of radical Salafists, the Saudi leadership began the fight against extremism and proclaimed the course of “moderation”. In the second half of the 1990s there was a split of the main opposition faction of Islamists as-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (“Islamic Awakening”), as a result of which one of the three factions took a Salafist-jihadist position¹¹. However, despite the fight against terrorism inside the country, Riyadh maintained contact with some dubious movements in neighboring regions.

The catalyst for bringing the external course into line with the internal was the tragic events of September 11, 2001. After the publication of the data of the American intelligence services that

out of 19 terrorists who hijacked planes, 15 were subjects of the kingdom¹², the Saudi establishment focused on protecting the reputation of the “Wahhabi kingdom”, and it was for this reason that the KSA initiated an emergency session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)¹³ at the level of foreign ministers on terrorism, which was held in the capital Malaysia Kuala Lumpur April 1–3, 2002¹⁴. In addition to the obvious reasons, the adoption of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism, which proclaimed the principle of “Islamic solidarity”¹⁵, was necessary for Saudi Arabia to maintain normal ties within the “Moslem world”, to which the kingdom is directly responsible for the possibility of performing pilgrimage – one of the key cult practices that are among the so-called “pillars of Islam” (Arabic. (مأسال ان الكراً).

Hajj and umrah (small pilgrimage) are of particular importance not only for the Islamic faith, but also for the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia. The organization of pilgrimage plays an important role both in the economy and in the “soft power” of the kingdom. **On the one hand, the annual influx of pilgrims provides an influx of finances.** In 2017, *umrah* alone brought more than \$4 billion to the KSA budget, and *hajj* – about \$8 billion, which, according to some experts and analysts, makes this industry the second largest source of income after the export of hydrocarbons¹⁶. **On the other hand, the “hajj industry” involves building a complex logistics system covering all parts of the “Moslem world”.** Visas for *hajj* and *umrah* are issued by the consulates of Saudi Arabia, and an application for its receipt is submitted through travel agencies licensed by the relevant Ministry of the KSA¹⁷. Thus, Riyadh in interstate relations, in addition to interaction at the level of official departments, has extensive ties in the field of public diplomacy, which are based on religious issues.

Despite the significant liberalization of visa policy within the framework of the Vision 2030 program, visas for pilgrims remain a special category. Based on a number of OIC agreements,

Saudi Arabia sets quotas for visits to Mecca and Medina for each year, assuming one thousand pilgrims per one million of the entire Moslem population of the country, but due to statistical errors and other factors, the Saudi leadership approaches this issue quite flexibly. The Russian Federation, being an observer country of the OIC since 2005, also has its own quota for *hajj* and *umrah*, it is determined through the Hajj Mission of Russia through the embassies and the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah of the KSA. Officially, there are eight licensed operators in the Russian Federation engaged in the organization of pilgrimage¹⁸: AVN TOUR, BULGAR TOUR, DUM RT HAJJ, Marva Tour, Moslem Tour, Safa Tour, Umma Travel and TF KAVKAZ. The official quota for Russian Moslems is twenty and a half thousand people per year, but, as a rule, this number, in agreement with the OIC, changes upwards. For example, before the introduction of coronavirus restrictions in 2019, twenty five thousand believers went on pilgrimage from Russia¹⁹.

* * *

It cannot be said that Russian-Saudi relations are developing exclusively in a positive way. Crises similar to those that arose during the 1990s – 2000s periodically arise at the present stage. Discrepancies between Moscow and Riyadh were observed against the background of the “Arab Spring” of the 2010s, the Syrian conflict in 2015 and the “price wars” for oil quotes on the world market in 2020. However, each such episode was necessarily followed by a process of “détente”, which would have been impossible without maintaining a constant dialogue.

Regardless of the state of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia, issues related to the organization of the pilgrimage of Russian Moslems to Mecca and Medina remained a constant of direct contacts. At the same time, *hajj* is an important element in building Russia’s relations not only with the Saudi Kingdom, but also with the “Moslem world”.

Intercivilizational dialogue is necessary both for the prevention of confessional and ethnic conflicts within the country, and for building a deeper, culturally specific policy of Moscow in the Post-Soviet East, where, since the 1990s, the Islamic factor has been playing an increasingly important role every year.

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KANYBEK KUDAYAROV. INTRODUCTION TO TURKEY'S DEFENSE POLICY. *Analytical Review*.

Keywords: Turkey; defense policy; defense industry; armament; military conflict; security.

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Abstract. The review analyzes the publications of nine Turkish specialists who give an idea of the modern defense policy of Turkey, the main stages of its development and implementation. The authors provide comprehensive theoretical and practical information for a better understanding of the processes taking place in the military sphere.

Much attention is paid to the domestic and foreign policy processes that predetermined the further development of the Turkish defense policy, the ultimate goal of which is to transform the Republic of Turkey into a strong regional power. Strategic autonomy, which official Ankara seeks both in the field of military-industrial production and in other sectors of the state's life, is an indispensable condition for achieving this goal.

The studies described in the review claim to make an important contribution to understanding the logic that the Turkish leadership adheres to in implementing its regional policy.

Introduction

In recent years, defense policy and strategies for its implementation have become an increasingly popular topic for discussion not only in the expert and scientific circles of Turkey, but also attract the attention of the general public. The rapid development of the Turkish military-industrial complex and certain technical achievements in the national defense sector give reason to believe that a big breakthrough has been achieved in this direction. The emerging trend towards strengthening military power occurred several decades ago, and according to some sources much earlier, being a natural reaction of the Turkish authorities to external and internal threats to national security. The current geopolitical situation along the perimeter of Turkey's external borders has only accelerated the processes and shaped the coverage of this issue in its dynamics, without paying due attention to its introductory part and the origins of the formation of this discourse. It is this fact that became the reason for writing this book by a team of Turkish experts who fill in some gaps in the coverage of this issue.

A team of authors led by Ferhat Pirincci and Murat Eschiltas conducted a study of Turkey's defense policy. Among the affected aspects are such as defense and international security (Ryfay Yengel), defense and armament relations (Ferhat Pirincci), defense economy (Selami Sezgin), defense planning (Mehmet

Hilmi Ozdemir and Nursima Shankulubey Baikal), new defense technologies (Ercyment Karapynar), the history of the Turkish defense industry until 1974 (Husnyu Ezlu), the development of the Turkish defense industry in 1974–2020 (Merv Saren), Turkish defense strategies (Murat Aslan), Turkish policy in the field of military partnership and defense cooperation (Ryf fat Yengel), as well as Turkey's military and defense strategies (Murat Eshiltas).

Defense and international security

Ryf fat Yengel, a doctoral student at the Middle East Technical University (Ankara, Turkey), believes that from the point of view of ensuring security, the multipolar system of the world order seems to be more stable compared to the unipolar one. Since the first, in his opinion, reduces the risk of conflict and expands the scope of possible cooperation. Yengel explains his position with three points: firstly, as the number of independent participants in multipolar systems increases, the number of compromises will increase, and the opportunities for cooperation will expand, reducing the risk of conflict. Secondly, an increase in the number of major powers in the system will reduce the risk of conflict by raising the threshold of tension, as these states will disperse their focuses. For example, as it was between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War. In addition to the security aspect, there was also an acute struggle that turned the opposite camp into a hostile one. Since there was no other force that could challenge the material capabilities of these states, all their attention was focused on each other. Thirdly, it will be easier to balance the behavior of actors with the help of alliances, since the system assumes the presence of many major powers. Thus, the trends in the field of arms buildup will slow down and the likelihood of a possible conflict between the parties will decrease, thanks to the alliances and allies that will play a deterrent role.

According to the second point of view, bipolar systems are more stable compared to multipolar ones and focus more on the

dynamics of allied relations. According to this point of view, the more large powers there are in the system, the more uncertainty and unreliability. While in multipolar systems, large countries will have to spend time and resources on coordinating actions with allies and managing the alliance, in bipolar systems they can create their own strategies in accordance with their own calculations [1, p. 12]. In bipolar systems, small states are more dependent on superpowers for security and cannot pursue an independent policy. In a unipolar world, the hegemon country determines the security zone based on its own interests. Regardless of the behavior of the hegemon, other states will distrust the hegemon because of the excessive asymmetry of power and the resulting sense of insecurity. This encourages other States to increase their power or create counter-coalitions.

The reason for the emergence of wars is largely explained by the anarchy prevailing in the international system, where there is no entity with incomparably greater power than others and able to deter other states from using force. In this case, conflicts between states will have a long-term character and are capable of escalating into a full-scale war due to the absence of deterrent factors [1, p. 16]. One of the reasons for the emergence of wars is the creation of a situation called the "Thucydides trap", i.e. there is a situation when a rapidly developing state in economic and military terms begins to pressure other (developed) states, challenging their rights to a certain privileged subjectivity in international relations. As a result, an environment As a result, a competitive environment in all respects is formed, there is a confrontation between new and old geopolitical forces that are relatively equal in power [1, p. 16], which quite naturally can turn into a war. As an example, it is appropriate to cite the nature and dynamics of relations between China and the United States, which, according to the author, will certainly fall into the "Thucydides trap". The author comes to the conclusion that there is no formula that could guarantee to prevent war.

Defense and armament relations

Ferhat Pirincci (Uludag University, Bursa, Turkey) believes that armament appears to be one of the most important tools of defense policy if viewed in the context of national and international security. There is an undeniable relationship between defense, weapons and wars. Among the large number of threats to the security of states, wars are the greatest danger. To counter such threats, states are strengthening their defense potential through active armament. Armament has been one of the main areas for cooperation in the international arena since the twentieth century. The development of weapons technology has significantly increased the importance of defense in security policy.

The relationship between defense and armament is explained by the fact that states arm themselves to ensure internal stability, but over time they also begin to worry about the external factor associated with unresolved problems both along the outer perimeter of their borders (territorial disputes, ideological conflicts, historical hostility, etc.) and in a wider geographical area. Thus, armament becomes not just a goal, but a means of ensuring protection and security [2, p. 47].

The arming of one state can be perceived as a signal to activate a similar process in the opposing state and lead to a certain arms race. By the arms race, the author understands the competition between two or more states for military superiority. This competition can be caused by both existing security problems and other objective and subjective reasons: for example, distrust and hostility between certain states. The model developed by Lewis F. Richardson for elucidating the arms race in the First World War, made an important contribution to this concept. Taking into account the activities of the main countries in the field of armaments, Richardson predicted that if armament prevails over trade, the arms race will progress and after a while will cause a war between the parties. Under the influence of Richardson's behavioral school, many mathematical analyses of

the arms race in international relations have been carried out. An arms race leads to an alliance, and alliances in turn exacerbate the arms race. Thucydides in the "Peloponnesian Wars" placed special emphasis on alliances and the arms race between Sparta and Athens. According to Thucydides, Sparta perceived the strengthening of Athens and the creation of alliances as a threat to itself and turned to increasing its military power and making alliances in order to maintain its influence. Thucydides' work emphasizes that such a policy (meaning the arms race between Sparta and Athens, the establishment of alliances, deterrence, and much more) played an important role in the emergence of the war [2, p. 50]. Research at the theoretical level shows that armaments and alliances eventually lead to war between rival powers. Moreover, the side that is afraid of losing its superiority in the arms race resorts to war and considers it necessary to neutralize the enemy while there are military capabilities for this.

Methods of armament are also an important aspect in the arms race. From ancient times until today, weapons have been considered the most important tool for protecting against threats. With regard to the domestic production of weapons, we can say that two points are important here: 1) states are not able to meet their defense needs and at the same time keep up with the pace of development of weapons technologies, while not having the necessary economic potential, since research and development work in the military field requires very large financial injections, and weapons systems produced as a result of each undertaken project cannot always give the desired result. Consequently, if the state does not have sufficient technologies and funds for their development and improvement, then it remains only to purchase weapons, which, of course, is less costly [2, p. 60]. As an exception, it is worth mentioning Mexico, which has the necessary economic and technological infrastructure for the production of basic weapons systems, but does not produce it; 2) many states continue their initiatives for the domestic production of weapons, despite these costs. By 1945 Only the

USA, USSR, Great Britain, Canada and Sweden produced these weapons systems. However, by the 1980s, more than 50 countries of the world had made attempts to develop basic weapons systems with the help of the domestic defense industry. Here there is a dilemma between economic and strategic calculations of the costs incurred by states. Strategically, this is justified, since the state that produces its own weapons is more independent in the foreign policy field. Despite the economic burden, the developed domestic defense industry can positively affect the economic development of the country by expanding the export line at the expense of military products. Another significant advantage is that the military industry gives impetus to the development of other economic sectors of the state. One of the methods of production of weapons is the licensed one, which allows not only to save significant funds to the state—the acquirer of the license, but also in the future to produce their weapons based on the experience gained through licensed production. Another method of arms production is the organization of joint production with the technology-owning country. However, this method is less common than the first one. States usually acquire the missing types of weapons abroad. The arms trade involves a seller, a supplier and a buyer. It should be borne in mind that the selling countries and the buying states cooperate only if there is no confrontation between them. Almost all arms-producing countries have reached the fourth technological generation in the production of military products and the 11th stage in the field of armaments. In the sale of weapons, suppliers are often guided not only by economic, but also by political and strategic goals. In the case of the sale of military products, cooperation does not end there, since it is also required to conduct instruction on its use, organize trainings, and carry out timely modernization of weapons. Among the goals of the arms supplier countries, it is worth noting their desire to influence the buyer country, including as a lever of pressure on the host country [2, p. 65]. Among other benefits, we note that in the case of the sale of

weapons to a country at war with another state, the manufacturer has the opportunity to directly check the technical characteristics of new weapons, without personally entering into conflicts on the one hand, and saving on R&D on the other [2, p. 66].

Defense economy

Selami Sezgin (Siirt University, Siirt, Turkey) believes that the importance and necessity of the defense economy increased in the late 1980s - early 1990s. Defense demand, the arms race, military procurement, military personnel, arms trade, defense industry, development and defense relations are the most researched topics in the defense economy. There are many studies examining the balance between defense spending and employment; the relationship between the development of the defense sector and regional development, etc. At the same time, empirical studies have not been conducted on the impact of defense spending on the volume of borrowings of a military-technical and technological nature in Turkey. However, it was found that total defense spending, including spending on defense equipment, did not affect the volume of borrowing, with the exception of borrowing related to the import of weapons [3, p. 79].

Demand for defense. There are many models that explain the determinants of defense spending. External security issues are not the main concern of defense in developing countries, giving way to internal security issues. Although defense spending in Turkey has been going on for many years, internal rather than external threats have been predominant. The most important factors determining defense spending are budget capabilities and the degree of limited resources. The main determinants of government spending are. The country's GDP and the income of the population. Defense expenditures are determined in accordance with the income and structure of the country's population [3, p. 83]. Many studies have been conducted to identify the main factors that make up defense spending in

Turkey. According to a study covering the period 1949-1998, national defense spending is determined by NATO defense spending, as well as threats to Turkey from Greece. However, in recent years, the Greek threat has given way to the terrorist threat (both inside and outside the state) as a factor determining defense spending. According to research conducted in Greece, Turkey's defense spending appears to still be the main determinant of official Athens' defense spending.

As you know, countries with a developed and effective defense industry are precisely highly developed countries in which the military-industrial branch is developing as a certain sector aimed at meeting the domestic needs of the country in the products of the military-industrial complex. The analysis of the defense industry is complicated by the fact that it is a complex structure in which combined types of economic activities are concentrated. An important distinguishing feature of such enterprises / companies is that they produce products for the state and, thanks to this, monopsonal markets are formed. Defense enterprises should be considered not only as enterprises for the production of weapons, but also as an important part of the military-industrial complex, which determines the level of defense spending. From this point of view, the defense industry plays a very important role in protecting the country [3, p. 90].

Today, Turkish defense companies are among the top hundred in the world. In the rating of the magazine "Defense News" for 2020, the number of Turkish defense companies reached 7. Aselsan A.Ş., which took the 48th place in the general list, is the leading Turkish company in the defense sector. Despite the fact that it was founded back in 1975, significant changes in turnover have been achieved only in recent years, bringing it to \$2 billion 172 million in 2019. The second place in the all-Turkish rating is occupied by the company Tusaş (Turk Havacılık ve Uzay sanayii A.Ş.), which took the 53rd place. This is followed by BMC, Roketsan, STM, FNSS and Havelsan, respectively located on 89th, 91th, 92th, 98th, 99th places. Among the countries with

the largest number of companies in the Top 100, Turkey became the fourth country with seven companies, behind the USA (41 companies), England (10 companies) and China (8 companies).

The author notes that Ankara's defense spending accounted for the highest share in the budget from 1923 to 2004. And it was only since 2004 that they began to give way to the primacy in the field of education. It is noteworthy that the decrease in defense spending occurs against the background of an increase in the number of threats (problems with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Cyprus problem, the Syrian crisis, instability in Iraq, the Armenian problem and the fight against terrorist groups (FETÖ, DHKP-C, PKK, DEAS).

Continued in №4 (317).

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SHARIPOVA GUZAL. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MULTICULTURALISM IN MALAYSIA

Keywords: multiculturalism; ethnic groups; Islam; Buddhism; Christianity; multiethnic society.

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Abstract. This article discusses a brief history of the formation of multiculturalism in Malaysia, gives examples of the development of the culture of interethnic and religious relations and considers the influence of religious teachings on the policy of multiculturalism.

Introduction

The political and ethnic history of any nation is historically conditioned and depends on cultural, primarily religious, factors [1]. Thus, in the second half of the 20th century, there were substantial changes in world politics that affected self-identification of many countries. As a result, there was also a change in the form of state structure, which led to the fact that now there are 21 federations in the world, while about 180 states are unitary in terms of political and legal organization. The issue of ethnic diversity, therefore, remained open, resulting in a general problem of the ethnic self-identification of society. This issue has been addressed not only in ethno-cultural and religious literature, but also in social and political writings, which demonstrates the relevance of this problem.

In this connection, Nathan Glazer, a well-known sociologist from Harvard, discussed the issue of globalization and democratization of a multinational society and promoted the idea of civil rights of different social groups. He subsequently became one of the strong advocates of multiculturalism, having published the book *We are all multiculturalists now* [2]. As a result, ideas of ethnic, cultural, racial and religious diversity and equality have been voiced more and more often. The number of advocates of the idea of multiculturalism has been increasing by year.

Contemporary studies on the topic of cultural diversity in the context of globalization reflect ubiquity and popularization of the multicultural model of the state. The works of such researchers as S. Benhabib [3], A. Fleras [4], A.S. Laden and D. Owen [5], B.C. Parekh [6] and many others illustrate the relevance of ethnic diversity issues. The author notes that the works of contemporary scientists and researchers, such as S. Benhabib, R.M. Alimova, V.I. Aleshkov, M.V. Orlova, A.R. Embong, A.M. Kuznetsov and I.N. Zolotukhina discuss some aspects of the issue from historical, political and economic perspective.

The Results of the Study

Malaysia seeks to implement multicultural policy that combines state structures and political institutions, established according to internationally recognized democratic standards with the historically developed system of values that is inherent in civilizations of Southeast Asia. The development path of Malaysia is based on the creative assimilation of international experience with comprehensive consideration of national peculiarities and cultural traditions.

The term 'multiculturalism' was coined in 1971 by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Canada. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, is a policy aimed at the development and preservation of cultural differences both in a particular country and in the world in general; and on the other hand, it is a theory or ideology that justifies such a policy. An important distinction from political liberalism is that multiculturalism recognizes the rights of collective actors: ethnic and cultural groups. Such rights may be reflected in giving ethnic and cultural communities permission to manage their education, express their political opinions, etc [7].

The author notes that there are unique multicultural models that relate to a certain type of state. Thus, the multicultural model of Malaysia emerged on the basis of historical, social, cultural, political and psychological context. Undoubtedly, in the mid-twentieth century, people in Malaysia noticed ethnic differences, but no longer treated each other with prejudice of the past. There may have been other reasons for racial tensions in the 1950s and 1960s, but at least those that could be attributed to the inequities in the distribution of national wealth were largely eliminated [8].

The author points out that in order to understand the scale of the policy of multiculturalism, one should examine the ethnic composition of the country. Today, there are about 180 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in Malaysia [9], the majority of which are

Bumiputera (Malays and various indigenous peoples) - 62.5 percent, Chinese - 20.6 percent, Indians - 6.2 percent, others - 0.9 percent, non-citizens - 9.8 percent (est. 2019) [10]. Peninsula Malaysia is inhabited by communities of indigenous people known as Orang Asli (lit. original people), whose numbers reach 150 thousand people. Orang Asli are divided into three main categories: Semang (Negrito), Senoi and Proto-Malay, with 18 sub-ethnic groups.

Aboriginal languages belong to the Austroasiatic and Austronesian language families [11]. There are several languages currently used in Malaysia: Bahasa Malaysia (official), English, Chinese (Cantonese, Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka, Hainan, Fuzhou), Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Punjabi and Thai. In total, there are currently 134 living languages in Malaysia, of which 112 are indigenous languages and 22 non-indigenous languages, which upholds the linguistic rights of citizens. Thus, it is possible to observe the introduction of necessary balance between the state language (languages) and the obligation of the state to support and respect the preferences of linguistic minorities. Government protection of the linguistic rights of citizens contributes to the preservation of linguistic diversity and promotes the development of a unique linguistic environment.

The author emphasizes that Malaysian ethnic environment has undergone changes throughout history which had a beneficial effect on further integration into the world community. Thus, ethnic Han Chinese is the second largest ethnic community in Malaysia (20.6 percent of the country's population). Most of them are Buddhists, Taoists and Confucians, and only a small number consider themselves Christians [10]. Ethnic Han Chinese people arrived from Fujian and Guangdong to trade throughout Indochina, Malacca and the islands of the Malay Archipelago [13, P. 192]. Hence, a new trade route made it possible not only to build bilateral trade relations, but to reinforce ethnic ties of the Han people who wished to stay in Malacca. As a result, increasing number of Han Chinese in Malacca and the islands of

the Malay Archipelago influenced the formation of an ethnic diaspora in Malaysia.

A large Indian diaspora (about 6.2 percent of the population) holds an important position in the country. The majority of the Indian community is Tamil, but there are also Malayalis, Punjabis and Gujaratis. Most of them are Hindus and Buddhists, though there are some Muslims and Christians, as well as representatives of Sikhism [10].

Malaysia is also home to immigrants from the Middle East, Thailand and Indonesia and their descendants. There are also Europeans (the British, for instance) who have lived in the country since colonial times. Thus, the Kristang in Malacca are a creole ethnic group of people who are descendants from liaisons and mixed marriages of the Portuguese and Malays. A small number of Cambodians and Vietnamese settled in Malaysia after the Vietnam War (1965-1973) [12]. Signs of the shift in the national society towards multiculturalism appeared during centuries-long history of Malaysia, which demonstrates a gradual assimilation of the indigenous population into neighbouring peoples and countries

The question is what factors bolster and promote religious tolerance and harmony in Malaysia. First, there is the Federal Constitution of Malaysia and Malaysian law. As we know, the priority of the rights and the interests of civil society strengthen interethnic and interfaith relations. Second, Malaysia is not a usual Islamic state, despite the fact that the majority of the population is Muslim; Malays naturally predominate in multi-ethnic society. Even though there is certain superiority, it does not affect the quality of life of non-Muslims in the country. Malaysian legal bodies work to promote the idea of religious tolerance and harmony among the Malaysians.

The main argument for this is Article 3 (1) of the Constitution of Malaysia [13], which provides that every person has the right to profess and practice his own religion throughout the country, which guarantees freedom of religion. Article 8 by clauses (1) and (2) of the Constitution of Malaysia [13] states that

all persons are equal before the law and entitled to its equal protection and guarantees no religious discrimination against citizens, thus illustrating freedom of conscience and the fact that citizens are not subject to any coercion in determining their attitude to religion. Article 12 (3) of the Constitution of Malaysia [13] proclaims non-interference in the religious practices of non-Muslim communities, therefore the state guarantees protection for all its citizens. Article 11 (2) of the Constitution [13] allows for religious propaganda with proper regard to legality.

On the example of Malaysia, one can analyze various ethno-cultural and ethno-confessional institutions that have retained their unique traits, lifestyle, cultural traditions and religious values, which are dictated by national (social) specifics. It is reflected in a study based on racial and religious census data published by the Malaysian Department of Statistics in 2010. According to the study, which examined the factors contributing to the prevalence of religious tolerance, Malaysians prefer teachings that promote religious tolerance and harmony [14].

It should be noted that there have been no ethnic violence in the country for 40 years. Malaysia shows the world that it has a history of interethnic relations based on conflict-free coexistence and compromises [15]. Malaysia demonstrates a unique model of religious multiculturalism in Southeast Asia.

The author notes that many researchers have been exploring the fact that there is religious acceptance and tolerance of ethnic minorities in a society where Islam is prevalent. To understand such a situation, one should examine religious teachings of both Muslims and non-Muslims. Studying religious teachings of Muslims, Christians, Jews, Buddhists and other religious groups helps to understand their thoughts about tolerance and their tolerant attitude towards ethnic (national) minorities. It is worth noting that many religious works contain teachings about tolerance and harmony. This, in turn, facilitates the spread of teachings that promote religious tolerance and harmonious social development.

As stated above, the number of Muslims prevails in Malaysia. It should be emphasized that today Islam has the second highest number of followers in the world; such a rapid spread of Islam and the impact it has on the world have become the object of research. Many agree that Islam preaches tolerance and cooperation with both Muslims and non-Muslims.

The following are examples from the Quran, the holy book of Islam. Surah Al-Baqarah (2:256) says that "There shall be no compulsion in (acceptance of) the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong [16]." The surah expressly forbids Muslims from coercing non-Muslims to convert to Islam, since Islam wants people to convert to Islam of their own free will and with full understanding.

Surah an-Nahl (16:125) says: "Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best [16]." This confirms that a Muslim resorts to wise explanation and good instruction when he encourages someone to convert to Islam. If a Muslim faces reluctance or rejection to convert, he should stay respectful and understanding. Surah Al-Kafirun (109:6) "For you is your religion, and for me is my religion [16]" proves that Islam accepts other religions and is willing to coexist with them in harmony and mutual respect. This, in turn, confirms commitment to the principles of religious tolerance in Islam. Thus, Muslims, the majority religious group in Malaysia, follow the abovementioned principles of religious tolerance and harmony both with Muslims and non-Muslims.

Islam teaches that human dignity does not depend on religion, skin colour and gender: Surah Al-Isra (17:70) "And We have certainly honoured the children of Adam [17]." Islam recognizes Christianity and the Christian Gospel, the prophet Jesus, and Judaism and the Torah written down by Moses [18]. It should be noted that God, when addressing the prophet Muhammad, said in Surah Al-Ma'idah (5:82): "...and you will find the nearest of them in affection to the believers those who say, "We are Christians [16]." This ayah shows respect and

tolerance for Christians. As it was once said, "The Arabs, to whom God has given power over the world these days, as you know, not only do not oppose Christianity, but praise the priests and saints, the Almighty, help churches and monasteries [19]." Once again, this proves commitment to religious tolerance. Christian doctrine also teaches religious tolerance and harmony.

The author draws our attention to the religious teaching of Buddhism, which has many followers in Malaysia. Buddha teaches that each person must grow up to embark on a spiritual quest and approach a mentor to gain secret knowledge. Those who are looking for the meaning of life have the right to choose any teaching or to seek true spirituality on their own. Neither Buddha, nor his true followers taught to forcefully 'save' or 'fix' people by converting them [20]. Moreover, it is described in the Udanavarga, a collection of verses from the Buddhist canon [21].

The 14th Dalai Lama once said that there should be not only political democracy but also religious democracy. He believes that if you find something that works for you, you have the right to choose [22]. This confirms the fact that Buddhists encourage freedom of creative and spiritual quest, which, in turn, contribute to tolerance, respect for each other's beliefs, cultures, and religious values. The ability to recognize differences and respect them is the best indicator of interreligious dialogue. As the Gospel of Luke (6:27-28) reminds us: "But to you who are listening I say: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who mistreat you [23]." This proves tolerance for all religious beliefs.

The author notes that the concept of religious tolerance in Hinduism is very old. Hinduism is the religion of an individual with the roots in the Vedas and the Bhagavad Gita. It means that one gets closer to a personal God individually, depending on his temperament and inner evolution [24]. We should take into account that at every mention of his own religion, one thinks about the requirements of religious dogma, and not about the fact that he is a follower of this religion. Believers who look out upon

the world through the prism of their own religion are able to understand the religion of others. This teaches us to understand other faiths.

It is important to note that all religions have such concepts as tolerance, peace, love and humanity regardless of the diversity of religious views. Therefore, it is possible to implement public policies aimed at religious tolerance, on the basis of the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance that stipulates “respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures” and “harmony in difference [25].”

The author notes that according to 2008 data published by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Malaysia received approximately 155,700 refugees and internally displaced people, thus becoming the country of first asylum. Most of them travelled from the Philippines - 70,500 people, Myanmar - 69,700 people, and Indonesia - 21,800 people [26].

Conclusion

The author concludes that the policy of multiculturalism in Malaysia makes it possible to build steady, harmonious intercultural and interethnic relations. This suggests that there is a shift in the relationship between citizens in the democratic, legal, multicultural and tolerant Malaysian society, thanks to various religious doctrines.

It should be emphasized that here have been no ethnically motivated violence for 40 years in Malaysia. Malaysia demonstrates the outside world its experience of interethnic interaction based on conflict-free coexistence and compromises [17]. Malaysia has built a unique model of religious multiculturalism in Southeast Asia. The fact that multiculturalism is an integral part of the state policy of Malaysia fosters interethnic dialogue as a means to maintain durable, balanced intercultural and interethnic relations. Many researchers concur that this way of life promotes

religious socialization. In addition, it facilitates coexistence between different religious values and norms.

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SWETLANA POGORELSKAJA. ISLAM AND THE NEW IDENTITY OF GERMANY

Keywords: Germany; Islam; "German Islam"; German identity; hybrid identity; Islamism.

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Abstract. Over the past two decades, the Federal Republic of Germany has been trying hard to integrate its Moslem community into the existing legal order. How did a country that has never had an indigenous Moslem population develop such an extensive and diverse diaspora that the state is forced to seek a dialogue with it? Does Islam influence Germany's new identity?

After analyzing the formation of the diaspora and the forces represented in it, from moderate to Islamist, as well as the changing state policy towards Islam, the author comes to the conclusion that Islam will not be able to become part of the German identity. The state is currently integrating moderate Islam into the existing legal order, cutting off and marginalizing radical parts of the diaspora, which could create prerequisites for strengthening cultural penetration. However, the Moslem diaspora itself is too diverse to have a common identity. It represents different ethnic groups and different, sometimes warring, directions of Islam. "Hybrid identities" as mediums of the introduction of Islam into the public consciousness in Germany are rare, these are persons of intellectual professions or politics. Islam does not have the deep historical roots in the country that Christianity or Judaism have and has not made a decisive cultural contribution to the mentality of society. Missionary activity among Germans, conducted by local Islamists, is crossed out by terrorist attacks of visiting jihadists who seek not to convert, but to fight.

Thus, even if Islam ceases to be a religion of migrants and foreigners, it will not be able to change the identity of Germany in the foreseeable future.

In 2010, the nerve of German society was touched by the words of the Federal President of Germany, conservative politician Christian Wulff, uttered by him in a speech on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the unification of the two

German states: "Islam belongs to Germany."¹ They caused bewilderment not only of his Christian-democratic party members who did not want to see this religion as part of the German identity, but also of a number of radical Islamic organizations in the country who did not want to belong to Germany. Nevertheless, these words best characterized the complex and contradictory situation in which German politics found itself at the beginning of the new millennium in connection with intra-German Islam.

After the terrorist attacks of 11.9.2001, which manifested the final onset of the era of new conflicts, Western democracies for the first time seriously turned to their own Moslem diasporas. During the years of the confrontation of the blocs, the Islamic world stood in the shadow of the conflict of socio-political systems, "socialism" and "capitalism", in the new conditions it became an actor of the "conflict of civilizations". It was a real revelation for the Germans that one of the main participants in the terrorist act in New York, a student Mohammed Atta, who came to Germany from Egypt to study physics, had already become radicalized in Germany, in Hamburg, in circles formed around a local mosque belonging to the radical Islamic union - and was recruited by Al-Qaeda there.

For almost half a century that has passed since the organized entry into Germany of the first Turkish "guest workers" (whose very name implied their temporary, guest status) and, later, political refugees from Islamic countries, a diverse and multi-ethnic Moslem diaspora has spontaneously developed and expanded in the country, with a developed system of not only religious, but also cultural and public organizations and unions covering almost the entire daily life of the Moslem population. As far as the role of Islam in the world process increased, the radical component of this diaspora began to strengthen, the German policy faced the inevitable task of integrating moderate Islam into the state legal order until Islamism integrated it into itself. However, will integrated Islam

become part of the modern German identity? In other words, will Islam in Germany become “German Islam”²?

In the proposed article, the process of integration of Moslems will be considered precisely in an identitarian context. In the proposed article, the process of integration of Moslems will be considered precisely in an identitarian context.

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The question of what is “Germanhood” is a traditional one for German thinking. He occupied poets, thinkers, and politicians as the last two reichs consolidated and was inextricably linked with this consolidation. The tendency of “Germanhood”, which arose due to fragmentation, first of all in the cultural, and only then in the state dimension, intensified or vice versa weakened due to the geopolitical situation of the country, changes in its borders, the size of compactly living ethnic groups, first founding themselves “abroad”, then again becoming part of the country, as well as due to with the cultural power of the German diasporas.³ Nevertheless, the concept of “cultural nation” has always carried a component of state thinking, implying either the unification of cultural German spaces into a state unity or, if there are no forces or opportunities for this, an identitarian connection of these spaces with Germany.⁴

With the end of the Third Reich, the concept of “blood” and “soil” was ousted from political usage, as well as a number of more harmless concepts that discredited themselves due to their use by Hitlerism. An integral part of the new German identity planted with the support of the Western allies was a sense of guilt, the so-called “historical guilt” for the outbreak of the Second World War and for the crimes of Hitlerism. “National” concepts (for example, “national interests”) were tabooed, the very topic of “Germanhood” was ousted from public discourse and was not discussed in the circles considered “decent”⁵. Even the patriotism of the West Germans was prescribed not national,

but “constitutional”, which meant – loyalty not to the national state and not to the national idea, but to the democratic constitution of the country, its Basic Law.⁶

The public, and consequently, scientific and political discourse of West Germany on issues of “Germanhood” in the years when the Moslem diaspora was spontaneously forming in the country, was determined by the intellectuals of the Frankfurt school (from Adorno to Habermas). “The gloomy heart” (as Travni figuratively writes) of the German identity professed by the public [Trawny, p. 25] since Adorno's time has been Auschwitz, i.e. German historical guilt. In these conditions, to infringe foreigners, and moreover the poor and underdeveloped, but friendly in their cultural diversity, seemed simply unthinkable. And there was no particular interest in them. After all, immigration legislation was built in such a way that, with all the liberality in matters of cultural habits and the right to their identities, it was not easy for a foreigner to settle in the country on a permanent basis.

Indeed, having been rejected by principled policy, the concept of “blood” remained in immigration legislation, albeit in a formal form. In any case, the right to be accepted by the country immediately for permanent residence and with all types of social security was granted only to Germans who lived abroad precisely as Germans by blood, who preserved the language and culture and were able to prove it. Moreover, in the era of the confrontation of the blocs, the provision on “late migrants”, i.e. Germans entering the country after the massive and forced relocations of the first post-war years opened the doors to Germany to Germans from Eastern Europe and even from the former USSR.

Germany did not accept other foreigners on a permanent basis. The possibility of naturalization was carried out through individual loopholes such as family reunification, marriages, through business, less often through long-term labor relations. Less often because foreigners, after the ban on the import of labor

in 1973⁷, were taken for terms that did not exceed the time after which they could apply for a permanent residence permit with a work visa. Since such naturalization took place every time in individual cases and the main concern of the foreign affairs services was to reduce the number of such cases, the state did not provide for the systematic integration of new residents into the German legal, civil and cultural space. The costs of integration justify themselves only if the state is a so-called "host country", i.e. it has criteria by which it accepts large contingents of foreign migrants for permanent residence.

Thus, the mass of the Moslem population, except for a small number of naturalized, in West German times, and in the first years after reunification, was considered to be temporarily staying in the country. In this temporality, there formed the permanence of the diaspora, which has been living in the country for generations, but is not part of it.

The formal "temporary" stay of the Moslem population in the country, on the one hand, made life easier for the state – there was no need to take care of the integration of these masses, it was enough to monitor the status of stay and expel those whose status for stay had expired. On the other hand, it, having passed, so to speak, into a state of "permanent temporality", led to the creation of parallel societies. The Moslem community had almost all the infrastructure necessary for life – from consumer, to public and even educational. Since Islam was not taught in schools as part of the subject "religion", school-age children attended Koran schools in mosques (which were maintained by Moslem unions and received mullahs from abroad). There were also private schools for Moslems, for example, the famous King Fahd Academy in Bonn, maintained by the Saudis on a plot of land belonging to them. According to German intelligence services, many Islamists known to them sent their children to this school⁸.

The structure of the diaspora was impenetrable, whole "caliphates" were created in its depths, for example, around the Kaplan family from Turkey. Metin Kaplan, the famous "Caliph of

Cologne", lived in Germany for decades, like his father Jemaledin, with the status of a "political refugee", and in Turkey was wanted for terrorism⁹. When the German state finally took up Islam, it was Metin who was cited by the media as a "hate preacher" (Hassprädiger) – in his sermons for many years he called on the flock to "turn their children into the tip of a spear aimed at the infidels."

Various organizations of the Moslem population were united in unions. The largest, "Ditib", the union of that part of the Turkish diaspora loyal to both Germany and Turkey, which makes up its majority and originates from "guest workers", is directly connected with the Turkish state and received muftis appointed from Turkey to its mosques. Another major union of the Turkish diaspora, Milli Gerush, on the contrary, represented radical forces in opposition to the Turkish regime and in its origins united those who lived in the country with the status of "political refugees". Many of its member organizations are under the supervision of special services because of their Islamism.

In addition, there were smaller unions representing other branches of Islam and other ethnic groups. Most of the unions are united into two competing parent organizations, the Islamic Council of Germany, which unites mainly Turkish Sunni organizations and the Central Council of Moslems of Germany, in which Arab Islam is mainly represented.

The identity processes within the Moslem community were of little interest to the state and society, except that by the mid-1990s sociologists noticed that, unlike the second and third generation of "guest workers", who sought to integrate into the life of Germany at a higher level than the parents standing at the factory conveyors, and gave the diaspora a galaxy of Turkish teachers, doctors, journalists and even politicians, the fourth generation, the youth, have the opposite development – adherence to their Turkish identity and Islam, and, often, in a radical form.

These processes were most often explained by the crisis of identity, life between two countries as different as Turkey and Germany, connected primarily with the fact that the majority in the diaspora did not have German citizenship, but some form of residence permit, which should be regularly renewed. In addition, the diaspora was constantly replenished with new members, since both wives and husbands of children who grew up in Germany were preferably taken from Turkey, from those rural regions the first “guest workers” once came from. In addition, with the coming to power of Erdogan, the Turkish state began to pay special attention to compatriots living in Germany, Erdogan himself, while in Germany on official visits, used them several times to address the Turkish diaspora with calls not to forget his roots.

Theorists tried to find a kind of “hybrid identity”¹⁰ that harmoniously connects ethnic origin and German socialization, but just in the case of the fourth generation of the Turkish diaspora, this concept did not work. Suffice it to say that a significant part of young men, according to polls, considered Erdogan¹¹ their president, while as for Merkel, they simply did not perceive her as the head of state. “We are Germany!” – tens of thousands of Turks chanted in Cologne in 2016, enthusiastically welcoming Erdogan¹². One can also recall how many threats from the Diaspora were received by Turkish Bundestag deputies (mainly from the Green Party) who voted in 2016 in a resolution in connection with the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire¹³.

Thus, the concept of “multiculturalism”, or, as left liberals affectionately called it, “multi-culti”, was accepted by both the state and society, and the reasons for which “multi-culti” was tolerated were mutually exclusive. The socio-political mainstream, defined by left-liberal intellectuals and the dogma of German historical guilt, understood the new “Germanhood” as a principled openness to other peoples and cultures, while immigration legislation allowed us to hope that all these peoples

and cultures would not stay in Germany for a long time. In essence, "multi-cultists" meant peaceful and friendly coexistence within the framework of one state of many widely understood "cultures" (religion was also considered a "cultural feature"), of course, on the basis of a common legal order for all.

For a long time, the Moslem community lived in a "rounded" state and the authorities did not care about it. It became bad when a butterfly fluttered out of the chrysalis - Islam in Germany became so strong, that it felt entitled to declare its claims against the state and, moreover, to start a mission to the "infidels". If in 2004 (the year of the adoption of the new immigration law) more than 3 million Moslems lived in Germany (of which only 750,000 had German citizenship) and about 3,000 mosques worked (of which about 100 were under the supervision of special services in connection with the propaganda of Islamism)¹⁴, then in subsequent years their number grew, moreover, Christian churches abandoned due to lack of flock began to be converted into mosques. Turkish parents who professed Islam increasingly filed lawsuits against schools, demanding that their daughters be exempted from swimming lessons or overnight excursions, Moslem women conducted lawsuits against employers, demanding permission to wear a hijab at work, moreover, Moslem lawyers began to refer to "sharia" as part of identity in the courts.

The strengthening of Islamic consciousness within the country went hand in hand with the increasing importance of the Islamic factor in the global political process. Of course, open Islamism and Jihadism in Germany was constantly in the field of view of the special services, but the problem was publicly recognized only after 11.9.2001, when it became known that one of the main perpetrators of the terrorist act, Mohamed Ata, a student from Egypt who studied physics in Hamburg, became radicalized and contacted Al-Qaeda emissaries already in Germany, in Islamist circles, "hanging out" around the local mosque, maintained at that time by the "Arab Cultural Union"¹⁵.

A new law on entry and stay (2004), prepared for a long time, but discussed for many years in the Bundestag and hindered by the Federation Council, was urgently adopted. It linked naturalization with integration. The concept of “multi-culti” began to be curtailed, albeit with great difficulty, overcoming serious resistance from left-wing intellectuals. It was only in 2010 that Merkel publicly confirmed its complete rejection¹⁶.

It was impossible to expel the mass that had accumulated for decades using the methods of the rule of law: the process of expelling Metin Kaplan alone, despite the frank Islamic radicalism and the hostility of this “political refugee” to the constitutional system of Germany, lasted for several years. In addition, not all radicals were migrants. Many already had German roots, and some, for example, the famous Salafist Pierre Vogel, were ethnic Germans who converted to Islam.

Therefore, in its new policy towards Islam, the state has gone the only right way in this situation - negotiations and integration. Since 2007, the Permanent Institute of Dialogue - the Islamic Conference (DIK, Deutsche Islam Konferenz) has been operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The largest Islamic unions¹⁷ were invited to participate in it, as well as intellectuals of the Moslem faith who represented Moslems who were not covered by the organization. The state has taken a course towards the inhibition of integrated Islam, offering it a number of amenities in exchange for some concessions. Non-integrated Islam was subject to political marginalization and quiet suffocation in legal ways. Over the years that have passed since the beginning of the Islamic Conference (a work complicated by contradictions between the changing leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the unions participating in the conference), it was nevertheless possible to agree on the training of muftis in Germany (preachers from abroad are the main source of radicalization), and in the meantime, on an exam for the knowledge of the German language for visitors. Several Islamic unions (belonging to the

Ahmadiyya Jamaat) have received, by virtue of their orderly structure, the status of “corporations of public law”, which gives a number of benefits in cooperation with the state.

The marginalization of non-integrated Islam was carried out mainly in the course of the fight against Islamic terrorism, and not only with outspoken jihadists, but with the entire logistics of Islamism formed in Germany over the years of “multicultural” life. In other words, Islamists are being not only in the implementation of their radicalism, but in everything, even in their public projects aimed at Germans, for example, the famous Salafist missionary project “Read!” was suffocated on the ways of banning its organization, the True Religion group¹⁸.

The migration crisis, which changed the composition of the diaspora in favor of Arab Islam, brought to Germany young jihadists who were not integrated even into the local Islamist landscape and, for the first time, terrorist actions inside the country, the largest one occurred in 2016 at the Christmas Market in Berlin¹⁹. From 2016 to 2021, the German special services, which created a special “Joint Center for the Prevention of Terrorism”²⁰ in Berlin, prevented 11 Islamist attempts²¹, strengthened control over the entire “Islamist scene”, i.e. the entire circle, in one way or another associated with Islamism, as well as sympathizers with it. According to the intelligence services, in the Islamist landscape of Germany there are currently represented salafist, jihadist and legalist groups, not counting just radical youth, from among whom future terrorists are mainly recruited²². Moreover, in the intra-German Islamist scene, the number of motivated young women is growing, primarily taking on the “home office”, working on the Internet²³.

* * *

So can Islam become part of Germany? There is no unity on this issue even in the ministry, which oversees the Islamic Conference. Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU), under whose leadership

the conference was created, was convinced that this was the case²⁴. The next minister, Thomas de Maiziere (CDU), was no longer convinced, and the minister of Merkel's last government, Horst Seehofer (CSU), said that "Islam does not belong to Germany,"²⁵ at the same time advocating at the meetings of the Islamic Conference for "German Islam", meaning own, prepared in Germany, muftis and sermons in German²⁶.

Reflecting on whether German identity, as it was officially planted in Germany (through the Federal Center for Political Education, Politics, Media, public Discourse), had an impact on Moslems living in the country, it should be noted that so far this impact has been minimal. Being forced to accept the existing legal order, as well as using liberal values to their advantage, Moslems (with the exception of a small number of intellectuals and politicians) did not approve of such special components of modern German identity as tolerance of sexual minorities, collective historical guilt of Germans for crimes of National Socialism or friendship with Israel. In their rejection of Israel, for example, Arab Islamists often clashed with the German ultra-right²⁷. In addition, the Moslem community in Germany is constantly growing and being replenished by migrants from countries where radical Islam is widespread.

The complex and lengthy processes of changing German identity after the reunification of the two German states and in the course of the "fusion" of the new and old federal lands together, as well as the transition from the "Bonn" to the "Berlin" republic, have so far practically not affected the self-contained and self-interested Moslems of Germany.

Reflecting on the possible impact of Islam on German identity, the following important points should be noted.

In the German case, firstly, it makes no sense to talk about the "Islamic identity" of the diaspora as such. Due to the peculiarities of its formation in Germany, it represents different ethnic groups and, accordingly, different, sometimes warring, directions of Islam. Before the immigration crisis in 2014–2016,

about 63percent of Moslems living in Germany were Turks. They were followed by Arabs, Bosnians, Pakistanis, Afghans, Chechens, Kosovo Albanians and Germans who converted to Islam. Accordingly, Turkish Sunnis prevailed quantitatively, followed by Shiites (Alevites, Iranian Imamites, Turkish Shiites, Ismailis), Ahmadis, Sufi groups. Having received more than a million Moslems at once in 2015–2016, Germany became the owner of not only the largest Moslem diaspora in Europe (5.6 million people, which corresponds to 6.7 percent of the total population²⁸), but also the most diverse one. This multiethnic diaspora does not have its own integral identity.

Because of this (and because of the peculiarities of Islam) it cannot even, in its own interests, create a single parent organization for negotiations with the state on the most important issues of its daily functioning²⁹, let alone somehow purposefully influence the established identity of society in the country of residence.

Secondly, “hybrid identities” in the German case are a rare phenomenon inherent mainly in Moslem liberal intellectuals, politicians, persons of intelligent professions, such as doctors or teachers, or German convertides. The identities of the majority of the Moslem population of the country do not include German components, despite living in Germany, but are tied to the country of origin, the professed direction of Islam and the measure of its radicality.

Thirdly, Islam, even if its integrated unions, ready to cooperate with the state, succeed in obtaining the status of “corporations of public law”, and with it the conditions of functioning in the legal field similar to those in which the confessions recognized in Germany operate, will not become part of the modern German identity. Not only because it is the identity of a secular state governed by the rule of law, but also because Islam does not have the deep historical roots in the country that Christianity or Judaism have. It is not historically the religion of any part of the indigenous population and has not,

accordingly, made a defining cultural contribution to the mentality of society. The heterogeneity of Islam represented in the country is another obstacle on this path. Passionarity is broken by internal conflicts in the diaspora, missionary activity among Germans, lovingly nurtured and implemented by generations of Islamists who settled in Germany, is crossed out by terrorist attacks by visiting jihadist “scumbags” who seek not to convert, but to fight.

Thus, even if it “belongs” to Germany, i.e. ceasing to be the religion of migrants, refugees and foreigners and entering the intra-German confessional community, Islam will not be able to change the identity of Germany in the foreseeable future, provided that the state does not change its policy - cutting off radicals, consistently integrating moderate organizations and unions into the existing constitutional order and into German (European) political and civic culture.

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- 6 The most famous authors in the topic of constitutional patriotism: Dolph Sternberger (conservative option), Jurgen Habermas (left-liberal option).

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- ¹⁷ Including the head Islamic Council of Germany, the Central Council of Moslems in Germany, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers and the Turkish Islamic Union (DITIB, Turkish Sunnis, loyal to Turkey Union).
- ¹⁸ Within the framework of this project, from 2011 to 2016 in the German-speaking space, free well-published Korans in German were distributed to the non-Moslem population on the streets and in Muslim shops. Interestingly, in response, as a sign of opposition, civil activists from the CDU handed out not Bibles, but the Constitution of Germany.
- ¹⁹ Tunisian Islamist, driving into the crowd in a truck, killed 11 and injured 55 people.
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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

ELMIRA SADYKOVA. THE ROLE OF INTER-RELIGIOUS
DIALOGUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
UNIVERSALITY

Keywords: Western human rights standards, Islamic states, international relations, inter-religious dialogue, the issue of universalism of human rights, the religious-traditional system of rights.

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Abstract: in today's global world, characterized by cultural and civilizational diversity, dialogue mechanisms have communicative

potential in all spheres of society, including such an urgent problem of human rights. This article is devoted to the scientific and practical aspects of the development and deepening of dialogue between different religions. The features of the modern stage of the formation of a multipolar world and the aggravation of the geopolitical situation are given, which increases the role of the constructive potential of interreligious dialogue in establishing partnership and respect for the religious traditions of various peoples.

The relevance of the issue of inter-religious dialogue in the context of the universality of human rights in the modern world is caused by the fact that religious organizations and movements have significant potential to consider them as an influential force in world politics. The religious factor is an important component ensuring international security. The study of this topic involves the use of an interdisciplinary approach in a complex of philosophical, religious, ethnological, political and cultural points of view.

In the context of the philosophical paradigm, the concept of interreligious dialogue has a long history, the beginning of which can be attributed to ancient Greek sages. In the modern world, its practical implementation in international relations as an instrument of political communication in various fields, thanks to its constructive potential, is becoming increasingly important. With the increasing number of interethnic armed conflicts, accompanied by numerous casualties, increasing threats of extremism and terrorism, the problem of exposure of ethnic and religious groups becomes extremely acute, which ultimately leads to a violation of human rights. In contrast to the demonstration and applying of military actions and economic sanctions, it actualizes the role of soft power diplomacy.

In most countries of the world, in recent decades, complex processes of change in the confessional population composition have taken place, caused by dynamic global trends, and the importance of civilizational identity has increased. After the collapse of the bipolar system in international relations, the

civilizational paradigm of world development comes to the fore, determining the features of dialogue formats in the examined field.

The evolution of the world history was accompanied by the formation and development of various cultural and civilizational communities. European countries, basing on the negative idea of civilizational superiority, pursue a policy of ignoring the specific ethno-cultural, religious features of traditional societies. "A.J. Toynbee in the middle of the 20th century noted the expansionist nature of Western civilization, due to its higher level of technological and scientific development. Peoples whose way of life during their historical evolution was distinguished by rigid family traditions, it is more difficult to perceive Western standards of human rights and free democratic principles of the political system, which does not mean their inability to self-development and economic modernization compliance to need of the hour.¹"

In practice, issues of interreligious dialogue are associated with the development of international public regulators of dialogue models with the participation of state and public structures, international organizations. In a speech by the Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, Rector of the General Church Postgraduate and Doctoral Studies named after Saints Cyril and Methodius Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk at the conference "Dialogue of Cultures and Civilizations" on March 15, 2019, it is noted: "unfortunately, the last decades were marked by speculation on the religious feelings of people and attempts to stir up confrontation between the East and the West, between Christians and Muslims. I am talking about events in the Middle East, where extremists and terrorists for years intensely promulgated among the population the ideas of confrontation between Muslim and Christian civilizations. In this region, unrest continues in regard to the status of the holy city of the three Abrahamic religions - Jerusalem."²

Acute political, socio-economic problems in today's world dictate the need for the common efforts of international actors to develop effective development strategies to guarantee the sustainability of human rights security against threats such as armed conflict, violence, environmental and epidemiological disasters and others. So, for example, over the past century, sectarian wars have broken out on the African continent, accompanied by bloodshed and numerous casualties, as it was in Sudan, Nigeria and other countries. Another region of ethno-political conflict is the Balkans, a complex node of confessional, intercultural contradictions, the tragic results of which are such events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia as the Croatian, Bosnian, Kosovo crises.

Large-scale migration processes and movements caused by ongoing conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan and other countries lead to enormous deprivation, violations of the rights of millions of people. In a number of European countries, including Great Britain, Germany, the United States of America, France, as a result of active migration processes, numerous Muslim communities have formed. The number of Muslims in Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Sweden and other European countries also increased significantly. These trends make actual the issue of the need for new mechanisms of public administration that ensure the integration of the immigrant population into the foreign environment and the provision of a complex of human rights, including the religious sphere, with particular urgency.

A manifestation of the Western ideological concept of "clash of civilizations" is the book "Self-Liquidation of Germany" by Bundesbank director Tilo Sarrazin, published in 2011, in which the author gives reasons for inability of immigrants from Muslim countries to assimilate into German society and considers them as a threat to the country's national identity. It is also worth mentioning the publications of cartoons of the Prophet

Muhammad that appeared in the Danish and some other European media, which caused an acute reaction in Muslim states.

The famous orientalist historian V.V. Naumkin notes: "It is harmful and erroneous to attribute allegedly inherent intolerance and rejection of freedom to the Islamic world. If we refer to the Muslim historical heritage, then one cannot but recall those striking manifestations of free thinking and tolerance that have existed in it for many centuries.³" It is worth emphasizing that the problems of perception of the West by the Islamic world are complicated at present by actively developing trends of undermining the foundations of family values in European states, when registration of same-sex marriages and even raising children in them are allowed. The Social Doctrine of Russian Muslims of June 14, 2015 states: "The development by Europeans in the 18th and 20th centuries of declarations and legislative documents on human rights testifies to the desire of the human spirit to escape from the darkness of ignorance to the truth. However, the diminution in these acts of conservative-religious values ultimately led to such extremes of modern liberalism as the public legitimization of evils, including the substitution of the historically established concept of family with the concept of "same-sex marriage."⁴

The practical implementation of the complex of human rights enshrined in universal international documents in the modern world faces many serious difficulties and problems. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly was an important stage in the consolidation of a wide range of fundamental human rights and freedoms, the guarantee of which should be regardless of citizenship, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, religion, language or other condition. The principles of equality and non-discrimination are central in the complex of human rights, the importance of which is confirmed.

The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development emphasizes the concept of "a world free from poverty, hunger,

disease and need,... free from fear and violence,⁵” consonant with principles of human security. Under the UN, a special structure was created – the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Statutory Body of the Human Rights Council, 10 treaty bodies monitoring the implementation of major international human rights treaties, such as, for example, committees against torture, on the rights of the child, on enforced disappearances and others.

The UN General Assembly Declaration “Transforming Our World: Sustainable Development Agenda 2030” states: “We see a world in which universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality and non-discrimination, respect for racial, ethnic and cultural diversity; a world of equal opportunity, enabling the full realization of human potential and promoting universal prosperity. A world that invests in its children and in which every child grows up not knowing what violence and exploitation are.”⁶

When posing the question of the role of inter-religious dialogue in the context of the problem of the universality of human rights in the realities of the modern world community, it is worth highlighting one of the most controversial aspects regarding the opposition of the countries of the Western world with its guarantees of rights and freedoms, individualistic worldview and Islamic states with the peculiarities of their religious traditions and culture⁷. Western human rights standards are difficult to combine with the religious-traditional system of law of Islamic states, based on the provisions of the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet.

In the international format, the countries of the Islamic world adopted a number of key human rights documents, namely: the Universal Islamic Declaration of 1981, the Cairo Declaration of 1990, the Arab Charter of Human Rights 2004. The general conceptual approach of these international normative acts is that the basis of the human rights embodied in them is such principles as equality, justice, freedom, dignity. These

important ideas comply with the principles of human rights established by Western standards, but human freedom in Islam is determined by Sharia norms, which is reflected in the constitutional acts of states. Thus, in accordance with Article 20 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, "All Iranians, regardless of gender, equally enjoy the protection of the law and have all humanitarian, political, economic, social and cultural rights, taking into account the adherence to Islamic norms."⁸ At the same time, this document guarantees the rights of non-Muslims in Article 14: "According to the ayat, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Muslims are obliged to treat non-Muslims with kindness and Islamic justice and respect their human rights. This principle applies to persons who do not oppose Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran and do not participate in a plot."⁹ Iran is one of the countries in which at the constitutional level the subordination of secular power to religion. Countries in which Islam as a state or official religion has a direct impact on the national system of law include Algeria, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Qatar, Malaysia, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.

In the modern world, an intense desire of peoples to preserve and strengthen their national or religious identity is developing. At the same time, religious fundamentalism is often used by nationalists and ethno-separatists to achieve political goals. Long-running international conflicts, accompanied by humanitarian problems, force people to leave for other countries in search of a peaceful life. As a result, legal and illegal immigration to European countries is increasing.

In these circumstances, the role of world religions in the search for peaceful means of solving acute problems caused by new challenges and threats, at the center of which are practical human rights issues, is increasing. In spite of the position of representatives of the secularization of public life, the positive potential of religion has the ability to influence the strengthening of the spiritual sphere. This topic was reflected in one of the

important documents - the Rhodes Declaration – 2009, which was adopted at the World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilizations” on the island of Rhodes in Greece. “We call on leaders of religious movements and believers around the world to continue dialogue and cooperation, doing everything possible to achieve mutual understanding and respect, thereby contributing to progressive development and peace on earth, wherever there would be no place for conflict and crisis.”¹⁰

The possibility of peacekeeping efforts of traditional faiths in crisis and conflict situations, at the same time, may decrease as a result of the lack of unity within religious structures, as evidenced by the example of the church dissent in Ukraine, where in 2018, on the initiative of ex-President P. Poroschenko, the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” (OCU) was created. The new “church” received a tomos on autocephaly (document of independence) from the Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew. As a result, the Russian Orthodox Church severed full communion with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The shown intra-religious dissent certainly affects the civil rights of believers. It is significantly, in this regard, an understanding of the severity of the problem in the decision of the United Nation Committee on Human Rights of November 11, 2021, dedicated to the problem of violation of the rights of believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. “This document also instructs the Ukrainian authorities to guarantee the exercise of freedom of religion in the country and to ensure the investigation of all incidents of violence against believers there.¹¹” Currently, Orthodox churches across Ukraine are also subject to assaults related to robberies by armed nationalists. The confessional factor in this case acts as a detonator of the aggravation of political tension.

In this situation, the practical importance of interfaith dialogue in the formation of a common approach to events in Ukraine is significantly increasing. Questions about the need to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine based on justice as soon as possible were discussed on March 16, 2022 during a meeting in

the remote format of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill and Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby. His Holiness the Patriarch emphasized that every person should have the right to freely profess his faith and speak his native language without being subjected to political persecution¹². The practical importance of such a dialogue in the situation with the Ukrainian crisis is undoubtedly high also from the point of view of reliable information exchange between the parties, in the context of attempts to isolate the Russian media from the West.

Practical steps to promote interreligious dialogue in the context of such important issues as the protection of human rights require obvious and joint efforts of States both at the bilateral level and in multilateral formats. Russian experience should be noted in this direction of state activity. High authority in the Muslim world allowed the Russian Federation to obtain official observer status with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 2005. An important role in the development of the dialogue with the Muslim world belongs to the Strategic Vision Group (SVG) "Russia - Islamic World," which was organized in 2006 at the initiative of V.V. Putin and under the leadership of prominent personalities E.M. Primakov, M.Sh. Shaimiev. On November 23-26, a traditional annual meeting of the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group was held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Jeddah, dedicated to preserving the traditions of interfaith dialogue. The event with the agenda "Russia-Islamic World: Dialogue and Prospects for Cooperation" was attended by 33 state and public figures from 27 Muslim countries. One of the members of the SVG Alhaj Syed Nazibul Bashar Maizwandari, the Chairman of the Tarikat Federation of Bangladesh and the current Member of Parliament, stressed in his publication following his participation in this meeting, that under the leadership of the President of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov, The Russia-Islamic World strategic vision group is turning to a strong advocate for Muslims in the international

arena with a deep understanding of Islamic values and the importance of local heritage and culture¹³.

Finally, it is possible to distinguish a number of conclusions:

- the role of world religions in the formation and development of the international foundations of the complex of human rights and freedoms has a conventional nature;

- theoretical approaches to the assessment of inter-religious dialogue formats are determined by understanding the following important messages based on the analysis of worldwide trends in global change: on the one hand, attempts of political forces to use inter-civilization dissents for their practical purposes; on the other hand, the processes of globalization are changing the forms of communication between people, understanding the essence of the influence of religion both at the domestic and international levels on the intensification of problems of national identity and updating the study of the effectiveness of existing communication mechanisms in a religious environment on the observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms, ideas of humanity, as basic values; - interreligious dialogue contributes to the search for mechanisms for coordination of common principles of international legal regulation in the field of human rights with national state-legal systems;

- the effectiveness of the implementation of international norms governing human rights and freedoms can be determined on the basis of a combination of fundamental human rights and a historically established legal culture and religious characteristics of peoples;

- attempts to absolute Western standards in ensuring human rights in the context of increasing and strengthening the role of the new non-Western world centers of power and influence in the system of international relations, face discrimination against their cultural identity;

- the problem exists not only in different approaches to assessing the principle of universality of human rights and freedoms, embodied in documents adopted by the UN, but also in practical realities related to violations of the relevant norms of international law by a number of states;

- a modern, essentially critical stage in the history of international relations, determines the relevance of the role of religions, intensification of spiritual exchange to find common ground and understanding in contrast to the policy of confrontation and the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

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