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\* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

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## MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

OLEG CHEREVKOV. ISLAMIC MODERNISM IN RUSSIA: ORIGIN, FEATURES AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: Jadidism, Islam, Islamic modernism, Ismail Gasprinsky.*

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*Abstract. In the 19th century, as a result of the policy of colonialism and the political and economic expansion of European empires, a number of Moslem educators and ideologists realized the need to reform Islam in the face of the objective superiority of Europe over the East. These processes have affected many Moslem countries and regions of the world, including Russia. In the 19-20 centuries a group of progressive-minded Moslems, the Jadids, conducted large-scale educational work aimed at improving the level of education of the*

*Moslem population and adapting Islam to modern socio-economic and political conditions.*

At the present stage of its development, the world community, including the Russian part of it, is faced with the problem of increasing the level of extremist and terrorist threats. Despite the fact that the largest states of the world use enormous power and material resources to resist this threat, terrorist activity not only continues to exist, but also adapts to constantly changing conditions.

Extremist and terrorist activities today are mainly associated with the activity of followers of so-called "Islamic radicalism", "Islamism", "Wahhabism", "Salafism", etc. First of all, it is important to emphasize that Islamism is not a religion, but a religious and political platform that not only takes individual elements of the Moslem religion, but also interprets them in the way most favorable for the radicals. The vast majority of the most well-known terrorist groups that carry out their destructive activities in the Middle East, Central and South-East Asia, North Africa, Western Europe and Russia follow in the wake of the religious and political ideology of Islamism. All this, in turn, negatively affects the image of Islam and the perception of followers of this religion in the mass consciousness, the growth of xenophobia and the isolation of followers of Islam from the rest of society, the creation of closed social institutions and other negative consequences.

It should be noted that the existing identification of Islam and Islamism, Moslems and extremists is not only fundamentally wrong, but also dangerous from the point of view of promoting state and public security, the development of civil society and the formation of a unified all-Russian civil identity. However, it should be said that Islam is not inherently monolithic: there are several trends in it, the most famous of which are Sunnism and Shiism; each of these trends has its own theological and legal schools (mazhabs); In addition, in different regions of Russia and

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the world, Islam has its own characteristics associated with the existing ethno-cultural complex on their territory. In addition to this division, there is also a typology of Islamic trends according to how its ideologists see the image of Islam, its place in society and the life of each individual follower. Within the framework of this typology, there are three types of trends in Islam: fundamentalism, traditionalism and modernism. The followers of the first type appeal to the “primordial” Islamic values of the “golden age” of Islam – the period of the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the first righteous caliphs; they want to “purify” Islam from the centuries-old layers introduced into it by other religions and cultures [1]. The second path is a path characterized by a certain synthesis, on the one hand, of Islamic spiritual practices and ethics, on the other hand, of elements of a particular ethnic cultural complex. It is the second type of Islam, which is called “traditional Islam” in the mass media, as well as in a number of academic works, that has the largest number of followers in the Russian Federation. “Traditional Islam” in Russia has a number of distinctive characteristics, first of all – a rich experience of free development in the conditions of multi-ethnic Russian society and the neighborhood with such religions as Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Buddhism, etc., a mandatory element of which was and remains mutual respect and the desire for peaceful coexistence.

However, in this article, we would like to pay more attention to the third type: modernism in Islam. Today, there is not a very large number of works on this direction, and little attention is paid to it in the mass media, and in the documentation regulating the main directions of the state religious policy in our country.

Islamic modernism as a phenomenon of development not only of Islam itself, but also of Eastern societies, became, in a way, a response to the expansion of European economic and cultural achievements, way of thinking and action. They began to penetrate into the countries and regions of traditional Moslem

residence along with the wave of colonization and political and economic expansion of the great empires - British, French, Russian, etc. To a certain extent, this reaction was due to the desire of Moslem ideologists to try to create a basis for the adaptation of the Moslem religion and society in relation to changing socio-economic and political relations, technological progress. From their point of view, the models of development of the state and society, social and economic relations that came from the West were perceived as certainly more progressive and developed than those that existed in the Moslem environment of a particular region.

Although the first attempts to comprehend and introduce Western intellectual achievements into the soil of Islam were made, or at least assumed, in the 17th century, the period of the most intense activity of the followers of Islamic modernism dates back to the 19th century. It was during this period, on the one hand, that the main part of the Moslem world was, to some extent, under the rule of European powers, and on the other there occurred events that were gradually changing the system of social relations, for example, the Great French Revolution and the War of Independence of the United States of America. Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion and capture of Egypt (at that time nominally part of the Ottoman Empire) led a significant part of the Moslem elite to understand the military-technical and socio-economic superiority of Europeans and to realize the need for large-scale reforms, including, and above all, in the field of Islam. The desire to free "dar al-Islam" from the control of the infidels, to stop the decline of Islamic culture, prompted the Islamic ideologists to act [2].

However, they understood that it was impossible to reform Islam, ignoring centuries-old customs and features of this religious complex, simply introducing Western standards and practices. Therefore, a characteristic feature of Moslem modernism was the selective borrowing of European economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other achievements, so that the

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Moslem world, at least, reached an equal position with the Western world. The first sprouts of the idea of the need to reform Islam appeared in Arabic-speaking countries, where, on the one hand, the expansion of the Western powers was more aggressive, on the other hand, the inability of the existing institutions, including state institutions, to protect the population from this expansion was obvious. Moreover, there is a deepening of contradictions between the Turkic elite of the Ottoman Empire, which owned most of the lands inhabited by Arabs, and the leaders of the local intellectual stratum, who sought to separate themselves from their rulers and independently determine the vectors of socio-economic and spiritual development.

Speaking about the development of Islamic modernism in general, it is impossible to pass by the figure of the theologian, the ideologist of the reform of the Islamic religion, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). Even then, his origin caused questions and gossip among opponents of the views that he preached: according to the nisba (the part of the name that indicates a certain regional, ethnic or other affiliation), he was of Afghan origin. There was some information about his Iranian origin and belonging to Shiism, which he always denied. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani traveled a lot, mainly in Moslem-populated areas: India, Persia, the Ottoman Empire. He also visited a number of European countries, in particular, the United Kingdom, France and Russia. However, he developed the main provisions of his concept of the development and improvement of Islam in Egypt and became a kind of founder of the ideology that in the twentieth century will be called "Islamic socialism". At the same time, the idea of uniting all the Moslems of the world within the framework of a confederate union for the sake of countering the predatory interests of the European colonialists occupied an essential place in his works. In this future confederate union, public life should be based on the principles of social justice, equality and freedom of expression, but with the obligatory reliance on Islam as the guiding moral and ethical complex. The

activities of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani were fiercely criticized by a number of theologians, primarily Sunni, for example, Mustafa Sabri [3].

Al-Afghani's ideas have influenced a wide range of Islamic public and religious figures. First of all, we are talking about Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian theologian, a liberal Moslem reformer who developed the ideas of al-Afghani. His main work is considered to be "Risala at-Tawhid" ("Message to monotheism"). In this work, as well as in his statements, one can trace a very specific synthesis of European and Islamic cultural elements: for example, Muhammad Abduh advocated the introduction of the principles of parliamentarism and constitutionalism for the modernization of the Moslem community in Egypt and the world. He believed that these principles are already, in a certain sense, present in Islam, expressed through the institutions of the Majlis (legislative body), shura (advisory body), as well as through the dastur (charter, as a rule, regulating state and political administration). It is noteworthy that Muhammad Abduh very clearly identified the areas that, in his opinion, it was possible and necessary to reform, and those areas that could not be touched on in any case. Thus, the fundamentalist character in his revolutionary work contains the statement about the need to preserve the "usul" ("roots") - the basis of the Islamic religion, which contained the Koran and the Moslem dogma derived from the holy text. At the same time, it was extremely important to reform the models and system of social, economic, political and other types of interaction between people - "foru" ("branches"), since it seemed necessary to maintain a certain tone of the Islamic community in the face of the industrial and economic revolution, the development of transnational transport routes and the expansion of Western powers in Moslem regions [4]. Despite the resistance that Abduh met in the course of his activities, he managed not only to significantly spread his own views, but also to occupy an important post, taking under his leadership one of the oldest Moslem universities in the world - Cairo Al-Azhar,

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founded during the Fatimid dynasty. Abduh had a decisive influence on the reform of the university structure, the modernization of the curriculum, and in fact shaped the modern image of the university. As a practicing theologian and mufti, Muhammad Abduh issued a number of fatwas, in the wording and main messages of which one can trace the process of adaptation of the Egyptian Ummah to changing social and cultural conditions: for example, fatwas were dedicated to the abolition of certain restrictions on food, allowing believers to wear European dress and hairstyles, to paint and sculpture, and to apply interest rates when borrowing money.

The uncertainty, even ambiguity of the views expressed by Muhammad Abduh, led not only to opposition to him during his lifetime, but is also reflected today: the desire, on the one hand, to build a Sharia state based on the oldest Islamic principles, on the other - to introduce European rules and norms into Islam, led to the fact that his works become sources of views not only for modern supporters of the modernist trend, but also for adherents of radical fundamentalism and the "purification" of Islam.

Among other followers of Islamic modernism, I would like to single out such people as Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid - a public figure, an opponent of colonialism, the first rector of Cairo University and one of the founders of the "People's Party"; Abd al-Rahman ibn Ahmad al-Kawakibi - a Syrian theologian and reformer, an opponent of the Ottoman regime, one of the founders of the ideology of pan - Arabism; Mustafa Kamil was one of the main ideologists of the national liberation movement in Egypt against the British occupation, an orator and journalist, etc.

The Russian Empire was seen in a different way. On the one hand, numerous Moslem peoples traditionally lived in fairly large territories and had a certain degree of autonomy, including implementation of justice, organization and implementation of trade and economic activities, had their own educational institutions and religious buildings, often subordinated to the central government quite formally. On the other hand, the

19th century was not only a century of expansion and Western European empires' conquests in Africa and Asia: Russia also conducted a consistent, rather aggressive foreign policy, expanding its borders to the south, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, i.e. territories inhabited by a significant number of Moslems. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that although the policy of the Russian leadership may not have been characterized by such extensive exploitation of the local population, it was based on the idea that the peoples who inhabited these lands were still more "barbaric" than "civilized". Russia, Russian soldiers and colonists seemed to be bringing enlightenment and culture to these lands, a kind of "burden of a Russian man". The response to this was resistance, primarily from the local Moslem intellectual elites.

In the former Russian Empire, Islamic modernism was associated primarily with the ideas and activities of the Crimean Tatar educator and public figure Ismail Gasprinsky (Gasparaly) (1851–1914). He became the founder of a specific trend in Islamic modernism, characteristic only for Russia and its neighboring territories – Jadidism. This term comes from the Arabic "Jadid" (new), although the people who attributed themselves to this trend preferred to call themselves progressives or intellectuals.

Jadidism contained provisions on the need to improve Islam on the basis of not only purely Moslem values, but also universal (European in origin) philosophical ideas about humanism. Its distinctive features in comparison with the parallel Middle Eastern modernist concepts were the following: 1) the bulk of the followers and ideologists of Jadidism in Russia were originally Turks (Volga, Crimean and Caucasian Tatars, Kumyks, etc.), while in the Middle East, modernism was joined mainly by Arabs, who resisted both European and Ottoman dictates and therefore formed not just a Moslem, but an Arab-Moslem ideological complex; 2) the followers of Jadidism lived and defended their rights within the framework of a predominantly Christian, Orthodox state, whose colonial ambitions were in a

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certain way linked to the spread of the light of civilization and Christianity in the lands of the Caucasus and Central Asia; 3) the followers of Jadidism were characterized by a large cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity; 4) a more tolerant attitude of the Jadids to mystical trends in Islam, the affiliation of some followers of Jadidism to the Sufi orders, etc. [5].

Among the main areas of activity of the Jadids, which have received the most extensive coverage and distribution, one can distinguish, first, Islamic education. The followers of Jadidism not only proposed to implement a new system of organizing the educational process in the predominantly Moslem regions of the Russian Empire, opened new schools (primarily in rural areas), but also advocated that Moslems should not just memorize the lines of sacred texts, but analyze them, interpret them, and translate them into their native languages. The Jadids sought to introduce secular standards of education in schools that operated at places of worship, including, first of all, in villages. Secondly, the followers of this trend of Islamic modernism advocated the distribution of books, the development of book printing, and greater openness of the Moslem community of Russia to ideas developed in other, including Moslem, regions of the world. The Jadids paid great attention to business activities, opened new bookstores, which presented the works of both followers of Islamic traditionalism and modernist trends from Egypt and Syria. The works of the ideologists of Jadidism themselves were also presented in them.

The main role in spreading the ideas of Ismail Gasprinsky was played by the newspaper "Terjiman-Perevodchik", which was published in Bakhchisaray until 1918 and was distributed in the Crimea, the Volga region, Central Asia, as well as many foreign countries: France, the United States, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Bulgaria, Switzerland, etc. This newspaper became the central mouthpiece of the Jadids in Russia and abroad, the first Turkic-language newspaper in the Russian Empire, and the first major victory of the Jadids. Thanks to the translation activities of

the Jadids, the works of European philosophers became available to a wide range of Moslems of the Russian Empire. A notable aspect of the activity of the Jadids was the spread of a fashionable trend in the world at that time -feminism, with Moslem specifics: so, in 1891, a new appendix to the "Terjiman" appeared under the name "Kadyn" (in Russian - "Woman"). Among other things, the Jadids advocated the unification of all Turkic peoples in a confederate format (which echoed the ideas of al-Afghani, but for Moslems in general) on the basis of Islamic reformed values and the desire for progress and change. Such a confederation was to cover large Eurasian expanses, from the Crimea to Dzungaria, from Eastern Thrace to the territories of Southern Siberia [6].

The views of the Jadids were relatively popular in the Caucasus, in particular, in the territory of modern Azerbaijan, where the main follower of Ismail Gasprinsky was Ali-bey Huseynzade (1864-1940), a doctor and philosopher, as well as in the lands of Daghestan, inhabited mainly by Kumyks, where Nuhai Batymurzayev (1865-1919), a journalist, writer and educator, the founder of Kumyk written prose, acted as a conductor of the ideas of Jadidism [7].

A powerful impetus for the activity of the Jadids in Russia was given by the defeat of Russia in the war with Japan in 1904-1905. It was one of the first victories of a non-European power over one of the largest European empires of the time, and gave confidence to the leaders of many national liberation and reform movements in Asia. The events of the First Russian Revolution allowed the Jadids to become actively involved in Russian politics. The Jadids tried to promote their views by participating in the activities of the Moslem faction of the State Duma of Russia. Then, with the establishment of the Russian Republic and the further disintegration of the unified state, the Jadids hurried to take an active part in the work of the bodies of the newly formed states on the ruins of the former empire: Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Bukhara, Bashkiria, Idel-Ural, etc.

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The events that unfolded after the end of the First World War were not entirely favorable for the development of Islamic modernism as a whole. In the Middle East, the reformers were faced with an even stronger expansion of Great Britain and France in the territory of the former Ottoman Empire, which led to even greater pressure from the colonial powers, who sought to form a loyal support from local political and religious figures, on the other hand, to the rejection of European cultural and civilizational attitudes by the local population. The often brutal and manipulative policies of the colonial authorities led to a growing number of adherents of fundamentalism in its aggressive forms, rather than followers of modernism, as well as supporters of violent resistance to Europeans and the national liberation movement for the rights and freedoms of the Arab and Moslem populations.

In Russia, the situation was different. The civil war created a certain power vacuum, for which various political groups began to fight. The Jadids, as already noted, began to take part in the construction of new state entities. However, gradually the Bolsheviks, who consistently expanded the geography of the territories under their control, began to take power into their own hands. Despite their often aggressive anti-clerical rhetoric, the Bolsheviks viewed the Moslem population as part of the previously oppressed strata of the population that had suffered from the tyranny of tsarism. In turn, the Jadids managed to establish control over some territories, particularly in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, and then allied themselves with local and visiting communists against anti-Bolshevik forces, most of which were associated with the old tsarist regime.

The policy of the Bolsheviks at that time was characterized by sympathies with the political and social trends of the marginal peoples of Russia, and in some aspects the views of the Communists and the Jadids were similar. The Jadids, like Bolsheviks, directed their efforts to overcome the consequences of tsarism, to introduce progressive views in the Moslem

environment, including on the gender roles of men and women in the emerging communist society. The educational and cultural activities of the Jadids in the field of theater development in Moslem regions are noteworthy. A prominent place in this process was occupied by the followers of Jadidism from Azerbaijan: Said Reza Alizadeh, Mirza Habib Akhundzadeh, etc. Russian textbooks on exact sciences were translated into local languages, modern versions of the Tajik and Uzbek alphabets were created, primers and pamphlets were produced that promoted not only education and openness to progressive ideas and views, but also adherence to the communist ideology as an instrument for the liberation of Moslem peoples and their development. In the academic literature, there appeared articles about the development of Jadidism, its role in countering Russian tsarist expansionism and the attempt to impose an anti-people type of socio-economic relations. The activity of the Jadids at this stage was perceived as the activity of "interpreters" between the Bolsheviks and the local population of the Moslem regions of the country.

It should be noted that the Bolsheviks had a more positive attitude towards Moslems and to the formation of their own religious and educational organizations. In 1922, one of the leaders of Jadidism, Rizaitdin Fakhretdinov (1859-1936), took the post of Supreme Mufti. The Moslem clergy, inspired by the revolution and supported by local party bodies, re-formed their own bodies of religious authorities - spiritual administrations, the largest of which was the Central Spiritual Administration of Moslems (CDAM) (1920). In terms of the number of believers, it was the largest of its kind, and its jurisdiction extended to the entire territory of the RSFSR, with the exception of the Crimea and the North Caucasus. The CDAM tried to expand this sphere to Central Asia, taking advantage of the fact that there were no large and centralized Moslem administrations in this territory. However, attempts to create an analogue of the CDAM in Central

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Asia failed, and until the mid-30s, scattered organizations in the largest Moslem centers of the region continued to exist.

Nevertheless, the alliance of communists and Jadids, who received posts in Moslem and national structures, was a short-term phenomenon. The anti-clerical and anti-religious nature of the Bolsheviks' activities led to the closure of many mosques and religious educational institutions. There were also some contradictions in the Moslem community of the USSR at that time. For example, the opposition of the Moslem clergy of Bashkiria to the CDAM, the resistance of local activists and religious figures to the policy of the CDAM in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is noteworthy. The Soviet government not only did not prevent, but also supported this split, which caused an even greater decline in the authority of the CDAM. The persecution of Moslem religious and political figures, which had been intermittent until the late 1920s and early 1930s, intensified. The failure of the attempt to spread revolutionary ideas to the East, to the Moslem-populated countries, led to an even greater reduction in support for the spiritual administrations, their further fragmentation, and then to large-scale repressions against the finally politicized supporters of Jadidism. The largest trials, including those involving the Jadids, were the "CDAM Case" and the "Chain of the Koran" case of the late 30s [8].

Thus, the actions of the Soviet government to destroy the influence of the spiritual administrations of Moslems on the community of the USSR led to actual eradication of Jadidism as an idea. The adaptation of Moslem society to modern conditions continued through cultural and ideological channels completely different from religious ones. The collapse of the USSR, the construction of new states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the aggravation of inter-religious and inter-ethnic contradictions caused a wider interest on the part of Moslems in the ideas of fundamentalism, the "purification" of religion from centuries-old cultural and ideological layers. At the same time, Islamic modernism in general and Jadidism in particular have been

almost forgotten in our country: little is known, spoken and written about it, it is perceived only as a kind of “ghost of the past”, and historiographical issues related to its appearance, development and evaluation of its past achievements are analyzed.

The main focus of the Russian authorities that manage religious and national policy in Russia in the field of countering Islamism and other destructive religious and political trends of an Islamic nature is related to the support of “traditional” Islam with local ethno-cultural specifics. It seems very doubtful that the ideas of Islamic modernism in our country will gain at least some of their former influence in the short and even medium term, and will be able to become any reliable basis for countering the radicals.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that despite the often controversial and even interpreted as anti-Russian nature of the activities of Russian Islamic modernists (especially with regard to the idea of pan-Turkism and the creation of the “Great Turan”), these people were among the most progressive adherents of the Islamic religion, not only in our country, but also in the world, and had a significant impact on the further history of entire peoples, on the formation of their modern culture and moral and ethical complex, the current system of Islamic education in Russia and many other aspects of the activities of the Moslem Ummah of our country.

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## PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2021.02.001. VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. INTERFAITH RELATIONS IN CRIMEA AND MIGRATION PROCESSES // *Condensed abstract.*

*Keywords: The Republic of Crimea, ethnic monitoring, interethnic relations, ethno-confessional situation, religious relations, ROC, Religious Administration of Muslims of Crimea RAMC, mosques, Islamic education, financing, manifestation of religious extremism, sanctions regime, blockade of the peninsular, migration processes.*

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INION RAN

1. Senyushkina T.A., Stepanov V.V., Starchenko R.A., Zotkin A.A., Ryabyh V.N. *Mezhetnicheskie Otnosheniya i Religioznaya Situatsiya v Krymu. Ekspertniy Doklad za 2018 God // Moskva-Simferopol, 2019. P. 152*

2. Kalyugina S., Pianov A., Tvaronavičienė M., Sorokin G. *Depopulation and External Migration as the Institutional Risks to Personnel Safety\* // Journal of Institutional Studies. 2018, Vol. 10, № 4. P. 125-144.*

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\* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

The expert report “Mezhethnicheskie Otnosheniya i Religioznaya Situatsiya v Krymu” [1] was prepared on the basis of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (academic advisor – academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.A. Tishkov). Research in the field of interethnic and confessional problems is carried out by the Distributed Scientific Center (DSC), uniting leading scientists and experts of the country, with general coordination from the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia.

The expert report is the result of studies based on indicators of the Ethnological Monitoring Network. This system helps to identify the interrelationship of economic, political and socio-cultural processes in the region and to analyse changes in the ethno-confessional situation, with the consideration of internal and external factors. As information sources, open materials of state authorities posted on the Internet portals of the Government of the Republic of Crimea and the city with federal status Sevastopol, articles of regional and federal media, and the results of sociological studies were used.

Experts state: in the first half of 2018, the region as a whole experienced a stable situation in the socio-political, interethnic and interfaith spheres. Despite the existing conflict-generating potential in the local community, accumulated earlier, there were no situations that could develop into an interethnic conflict. Experts note the presence of positive dynamics in achieving interethnic harmony and general Russian unity common to all citizens, but at the same time they pay attention to the preservation of the specifics of regional, ethnic and confessional identity and the peculiarities of the political culture formed in previous years.

At the same time, as a result of monitoring, certain problems and contradictions were detected. One of significant factor influencing the intraregional situation is the external environment. Foreign policy players from the G-7 countries are

trying to keep the definition of Crimea as an object of a “territorial dispute” on the world agenda, which is accompanied by a tough sanctions regime. The political leadership of Ukraine and the leaders of extremist organizations conduct well-directed disinformation against Crimea, as well as intelligence and sabotage activities to provoke conflicts in the region. This, in turn, encourages the maintenance of high alert mode of law enforcement agencies to prevent a negative external impact on the situation in the region.

Work is underway to overcome the blockade of Crimea in the information, economic and legal areas. There is a search for forms of international cooperation. The conclusion of agreements between the Government of Sevastopol and the Syrian province of Tartus became the result of the Yalta International Economic Forum (YIEF).

An important indicator of internal stability is the results of a study of demographic trends. They indicate that the sanctions regime and the blockade of Crimea did not have a significant impact and did not lead to out migration. Crimea remains an attractive region and therefore has a population growth, primarily due to the external migration flow. In general, the situation in Crimea in the first half of 2018 remained stable and predictable. A number of important events – the election of the President of the Russian Federation, the opening of the Crimean bridge, etc. – contributed to improving the general socio-psychological background and strengthening the confidence of Crimeans in their future. This is demonstrated by the results of sociological surveys. The existing difficulties are predetermined by external foreign pressure and insufficient managerial experience among Crimean politicians.

One of the features of the ethnic and religious landscape of Crimea is the coincidence of confessional and ethnic scope. According to the census conducted in Crimea in 2014, representatives of 175 nationalities live on the peninsula. The most numerous ones are Russians (68.3%), Ukrainians (15.8%)

and Crimean Tatars (10.6%). The majority of the inhabitants of Crimea are Russians, and this majority is not only ethnic, but also religious. As a result of monitoring, there was revealed a trend towards a decrease in external influence on Crimean Muslims. To a decisive extent, this is due to the fact that since March 2014, a new system of relations between the state and Islamic religious communities has been formed in Crimea. Along with the entry of Crimea into Russia, external financing flows of the Muslim diaspora in Crimea were suspended.

Currently, great financial assistance to the Islamic religious organizations of Crimea is provided by the regions of Russia, in particular, Tatarstan and the Chechen Republic.

Experts note the strengthening of the role of the RAMC at all levels of Islamic education. There was revealed an orientation towards the spiritual and educational institutions of the Republic of Tatarstan, centralization of the system of Islamic education in the format of Islamic courses. The observed changes create conditions for unification of the Islamic education system and improvement of its professional level. Construction of the Cathedral Mosque in Simferopol, the main religious object of Crimean Muslims, is important for ethno-confessional stability in the region.

Orthodox and Muslim religious holidays, which are celebrated at a high level and officially become weekends for all Crimeans, regardless of national and religious affiliation are important for ethno-confessional stability in Crimea. April 9, 2018 was declared a weekend in connection with the celebration of Orthodox Easter, May 28, Trinity Sunday. On June 15, Muslims of the peninsula celebrated Eid Festival, and on August 21, the Kurban Bayram Sacrificial Festival. May 5, 2018 about 55 thousand people took part in the national Crimean Tatar holiday Hidirellez, which became traditional and unifying for all Crimeans.

As a result of monitoring, along with positive trends in the field of interethnic relations, conflict situations were identified.

In June 2018, the conflict situation was worsened in connection with the demolition of the mosque under construction in the place of compact residence of the Crimean Tatars in Simferopol (Strelkovaya residential community). The conflict faced the interests of local residents, with the funds of which the mosque was built, and the commercial project "Crimean Rose," which allowed corruption schemes when issuing leasing agreements and building permits. Residents of the village appealed to take the situation in the Strelkova residential community under the patronage of the President and initiate criminal proceedings against the destroyers of the mosque. At the initiative of residents, representatives of federal structures were involved in resolving the conflict, as a result of which alternatives for joint actions to resolve the situation were worked out. They also agreed on the undesirability of unnecessary politicization of the situation related to the demolition of the mosque and resolving issues within the framework of administrative and economic activities.

In Crimea, the risks of religious extremism and international terrorism remain relevant. In January 2018, members of the extremist community set fire to the house of the Mufti of Crimea. As a result of the FSB investigation, together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, there were revealed the activities of an extremist group created by the assistant to the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Mustafa Dzhemilev Erol Veliev at the direction of the wanted leader of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People organization Refat Chubarov with the support of the SBU. Extremists planned to commit crimes in order to intimidate pro-Russian Crimean Tatars and escalate ethnic tension in the region.

Turning to the demographic situation and migration in the Crimea, the authors present statistical data. The permanent population in the Republic of Crimea for January 1, 2018 is 1913731 people. In Crimea, the population lives in 11 urban districts and 14 municipal districts, which include 4 urban

settlements and 250 rural settlements. The urban population for January 1, 2018 is 974778 people, the rural population is 938943 people. The ratio of citizens to villagers is 51 and 49%, respectively.

The ethnic composition of the population as a whole retains the proportions found as a result of the census conducted in Crimea in 2014. Those who indicated their nationality were distributed in the following proportions: Russians - 65.2%, Ukrainians - 15.99%, Crimean Tatars - 12.59%, Tatars - 2.32% (representatives of other ethnic groups made up less than 1% of the population of the Republic of Crimea). Russians are most densely settled in Simferopol and Simferopol district, urban districts of Yalta, Feodosia, Kerch, Yevpatoria. In many of the administrative-territorial units of the Republic of Crimea, Russians represent the majority of the population. In the Dzhankoy, Krasnoperekopsky, Pervomaisky and Razdolnensky districts, their share is less than 50%. Ukrainians are densely settled in Simferopol and Simferopol district, in the urban districts of Yalta and Yevpatoria, Saki district. The share of Ukrainians is highest in the urban districts of Armyansk and Krasnoperekopsk, Dzhankoy, Krasnoperekopsky, Pervomaisky and Razdolnensky districts. Crimean Tatars are numerically represented in Simferopol and Simferopol district, in Bakhchisaray, Belogorsky and Krasnogvardeisky districts. Comparative figures demonstrate that the proportion of Crimean Tatars in the Belogorsky district is 31.3% of the population, in the Kirovsky district - 28.8%, the Soviet district - 25.9%, the Bakhchisarai district - 23.6%, Simferopol district - 22.8%, the urban district Sudak - 21.4%, Krasnogvardeisky district - 20.6%, Dzhankoy district - 20.4%. In all other regions of the Republic of Crimea, the share of Crimean Tatars is less than 20%, and in cities - less than 10%.

Crimea is a multi-religious region. Traditional religions are Orthodoxy, Sunni Islam, Karaimism, Judaism, as well as Catholicism and Armenian apostolic Christianity. Religious processes in the Islamic community of Crimea during the study

period are concerned with a new vector of development, which surged in 2014–2018.

Since March 2014, the system of relations between the state and Islamic religious communities has changed in Crimea. All Islamic religious organizations became part of RAMC, and the Taurian Muftiat was also created. According to experts, the creation of two muftiats contributes to the separation of the Crimean ummah and is a conflict-generating factor. On the other hand, the creation of the Taurian Muftiat can be considered as a form of institutionalization of the already existing conflict within the Crimean Tatar community.

In Crimea, as in other regions of the Russian Federation, there is legislation to suppress extremism associated with religious motives in relation to the extremist activities of religious organizations. According to the regulatory documents of the Russian state, a system has been formed that determines the legal degree of responsibility of citizens, religious organizations, public associations, officials, civil servants, as well as the media for distribution of extremist materials. As a result of the legislation, and also state policy in the sphere of regulating national and religious issues, there are currently no acute manifestations of strife in the field of ethno-confessional relations in Crimea.

Currently, there is a tendency to reduce external influence on Crimean Muslims. This is especially evident in the sphere of Islamic education. Experts note the elimination of foreign influence on the Islamic education system and the strengthening of the role of the muftiat at all levels of education. There is an orientation towards the spiritual and educational institutions of the Republic of Tatarstan, centralization of the system of Islamic education in the format of Islamic courses. The observed changes create conditions for unification of the Islamic education system and the improvement of its professional level. There are training courses for imams, within the framework of which interaction is carried out with Islamic universities operating in the Russian Federation.

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The authors of the article “Depopulation and external migration as institutional risks of personnel safety” [2] S. Kalyugina, A. Pianov, M. Tvaronavičene, G. Sorokin refer to demographic and migration problems. In leading European powers there is a decline in the birth rate. This fate affected Russia. Due to the entry of the Republic of Crimea into Russia, the population of the country increased by 2.3 million people. World experience shows that raising the birth rate by means of financial incentives for the birth of children is unreal. The problems of population decline are relevant for almost all developed countries. According to the authors of the article, their solution is possible only due to migration. However, this idea, according to some demographers and sociologists, has significantly more negative than positive reasons. Without taking them into account, Russia may be in the same migration crisis as Western Europe. Moreover, some Russian regions, including Crimea, are already experiencing a significant migration burden on the labor market and social infrastructure, which leads to an increase in social tension in society. Therefore, researchers conclude, migration policies should be targeted and selective, include restrictive mechanisms.

ASLANBEK ADIYEV. SOCIAL-POLITICAL AND ETHNOCULTURAL SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN IN 2020 (EVENT ANALYSIS) // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

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*Abstract. The most difficult ethno-political problem in the Republic of Daghestan (RD) is still the question of the restoration of the Aukh district. The lack of regulation of this problem negatively affects the socio-political situation in the Kazbekovsky, Novolak and Khasavyurt districts of the Republic of Daghestan and in the city of Khasavyurt, where periodically protest and commemorative actions of the Daghestani Chechens take place, and at times there are domestic clashes that threaten to escalate into pogroms and riots. In the first quarter of 2020, activists of the Chechen community of the Republic of Daghestan once again tried to actualize the issue of restoring the Aukh district by holding public events, including a protest (“nationwide”) rally of Chechens in the city of Khasavyurt. However, the introduction from March 18 of a ban on holding mass events on the territory of the Republic of Daghestan in order to avoid a worsening of the epidemiological situation in the region did not allow them to organize a protest rally. In early July, the leadership of the main public organization of the Chechens of Daghestan, advocating the restoration of the Aukh district, was replaced, which temporarily reduced their public activity. In October, the political leadership of the Republic of Daghestan changed. The new head of the region, S. Melikov, has not yet voiced his position on this ethno-political problem and has not yet met with activists of ethnic and territorial communities, whose interests are affected by the issue of restoring the Aukh district. In the current conditions, when the regional government habitually ignores the socio-political demands, protests and commemorative events of the Chechen public of the republic, the Chechens of Daghestan (especially the youth) are more and more oriented towards Grozny than towards Makhachkala. This leads to weakening of the already weak Daghestani identity of the Akkin Chechens. This trend is observed in the informational, cultural, religious and other social spheres. The new*

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*leadership of the republic will have to develop its own approach to solving problems associated with the process of restoring the Aukh district.*

Another regional problem that can affect the sphere of interethnic relations in the Republic of Daghestan is the process of degradation and desertification of republican lowland pastures (lands for distant pastures) in the north of the RD. The reason for this environmental problem, according to biologists, is the off-season, irregular and uncontrolled use of pastures by tenant farmers who are engaged in sheep breeding on the republican lands of distant pasture cattle breeding. A zone of interethnic tension here is the border pasture areas, where the economic interests of local rural communities in lowland areas collide with the interests of tenants of republican lands for distant pasture farming, resettlement farms from the mountainous regions of the Republic of Daghestan. The authorities of the Republic of Daghestan introduced on November 24, 2020 a state of emergency in the Tarumovsky and Nogai districts of the Republic of Daghestan, where the revealed destruction of the soil cover on the lands of distant pasture breeding no longer allowed economic (sheep breeding) activities there. This temporary measure does not remove from the agenda the problem of desertification of republican pastures in the north of the Republic of Daghestan, which, moreover, are perceived by the Nogai and Kumyk communities as ethnic lands of these peoples.

In the spring of 2020, during the period of active struggle against the spread of coronavirus infection in the territory of the Russian Federation and neighboring states, citizens of the Russian Federation and citizens of Azerbaijan had serious difficulties crossing the state border between the two countries through ground crossing points on the territory of the Republic of Daghestan. As a result of the restrictive measures introduced by the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan, migrants – Azerbaijanis who were allowed to return to Azerbaijan only after a few days

and weeks of waiting in groups of 100–150 people at a time, began to accumulate in the regions of the Republic of Dagestan bordering with Azerbaijan,. The same procedure for crossing the border from Azerbaijan in the opposite direction was organized by the authorities of this state for Russians returning home. The RD authorities set up a tent camp to accommodate the Azerbaijanis congregating on the border, where a riot took place in early June. The migrants, dissatisfied with the long wait for departure, as well as non-compliance with the order of departure to Azerbaijan, tried to block the federal highway and attacked the police officers who were on duty near the tent camp. On the same day, public order in the camp was restored, and the perpetrators of the attack were arrested and taken to the police station. Shortly after this incident, border crossing traffic was significantly increased and the situation on the Russian-Azerbaijani border returned to normal.

### **Aukh question**

The most difficult and potentially explosive ethnopolitical problem on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan is the question of restoring the Aukh district, which was abolished in 1944 shortly after the deportation of the Chechen population from the republic. The activists of public organizations of Dagestani Chechens annually hold public events designed to speed up the process of restoration of the Aukh district.

On February 15, the 11th congress of Dagestani Chechens was held in Khasavyurt, at which the prospects for the restoration of the Aukh district were discussed. There were no representatives of the Dagestani media at the event, but there were journalists from the Chechen Republic. Therefore, a report on the congress was shown in the evening news bulletin of the Grozny State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company.<sup>1</sup> According to the statements of the organizers of the congress, the Dagestani authorities ignored the proposals and projects

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prepared by public activists of the Akkin Chechens for the restoration of the Aukh district. S. Shavkhalov, chairman of the Daghestan regional public organization "Public Council 'Aukh' ", told the reporters: *"We have prepared proposals, including a roadmap, on how to solve this issue by 60-70% without spending budget funds. However, none of the points of our project was implemented, not even accepted for consideration"*.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, for 30 years (since 1991) the decisions taken by the regional authorities on the restoration of the Aukh district have not been implemented. We assume that the main reason why the situation remains "frozen" is the impossibility of meeting the interests of all parties to the conflict. To date, the Lak population of the Novolak district, which agreed in 1991 to resettlement on the terms of re-creating the municipal district of the same name in a new place, in fact, lives on the territory of two districts: the "old" Novolak district and on the territory of the so-called "Novostroy" near Makhachkala, where the Novolak district was supposed to "move" completely.

It is important to take into account that since 1991 the socio-political context and the approach to the solution of this ethnopolitical problem caused by this context have radically changed. In the early 90s the Daghestani public as a whole was sympathetic to the need for re-resettlement of the Lak population of the Novolak district, but today this voluntary-forced migration on an ethnic basis is very difficult to explain or justify by the current Russian legislation. Meanwhile, the resettlement of the Lak part of the population of the Novolak district, where, in addition to the Laks and Chechens, there are also Avars, is only one of the preconditions for the restoration of the Aukh district. After all, the Daghestani Chechens insist on the restoration of the Aukh district not within the boundaries of the Novolak district, but within the boundaries of the beginning of 1944, i.e. with the territory and settlements transferred after the abolition of the Aukh district to the neighboring Kazbek district. This requirement of the Akkin Chechens categorically does not suit the Avars living in the villages of Leninaul and Kalinaul of the

Kazbek district. Therefore, it seems to us that while the Avar population of Kalininaul and Leninaul does not agree to become part of the future Aukhdistrict, and the Akkin Chechens do not agree to the restoration of this area within the borders of the Novolak district, Novostroy, where the Laks are going to resettle, will not receive the status of a municipal district and Novolak district will function in the same place. This vicious circle cannot be broken without mutual concessions and compromises.

Another reason for holding a protest congress of Chechens in Daghestan on February 15 was information about the intention of the RD authorities and the leadership of the Novolak district to transfer to an entrepreneur 150 hectares of agricultural land for the construction of a market, which land, according to the Chechen public, is reserved for the restoration of the Aukh district. As follows from the video material published by the Grozny Chechen State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, the participants of the congress of Daghestani Chechens are concerned about this information and are outraged by the plans of the RD authorities to transfer to a private person the lands falling under the program for the restoration of the Aukh district. The chairman of the Council of Elders of Chechens of Daghestan Kh. Abrekov, commenting on the problem of restoring the Aukh district to journalists, said that according to the Koran, living on a foreign land, appropriating someone else's property is a sin. Moslem rhetoric, to which representatives of the Chechen community turn to in the controversial issue of restoring the Aukh district, is rather addressed not to representatives of the federal and Daghestan authorities, but to the residents of the Novolak and Kazbek district, to their Moslem (common for Avars, Laks and Chechens) identity ... This rhetoric is used by participants in many land disputes on the territory of the republic. In local land disputes (between two rural communities), recourse to Sharia norms can still lead to a peaceful and informal settlement of the conflict situation, but in an overly politicized and bureaucratized dispute over the restoration of the Aukh

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district the norms of Islam, to which one of the parties appeals, do not work as conflict resolution mechanism. As a result of the congress, the delegates decided to hold an annual mourning and religious event on February 23 in memory of the victims of political repressions of the Stalinist period, and also planned a general national rally of Chechens in Daghestan for March 22, in order to update and keep on the agenda the issue of restoring the Aukh district.

On February 23, 2020, at the memorial to the victims of Stalinism near the old cemetery of the village of Yaryksu-Aukh, Novolak district, Daghestani Chechens held an event dedicated to the 76th anniversary of the deportation of Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The Chechens of Daghestan annually hold this commemorative event, which contributes to the strengthening of their ethnic solidarity and identity. On this day, elderly people share from the rostrum their memories of the tragedy of the deportation of 1944, and the leaders of Chechen public organizations report on their activities aimed at accelerating the process of restoration of the Aukh district. *“It would seem that all the regulations and decisions have been adopted, huge funds have been allocated from the state budget for resettlement of the Laks to a new place of residence, and the issue of rehabilitation of the Chechens of Daghestan has not been completed yet. And therefore, every year, with every regular anniversary of our national tragedy, the traditional place of mourning events for the repressed Chechens of Aukh, a monument to Chechens, victims of Stalinist repressions in the village Yaryksu-Aukh of the present Novolak district attracts more and more disgruntled Aukhites, and that is why the tone of the speeches is more and more angry,”* – said A. Machaev<sup>3</sup>, one of the public activists of Chechens in Daghestan. Deputy Chairman of the “Public Council ‘Aukh’ ” Kh. Sultanbiev, in his speech at this event, criticized the leadership of the Republic of Daghestan, stating that the Daghestani authorities ignored the issue of restoring the Aukh district.

*“Since returning to Dagestan after 13 years of exile, our people have been striving for the restoration of historical justice for 63 years now. In 1991, the RSFSR Law “Rehabilitation of repressed peoples” was adopted. In the same year, a resolution of the III Congress of People’s Deputies of the DASSR “Restoration of the Aukh district” was adopted. Soon it will be 30 years since the people of Dagestan, represented by the III Congress of People’s Deputies, made this decision. During this time, 5 leaders of Dagestan and 6 members of the People’s Assembly were replaced, from all of them we have heard and are hearing promises that the Aukh district will be restored. Since the new leadership came to power, the issues of rehabilitation of the Chechens of Dagestan, the resettlement of the Lak part of the population of the Novolak district to a new place of residence, not only did not move ahead, but even stalled at all. They are stubbornly hushed up by the leadership of the republic, which pretends that such a problem does not exist in the republic at all,”* <sup>4</sup> Kh. Sultanbiev said. According to the public figure, over the past two years, the organization “Public Council ‘Aukh’ ” has submitted proposals for the restoration of the Aukh district to the head of the republic 10 times, and to the chairman of the regional government – 11 times, but received only one written reply that the meeting with the Head of the RD is appointed for September 2018. But this meeting, according to the public figure, never took place.

The RD authorities rejected the application of Chechen public activists to hold a general national rally of Dagestani Chechens on March 22, pointing to the threat of terrorist attacks and the risks of blocking the highway near the town of Khasavyurt. The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Dagestan did not agree with either the time or the venue of the rally announced by the Chechen public. The department suggested that Chechen public figures submit a notice of holding a public event from 10 to 25 April 2020 in the Novolak district. In turn, activists of the “Public Council ‘Aukh’ ” tried to challenge the refusal of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Dagestan to hold the event, but less than a week later, the Decree of the Head

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of the Daghestan Republic No.17 of March 18, 2020 "Introduction of a high alert regime ..." banning mass events throughout the republic due to the risks of worsening the epidemiological situation in the region.

On March 26, representatives of the Daghestani Chechens appealed to the chairman of the Council of Alims of the North Caucasus H.-A. Kadyrov with a request to discuss the problem of restoring the Aukh district at a meeting of this religious organization and with the leaders of the Muftiate of the Republic of Daghestan. Chechen public activists told reporters that they had to turn to Kadyrov, because, despite the discussion of this problem with the Daghestani clergy, the conflict has not yet been resolved. Daghestani Chechens are asking Kadyrov to "facilitate its final and just decision." Commenting on this appeal, A. Machaev, an activist of the Daghestani Chechens, said: *"This was done in order to reach out to the religious feelings of those who oppose the solution of this problem. We all call ourselves believers, practicing Moslems. In the situation when the government does not solve this problem, but postpones it for later, it would be a blessing for people and for the Almighty if religious authorities tried to resolve this situation. How possible is this in today's reality? This, of course, is an open question."*<sup>5</sup> This meeting, judging by the lack of reaction to it on the part of the republican and federal authorities, did not in any way affect the sluggish state of the process of restoration of the Aukh district.

On July 7, the leadership of the main public organization, which speaks on behalf of the Chechens of Daghestan with a demand for the restoration of the Aukh district was replaced. The former chairman (Shavkhalov S.) and his deputy (Sultanbiev Kh.) who had disagreements with the youth wing of the organization left the organization "Public Council 'Aukh' ", Kh. Musalimov became the new chairman of the "Public Council 'Aukh' ", and S. Vagabov became his deputy. They presented their program of action, outlined the expediency of closer and constructive interaction with relevant departments within the Daghestan

government, and also stated the need for more active involvement of Chechen youth in nationwide cultural, sports and other social events. The priority areas of activity of public activists of the Chechens of Daghestan, in addition to helping to accelerate the process of restoration of the Aukh district, are: public oversight of the distribution of land plots in Novolak and Kazbek districts; information and explanatory work with the Chechen population of the republic in preparation for the upcoming All-Russian population census in order to fully reflect the number of Chechens in Daghestan in the census; collection of information about Chechens - participants of the Great Patriotic War, sent to the front from Daghestan.

On November 7, in the village of Yaryksu, Novolak district, on the initiative of the Daghestani Chechens, the opening ceremony of the Memorial to the memory of the Chechens - participants of the World War II, took place. For the Chechen population of Daghestan, this was certainly a significant event, which, for some reason, remained without due attention from the Daghestani government and the official media of the Republic of Daghestan. As the activists of the public organization "Public Council 'Aukh' " stated: *"the opening ceremony of the Memorial, which took place on such a large scale, left more questions than answers. We are already used to the fact that the republican authorities, or rather, the top leadership of our republic, ignore the events organized by the Public Council of Chechens of Aukh (February 23), while we often see how the first persons of the republic attend various events in other cities and districts of Daghestan. But this time we were sure that such an important and significant event dedicated to the memory of those who defended our Motherland, and even more so dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Great Victory, would not be ignored by both the leadership of the republic and the leading media, who were also notified of the upcoming event and sent out appropriate invitations. Unfortunately, we were disappointed in our expectations. And now we are rightly faced with the question – are we considered citizens of the republic at all, and do we still have any hope that we will ever be recognized as such in this*

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*republic?!"*<sup>6</sup> The Government of the Republic of Daghestan repeatedly ignores mass events of the Chechen public in the republic, which leads to the weakening of the already weak Daghestan identity of the Akkin Chechens. In the current situation, the Chechens of Daghestan (especially young people) more and more focus rather on Grozny than on Makhachkala. This trend is observed in the information, cultural, religious and other social spheres. The new leadership of the republic, perhaps, will have to develop its own approach to solving the problems associated with the process of restoring the Aukh district.

### **Deterioration of the epidemiological situation in April-May**

In terms of the number of people infected with coronavirus, Daghestan entered the top ten regions of Russia in April, and in May Daghestan recorded an explosive increase in the incidence of COVID-19. Due to the fact that the residents of the republic for the most part did not observe the self-isolation regime (introduced by the decree of the head of the republic on March 31), since mid-April, the police have set up roadblocks at the entrances to the cities and districts of the RD. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation on the RD called on citizens to treat with understanding the restrictive measures and recalled that for violating the self-isolation regime under Article 20.6.1 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation (Failure to comply with the rules of conduct in an emergency or threat of its occurrence) they can be fined from 1 to 30 thousand rubles.<sup>7</sup>

On April 16, the chief sanitary doctor for the RD N. Pavlov issued a decree aimed at preventing visits to cemeteries, churches and mosques. The Muftiate of the republic supported this decision and appealed to Moslems not to visit mosques until the authorities lifted the restrictive measures imposed. As the epidemiological situation worsened in some cities and districts of

the RD, the regime of high alert and self-isolation of citizens was also tightened. So, in connection with the spread of coronavirus infection, on May 3, the entrance to the territory of the city of Khasavyurt and exit from it were completely closed. It was also forbidden to move vehicles inside the city. At the same time, the operational headquarters of Khasavyurt to prevent the spread of the coronavirus infection completely canceled the special passes issued earlier to citizens.

On May 7, the head of the Tsuntinsky district of the RD Sh. Magomedov recorded a video message to the leadership of the republic, the Ministry of Health of the Republic, people from the district and public organizations, reporting on the shortage of doctors, medicines and personal protective equipment in the municipality.<sup>8</sup> In a number of high-mountain villages of the republic, local residents themselves blocked the road by the decision of the village assembly and made appeals on social networks so that students and labor migrants would not return to their village during the pandemic, as well as guests would not come. So, on May 7, residents of the village Kunki of the Dakhadayevsky district of the RD (mostly women and elderly people), arbitrarily closed the village (barricaded the road) to protect themselves from coronavirus infection. At the same time, the villagers recorded a video message in the Darginian language, which is literally translated: *"Let no one, neither our kinship nor our neighbors, come to us! We have something to eat. There are no medicines, no doctors, no ambulance, if we get sick - we have no one to help us, we want to live!"*

On May 12, on the eve of the end of the month of Moslem fasting, the Muftiate of the Republic of Daghestan made an appeal to Daghestanis not to celebrate Eid al-Adha in the traditional format (arranging lavish celebrations including invitation of guests, visiting cemeteries, going to other villages for this purpose) and to perform a festive prayer at home. Despite the appeals of the Muftiate of the republic, collective prayers were still performed in some mosques of Daghestan. According to the

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representative of the Muftiate of the RD, these are mosques in the village of Novosasitli in the Khasavyurt district, in the villages of Gagatli and Miarso in the Botlikh district, in the village of Tisiahitli in the Tsumadi district. as well as a number of mosques in Khasavyurt (Andiysky settlement, 30 Sulakskaya street; 1 Lazo street; 127 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of VLKSM street).<sup>9</sup> *“It is unfortunate that neither the insistent decrees of the leadership of the country and the region, nor the repeated appeals of the clergy of Daghestan could lead the representatives of these mosques to prudence. Apparently, the opinion and words of other leaders unknown to us are more important for them,”*<sup>10</sup> said the representative of the Muftiate of the RD Sh. Alikhanov, making it clear that the imams of these mosques do not interact with the centralized Islamic religious organization of Daghestan.

By mid-May, the situation with the spread of coronavirus in the RD had become so critical that it required the direct intervention of the President: on May 18, Vladimir Putin held a meeting with the leadership and public representatives of the republic, where it was recognized that the epidemiological situation in the region is critical and assistance from the federal center is needed.<sup>11</sup>

The main reason for the sharp increase in the incidence of COVID-19 in the Republic of Daghestan, in addition to the medical aspects of the problem, is the specifics of the way of life of today's Daghestani society. First of all, this is a high mobility and contact of the population. A significant part of the residents of the republic leave for work, both from villages to the cities of Daghestan and in other regions of the Russian Federation, and then return. The deterioration of the economic situation in the country has increased the return movement of labor migrants from other regions of the Russian Federation. Daghestani students of central universities also returned to the republic after the introduction of the remote learning format. As noted by specialists in Caucasian studies K. Kazenin and I. Starodubrovskaya, according to tradition, after returning, you need to meet with

relatives, neighbors, friends, and this is always dozens of handshakes.<sup>12</sup>

In late May – early June, local residents were outraged by the excessive, according to their estimates, police activity in drawing up reports for violating the self-isolation regime under Article 20.6.1 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation. The episode with the detention of two residents of the Karabudakhkent district by police officers on June 9 for violating the self-isolation regime provoked a protest gathering of local residents on the federal highway near the village of Manas.<sup>13</sup> According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one of the detainees, an elderly man, while driving a car, responded rudely to a police officer's request to show documents, which provoked a conflict. The detainees were released after a court fined them for violating the self-isolation regime, and police officers apologized after popular outrage for the rough treatment of the detainees. The conflict was settled.

Starting from June 15, the leadership of Daghestan began to lift restrictions connected with the anti-coronavirus regime. In the republic, service enterprises, non-food stores resumed their work, citizens were allowed to walk and play sports in the open air, while observing the mask regime and social distance. According to the regional operational headquarters, as of June 13, 6,463 cases of infection were registered in the RD, 4,710 people recovered, and 313 died.<sup>14</sup>

### **Unrest on the border with Azerbaijan**

On April 9, about 100 Azerbaijani citizens went on a hunger strike in the Magaramkent district of the RD near the Russian border checkpoint “Yarag-Kazmalyar”. The reason for this protest action was that they could not leave for their homeland, because the Russian-Azerbaijani border was closed from April 5 to 20. Azerbaijan has closed its air and land borders for this period due to the spread of coronavirus infection in the country.<sup>15</sup>

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But the epidemiological situation in Azerbaijan did not improve after April 20. In this regard, ground checkpoints across the state border between Russia (on the territory of the RD) and Azerbaijan began to operate at intervals of 14–20 days to implement quarantine security measures. People who crossed the border were placed for this period in border temporary accommodation points (TAP). In Daghestan, by the decision of the operational headquarters in the territory of the border region of Derbent near the village of Kullar, for Azerbaijani citizens returning home, a TAP was set up. Field kitchens, supply of drinking and industrial water, a fire station and a medical center were organized for the residents of the tent camp. Azerbaijanis came to the RD from different regions of Russia to use ground cross border checkpoints. By the beginning of May, about 600 Azerbaijani citizens were already on the territory of the tent camp in the Derbent district of the RD, waiting for the opportunity to return home. The official authorities in Baku said that the return of Azerbaijani citizens is carried out in stages as fast as the infrastructure is ready to accommodate new arrivals and under mandatory quarantine. The first group of Azerbaijanis left for their homeland on May 18; the second – on May 26. By May 29, it became known that 11 guests of the tent camp were hospitalized in the Derbent City Hospital,<sup>16</sup> and one of them was found to have COVID-19. The third batch of Azerbaijani citizens numbered 130 people crossed the border on June 9, and on June 16, another 240 people were planned to be sent home, but the night before, mass unrest occurred in the tent camp where the migrants were housed, and turned into a clash between migrants and security forces.

The unrest in the camp began on the evening of June 15 after Azerbaijanis waiting for permission to cross the border were outraged by the list of persons for whom a special corridor was to be organized at the Yarag-Kazmalyar checkpoint. According to the migrants themselves, this list did not follow the order of sending for the people waiting in the camp for their return home.

The new list of names for departure to Azerbaijan also included those who arrived at the camp just a few days ago, and many of those who had been waiting for their departure home for almost a month, living in a tent camp, had to wait for the formation of new lists. Outraged migrants came to the federal highway "Caucasus" and tried to block the movement of vehicles. Police officers on duty at the Kullar checkpoint were pelted with stones and heavy objects, and several security officers were beaten. Additional units of the security forces were quickly pulled to the scene of the events. As a result, according to official data of the Investigative Committee of Russia, seven law enforcement officers were injured, five cars were damaged, including two cars of the Border Department of the FSB. The police were forced to open fire in the air to subdue the discontented crowd. 93 people from the TAP were taken to the police department in the Magaramkent district of the RD.<sup>17</sup>

Immediately after the incident, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov said that Russia and Azerbaijan continue contacts to resolve the situation in the RD with the citizens of Azerbaijan. He recalled that the problem arose from the very beginning of the self-isolation regime, and the authorities of the RD quickly set up a tent camp for Azerbaijani citizens who at that time wanted to return to their country, but the borders were closed. According to the Kremlin representative, *"the leadership of Daghestan has done a lot to somehow resolve this situation"* Peskov stressed that *"the situation is not man-made, it is connected with the conditions in which everyone found themselves because of the coronavirus."*<sup>18</sup> It is important to emphasize that the lists for the return of Azerbaijanis home were prepared by the Azerbaijani authorities. For this purpose, employees of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as a representative of the President of Azerbaijan, came to the RD. Therefore, the migrants' discontent should have been addressed to their own authorities, and not to the Russian ones. As a result of the incident, criminal

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cases were initiated against 10 Azerbaijani citizens on their use of violence against government officials and intentional damage to property. Subsequently, the Azerbaijani authorities increased the traffic across the border up to 400 people at a time with an interval of a week. At the same time, by the autumn, due to the completion of seasonal work, the number of citizens of this state who wanted to return home through Daghestan increased.

Representatives of the NCA of Azerbaijanis in the RD and other subjects of the Russian Federation also joined the process of resolving the situation on the border, they kept records of their fellow countrymen arriving in the RD, and helped those of them who needed urgent material, medical or other assistance. *“Everyone wants to go home, people are outraged that they can’t go back. But we can’t help them all. But we try to make sure that the list includes at least those who have health problems. So, we managed to insist that a man who had an allergic reaction – what exactly was unknown, but his body was covered with blisters –was included in the group that went that very day. We managed to put him on a bus to the border”*, A. Allahverdiyev, the representative of the Azerbaijani National Assembly in the Moscow region, said on August 25.<sup>19</sup>

Until the end of September, Azerbaijanis in groups of 400-500 people regularly left the territory of the Russian Federation through ground checkpoints on the territory of the RD, until on September 28, Azerbaijan imposed martial law due to a new escalation of the armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The departure of Azerbaijanis to their homeland from the territory of the RD was suspended for almost a month. Only on October 20, the ground crossing of the border across the RD was resumed. With the onset of cold weather in early November, it was decided to dismantle the shelter for migrants near the village of Kullar, since the tents were not heated. The Azerbaijanis who were waiting to be sent home were placed in the Ogonyok children’s camp in the Kaitag district of the RD. By the end of November, there were about 250 Azerbaijani citizens there. As of December 6, about 500 people were expected to be sent home in the RD. On

December 18, the Azerbaijani Embassy in Russia announced the closure of the land border until March 1, 2021 due to the increase in coronavirus infections in both countries, and called on its fellow citizens to refrain from traveling to the RD to cross the border.<sup>20</sup> After the closure of the land border, the citizens of Azerbaijan who remained in the territory of the RD could only enter Azerbaijan by air.

### **Prevention of the ideology of extremism and terrorism**

The problem of terrorism, the presence of illegal armed groups (IAF) in the region, their “sleeping cells”, whose terrorist activities are covered up and “justified” by pseudo-religious slogans, is still the most resonant problem in the RD. This problem for many years to come attracted the attention of federal and local authorities, the public, the clergy, journalists, human rights activists and researchers-specialist on Caucasian studies. Currently in Russia, as noted by prof. Dobaev, *“there is a coherent system of countering radical Islamism, aimed primarily at combating its most extreme manifestations, the epicenter of which is modern terrorism.”*<sup>21</sup> This centralized system is headed by the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC), which directly coordinates the activities of Anti-Terrorist Commissions (ATC) and operational headquarters in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. At the regional level, the ATC apparatuses formed by the heads of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation coordinate the work on countering the ideology of extremism and terrorism on the territory of the entire subject, within which municipal ATCs operate at the municipal level. Thus, the work on countering terrorism in Russia covers all levels of government, and in the RD - all administrative and territorial units of the region. The Republic of Dagestan is implementing the “Comprehensive Program for Countering the Ideology of Terrorism in the Republic of Dagestan” (CP). The responsible executor of the CP, designed for 2018–2020, was the Ministry of

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Informatization, Relations and Mass Communications of the RD (Minkomsvyaz of the RD). The co-executors were: Ministry of Education and Science of the RD, Minnat of the RD, Ministry of Culture of the RD, Minmol of the RD, Minsport of the RD; local self-government bodies. The participants of the CP were also the Muftiate of the RD, the Diocese of Makhachkala and Grozny of the ROC, the Council of Jewish Communities of the RD, the DFC RAS, the Public Chamber of the RD. The goal of the program is to reduce the level of radicalization of various groups of the population, to create an atmosphere of rejection of the ideology of extremism and terrorism in the RD. As part of the implementation of the CP, the following events were held: research and analytical activities (opinion polls); activities for the creation and dissemination of anti-terrorist content (outdoor advertising, videos, etc.); professional development of specialists in the field of countering the ideology of extremism and terrorism (courses and seminars); conferences, forums, festivals; individual preventive work with the population; support for the activities of citizens and public organizations in the field of countering the ideology of terrorism and extremism (grants, subsidies, competitions).

Every year, the RD, through the efforts of the republican authorities and religious public organizations, hosts the international interreligious youth forum (the VII-th forum was held in September 2020), aimed at the spiritual and moral education of young people, information counteraction to the ideology of extremism, as well as the development of inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations of young people from various regions of the Russian Federation. Other events were also held within the framework of the forum (on September 22 – a scientific and practical conference “Interethnic and interfaith dialogue as a consolidating basis of society in the fight against global threats of terrorism and extremism”; on September 24 – a round table in Derbent with the participation of youth activists of the city, dedicated to strengthening inter-confessional relations and preventing the ideology of extremism and terrorism). On

September 23, the Republican House of Friendship hosted the 8th Congress of Moslem Communities of the North Caucasus,<sup>22</sup> dedicated to the problems of preserving peace and stability in society, countering the ideology of terrorism, including among migrants. Every year, the congress is attended by the heads of the RD, representatives of the state and municipal authorities of the RD, representatives of the ATK in the RD, clergy of the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District, public and religious figures.

Many measures to counteract the ideology of extremism and terrorism are implemented in Daghestan with the active participation of the Muftiate of the Republic of Daghestan. These are, first of all, events of an ideological and spiritual-educational nature, as well as activities for the dissemination of anti-terrorist content in the republic. In addition, the Muftiate of the Republic of Daghestan carries out important work on the certification and professional development of imams of mosques in Daghestan cities and villages. The role of the imam of the mosque in the information and ideological counteraction to pseudo-religious extremism is difficult to overestimate, since the imam of the mosque constantly contacts the parishioners of the mosque and regularly reads religious sermons to them. In some Daghestani villages, until recently, mosques were openly functioning, which were perceived by the local population as hotbeds of non-traditional trends in Islam in Daghestan. In the common people, these mosques were called "Wahhabi", because the preachers in these mosques opposed some religious practices that are considered traditional in modern Daghestan. An indirect sign that some provocative sermons were being preached in these mosques was the fact that young people who attended these mosques went abroad to participate in the activities of international terrorist organizations. These so-called "Wahhabi" mosques did not interact in any way with the Muftiate of the RD, and most often, the imams of these mosques were ideological opponents of the official clergy of the republic. The logic of the

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emergence and strengthening of the positions of non-traditional movements in Islam in some Daghestani cities and villages is primarily connected with the religious activities of persons who have received religious education abroad. These Daghestanis, returning to the republic, gradually began to gain the trust of the parishioners in the mosques. They were distinguished by high oratorical abilities, the ability to capture the attention of the audience, against the background of the former poorly educated imams. If the local imams gave a worthy rebuff at the level of theological disputes to these graduates of foreign Islamic universities, they initiated the construction of another mosque, usually in the opposite or remote part of the village, and thus the village community split into traditionalists and adherents of a new, non-traditional version of Islam for Daghestan. Thus, gradually, radical religious and political views and worldview were introduced into the Daghestani Moslem communities. To improve the situation in this area, it was necessary not only the activities of the responsible state authorities, their interdepartmental coordination, but also active participation of the Muftiate of the RD, which, together with the Ministry of Education and Science of the RD, assumed the functions of improving the skills and civic consciousness of rural imams. An important event in the work in this direction was the conclusion on October 26, 2020 of a cooperation agreement between the Daghestan Humanitarian Institute (an autonomous non-profit organization of higher education affiliated with the Muftiate of the RD) and the Bulgarian Islamic Academy (Republic of Tatarstan). Within the framework of the signed agreement, the institutes will maintain cooperation in the following areas: exchange of visits of the teaching staff, students and young scientists; exchange of information about the educational process and scientific activities; joint organization of conferences, scientific schools, round tables, seminars; conducting joint scientific research. DHI and BIA are active participants in the federal project to train specialists with an in-depth knowledge of the history and culture

of Islam, so the interaction of these two educational institutions can benefit from strengthening the position of traditional Islam among Russian Moslems.

To date, the efforts of the federal law enforcement and republican state civil authorities, with the active participation of the Muftiate of the RD, have managed to stop the growth of the number of so-called "Wahhabi" mosques and significantly reduce their number through the registration of mosques by the Ministry of Justice of the RD. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the RD conducts preventive work with persons exposed to the ideology of terrorism, as well as those who have already fallen under its influence. First of all, they are graduates of foreign Islamic universities who worked as imams in "problematic" mosques. They are suspended from working with parishioners, and the Muftiate of the RD sends new preachers - graduates of their educational institutions - to these mosques, which have remained without imams. In general, the Muftiate of the Republic of Daghestan carries out a great work in the field of spiritual and moral prevention of the ideology of extremism and terrorism, performs routine and everyday work in this direction, which cannot be performed by state authorities.

The success of the state in countering the ideology of extremism and terrorism in the Republic of Daghestan is associated with the implementation of a comprehensive approach that combines military operations to neutralize members of the underground with information and ideological prevention. The NAC of the Russian Federation is constantly improving its work, increasing the coordination of the activities of regional ATCs, which analyze the experience of countering terrorism at the municipal level and work on mistakes. In the Republic of Daghestan, public organizations are actively involved in this work, primarily the Muftiate of the RD, as well as public organizations of the national-cultural sense, the community and the diaspora of migrant workers.

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## Conclusions

In general, the socio-political and ethno-cultural situation in the Republic of Daghestan remained manageable and stable in 2020. The activities carried out by state authorities together with educational institutions, ethno-cultural and religious organizations cover all areas of the modern state national policy of the Russian Federation. A large number of events are being held in the republic aimed at harmonizing interethnic and confessional relations, countering the ideology of extremism and terrorism, and strengthening the Russian civil identity. In October 2020, the leadership of the region was changed without conflict, S. Melikov became the new head of the RD and by the end of the year formed the Cabinet of Ministers. The municipal elections in September 2020 were also held without serious complications and contradictions, which indicates the manageability of the socio-political situation in the region. The activities of public organizations of an ethno-cultural nature and individuals acting on behalf of their ethnic communities in the RD are carried out within the boundaries of the Russian legal framework. Religious life in the republic is also gradually normalizing and was characterized in 2020 by the absence of any open clashes and conflicts on confessional grounds. V. Vasiliev, who served as the head of the RD from October 3, 2017 to October 5, 2020, has greatly contributed to the stabilization of the socio-political situation in the RD. Vasiliev systematically worked to convey to the Daghestani public the idea of the need to work within the boundaries of a single legal framework. He managed to neutralize the ethnic factor in the practice of state administration of the republic. Daghestani society, as noted by local political observers, has for the first time in its new history seen the honest and selfless public service of the head of the republic, who worked not in the interests of his family, tukhum, ethnic group, but in the name of the national interests of society and the state.

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2021.02.002. ELENA DMITRIEVA. AZERBAIJAN–TURKEY RELATIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS // *Condensed abstract*.

*Keywords: Azerbaijan, Turkey, foreign policy, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Russia, Armenia, South Caucasus, conflict settlement, military-political escalation, international recognition, geopolitical analysis.*

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2. Maslakova-Clauberg N.I., Sadykova E.L. Escalation of the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh as a Geopolitical Challenge\* // *Vestnik Instituta mirovyh tsivilizatsi*. 2020. Vol. 11, № 3 (28), P. 51–57.

The authors of the article, Yumatov K.V. and Sivina K.N. (1), analyze Azerbaijani-Turkish relations since the collapse of the USSR and investigate their impact on the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus. The authors refer to the importance of studying this issue, since this is Turkey, relying on the ideology of "one people, two countries," did a lot, to help Azerbaijan overcome the political and economic crisis of the 1990s, lobbied for its interests in the international arena in organizations such as

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\* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

the UN, NATO, OSCE, OIC, and under President R. Erdogan in 2020 allowed Azerbaijan to inflict a military defeat on Armenia and regain most territories captured by Armenians during the Karabakh war of the 1990s.

The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus and in the Eurasian arena, new players appeared seeking to find their place in world politics. The authors note that when building foreign policy in the South Caucasus, Russia needs to take into account the established historical ties between the main actors of international relations in the region. The development of friendly relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the post-Soviet era was predetermined by both geography and Turkic ethnic history. These two countries were united by the fact that for several years Azerbaijan had an open ethno-territorial conflict with Armenia for Nagorno-Karabakh, and Turkey, refusing to take historical blame for the 1915 Armenian Genocide, was objectively interested in proving the expansionist policy of Armenian nationalism and Azerbaijan's rightness. Therefore, interaction between the two states developed rapidly.

Azerbaijan and Turkey have an advantageous geoeconomic and geopolitical position. Through the territory of the South Caucasus, it is possible to create a direct trade and transport route between Central Asia and the Black Sea countries. Turkey unites the southeastern part of Europe with the Middle East. Azerbaijan has access to the Caspian Sea basin, which allows producing and delivering hydrocarbon crude to Turkey and then to Europe. Turkey, in turn, is becoming, due to this, a kind of energy "hub" that accumulates oil and gas flows of Russia, Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Thanks to the combination of these factors, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations become one of the key issues of geopolitics and the economy of Eurasia. Azerbaijan immediately took the place of Turkey's closest partner in the post-Soviet space. The Turkish Republic throughout the 1990s, to the best of its ability, contributed to attracting Azerbaijan to transatlantic, European and Asian political and economic

institutions. Ankara tried to pursue an active policy towards all post-Soviet countries. Pan-Turkist slogans were revealed in the country: "Turkic world from the Adriatic to China".

In 1992, a summit of Turkic-speaking peoples was assembled, at which Azerbaijan played a key role, supporting and promoting Turkey's initiatives in the post-Soviet space. But in time, it became clear that other Turkic states do not need an "elder" brother and are aimed at building their own foreign policy. These particular agreements will help Azerbaijan to consolidate in the international arena in the conditions of building independence during the war and economic crisis. Turkey also respected its interests. It became a mediator in international relations between Azerbaijan and the West, in particular in NATO structures and programs. The example of Azerbaijan was to convince the usefulness of cooperation with Turkey and other post-Soviet states. Thus, backing it, Turkey created a strong support in the Caucasus and extended its political influence to the vast territories of the former Soviet Union.

The policy of Ayaz Mutalibov in the presidency was ambiguous. On the one hand, he tried to strengthen the role of his state in the international arena, showing it as a strong player in the Caucasus. On the other hand, by 1992, he had lost all the levers of governing the country, was subjected to relentless criticism and sabotage both from the opposition and from his own security forces. Agreements with Turkey in the military sphere were not put into practice. After the defeats of the Azerbaijani army in Karabakh, A.N. Mutalibov was forced to resign, and in May to flee to Russia. With coming to power of the new leader of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey, the foreign policy of Azerbaijan changed dramatically. Having come to power under the slogan "Turkism, Islamism, modernization," A. Elchibey declared himself as a pan-Turkist, a fan of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Mamed Emin Resulzade. He fostered his efforts to build special relations with Turkey, defined as a strategic partnership. Elchibey considered Iran and Russia

hostile neighbors for Azerbaijan. The created conditions had a favorable effect on relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. In the shortest possible time, trade contacts were established on favorable terms and huge benefits were received for Turkish businessmen. Against the background of domestic political successes in Azerbaijan, the Turks tried to act as initiators of a peacekeeping initiative. With the advent of such an ally as Turkey, Azerbaijan began to feel more confident in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

In the euphoria of the opening opportunities in the South Caucasus in the elite of the Republic of Turkey under President Turgut Ozal, there began the discussion of possible participation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Turkish statesmen viewed the Karabakh problem indeed as an internal problem affecting the interests of the Turkish people across the nation. The rebellion of troops led by Suret Guseynov and large-scale defeats in the Karabakh conflict led to the resignation of A. Elchibey in 1993. Heydar Aliyev came to power and served as president from 1993 to 2003. Heydar Aliyev the new president immediately defined the course of further development of the country as a “policy of balances”, the purpose of which was to mitigate conflict situations within the country and solve the consequences of the mistakes of previous presidents. As a result, long Karabakh armed conflict was frozen, but a mutually beneficial solution to this issue was not found and the events of September–November 2020 are a direct confirmation of this.

The authors note that under Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijani-Turkish relations did not always have a trouble-free character. H. Aliyev did not want to depend on one partner. This became obvious especially after the events of 1994 and the attempt to commit a coup d’etat by R. Javadov. Turkey had been denied the priority status of intergovernmental relations. H. Aliyev's policy focused on diplomacy with Western powers, in particular the United States and the European Union (EU), without any intermediaries. At the same time, during the reign of Aliyev Sr.,

20 visits were made to Turkey, which shows a favorable attitude towards Turkey.

In 2003, Ilham Aliyev became the leader of Azerbaijan, as the heir and successor to the political course of Heydar Aliyev. During his reign, Azerbaijani-Turkish relations underwent serious strength testing. By this time, it seemed that in the process of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, a situation of “frozen instability” gradually developed as a form of stability that suits both participants and mediators. Turkey's policy of restoring bilateral relations with Armenia has intensified. But, as further developments showed, the contracting parties did not take into account the factor of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Azerbaijan's reaction to the Armenian-Turkish negotiations. Azerbaijan reacted ferociously to the restoration of relations between Yerevan and Ankara. The confirmation of it was an event that went down in history as the “history of flags,” when, in response to Turkey's ban on allowing Azerbaijani fans to enter the arenas with national flags in 2009, the Azerbaijani authorities removed Turkish flags from the buildings of the Memorial to Turkish Soldiers, the Council for Religious Affairs, etc. Due to such actions, economic relations between the two countries suffered, because Azerbaijan was deprived of gas exports for two years. These events led to the search for new markets for Azerbaijani gas. Normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia bothered Azerbaijan. It began to be skeptical about its ally. But it should be noted that the restoration of Armenian-Turkish relations did not have positive results.

According to the authors, the attempt to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey only deepened relations between Baku and Ankara. Azerbaijan's policy was based on the “tempo-battle” on the diplomatic front. Thus, at a meeting in Munich, Ilham Aliyev said that actions in Nagorno-Karabakh can be resumed if a solution is not found at this conference between Baku and Yerevan. Such a passage was used more than once by Azerbaijani leaders, but at the moment the result was much more

serious, since the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh was considered in the context of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia. It has become a tool for exerting pressure on Turkey. The Turkish authorities nevertheless tried to bypass Azerbaijan in 2009 at a meeting of Russian Prime Minister V.V. Putin, US President B. Obama and Turkish Prime Minister R. Erdogan. The Turkish party expressed the need to combine the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and normalize relations between Turkey and Armenia. But Azerbaijan's positions are very important for Turkey, and therefore there is no bilateral solution that would satisfy Azerbaijan.

In 2009–2020, the EU actively used the Eastern Partnership program to strengthen its influence in the South Caucasus. As a result, by 2020, Georgia and Armenia had concluded agreements with the EU, Armenia (an exceptional case for a member of the Eurasian Integration) – a framework agreement on partnership and cooperation with the EU. Azerbaijan and the EU did not find a common ground for concluding the treaty. Azerbaijan was finally convinced that the EU is not ready for real cooperation with a political regime that does not share its values. Moreover, when the Velvet revolution took place in Armenia, and the West actively supported Nikol Pashinyan and his associates, Ilham Aliyev perceived as a signal that changes should not be expected from the OSCE. On the other hand, N. Pashinyan's policy towards politicians during the reign of the "Karabakh clan" in Armenia created a certain tension between Moscow and Yerevan. At the same time, Turkey was being revitalized.

The Neo-Osmanist doctrine of R. Erdogan, which has been actively implemented in recent years, turned out to be very profitable for Baku. The Syrian Astana format was a deterrent for both Russia and Iran. Thus, Turkey could use its potential to help Azerbaijan. Moreover, the OSCE Minsk Group has long been criticized by the Azerbaijani side for inefficiency, and therefore alternative projects were considered.

At the present stage of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, after signing of the joint statement of the Presidents of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the following international situation developed: Russia joined the resolution of the conflict at a critical moment when Azerbaijani troops took Shusha, which actually meant a further military defeat of NKR and Armenia. According to the authors, the military helicopter of the Russian Federation shot down a day earlier by Azerbaijanis from Nakhichevan gave such an opportunity. As a result, Russian military peacekeepers became the main guarantors of peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey stated that it didn't participate in the hostilities that began in September 2020, but only carried Azerbaijan along. But Azerbaijan's actions looked like a clearly planned military operation with real material and organizational support from Turkey. In October 2020, Turkey began military exercises near Ankara and announced that it was ready to provide its armed forces, but only at Azerbaijan's request.

In this conflict, Turkey pursued its own goals. Firstly, this is an opportunity to replace Russia as a partner of Azerbaijan, since Russia is a trading partner (military sphere) of both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey was in this case in a very favorable position, because it supported the position of one party. Secondly, this ensures safety of the Baku-Ceyhan gas pipeline and the South Caucasus one from Azerbaijan to Turkey (since the gas pipeline runs along the border with Armenia). Thirdly, this is an opportunity for Turkey to spread the ideology of neo-Osmanism, which helps strengthen its position.

As for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the Armenian diaspora has weight both in the United States and in European countries, so Azerbaijan does not have to wait for any support. For the US administration, Karabakh is clearly in the background after Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, France represented by E. Macron criticized Turkey and Azerbaijan in connection with the escalation of the conflict, Iran as an external actor and the

only territory in contact with all three parties to the Karabakh conflict, tries not to interfere in these disputes, but the Azerbaijani population of Iran is a factor of tension between Tehran and Baku. Iran's policy is more in contact with Armenia than with Azerbaijan. The Chinese party, which worked extensively with Azerbaijan on the One Belt and One Road program, called on the parties to come to a peaceful solution to the conflict, since it is important for it that the region of the South Caucasus remains as calm as possible.

At the end, the authors come to the following conclusions: the development of the conflict in Karabakh forces Russia to be in constant tension, that limits its capabilities in other areas; military operations in the territory of the South Caucasus are beneficial for the West, since this region will later become an excellent base to contain Russia; Turkey managed to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus and throughout the post-Soviet space by helping Azerbaijan resolve the conflict in a beneficial direction. The events of 2020 showed that the OSCE Minsk Group was powerless to resolve the situation. In fact, the war was stopped at the expense of diplomatic instruments in the format 2 + 2 (Russia - Armenia, Azerbaijan - Turkey) with a clear advantage in favor of the Azerbaijani-Turkish union. Military and political support from Turkey became a decisive factor in Azerbaijan's victory in the 2020 Karabakh conflict, which will undoubtedly lead to a further rapprochement of the foreign policy of R. Erdogan and I. Aliyev.

The authors Maslakova-Clauberg N.I. and Sadykova E.L. in the article "Escalation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh as a geopolitical challenge" (2) analyze in details the origins of the Karabakh conflict and show its role in the geopolitical situation developing around the region of the South Caucasus. Speaking about the story behind this conflict, the authors turn to the times of the collapse of the USSR, when the territory of the post-Soviet space became a field of geopolitical competition, on which conflict processes caused by external and internal factors remain

to date. Gorbachev's policy in the 1980s caused a general rising in national radical sentiments in the country, that entailed the so-called "parade of national sovereignty" as a result of the conflict between the union center and the republics. The reason for this was the proclamation of the supremacy of republican laws over the Union ones, which was regarded as a violation of Art. 74 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Thus, in the second half of the 1980s, the national movement of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh intensified and in 1988 an appeal was sent to the leadership of the USSR, the Azerbaijan SSR, the Armenian SSR, which asked the Regional Council of People's Deputies of the NKAR to consider the possibility of withdrawing the NKAR from the Azerbaijan SSR and joining the Armenian SSR. However, the CPSU Central Committee, like the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR, took a negative attitude to this request. Then multiple armed clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis began. In September 1989, the Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR announced their sovereignty. The referendum on independence held in December 1991 in the self-proclaimed NKR was boycotted by local Azerbaijanis and could not receive international recognition. As a result, this inter-ethnic conflict went beyond the local problem of Nagorno-Karabakh and escalated into an open international confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite the international efforts undertaken since the beginning of the 1990s with the participation of the CIS, the UN, the OSCE and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, it was not possible to resolve the Karabakh conflict by political and diplomatic means.

The authors note that the multifaceted ethnopolitical Karabakh conflict has a historical, ethnosocial, ethno-religious, as well as geopolitical basis. Answering the question of why the Karabakh issue has become so acute today, the authors believe that first of all, this is due to the state in which the world has been since the beginning of the 21st century - the stage of "global confrontation" or "global break." The consequence of the USSR collapse was that the United States and the EU declared their

interests in the post-Soviet space and the Americans had a real opportunity to realize their main strategic goal - construction of a unipolar world. However, in a number of states in the world, their own national ideas began to appear on the basis of greatpowerness (Poland - on the revival of the "Great Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth," the Eastern European states began to define national-state ideas on the ground of affiliation with a common European historical community, denying in fact all historical ties with Russia). In this emerging trend of reviving historical national ideas, the countries of Asia and the Middle East are not retarded, which have begun to consider inter-ethnic conflicts as an opportunity to expand their zones of political influence and include them in the orbit of their strategic interests.

Thus, the "Karabakh conflict" turned from a regional conflict in the South Caucasus into a "geopolitical chess game" with several geopolitical players with their own strategic interest in it. In that way, one of the parties to the Karabakh conflict is Azerbaijan with the active support of Turkey as one of the major geopolitical players in the modern world. Turkey's participation on the side of Azerbaijan is formulated by the motto "Two States - One Nation," which emphasizes the historical community of the two peoples. Modern Turkey is engaged in the embodiment of its long-standing national idea - the revival of a strong Turkish state on the basis of neosmanism and neopantürkism and sees itself as the leader of the big "Turkic world." However, Turkey does not still have enough political and economic resources to implement such a project. Expanding Turkey's influence in the Greater Caucasus and Asia is seen as a priority.

However, two issues remain open in Azerbaijan-Turkey cooperation on Nagorno-Karabakh:

- How is the interaction of two directions of Islam - Sunnis and Shiites seen in the declared strategy of "two states - one nation"? Given that Turkey represents Sunni Islam and Azerbaijan represents Shiite Islam.

- What role is defined in this strategic partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan - who will be the "elder" and "younger" brother? A lot will depend on the formation of this position.

The importance of the "Karabakh issue" in Turkey's foreign policy strategy is indicated by the following fact: declaring Armenia's unconditional liberation of the "occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh," Turkey is ready to go quite far in its relations with its recent partners and allies - the European Union and NATO, presenting itself as a separate player in the Caucasus and pursuing its own geopolitical line, without looking at the interests of the partners, as well as the need to coordinate further steps with them. As a result, there are opinions in the EU that Turkey should be expelled from NATO and it's necessary to reformat EU partnerships with it. However, Turkey today has quite strong leverage on the countries of the European Union, among which there is significant "diaspora Turkish potential" in Europe, as well as influence on "migration flows" in the EU. Such a political position of Turkey is based on the fact that it will not succeed in gaining membership in the EU, since negotiations between Brussels and Ankara on the country's accession to the European Union have achieved stalemate and this means that for Turkey only its own national interests become a priority and not "European solidarity". Moreover, NATO allies fear that Turkey is trying to drag the Alliance into a large-scale war that does not meet NATO's strategic goals. In turn, Turkish President Erdogan said that "NATO allies should express solidarity with Turkey."

The authors highlight the interesting fact that there are visible and invisible geopolitical players in the Karabakh conflict. Among invisible ones, Iran occupies an important position. In the past, Turkey and Iran were empires opposing to each other. Today, the two countries are Middle East neighbours seeking to assume the role of regional leaders. Turkey presents itself as the leader of the Sunni Islamic world, and Iran as the center of the Shia Islam. Relations between countries are based on competition and possible cooperation. It should also be taken into account

that there are 15–30 million Azerbaijanis (18–42% of the Iranian population) in Iran in the “Iranian Azerbaijan” region (West, East Azerbaijan and Ardebil provinces) who are mainly Shia Muslims. The other side of the “Karabakh conflict” is Armenia, which, despite its multifaceted foreign policy and tendency to Euro-Latin partnership, remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO. In addition, the Russian military base Gyumri is located on the territory of Armenia. Russia is one of the main investors in the Armenian economy, the gas monopolist Gazprom Armenia is completely owned by the Russian Gazprom. Armenia looks forward to the assistance of Russia in this conflict, on the basis that for centuries it was Russia that carried out the historical mission as a guarantor of stability in the Caucasus. However, after the Velvet revolution in Armenia in 2018, the new leadership of the country, represented by Prime Minister N. Pashinyan, began to pursue a multi-vector pro-Western policy, as a result of which relations with Russia were exposed to adjustments. So, on July 16, 2020, the Armenian Parliament adopted the bill “On Audiovisual Media,” and the leading Russian channels fell under information clearance, which, according to the Armenian leadership, pose threat to the country’s national security.

In relations with the European Union, Armenia adheres to the line of European strategic partnership and even declared accession to the EU one of its long-term goals. As for the United States, there is a large Armenian diaspora in this country, which is one of the effective ethnic lobbies. The strategic importance of Armenia's cooperation with the United States is evidenced by the fact that Yerevan has the largest US embassy in the entire post-Soviet space.

Each of the above parties has its own geopolitical interests in the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh. For Russia, the question of a peaceful resolution of the conflict is of particular importance, since the conflict is actually developing at Russian borders. Russia cannot allow a “big war” in the South Caucasus. It is also necessary to highlight the problem of strengthening the

military-political influence of Turkey in the Greater Caucasus and Caspian regions. France and the United States, as NATO allies and partners, begin to realize that Turkey is playing its own game, thus violating the unity of the Alliance.

Summing up, the authors draw the following conclusion: only Russia can solve the aggravated "Karabakh issue." Precisely, Russia has interacted with the peoples of the Caucasus for many centuries, knowing well the mentality and value system of the Caucasian peoples. Its historical mission is always to prevent conflicts in the Caucasus and maintain the necessary geopolitical balance. However, it is hardly possible to count on its protection in the name of "friendship of peoples," and at the same time take up an anti-Russian position for the sake of "flirting" with the West. Russia today holds a rather pragmatic position, guided just by national interests and acts within the framework of the international law. Precisely, the course of this "international political chess game" on Nagorno-Karabakh will depend on Russia's position.

VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. IMPACT OF THE MASS MEDIA OF KAZAKHSTAN ON THE ETHNOPOLITICS OF THE REPUBLIC // *Analytical review was written specifically for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: Mass media of Kazakhstan, "fourth power", instrument of power, ethnopolitics, regional identity, multi-ethnic societies, Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, Eurasia, integration, ethno-confessional harmony, Islam, Christianity, DUMK, ROC.*

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*Abstract.* At the current stage, the topic of the influence of the media on ethnopolitics is relevant. The researchers show that a multinational state, such as Kazakhstan, has to take into account that the media today often become the main source of information for the population. Otherwise, destructive opposition forces, exacerbating existing ethnic conflicts, can lead to the collapse of the state.

## **Introduction**

Due to the transformation of the Kazakh political system from the beginning of the 90s to the present, the position of the media has changed. After gaining independence, in the media system of the republic underwent some changes. The Kazakh media sought to implement the ideas of the libertarian theory of mass communications, which assigns the role of free media as a tool for controlling and criticizing the authorities. However, in the Kazakh media environment, there was a substitution of concepts. Access to the instrument of power, which is the media, has become confused with the power itself. The concept of “mass media – the fourth power” considers them as a separate political force, equating it with the three generally recognized branches of government. The media are recognized as full participants in political governance, performing a specific function.

## **State information policy of Kazakhstan**

The process of formation of mass media in Kazakhstan, according to Yu. Balakina [1], was not spontaneous or unambiguously predetermined, but was conditioned by a purposeful state information policy. As the author of the article

emphasizes, the most important role in the structure of the modern media policy system of Kazakhstan is played by the all-Kazakh mass media due to their capabilities in promptly informing the population of the state. Despite the differentiation of Kazakhstan's society and its polyethnicity, the media political system effectively achieves its goal. This is due to the mobilization of various information flows aimed at different social and ethnic groups. The most popular mass media in Kazakhstan are part of the media policy system, one of the main goals of which is to form public opinion. Today, the media have all the resources to exert both negative and positive influence on the ethno-political processes taking place in the world, including in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Through the media, the Government and legislative bodies receive information about existing problems and emerging conflicts. Despite its positive role in influencing ethnopolitical processes, the media can also play a role that provokes and exacerbates conflict.

During the transition period, there is a process of national revival of all ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan. The previously existing Soviet policy aimed at eliminating national traditions, peculiarities, and customs has failed. It was replaced by the rapid development and revival of national languages, traditions, and culture. And in this process, the role of the media, the researcher notes, is truly invaluable. The bloody inter-ethnic conflicts that have led to grave consequences in the destinies of multinational countries can serve as proof of this.

### **The impact of mass media on ethnopolitical processes**

Mass media are increasingly used as political tools to influence ethnopolitical processes. One of the existing problems of media development is the influence, and not always positive, on the entire range of socio-political processes in a particular society. Even such an authoritative organization in the modern democratic world as the OSCE confirms the need for a kind of

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control over the activities of the media in the field of inter-ethnic relations. This is especially important in multi-ethnic societies that strive for democracy. Modern independent Kazakhstan is one of such societies. The policy aimed at preventing the destructive impact of the media on inter-ethnic relations in the Republic of Kazakhstan by the state and the public is welcomed by the OSCE principles. Kazakhstan as a new democracy sees the support of the OSCE, an organization recognized by the democratic world community.

According to the observation of Yu.Balakina in the context of the transition to democracy in multi-ethnic societies, it is the media that have the potential to help eliminate various contradictions, including on an ethnic basis. Gaining a different status in the process of its transformation into the so-called "fourth power", the media are aware of their different place and role, especially in the field of inter-ethnic relations. The role of the media in such processes can also be reversed, i.e. negative. This happens when the media, their role, influence and resources are not aimed at uniting, but at disuniting and disintegrating a transitional multi-ethnic society. Modern leaders of ethnic conflicts actively resort to the media in terms of defending their own interests.

According to the author of the article, three main trends are characteristic of modern information processes in Kazakhstan:

- 1) distancing of the media from state guardianship, their independent development, the withdrawal of the state from direct interference in the activities of the mass media, the formation of relations: "society" – "mass media";

- 2) legalization of the information space, the formation of the legal basis for the activities of the media, the resolution of all problems only by judicial procedure;

- 3) commercialization of the majority of mass media, their aspiration to make a profit in any way, the formation of the advertising market in the country.

In the modern world, striving for democracy and freedom of speech, the media is becoming the most widespread and often the only source of information. In addition, their current capabilities give them a special status and influence, the ability to influence political processes, including ethnopolitical ones. One of the positive elements in the media is the dissemination of information about the nature and consequences of ethnic conflicts to a wide range of the population. The media can perform a preventive function of rejecting inter-ethnic conflicts. In the opposite case, when the media spread deliberately false or biased information about the causes or prospects of inter-ethnic differences, they can have an extremely negative impact, still more dividing the society that is already on the verge of crisis, the researcher emphasizes.

### **Ethnopolitics of the state**

After the declaration of independence of Kazakhstan, the interest in the national culture, traditions, history and language of the titular ethnic group and representatives of all ethnic minorities increased in the republic. Almost all national cultural associations were formed, notes Yu. Balakina, during the period of "surge" of ethnic consciousness, from 1992 to 1994, although some associations on the ethnic principle were founded before 1991, which is due to the high degree of ethnic identity and the willingness to create associations among a number of ethnic groups. Ethnopolitics, the author points out, is an integral part of the policy of the state, political parties, organizations and associations, indicating a strategic course in the national issue, in the development of interethnic relations.

According to the researcher, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the previously suppressed sense of national pride, belonging to a particular ethnic culture, language has reflected in an unprecedented surge of national feeling. The process of national revival is positive for the new sovereign States.

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However, despite the positive assessment of these processes in the field of ethnopolitics in Kazakhstan, there are also negative examples in the ethno-political processes. Ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation, the problems of Transnistria, Kosovo, and today in Ukraine – this is nowhere near a complete list of bloody clashes between former friendly ethnic groups who faced the horrors of a war unleashed on ethnic grounds.

Yu. Balakina believes that the ethnic factor, as an effective essential force, can increase the creative potential of a nation, develop it and turn it into a competitive force. In order for the ethnic factor to become a constructive force, democracy is necessary, since only in the regime of the rule of law, in conditions of openness and civilization of interethnic relations, it can contribute to the development of each ethnic entity, form social unity and interethnic closeness.

### **Regional identity**

Analyzing the state strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the formation of a model of social harmony and national unity, V.A. Malinovsky [3] notes that the Kazakh identity is based on the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1995, which enshrined the priority of equality of human rights and freedoms regardless of their ethnic and religious affiliation. The values proclaimed in the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1995 and the Concept of the Formation of the State Identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1996) were developed in the Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan (2010). A number of the conclusions presented in this document are of a strategic nature and are intended to last indefinitely. Among them: the content of the term “state identity” as the main condition for development for any society and for any people; the basic aspects of sovereignty that form its basis – the territory, the limits of which are clearly defined and approved with neighboring states in accordance with international

requirements by the state border; interethnic harmony, unity of the people of Kazakhstan; citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan, etc.

The ethnic center of the Kazakhs is Kazakhstan. Today, while remaining a national state, the Republic of Kazakhstan expresses the interests of the entire population, regardless of ethnicity. The definition of Kazakhstan as a national state takes into account the strategic trend in the development of state identity – the formation of a nation-state in the future. The Presidential Decree of December 28, 2015 approved the Concept of Strengthening and Developing Kazakhstan's Identity and Unity. The object of the Concept of 1996 was, for the most part, the identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a state, and the object of the Concept of 2015 is the socio-political community – the people of Kazakhstan in the new capacity of a single nation in all its internal diversity. The foundation of Kazakhstan's identity and unity is national values based on cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity; Kazakhstan's identity and unity is a continuous generational process. It is based on the fact that every citizen, regardless of ethnic origin, connect his/her fate and future with Kazakhstan. A common past, a shared present, and a shared responsibility for the future unite society into one whole.

As noted by S. Sadykov [6] the press of the Republic of Kazakhstan strives to consolidate the modern Kazakh society. The newly independent states, face the task of national consolidation of the multi-ethnic population into a single community, united by a high level of the ideas of the Kazakh ethnic group. In these conditions, the position of the state, which seeks to reconcile the Kazakh elite with the Russian-speaking elite, is of great importance. It seeks to prevent a confrontation between them, so that the conflict of values does not turn into a conflict of interests and dangerous actions for society. In the republic there is an objective need for the existence of both a titular ethno-cultural concept of the nation and a civil one. From the point of view of journalists, to preserve the stability of society

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and the state, it is necessary to strengthen both the civil national identity and the ethno-cultural identity of the Kazakhs. Therefore, it is important to include the idea of a civil nation in the development of a national idea. This will have a positive impact on the identity of all Kazakhstanis, regardless of their ethnicity.

The journalists emphasize that the formation of a single Kazakh people around the state-forming ethnic group – the Kazakhs – assumes their special place in the structure of the civil nation. We are talking about the inclusion of an ethno-cultural concept that would be compatible with the civil concept. It should be borne in mind that the nature of the unified people formed in Kazakhstan has ethnic and historical roots, primarily associated with the Kazakhs, and this aspect should find its place in the national idea. And on this path, publicists believe, Kazakhstan will find a national idea that will be common to all Kazakhstanis. Reaching a consensus on this issue, without which state-building is impossible, means for Kazakhstan the consolidation of society into a single nation. The materials that regularly appear in the press of Kazakhstan, contribute, on the one hand, to the self-identification of various ethnic groups, and on the other – to their self-identification as a single Kazakh people.

Kazakh scientists believe that the concepts of “Kazakh society” and “Kazakh people”, although of the same type, but with the difference that the range of reflected phenomena is different in time, scale and volume. Therefore, they are not completely identical. “Kazakh society” emerged after the unification of Kazakhstan with Russia (20th century) and is to some extent distracted from interethnic relations, while the ethno-political community of peoples – the “Kazakh people” – began to form in the course of deformed socialism, the renewal of society and the implementation of national policy. Attempts to identify these concepts often lead to the substitution of the subject of analysis. At the same time, the concepts of “Kazakh society” and “Kazakh people” should not be separated from each

other. The concept of “Kazakh people” implies that we are talking about a qualitatively new social phenomenon, about the integration of people of different nationalities into one ethnopolitical community. The political experience of sovereign Kazakhstan shows that while maintaining interethnic peace, ethnopolitical processes are actively functioning.

The article by E.M. Espolova [2] considers the model of interethnic and international harmony initiated and implemented by the first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev, which has proved its effectiveness throughout the entire period of development of independent Kazakhstan and continues to play a crucial role in the process of modernization of the country. Representatives of various ethno-cultural communities living in Kazakhstan form a single state-political and cultural-historical whole. This ensures stability and creates the basis for the economic progress of the country and the growth of the well-being of the people. In foreign policy, the path of multi-vector and Eurasian integration was chosen. The holding of the OSCE Summit in Astana in 2010, the chairmanship of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 2011, the holding of congresses of leaders of world and traditional religions in Kazakhstan, the initiation of regional integration associations demonstrate Kazakhstan’s commitment to dialogue and cooperation.

The Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan (APK), created on the initiative of N.A. Nazarbayev, has become a public institution that has played a key role in preserving civil peace and social harmony in the state. A solid legal framework for inter-ethnic and inter-religious equality has been established. It includes a whole system of laws – on freedom of religion, on languages, on public associations. The equality of all citizens is spelled out in the Basic Law of the country. Kazakhstan’s policy in the interethnic sphere is based on the principle of “Unity in diversity”. This is most clearly manifested in the language policy. First of all, the network of schools with the state language of instruction is expanding. At the same time, the State supports the

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development of ethnic languages and cultures. There are 35 printed publications in 15 languages in the country. TV channels broadcast programs in 11 languages. The principle of “Unity in Diversity” means that the image of modern independent Kazakhstan is formed by all 130 ethnic groups, whose representatives call themselves Kazakhstanis.

### **Language Law**

The law that gave the Kazakh language the status of the state language was adopted in 1997. In the legislative acts of the first half of the 1990s, the emphasis was placed on the politicization of the Kazakh ethnicity. But this ethnocentric approach, due to the outflow of the Russian-speaking population, was replaced in the Constitution of Kazakhstan in 1995 by a political-territorial approach, where instead of ethnic priority was given to the civil principle. Since that time, the Kazakh nation has been recognized as a subject of the republic. The Kazakh language is in the status of the state language, and Russian, along with Kazakh, has been legalized the right to be used in state organizations and in local self-government bodies.

The issue of language is in the focus of public and media attention. And for Kazakhstan, with its specific ethnic composition of the population, the language has not only a special significance, but is also one of the main factors in strengthening national sovereignty and statehood. Therefore, the language occupies a priority place in the strategy of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, in the Doctrine of National Unity.

### **The role of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan**

S.N. Mamytova [4] shows the role of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan in the implementation of the state program for the modernization of public consciousness, in improving the Kazakh model of interethnic interaction by involving the

scientific and expert community and organizing the APK departments in higher educational institutions.

Multi-ethnic composition of Kazakhstan has a huge impact on the process of its spiritual revival and unity of the nation. For several centuries, a rich experience of harmonious interethnic relations has been accumulated, and mechanisms for effective interaction and mutual enrichment have been developed. This helped to overcome the problems that arose during the formation of independence. After the collapse of the USSR, the former communist system of values collapsed too, and part of the Kazakh society was left in a state of confusion and rejection of the past. It is the presence of well-established traditions of interethnic tolerance and the deep historical roots of friendship and harmony of peoples that have allowed us to overcome the growing crisis of spirituality and unity of the nation. Of particular importance is the historical experience of absorbing the best of the foreign at the present stage, when the republic is making efforts to integrate into the world cultural space, to master the latest foreign achievements. At the same time, under the influence of the massive introduction of the patterns of Western “mass culture” into the public consciousness, a part of the population, especially young people, has a negative attitude towards national traditions and the cultural and historical heritage of their ancestors. In this regard, the implementation of the state program for the modernization of public consciousness “Rukhani Zhangyru” has begun in Kazakhstan.

The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan plays an important role in the preservation and development of ethnic identity, the revival of spirituality and unity. It initiates many events aimed at studying and popularizing the rich historical and cultural heritage of the people of Kazakhstan. Since 2009, the scientific and expert groups established under the APK have been conducting research on interethnic relations, monitoring public opinion, and on their basis they make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of state ethnic policy. Major centers

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for scientific research are higher educational institutions, on the basis of which the departments of the APK are created. The results of scientific research conducted by scientists-experts are actively implemented in the educational and bringing-up process of universities. However, the author of the article notes that not all problems in the field of interethnic relations have been solved. The potential of the APK deputies, academic experts, ethno-cultural and youth associations has not yet been fully utilized.

### **Kazakhstan's model of ethno-confessional harmony**

V. Ovchinnikov [5] examines the trends and features of the creation and functioning of the model of ethno-confessional harmony in Kazakhstan. The development of a special model was due to the threat of sociopolitical stability, changes in the ethno-religious structure of the population in the post-Soviet period, and the multinational and multi-religious nature of the state.

After the collapse of the USSR in Kazakhstan, as in most of the former Soviet republics, citizens' interest in religion increased. The new independent state was faced with the task of strengthening the national and spiritual unity of citizens, preventing the "politicization of religion" in the process of reviving Islam. By trial and error, the state and society formed an idea of the model of state-confessional relations, of the mechanisms of the revival of Islam and religious traditions while maintaining the course of fundamental socio-political transformations and the construction of a secular state. Imperfect legislation, the lack of state control mechanisms at the stage of building a new model of interfaith harmony led to the unregulated growth of religious associations that received support from abroad, the influx of foreign missionaries, and created the basis for the involvement of citizens, especially young people, in destructive religious movements.

The Moslem community of Kazakhstan is heterogeneous, and the belonging of different ethnic groups to the same

denomination has not led to the neutralization of interethnic contradictions. In addition to Kazakhs, the Moslem community is represented by 17 ethnic groups: Uzbeks, Tatars, Uighurs, Tajiks, Kurds, Dungans, Chechens, Ingush, etc. In this situation, the state authorities understood that they needed to enlist the support of traditional Christian religious organizations. To ensure, first of all, the loyalty of the Russian population, as well as slow down the migration of Russians from Kazakhstan. This should have been the basis for building a stable model of inter-confessional and inter-ethnic harmony. As a rule, Kazakhs were representatives of the Moslem community, while Russians were representatives of the Orthodox community.

A special feature of the Kazakh model of ethno-confessional harmony is the system of constant interaction between the secular state and religious organizations on all important issues of socio-political development. The functioning of the model of ethno-confessional consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan is regulated by the Constitution and a number of legal acts, which grant equal rights to all religious associations and note the independence of the state and religious organizations within the legal framework. In 1993 the Constitution introduced a provision prohibiting the activities of public and religious organizations that proclaim or practice religious intolerance, which was also enshrined in the 1995 Constitution. The implementation of the state national policy was facilitated by the creation of an advisory body under the President of Kazakhstan – the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan (1995, since 2007 the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan). Since 1996, the Presidential Council for Religious Affairs has been functioning in the country. Issues of coordination of relations with religious organizations began to be resolved within the framework of the Ministry of Information and Public Consent. The state has increased its support for official Moslem religious associations.

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Kazakhstan has been given a special place in the model of ethnic and confessional harmony being created. The number of parishes of the Russian

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Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan has begun to grow steadily. As of 2012, there were 271 religious associations of the Russian Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan, including the Republican religious association-the Metropolitan District, as well as 9 dioceses and 261 parishes. During 2000–2018 the Orthodox Church of Kazakhstan has consistently positioned itself as a reliable partner of the state.

Despite the consistent construction of a secular state, in Kazakhstan in 2000–2010, there was an increase in both traditional and new religious organizations in the region. The protest events of 2011 in the country showed the need to modernize the mechanism for regulating the religious sphere. In the process of strengthening the role of the State in regulating religious activities, a new legal framework was formed, and religious associations were re-registered. As a result of the reform, a single Islamic organization was created, which preaches the Sunni Islamic faith, taking into account the historical features of Islam in the territory of the republic. Official Islam is represented by the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Kazakhstan. Since that time, the structures of the ROC in the Republic of Kazakhstan have been called the Orthodox Church of Kazakhstan by the official authorities.

The ethnic structure of the society determined its religious structure. The main types of religious self-identification of citizens are associated with Islam and Christianity. Traditionally, the most numerous among them are Hanafi madhhab Islam and Orthodox Christianity. 81% of the citizens of the republic consider themselves believers, 19% – atheists and agnostics. Despite the consistent measures taken after 2011, the situation in the political and religious sphere worsened in 2015–2016. Other States began to interfere in complex internal interfaith processes. After the attempted “coup d’etat” in the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2016 and the increase in the level of terrorist danger, measures were taken to “tighten” religious legislation. The state's position was reflected in two main documents: the State Program on

Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2013–2017 and the Concept of State Policy in the Religious Sphere of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017–2020. In 2016, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Civil Society was established by presidential decree.

The construction of Kazakhstan's model of ethno-confessional harmony was accompanied by transitions from "rigid" to more flexible mechanisms and forms of control in the religious sphere. The leadership of Kazakhstan is faced with the task of ensuring the development of the state and society and the formation of a new civil-national identity based on traditional culture and religion, primarily on the values of Islam, and the eradication of radical forces that destroy interethnic and interreligious harmony. According to official data, in Kazakhstan, about 75% of the population consider themselves believers, 94.9% of citizens positively assess the interethnic situation, and 94.5% feel that they are representatives of the united people of Kazakhstan. The state policy in the field of interethnic relations is supported by 95.7% of citizens, and the level of tolerance to representatives of other ethnic groups is 83.7%. This allows the researcher to draw a conclusion about the positive results of the national and confessional state policy and the success of the implementation of the Kazakh model of ethno-confessional harmony.

### **Conclusion**

The media have a significant impact on inter-ethnic relations. All parties are interested in the resource capabilities of the mass media, both the official authorities and various political forces that seek both cooperation and conflicts with other ethnic groups, and with the state itself. At the present stage, the possibilities of interaction between the media and the political authorities in resolving inter-ethnic problems have significantly expanded. Today, the political practice of conducting negotiations,

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meetings, and debates to resolve differences in inter-ethnic relations is effectively attracted by the resource capabilities of the media.

In a multi-ethnic society, the preservation of peace and harmony becomes especially important, especially for the new democracies of the post-Soviet space. The influence of the media on the formation of peaceful inter-ethnic relations has an impact on the successful implementation of the democratization process, which is relevant for many post-Soviet republics, in particular for Kazakhstan. Through the use of mass media, it is possible both to positively influence the peaceful coexistence of a multi-ethnic society, and to provide a basis for inter-ethnic conflicts that are destructive to state foundations.

It is not only the media themselves that have an impact on the formation of inter-ethnic relations. Ethnopolitical processes and official ethnopolitics influence the content aspects of the media. In an ethnically polarized society, in the context of conducting an unfair ethnic policy, the media reflect these existing contradictions. At the same time, the media either exacerbate these problems even more, or contribute to their effective resolution and prevention of new ones. The state is always in a position where it is necessary to observe the most important values of democracy, such as freedom of speech, and at the same time to ensure the harmonization of ethno-political processes in multi-ethnic societies. Thus, the state cannot withdraw itself from the activities of the mass media, regulation and control in this process are dictated by the issue of preserving inter-ethnic harmony and the existence of the state itself.

At the present stage, the media are active participants in political processes, including in the field of ethnopolitics. The media today not only inform, but also have the ability to impose, form stereotypes and manipulate people's minds, including in the field of interethnic interactions. Such blatant manipulation of the population's mindset can be carried out by oppositional, destructive external and internal political forces. They can, by

undermining inter-ethnic peace and harmony in multinational States, achieve their own political goals, even to the point of destroying statehood as such.

Thus, the researchers emphasize, the modern media is the most important political institution that has great opportunities to influence the ethno-political, social and other processes in society. Being an integral part of the culture of modern society, the media seek to spread their influence on public opinion, thereby forming new realities and changing reality. In addition, in multi-ethnic societies, the media can play a positive role in the process of consolidating the entire civilian population of the country. By promoting common political interests and spreading the ideas of peaceful coexistence, the media influence the preservation of inter-ethnic harmony.

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## ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2021.02.003. ELENA DMITRIEVA. IMRAN KHAN AS THE KEY TO SUCCESS OF PAKISTAN TEHREEK-E-INSAF // *Condensed abstract.*

*Keywords:* Pakistan, elections, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan, Pashtun, corruption, National Assembly, Kashmir, Afghanistan, USA, Pakistani army.

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INION RAN

1. Alina Filimonova. PTI Election Success in Pakistan: Socio-political Aspect\* // *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya. Moskva, 2019. № 7, P. 32–38.*

2. Andrey Demidov. Imran Khan – A Non-system Prime Minister of Pakistan\* // *Simvol Nauki: Mezhdunarodnyj Nauchnyj Zhurnal. 2020, № 12-2, P. 182–186.*

Alina Filimonova (1) analyzes internal political and socio-economic trends in Pakistani society that brought to power Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, Pakistan Movement for Justice) in 2018. The author notes that rise to power of this party for the first time in the history of Pakistan caused a great resonance, but, upon closer examination, this unprecedented event has a certain logic. PTI was founded in 1996 in Lahore and thus is a relatively new player in the Pakistani political arena, but nevertheless, in a

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\* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

short period of time it managed to achieve a phenomenal increase in electoral support. Having received only 1.61 percent of the votes in the 1997 elections, PTI obtained 31.92 percent of the votes in 2018, which allowed it to become the ruling party.

The author notes that according to a number of analysts, PTI is backed by the Pakistani army. The party currently has over 10 million members and is considered to be the largest in Pakistan. The success of PTI in the political arena means the decline in the popularity of “traditional” political heavyweights. However, if we take into account the socio-cultural specificities of Pakistan, the situation seems to be much more complicated, since Pakistani society is ethnically heterogeneous, rigidly stratified and defined by the traditional system of political allegiances. In this context, the success of one party and the decline in popularity of another means not only a change in the voter attitudes, but also a display of those informal obligations that allows an average Pakistani to consider himself part of a particular social group. Thus, the change in the dynamics of the vote indicates a more profound and long-term social change.

The personality of Imran Khan, the founder of PTI and its permanent leader, is a key success factor of the party. Imran Khan comes from a family of Punjabi Pashtuns; according to him, his paternal ancestor was one of Sher Shah Suri’s leading generals, commanded troops during the battles in India and later became the governor of Punjab. Imran Khan’s maternal relatives are Indians who immigrated to Pakistan after its formation in 1947. Thus, the ancestry of Imran Khan contributes to his image, making him appealing to the general public, because people of Pakistan consider him Punjabi, Pashtun and Muhajir at the same time. In addition, Imran Khan is a former captain of the Pakistani cricket team, under whose leadership the team achieved great success. It’s important to note that cricket in Pakistan is a major sport and in the mass consciousness is closely associated with national greatness.

Imran Khan also meets another Pakistani criterion for success, as he was able to reach certain heights and achieve recognition in the UK. The PTI leader graduated with honours from Oxford, was married to an English noblewoman and became quite popular in the Western media. British newspapers cite Imran Khan and Benazir Bhutto, who was killed in 2007, as two Pakistanis to be well known worldwide. Although Imran Khan became a public figure at a relatively young age, he managed to create a positive image in the mass media and use various scandals around him to his advantage.

According to the author, the success of PTI was also facilitated by the changes in Pakistani society, i.e. gradual rejuvenation and computerization of society at the same time. Access of the population to modern means of communication and obtaining information has increased; the number of Internet users increased from 0.1 percent in 2000 to 22.2 percent in 2018. In the world of fast-moving development of new information technologies, a large number of young voters represent a significant political force, and therefore the use of social media is becoming more and more important for the party and its leaders. In this situation, PTI was most able to capitalize on these social changes. It is also noteworthy that PTI develops much more mobile applications for smartphones than any other Pakistani political party; these applications contain information about ideology of the party and updates on its activities, as well as popularize the image of Imran Khan in a playful way.

The leader of PTI does not belong to any of the traditional “ruling families” of Pakistan, which makes the author wonder about the kind social forces behind PTI. The phenomenon of new parties coming to power, which managed to integrate into the already established (usually two-party) political system, has been widely studied using the example of European countries, but there is no such researches on Asian countries. However, the general paradigm is noteworthy and provides a better understanding of some of the developments in Pakistan. Political

parties can achieve success under two major internal political conditions:

- a fully functioning electoral system, which is not controlled by the country's ruling circles;
- a change in socio-economic conditions in society, which leads to the transformation of electoral requirements.

Pakistan features both of these conditions. PTI has always positioned itself as a new party, not associated with traditional elites, which are branded corrupt and anti-democratic. Nevertheless, at some point the party resorted to generally recognized levers of social influence. Initially, Imran Khan was reluctant to cooperate with those popular candidates, for whom ordinary people vote regardless of their party affiliation, but over time he changed his views on the matter. As a result, PTI managed to significantly increase the number of socially prominent figures in its ranks, e.g. the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mahmood Qureshi joined the party in 2011. By the 2018 elections, there were so many influential politicians in PTI that all of them could not be listed on the electoral list. Thus, PTI easily secured the support of the elites, a traditionally important political resource.

The author notes that PTI relied heavily on political clientelism, i.e. the exchange of goods and services for political support. PTI implemented a number of land improvement projects, including the construction of eight dams, which provide different areas with electricity and water for irrigation. Imran Khan Foundation works on the improvement of areas suffering from floods, builds temporary hospitals there and is involved in infrastructure rehabilitation. Also, microcredit programs, which provide zero interest loans to those wishing to start their own business, are a separate object of expenditure.

The author concludes that the huge success of PTI was possible due to systematic replenishment of the party leadership with traditional elites, adherence to the principles of clientelism,

widespread use of modern media tools and appeal to a steadily growing number of young voters.

A. Demidov in his article (2) discusses Imran Khan as a politician. For the first time in more than 70 years since independence, the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, a former professional cricketer, comes neither from the military nor from the richest aristocratic landowning families. Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi was born on October 5, 1952 in Lahore, the province of Punjab. They were an upper-middle class family and thus were able to pay for his education at Keble College, Oxford, where he studied philosophy, politics and economics. While in college he joined a cricket team and upon his return to Pakistan had an impressive career as a cricketer, becoming captain of the national team in 1982. At the end of his sports career in 1994, Imran Khan wrote several articles on cricket for various British and Asian newspapers, and also appeared as a commentator at international cricket competitions. In the 1990s, Imran Khan did charity work, founded a memorial fund named after his mother Shaukat Khanum and was the primary benefactor of the only cancer hospital in Pakistan.

Eventually, Imran Khan went into politics. A nationalist and populist, he advocated the need to protect Islamic values, develop the economy on a liberal basis, create a welfare state, reduce bureaucracy, draft anti-corruption laws, establish an independent judiciary, restrict police violence and build a democratic Pakistan free from terrorism and extremism. Imran Khan demanded a Pakistani apology towards the Bangladeshi people for the 1971 repressions by the Pakistani military. He likened it to current treatment of ethnic Pashtuns in the war on terror, and called for the army's withdrawal from the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan. Imran Khan was a fierce critic of the US policy in the region. In 1994, Imran Khan and the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Hamid Gul created a pressure group, which was a first step towards the creation of a new political party. In April 1996, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was

founded. In 1999, Imran Khan supported a military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf. He publicly expressed the hope that Musharraf would “end corruption, clear out the political mafias.” In 2002, Imran Khan was elected to the National Assembly. In 2007, Khan and 85 other MPs resigned from Parliament in protest of the presidential election, which general Musharraf was contesting without resigning as army chief. In early 2010s, Imran Khan became one of the most influential politicians in the country already, and PTI was one of the most popular political parties in the country. In August 2018, his party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf won 156 of the 342 seats in the National Assembly and, following the election, Imran Khan assumed control of the coalition government. The author points to the fact that Khan formed the government mostly from the members of Musharraf’s government or that created after his resignation.

The new government placed economic issues at the top of the agenda. In his victory speech, Imran Khan said that his party would build Pakistan as a humanitarian state based on principles of the first Islamic state of Medina. He also said that the government would put interests of the poor and commoners of the country first. The government announced that the “New Pakistan” plan involved the construction of five million houses for the poor over the next five years and solution to the problem of unemployment. In February 2020, the government decided to allocate 10 billion rupees (64.8 million US dollars) to contain the rise in prices for basic foodstuffs. In March 2020, against the backdrop of a slowdown in global economic growth and COVID-19 pandemic, Imran Khan called upon major creditor countries to write off the external debt of Pakistan. The author notes that the external political situation remains unfavourable for Pakistan: terrorist groups still operate along the border with Afghanistan; tensions in Kashmir are high; and New Delhi makes provocative statements. This situation causes the Pakistani military to demand an increase in military expenditure, already burdensome for the country, as the military spending accounts for over

50 percent of the State budget. While emphasizing the importance of partnership with Saudi Arabia, Imran Khan, at the same time, pointed out the need to maintain a balance between the leading states of the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Khan's government supported the Turkish military operation in northern Syria in 2019. Another important problem the government faces is religious extremism. Over the past decades, successive military and civilian regimes have sought to strengthen their positions not by improving living standards in the country, but by fostering religious intolerance.

In conclusion, the author points to the fact that Imran Khan is a non-system politician for Pakistan. On the one hand, he is not of humble origins, his net worth is approximately 50 million US dollars, he owns real estate and agricultural land; and is a shareholder in various private enterprises. On the other hand, he is a Pashtun raised in the centre of the Punjab province and the first Pashtun to occupy the highest positions of power. He started his career as a sportsman, not a military man, businessman or government official. His party, unlike other Pakistani political parties, is not dynastic and unites like-minded people, not people from the same ethnic group. Political opponents of Imran Khan argue that only the strong support of the Pakistani military secured his success in the 2018 elections. They state that the army is the real ruling power in the country during the PTI leader's term as Prime Minister.

The author draws attention to the fact that the civilian politicians who ruled in Pakistan, i.e. the Bhutto family, the Sharif family, etc., discredited themselves as corrupt officials and neglected the duty to develop the national economy and improve the living standards and well-being of the population. In contrast, the Pakistani army during the years since independence has always played an important part in shaping the State policy. In Pakistan, the army is greatly respected and is a source of national pride. Nevertheless, the highest military officials are well aware that today an undisguised military leadership of the

country will only lead to the international isolation of Pakistan. Thus, a new political figure is required: an incorrupt civilian politician, on the one hand, and one who suits the army, on the other hand. Imran Khan has shown his loyalty to the military in the past, owing in part to his Pashtun ancestry (the number of Pashtuns in the army is large and growing). Last but not least, Imran Khan has been popular with young people ever since he was the captain of the country's national cricket team, and managed to build on this popularity in the early years of his political career.

VLADIMIR KIRICHENKO. SULTAN QABOOS AND THE MODERNIZATION OF OMAN // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World"*.

*Keywords: Oman, Sultan Qaboos, foreign policy, domestic policy.*

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*Abstract. The article is devoted to the activities of the Sultan Qaboos (1970–2020). The Sultan of Oman made a unique contribution to the development of this country. In addition, the neutrality in foreign policy, which Oman adhered to during his reign, helped to establish relations with neighboring countries and become a mediator in conflict situations.*

Sultan Qaboos bin Said was born on November 18, 1940 in the Dhofar governorate of the Sultanate of Oman. Sultan Qaboos

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is the only son of Said bin Taimur (1910–1972) and Princess Mazun al-Mashani. He was the eighth sultan and direct descendant of the Al-Said dynasty, founded by Imam Ahmed bin Said in 1741.

The future sultan began his education in Oman, then, in September 1958, his father Said bin Taimur sent his son to the UK for continuation training. He spent two years at a private school in Suffolk and in 1960 entered the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst<sup>1</sup>. After graduating from the academy, he served two years in the rifle battalion of the English army, and then completed the course of headquarters director in Germany. When he returned to the UK, he received specific training in the study of the local government in the UK. After completing his studies, Qaboos bin Said went on a trip around the world to get acquainted with the cultures and developmental delays of foreign countries. He returned to Oman in 1964, where his father, the ruling sultan, probably did not like his European experience, as a result of which the heir was placed under house arrest. Official biographies about this period say that he spent most of his time studying Sharia law, as well as the history and culture of Oman<sup>2</sup>. Subsequently, Qaboos himself noted in an interview that the study of the religion, culture and history of his country influenced greatly his attitude towards the world<sup>3</sup>.

In 1966, significant oil deposits were discovered in Oman. Under the pressure of foreign companies interested in developing oil fields, Sultan Said agreed to build a modern port (Matrakha) on the coast of the Arabian Sea, lay a hard-topped highway (Muscat – Sokhar). In the spring of 1970, a modern national currency was introduced in Oman, which replaced the previous Maria Theresa thaler<sup>4</sup>.

In 1970, as a result of a bloodless palace coup, Qaboos bin Said came to power. This happened with the support of the Omani armed forces controlled by Britain<sup>5</sup>. So, on July 23, 1970, Said bin Taimur was forced to sign abdication in favor of his son.

The former sultan died in London in 1972<sup>6</sup>. At the same time, a united Kingdom of Oman<sup>7</sup> was proclaimed.

### **Modernization of the country during the reign Sultan Qaboos**

Having come to power, Qaboos immediately began to develop reforms to modernize the state. Radio Oman, working in Arabic and English, was launched almost immediately. A little later the same happened to Radio Salal, broadcasting in Arabic. Since 1972, daily newspapers in Arabic began to appear: Oman, and Al-Watan. In 1975, national television was launched, traditionally starting its programs with prayers broadcasting. Today, these are five channels working "in 5 directions: a general program, a foreign program, a youth program, the Koran program, a program of classical music<sup>8</sup>." In 1976, the construction of a satellite communications center began.

In 1976, thanks to military assistance from Iran, Jordan and Great Britain, Qaboos managed to weed out resistance of the Dhofar Liberation Front<sup>9</sup>. This organization fought for split from Oman since 1965. Having solved the problem with the separatists, the sultan could engage in the development of the country.

The basis for the development of Oman was and remains oil production. Oman's oil fields were discovered in 1962<sup>10</sup>. The main oil company in Oman is Petroleum Development Oman Ltd. (PDO). Until 1974, Shell owned a controlling interest. Since 1974, the Omani government has been the majority owner, and Shell, as a minority shareholder, provides technical and management services. In the early 1970s it became clear that the original Fahud oil-bearing region could not maintain production at the opening rate of about 300,000 barrels per day. In 1975, the development of fields in the Ghab region increased production from 291,000 barrels per day to about 350,000 barrels per day. In the early 1980s, the development of southern fields restored

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production from 282,000 barrels in 1980 to 400,000 barrels in 1984. Since then, production has continued to grow and by the end of 1990 oil reserves reached 700,000 barrels. Gas reserves in 1988 amounted to more than 912 cubic feet with production of about 450 million cubic feet. Since then, the Omani economy has experienced impressive GDP growth, rising from \$256 million in 1970 up to \$79.66 billion in 2012<sup>12</sup>.

Largely due to oil export revenues, Qaboos was able to begin a plan of modernization of Oman. In 1970, Oman almost didn't have modern infrastructure. There were 3 (!) schools and 10 km of asphalt roads in the country. Medical care was minimal, life expectancy did not exceed 50 years.

When Qaboos ascended the throne, he abolished slavery. Then the sultan took to infrastructure: asphalt roads were laid, bridges were built, desalinating plants and dams were built, high-speed Internet was carried. The life expectancy of Omanis began to exceed 77 years, and literacy is estimated at 96% adults<sup>13</sup>.

The "omanization" plan, implemented in 1988, was aimed at reducing the country's dependence on foreign labor. The policy offered reducing the share of foreign workers in both public and private sectors. The reforms also affected the private sector, the share of which increased from 14.7% in 1995 to 16.6% in 2000. At the same time, agriculture and fishing were the least affected by the plan; wholesale and retail trade; restaurants and hotels; production; construction of roads and buildings and services. These sectors employed 88% of the total number of private sector workers and 95% of the total number of foreign workers.

The highest level of "omanization" was achieved in the following sectors: transport, communications; financial insurance, real estate and labour services and mining. But only 8 per cent of the total private sector workforce was employed in these sectors<sup>14</sup>.

In November 1996, at the initiative of Qaboos, a constitution was introduced in Oman. A Council of Oman was also established, the activities of which are deliberative. Sultan

Qaboos remained an absolute monarch, combining the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Central Bank. However, in relation to the lieges, he behaved quite democratically. So, the monarch gathered around him vice-agents, with whom he traveled from time to time throughout the country to meet with the public. This helped him sort out priorities and respond to people's inquisities<sup>15</sup>.

The dominant direction of Islam in Oman is Ibadism, which differs from both Sunnism and Shiism. Ibadites are tolerant of other faiths. The British orientalist Bernard Lewis noted that Ibadites is – “the most extreme example of tribal independence<sup>16</sup>”. Indeed, Sultan Qaboos, who received an excellent education in Europe, managed to preserve tribal traditions by making his state the most tolerant, despite fierce differences and ambitions of neighboring Gulf states.

In Oman, ibadits make up 75% of the population. In addition to them, 5% of the Shia population live in the country. Another 5% are Christians and Hindus, mainly of South Asian descent. The rest of the population is Sunni Muslims. Sunni and Shia minorities coexist peacefully in Oman<sup>17</sup>. In 2001, the construction of the majestic Sultan Qaboos Mosque was completed. The dome of the main prayer hall is located at a 45 m height, and the height of the main minaret reaches 92 m<sup>18</sup>.

Omanis enjoy freedom of thought, while there is censorship in the media. Criticism of the government and Qaboos himself, as well as religious ideas, are prohibited<sup>19</sup>.

Oman was not passed by the events of the Arab Spring 2011. However, there were no major disturbances in Oman. Thousands of people got out on the streets across the country to demand payrise, more jobs and tightening of control against corruption. Primarily, the security forces did not disperse the demonstrations, but later tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition were used to stop the protests. As a result, two people were killed and dozens were injured. Hundreds of people

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were convicted of “illegal meetings” and actions “insulting the sultan”. The protests did not lead to major changes. However, Qaboos removed several officials who have long been accused of corruption, broadened the mandate of the Advisory Board and promised to create more jobs in the public sector<sup>20</sup>.

Qaboos carried out a decisive administrative reform, redrawing the map of Oman in such a way that the borders of the new provinces ceased to repeat the territories of the tribes, and the governors were able to carry out Muscat decisions without looking about the opinion of the tribal leaders. Qaboos paid attention to the development of trade and business activity. The Sultan also strengthened the army by rearming it and significantly increased military payments<sup>21</sup>.

It should be noted that solar and wind power was also developed in Oman under Qaboos. In 2017, it was announced that the Omani government set out that by 2025 the sultanate covers 10% of its energy needs using these sources. The use of wind and solar energy is of great importance in agriculture<sup>22</sup>.

The Sultan initiated programs to help the poor. It provides housing and land throughout the country to poor families and other categories of people in need. They can get a loan from the Housing Bank, under the terms of which they are absolved from 50% of the loan disbursements. For example, in 2008, the volume of payments and benefits to families on social security increased. The minimum pension for former civil servants has been increased by 35%. At the same time, payments for other categories of the poor increased by 5–17%<sup>23</sup>.

### **Foreign Policy of Sultan Qaboos: Moderation and Neutrality**

Under Sultan Qaboos, Oman established diplomatic relations with its neighbors, joined the League of Arab States and the United Nations, and became one of the important members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

All this time, Qaboos supported the independence of Oman, demonstrating the ability to build equitable relationship with a number of world and regional powers. In violation of the Arab consensus, he supported negotiations between Egypt and Israel, which led to the conclusion of the first peace treaty between Israel and the Arab state (1978).

After the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), Qaboos delegated the Ambassador of Oman to Tehran to get acquainted with the new rulers of the country. This led to a meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini, who received assurances that Oman would maintain relations with the Islamic Republic, regardless of the sultanate's alliance with Western powers.

In 1978, after the conclusion of the Camp David Accords, 24 Oman was one of the few members of the League of Arab States that did not interrupt diplomatic relations with Egypt. A year later, after Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel (1979), the governments of Oman and Israel first opened trade offices in Muscat and Tel Aviv. Throughout the ongoing war in Syria, unlike most Arab states, the Omani embassy in Damascus remained open.

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In 1994, Oman became the first Gulf state which hosted the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin arrived in the country. Subsequently, Oman did the same with Israeli Prime Ministers Shimon Peres, Netanyahu, while maintaining friendly ties with the Palestinian Authority<sup>26</sup>.

Qaboos's independence and neutrality often irritated his more powerful neighbors in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,

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which vainly hoped that Oman would be in line with their regional policies. In 2011, when Saudi Arabia sent tanks to subdue the Shia revolt in Bahrain, Oman did not support that intervention. He did not interfere in the Saudi military operation against the Houthis rebels in Yemen (2015), but later Oman provided a platform for peace negotiations between the warring parties.

Oman became a mediator in Iran's negotiations with the United States and other powers. These negotiations led to an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program (2015), although President Trump withdrew from the agreement three years later<sup>28</sup>. Oman has also established friendly relations with Russia and China.

In 2017, Saudi authorities accused the Qatari leadership of supporting terrorism and interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Oman, along with Kuwait, did not support the subsequent blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab countries<sup>29</sup>.

The following year, the first ever municipal elections were held in Oman, in which women also participated. Omani women under Qaboos one the first were qualified for the vote in the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, they can own land, hold ministerial office, and serve in the army. Today, they make up almost half of civil servants. They can also head companies and receive equal pay with men. In 1999, Oman became the first Arabian country which sent woman as its ambassador abroad<sup>30</sup>.

It is worth noting that Qaboos paid great importance to ecology. In 1991, together with UNESCO, the Sultan established an award for the contribution of individuals, groups of individuals, institutions or organizations to the preservation of the environment<sup>31</sup>.

In 2017, the first Oman Environment Forum was held. The participants of the event noted the efforts of Qaboos to improve environmental sustainability and thanked him for preserving the environment. Rational use of Oman's natural resources has played a significant role in this<sup>32</sup>.

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His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said died of cancer on January 10, 2020. He was 79 years old. As it's known, the sultan did not leave heirs, so the Council of the ruling dynasty elected Haysam bin Tariq Al-Said (born 1935), a cousin of Qaboos, new sultan of Oman. A graduate of the Sorbonne, he headed the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage for many years, repeatedly was a representative of Qaboos in the international arena.

Qaboos bin Said turned Oman into a modern and stable state. Infrastructure and social development have made life in Oman comfortable. The policy of the sultan was supported by the majority of the population. This is demonstrated by the low level of interventions during the Arab Spring (2011). In addition, the policy of religious tolerance supported by the sultan has led to the peaceful coexistence of adherents of many faiths and religions in the country. And the Sultan's smart foreign policy helped Oman avoid conflicts with neighboring states and become an independent player in world politics.

Today, Oman is a small monarchy of the Persian Gulf (territory 309,500 km<sup>2</sup>), with a population of 4.6 million people, 43% of which are expats, it is considered an island of stability and tranquility in the Middle East. In 2010, Oman was recognized as the world leader in terms of development in accordance with the Human Development Index, in 2017 the sultanate took fourth place among the safest countries in the world, and in 2019 the state was in second out of 150 places in the global welfare index<sup>33</sup>.

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2021.02.004. MARIA VIDIASOVA, TAMARA GASANBEKOVA. EGYPT AFTER THE 2018 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: GETTING BACK ON TRACK // *Nestabilnost geostrategicheskogo prostranstva v stranah Blizhnego, Srednego i Dalnego Vostoka: Aktualnye problemy. Ezhegodnik. Moscow, IV RAS, 2019. № 1. P. 78–89.*

*Keywords: Egypt, political parties, presidential elections, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, Hamas, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia.*

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The authors of the articles note that the current situation in Egypt is characterized by the predominance of pro-regime political parties in the Parliament and relative internal stability. In March 2018, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was re-elected for a second term, receiving 97.8 percent of the vote; there was only one alternative candidate. After the re-election of el-Sisi, his supporters raised the issue of extending the presidential term from four to six years. The majority of the members of the House of Representatives (the former People's Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt) welcomed the idea, citing the example of China. However, el-Sisi himself claimed he had no interest in following this example and repeating the bitter experience of Mubarak.

El-Sisi had an absolute majority in the Parliament, although his authority was undermined by the increase in consumer prices and, in particular, state tariffs for transportation, which also had an impact on fuel prices. Previously, the Government raised

electricity and water tariffs, as well as ticket prices for public transport.

The authors note that el-Sisi tried to win over feminists by allowing men and women to pray together in Egyptian mosques. Traditionally, there are separate areas in mosques for men and women. Moreover, a spokesman for the Ministry of Awqaf of Egypt (the Ministry of Endowments) announced that more than 140 women had received licenses to preach and are tasked with religious educational work among women and girls.

The authors of the article believe that the aftermath of the July 2013 military coup served as a barometer of public attitudes in the country. Egypt has been fighting against armed Islamists for years, but since the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi in 2013 they have strengthened, creating a network of gangs operating against the army and police in the north of the Sinai Peninsula.

Having analyzed the foreign policy of Egypt, the authors note the importance of the country's relations with Libya. As of 2010, 1-1.5 million Egyptians worked in Libya, most of them illegally. During the civil war in the country, hundreds of thousands of them fled and by middle of 2017 there were only 70 thousand citizens of Egypt. At the beginning of 2018 their number reached 121 thousand, but the return to the pre-war figures is unlikely.

The authors point to the fact that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has allied himself with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Earlier, the UAE and Egypt violated the UN embargo on the supply of arms to Libya, thereby making Haftar's military success in 2016 possible. The UAE supplies the LNA with aircraft and military vehicles. In January-April 2017 many dual-use Toyota vehicles were shipped to the LNA via Port Said.

According to the authors, there are three problems that cloud relations between Egypt and Sudan: the issue of using the waters of the Nile, the territorial dispute over the Halaib Triangle,

and the infiltration of terrorists from the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood into Egypt. The question of the use of the waters of the Nile was first raised by President Mohammed Morsi in June 2013. In his speech at the National Conference, the President declared the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on one of the tributaries of the Blue Nile illegal. Sudan, on the other hand, supported Ethiopia, since the construction of the dam and the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed will automatically increase the share of Sudan's use of the waters of the Nile. At the end of December 2017, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Sameh Shoukry went to Addis Ababa for talks after months of tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa. He voiced concerns about the possible shortage of water for Egyptians and proposed the World Bank as a neutral interlocutor in the talks to resolve the crisis. In 2018, a tripartite meeting at the level of foreign ministers and ministers of irrigation was held. It was decided to create a scientific committee made up of politically independent representatives from the universities of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, tasked to assess the environmental impact of the construction of a high dam on the Blue Nile.

The authors give an overview of the territorial dispute over the Halaib Triangle. Having created a condominium over Sudan in 1899, the United Kingdom set the border strictly at the 22nd parallel. However, in 1902 they transferred the seaside "triangle" covering more than 20,000 square kilometres, located north of the 22nd parallel, under the jurisdiction of the administration of the condominium. In 1995, Hosni Mubarak sent troops to the Halaib Triangle after accusing Sudan of the assassination attempt on his life in Addis Ababa. From an economic perspective, Egypt has a certain interest in mineral deposits and probable oil fields on the territory of the notorious "triangle". In December 2017, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, sent a petition to the UN protesting against Egypt's occupation of the Halaib Triangle. This immediately caused tension between the two countries in early January 2018 both Sudan and Egypt recalled their ambassadors

for consultation. In early April, the three parties to the conflict (mediated by the US) reached an agreement in Khartoum. The agreement committed Ethiopia to launch only 2 of the 16 turbines of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (formerly known as the Millennium Dam) in the near future, and Egypt to raise the water level of the artificial Lake Nasser above the Aswan Dam in order to protect farmlands from drought during low-water years. However, the authors note the fragility of this arrangement. Egypt and Sudan have different foreign policy directions: Egypt allies itself to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while Sudan is getting closer to Qatar and Turkey.

In December 2017, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Sudan, making Egypt and Turkey's relations with Sudan extremely complicated. First, Erdoğan and Omar al-Bashir signed a number of agreements on the development of economic ties between the two countries. Second, Turkey received the right to improve the infrastructure on Suakin Island in the Red Sea. Officially, Turkey is going to set up a tourist business, but there is also a possibility of creating a Turkish naval base on Suakin. These developments stirred up Egyptian public opinion.

President el-Sisi remains suspicious of Turkey after Erdoğan condemned the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état (i.e. the overthrow of Muhammad Morsi) and sheltered many members of the Muslim Brotherhood who fled from Egypt at that time. They regularly criticize the current political regime in Egypt through the media they founded in Turkey. The authors also discuss Cairo's reasonable suspicion that Khartoum turns a blind eye to the movement of terrorists through Sudan both into Egypt and Libya. In turn, Khartoum insists that anti-government elements are infiltrating into the rebellious region of Darfur through Egypt.

The authors examine the relations between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Egypt sealed makeshift underground tunnels connecting the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip so that no one could bypass the Rafah Border Crossing, which is the sole crossing point on the Gaza-Egypt border. From

time to time the authorities of Egypt close the border crossing, reopening it for only one hour or one day, as it was done on February 22–23, 2018. On May 14, 2018, Donald Trump moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, triggering violent unrest in the Gaza Strip. In this connection, on June 2-3 the Israeli Air Force bombed the northern part of the Strip, killing dozens of people. Egypt faced a delicate situation, since President el-Sisi was keeping ex-President Morsi in prison under threat of death penalty, in particular, for his connections with Hamas. On March 30, 2018, the leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, declared the Great March of Return. However, on May 13 Haniyeh arrived in Cairo, where he was persuaded to soften his position towards Israel, and the next day he called for a new Intifada. After only one day of relative calm the Gaza-Israel border became a front line with all types of conventional weapons used.

The authors give a thorough analysis of economic issues. Relatively recently, Egypt was predicted to become an importer of hydrocarbons in the near future. The discovery of new large gas fields on its territory has improved the situation. In 2017, following the development of the Zohr field, Egypt has significantly reduced the purchases of liquefied gas. The start of the production at the Atoll field was scheduled for the first half of 2018.

In Helwan Egypt has built the largest metallurgical complex in the Arab world. As of 2015, it produced 5.506 million tons of steel, compared to 803.825 million in China and 105.134 million in Japan. However, it should be taken into account that the metallurgical plants in Helwan are part of the military-industrial complex, as they produce both rolled ferrous metals and steel, and weapons. Not only small arms and light weapons. Under the 1992 agreement between the US and Egypt, M1A1 Abrams tanks are assembled from kits of parts supplied by the US. In the fourth quarter of 2019, the Helwan plant was set to start assembling T-90 tanks from kits of parts supplied by Uralvagonzavod. Thanks to shipments of frigates, corvettes and submarines by the USA, Germany and France, Egypt strengthens

its navy. The Egyptian Air Force is ranked 9th in the world ahead of the German Air Force.

Historically, the US and France are the main suppliers of military aircraft to Egypt. Russia also continued to export military aircraft to Egypt after the collapse of the USSR; deliveries of the MiG-29M have already begun. Under the bilateral contract, approximately 50 fighters of this type are expected to be shipped. Overall, arms imports in Egypt increased by 215 percent in 2013–2017, compared to the previous five-year period. According to this indicator, Egypt is the second-largest arms importer in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia (225 percent).

The authors note that relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia are particularly important. According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Egypt, in 2018 Saudi investments in Egypt amounted to 6.1 billion USD, which is 11 percent of total foreign investments and approximately 27 percent of investments from Arab states. On March 6, 2018 in Ismailia, President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Crown Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia discussed a number of projects related to the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal Corridor Area Project will allegedly turn Egypt into a global trade and transport hub that is expected to attract large investments to the region. This was seen as a compensation for the transfer of the uninhabited Tiran and Sanafir islands in the Red Sea from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. In April 2016, the transfer caused a storm of resentment against President el-Sisi from the Egyptian opposition, since it virtually meant a delimitation of the disputed maritime border, which came under the jurisdiction of Riyadh.

The authors conclude that Egypt is currently in the midst of the post-Arab Spring political changes. There was no violent civil war that still goes on in Syria, Libya and Yemen. However, Egypt teeters on the brink of such a war due to internal and external reasons. In the face of such a crisis, Egypt arms itself heavily, despite serious economic difficulties.

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2021.02.005. ELENA DMITRIEVA. ISLAM AS A PART OF THE SWEDISH RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE // *Condensed abstract.*

*Keywords: Sweden, Islam, migration, confessional structure of the population, intercultural communication, mass media, Muslims in the countries of Northern Europe, parallel migrant communities.*

1. S.Yu. Dianina. The Interaction of Peoples and Cultures in the Context of Muslim Integration into Society in Sweden: Problems and Prospects\* // *Concept: philosophy, religion, culture.* 2020. Vol. 4, No 2 (14). P. 105–114.

2. M.M. Agafoshin, S.A. Gorokhov. Impact of External Migration on Changes in the Swedish Religious Landscape\* // *"Baltic region"*, 2020. Vol. 12. No. 2, P. 84–99.

Today, an increase in the pace of migration of the Muslim population to Europe that results in intensification of the role of the "Islamic factor" in the lives of Europeans is one of the most important processes in the region. Sweden has one of the world's highest rates of spread of Islam in Europe. With the indigenous population of Sweden being mostly not religious, integration of Muslims into Swedish society often leads to misunderstandings and conflicts on both sides. An increased level of secularization of modern society in Sweden entails ignorance of the religious rules and customs, including both Christianity and Islam. As a result, Swedes lack understanding of the way of life of Muslim migrants. Nowadays, religion in Sweden is viewed as a private matter, while in Islam religious rules go far beyond that. Nevertheless, the high level of secularization of the Swedish population leaves room for Muslims to practice their own religion, but at the same time religious rules and lifestyle of Muslims undergo changes, tuning in to certain cultural filters and adapting to the everyday life of Swedes.

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\* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

The author of the article S. Dianina (1) notes that today's Sweden is somewhat conflicted due to Muslim migrant inflow, and the number of such conflicts keeps growing, e.g. relations between migrants and the indigenous society, challenges the Swedes face living side-by-side with migrants, etc. In case Muslim culture and religion, the problem is particularly acute, since Europeans tend to believe that Muslim values are not quite in line with the European way of life with strong secular rational and non-traditional values. As an illustration of social and cultural differences, the author cites the case of Yasri Khan, a member of the Swedish Green Party and a Muslim, who refused to shake hands with a female reporter while recording a TV show back in 2016. Instead, he intended to greet her with his hand over his heart, without actually touching her. Later he explained that a handshake was considered too intimate in Islam, but anyway, Khan had to leave the party due to heavy criticism.

The author points out that Swedish mass media plays a significant role in interpreting Islam to the Swedes. Thus, Islam is often presented as a static, unchanging religion that dictates people how to live and behave. Swedish mass media tend to give too much focus to issues and differences between Swedes and Muslims, which leads to mutual misconceptions and further alienation. In such a way, mass media act as a tool for shaping opinions, attitudes and stereotypes. The author suggests that high level of secularization of Swedish society demands a Muslim not only to incorporate into the host society adhering to another religion, but also to adapt to a highly secular environment that is fundamentally different from the one in his country of origin. In the author's opinion, when discussing the increase in the number of Muslims and the place of Islamic religion in Sweden, Swedish researchers make a focus on employment or education of migrants, leaving out such themes as family and childbirth. In this connection, they assume that studies focused on demographic characteristics of migrants are more like propaganda intended to scare the indigenous

population of the country. According to Swedish researchers, the attitudes and values of migrants change over time and the process of assimilation is discernible.

The majority of Swedes are eager to help migrants integrate into society following large refugee inflows to Europe in recent years. Most often, this is due to a sense of moral responsibility, because many Swedes believe that migrants have no other choice but to stay in Sweden. A dilemma is that immigrants are viewed as vulnerable people in need of assistance, on the one hand, and as a cultural threat to Swedish society on the other hand. In recent years, Swedish policy focusing on the adaptation of refugees has been heavily criticized for putting cultural differences above everything else. Data by Swedish researchers show that more than half of the Muslims who arrived in Sweden over the past five years consider language-learning as one of their priorities. Language proficiency is an advantage when seeking employment and during job interviews. The author notes that other scholars believe that the concept of "cultural identity" refers to a complex set of beliefs and attitudes, coming to the fore only in contact with another culture, but not in a homogeneous cultural environment.

In Swedish media, Muslims are often portrayed as a group that creates a dilemma for Swedes concerning the discussion of religious freedom. When minorities live under oppression, full tolerance for all differences may lead to increased segregation and injustice. The author cites as an example the case of a Muslim immigrant, who claimed that in about three years since he arrived in Sweden his colleagues never asked him about his religion or mentioned Islam in his presence, although he usually went somewhere private to pray during the working day. But when his acquaintances started asking questions about Islam, he felt uncomfortable and even defined it as a manifestation of racism. Thus, full tolerance and acceptance of differences is not enough to ensure intercultural communication. In order to jointly create a functional social structure, blind tolerance for all

differences is not an option. The most important thing here is mutual understanding and friendly atmosphere that can be achieved through communication, including discussion of differences between people.

The author identifies several stages of integration of Muslims into a host society. Everyday habits of a member of a minority may be questioned, since it is not always clear what is right or wrong about the behaviour patterns. The more a person is integrated into society, the more he absorbs its culture, and the culture starts to change his understanding of religion. Based on a study of media materials, the author highlights several differences between Sweden and the countries of the Islamic world, which create additional hardships for Muslim migrants. The length of daylight hours is an important factor that complicates fasting. Unlike this natural factor, social patterns of conduct are much easier to change. Cultural differences in everyday communication may be illustrated by the following example: in Somalia, at a bus stop, it is easier for strangers to start a dialogue, while in Sweden it is almost impossible. According to migrants, the Swedes are usually emotionally reserved, frown upon children contacting in public places, etc. Moreover, the focus shifts from private problems in communication towards global problems of integration. Sweden is the country with one of the most open migrant policy in the world where government allocates sufficient funds to provide cash benefits and housing for migrants; but at the same time, for example, in the US migrants are better integrated into society, although they receive significantly less financial support. Thus, successful integration of migrants could be achieved through combined efforts of the State and civil society, i.e. closer interaction and greater understanding between people. In addition, Muslim migrants mentioned low interest in and misunderstanding of their religion, absence of the call to prayer, women wearing revealing clothes and no hijab in the streets, and difficulty to combine working or study time with prayer.

Due to the high level of secularization, Sweden guarantees freedom to practice religion freely to all its citizens. Over time, young Muslims who arrive in Sweden change their views on certain things.

In conclusion, the author states that the high level of secularization in Sweden gives a certain religious freedom, but at the same time it creates a number of difficulties that often affect the daily life of Muslim migrants, limiting their right to performing cultural or religious rituals. Attitudes, prejudices and views of Swedes on how to behave in society affect lives of Muslims in today's Sweden. Thus, the process of integrating Muslims into Swedish society is rather difficult, and disconnect between people is steadily growing. The behaviour of Muslim migrants largely depends on the specific situation, which may not be regulated by religious rules, therefore making religion only a guide, but not a guarantor of their actions. Cultural and religious constructions are constantly changing, so they cannot be reduced only to a social code of conduct. Swedish Muslims interpret their own religion by applying various cultural filters, building an understanding of European society and trying to tune in on the acceptance of differences, not only the search for common ground and compromise. Integration is possible only with the involvement of both sides.

Researchers M. Agafoshin and S. Gorokhov (2) study the changes in the confessional structure of Swedish population taking into account the cyclical dynamics of replacement of Protestantism by Islam. The authors note that although the Lutheran Church has had the status of the official state religion throughout most of the history of Sweden, the beginning of mass immigration in the second half of the 20th century had a considerable impact on the confessional structure of the country's population. As a result of growing number of refugees from the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East and Africa, Sweden has become a multi-religious state and one of the leaders among the EU countries as far as the growth rates of Muslims are concerned.

Immigrants have adaptation difficulties that result in their social, cultural and geographical isolation and subsequent emergence of parallel migrant communities.

The authors note that European migration crisis of 2014–2016 that caused millions of people from Asia and Africa come to Europe has seriously aggravated the problems of social and cultural adaptation of migrants; these problems are particularly pressing in countries that host more migrants from Islamic countries, e.g. Sweden. As a result, numerous parallel religious communities emerge; members of such communities tend to escape from the new reality by concentrating in enclaves, refuse to integrate into the European civil society and create parallel bodies of power. These parallel communities maintain close relations with their country of origin and relatives who stayed there, thus increasing the migrant flow from their homeland and hampering the cultural assimilation of the diaspora. In this connection, it should be mentioned that diasporas play a crucial role in establishing economic relations between the country of origin of its members and their new homeland and that various migrant organisations facilitate integration of their members into the new social and cultural environment by helping them with accommodation, employment or education. Nevertheless, intensification of migration processes in the modern world that cause emerging of parallel communities in the developed countries with low birth rates may result in ‘indigenous’ population of these countries gradually becoming a minority. This process is known as a “third demographic transition”; according to the author of this concept David Coleman, a British demographer, the benchmark is a priori decline of indigenous people (former majority) to below of 50 percent of the total population. The authors hypothesize that religious landscape dynamics has a cyclic nature shaped by competition of religions; this hypothesis is in line with the third demographic transition. The cycle of replacing one religion by another may be triggered by the migration of adherents of the religion that starts to

compete with the one that previously dominated in the religious landscape of the hosting country. The authors estimate that such a cycle lasts for 106 years on average and consists of 4 stages: initial replacement, sustainable replacement, parity, and final replacement; each stage has a certain duration and impact on the structure of the religious landscape.

Considering the historical background, the authors note that in the Middle Ages migrants from Northern Germany, mainly merchants and artisans, were already arriving in Sweden. In the 17th century, the discovery of large deposits of iron ore attracted Walloon Protestants, who fled from religious persecution in their homeland, the territory of modern Belgium. Since the 16th century, Lutheranism has become the state religion in Sweden, and restrictions were imposed on the activities of other religious organizations. Over time Swedish law has become more liberal in terms of religious freedom, and finally in 2000 the Lutheran Church lost its status of the official church of Sweden. Thus, until the mid-20th century migration inflow didn't have a significant impact on the ethnical or confessional structure of the Swedish population; in the years after World War II, immigration to Sweden significantly increased, which was mainly due to the favourable economic situation in the country. As the Swedish economy was developing fast after the war, it desperately needed labour force. After the liberalization of migration legislation in the 1950s, Swedish labour market was flooded with migrant workers, coming mostly from Scandinavian countries, Germany and countries of Eastern Europe. However, since 1970s migrant flows to Sweden have become more heterogeneous due to an increase in the number of immigrants from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe outside the EU. In total, during the period from 1950 to 1980, the number of Catholics in Sweden increased almost fourfold, the number of Orthodox Christians increased by 12.5 times, and Muslims became a hundred times as numerous. Thus, with the diversification of the religious landscape in Sweden, there appeared religions that can compete with

Lutheranism, i.e. trigger the cycle of religious competition in the country's religious landscape.

In the late 1970s, the structure of immigration flows to Sweden started to change, which was due to a lower demand for labour as a result of weak economic climate in the country and overall decline in industrial employment. This is why labour migrants from developed countries were replaced by refugees and immigrants from developing countries, whose culture and religion differ from those of the Swedes. Swedish migration policy was exceptionally humanistic, and the state leadership positioned the country as a "humanitarian superpower", emphasising human rights protection and large public support of hosting refugees. In the 1990s, mass migration of refugees to Sweden began. Its first peak was due to the flow of migrants from the former Yugoslavia (primarily Bosnians), which was in a state of civil war at the time. For instance, only in 1992 (the record-setting year in terms of the number of refugees) Sweden granted asylum to 84,000 migrants mostly coming from the former Yugoslavia. Besides, Sweden continued to receive refugees from the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

In the 2000s, the flows of migrants from these regions kept growing for several reasons. Firstly, Swedish law guarantees the right of families for reunification, so relatives of migrants relocated to Sweden too. Secondly, the situation in countries trafficking migrants to Sweden became even worse; the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 almost tripled the number of migrants from that country within just a decade. The Arab Spring in 2011 and the following events in the countries of the Middle East, including the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, gave rise to the next wave of refugees to Sweden. Among European countries, Sweden has hosted the largest number of refugees per capita. Since 2017, Syrians have been the most numerous group of migrants in the country; the Finns are the second largest group, while the Iraqis hold the third position.

Considering the confessional structure of the population in the countries that generate inflow of migrants to Sweden, the authors assess that Muslims account for more than 80 percent of the migrants. This is why the share of Muslims has become the most fast-growing segment of the religious landscape of Sweden. The number of Muslims in Sweden peaked in the 1990s and after 2010, which matches the two largest waves of refugee flows to Sweden, the first one from Yugoslavia and Bosnia, and the second one from Syria and Iraq. Muslims account for almost 14 percent of the religious population in the country. Today, Sweden is literally a country of migrants: in 2018, 930,000 people (9.1 percent of the country's population) were citizens of other countries, and more than 1.2 million of Swedish citizens were born abroad. In Sweden, almost 25 percent of the population have foreign origins, that is, either they were born abroad or at least one of their parents was born abroad.

Geographically, migrants in Sweden are located in a rather uneven manner, more than half of them are concentrated in 3 of the country's 21 counties (läns): Stockholm, Västra Götaland, and Skåne, primarily in their largest cities (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö). There live almost 60 percent of migrants from Islamic states. Muslims are especially numerous in Stockholm County, where 27 percent of the country's Muslims live. In Rinkeby, north-western district of Stockholm municipality also known as Little Mogadishu, about 80% of the population adhere to Islam. This also applies to Rosengård (a district of Malmö), where almost 86 percent of locals are of foreign origin, mostly from Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan and other (predominantly Muslim) countries.

The authors note that since the 1990s Sweden predominantly receives immigrants belonging to other cultures and religions, which makes their integration into the Swedish society hard (and impossible in case of Muslims), contributes to their social degradation and criminalisation and leads to emerging of parallel migrant communities. Parallel communities usually emerge in the

so-called “vulnerable areas”, enclaves where the state monopoly on law enforcement is challenged by the institutions of traditional leadership based on the Islamic norms that are different from the West European liberal values. In 2017, there were 61 vulnerable areas in the country, which hosted 560,000 people (more than 5 percent of the country’s population). According to the Swedish police, 5,000 criminals and 200 criminal networks operate in these vulnerable areas. Moreover, 23 of these areas with a total population of 200,000 people, including Rinkeby in Stockholm and Rosengård in Malmö, are classified by Government of Sweden as “especially vulnerable” and almost uncontrolled by the authorities. In this way, it took only 50 years for the external migrants to transform Sweden’s religious landscape. According to the authors, migration flows to the country has become more diversified primarily due to the increasing number of migrants from Muslim countries, resulting in the growing share of Muslims in the country’s population, which in turn triggered the cycle of replacement of Protestantism by Islam in the religious landscape of Sweden. Initial replacement, the first stage of the cycle of religious competition, began in 1994 when Muslim migrant inflow from Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran and Iraq was at its highest. Next time Muslim migration to Sweden peaked in 2014–2015 when the country received the record number of refugees from the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, which triggered the second stage of the religious competition cycle. Thus, in Sweden, the first stage lasted for 20–21 years, approximately matching its average duration of 18 years. By 2018, share of Muslims increased to 14 percent that corresponds to the parameters of the next stage in the religious competition cycle, the stage of sustainable replacement. Taking in account its ideal cycle of 21 years, the authors suggest that by 2036–2040 parity stage will begin, i.e. by that time the share of Muslims in the religious population of Sweden may reach 30 percent, which is in line with the data of Pew Research Center (by 2050 the share of Muslims in the country’s population will exceed 30 percent). In any case, parity stage has already become

a reality in a number of districts of Sweden's largest cities where the majority of the population is Muslim.

The authors conclude that modern Sweden is one of the first countries in the world, which went from a mono-ethnic country with a dominating official religion to a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state in just 50 years. External migration is the key factor that transformed the Swedish society and changed its cultural traditions. Initially, this migration had economic reasons, but later receiving migrants from the world's most disadvantaged regions became a "humanitarian responsibility" for Sweden. Growing Muslim community that is gradually becoming the "second majority" after the adherents of Lutheranism, creates serious problems for its adaptation and integration into the Swedish society. It turned out that not only the migrants but also the Swedes themselves, who belong to different religions and often adhere to different values, are not ready to coexist in one country. This is why the growing cultural, social and geographic isolation of refugees in Sweden leads to sustainable emergence of parallel migrant communities. Today, the political elites of Sweden are yet to develop a new migration strategy. On the one hand, the political parties of the "old" system have reached consensus regarding the image of Sweden as a "multicultural humanitarian superpower" that does not impose discriminatory restrictions against Muslim migrants. On the other hand, many politicians in Sweden cannot afford to overlook many Swedes pleading to restrict migrant flows to the country. As a result, the new party of Sweden Democrats, which aims at protecting national identity and ensuring wellbeing and safety of Swedish citizens in the wake of Muslim migrant inflow, has become quite popular. It's hard to imagine today's Sweden becoming a mono-ethnic state again. However, the authors believe that under the electorate pressure Swedish government will have to change its "generous" migrant policy to a more practical one.

## THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

2021.02.006. ANDREW POLOMOSHNOV, PLATON POLOMOSHNOV. RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AS A LAW AND PRACTICE (IN ISLAM AND ORTHODOXY)\* // *Islamovedenie*. 2020. Vol. 11, № 4. P. 47-58.

*Keywords: Islam, Christianity, religious tolerance, tolerance, freedom of conscience, religious policy, interfaith relations.*

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The authors of the article consider religious tolerance as one of the basic principles of interfaith relations in Russian society. According to researchers, the task of state policy in the field of religion is to optimize interfaith relations in the country, relying on the support and creation of effective dialogue and cooperation between church organizations of traditional Russian confessions both at the regional level and at the level of central governing bodies.

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\* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

During the 1990s–2000s, Russia passed the process of religious revival. Freedom of Conscience, guaranteed by the Constitution and by Law, replaced the previous atheistic state policy of the USSR. However, the post-Soviet religious revival cannot be called a completely successful and problem-free process. The authors of the article believe that the atheistic worldview that has developed in the masses of the population during the years of Soviet power is still prevalent today.

Mass atheism is gradually giving way to complete indifference to issues of faith and spirituality in the post-Soviet period. Although many citizens have turned to the traditional religions of Russia, their faith is often formal in nature, since newly converted believers do not know the basics of religious dogma and rituals, and they do not regularly observe the requirements of a religious cult.

The social instability of modern Russian society, its deep social stratification, economic crises undermine the psychological stability of Russian citizens and creates potential prerequisites for psychological intolerance rather than tolerance and loyalty. The authors of the article note that the fact of the poly-confessional nature of Russian society sharply reveals the problem of interfaith relations, especially in the context of the division of spheres of influence, social resources (material, informational and educational) and missionary activity.

Defining freedom of conscience as the principle of choosing the Faith, and religious tolerance as an attitude towards a member of another confession, the authors emphasize the inadmissibility of identifying religious tolerance with confessional equality. Confessional equality determines the balance of sociocultural and prestigious statuses of various confessions, and religious tolerance determines the way of their relationships and interactions. Tolerance should be viewed as an independent principle of religious policy in a multi-confessional society, characterizing the mutual respect of believers of different confessions and mutual recognition of the right to exist for various religious beliefs in the

presence of their own convictions and a willingness to defend them.

Analyzing the essence of religious tolerance, the authors also analyze the concept of “tolerance”, which came to Russia from Western cultural discourse. The concept of “tolerance” is much broader in scope than the concept of “religious tolerance”, since it refers to the entire sphere of intercultural relations of various forms of social and cultural organization of modern society. Religious tolerance is one of the forms of general cultural tolerance. However, the extensive interpretation of religious tolerance as a form of tolerance, according to the authors, distorts the meaning of religious tolerance as a norm of interfaith relations. It is proposed to search for a certain universal, ecumenical religion instead of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence of different confessions, which actually means the abolition of original religious systems.

*Tolerance in Orthodoxy.* Orthodoxy is a deeply humanistic religion in its dogmatic and moral content, emphasizing the spiritual autonomy and responsibility of the individual, and the inalienable freedom of moral choice in particular. Tolerance towards other religions as respect for the personal choice of the believer follows naturally from this. The authors consider religious tolerance as an essential feature of Christianity manifested itself most clearly in the history of not Western, but Eastern Christianity – Russian Orthodoxy, which is associated with the history of the formation of Russian civilization as a free multinational and poly-confessional community.

*Tolerance in Islam.* Like Christianity, Islam also has a great potential for a true religious tolerance as a humanistic religion. Islam considers the freedom of religion as an inalienable right of a person with consciousness and will. The Quran states that there is no compulsion in religion. The tolerance of Islam in relation to the gentiles is proved by the fact that the attitude towards non-Muslims was quite tolerant both in the Arab Caliphate and in the Ottoman Empire. Islamic humanism respects the rights of every

person, including the right to choose one's faith. The population of the conquered countries either converted to Islam or continued to practice their old faith, but in this case they paid a special tax and were not full subjects of the caliph. Islamic humanism respects the rights of every person, including the right to choose one's faith. A tolerant attitude to the other faiths is not introduced into Islam from other creeds and ideologies. There are many examples of Islamic extremism in the history of Islam, despite the fact that tolerance and respect for the individual believer and his personal free choice of faith in Islam are fundamental, basic. The authors of the article point out that Islamic extremism took root in Russia in the 1990s, becoming one of the most serious problems for Russian society. However, this does not disprove the fact that Islam in its essence is a religion of peace and religious tolerance, since each specific case of Islamic extremism and fanaticism has its own specific historical reasons and manifestations. As for the ideological basis of various forms of Islamic extremism, it is always associated with a greater or lesser complex of incorrect, "extremist" distortions of traditional Islam, one of which necessarily turns out to be a false substitution of the principle of religious tolerance by the principles of religious intolerance and violence against gentiles.

Tolerance as a norm of interfaith relations can be considered at three levels, according to the authors of the article: at the level of individual religious behavior of believers; interchurch relations of confessions; religious policy of a poly-confessional state.

Tolerance at the level of individual religious behavior of believers is manifested as a loyal attitude towards other believers and atheists. In this regard, it is extremely important that traditional Russian religious confessions deliberately cultivate the tolerance of their flock in relation to other confessions.

Tolerance at the level of interchurch relations of confessions is realized as an orientation towards the interfaith world, dialogue and cooperation of confessions in maintaining the socio-cultural stability of Russian society. The organization of an effective and

constructive dialogue and cooperation between traditional Russian confessions in the common cause of increasing the spirituality of Russian society is an urgent modern task. And the positive experience of such dialogue and cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church (the ROC) and Islamic religious organizations has already been accumulated. This does not mean that there are no problems and tense issues in matters of interfaith relations between the ROC and Islamic religious organizations. The problem of increasing the number of the flock, as well as the struggle for spiritual leadership in certain regions and in Russia in general, can serve as a ground for tension. However, the general tasks of maintaining interfaith peace and social stability in Russian society are the basis for finding effective solutions to problems in the course of dialogue.

The authors come to the conclusion, that religious tolerance is closely related to the principles of freedom of conscience and confessional equality in a multi-confessional society, but it is not limited to them only. Religious tolerance is individual and has a specific historical character in different countries between different confessions and peoples, and within individual countries it has regional characteristic features. Religious tolerance is an uncontested principle for the modern spiritual situation in Russia, although there is still no complete correspondence between its legislative declaration and the actual practice of interfaith relations. The task of state policy in the sphere of religion, according to the authors of the article, is to optimize interfaith relations in the country. One of the main advantages of the modern Russian system of religious tolerance is regional and situational flexibility and adaptability.

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