

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

**RUSSIA
AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2020 – 3 (309)**

SCIENCE-INFORMATION BULLETIN

**Moscow
2020**

Federal State Budgetary Institution of Science
Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN)

Centre for Global and Regional Studies

Division of Asia and Africa

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Russia and the Moslem World : Science Information Bulletin /
INION RAN, Centre for Global and Regional Studies. – Moscow, 2020. –
N 3 (309). – 141 p.
ISSN 1072-6403

Scientific materials on the current political, social and religious issues concerning the relations between Russia and the global Islamic Ummah as well as Muslim countries are represented in the form of articles, reviews and abstracts.

ISSN 1072-6403

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.00

Journal is indexed in the Russian Science Citation Index

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по общественным наукам РАН, 2020

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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

IGOR DOBAYEV. EXTERNAL FACTORS OF GEOPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Wahhabism, geopolitics, "collective West", Islamism, Pan-Turkism, Panturanism, North Caucasus, South of Russia.

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Citation: Dobayev I. External Factors of Geopolitical Processes in the South of Russia in the Context of Globalization and Regionalization // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 5–22. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.01

Abstract. Russia is the largest country in the world, a civilization state, with its unique geopolitical code. To change this course, the identity of our country, to force it to wander in the wake of the geopolitical and foreign policy aspirations of other centers of power, a number of geopolitical projects based on "hard power", "soft power" as

well as “soft power” are being implemented in the Russian Federation and beyond its external borders. At the same time, due to the large-scale territory of Russia, the presence of its internal regions that are different in their characteristics, various projects are deployed by external forces in various directions. This article discusses the geopolitical projects of the main external forces projecting their influence on the South of Russia – the territories of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation that are part of the Southern and North Caucasian federal districts. There are eight republics there: Adygea, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachay-Cherkessia, Crimea, North Ossetia-Alania and Chechnya, two territories – Krasnodar and Stavropol and three regions – Astrakhan, Volgograd and Rostov; in total 14 subjects of Russia.

In the south of Russia, and especially in its North Caucasian subregion, a number of geopolitical megaprojects are being implemented, among which we single out the three most dangerous for the national and regional security of our country – Western (primarily American), Arab-Islamic (Wahhabi) and Turanian (Turkish). The leading one is the Western project, and the other two, despite their relative autonomy, are actively supported by the United States and its allies (the so-called “collective West”). As a result, separatism, nationalism, religious fanaticism are constantly being heated up in the region, hotbeds of tension, mutual territorial claims, etc. are preserved for a long time. The religious-ethnic factor has been exploited there with utmost activity here in the past 25 years. Let us consider the content and goals of the initiators of these geopolitical megaprojects in more detail.

Western (American, or Euro-Atlantic) project.¹ The Western project is being implemented on the external and internal for Russia dimensions. On the outside, there is a steady expansion of NATO and its military infrastructure to the east, the territory of the Russian Federation is increasingly surrounded by American military bases, a missile defense system is being built around its

borders, a situation of the so-called “regulated chaos” is being artificially created in the territories of neighboring states of the Near and Middle East. At the same time, the EU is expanding, and the Baltic countries are already part of this organization, and currently there is going on a struggle for Moldova, Ukraine, and the states of the South Caucasus.

Thus, threats to Russia's national security are being formed: in the immediate vicinity of its borders, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in the post-Soviet space, the creation of a “sanitary cordon” from former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet republics is in full swing.

At the same time, this geopolitical megaproject provides for comprehensive support on the territory of Russia of pro-Western oriented parties, movements, numerous NGOs and NPOs that have been working there for a long time and not without success. After the collapse of the USSR, in the territories of post-Soviet states, including in the Russian Federation, representative offices of many foreign and international organizations of various kinds appeared, the vast majority of which were engaged in the popularization of market relations, the principles of democracy in their Western understanding and universal values, thereby influencing the processes of state construction in post-Soviet countries. With the help of foreign donors, numerous Russian non-profit organizations were created and poured into global civil society, the number of them, according to the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, by the middle of the first decade of this century exceeded 600 thousand.²

In the same period, about 14,500 non-profit organizations were registered in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation located within the Southern Federal District (SFD).³ At the same time, according to law enforcement agencies, more than 100 western and pro-Western oriented non-governmental organizations, funds and monitoring networks engaged in political activities were operating in the district⁴. Among them are the Danish Refugee Council, the International Medical Corps,

the International Rescue Committee, World Vision, Caritas Internat. (Czech Republic), International Non-Violence, UNOCHA, UNHCR, National Endowment for Democracy (USA), International Civil Liberties Fund, United States Agency for International Development, Freedom House, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, National Democratic Institute (USA), Matra (Netherlands), Open Society (Soros Foundation), Legal Initiative for Russia (Netherlands), F. Ebert, C. Adenauer, R. Luxemburg and others' German Party Foundations. Various political and "scientific" organizations, monitoring networks, the activity of which objectively played into the hands of the Western "partners" of Russia also acted in the Southern Federal District⁵. Among them there are the United Civil Front (UCF), the Russian People's Democratic Union, the Civic Assistance Committee, the all-Russian movement For Human Rights, the human rights society Memorial, and others. Such associations, as a rule, organized their activities with the support of foreign non-governmental organizations and were funded by them. This is evidenced, in particular, by the espionage scandal that erupted in January 2006. It was related to the subversive activities of the British intelligence services that through secret operations financed the activities of a number of Russian human rights organizations.

For less than 30 years of work, foreign non-governmental organizations have implemented a grant system in Russia and "accustomed" some of its citizens to humanitarian aid. Moreover, often even the goals and objectives of Russian public organizations were formed at the prompt from abroad, and not based on national priorities⁶. A separate and important area of activity for the abovementioned and similar NGOs in expanding networks is considered to be youth, the work with which was carried out in schools, secondary and higher educational institutions, as well as outside these institutions, through the formation of various youth structures and organizations. For example, in the Rostov region there were numerous youth

organizations created under the grants of various Western funds. Among them are such as the Youth Human Rights Movement (human rights grants), Eco – logica (environmental), Scythia, the Center for Development of Local Communities and Volunteer Initiatives “Help with a Council, the Russian Union of Navigators / Scouts, a group of projects “New Civilization,” etc.

The activity of Western and pro-Western NGOs in the territory of Russia and its regions prompted the Russian authorities to take decisive steps to legislatively limit their activities on their territory, as a result of which on January 10, 2006 Federal Law No. 18-Φ3 on amendments to the Law on Non-Profit organizations was adopted. Amendments to the law led to a significant reduction in the number of foreign non-profit organizations and increased control over their activities by state bodies, but they did not fundamentally solve the problem.

As a result, in 2012, a bill was submitted to the State Duma requiring more openness in the activities of NPOs that carry out political activities in Russia, but are financed from abroad. It was suggested that they be considered foreign agents and entered into the register. According to the initiators of this bill, more than 230 thousand NPOs operated in Russia at that period. At the same time, tens of millions of dollars were spent on their financing, but only a third of the funds came in by bank transfer, with about 70% of the funds coming from the budgets of foreign states, 20% from transnational corporations, 10% from private donations. As for Russian human rights defenders, they received 90–95% of the funds in the form of grants from foreign donors⁷. In 2019, this law and related law enforcement practices were significantly expanded. However, the activities of pro-Western NPOs in Russia, although complicated, are not stopped.

It should be emphasized that the Western (American) geopolitical megaproject in the South of Russia is being implemented, inter alia, by manipulating and controlling other participants in the geopolitical game by Washington. This refers, first of all, to the Turanian (Turkish) and Arab-Islamic

("Wahhabi") projects. The first impression is that these projects are far apart and in no way interact with each other. However, this perception is misleading, because both modifications have long had the objectives of the United States – NATO and the Greater Caucasus project. It is no coincidence that today none of these projects is independent and dominant.

The Arab-Islamic ("Wahhabi") megaproject is being implemented in the regions of Russia, primarily by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf following its foreign policy aspirations, among which Qatar, which is rich in energy resources, should be highlighted. Their goal is to spread on the territory of the Russian Federation ideological attitudes of the so-called "Pure Islam" ("Islamism"), the stimulation on this basis of separatist sentiments among Russian Moslems, the separation of their territories from Russia, the creation of the so-called "Islamic state" living according to Sharia⁸.

An analysis of the ideological doctrines of the North Caucasian radical Islamists, consideration of the peculiarities of their organizational structures, forms and methods of implementation of specific political practices, channels of financial support for regional extremism and terrorism indicates a significant external influence and even external participation⁹.

Thus, the ideology of the modern jihadist (terrorist) movement promoted by the Saudis and their allies is based on the postulates put forward by the adherents of radical fundamentalism – the Arabs Ibn Khanbala, Taki ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah, M. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and their modern followers – S. Kutb, M. Shukri, M. Faraj, A. az-Zawahiri and others. In turn, the basis of the ideological doctrine of radical Islamists is two indispensable, system-forming, organically inherent to Salafism (Islamic fundamentalism – *I. D.*) provisions – about takfir¹⁰ and jihad¹¹, which are interpreted by Islamists in isolation from Moslem orthodoxy. Its appeal is based on the obvious simplicity, accessibility and consistency of ideological arguments, a clear definition of "enemies of Islam" and the need to conduct "jihad"

against them. All this resonates and is understood among some young Moslems, as a rule, marginals who are not too educated in traditional Moslem dogma.

A review of the stages in the development of the ideological doctrine of radical Islamists in Russia and, in particular, in the North Caucasus, testifies to the superimposed origin of almost all the ideological postulates of radical Islamism are introduced into the territory of the Russian regions, the exogenous nature of the ideological factor in the activities of the still-preserved North Caucasian bandit underground. This is confirmed, in particular, by the fact that the leaders of Russian Islamism have so far not been able to create a single original work that would allow talking about the emergence of North Caucasian Islamists' own political ideology meeting modern realities. General discussions about the need for the introduction of Sharia cannot compensate for the lack of a socio-political program for this movement.

As for the structural design of the North Caucasian Islamic organizations, external borrowings are obvious here. Thus, the beginning of the 2000s, as a result of the US-led international anti-terrorism campaign, was marked by a breakdown in the hierarchical structures of international terrorists such as the International Jihad Front and Al Qaeda¹². They were transformed into networks – partially centralized, decentralized, and completely autonomous. As a result, a whole series of networked terrorist clusters has emerged in the world: in the Near and Middle East, North Africa, etc. The connecting elements of these clusters and their constituent structures are the community of ideologies and ultimate goals, which consist in building the so-called “Islamic states,” and in the future, a single Moslem caliphate, life according to Shariah standards¹³.

The network construction of the sabotage and terrorist underground in the North Caucasus took shape later - in the second half of the first decade of the new millennium (Emirate of the Caucasus - 2007, and since 2014 - Velayat Caucasus), under the influence of general trends in the “Moslem world” as well as

in connection with a change in the military-political situation in the region, which allows us to talk about a powerful external influence on the institutionalization process of the North Caucasian jihadist movement, its structure and organization system, as well as on the North Caucasian terrorist cluster formed in the region, which is an organic part of the network structures of the international terrorism. At the same time, the terrorist model prevailing in the North Caucasus has been thoroughly adapted to local social and ethno-political conditions. The vitality of this system is given by merging of the ideology of radical Islamism with the North Caucasian traditional social institutions and the prevailing modern socio-political conditions¹⁴.

At the same time, the ideological-propaganda and informational activities of international jihadist takfirits are an additional, non-mainstream activity of extremists and terrorists, and are designed to ensure a constant influx of radical Islamist ideology carriers into the ranks of the "Mujahideen," as well as justify specific sabotage-terrorist practice of fighters with appropriate pseudo-religious postulates. Islamist-led terrorism itself, as a specific political practice, is constantly changing, adapting to dynamic transformations in the world and regions. Currently, in different countries, terrorists perform targeted and non-targeted actions, while conducting most terrorist attacks, tactics of action using small arms, hand grenade launchers, bombing, kidnapping, etc. are used. Against the general background of the escalation of terrorist violence, the most dangerous form of terrorism - suicide bombing - continues to be updated.

As for the North Caucasian separatists, they practically copy the forms and methods of ideological-propaganda and sabotage-terrorist activities of their foreign like-minded people. Beginning in 2000, suicide terrorism, which historically has never been recorded in the North Caucasus, has become an obvious external borrowing. In this case, the main vector of terrorist activity in the North Caucasus region was aimed mainly against

law enforcement officials and law enforcement agencies, representatives of state authorities and government, and the official Moslem clergy. At the same time, outside the North Caucasus region, terrorists, as a rule, carried out and are still preparing their destructive operations in crowded places, mainly from among the civilian population (for example, terrorist attacks in Moscow, Beslan, Volgodonsk, Caucasian Mineral Waters, etc.).

And, finally, terrorist activity would have been practically impossible without financial support. Financing for terrorist organizations can be sourced from external and internal revenues. External sources include support from states, religious institutions, commercial and non-profit organizations, individuals, the population and diasporas, as well as from terrorist cells. These channels in relation to the North Caucasus prevailed in the 90s of the XX century. The sources of domestic financing should include income derived from legal and illegal business, as well as other incomes, which include membership fees in the framework of an existing terrorist organization, assistance from wealthy terrorists who may be members of a terrorist organization, as well as racketeering. At the same time, it should be noted that in the last decade, the processes of globalization of the economy and the transition to the network structure of the organization have transformed the role of financial sources of terrorist groups, reducing the share of external revenues and at the same time increasing and diversifying internal ones. Thus, terrorist groups financially have become increasingly autonomous and self-sufficient.

At the beginning of the new millennium, the real structure of financing the terrorist underground in the North Caucasus was an extensive network, constantly changing its geography and structure, the total volume of circulating funds, and the share ratios of various sources. The main source of funding is extortion, which was theoretically justified as a "jihad tax." Among the general trends of recent years, one can also single out the reduction of revenues from external sources and, as in other

regions of the world, the strengthening of domestic financial support for terrorism, the diversification of internal sources, as well as the gradual financial “optimization” of the activities of the bandit underground, which, under severe pressure from the state, switched to a regime of self-restraint, learned how to spend the reduced volumes of financial income rather economically and effectively.

Consideration of the four most important areas of the development of terrorism under the guise of Islam in the North Caucasus - ideological, structural and organizational, practical (referring to the forms and methods of terrorists implementing specific political practices) and financial and economic - allows us to state the weight of the influence of an external factor on the process of emerging, ideological substantiation and functioning of the jihadist movement in the North Caucasus region of Russia. First of all, this was due to ideological, financial and other support from abroad and the presence in the ranks of the North Caucasian militants at different periods of time of a significant group of foreign “Mujahideen” from many countries of the Near and Middle East, other parts of the “Islamic world”. The diverse and massive external assistance acted as a significant factor in the radicalization of the Wahhabi movement there. The role of Gulf monarchies led by Saudi Arabia looked unprecedented¹⁵.

It is obvious that though the situation over the past decade has qualitatively changed, but the external (exogenous) impact on regional ethnopolitical processes remains significant, significantly fueling the internal (endogenous) conflict factors that are characteristic of the modern Russian North Caucasus. At the same time, the cruelty of the “Mujahideen” not only towards Gentiles, but also to those Moslems who oppose them (for example, the local police) could not help creating an exclusion zone around them and reduced the base of their social support. In addition, as rightly pointed out by the domestic Islamic scholar S.Ya. Sushchi, “it is not known how honest and sincere in their radical convictions A. Astemirov and other underground activists

who motivated the creation of a terrorist system of taxing the local economy with the tasks of establishing a socially just society based on Sharia law in the region. But the dialectic of development is such that, having joined in the existing socio-economic corruption schemes as one more link, "fighters for justice and religious purity" immediately began to evolve into another criminal roof of local administrative and economic clans"¹⁶. All this could not but compromise, to a significant extent, in the eyes of the local population, the Arab-Islamic project being carried out in the region.

The situation worsened after the neutralization of D. Umarov in November 2013. It was then that the turn of the North Caucasian Islamists from Al-Qaeda of Osama bin Laden to the "Islamic State" (IS) of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began. Then, instead of the Caucasus Emirate project, a new Vilayet Caucasus project appeared, and many local militants went to Iraq and Syria to fight as part of the IS. In September 2015, Russia joined the fight against terrorists in Syria. At the same time, the structures of radical Islamists remaining in the North Caucasus were dealt devastating blows by Russian security forces. As a result, today the small destructive groups of radical Islamists have acquired the character of autonomous as well as "sleeping cells," with virtually no hierarchy.

Turan (Turkish) megaproject. After the intellectual failure of the Arab-Islamic project, not only in Chechnya, but throughout the North Caucasus, curatory over the remaining bandit underground remained in the region passed over mainly to the special services of the West and partly Turkey. The task of the ideologists of extremism was the creation of a new and already unified modification of the information-ideological matrix - the model of the desired future¹⁷.

Modern Turkey seeks to regain its leading position in the Balkans and in the Greater Caucasus and later - throughout the Islamic world¹⁸. Researcher I.I. Ivanova, noting the strengthening of Islam in the countries of the Near and Middle East in the 70s of

the twentieth century, wrote: "The Islamic factor revealed the need for the Turkish leadership to make statements that Turkey is a "truly Islamic country" and is ready to develop relations with "brothers in religion" in various fields; in the introduction of compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools since 1982; in the arrests of the most radical religious figures and the prohibition of political organizations; in an attempt to mediate in regional disputes between Islamic states; in using the slogan of Islamic solidarity"¹⁹.

The model proposed by Turkey today takes into account and uses the Islamic factor and embeds pan-Islamism as an auxiliary factor for involving non-Turkic peoples in its orbit. The main idea of the pan-Islamist project is that Islam should become a "third world system", as Moslem ideologists want, with the necessary degree of integration of Moslem countries in all areas: economic, political, ideological, military, etc., contributes to the goals of Turkey, but subject to the dominance of the created model of pan-Turkic goals²⁰.

Such an export version of pan-Turkism for the Moslem regions of Russia could well have become a geopolitical project, at one time proposed by adherents of the radical sect Nurdzhular. This international religious society was created at the beginning of the 20th century in Turkey. The founder of the society is Said Nursi, the author of the 14-volume composition "Risale-i Nur" ("Light Source"). During his life, Said Nursi had about five million followers. After the leader's death, 40 of his students formed 40 independent currents called by their names. Despite some unprincipled differences, the goal of the society and ideology are the same, namely: to achieve real influence and governance in Turkic-speaking and Moslem countries. To achieve these goals, there was set the task of involving new supporters in their ranks, educating them in their educational institutions and introducing them into state, military, law enforcement structures and authorities in the host country.

The most powerful organizationally and financially direction of Nurjular is the direction of Fethullahchilar, the leader of which is a Turkish billionaire Fethullah Gulen, former imam of a mosque in Izmir. After the military coup of 1980, he was forced to emigrate to Europe, and then to the United States, where he brought together immigrants from Turkey and the Balkan countries. One of the main methods of attracting supporters to the sect is to influence and promote their ideas through the media.

The works of Nursi and his follower Fethullah Gulen are prohibited in many countries, including Turkey itself. In their books, the Nursists call for overthrowing secular governments and replacing them with Sharia ones. According to Western intelligence agencies, Nursists are associated with the Gray Wolves terrorist organization²¹. Its plans include training kamikaze militants, as well as students who in the future should occupy key positions in the economy, science and management structures of different countries, including Russia.

The leader of the radical Islamic organization Fethullah Gulen and his associates did not conceal that their main goal is to capture Russia without any jihad. Gulen himself is currently on the international wanted list for preparing for a violent change in the constitutional order in his homeland (Turkey), sentenced in absentia to 10 years in prison, but to this day he lives quite comfortably in the United States. From there, he quite legally carries out operations to finance the ideological, sabotage and terrorist activities of the Nurjular branches in many countries, including Turkey and Russia. The authorities of the Republic of Turkey, apparently, are not groundlessly accusing Gulen of organizing another failed military coup in 2016.

The emphasis on education is the specific “handwriting” of Nurjular. Gulen initially paid great attention to educational projects, logically believing that future belongs to the young. The social base of Nurjular and other similar sects is mainly made up of the part of Moslems who, during modernization projects,

found themselves outside the usual social guidelines, outside the usual social niche (as a rule, these are young people). The main reason for the attractiveness of such projects is the inclusion of an Islamic component in their ideological doctrines. In turn, the peculiarities of Islamic doctrine itself, which consists in the presence of a sufficient number of provisions of a radical nature (jihad, interpreted as a holy war, is a struggle, first of all, not against bad inclinations, but against dissenters, both Moslems and representatives of other religions). Young people are simply seeking to make up for the lack of knowledge and attitudes, ideological guidelines by addressing the fundamental principles of the Moslem religion.

Interestingly, in the 90s, Fethullah Gulen's articles were published in almost all Russian Islamic newspapers, and his works in Russian were sold everywhere. In addition, his followers taught for nearly ten years in a number of Islamic educational institutions, including in the south of Russia, openly preaching their views with the support of very high-ranking regional officials.

For example, in Daghestan, Turkish colleges were built to select promising young people for subsequent recruitment. Since the Nursists fit in well with the traditional Daghestan Islamic structure and did not position themselves as its antagonists as Wahhabis did, it was more convenient for secret services to work on this model. The Daghestan nursists, having previously become the murids of the "right" sheikh and joining the "right" political party, perfectly adapted to the system of power in the republic²².

Listeners, who were, as a rule, on complete contentment, five times a week listened to lectures on the history and divine destiny of Pan-Turkism, the "chosenness" of the Turkish version of Islam and its special role in human life. The most diligent students of foreign colleges received an assignment to study in Turkey for a more fundamental development of Pan-Turkic theory and practice. The most gifted of them were offered

improvement of housing conditions, assistance in entering prestigious educational institutions in Turkey, Great Britain, France, Germany and the USA, and after graduation – good work in large Turkish firms, companies and representative offices at each candidate's location.

At the same time, the ideologists of "Nurjular", realizing that during one generation it is impossible to reorient entire nations and regions on the pro-Turkish path of development, in the sermons indicated that their followers needed to attract their children, and only then would they succeed. As a teaching aid, radical Islamist Turkists in their lessons used a well-published in many languages, but still an imaginary map of the future great "Turkic world". At the center of the universe, of course, is Turkey, which grows in northern Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Pan-Turkist cartographers include many regions of Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, Mongolia, Afghanistan and other now sovereign states to this "world".

The training took place both in joint lyceums at the place of residence, and with export to Turkey. Thus, in 1997, the sect organized the delivery to Turkey from Chechnya of about 20 school-age children who were trained in a religious educational institution in the region of the town of Denezly. Organizers of the lyceums tried to "switch on" the Turkic factor, "cutting off" Russian influence as much as possible. And they didn't act straightforwardly, but inspired these ideas gradually.

The existence of joint lyceums and colleges created the necessary legal basis for a long stay in the North Caucasus of an unlimited number of Turkish citizens and favorable conditions for the implementation of reconnaissance and subversive actions. A large number of Turkish citizens entered Russia and were engaged in purposeful collection of information about the socio-political situation in the region, the environmental status of the Caspian Sea and its legal status, the oil and gas complex, interethnic and interfaith relations, sources of conflict factors,

locations of troops, etc. Later it turned out that many of them belonged to various nationalist and extremist parties and brotherhoods of the pan-Turkist trend and specially came to the Moslem regions of Russia in order to spread their ideas. To this end, the Turks signed up as post-graduate students at local universities and, on the pretext of working on dissertations, sent written information requests to various ministries and departments, using existing contacts, went directly to carriers of information of interest to them, and traveled to areas with compact residence of Turkic-speaking peoples. As a rule, the materials collected during such "scientific expeditions", to put it mildly, went beyond the scope of their scientific topics.

Due to the above circumstances, the activities of the Daghestan-Turkish educational institutions were declared illegal and subject to judicial termination²³. Similar decisions were made in other constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, one should not lose sight of the fact that the current round of determining the identification of Russia and its regions occurs during tectonic geopolitical shifts in international relations. Aggressive Western liberalism, extremism and terrorism, disguised as Islam, pan-Turkism and panturism in this context act as a means of pressure on world and regional politics, ensuring the realization of the global interests of the forces, sometimes very far from the interests of not only the peoples of Russia, but foreign Moslems, including Moslems Türk. Today, all three of the above geopolitical projects implemented in Russia have lost their potential to some degree. However, this does not mean at all that, when certain conditions arise, their initiators will not again try to restore their lost positions. It follows that it is premature to write them off from geopolitical accounts. These processes should remain in the field of vision of the Russian authorities and the scientific community.

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21. “Gray Wolves” is one of the oldest pan-Turkist organizations, has followers among the nationalist-minded intelligentsia in some republics of the North Caucasus – it was especially popular in the early 90s of the twentieth century.
22. Most of the Turkish followers of Nurdular are big businessmen who have created an entire empire of capital that controls influential media structures abroad. More than three hundred schools and universities controlled by the fraternity operate in 35 countries. For almost ten years, the Toros Foundation and the Eflyak firm operated in the North Caucasus, the Serhat firm in the Volga region, the Ufuk fund in Khakassia and Buryatia, in the Volga region, Moscow, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don, St. Petersburg – the Tolerance Foundation. In less than 15 years, “Nurdzhular” through subordinate structures has opened 24 special schools, 1 university, 1 university department, 3 language institutes in Russia.
23. In August 2002, several international Daghestan-Turkish colleges and lyceums operating in the republic in violation of the established legislation were liquidated in Daghestan. At the end of May 2007, a Moscow court declared Russian translations of fourteen books by the Turkish philosopher Said Nursi extremist. The fact that these books are extremist was proved by the socio-psychological and psychological-linguistic examination of the texts carried out by the Institute of Linguistics of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

THOMAS FLICHY DE LA NEUVILLE. DIGITALISING THE WORLD: THE ERA OF INVISIBLE POWER* // *English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: digitalising the world, cybernetic era, hackers, digital technology, technoliberalism, hybridizing, personalised marketing, captology, 5G, hybrid civilizations.

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Citation: Flichy de La Neuville T. Digitalising the World: The Era of Invisible Power // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 23–36. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.02

It is clear that digitalising the world, which interconnects people and equipment, represents a major transition within our civilisation. It is changing the ways in which power is exercised, partly concealing it from public view. Hackers operate anonymously,¹ attacking websites that collect unwitting users' information. The cybernetic era is therefore making power less perceptible² and this, in turn, makes research into this current technological shift crucially important. However, this endeavour is not without risk. There is a danger that we mistake advances in digital technology for the true vitality of a civilisation built on the

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version

¹ The idea behind all anonymising systems is to blend various network users' communications together so that they become individually indistinguishable. As a result, it becomes impossible to draw a correspondence between data and identity.

² Cyberattacks have now become so sophisticated that it is impossible to determine where the perpetrators are located. This makes it difficult to implement aggressive tactics as recommended by the latest cyber strategy white paper.

ability to breathe new life into every part of society.³ Currently, real and virtual worlds are hybridising, generating fears around human life being stripped away in favour of technology. This concern is balanced out by hopes that a form of digital humanism will arise. Invisible power⁴ is not easy to spot. One of the dilemmas faced by research into cybersecurity is that most data is not accessible to the wider public. This complex field of study can only be deciphered using the technical capabilities of the army or intelligence services. It is possible to overcome this barrier by exploring the sources of information at either end of the chain. Upstream, a small number of philosophers are reflecting critically on the digital world. One example is Bernard Stiegler, who considers that the internet is a disruptive technology⁵ in that digital automation leads to tax avoidance and unemployment. Eric Sadin, meanwhile, defines artificial intelligence (AI) as a kind of rationality that interprets various situations in real time in order to continually propose services and products. This technoliberalism aims to mould behaviour. Lastly, Kave Salamatian sees the internet as a many-tentacled beast with a hyper-connected heart, whose underwater infrastructure provides an indication of the state of digital geopolitics.⁶ Downstream, various blogs and websites testify to the current vitality of technology. It is useful to cross-reference technology website Wired.com, which is written for a non-specialist

³ Arnold Toynbee wrote that “if we were to look at the history of war techniques in isolation in Greek history, we would observe continuous progress from beginning to end, before, during and even after the growth period. We would also observe that each step on the road to progress is stimulated by events that are otherwise disastrous for Hellenic civilisation,” Arnold Toynbee, *L’histoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), p. 219. Translation from the French text.

⁴ The wider public is entirely unaware of how Google’s search engine works.

⁵ Magistrate and cyber specialist Myriam Quémener examines how French law is changing in reaction to disruptive digital technology.

⁶ The Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca are strategic points for underwater cables. China, meanwhile, is only connected to the world via four points.

audience, with French websites InternetActu.net and Reflets.info, which offer a more critical reading of the subject. Various online tools also enable us to assess the evolution of digital technology, from maps of the underwater cable network that carries 99% of internet data⁷ to maps of the users of TensorFlow or Shodan.io, which provides an overview of connected devices. It is also possible to approach the gamer-hacker community⁸, which is not opposed to talking about its underground activities⁹ (although IT specialists can be reluctant to come into contact with a world quite different from their own).¹⁰ However, neither upstream nor downstream information sources are location-specific. As a result, monitoring software such as Tadaweb.com and relational mappers such as Gephi.org give us an idea of digital geopolitics in specific places. Counter-intuitively, the enhanced imperceptibility of digital power does not tend to smooth out the idiosyncrasies in connected individuals' data. Digitalisation thrives by collecting personal data on a massive scale and this, in turn, means breaking societies down into pre-identified micro-groups. Enclosing groups of individuals into online silos is a prerequisite for effective personalised marketing, of which electoral marketing is an offshoot.¹¹ Paradoxically, when human societies

⁷ The Marea network is made up of cables no bigger than a hosepipe and was completed in 2017. It links Virginia to Bilbao and currently transmits 75% of the world's current online traffic.

⁸ The website Pastebin, for instance, lists the most recent hacking operations.

⁹ Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor, "A Sociology of Hackers", *The Sociological Review* (vol. 46, no.4, November 1998), pp. 757-780.

¹⁰ People with Asperger's syndrome (a form of autism characterised by communication difficulties) are particularly likely to thrive in IT professions. Steve Silberman, "The Geek Syndrome", *Science*, 12 January 2001.

¹¹ One of Quantcube Technology's flagship products is Global Macro Smart Data, a real-time predictive platform licensed annually to users. Since May 2013, Quantcube Technology has predicted 21 election results with 92% accuracy, several weeks before the polls even opened. The start-up notably predicted that the UK would vote to leave the EU in 2016 and that Donald Trump would win the 2016 US presidential election (a fortnight ahead of time in the latter case), as well as the results of France's first round of presidential elections in 2017 and the 2018 American mid-terms.

are digitalised, their identities become more distinct, to the extent that micro-groups of connected but single-minded individuals find themselves in opposition to one another.¹² Pay close attention to it and the permanent connectivity generated by all-governing algorithms appears more belligerent than unifying.¹³ To understand this, we have to examine the digital revolution's workings so that we can sketch out the potential geopolitical consequences.

The Commercial Dynamics of the Digital Revolution

Driven by an ambition to replace human unpredictability with artificial intelligence, the digital revolution uses captology to monopolise consumers' attention and has remained largely untouched by cyber-dysfunctionalities.

Artificial Intelligence: A Trojan Horse Designed to Rob Humans of their Independence

In the years to come, the development of artificial intelligence will be flanked by the development of 5G and quantum computing. 5G is one hundred times faster than 4G and interconnects people with digital devices. It provides the conditions for everything from smart cities to automated environments. 5G is designed for the Internet of Things, such as smart cars and drones, for example. Switzerland has taken an early lead in this area, launching 338 5G masts on 17 April 2019. This technology is not without its risks, however, as it has to be

¹² Major digital platforms' most significant means of reducing friction between these different identities is to moderate users' posts. This invisible task was analysed by Tarleton Gillespie in *The Custodians of the Internet* (Yale University Press, 2018), p. 296. It consumes a huge amount of resources. Global platforms use automated detection tools to moderate content. The task of moderation itself involves flagging up offensive or inappropriate content.

¹³ Unless, of course, these virtual confrontations threaten the cybersecurity upon which foreign investments depend.

relayed every 800 metres. The waves are very high in frequency and non-continuous. China has a number of 5G-related patents. In May 2019, US President Donald Trump banned American telecoms networks from buying Huawei equipment. The US has expressed fears about wide-scale espionage and has pressured its allies to freeze out the Chinese company. However, should Huawei and other Chinese businesses be prevented from rolling out 5G capabilities in Europe, the cost to European telecoms operators would be €55 billion and 18 months of lost time. Secondly, new quantum computers (and IBM Q in particular) are rendering current cryptographic protocols obsolete. But the ten or so quantum computers currently in existence are still in the experimental stage. In the next few years, the development of AI will primarily allow it to guide consumers' choices, but also to reform state bureaucracy.¹⁴ A new science – captology – has been developed to this end.

Captology: The Art of Invisible Manipulation

AI is first and foremost about emotions.¹⁵ Algorithms turn our mental space into code in an effort to capture our attention. The origins of captology reside in the work of BJ Fogg from Stanford University, who published *Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We Think and Do* in 2003. Persuasive technologies have been designed by choice architects to nudge people's choices in a certain direction. Rooted in behavioural economics and neuro-marketing, they lend algorithms a governing power. This new economy considers our attention

¹⁴ State start-ups could find themselves at the cutting edge of government reforms.

¹⁵ For Pierre Bellanger, "software and algorithms are human thought in code. Only a third of our brains is dedicated to rational cognition. If the majority of our thoughts emerge from our unconscious, as soon as networks develop they become unmoored from reason, control and any understanding of our own thoughts. The internet is coding and connecting up our dreams." Translation from the French text.

spans as a rare and precious resource that can be used to a business' advantage when it is focused on information which, in turn, provokes a particular action. Bernard Stiegler has criticised psychotechnology that short-circuits our attention spans, as had Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman before him when they denounced the media's role in manufacturing consent. Captology can also build on artificially generated anxieties, such as the 'fear of missing out'. This particular fear is largely fuelled by certain aspects of modern technology, such as mobile phones and social networking sites, such as Facebook or Twitter, which enable users to constantly compare their profiles. As the world's internet usage grows, a proportion of individuals will become psychologically dependent on being online and suffer from anxiety whenever they are not logged in.

Cybercrime's Minimal Impact on Global Digitalisation

Although cybercrime is becoming increasingly prevalent,¹⁶ especially in developing countries,¹⁷ groups of hackers rarely manage to paralyse organisations or states for long periods of time. In reality, cyberattacks (which are often supported by states¹⁸) are a sophisticated version of three ancient practices, namely *sabotage*, *espionage* and *subversion*. Although the costs involved in these operations have plummeted, cyber-sabotage is

¹⁶ The most effective hackers operate from Israel and India.

¹⁷ Cybercrime is mostly fuelled by developing economies, which have recently become a significant force as far as fraud is concerned. Attacks originating in Brazil continue to rise, making it one of the world's five most prolific cybercrime hotspots.

¹⁸ The Tor network, which is spreading through the darknet, uses the onion routing technology that was developed by the US Navy in the 1990s. This military technology was mostly financed by the US government to promote democracy around the world. Until 2017, the US government funnelled nearly all its funding via the US Navy, the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors that emerged from the CIA. As a result, major intelligence agencies can reverse data anonymising processes to uncover Tor users' true identities.

still limited in scope. It has done damage in various ways: it is now possible to blow up a pipeline, break a dam, scramble a radar, delay a nuclear programme, shut down a bank, take control of a car¹⁹ or assassinate someone by booby-trapping their mobile phone. Cyber-espionage is the real growth area: today, spies are overwhelmed by the amount of stolen data on offer, rendering them incapable of interpreting all this information shorn from its cultural context. In the world of espionage, attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Certain viruses erase themselves as they go, for instance, making them impossible to trace.²⁰ They can also mutate, just like biological viruses.²¹ As for subversion, while it is easy to start a protest movement online, it is very difficult to maintain in the long run. As a result, sabotage makes it temporarily trickier for the world to go digital, whereas espionage harvests the results of our constant connectivity. Ultimately, only non-commercial subversion is capable of endangering the current digital transition, but it is too infrequently executed to pose any serious kind of threat.

Global digitalisation is rooted in market dynamics and enables power to be exerted invisibly upon connected individuals. It is aiding financial capitalism to manoeuvre towards a new international geopolitical stance.

Digital Empires vs Digital Vassal States

Geopolitics in the digitalised world are characterised by three major trends: an erosion of American power, an increase in

¹⁹ Hackers can control the automatic windows and the indicators on a dashboard, or even cause the engine to malfunction.

²⁰ According to Kaspersky Lab's predictions for targeted threats in 2019. The next viral infections will be imperceptible.

²¹ Viruses use an unstable enzyme to multiply. Because there is no corrective system to call upon, this error remains in the genome. It occurs in about one out of every 10,000 cases. Much variation therefore exists within a viral population.

Chinese power, and competition between the two to digitally colonise the rest of the world.

Eroding America's Digital Power

American power entered the virtual world via an oligopoly: GAFAM. Made up of five major businesses (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft) and founded by former hackers,²² GAFAM physically stores information.²³ As such, this big data is accessible to the US and its British relay station.²⁴ 80% of data goes through the United States. Listening stations are positioned close to where underwater cables reach land.²⁵ Cable geopolitics also reflect Chinese-American tensions,²⁶ as well as Portuguese-Brazilian wrangling for control over the former Portuguese colonies' economic market.²⁷ These cables can foster dependency among overseas territories far from major

²² Examples include Steve Jobs (Apple), Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook), Bill Gates (Microsoft) and Linus Torvalds (Linux).

²³ The internet's infrastructure is mainly made up of high-capacity underwater fibre optic cables linked up to terrestrial cables and routers. For Europe, the most important cables are those that link the continent to the UK and, from there, to the US via the Atlantic Ocean.

²⁴ To evade American surveillance, Brazil has built its own cable link to Spain. China has also built the Sea-me-we 5 cable to connect with the Middle East and, ultimately, Europe. The Huawei Marine group is laying more and more underwater cables, for instance between Brazil and Cameroon.

²⁵ Historically, underwater cabling helped the British Empire to increase its financial power. The first functional cable was laid in 1851 between the coasts of France and England with the primary aim of telegraphing stock market information. Today, the Seaborn Networks consortium has now started building an underwater fibre optic connection between Fortaleza in Brazil and Wall Street. Known as Seabras-1, the project will eventually link up to African financial markets via South Africa.

²⁶ The United States has responded vigorously to increasingly powerful Chinese investments. In 2013, the American administration thwarted plans to lay a new transatlantic cable between New York and London, to which Chinese firm Huawei was meant to contribute.

²⁷ The SACS cable has linked Angola to Brazil since February 2019, while ELLALINK connects Portugal to Brazil via Cape Verde.

population centres.²⁸ Because GAFAM behaves like a state, Denmark dispatched an ambassador to it in 2017. In reality, it is more like a kleptocracy living off stolen data.²⁹ Its hybridised belief system borrows from both left-wing libertarianism and right-wing technological determinism. The resulting techno-libertarianism is espoused by visionary, charismatic founders who generate innovative commercial offerings that are always technologically avant-garde. With support from investment funds, GAFAM spent \$58 billion on research and development in 2016. They partly owe their monopoly to the brilliant Chinese and Indian minds that staff Silicon Valley. They are still in competition with China, however, which is trying to prevent them from developing any further.³⁰ To maintain its dominant position, the US has to speed up its industrial integration with Europe.³¹ If it hopes to re-establish its digital sovereignty, Europe needs to redouble its efforts and investments. If it does not, it will have to accept strategic alliances which reduce it to nothing more than a digital vassal state.

China's Rise to Cybernetic Power as an Indicator of Rare Resources

China's demographic collapse has forced the emerging power to concentrate on technology. China is now hugely connected, and over half of its population has been online since 2017.

²⁸ New Caledonia has been linked to Australia via the Gondwana-1 cable since 2009, guaranteeing it the fastest possible communications. Orange is also planning to link French Guiana to the Caribbean.

²⁹ GAFAM's system bears historical comparison to the extremely mobile Venetian gondolier company, which was able to pass information shared by travellers to the doge.

³⁰ There are similarities between China's efforts and the way the US attempted to block the USSR's forays into the nuclear and aerospace industries in the 1950s.

³¹ It should be noted that despite its legal stability and appeal, France has not been able to create any ground-breaking innovations for the past 20 years due to its rigid labour laws.

400 million Chinese people play online games, for example. China is attempting to disentangle itself from ICANN, a legal authority based in California that regulates the internet, by boycotting multilateral meetings. Its objective is to draw a strict dividing line between the 'Chinese internet' and the 'global internet'. In an attempt to 'cleanse' the internet, the Chinese Communist Party has long sought to strengthen its grip on what it describes as information pollution and 'electronic opium'.³² Chinese internet users are online for about three hours a day, and over half of that time is spent on a mobile device. They browse and watch online videos, abandoning TV screens in favour of more nomadic options. The Chinese have outclassed the Americans when it comes to AI. AI thrives when data is collected in massive quantities, and China has huge amounts of homogenised data that enables it to outstrip the US. The country's 'social credit' system, which awards every citizen a certain number of points, will enable it to extract vast amounts of data when it comes into force in 2020.³³ Two modes of plundering data are thus going head-to-head: GAFAM pilfers our data on the one hand, while the Chinese government pilfers its own citizens' data on the other. The Chinese have the data but the Americans have the algorithms, which is why it is so crucial to the Chinese that they manage to plunder the latter or attract the very best engineers. Competition here is fierce and has left behind India, which is only responsible for developing existing programs. In order to maintain its digital independence, China restricts how its rare metals are exported and used, as these will go on to be used in the mobile phone manufacturing process. For Guillaume Pitron, the battle for rare metals is the hidden side of the digital revolution. Tensions will become particularly high in territories targeted by cyber-colonists.

³² Internet addicts are viewed as both 'deviants' who need their behaviour correcting and 'sick patients' who require medical help.

³³ This system is based on the questionnaires used by certain American insurance companies.

Major Powers Competing to Digitally Colonise Africa

If the digital colonisation process were modelled on an algorithm, it would include the following steps. First, it would facilitate a cyberattack on the target state's communications and present itself as its saviour. Next, it would connect the country to the internet, secure its strategic networks and capture local cyber elites by rolling out a master's degree programme in digitalisation. It would then pillage its data, take over the consumer market and, finally, engage in online electoral marketing to maintain its grip on its conquered market. Connectivity is growing rapidly in Africa. In 2018 alone, 35.2% of Africans were using the internet, compared with 16% in 2012. China has taken a very original stance towards Africa. First of all, Chinese businesses have provided the continent with technological tools at very competitive prices. For instance, Shenzhen-based electronics manufacturer Huawei has been operating in Africa since 1999. In 2013, it partnered up with Microsoft to conquer the African smartphone market and is now outperforming the Californian giant in this sector in Africa. Huawei's ambition is now to sell premium telephones to an African middle class looking for enhanced services. There are, however, significant differences between countries, from North Africa³⁴ to the Sahel region.³⁵

³⁴ Algeria – considered the least secure country – had to call in specialist cyber police officers to monitor its baccalaureate exams in 2017. The British are also taking an interest in this promising market and organised a cyber-forum in 2018. In 2019, Orange set up a specialist cyber defence subsidiary in Morocco: Orange Cyberdefense Morocco officially opened for business in Casablanca on 16 April 2019. A master's degree in cyber defence has been set up in partnership with the Université Polytechnique Hauts-de-France in Valenciennes to attract local talent and launch their careers. France also has a long-established presence in Libya as, in 2007, Amesys – a French subsidiary of Bull – sold its Eagle program to the Gaddafi regime to track its opponents. After changing its name to Advanced Middle East Systems, the company then sold a similar system to Egypt known as Cerebro.

³⁵ In the Sahel region, practices are changing as internet cafés offer faster internet speeds rather than access to computers. The French army ran several cybersecurity courses, including in Nouakchott, Mauritania, from 10 to 13 September 2018 and in Niamey, Nigeria, from 29 January to 3 February 2018.

The Middle East: Digital Islands and Rich Pickings

The Middle East has two digital ‘islands’, Iran and Israel, which represent opposing yet mirroring forces. Israel provides 7% of the world’s cybersecurity. Its industry benefits from high levels of investment³⁶ that aim to protect a territory stripped of its strategic importance, while also improving its ability to export innovations. On 6 May 2019, Israel sent out a warning to hackers operating outside its borders. After one cyberattack, the Israel Defense Forces bombed a building in the Gaza Strip that was sheltering Hamas hackers. This has not prevented Israel from recruiting hackers keen to offer it their services for a hefty fee. Hackers are highly coveted. In fact, Dubai even organised a hacking fair! Three former Israeli intelligence officers founded XM Cyber in 2016 to operate in this particular field. The digital island that is Israel stands in opposition to Iran, a country with equal levels of creativity³⁷ but lacking in Western investment. Iran appears to have been behind cyberattacks on certain British banks in December 2018. The viruses used – Shamoon 1, 2 and 3 – also targeted petroleum infrastructures in the Gulf’s oil monarchies.³⁸ In Turkey, the nationalist Cyber-Warrior Akincilar group has hacked anyone or any organisation deemed opposed to the interests of Turkey and Islam.³⁹ Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has enjoyed technical support from certain Israeli cybersecurity firms, who have made use of their position to gather data on the behaviour of the country’s elites⁴⁰ or

³⁶ \$800 million in 2017.

³⁷ The word ‘algorithm’ was invented by Persian mathematician al-Khwarizmi in the 9th century.

³⁸ Cybercrime can sometimes be a proxy for military action. This was the case for these Iranian cyberattacks, which were designed to relieve pressure on the country during the embargo.

³⁹ They hacked into *Charlie Hebdo*’s website, for instance, in 2011.

⁴⁰ In 2017, representatives of Herzliya-based NSO Group Technologies held a series of meetings in Vienna and at least one Gulf nation, during which a \$55 million contract was signed to supply Saudi Arabia with its famous Pegasus spyware.

opponents.⁴¹ Despite the protection offered by these Israeli companies, Saudi Arabia is now the most frequently targeted Middle Eastern country when it comes to cyberattacks,⁴² which mostly aim to steal information from private and public institutions' information systems.

The growth in digital power offers a very imperfect reflection of each state's real clout: GAFAM's rise covers up for the United States' geopolitical decline, while China's technological power conceals its demographic fragility. Conversely, in both Africa and the Middle East, hacking operations designed to steal digital or financial resources reveal the weaknesses of supposedly powerful forces.

Social digitalisation rates are therefore a better reflection of the resources that are immediately available rather than their future potential. The internet has become a bitterly contested space among competing economic powers. The aim of this competition is to effectively privatise a space that is temporarily free for users to explore. Permanent connectivity, which devours instant data and interconnects objects and reified human beings, bypasses anyone who refuses to accede and labels them as suspicious. In future, states and individuals will generate a fog of incorrect data in an act of defiance designed to shield themselves from view.⁴³ Finally, digitalisation is throwing up unexpected

⁴¹ Jamal Khashoggi and Omar Abdulaziz wanted to set up a cyber-opposition movement.

⁴² The lack of local training and a general lack of awareness of the dangers of cyberattacks have left the kingdom exposed.

⁴³ Voice cloning is now a reality. Using a single minute of recorded audio, Lyrebird and Wave Net can digitally recreate an individual's voice to have him or her 'say' whatever they want. Similarly, Stanford University has demonstrated facial control in which a person's facial expressions are recorded live but edited by an actor, with a computer instantly reproducing the latter's movements yet with any target person's face. Such deepfakes can attack individuals, organisations and states. University College London has developed its *My Text in Your Handwriting* program to accurately reproduce a person's handwriting from a single sample. A talking robot named Luka mimics the characters from the TV series *Silicon Valley*, recycling dialogue from the first two seasons. The robot responds to questions by generating new phrases based on

geopolitical changes. Ultimately, it will sweep away repetitive jobs and temporarily concentrate power in innovative territories, while making it possible for states and businesses to identify opinion leaders using relational mapping. Lastly, it will enable military chiefs to order robots to kill targets using AI-powered facial recognition. We are entering into the era of hybrid civilisations.

the models provided to it. In 2022, it is believed that populations in developed nations will read more fake news than genuine information. Automatic text, image and audio generators could contaminate the entire human communication network. 8.5% of Twitter accounts are already run by bots.

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

ASLANBEK ADIYEV. INTERETHNIC RELATIONS AND RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN IN 2019 (A CASE STUDY OF EVENT ANALYSIS) // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Interethnic relations, religious situation, interethnic conflicts, tolerance, state national policy, all-Russian civil identity, social adaptation.

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Citation: Adiyev A. Interethnic Relations and Religious Situation in the Republic of Daghestan in 2019 (a Case Study of Event Analysis) // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 37–56.
DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.03

Abstract. Interethnic relations and the religious situation in the Republic of Daghestan (RD) are developing positively. Media resources do not record cases of interethnic clashes in 2019. The tolerance of the region's residents towards representatives of other ethnic groups is at a high level. The state national policy is being comprehensively implemented in the field of harmonizing interethnic relations,

strengthening the all-Russian civil identity, as well as the social adaptation of foreign citizens - labor migrants.

Introduction. Interethnic relations and religious situation in the Republic of Daghestan (RD) are developing positively, maintaining, despite the presence of a number of “old” conflict subjects, controllability and stability. During 2019, media resources did not record cases of interethnic clashes and other manifestations of open interethnic conflict in the region. According to a survey conducted in October 2019, 87.2% of respondents appreciate the state of interethnic relations in the Republic of Daghestan, 91.9% of respondents indicated that they do not dislike migrants. Tolerance of the inhabitants of the region towards representatives of other ethnic groups (nationalities) is also at high level (88.6%).

In Daghestan, under the coordinating role of the Ministry for National Policy and Religious Affairs of the Republic of Daghestan (Minnats RD), state national policy is being implemented in an integrated manner in the sphere of harmonizing inter-ethnic relations, strengthening of all-Russian civic identity, as well as social adaptation of foreign citizens – labor migrants. For the second year, the state program of the RD “Implementation of state national policy in the Republic of Daghestan for 2018–2020” is being executed, and in municipal districts and urban districts corresponding municipal programs were adopted and responsible officials were appointed. The functionality of the Minnats includes work to promote the harmonization of inter-ethnic relations, to preserve interfaith and intra-confessional peace; strengthening of all-Russian civic identity among the population of the republic; countering the ideology of ethnic (national) and religious extremism; preservation of ethnocultural identity of peoples living in the territory of the territorial unity. Since 2019, activities on adapting foreign citizens (migrants) have become a required focus area of the department. This work becomes relevant, since migration

processes affect not only the demographic situation, but also the socio-economic and socio-political situation in the region.

Demography and migration. The permanent population of the Republic of Daghestan in the beginning of 2019 was 3,086,126 people, which is 22 thousand people more than last year data. The population of Daghestan has been constantly growing for many decades. On the basis of official statistics, only over the last 20 years (from 2000 to 2019) the population of the republic increased by 643,517 people (by more than 26%). Natural population changes indicate the demographic well-being of the republic: the difference between the fertility and mortality rates in Daghestan is positive and amounted to 33.2 thousand people gain in 2018. It is important to note that the recorded population growth of the republic takes into account the migration loss, which significantly impacts on the growth rate of the resident population of Daghestan. A study of general migration trends of the population of the republic in recent years makes it possible to note a steadily negative migration balance. The outflow value – 4,518 of people, recorded in 2000, increased to a maximum value of – 23,958 people. in 2012. Since 2014, it has been noted a decrease in migration losses to 14–11 thousand people annually, and in 2018 migration loss amounted to – 11008 people. The main destination of Daghestanis is intra-country migration to other regions of Russia. Every year, about 100 thousand people participate in the migration processes of the republic – the amount of annual arrivals and departures from Daghestan, almost 99% of which move within the country. Most of the departures and arrivals are people of working age. First preference areas of migration of Daghestanis are Moscow and the central macro-region, the cities of the West Siberian macro-region (Tyumen region), as well as St. Petersburg, where the average level of salary is significantly higher than republican rates. Moreover, a significant part of Daghestani migrants settles in the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories, in the Rostov and Astrakhan regions, where there are favorable opportunities to

engage in traditional agricultural activities for them. Thus, almost the whole migration flow from Daghestan circulates within the Russian Federation and is aimed at economically developed regions of the country.

Migration processes related to the countries of the post-Soviet territory cover a very small proportion of arrivals and departures (0.04% of the resident population of the republic for 2019), and only a few of people participate in movements between Daghestan and distant foreign countries. For the recent years, the migration process (albeit very modest) between Daghestan and the countries of the post-Soviet territory has a stable surplus. The largest migration growth in the population of the republic comes from Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Mainly labor migrants arrive in the republic (with the exception of Ukraine, for the most part ethnic Daghestanis participate in migration processes with it) from all the listed countries. A temporary resident permit (which is given in the Russian Federation for 3 years), as well as a residence permit (a document confirming the rights of a foreigner for permanent residence in the Russian Federation) are executed in the republic annually by about 1.5 thousand people, more than half of which are immigrants from Azerbaijan. There are many people who want to receive a residence permit among citizens of Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Paradoxically, in Daghestan - the most labor-making region of the North Caucasus Federal District of the Russian Federation, labor migrants from the countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasus arrive to work in such sectors of the economy as: construction, trade, agriculture, catering. The largest number of migrants (foreign citizens) in the republic lives in Makhachkala (more than 13 thousand people), Khasavyurt and Khasavyurt region (more than 5 thousand people), Derbent and Derbent region (more than 4 thousand people), in Kaspiysk (about 2 thousand people) and Karabudakhkent region (more than 1 thousand people). A relatively large number of migrants (from 500 to 1000 people) are registered in the Karabudakhkent,

Kayakent, Kizilyurt, Levashinsky, Buinaksky, Kizlyar and Nogai districts of Daghestan. In all six state universities of the Republic of Daghestan located in Makhachkala, foreign students study, the total number of which for the 2018–2019 academic year amounted to 1,435 people.

The materials of in-depth interviews conducted in 2019 with representatives of expat and migrant communities from Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan in the republic testify to their preference for the Republic of Daghestan due to the socio-cultural affinity of the host community in comparison with the societies of the central regions of the country. Comparing their work experience in other regions of Russia, migrants from Central Asia working in Daghestan note that the price for their work in the republic is noticeably lower than in Moscow and other large cities of the country, but the positive aspects are the cultural affinity and benevolence of people.

Domestic migration in the context of municipal districts of the republic has its own characteristics. Almost all rural areas of the republic, with the exception of the Novolaksky district, show the migration loss of the local population. But the difference in the number of people participating in migration processes between the municipalities of the republic is significant. If, on average, 500 people annually participate in migration processes in the mountainous territories of the republic, in the southern regions of Daghestan migration includes about 1,500 people annually. In addition, in the direction of migration, the population of mountain territories moves mainly within the republic with an insignificant negative migration balance (i.e., settle in cities and plain regions of the Republic of Daghestan), while in the southern regions of Daghestan and in the northernmost – Nogai region, external migration dominates. Thus, the largest migration losses of the entire population of municipalities are recorded in the southern regions of Daghestan, as well as in the northernmost – Nogai district. Losing about 600 people on the difference between migration inflow and

outflow annually, the population of this district decreased from 22,472 people given according to the 2010 census to 18,397 people by the beginning of 2019 and continues to decline, despite the natural population growth. There is a similar situation in many southern regions of Daghestan (Agul, Akhtynsky, Dokuzparinsky, Kurakhsky, Rutulsky, Suleman-Stalsky, Tabasaran, Khiva municipal regions of the republic), where migration loss is not compensated by natural growth and leads to a reduction in the number of resident population. In the remaining territories of the republic, migration loss is compensated for natural growth, which leads to an increase in the number of permanent population there.

“Old” conflicts: the problem of the Aukhov district.

In general, the stable nature of inter-ethnic relations in the republic is overshadowed by the presence of “old” conflict factors, among which the most difficult factor is the uncertainty of the administrative-territorial prospects of the Novolaksky district and the administrative subordination of two villages of the Kazbekovsky district with a mixed Avar-Chechen population in connection with the sluggish process of restoration of the Aukhov district. The situation on the continuous process of resettlement of the Lak population of the Novolaksky district to a new place of residence (the territory of Novostroy – the future Novolaksky district) and the restoration of the Aukhovsky district remains actually “frozen.” The ongoing head of the republic, V. Vasiliev, said it was advisable to postpone for the future the solution of the questions where there is at least the faintest risk of interethnic conflicts².

At the same time, according to experts, any “frozen,” “delayed,” “smoldering,” “old” conflict have the risks of actualization, so such hotbeds existing in the North Caucasus cannot be left without the constant attention of both federal and regional authorities³.

The process of restoring the Aukhov district, which was liquidated after the deportation of Akkin Chechens in 1944,

remains the most politicized problem, which can exacerbate inter-ethnic contradictions to direct and mass clashes between Avars and Chechens in the villages of Kazbekovsky and Novolaksky districts. Although there were no open manifestations of the conflict in 2019, the tension of the discourse on the restoration of the Aukhov district does not decrease. As it is known, in April 1991 the Law of the RSFSR "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples" was adopted, after that on June 26, 1991 the III Congress of People's Deputies of Dagestan adopted a resolution "On practical measures aimed at adherence to the decisions of the congresses of people's deputies of the DASSR and execution of the law" On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples." According to the decisions and agreements of the interested parties of this controversial ethno-territorial dispute, the Lak population of the Novolaksky district agreed to move compactly (by settlements) to a new place to the north of Makhachkala with the formation of the similarly-named municipal district there. The Avar and Chechen populations of the Novolaksky district initially agreed to live together in the restored territory. Later, Avars living in the northern part of the Novolaksky district (in the villages of Gamiy, Novomekhelta, Novochurtakh and Tukhchar) began to demand a special status for their villages as a part of the restored Aukhovsky district or incorporating of their villages to the neighboring Khasavyurt district. At the same time, Avars living in the villages of Kaliniaul (in Chechen Yurt-Aukh) and Leninaul (Aktash-Aukh) of the Kazbekovsky district, which until 1944 were part of the Aukhovsky district, categorically disagree with the prospects of including these villages in the restored Aukhovsky district, and also they are committed to the maintenance of these villages as a part of the Kazbekovsky district. Thus, the northern and southern territories of the former Aukhov region, inhabited mainly by Avars, have uncertain prospects, and their introduction in the restored region is a very controversial and conflict-generating issue.

On February 23, 2019, an annual rally of Akkin Chechens dedicated to the memory of the victims of the repressions of 1944 was held, where there was again a demand to restore the Aukhov district. The rally participants accepted an appeal to the peoples of Daghestan to support them in their desire to obtain historical justice: *"the incompleteness of the process of resettlement of the Lak population and the restoration of the Aukhov district creates an additional hotbed of tension in our region and serves as a source of various kinds of provocations and conflict situations between our peoples,"* the text of the appeal says⁴. According to activists of the Public Council of Chechens of Daghestan, in the last 2-3 years the situation has worsened due to the trend of uncontrolled grant (sale) of lands in the villages of Novolaksky district, as well as in the villages of Kalininaul and Leninaul of Kazbekovsky district. Especially, according to their estimates, the administrations of the villages of Kalininaul, Leninaul, Kazbekovsky district, as well as Gamiy, Tukhchar and Novokuli, Novolaksky district, are active in the distribution of the land fund. The land left for the restoration of the village of Bursun by the administration of the village of Leninaul, Kazbekovsky district, according to Chechen social activists, is divided into plots (more than 700) and distributed among the inhabitants of this village⁵. And now, families of heritors of the deported residents of the village of Bursun, as they say, have lost the possibility of territorial rehabilitation. Thus, the work of rural administrations on the distribution of land plots in the villages of Novolaksky and Kazbekovsky districts is perceived by the Public Council of Chechens of Daghestan as a seizure of the lands of the restored Aukhovsky district.

As of 2019, a significant part of the Lak population of the Novolaksky district has already moved to a new place (Novostroy), derived for this district to the north of Makhachkala. At the same time, the process of returning houses released by the Lak population to rehabilitated Chechens, as in general, the process of restoring the Aukhov district was extremely delayed

and politicized. On July 24, 2019, the Executive Committee of the Public Council of Chechens of Daghestan held an enlarged meeting with the participation of the heads and deputy heads of villages of the Novolaksky district. On the agenda there was the question of the attitude of rehabilitated Chechens to the information that the Government of the Republic of Daghestan advanced a proposal to change acceptance and transfer certificates of a residence building, building or land plot to a rehabilitated citizen. In particular, in this legislative initiative of the regional authorities, it was proposed to introduce the wording "on the transfer of a house (building, land) to safe storage until compensation is received by the relocated people." Following the results of the meeting, the Chechens expressed their categorical disagreement with this initiative to change acceptance and transfer certificates of real estate and insist on maintaining the previous form of this act. *"We do not object to the receiving of compensation by the immigrants, but strongly disagree with the linkage to this return of house buildings to its legal owner – a rehabilitated citizen of the Russian Federation,"* the Public Council of Chechens of Daghestan said in a statement⁶.

Taking into account the updating of the land issue on the territory of the Novolaksky and Kazbekovsky districts, social activists of the Chechens of Daghestan demand from the leadership of the republic:

- adopt the state program of the RD "Restoration of the Aukhov district" and include it in the Program of the Russian Federation "Development of the North Caucasus for the period up to 2025";

- regulate the process of land use on the territory of the restored Aukhovsky district, prohibit the sale of land, its allocation for long-term rent, as well as registration actions on land and house buildings which should be returned to rehabilitated citizens and transferred to the municipal property of Aukhovsky district;

- conduct a complete inventory of house buildings and land plots assigned to immigrants in the Novolaksky district with the subsequent approval of the registry in the Government of the Republic of Daghestan as property transferring to the Government of the Republic of Daghestan after an immigrant receives new housing for subsequent transfer to rehabilitated citizens;

- introduce for consideration by the National Assembly of the Republic of Daghestan a draft decree on the creation of the Novolaksky district on the territory allocated for the resettlement of the Lak population of the Novolaksky district;

- introduce for consideration by the National Assembly of the Republic of Daghestan a draft decree on the restoration of the Aukhov district;

- create a temporary administration of the restored Aukhovsky district until the adoption of the charter of the municipality and election of local government bodies⁷.

Currently, the leadership of the republic is most likely not ready to fulfill the listed requirements of the Chechen party, given their conflict-generating potential in the form of a response from the Avar and Lak party. According to the statement of Chechen activists, the whole situation with the position of affairs in matters of rehabilitation and resettlement in the appropriate manner was communicated to the leadership of the Republic of Daghestan and the Government of the Russian Federation indicating violations of the current legislation in these matters, and concrete proposals were prepared to eliminate them. Also, according to Chechen activists, to the Government of the Republic of Daghestan there was presented a step-by-step plan (roadmap) for the implementation of measures to complete the process of resettlement and rehabilitation. The legal framework for resolving these issues exists, however Chechen social activists are sure that there is no political will of the leadership⁸.

The authorities, as it seems to us, do not still see a mutually acceptable solution to this ethno-political issue, and therefore the

leadership of the republic is trying to maintain the status quo that has developed in recent years. The Lak population of the Novolaksky district is gradually relocating to the territory of Novostroy, but in fine this municipal district is unlikely to be relocated in the years ahead. Only 4 settlements (the villages of Akhar, Shushia, Duchi and Nitsovkra) have official standing on the territory of Novostroy. The remaining 7 resettlement villages in Novostroy are partially populated, but do not have official standing, and their rural administrations are located on the territory of the "old" Novolaksky district. In addition, the Novolaksky district, judging by official statistics, is the only rural region of Daghestan where migration population growth is observed (about 200 people. per year). It is not still clear which ethnic group is increasing in the municipality due to mechanical growth. Moreover, it is not known what kind of population of villages (old or resettlement; Chechen, Avar or Lak) is increasing due to migration, as the administration of the Novolaksky district serves today not only the population of the villages of the region itself, but also immigrants living in the villages of Novostroy. Meanwhile the Avar population of Kalininaul, Leninaul, Novomehelt and others disagree to become part of the future Aukhovsky district, and Akkin Chechens do not agree to the restoration of the Aukhovsky district within the borders of the Novolaksky district, Novostroy will not receive the status of a municipal district, and Novolaksky district will function at the same place.

The surge of negativity in Daghestan-Chechen relations during the period of work to clarify the administrative borders between Daghestan and the Chechen Republic. The "frozen" status of the problem of restoring the Aukhov district was clearly manifested during the aggravation of the socio-political situation due to controversial episodes in the process of clarifying the administrative boundaries of the Republic of Daghestan with the Chechen Republic. Such episodes happened on the border near the city of Kizlyar, as well as on the border of the Botlikh and

Tarumovsky districts with the Chechen Republic. On June 10, a road sign was set up by the Chechen party indicating that the road leading from the city of Kizlyar towards the Chechen Republic passes through the Shelkovskiy district of the Chechen Republic. At night, about two hundred young people gathered at the sign, who barbarously dismantled it. Next day, the chairman of the Chechen parliament M. Daudov arrived in Kizlyar, accompanied by security, who met with the head of the administration of the Head and Government of the Republic of Daghestan V. Ivanov and the head of the Kizlyar district A. Pogorelov. At the meeting, Daudov accused the leadership of Kizlyar of what is happening, who, according to him, is not engaged enough in work with the population. The road sign was set up again and cordoned off by the security leaders. In addition, the Chechen politician at this meeting said that some Daghestanis still live in houses that the Chechens built, reminding of restoring the Aukhov district. This statement encouraged the public of Daghestan Akkin Chechens, demanding to step up the process of restoring this area, as there have been no other publicity opportunities that draw attention of the public to this problem for a long time. The rest of the Daghestan public perceived the words of the speaker of the Parliament of the CR as an attempt to intervene in intra-republican matters. Activists of the Public Council of Chechens of Daghestan, taking advantage of the publicity opportunity because of the near-border dispute of Kizlyar, recorded a video message to the leadership of the republic with another call to accelerate the process of restoring the Aukhov district⁹.

The head of the RD V. Vasiliev, reacting to the border incident in Kizlyar, said that the setup of the sign does not violate anything. *"The territory on which one sign was placed on the federal road and two signs on the regional one is the territory over which neither Daghestan nor the Chechen Republic have any complaints against each other"*¹⁰ V. Vasiliev explained. He also noted that all controversial issues will obligatory be discussed, including with

the population of border municipalities. However, on the same day, information appeared on social networks and instant messengers that an unknown person on a truck demolished two signs with the name of the Shelkovsky district of the Chechen Republic on the border with the Tarumovsky district of Daghestan. In this part the Chechen border, which passes through the territory of Daghestan by a wedge, connects two border regions of the Republic of Daghestan – Tarumovsky and Nogaysky. A member of the Daghestan border demarcation commission S. Khadulaev accused the offender of inciting a conflict with the Chechens¹¹. In response to the demolition of road signs by an unknown driver, the Chechen party built checkpoints on both sides of this short sector (only 9 km) – Cordon 50 and Cordon 60. According to the head of the Shelkovsky district of the Chechen Republic, Kh. Khadzhiev, these checkpoints are of great importance for the region, since this is the border between Daghestan and the Chechen Republic¹². These measures of the Chechen party forced the leadership of the Republic of Daghestan to explore the issue of asphaltting a bypass road 30 km long, connecting the Nogai district with the Tarumovsky district without passing through the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The conflict amendment of the administrative boundaries between the Republic of Daghestan and the Chechen Republic negatively affected relations between Daghestanis and Chechens. So, on July 12, a brawl took place in the Vedensky district of the Chechen Republic of local residents with cowhands from the Daghestan village of Gagatli, who rented Chechen pastures¹³. In addition, a new dispute broke out on social networks and messengers between the Daghestan and Chechen public regarding the ownership of a plot of land on the border of the Vedensky district of Chechnya and the Botlikh district of Daghestan¹⁴.

Due to the arising territorial disputes during the period of amendment of the administrative boundaries between the Republic of Daghestan and the Chechen Republic, the

plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus Federal District A. Matovnikov (from June 26, 2018 to January 22, 2020) announced a decision to postpone work on amendment of the borders between these subjects of the Russian Federation for 2020. The republican authorities will have to prepare thoroughly, study constitutive documents, including archival ones, and next year continue this work with more active involvement of the heads of border municipalities and the public, ensuring openness and transparency in the process of amendment of administrative borders¹⁵.

Another reason for the aggravation of Daghestan-Chechen relations was the publication of an interview with the head of the CR about the events of 1999 and about the activities of Imam Shamil during the "Caucasian War" of the XIX century in Chechnya. In Daghestan, that year was the 20th anniversary of the events of 1999, marked by the defeat of international rebel groups that invaded the territory of Daghestan from Chechnya. A landmark was the adoption by the State Duma of the Russian Federation of a bill identifying volunteers as veterans of hostilities who opposed the invasion of militants in Daghestan in 1999. Bearing in mind those events in his interview, the head of the CR R. Kadyrov said: *"Yes, 20 years have passed. All this time, we continue to condemn the invasion of Daghestan in Chechnya. At the same time, for 20 years we hear the same thing! That, "Chechen terrorists attacked Daghestan"*¹⁶". In the same interview, the head of the CR noted that the events of 1999 lasted two weeks, and Shamil's actions over 20 years contributed to kill of more than half of the Chechen people and burning of all Chechnya.

After the declaration of the head of the CR about activities of Imam Shamil during and after the end of the "Caucasian War" in the Daghestan segment of social networks, there was a heated discussion of this topic and an increase in negative reaction to the words of the politician. Observing the growth of negativity in Daghestan-Chechen relations on social networks and instant

messengers, the Head of the Republic of Daghestan appealed to the residents of Daghestan and Chechnya not to create excessive tension around the evaluation of the historical role of Imam Shamil. *"There are always people who judge as it seems to them. I am convinced that wise Daghestan people, like the equally wise Chechen people, will find a solution,"* said V. Vasilyev¹⁷.

Territorial issue in the Nogai district. The Nogai public continues to seek a reconsideration of the status of distant-pasture cattle tending lands in the RD and the transfer of these pastures from republican ownership under control of local governments. The total area of lands in the Nogai district is 887.1 thousand hectares, the land of distant-pasture cattle tending of which (i.e. land confiscated during the Soviet period from the municipal district in favor of the republic) is 577.5 thousand hectares. The main arguments of the Nogai public in favor of returning of distant pastures to the balance of the municipal district as inter-settlement territories are the expected increase in the collection of rental charges if there are municipal supervision over the economic activities of agistors and an increase of the local budget that way of the revenues. Moreover, the returning of distant-pasture cattle tending lands to the municipality is justified by the Nogai public by the need to prevent desertification of the Nogai plain due to unrationed and year-round cattle grazing on these pastures.

March 24, 2019, in the Nogai district, a meeting of the Council of Elders of Nogais was held with administration of the municipal district. Delegates of Nogai communities from the northern regions of the country, as well as representatives of Nogais from the Astrakhan region, the Chechen Republic and the Stavropol Territory came to the event. The subject of discussion was the problem of desertification of the territories of the Nogai region. The reason for this environmental disaster is a multiple exceedance of the grazing standards in winter pastures. Nogai social activists, examining the territories of the municipal district, confiscated by the Daghestan government as distant-pasture

cattle tending lands, discovered old Nogai cemeteries there. As the participants of the trip told and showed at the meeting, due to desertification of the soil, the bones of people buried in these unhedged cemeteries were on the surface. According to R. Murzagishiev, Chairman of the Council of Elders of the Nogai District, the transformation of the Nogai plain into a desert is a trend of recent decades. The head of the Nogai district, M. Adzhekov noted that in the Soviet years, control over the use of the distant-pasture cattle tending lands was carried out by district employees, and in the modern period control is transferred to republican departments, which, obviously, do not cope with this task. According to M. Adzhekov, the head of Daghestan entrusted with the task to solve some land problems in the Nogai district, in particular, for the villages of Kumli and Ediga, which do not have land for cattle grazing. But, according to the official, these instructions are still not fulfilled. Regional deputy R. Adilgereev in his speech noted that the measures taken by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Republic of Daghestan of localizing sandy areas are only half measure, and the money allocated for struggle against desertification will "go into sand" while there is the practice of excess cattle breeding in the region. The legal side of the problem was commented by the chairman of the regional assembly of deputies R. Nasyrov, according to whom the republican law on the distant-pasture cattle tending lands contradicts the federal law. To repeal this law, the Assembly of Deputies of the Nogai District sent documents to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Daghestan. The deputy noted that the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Daghestan called this issue political and recommended coordinating the abolition of the law with the leadership of the republic. The result of the meeting on March 24 was a resolution, with another demand to the Daghestan government to delegate the right to control and supervise the use of the distant-pasture cattle tending lands located within the Nogai district of the administration of this municipality¹⁸.

The inefficiency of the practice of distant-pasture cattle tending was also mentioned in the annual message of the head of the Republic of Daghestan to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Daghestan on March 20, 2019¹⁹, in which V. Vasiliev complained that the farmers of the republic lose about 7 thousand tons of lamb due to cattle overlanding between summer and winter pastures. At the same time, the committed position of the Daghestan government on the issue of ownership of distant-pasture cattle tending remains the same - these lands belong to the Republic of Daghestan and have a special status.

Religious situation and opposition to pseudo-religious extremist ideologies. As of 2019, there are 2669 religious organizations in the Republic of Daghestan: of which: Islamic – 2631 (of which 1273 jumah mosques, 899 quarter mosques, 437 preaching houses, 15 madrasas, 6 universities and 1 union of Islamic youth); Christian – 33 (of which 23 Orthodox, 8 Protestant, 1 Old Believer and 1 Armenian Apostolic Church); Jewish – 5. As it can be seen from the above figures, there are sufficient Islamic religious educational institutions with an appropriate base and conditions for religious education. The preservation and development of religious educational institutions in Daghestan is given precise attention, since the Muftiyat of the Republic of Daghestan and state authorities have faced with the task of ensuring access to high-quality religious (Islamic) education within the Russian Federation.

Nowadays, in the RD there is a significant stabilization of the situation in the intra-confessional sphere. Every year, with the participation of representatives of religious organizations, a large number of measures are taken in the republic to prevent and combat the spread of extremist ideologies. The organization and implementation of such activities is getting more focused and systematic character. Monthly preventive conversations with school students, students of universities, technical schools and colleges are conducted by specialists of the Education Department of Muftiyat RD. At the regional level in Daghestan, events are regularly held

with the participation of religious organizations aimed at spiritual and moral education and cultural education in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, mutual understanding, mutual respect and cooperation of representatives of the younger generation who profess Islam, Orthodoxy and Judaism. One of these events is the "International Interreligious Youth Forum," which (the sixth since 2014) was held in Daghestan from September 29 to October 4, 2019. At the level of municipalities of the Republic, preventive measures to counter the ideology of extremism are carried out by the municipal Anti-Terrorism Commissions (ATC), which include not only representatives of local administrations and commissioners of police, but also imams of mosques, rural deputies and authoritative social activists. Municipal ATCs deal not only with issues of anti-terrorist protection of the most important socially significant objects (schools, kindergartens, hospitals, sports complexes, cultural centers, transport infrastructure), but also conduct socio-political, cultural, sports and public awareness activities of anti-terrorism orientation.

Conclusion. Activities carried out by state and local government bodies together with educational institutions, ethnocultural and religious organizations overwhelm all areas of modern state national policy of the Russian Federation. Great attention is paid to strengthening an all-Russian civic identity among the residents of the republic (especially among youth), patriotic education, inter-ethnic and interreligious tolerance. The policy of the republic's leadership, including personnel, is based on an approach that recognizes the subject of public, including relations of power, the entire multinational people (population) of Daghestan, and not its individual ethnic groups, communities and territories. In his public speeches, V. Vasiliev uses the concepts of "people of Daghestan," "Daghestanis," "residents of the republic," without distinguishing ethnic groups and doesn't recognize them as subjects of political processes. This approach contributes to the significant depoliticization of ethnicity in public discourses and strengthening of civic identity among Daghestanis.

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- ZAID ABDULAGATOV. THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN ISLAMIC EDUCATION ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS OF MOSLEMS OF DAGHESTAN (continued in No. 4, 2020) // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

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Citation: Abdulgatov Z. The Influence of Foreign Islamic Education on the Religious Consciousness of Moslems of Daghestan // Russia and Moslem World, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 56–65. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.04

Abstract. The author states on the basis of historical facts that the foreign Islamic education of Caucasians was a problem for the Russian state at the beginning of the 20th century. According to historical information, expert assessments and data from a small sociological survey, he concludes that foreign Islamic education contributes to changes in the confessional identity of Muslims of Daghestan in the direction of Salafitization of their consciousness at the present time. Thus, foreign Islamic education contributes to the strengthening of interfaith tensions in the republic.

Features of the current situation of manifestations of religious extremism and terrorism in the region. Despite the fact that the armed conflict in the North Caucasus after the well-known events of the late 20 and early 21 centuries is noticeably subsiding, this relative lull may be temporary. There are certain facts that provide a basis for such conclusions.

Firstly, according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 4500 militants from Russia and the CIS countries were eliminated during operations in Syria [1, p. 11]. The head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, said that in Syria, according to confirmed data only, over 4 thousand Daghestanis² are fighting on the side of ISIS¹ and other detachments. The ethnologist A.A. Yarlykapov believes that there are at least 5 thousand of them in Syria³. In the Russian regions, in particular in Daghestan, there are numerous close relatives of those killed and now continuing to fight on the side of ISIS. Our society has yet to digest the inevitable return of the many orphans and widows of this war to the Russian regions. There is no certainty that over time they will not become potential sources of the development of extreme consciousness and extremist behavior in the region. Perhaps they may form new dormant waves of radicalization of Islamic consciousness in certain regions of Russia.

Secondly, there is statistics of extremism on the list of organizations and individuals included in the "List of organizations and individuals in relation to which there is

information about their involvement in extremist activities or terrorism on the basis of subparagraphs 1–3 of paragraphs 2.1 of Article 6 of the Federal Law of 07.08.2001 No. 115-Φ3 “Counteracting Legalization (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and Financing of Terrorism”. These lists are compiled by Rosfinmonitoring. Of all the published lists for the years 2013–2016 the author analyzed the five subjects of the Russian Federation, most significant in terms of Islamic activity: Daghestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Tatarstan. The significant excess of the number of those included in the List from Daghestan is striking: 32.6%, almost a third of the Russian list (Chechen Republic – 8.7%; Kabardino-Balkar Republic – 5.4%; Republic of Ingushetia – 1.4%; Republic Tatarstan – 1.1%).⁴ The statistics of extremism after 2016 does not give grounds to believe that the extremist activity of the Daghestanis has begun to decline. It has rather changed the forms of its manifestation. So, according to Rosfinmonitoring, the percentage of Daghestanis in one of the lists of those involved in extremist activities and terrorism, published at the end of 2018, turned out to be 24.1%.⁵ In the list published in early 2019, the percentage was already 38.3%.⁶

The list shows other configurations of extremism and terrorism in the Republic. This is not just banditry and random antics of “lost,” as they often say, young people. It is a well-organized, well-thought-out activity with religious goals. It also shows that the allegations about the decline of extremism and terrorism in the Republic of Daghestan are not grounded.

Thirdly, attention should be paid to the fact that a high level of extreme religious consciousness of a part of the Moslem population remains. This is confirmed not only by the information provided by Rosfinmonitoring, but also by the data of opinion polls in Daghestan. According to a sociological survey in the republic, 64.0% of respondents said that one should not follow the laws of the state if they contradict the faith. It is not just young people who feel most hard towards the laws of the

state, but its younger group “from 15 to 20 years old”. The above figure for this group is equal to 70.4% (“not to comply with the law if it is contrary to the faith”). To the question “Could you, for some reason, be in the ranks fighting on the side of ISIS?” 3.5% of the young people surveyed answered “Yes”. Among those with a religious education, this figure was 10.3% (with a secular education – 2.8%). Only 72.3% of respondents confidently say “No”. Those who answered “No” and found it difficult to answer the question make up a rather large group to be sure of the stability of public life in the republic.

Fourthly, the socio-economic situation in the republic remains difficult. For example, if in Russia as a whole, unemployment in April 2019 was 4.9%, then in the North Caucasus Federal District it was the highest in Russia and amounted to 11.5%, and in Daghestan – 14.1%.⁷ This indicator is higher among the youth of the RD. At the same time, according to a sociological survey, the population points to the unsolved social problems of youth in the first place among the causes of extremism and terrorism in the republic.

In Moscow, the unemployment rate is 1.3%. In reality, in RD, the rate of unemployment is higher than officially declared. A large part of the population is just not registered with the Employment Centers as unemployed. In 2017, unemployment in the North Caucasus Federal District, including Daghestan, was lower.⁸ For many years, the average salary of Daghestanis was the lowest in the Russian Federation. And today it remains at the level of outsiders in Russian regions in terms of this indicator. The average salary of Daghestani teachers of secondary schools who conduct educational work to counter extremism and terrorism, in 2018 was equal to the minimum wage (minimum wage) in the region – 11,163 rubles, while today the average salary in the Republic of Daghestan is 25,160 rubles.⁹

All this suggests that it is too early to consider the social factors stimulating protest moods to be overcome and eliminated. Forceful suppression has nothing to do with overcoming the

extremeness of consciousness as a manifestation of the ideology of extremism and terrorism. For many years now we have been observing the absence of a clearly defined secular ideology in countering extremism and terrorism, the excessively high role of force methods in solving the problems of extremism.

This concerns, first of all, the need to solve many social problems, especially those of young people, especially in regions such as Daghestan, which economists call depressed regions. RD budget for 2019–2020 is by 75% subsidized by the federal center.¹⁰ This situation, against the background of the monstrous scale of corruption in the republic, has remained unchanged for many years.

The religious opposition to traditional Islam that exists in the regions still persists, and in some places it is growing.

The worldview confusion of the school education and upbringing system coexists with the excessively high role of the religious socialization of young people in certain regions of the Russian Federation.

This, and many other things is the fact that concerns the internal factors contributing to the extremity of consciousness, and as a result, its radicalization. But there are also external factors, such as the activities of ISIS, the propaganda of the ideas of radical Islam via the Internet, the activities of foreign Islamic organizations in the Russian Federation, etc.¹¹ Among them, a special place is occupied by issues of extremism and terrorism associated with the peculiarities of foreign Islamic education of Russian Moslems.

From the history of foreign Islamic education of the Daghestanis. The issue of foreign Islamic education is not a new problem for the Russian state, which arose at the turn of two centuries – the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Back in the 17th century, a well-known scholar in the Moslem East from the Daghestan village of Kudutl (now Gergebil district of the Republic of Daghestan), Muhammad b. Musa b. Ahmad al Kuduki ar-Ruguja al-Avari ad-Daghestani¹² to set forth to improve his knowledge to Hejaz, Egypt, Yemen, and possibly in the Crimea, Azerbaijan, Iran, Khorasan, Central Asia, Ottoman

Turkey. It is important to note that the theological work of Muhammad al-Kuduqi did not fit into the existing system of Sunni maskhab. Al-Kuduqi wrote: "I refused to follow the interpretations all my life and gave preference to the "book" (the Quran - A. Z.) over the companions" [2, p. 583]. Foreign Islamic education had a great influence on Daghestanis through the "Kudutla school", from which a whole galaxy of prominent Islamic scholars of Daghestan emerged. Describing one of them - Barka Kadi from Kakamakha, the famous Daghestan scholar Ali Kayaev (Zamir Ali) writes that he was "one of those who were the first to oppose the tarikat teaching and muridism" [3, p. 65].

Even in the pre-Soviet period, those studying in foreign Islamic educational institutions were characterized as Salafi-Wahhabis. The famous Daghestani educator and religious leader Ali Kayaev studied Islamic sciences in Al-Azhar (Cairo) in 1905-1907. He closely associated with Egyptian reformers, including Rashid Rida. According to the leaders of Daghestani Sufism, including the late most authoritative Sheikh Said Afandi Chirkeisky, Ali Kayaev is the first Daghestani Wahhabite [4, p. 99].¹³

In fact, the Salafist influence of foreign Islamic education on the Daghestani Islamic consciousness existed before Ali Kayaev. Ali Kayaev himself believed that the spread of religious freedom of thought in Daghestan was the result of reading the books of the Yemeni scholar Salih.¹⁴ Reliable information about the Daghestani theologians, who actually practiced ijtiḥad, is given by the famous orientalist I.Yu. Krachkovsky. His work "Daghestan and Yemen", on the basis of various historical sources, shows that interest in the personality of the Mujtahid Salih of Yemen in Daghestan has existed for a long historical time. Evidence, the lack of complete trust in the tradition (taqlid), Sufi involvement in the secret, the expression by Salih of Yemen of his opinion on various madhhabs suggests that in Daghestan since the 17th century, with the help of his books, the ideas of ijtiḥad were spread. Moreover, the ideas of rationalism, laid

down in the writings of Salih of Yemen, were actively transferred to Daghestan by individual scientists, one of whom was Muhammad al-Kuduki (1652-1717) [2, p. 580; 5, p. 48-53].

The Caucasian governor, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, wrote to Emperor Nicholas II about the danger of foreign Islamic educational influence on Russian statehood as early as at the beginning of the 20th century: "... Deficiencies in the organization of educational affairs lead to the fact that Russian Moslems, intending themselves for spiritual activity, tend to educational institutions, where they often perceive views and beliefs that are dangerous for Russian statehood."¹⁵

The above information shows that the explanations of the reasons for the outflow of Moslems of Russia to foreign educational centers in the Soviet atheistic period of history in the religious and scientific environment do not correspond to reality. They go to other countries for other Islamic knowledge, which was not present either in the Russian Empire or in Soviet Russia, which is not present in post-Soviet Russia either. Firstly, in Russian Islam, little attention is paid to Islamic philosophy. In modern Daghestani Islam, there is no Islamic philosophy at all. This is a consequence of the tradition laid by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111). In his book *Tahafut al-falasifa* (Self-refutation of philosophers) he denied the need for philosophy in religious knowledge. Daghestani Moslems honor the legacy of al-Ghazali. Secondly, in Russian Islam, the Hanafi and Shafi'i madhhabs, which cannot absorb all the wealth of Moslem sciences dominate. Thirdly, the Sufi trend, dominant in Daghestan, inherently, cannot provide Islamic knowledge that is based on Salafi ideas about "pure" Islam. Daghestanis are looking for "pure" Islam in foreign education. The survey data given in the text confirm this. So far, Moslem education in Russia cannot provide such knowledge. Even if it were possible with the involvement of foreign experts, for religious and political reasons this knowledge will not be disseminated by representatives of official Islam in Daghestan.

Russian Moslems in foreign educational networks. According to the available publications on foreign Islamic education, mainly Russian Moslems study in Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Uzbekistan (Bukhara), Jordan, Sudan, Bahrain, Malaysia, Morocco. The survey revealed that Daghestanis have a wider range of their Islamic educational interests in its geographical expression: Georgia (Adjara), Azerbaijan, Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Yemen, Kyrgyzstan, China, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Uzbekistan, Tunisia, Turkey – 18 states altogether. There is no reason to believe that this list fully describes the geography of the countries of foreign education of the Daghestanis. According to a sociological survey, Daghestani Moslems are most interested in the states of Islamic education in the following order: Syria – 28.6%, Egypt – 16.3%, Turkey – 14.3%, Malaysia – 6.1%.

One of the most popular Islamic educational institutions is the Islamic University Al-Azhar (Cairo), which has ancient roots (founded in 972).

The famous Daghestani Salafi Abas Kebedov believes that “almost 90 percent of Islamic knowledge came from Al-Azhar, Egypt.”¹⁶ Al-Azhar today is a gigantic religious and educational complex, where more than 120 thousand people study, 25 thousand of them are foreigners. The number of Russian students, according to various sources, ranges from one thousand to one thousand five hundred people. These are mainly people from the North Caucasus. According to one of Al-Azhar's students, Amin Magomedov, today up to 200 people from Daghestan are studying at the university at different departments.¹⁷ In 1996, 1.5 thousand Daghestanis studied in foreign educational centers [6, p. 5]. The famous Daghestani religious scholar K.M. Khanbabaev, in an interview with the author of the text, spoke about 3,000 Daghestanis who went abroad for Islamic knowledge. There is no reason to believe that these indicators have decreased at present.¹⁸

According to expert assessments and the students themselves studying in Al-Azhar, Russian youth traveling to Egypt with the aim of receiving a Moslem education is not homogeneous in the specific nature of this goal. One group is represented by those who are determined to pursue a long university course with the intention of completing it and receiving an al-Azhar graduate diploma. "Unfortunately, there are not so many of them."

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TOHIR KURBONOV. INFLUENCE OF MODERN CIVILIZATION ON THE UZBEK NATIONAL MENTALITY // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: civilization, mentality, national mentality, transformation of society, spirituality, national consciousness, humanism, national identity.

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Citation: Kurbonov T. Influence of Modern Civilization on the Uzbek National Mentality // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 65–70. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.05

Abstract. This article analyses the influence that modern civilization exerts on the mentality of the Uzbek people. The article also

scientifically describes customs, traditions, language, religion, psychology, worldview and mentality of the nation.

By the end of the 20th century, the world has entered a phase of significant structural and functional changes that have a considerable impact on economic, political, social and spiritual facets of society and affect all countries, including Uzbekistan. The centuries-old national way of thinking is enriched with new elements and features. Matters related to the national mentality are of particular interest, since the national mentality influences social processes in the world and in the country and at the same time is influenced by them. That is why in the years following the independence first President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov used to say that the country's own path of development should be suited to national specificities [1, p. 34].

In the context of society transformation in Uzbekistan, it is important to analyse and explore issues, related to the change in the national mentality, as follows:

1) Economic transformation is a factor changing not only the nation's ways, but also its mentality. However, the issue of the impact of economic reform programmes on the national character of the Uzbekistan people has not been well studied yet.

2) The national mentality of any society is affected by the changes in the social structure. How much has the social structure of the society changed over the years of independence? That is the question that needs to be answered.

3) Over the years of independence, the Uzbek people have experienced an unprecedented process of spiritual rebirth. Spiritual development leads to a completely new national mentality. Therefore, all the issues need to be explored in the context of spirituality & national mentality.

4) Uzbekistan's integration into the world community as an independent country has created new factors and tools that have an impact on the mentality of the nation. It is also important to

determine these factors and tools and analyse changes in the national way of thinking.

5) Democratization of the Uzbek society and modernization of the country demand that we seek solutions to the problems inherent in our national mentality in the light of social scientific knowledge.

The change in the national mentality in the context of social transformation is a fundamental and relevant problem for Uzbekistan. The processes following the independence caused inevitable changes in national consciousness and spirituality and is deeply rooted in social relations. Today, national development, unity and spiritual integrity are priorities for Uzbekistan. The logic of today promotes us to give serious consideration to the change in the people's character and mentality.

National characteristics and personality traits build on certain socio-economic, natural-geographical and political conditions, religious ties and relations with other people in times of war and peace. Russian scientists A. Panarin and I. Pantin note that mentality is no more than an end product of mental and psychological state of people and interpret mentality as a related phenomenon [1]. There is also a view that this concept constitutes a set of particular rituals and ceremonies of the nation. In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics, the national mentality also comprises intelligence and psycho-social features of the nation. These characteristics stem from an integral system of historical background, customs, rituals and ceremonies of the people. They act as the driving forces of the mentality.

In the age of market relations and dominance of the state-of-the-art IT, the modern Uzbek mentality should become even more important. Changing world requires fast, resourceful and at the same time evolving approach to the people's behaviour patterns, as well as planning, thorough preparation, understanding and cooperation. And also, the role of individuals in the system of relations between the individual and the society & the individual and the State has increased markedly.

The spread of civilization raises the need for a different approach to the role that people play in life and society. The role of the individual in society is becoming increasingly important, and their influence on social life is increasing, either directly or through a particular community or group. It is well known that the democratic order of that time was a phenomenon born in the Western world. The principles of democracy currently applied to the nations of the world are a reflection of the lifestyle that the peoples of Western Europe lead.

Globalization, i.e. the Western model of democratization, which is part of the civilizing process, is experiencing certain difficulties while taking root in the lives of the peoples of the East. Thus, every state must undergo a period of adjustment and at times obtain results which are the opposite of what it hoped for.

That is why Uzbekistan has consistently pursued a policy of preserving the spiritual integrity of the people, stayed true to itself, and supported the very best in the human nature. In this regard, on the 16th August 2017 President Shavkat Mirziyoyev issued a decree No. IIII-3217 on the development of tourism during 2018/2019 according to which tourism was set to be primarily aimed at attracting tourists to the holy sites in Uzbekistan by revitalizing event organization, running a relevant promotional campaign and organizing logistics, including charter flights.

A government decision on organizational matters and technical facilities of tourist zones and mountain clusters in 2018/2022 is very important. It's also vital to cultivate the notion of the national cultural heritage among the majority of the population. The national cultural heritage should be based on the national mentality, an objective study and evaluation of the country's historical background and assessment of its contribution to a world civilization. So, what does "mentality" mean? Professor K. Khanazarov defines the Latin concept of mentality as a set of "mental and spiritual capacities, mental

characteristics and abilities to analyse the laws of life held by a social or ethnic group of people" [2, p. 3].

The national mentality comprises specificities of a nation, its way of thinking, work & life (for example, the Uzbek people live either in cities or villages), its culture and contribution to a major body of values. It is widely known that different natural, social, and cultural settings of each nation shape the peoples' ability to deal with the joys and problems in everyday life, their professional skills and contribution to the development of a universal culture.

The mentality of the nation is defined not only by its historical ancestral heritage. Rather, it shows the character building of people of the same ethnic background, their personal characteristics, professional skills and daily behaviour.

From the very beginning the Uzbek people have always tended to live in groups. Furthermore, the Uzbek mentality features respecting adults, caring for children, helping each other, and candid, friendly & sympathetic attitude to all the people regardless of their ethnicity. The best qualities of the Uzbek people include patriotism, hardworking, and special respect for teachers.

Most Uzbeks care not only about their personal well-being, but also about the well-being of their families, relatives and neighbours. That is the greatest spiritual value and the jewel of the human heart. For centuries, the Uzbek people have stayed just, humane and kind to their neighbours. While humanity is integral to the national spirit of the Uzbek people, cruelty and violence are foreign to their nature. Uzbeks always face problems and enjoy the moments of happiness with patience and inner peace [3, p. 77].

The Uzbek national identity is a unique example of Asian cultural and spiritual life. It requires building on the experience of ancestors and respecting them. On the path to independence the country has embarked upon the major reform of socio-political, economic, spiritual and educational systems. The

effectiveness of the reforms is both directly and indirectly related to the changing mentality of the people. That is why the human factor and national mentality are essential when improving the system of public administration, teaching citizens about self-governance via local authorities, broadly promoting the principles of social participation and building a civil society against the new background. Consequently, the State now carries out its functions not by strengthening the authority, but rather by expanding democratic self-governance.

The Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan reflects the strategy on five priority areas for development in 2017/2021. The government is meant to serve the Uzbek society and is charged, above all, with establishing a direct dialogue with the people, protecting civil rights and freedoms of citizens, and ensuring the rule of law. The spirit of change has an impact on people's relationships, views, objectives, plans, social goals and whole lives. It also improves social mobility of the people.

Thus, a great deal of creative work done in the country over the years of independence resulted in a change in the mentality of the people.

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ODIL MUSAEV. SHERZOD KARSHIEV. PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN UZBEKISTAN // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: religion, tolerance, faith, multinationality, interethnic relations, interethnic conflicts, interethnic harmony.

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Citation: Musaev O., Karshiev Sh. Problems of Religious Tolerance and Interethnic Relations in Uzbekistan // Russia and Moslem World, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 71–78. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.06

Abstract. This article analyzes some aspects of religious tolerance and interethnic relations in Uzbekistan.

In its centuries-long history, Uzbekistan has been and remains a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Being president of the Republic of Uzbekistan I.A. Karimov noted: "Millions of people of different nationalities and religions have their destiny and their future connected with Uzbekistan and live in peace in this ancient and generous land" [1. P. 175].

We know that interethnic relations are often represented as a major component of public policy in multinational democratic societies.

In our multi-human society, in terms of structure and character, special attention is paid to the maintenance of inter-ethnic harmony. Therefore, the first President of the Republic of

Uzbekistan I.A. Karimov emphasized the nature of inter-ethnic relations in our country and said: "Uzbekistan has a lot of wealth, but our greatest wealth is our greatest value, particularly peace, inter-ethnic friendship and solidarity in our society" [2. P. 181].

From this perspective, another important task today is to ensure that the idea of inter-ethnic harmony in our country is a permanent priority. In the minds of the people of our country, which is keen on building a humane, just and legal society, it is important to note that each nation has its own national culture, that every ethnic group is unique in the world in order to respect attitude to them, and not the preference of one over the other, is extremely important.

When it comes to religion, it is rationally to think of such a universal concept as "tolerance," which harmonizes religious and secular views, and to think of the problems associated with this concept.

The Declaration of Principles on Tolerance adopted by UNESCO in 1995 in the UN defines and describes the essence of the concept of tolerance as follows: tolerance means respect, acceptance and understanding of various ways in which different cultures of the world demonstrate self-expression and distinctive characteristics.

Tolerance generates knowledge, sincerity, open communication, independent opinion, conscience, and faith. Tolerance is in the unity of diversity. This is not only an obligation, but also a political and legal necessity. Tolerance is a force that promotes peace and leads society from war to a culture of peace.

Tolerance is not a concession, not a prudence or flattery, but an attitude to the admission of universal human rights and freedoms. Any way, the tolerance does not infringe above-mentioned values. Tolerance must be demonstrated by all people, groups and states.

Tolerance is a commitment to assert human rights, support the victory of pluralism (including ethnic and cultural pluralism), democracy and law.

Tolerance is a concept that recognizes the principles set out in international human rights law and means denial of doctrine and the establishment of absolute truth.

Demonstration of tolerance does not mean indifference to human rights or tolerance of social injustice or freedom from one's beliefs and support of others' ones. This means that everyone can freely profess their religion, and everyone must recognize that others have this right. This means that people differ from each other in their appearance, image, behavior, speech, values, and that they have the right to live in peace and maintain their individuality. It also means that views cannot be imposed on others [3. P. 91-92].

The impact of religious tolerance on inter-ethnic relations is:

Firstly, religion and religious values do not oppose the ethnopolitical paradigm that is forming in Uzbekistan, but contribute to development by their own means and methods. The strategic goal of the ethnopolitical paradigm is applicable to all members of the community, including representatives of religious beliefs, confessions and religious organizations.

Secondly, Uzbekistan is a secular democratic and legal state in which religion is separated from the state and religion does not interfere in the affairs of the state, and the state does not also interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations. However, this does not mean that religion and religious authorities do whatever they want and that they can be indifferent to the state and society. The state and society cannot be indifferent to social and moral, as well as political and legal values of believers.

Thirdly, when people, nations live together in peace, when they take strategic goals as their life goal, they can achieve social progress.

Fourthly, ethnocultural pluralism and polytheism are natural in multi-ethnic states. One of the challenges of the ethnopolitical paradigm is to maintain a compromise between multi-ethnic pluralism and polytheism and to ensure that they serve the interests of social development.

Fifthly, religious tolerance is not a sympathy for destructive groups, fundamentalism and terrorism, but a phenomenon that can constantly distinguish positive or negative characteristics of actions and ideological views. The fact that man is a “social being” imposes certain requirements, even restrictions, on his actions and ideological views. These social requirements and restrictions are determined by legal norms and spiritual and moral imperatives.

Sixthly, the reliance on religion and religious values in inter-ethnic relations is ensured by freedom of conscience. This is the constitutional right of a person to profess any religion, respect, promote and promulgate any religious values. However, religion and religious organizations cannot directly interfere in inter-ethnic relations, somehow organize them and create one nation against another. Religion or religious organization based on national and ethnic affiliation contradict the multi-ethnic and polytheistic character of the state. Religion does not choose a nation or ethnicity, confession of religion is the concern of every person for choice.

Seventhly, the application of historical and cultural, sociocultural experience accumulated by religions and religious organizations in inter-ethnic relations is of practical importance for both sides, especially for social development. However, the ethnopolitical paradigm must always take into account that there are conservative and dogmatic elements in religion and that destructive groups of people try to use them. Due to the fact that religious fundamentalism and terrorism are widespread, it became a reality to look at each other doubtfully rather than to believe each other in inter-state and international relations.

Polytheism has been established in Uzbekistan: more than 95 per cent of the population profess Islam and the rest of people profess other religions.

Traditionally, as a place for development of ancient religions, our country occupies a special position in the history of world civilization. On this blessed land, our predecessors always respected people of other religions, and no one can deny that they fought for the freedom of the country with these people. Indeed, our region became the centre of diverse religions, cultures and lifestyles and ensured peaceful coexistence of different peoples.

It is impossible to divide world religions into different groups that do not support democracy, contradict democracy or are neutral. For example, Christianity supported both royal rights and the republican drive for equality. Some groups support authoritarian regimes, while others protect democracy and human rights. Therefore, as a complex social phenomenon, religion can have diverse and sometimes contrary to progress and growth sects and groups. One of the most important challenges at present is the use of positive aspects of religion, which serve the progress and spirituality of mankind, as well as form religious tolerance.

Religious tolerance is an idea based on ethnic tension, civil war and fanaticism, bad historical experience. Religious tolerance means not freedom from one's faith and religion, but respecting human dignity, freedom of conscience and freedom of thought.

The existence of equal rights based on the priority of human rights and freedoms among various religious communities living in our country and established interfaith cooperation form the basis for social stability in the country. The fact that our state is occupied with religion is based on the principle of "people cannot live without faith," which contributes to the improvement of interfaith relations. Article 31 of our Constitution states: "Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all people. Everyone has the right to profess or not to profess any

religion. Any coercive imposition of religion is unacceptable" [4. P. 8]. There are described basic principles of relations between the secular state and religion. According to it:

First, the state is committed to pursue anti-religious policies in accordance with its basic law;

Secondly, it is recognized that to profess or not to profess any religion is an inalienable right of everyone;

Thirdly, on the basis of the two above-mentioned fundamental principles, the state guarantees that it does not allow the forced acceptance of religious views by people in the regulation and maintenance of religious relations in society.

During the years of independence, the number of religious organizations increased. If in 1990 there were 95 religious organizations in the country, then by 2015 their number exceeded 2200.

During the years of independence, the system of religious education also developed. For example, before independence, there were only two Islamic religious schools, and today there are 11 such schools.

For the first time, there were granted scholarships for religious students. Over years of independence, the level of religious education of imams increased significantly. In 1997, only 4.2% of them had higher and advanced education, and in 2005 this proportion was 84.5%, and today it is about one hundred percent [5. P. 116–17].

Religious interests of representatives of nations and nationalities in Uzbekistan are respected. Churches, churches, preaching houses and sanctuaries seized in Soviet times and used for other purposes were returned to believers.

Actually, there are more than 30 Orthodox churches in our country. Alexander Nevsky, St. Vladimir, St. Uspensky in Tashkent, St. Sergeyevesky in Ferghana, St. Uspensky in Almalyk and other churches serve to develop inter-ethnic relations and spread the idea of respect and veneration of other nationalities.

It is noteworthy that representatives of different nations and nationalities also participate in construction of churches. For example, local population participated in the construction of an Orthodox church in Termez [6. P. 35].

The most confessional regions in the country are the city of Tashkent and Tashkent region. They are followed by Syrdarya, Ferghana, Samarkand and Navoi regions.

Inability to estimate the role of religion in a society that can affect the mind, heart and spirit of millions of people, failure to harmonize religious values with development and laical spirit can lead to negative consequences.

Religious tolerance in Uzbekistan is based on Eastern values, life force of Eastern civilizations and their positive experiences. Many of our values are historically associated with Islam and its humanist traditions.

In our opinion, we need to explore and promote more widely the values of the new ethno-political paradigm in Islam and socio-moral ideas that will help maintain peace, brotherhood and tolerance in our country.

Interfaith relations play a critical role in multinational and polytheistic states. Building interfaith relations based on the principles of tolerance will affect the general spiritual environment in society, as well as socio-political stability.

As Islam Karimov noted: "In our independent, liberal, multinational country, as well as in Islam, other faiths, such as Orthodoxy, Judaism and Catholicism, function freely. No matter religion or sectionalism, we are glad that representatives of these faiths work with us and work hard for the prosperity and growth of the peoples of Uzbekistan" [7. P. 175].

Whereas religious tolerance is based on human values and aimed at strengthening inter-ethnic relations, it ensures social stability in society.

The new ethno-political paradigm in our country directs all religions and faiths to achieve the goals of democratic development.

As a result, the strategic goal of the Republic of Uzbekistan, that is, to build a democratic legal state and civil society, to form a new generation with high moral standards, became a common goal of religions and faiths. They create noble intentions and noble deeds in people; they establish spiritual and moral standards in interpersonal relations through high beliefs and belief in God. Religion enhances social and spiritual progress by cleanup of a human soul of evil thoughts and intentions. That is why it is vital from a social perspective to rely on these positives in religion and use them to develop inter-ethnic relations.

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

BAKHROM MAMADIEV. FEATURES OF CENTERS FOR PUBLISHING FATWAS IN SAUDI ARABIA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Ulema, fatwas, The KSA Fatwa Institute, Saudi Arabia, Council of Senior Ulema (CSU).

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Citation: Mamadiev B. Features of Centers for Publishing Fatwas in Saudi Arabia // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 79–93. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.07

Abstract. In Saudi Arabia, conservative Ulema are trying to resist the process of the country's modernization. Other clerics take a balanced view of the progress of Saudi society, including changing their religious positions in response to changing circumstances. There are two main problems that lead to the fragmentation of the uniformity of religious thought in the kingdom: the increased political activity of the clergy and undeniable social changes in society. From the end of the 17th century to the 90s of the last century, the clergy of Saudi Arabia issued fatwas that rejected and protected the population from the achievements of modern science, culture and art. The Ulema criticized King Fahd for his decision to allow the presence of US military bases on Saudi territories, arguing that cooperation with non-Moslems is unacceptable. The Ulema liberal to the state supported their government

and issued a fatwa justifying the state's decision on the principle of "eliminating great harm with less harm." The KSA Fatwa Institute was radically reformed in August 2010, the circle of persons who could issue fatwas was limited, but not all clergymen were silenced. In 2011, the Ulema issued a fatwa banning protest rallies and demonstrations in the KSA. The bureaucratization of religious institutions in Saudi Arabia weakened the position of the Ulema, as they became the object of state control and became an important factor supporting the Ulema in the face of modernization.

In the context of the global development of information technologies, the Internet and social networks, anyone who wishes can easily wreak havoc by applying distorted forms of interpretation of the norms of Islamic sources. Riots, the formation of fundamentalist movements, and the resurgence of political Islamist groups have coincided with the fragmentation of the structure of many countries, unrest in their institutions and the severing of their relations to such an extent that large areas have fallen under the control of militias and other countries. Despite their former greatness, some countries are unable to withstand modern ideological threats and easily lose the most important attributes of statehood, are recognized as failed and, ultimately, become subject to imposed religious rules adapted to please individual confessors.

In these processes, the fatwas of the Moslem Ulema play an important role, being the main way to resolve misunderstandings and maintain the necessary Islamic spirit of the population. A dangerous aspect associated with the issuance of fatwas is the creation by opposition and destructive organizations of groups of fakikhs (theologian-lawyer) who exaggeratedly appeal to social, economic, cultural and other processes, pursuing their own narrowly selfish, and sometimes, paid-for interests, discredit governments, organizations or individual officials based on questionable or outdated fatwas. In some cases, they try to destroy the traditional religious beliefs of peoples by using

fatwas issued in inappropriate cultural conditions, periods and circumstances. The fatwas of the leaders of such groups are comprehensively implanted in the minds of the common people and are presented in artificial forms as a natural “democratic” reaction of the entire ummah. In this case, such Western slogans as “freedom of speech” and “human rights” are also playing into their hands.

A positive moment in the light of all this chaos is that many countries are centralizing and modernizing their religious institutions to flexibly coordinate the religious consciousness of the population in accordance with the general position of governments and new aspects of life and development. [1]

In the Moslem world, the question of the correct interpretation of Islamic norms is acute. Despite the centuries-old process of the formation of Islamic dogma, its norms, to this day, are being improved in interpretation and are facing resistance of the conservative Ulema. Realizing the importance of continuous and systematic research, the leading countries develop flexible and average interpretations that meet both Islamic and modern norms, aimed at resolving disputes, adapting to ongoing processes, avoiding misunderstandings and contradictions in society. The role of coordinator in such matters in Moslem countries is played by ministries, departments and organizations that regulate clergy issues, and especially their bodies that issue fatwas.

When considering the features of the institutions of fatwas of each country, it is necessary to take into account the historical and national-cultural identity, the form of government of the state, the privilege of adherents of one or another Islamic school, the political and socio-economic situation, as well as other features of each country.

In modern Saudi Arabia, some conservative Ulema are struggling to resist the country's modernization process and socio-political transformations affecting the kingdom's fundamental religious traditions, established in the 18th century

by Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Other clerics take a balanced view of the progress of Saudi society, including changing their religious positions in response to changing circumstances. Moderate fatwas of pro-state Ulema adapted to the changing socio-political situation in Saudi Arabia are not always positively received by those who consider themselves loyal to the teachings of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. This leads to controversy and intense debate among Saudi religious circles over the authenticity of Saudi religious identity.

There are two main problems for the Saudi clergy that lead to the fragmentation of the uniformity of religious thought in the kingdom. Firstly, this is the strengthening of the political activity of the clergy, and secondly, these are undeniable social changes in society. With the increasing modernization of the Saudi state, especially with the implementation of social, political and economic reforms, the intellectual gap between subjects who received a pro-Western and traditional Islamic education is widening [2: 105]. The introduction of Western mechanisms of government is accompanied by great concern among some clerics and their followers. This has led to the emergence of various conservative groups whose goal is to oppose the liberalization of Saudi society [3: 155-158].

The activity of conservative Ulema lasted from the end of the 17th century to the 90s of the last century. During this period, the clergy of Saudi Arabia issued fatwas that rejected and protected the population from the achievements of modern science, culture and art. Among such Islamic fatwas are the following:

- "ban on images, photographs and sculptures - this fatwa has now been canceled. The well-known Saudi fakikh and mufassir Sheikh Muhammad ibn Salih Al-Useimin (1925-2001) in his book "Majmu ul-Fatawa wa rasail" interprets this fatwa in the following way - "an image is understood as some object with a human soul, if only this is not required by necessity or need, to identify an identity, issue a driver's license, establish certain

rights, etc. As for other purposes, I do not allow this, no matter whether it is in the form of a sculpture or an image, whether this image is created by a machine or by hand ... And I continue to give a fatwa on this issue and order those who have images for memories, destroy them and I'm even more strict with images of those who are already dead" [4: 287-288].

- "ban on driving a bicycle" - in the 1950s, an official fatwa was issued in Saudi Arabia, in which bicycles were called "the devil's horses" - at present this fatwa has been canceled;

- "ban for women on watching TV without niqab" - this fatwa affirmed that TV presenters can see women through the screen - at present this fatwa has been canceled.

During this period, preachers tightly controlled religious politics and became popular. For example, in the 1950s and 1970s, sales of sermon cassettes and fatwas in KSA competed with sales of Arab star singers. Many fatwas forbidding watching TV, using a camera, traveling, having fun, approaching a woman, giving flowers, etc. were issued. In the late 90s, they also declared that novels, poetry and the Internet are sinful because they incite debauchery [5].

Doctor of Sociological Sciences of Riyadh University named after King Saud - Muhammad Al-Atiyek called the authors of such fatwas "hyperbolic (exaggerated) Ulama" whose rhetoric contaminated the entire society of the kingdom.

In August 1990, after the occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi troops, Saudi Arabia announced mobilization and turned to the United States for military assistance. King Fahd allowed the temporary deployment of thousands of American and allied military forces to Saudi territory [6: 53-54].

The situation in the kingdom was aggravated not only by an external threat, but also by increased internal protests and discontent among the population about the violation of the sanctity of Saudi shrines.

Conservative Ulama displayed political activity and criticized Saudi Arabia's ruling family, led by King Fahd, for its

decision to allow the United States presence on Saudi soil as a base from which their forces can fight Saddam Hussein's forces. The main opposition stemmed from the fact that, according to these Ulema, cooperation with non-Moslems was unacceptable [7]. The main argument of the instigators who sowed contradictions in society was the following ayah of the Holy Quran:

“O you who have believed! Verily, polytheists are unclean. And let them after this year of theirs do not come close to the Protected Mosque. If you are afraid of poverty, then Allah will provide you with wealth out of His mercy, if He wishes. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Wise” (Tafsir al-Saadi, Surah At-Tawba, ayah 28).

In addition, they based their position on the doctrine of “al-wala wa-l-bara” 2, who served as the head of the Supreme Court of Saudi Arabia, that is, on the requirement to observe absolute devotion to God and a complete denial of unfaithfulness to God and the actions associated with him [8: 11].

Under these conditions, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz appealed to the members of the Council of Senior Ulema (CSU) with a request to issue a fatwa that would justify his appeal for help to non-Moslems, i.e. the USA and the deployment of their troops on the territory of the kingdom.

When the Ulema liberal to the ruling family faced the state's decision to repel Saddam Hussein, working with the US-led international coalition, they backed their government. Grand Mufti Abdulaziz ibn Baz secured religious legitimacy supporting the ruling family by issuing a fatwa justifying the state's decision on the principle of “ahaffa al-Dararain (“eliminating great harm with less harm”).

Many Saudi Ulema, especially those loyal to the state, are still trying to gradually depoliticize the al-wala wa-l-bara doctrine, emphasizing that it requires Moslems to be different from non-Moslems. This includes prohibiting Moslems from celebrating non-Moslem holidays [9: 99-110].

At the same time, the first Gulf War largely contributed to the fragmentation of the unity of the clergy of Saudi Arabia. This was not a new phenomenon: the Ulema had previously occasionally faced disagreements on political issues concerning the leadership of the Saudi state. However, divisions among the Ulema have never been as intense as during the first Gulf War. Those who opposed the state openly and fiercely criticized the ruling family [10].

After the Gulf War, the government of Saudi Arabia got under pressure of Islamic radicals, who demanded political reforms, strict adherence to the provisions of Sharia, the withdrawal of Western countries, especially American troops, from the sacred land of Arabia. Petitions were sent to King Fahd calling for broadening government power, wider public participation in political life, and greater economic justice [11: 54].

The presence of the American military contingent in the KSA is to this day used to discredit the ruling family in the kingdom by the opposition and conservative ulema.

From the late 1990s of the last century to the present day, one of the aspects of the reforms carried out by the KSA government is the gradual restriction of the role of religion and the influence of theologians. Active work is being carried out to promote moderate views through fatwas [12].

Currently, the Council of Senior Ulema (CSU) of Saudi Arabia is a state institution, all its members are appointed by the king, they are paid wages from the state budget. The members of the Council hold their positions for no more than 4 years. Since 2009, the Council has 21 members. The Supreme Mufti is the head of the Council, which at the same time directs its substructure - the Standing Committee on Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas. The council also issues a fatwa approving the coronation of the new king. In theory, it serves the ruling family and tests his adherence to Islamic principles, however, in practice, it never objects to any decision of the King.

Similar to all spheres of the religious apparatus of Saudi Arabia, the institution of fatwas of the kingdom was subjected to a radical reform in August 2010 by the decree of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. The kingdom's strong conservative ideology and the vulnerability of the clergy began to threaten the cohesion of Saudi society. In this regard, royal decree limited the circle of persons who could issue fatwas. The document stated that only religious leaders officially approved by the government could issue fatwas. It was separately emphasized that only priests approved by the Council of Senior Ulema (CSU) have the right to issue fatwas.

In his message to the Supreme Mufti Abdulaziz Al Shaykh, the king wrote:

“As part of our religious and national duty, we want you to ensure that fatwas are issued only by members of the Council of Senior Ulema and other clerics who are authorized to do so. Separate fatwas on personal matters such as questions of worship, business relationships, personal matters are exempt from this decision, but they must be between the questioner and the scholar. There should be a complete ban on any topic related to strange or obsolete views. When unqualified persons issue fatwas and such actions undermine official state institutions, then these cases will come under state jurisdiction”... [13]

Taking into account the peculiarities of the monarchical form of government, this letter is regarded as a normative act in which the Supreme Mufti is made responsible for observing the clear limitations of the Ulema, who are given the right to issue fatwas.

The document also outlines the issues on which Islamic rulings can be issued by other Ulema, subject to strict confidentiality between the questioner and the scholar. Restricting the publicity of published fatwas on such issues is qualified as avoiding the spread of incorrect interpretations and distortions of the fatwas in society.

The document strictly prohibits the use of controversial and distorted, as well as obsolete fatwas and other norms of Islam that do not correspond to modern conditions. It is indicated that if the Ulema issue a fatwa that would contradict or undermine the activities of state institutions, then these Ulema will be held accountable in accordance with the laws of the kingdom.

The king also commissioned the high mufti to identify scholars capable of issuing fatwas. In the structure of the Council of Senior Ulema (CSU) there has been created a new department which oversees the work of the Standing Committee for Research and Issuing Fatwas. The main responsibility of this department is to monitor the issuance of fatwas and prevent the participation of outside scientists in this matter. The new department has branches in all regions of the kingdom, which are responsible for appointing approved Ulema who are allowed to issue fatwas and assessing the legality of their Islamic rulings.

In accordance with this decree, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Waqfs of Saudi Arabia has instructed all imams and preachers to observe the new rules and explain the content of the King's decision to the population during Friday sermons. The ministry also ordered its employees not to accept requests for fatwas. For example, the president of the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud in Riyadh took strong action against any teacher who violated the king's decree. Some scholars have been publicly reprimanded for not following the new rules, including Sheikh Yusuf al-Ahmad, who argued that using women as cashiers in a supermarket violated Islamic norms.

In the framework of the implementation of the new rules, several centers that issued fatwas were closed, including websites and TV and radio broadcasts of religious satellite channels. The Saudi Communications and Information Technology Commission ordered all websites to shut down subsections of fatwas, and those that refused to comply were blocked. Television and radio programs of Sheikh Abdul Mohsin al-Obeikan, a senior adviser to the Royal Court, were also taken off

the air as he was not a member of the Council of Senior Ulema (CSU).

However, not all unauthorized clerics were silenced. While others self-censored or closed their websites and centers, Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Barrak continued to issue fatwas. Al-Barrak enjoys great authority in the rigidly conservative community, while he does not hold any official position in the government and is not a member of the Council of Senior Ulema (CSU). His famous fatwa, issued before the new king's decree in February 2010, is that "those who support the possibility of free mixing of the sexes in Saudi Arabia should be executed if they do not renounce their beliefs." Although measures have been taken to reduce Al-Barrak's influence, his independence, authority in society and numerous supporters do not allow the authorities to condemn him.

As for the relationship between the state and the clergy, the government rarely turns to the Ulema when making any decisions. Often a decision is made, and then it goes through a process of approval by the religious apparatus [13].

One of the important tasks of the High Council of the Ulema is to provide religious support for the domestic and foreign policy of the kingdom's government.

For example, in 2011, the Council issued a fatwa that regularized the issue that "protest demonstrations are intellectually deviant and have partisan ties. Demonstrations and everything that leads to disunity and fragmentation of the nation is not allowed by the Shariah. Reforms can only come from the provision of suggestions and recommendations, and not by collecting signatures on intimidating or discord-inciting statements that violate what God has commanded."

This fatwa was based on the 83rd ayah of surah 4 "An-Nisa" of the Holy Quran, which reads: "When they receive the news of security or danger, they divulge it. If they turned with it to the Messenger and those who have influence among them, then those who can investigate it would learn about it from them.

If it were not for the mercy and grace of Allah to you, then you, with the exception of a few, would have followed the devil" (Tafsir al-Saadi).

This fatwa, based on an ayah from the Holy Quran, helped to drown out the escalating protest reformist sentiments in Saudi society, incited by pro-Western oppositionists who are still trying to undermine the monarchical form of government in the KSA.

With the accession to the throne of King Salman bin Abdulaziz (January 2015), his son Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman stepped up the reform policy, among other things, in the field of deradicalization the consciousness of society. As a result, the conservative Ulema began to spread among the Saudi population such arguments as: "Where were these tolerant religious views and flexible doctrinal interpretations of Islamic norms hidden earlier?", "Why did they begin to be announced all at once?" "The implied and sometimes explicit conclusions and interpretations of moderate religious views that are becoming popular today are part of a major conspiracy against Islam!"

Some Saudi scholars acknowledge the existence of contradictions and controversies in Islamic norms regarding restrictions on women, arts and entertainment, as well as relationship of Moslems with persons of other religions. In their opinion, those who bring charges against moderate religious views do not have a deep knowledge of fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence, on the basis of which moderate fatwas are formed, which they consider heresy.

In his interview with the press, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman stated that "Islam is filled with various factions like the religious-political organization" Moslem Brotherhood "and the Sururist3 movement [14], which seek only to gain power through the use of religion". Referring to the ongoing changes in the KSA, in particular regarding the departure from the restrictions imposed by these groups on women, he stated that the common Moslem conscience supports the principles of decency and good manners without any restrictions on the color

and austerity of abaya (long traditional Arab woman's dress with sleeves intended to be worn in public, usually black) or other dresses worn by Moslem women. Clothing is a manifestation of local cultural norms and conditions. Take a look at the clothes of women from Mauritania or Sudan and compare them to those of women from Chechnya or Iran. They all have distinctive features that reflect their respective indigenous cultures. The main idea of Islam in such cases is the emphasis on good manners and decency."

Thus, the Saudi heir emphasized that there is nothing new in the moderate religious discourse and it is not a reflection of the current trend. "The point is that closed thinking was open and a stream of fresh air began to flow into society," he said [15].

On the one hand, the bureaucratization of religious institutions in Saudi Arabia weakened the position of the ulama, since they became the object of state control, on the other hand, it became an important factor supporting the Ulema in the conditions of modernization [16: 728-729].

In this regard, in the new era of reforms in Saudi Arabia, carried out by the crown prince, the main task of the fatwa institution is to gradually instill in society moderate and secular views based on the principles of tolerance and leniency. There is a process of liberalization of the consciousness of society, in particular, reedition, cancellation and adaptation of new fatwas for the above tasks. An example are the fatwas allowing women to work, participate in elections, drive a car, do not wear a niqab, that is, to appear in public with an open face, as well as some others.

Some fatwas shocked Saudi society, most notably the one that allowed women to drive. Such shocks occurring in the process of modernization are accompanied by the formation in the Saudi society of distrust in the "old" fatwas, which severely restricted them. Many Saudis are convinced that fatwas are changing in line with the official position of the government, as a result of which the conservative part of the population loses

confidence in pro-state religious figures. Most preachers seek to prevent and suppress crime, and therefore, they issue fatwas that restrict certain actions that are not prohibited, for fear that they may lead to sinful actions. However, conservative opponents are trying to oppose new fatwas in order to confuse the kingdom's society.

Thus, the modernization of the institution of fatwas, on the one hand, finds the support of the younger generation of Saudis, on the other hand, it forms a distrust of the clergy in certain "conservative" strata of the population.

The Saudi Arabian Fatwa Institute issues fatwas that can be classified into two categories:

The first is fatwas aimed at preserving the conservative nature of Saudi traditions, in turn, it means gender segregation and moral order;

The second is where the Ulema are willing to provide more flexibility in such areas as media and medical innovation [17: 51-60].

Although the Supreme Council of Ulema and its substructure, the Standing Committee on Research and Fatwas, have the authority to issue fatwas, some Ulema periodically ignore and even oppose official fatwas with their own views.

The Ulema are far from unity when it comes to defining social acceptability. On social issues, they can be divided into the following categories: reformers, traditionalists, and ultra-radicals. This classification is relative, as there are a large number of Ulema who may be liberal on certain issues and conservative on others.

Often, the Ulema face harsh criticism from other Ulema for pushing the boundaries in rethinking socio-religious issues. In 2014, Ahmad al-Hamidi, the former head of the religious police station in Mecca, appeared on Al-Arabiya TV and said that a niqab covering a woman's face, interpreted by Salafis as a religious obligation, should not be mandatory. He even claimed that women are allowed to wear makeup, as this practice is not contrary to Islam. Al Hamidi appeared on the program with his

wife wearing makeup [18]. The fact that al-Hamidi was previously the head of the religious police department in Mecca made his intellectual eccentricity all the more fascinating. He was criticized by some members of the Supreme Council of the Ulema, including the Grand Mufti [19]. Another example of this eccentricity is Adel al-Qalbani, the former imam of the main mosque in Mecca. He issued a statement that listening to music should not be considered un-Islamic [20], which angered conservatives.

From all this, it should be noted that the Saudi Ulema as a group is not a monolithic entity, nor are they part of its political power. They are diverse and their fatwas on socio-religious and socio-political issues are changing. The fragmentation of religious authority has greatly increased the number and frequency of disputes and debates among the ulema.

Thus, the official apparatus of theologians is subordinate to the government, which requires support by issuing fatwas. Their fatwas can be implemented if they are approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. The authorities may disagree with their content, while disagreement with state policy, as well as a public statement by members of the Supreme Council of the Ulema, contrary to government decrees, is strictly prohibited and suppressed.

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DMITRY MOSYAKOV, UNSIYA OMAROVA. THE "NEW ISLAMIZATION OF CHAMS" CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR CAMBODIA* // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islam, the Cham, Muslim preachers, International Islamic Foundations, Cambodia.

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Citation: Mosyakov D., Omarova U. The "New Islamization of Chams" Causes and Consequences for Cambodia // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 94-105. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.08

Abstract. The article is devoted to the current state of the Cham Islamic community in Cambodia. The authors analyze how the ideas of radical Islam, which is distributed among Cambodian Cham, with the direct participation and support of Islamic international foundations, affect the state of the Islamic community, what threats and challenges it faces.

The Cham people are one of the oldest ethnic groups in Southeast Asia, who built one of the most powerful states in the region throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages – Champa (or Tsiompa). They professed Hinduism, later converted to traditional Islam. A significant part of the population moved to Cambodia after the defeat of the Cham state by the Vietnamese in the 15th century, and integrated into Cambodian society. The

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

Cham people were subjected to mass persecution under the Pol Pot regime, they were forbidden to practice Islam. Significant changes began to occur in the Cham society in 1979 – after the defeat of the Khmer Rouge regime and especially after the cessation of the war and general elections in Cambodia under the control of the UN in 1993. Some Cham intellectuals consider them a “spiritual rebirth”, for example, the Cham historian and philosopher Po Dharma (Quảng Văn Đủ), who lives in Paris.

Is there really such a “spiritual rebirth”? Can one suppose its manifestation in the spread of radical Islamic ideas combined with the loss of the traditional Cham identity both in the way of life and in the sphere of self-consciousness of the Cham ethnic group? The authors conducted a thorough analysis of the processes that have covered the Cham community in Cambodia since 1993 (there are different estimates from 250 thousand to 800 thousand people) to answer this question. The Cham community in Cambodia came into the spotlight when dozens of radical Islamic preachers, acting on behalf of global Islamic foundations, appeared in Cambodia after the end of the civil war in 1993. Formally, their arrival was related to the appeal from many authoritative and respected people in the Cham community to all Muslim countries and associations to provide financial assistance for the restoration of the Muslim community of Cambodia, which, they said, was dying after the war and ten years of Vietnamese occupation. Salafists, followed by several more international Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from Arab countries and Malaysia, arrived in the country in response to this call.

In a short time, almost the entire Cham society from imams of mosques and local authorities to ordinary people came under very strong ideological influence, since most foreign missionaries believed that the Cham in Cambodia do not follow Islam well and, therefore, urgently need to “purify their faith”. Each of the arriving preachers saw that “purification” in their own way and made efforts so that the theology of him and his like-minded

people would be accepted by the Cham. This imperative led to rivalry between missionaries and conflicts in the Cham communities, when two or three different groups of preachers competed for followers in the same place (for example, in the villages of Chumnik and Soi in Kampong Cham province).

That missionaries convinced the Cham that their traditional Islamic practice was not very “pure,” especially visiting the mosque once a week on Fridays, and now they needed to adopt new practices in order to purify their faith. People were convinced that their traditionally professed Islam was “wrong Islam,” and these missionaries from the Arab East, Pakistan or Malaysia, carried true and correct Islam, showing how to live and pray.

Their arguments were all the more convincing as their financial foundations and organizations helped believers financially - they distributed food, necessary goods, paid a hajj to Mecca for the most authoritative people, and, what was even more important, their emissaries selected and sent young people to Islamic religious centers abroad for a greater perception of “new Islam.” This simple propaganda, based on relatively small financial investments (taking into account the actual budgets of global Islamic charitable funds), proved to be quite effective - at least, it was enough to change the religious guidelines of a significant part of the Cham society.

The enormous interest of the Cham majority in the “new Islam” became noticeable already in the mid-1990s, in contrast to some other places in the Islamic world, where the Salafis did not succeed much with their propaganda and where the faithful adhered to their traditional spiritual heritage and knowledge led by their religious leaders - muftis, imams of mosques and authoritative Muslims. It is difficult to explain what prompted the Cham majority to a rather radical departure from their traditional Islam. Perhaps the desire for change was caused by the consequences of the genocide during the period of the Pol Pot regime, their certain isolation, and the control of the authorities

during the period of People's Kampuchea. They expected to change their position in Cambodia through active cooperation with Islamic international foundations and with their help and support to become part of the vast world of Islam, and not feel like just a small people surrounded by the Khmer majority.

Also, one cannot ignore the material factor. The Cham communities continued to live very hard and very poor, despite all the positive changes, except that the threat of hunger, still relevant in the early 1980s, had almost disappeared by then. Therefore, any donations from foreign co-religionists were perceived extremely positively, and the Salafis always had money, and most importantly the ability to manage them. It can be said that a whole range of factors predetermined the religious reorientation of the majority from traditional to radical Islam brought by Salafists from Arab countries and Pakistan.

As for the Cambodian authorities, they preferred either not to notice the changes taking place in the Cham environment for a long time, or even indulged them, apparently believing that the donations of the Arab countries, Pakistan and Malaysia contribute to maintaining calm among the Cambodian Muslims and increasing their living standards. The authorities did not take into account the facts that Islamic funds were active in the country, such as the Saudi Om-al-Qura, La Wamy (World Assembly of Muslim Youth), L'IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organization) and a number of others from Kuwait and Pakistan, blacklisted by the U.S. Department of State, as they were seen funding the training of Islamic militant terrorists.¹

More important for the government was the stability of the situation in the settlements, and the support given to Hong Sen and his party by both the Cham people and their leaders in full. Therefore, the authorities often made serious concessions to the radical preachers. They were allotted territories and allowed to build new mosques, open religious schools, and create foundations subordinate to themselves already in Cambodia, and in 2008 the government even decided to allow all Muslim

students and government employees to wear Islamic clothes in classrooms and workplaces.²

In turn, the Cham showed their loyalty to Prime Minister Hong Sen, the long-term ruler of Cambodia, especially during the events of 1998, when he defeated the opposition at once. One of the strike forces was just units with a predominance of Cham soldiers during short-lived battles in Phnom Penh. The Hun Sen government supported the Cham people in response, for example, each family was given 3 hectares of land in the area of Sihanoukville for free.

It is also clear that the Khmer ruling elite, who worked closely with the Cham top community, was not fully aware of the essence of the processes taking place among the Cham, especially since they were not noticeable at first. They considered Salafists and donates coming from Muslim states as another source of funds for rebuilding the country than as actions that threaten Cambodia's national unity and integrity in the near future.

In the early 2000s, changes in the Cham community became visible to the naked eye. In conservative Cambodia, girls in Arabic clothes appeared who tried to learn Arabic instead of the Khmer language. They behaved in many ways defiantly, did not look like ordinary Cham women, and claimed that their cultural identity was not Cambodia, its history and culture, and not even Champa, but the world of Islam. They began to declare everywhere that Cham were taller and stronger than Khmers in all respects, demonstratively indicating that they did not represent the traditional Khmer-Cham, but a much more powerful and influential Islamic world in Cambodia. In many villages, except for some that remained traditionalist, the national Cambodian scarf - *krama* - on the heads of Cham women was replaced by a hijab or *tudung* (Malaysia' veil, covering the hair)³.

In some areas, very young girls began to wear a black *burqa* (*purdah*) covering their face, although L. Robet, a well-known researcher of Cham life and culture, noted in the late 1990s that Cham women did not wear an Islamic veil⁴. The same

author pointed out a little later that wearing a hijab among Cham women was never as widespread as at that time, which confirmed the extremely rapid evolution of Muslim society in Cambodia.

Muslim clothing has become something quite common for Cham women today. They follow rather Malaysians, where almost the vast majority of women wear Islamic clothing at all times, and if not the hijab, then at least the headscarf. So in contrast to the early 2000s, today this is no longer surprising, but rather a variant of the norm.

Not only women were affected by external changes, a similar trend occurred in men. According to the observations of the French journalist Agnes De Feo, who studied the Cham people, they began to wear plaid headscarves and juba gowns, just like their Arab preachers. Many began to wear a beard, which was extremely rare earlier among the Cham. The Cham themselves argue that all the external changes in their appearance are not just a change of clothes, they consider this a national revival, the formation of their own new Islamic identity, and clearly contrast themselves with Khmers.⁵

Their new Salafi teachers are constantly campaigning for such changes in the appearance of men and women, convincing them that demonstratively following Islamic customs serves to verify the truth of the Muslim faith. A faithful Muslim, as they teach the Cham, should stand out among others not only by his behavior, but also by his active testimony of his faith – Friday prayer in a mosque, circumcision ceremony, sacrifice of a ram, performing a hajj, wearing a hijab for women, giving up meals, if the food is not halal, etc.

Naturally, the transformational process of such magnitude and profound changes that captured the Cham world could not but be accompanied by certain conflicts that arose naturally between the “old” and “new” Muslims. The “old” are older people, mostly survivors of the era of the Pol Pot genocide, who did not approve of all these innovations; they were frightened

that the Cham began to oppose themselves to the Khmer majority more and more, emphasizing their differences and superiority. There was a kind of conflict situation between generations, when “children” who were trained by radicals began to reproach their “parents” for religious errors, and called them to change.

Today, it is the youth of the Cham who are pushing their parents to move to a virtually new religion for them with more or less success. This is the plan for reformatting the religious preferences of Cham society. Therefore, various kinds of religious associations, which have occupied the sphere of education and religion, rely on the teaching of Islam primarily among children. They organize orphanages not only for homeless or abandoned children, but also for those who live in normal conditions in families and do this in order to increase the effectiveness of their preaching. By the way, the Salafis operate approximately according to the same plan in Cambodia, as in all Muslim countries - religious education begins with the education of children. Nowadays, this practice is very widespread among the Cham and is already supported not only by the external foundations of the Islamic world, but also by the Cambodian government. According to Saleh Abutalib, an Islamic businessman who helps a lot with religious education, a madrasah was created at the “8-kilometer” mosque with the support of one of the Arab foundations, where 700 students study in two shifts today. They are trained by 25 teachers, and if previously they were paid partly by the parents of students, partly by foreign, primarily Arab funds, now they are paid by the state at the suggestion of Hun Sen. At the same time, 13 teachers out of 25 receive one million riels each (\$250), which is quite a lot by Cambodian standards. According to Saleh Abutalib, there were only 150 mosques in Cambodia before Pol Pot, now there are more than 1000⁶. As for the education of Cham children, some Cham schools even switch from Cham to Arabic in the learning process according to the testimony of Farina So, another informant. The reason is that Arabic speakers find work easily.

The government pays well for teaching Arabic. 1,500 Cham teach Arabic and religion today⁷. The transition to Arabic as the main foreign language, and the shift of Khmer – the state language – to the third place testifies eloquently to the depth of the changes taking place among the Cham.

Probably, for a more adequate idea of what is happening in the Cham society and the degree of its radicalization, the Cham began to receive some help, even from the United States. In particular, funds were allocated for teaching English and sewing, and the Americans financed such NGOs as the Cambodian Muslim Community, the Cambodian Islamic Youth Association, the Islamic Local Development Organization, and the Imam San Association, which had already been created by the Chams themselves.

There is no doubt that international Islamic foundations and structures, with their headquarters in the Persian Gulf and Pakistan, are the main donors paying the cost of changing the religious direction. There are several dozens of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that conduct a scholarship program for the money received from Islamic funds, allowing students to study at home and abroad. Most go to study in Malaysia and Indonesia. It is difficult to immediately list the entire set of NGOs engaged in retraining and propaganda of “the right Islam”, which have the opportunity to send the most successful students abroad to the Arab East, Pakistan and Malaysia, to pay the Hajj for imams and authoritative and most influential parishioners. Among the largest and most famous structures are: “Cambodian Islamic Youth”, “Cambodian Muslim Student Association”, “Cambodian Muslim Development Fund”, “Cambodian Charity Association”, “Cambodian Muslim Alliance” and “World Muslim Youth Assembly”. Some Arab NGOs do not operate through local intermediaries, but directly through their offices in Cambodia. Representatives of “Partners for Development” NGO arrived from Kuwait in 1996 and opened an Islamic high school under their patronage. Later, the same

NGO established its branches in various provinces, where especially many Muslims live. In 2007, another Kuwaiti organization, "Society for Social Reform - State of Kuwait", came to Cambodia and began to actively engage in charitable activities, a scholarship program, and community social development.

"Revival of Islamic Heritage Society" (RIHS), another organization from Kuwait, is located in the capital of Cambodia. This organization took on the training of several hundred Cham orphans. Moreover, it is known that radical Wahhabis Islam is promoted and taught there. The Cambodian government did not take any action to restrict the activities of Kuwaiti missionaries, as well as emissaries of other Islamic countries, up to Nigeria, which operate with the support of the Kuwait Fund. Moreover, the government noted that Kuwaiti investments were highly appreciated and it was undesirable to lose them. In this regard, Kuwaitis were allowed to open five more such boarding schools for orphans in the provinces⁸.

This activity of numerous foundations and related structures and preachers leads to their competition with each other for influence on the Cham; this competition affects society, and as a result, not only different generations do not understand each other, but representatives of the same generation are largely opposed to each other. Some (chwea) began to call other (jat) pejoratively as *fasik*, i.e. sinner, or *sindir*, if this person expressed doubt about the "five pillars of Islam." The worst thing happened when some Cham began to call their fellow tribesmen as *murtad* (i.e. apostate) if they do not want to follow their path⁹.

There are a number of other examples showing that there are deep changes in the Cham society life, changing their traditional customs and habits. There are a number of other examples that show that there are deep changes in the life of the Cham society, changing their traditional customs and habits. Earlier, the cult of saints was widespread among them, as evidenced by Etienne Aymonier, one of the founders of the French school for the study of the Far East, who noted that the

Cham of Cambodia venerate the tombs of the righteous, surrounded by a halo of Holiness. When they visit these rather numerous tombs, they stop, bow down and pray¹⁰. In Cambodia, these tombs are found everywhere in the Cham habitat. In this regard, A. Kabaton did not hide his surprise at the prevalence of so many tombs of Muslim saints in the Khmer land¹¹. However, the cult of saints, widespread in the Muslim world, is condemned by modern Salafists, as is known.

And so, the traditional Muslim order does not just go by the wayside, it becomes less generally accepted in a relatively short time, but even practically disappears along with the graves of the Cham sheikhs, which are either destroyed or abandoned and cease to be a place of worship. For example, the grave of Po Sei Bray in the village of Rokapo Pram once served as an object of special worship. They made sacrifices and preserved the tradition of the origin of the Cham and their loss of land, since it was there that the Cham ruler was buried, having suffered a decisive defeat from the Vietnamese army. Earlier in this village, you could always meet many Cham pilgrims who arrived from all over Cambodia¹². Today, there is a certain desolation there, as well as next to the tombs of other historical figures, spiritual and religious leaders and teachers that have been destroyed and disappeared. Memorials that have been the object of worship in many places earlier, nowadays are either in an abandoned state or simply disappeared, and their disappearance did not cause much protest in the Cham society and the desire to restore them.

It is hard to believe that only the tomb of the famous Imam San (an associate of King Ang Duong) is revered even today, thanks to conservatism or even direct resistance from a relatively small part of the Cham society, not obsessed with radical views. This small group is called Cham-Jat and has recently become more and more isolated from the rest of the Cham world¹³.

It is hardly correct to call the changes in the Cham society as "spiritual revival."

Firstly, if the Cham never had radical Islam in their long history, then what kind of revival could it be? Secondly, the radical rejection of the traditional way of life and traditional Islam embedded in the daily lives of people causes an increasingly clear internal split of the Cham society and religious community, when some follow missionaries from the Middle East, others follow Pakistani radicals; when there is not only a cultural conflict of generations, but also a conflict within communities, when clashes occur where they have never been. And thirdly, the radicalization of the Cham forms a barrier between them and the Khmer majority destroys their historical integration into Cambodian life. The Khmer look at the arabized Cham with suspicion and the possibilities of social elevators for the Cham are rapidly diminishing. Reports that some young Cham went to war in Syria or even neighboring Thailand do not represent the Cham community in a positive light either.

So the question remains open so far: will authoritative religious and public figures be able to stop the process of radicalization and find a balance between radical and traditional Islam and to what extent? Only the future will show whether the Cham can maintain their unity, culture and lifestyle, or whether they will be divided into warring Muslim groups and turn into people without any roots.

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EKATERINA ASTAFYEVA. MUSLIM / MALAY COMMUNITY IN SINGAPORE* // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: Singapore, Muslim / Malay community, socio-political development, Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.

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Citation: Astafyeva E. Muslim / Malay Community in Singapore // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 105–XX. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.09

Abstract. The article is dedicated to the Muslim / Malay community in Singapore. The author dwells to analyse of historical and socio-political aspects, which affected on its modern development, considered the activities of its main institutions and organizations, and

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

concluded the prospects for the full integration of the Malay community into the construct of united Singapore nation.

The Republic of Singapore, located in the very heart of the Malay world, is a country with a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, which is divided into four ethnic groups: Chinese, Malay, Indian and others. The Chinese ethnic group accounted for 74.3%, Malay – 13.4%, Indian – 9%, others – 3.2%¹, according to 2018 data. And this percentage of ethnic groups has been maintained (with minimal fluctuations) since the beginning of the 20th century. The population compartmentalization into four main categories is used for simplification, and “nationality” is used for homogenization, to hide the linguistic, religious, and cultural differences within each category. In particular, the Malay ethnic group is divided into two main groups by origin: those born in Singapore and Malaysia and immigrants from Indonesia. At the same time, all Malays consider themselves a single group, although they are aware of the differences in their origin. As for religious affiliation, 43.2% of the population professed Buddhism and Taoism, 18.8% – Christianity, 14% – Islam, 5% – Hinduism, do not profess any religion – 18.5% of the population as of 2015².

Singapore is a unique country in the region of Southeast Asia, as its population is formed solely by migration, which began with the arrival of the British East India Company in 1819 in this part of the world and the further development of Singapore under the rule of the English crown. Although the Chinese were the ethnic majority in the island's population by the end of the 19th century, ethnic Malays are recognized as native residents of Singapore under the Constitution, which obliges the Government to support the political, educational, religious and other interests of the Malay minority. The special rights of Malays and Muslims are enshrined in Articles 152 and 153 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. Islam is practiced mainly by Malays and Muslim Indians, thus it is possible to

equate the concepts of the Muslim community of Singapore and Malay in most cases.

It is necessary to look back to the recent past to understand the problems of the modern Malay community in Singapore among other things the Malays did not have a tradition of community organizations until the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. Their activities were associated with religious and political organizations due to their religious and national identity, in contrast to the Chinese and Indians with strong communal traditions. It was the community, both Chinese and Indian, which helped to socialize, get a job, etc., to newly arrived immigrants to the island. The policy of the British colonial authorities, aimed at assigning each ethnic group its own niche in economic activity, played a significant role in this. In fact, the various ethnic groups in Singapore did not overlap with each other, living separately in ethnic areas and doing their own thing. This unfortunate legacy has been overcome by the government of Singapore ever since it strives to create a unified Singaporean nation of various ethnic groups. An attempt to solve this problem within the Federation of Malaysia, which Singapore was a member of in 1963–1965, was unsuccessful. The appeal of Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister of Singapore, 1959–1990, chairman of the People's Action Party) to the population regarding the formation of a single “Malaysian nation” within the Federation was met with hostility by the Malays, who were afraid of the consolidation of the already obvious superiority of the Chinese ethnic group.

In 1965, with the formation of the independent Republic of Singapore, the Malays on the island were “torn away” from the Malays on the mainland, completely losing their political influence. The state, led by the People's Action Party (PAP), assumed the functions of initiating and developing the organizations of the Malay community in these conditions. One of the first such initiatives of the PAP government was the establishment of the umbrella organization of non-political Malay

institutions of the Central Council of Malay cultural organizations of Singapore (Majlis Pusat)⁴ in 1969, which aimed to improve the education and welfare of the Malay community. This was the very first attempt by the government to rethink the role of Malays within independent Singapore after its separation from Malaysia.⁵

Another important government initiative was an attempt to promote the development of small, informal groups of Malays, so to speak, modern Malay intellectuals, who were to play a crucial role in adapting the Malay community to the rapid economic changes in the country. The challenging mission of calling for the progress of the Malay community, shackled by traditional values and obligations, was entrusted to this group of "middle class mediators." Identifying such intermediaries was a difficult task in the 1970s, as there were few suitable candidates, and not everyone was willing to participate, and Muslim Arabs or Indians by origin could hardly claim to be representatives of the Malay community.⁶ The few, who served as intermediaries, felt hostility and suspicion from the Malay community. The effort to reorient the values and identity of the Malay community, initiated in 1969–1970, resulted in increased awareness of the need for change. However, these government initiatives created bewilderment among the Malays as to what was required of them and how they were supposed to act. In particular, the lack of appropriate structures to bring about the desired changes was discontent.⁷

Despite the secular nature of the state recorded in the report of the 1966 Constitutional Commission, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) entered into force in 1968. Singapore Muslim affairs are handled by Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), also known as the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. The functions of the Council members include advising the President of Singapore on Islamic issues, as well as promoting religious, social, educational, economic and cultural activities in accordance with the principles and traditions

of Islam, as enshrined in the Koran and Sunnah. The Council is headed by the President of MUIS and consists of the mufti of Singapore, persons recommended by the Minister of Muslim Affairs, and other members nominated by Muslim organizations. All Council members are appointed by the President of Singapore.¹¹ MUIS was created as the supreme governing body of Muslim religious affairs, partly to meet the demands of Muslim organizations and partly to amalgamate some fifteen religious organizations into one structure.¹² There was considerable controversy over the issue of its autonomy. When the parliamentary bill to create this organization was passed in 1966, it provided that the president, mufti (religious head of the Muslim community in Singapore) and the secretary of the organization are appointed by the government. The Council carries out an intermediary function between the state and the Muslim community. More importantly, MUIS is an effective tool to contain Malay extremism and religious fanaticism.¹³

MUIS collects religious tax (zakat) from Muslims, monitors the state of mosques, Muslim cemeteries and waqfs.¹⁴ There are currently 101 waqfs in Singapore. The first waqf was created in 1820 - it is the Omar Kampong Malacca Mosque, built with funds from Syed Omar bin Ali Aljunied, (Yemen). It is noteworthy that in the 19th century it was merchants from Yemen who actively created waqfs in Singapore.

It is necessary to mention about 14 waqfs, founded by representatives of the Indian Muslim community. A significant contribution was made by the Bugis from the Indonesian archipelago. Almost a third - 30 waqfs - were created by women. However, not a single new waqf has been created in Singapore since the 1970s. Probably one of the reasons is the rise in property prices, making it impossible for many Singapore Muslims to bequeath property as a waqf. People talk about "donor fatigue."

All waqfs are owned by MUIS, with 68 managed by the Council and 33 managed by Trustees. A total of \$ 3.082 million was allocated in 2019. The largest beneficiaries are mosques -

62%, madrassas – 9%. In accordance with the will of the creators of waqfs, contributions are paid to other countries (usually the country of origin of the waqf or Holy places, i.e. Mecca and Medina), these payments are 13% today. It should be clarified that the beneficiaries of the waqf are usually indicated in the will of the donor, and the distribution of funds is carried out in accordance with his will.¹⁵

Returning to the activities of MUIS-competitions of Koran reciters are held under its leadership, members of the Council give advice on Sharia issues, as well as monitor how the believers fulfill their religious duties.¹⁶ This control has a legal basis in the form of a law of 1966, which requires Muslims to strictly fulfill their religious duties, as well as a decree of 1968 regarding the punishment for violators of piety. The legal capacity of both legislative acts has been and is being reinforced today by the relevant decisions of the Sharia courts. The Council has monitored the performance of the Hajj since 1975. A compulsory official registration rule was introduced in 1982 for pilgrims who had to fly to Mecca on either Singaporean or Saudi Arabian airlines only.

The construction of mosques in Singapore is carried out through a special program funded by donations. Every working Muslim contributes a monthly amount (zakat) to a special fund (Mosque Building and Mendaki Fund, MBMF) run by MUIS. In the early 1970s, during a period of rapid urbanization and development of the country, the government moved the residents of the Muslim community of Singapore from kampong to apartments provided by the Housing and Development Board (HDB). There was an urgent need to raise funds for the construction of mosques in new areas in this regard. Although the Muslim community was willing to contribute, traditional fundraising methods were too slow, so an efficient way to raise funds was developed through the Central Social Security Fund system. Every Muslim working in Singapore, including

foreigners, must contribute to a community fund – the Mosque Building Fund, which was established in 1975.

In 1984, the Mendaki Foundation was created to promote the development of religious education for the Muslim community, thus MBF was merged with it in the Mosque Building and Mendaki Fund (MBMF). The key beneficiaries of the Fund are mosques, madrassas and families in need. The Fund finances the construction of new mosques and renovation of old ones, a complex of programs in the field of religious education and social programs aimed at improving the situation of Malay / Muslim families is being implemented.

Due to the growing Muslim population, as well as increased spending on education and construction, contributions to the Fund increased several times in 1977, 1984, 1991, 1995, 2005 and 2009. The latest changes took effect on June 1, 2016. For example, for Muslims earning less than \$ 1,000 a month, zakat was 50 cents in 1975, \$ 1 in 1977, \$ 1.5 in 1984; \$ 2 from 1991 to 2015, and \$ 3 from 2016 to the present. It is noteworthy that the gradation of zakat depending on the level of income did not exist until 1995, when a progressive scale of calculation was introduced.¹⁷

In October 2006, the Center for Harmony was opened at the initiative of MUIS, whose activities are aimed at deepening the understanding of Islam and Muslims by the multinational population of the country, as well as stimulating interfaith dialogue and interaction at all society levels. Prime Minister Li Hsien Loong said at the opening ceremony that the establishment of the Center was a significant step forward in the tireless efforts to bring Singaporeans of different faiths closer together.¹⁸

In addition to these major Muslim institutions, there are various ethnic Muslim organizations – self-help groups, voluntary charities, civic and religious-cultural groups, for example, Malay Muslim organizations: Association of Muslim Professionals, Muslim Missionary Society (Jamiyah), Singapore Islamic Scholars and Islamic Teachers Association (PERGAS),

Muhammadiyah and Islamic Theological Association of Singapore (Pertapis) and others. Indian-Muslim organizations: Federation of Indian Muslims, Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League, Singapore Tenkasi Muslim Welfare Society, etc.

In 1981, a special outreach service was established in Singapore, under government control, with the responsibility of organizing religious discussions and publishing and distributing theological literature among Muslims. The activities of foreign Islamic preachers in Singapore are prohibited in order to curb the spread of Wahhabism.¹⁹

The problem of religious education is very urgent for the Muslim community in Singapore, since all madrassas are private institutions funded by the community. Madrasahs raise funds through school fees and fundraising, the Muslim community contributes through zakat and waqf, targeted donations to the madrasah and the MBMF Foundation. However, it is incorrect to believe that the government is on the sidelines of addressing these issues – it provides assistance to students through the Edusave system. To date, more than 90% of madrasa teachers have a basic certification, and 59 teachers and school principals have been trained in middle management and leadership programs thanks to effective government support; 98.5% of madrasah students achieved the PSLE (Primary School Leaving Examination) level, i.e. the unified state examination at the end of the elementary six-year school, which assesses the level of preparation for further education in the corresponding secondary school course)²⁰, and were able to get a high score.²¹ A government – funded special grant scheme for Malay students (Tertiary Tuition Fee Subsidy-TTFS) was established in 1991 and currently covers approximately two thirds of Malay families. In 2011, the criteria for providing assistance under this scheme were revised. While the grants were initially provided to Malay students from families with incomes of up to \$ 3,000 per month, from the beginning of 2012, the cost of education is fully covered with an average monthly income for each family member of less

than \$ 1,000, i.e. 100%, with an income between 1001 and 1200 – 75%, 1201–1500 – 50%. At the same time, students from a typical family of four with a total income of less than \$ 6,000 began to receive full subsidies.²²

However, despite the support of both the Muslim / Malay community and the government, the problem of fully integrating the Muslim (majority Malay) community into the structure of a multi-ethnic and multi-faith Singapore has not been resolved. The level of well-being of most members of the Muslim community is much lower than that of other groups. The government of Singapore, under the leadership of the People's Action Party, sought to establish the compatibility of Malay identity within a common national system, aiming to create a unified cultural space with clearly defined basic concepts such as survival, meritocracy, and multiculturalism. However, one of the ways to solve this problem was the government's justification of the economic backwardness of the Malay community in terms of the specificity of their cultural values. This position of the ruling circles of Singapore contributed to the recognition of the “cultural weakness of Malay traditionalism” by the Malays themselves. In other words, the Malays were convinced that they, and not the Chinese or the government, were responsible for their own socio-economic problems. The reason for their “predicament” is the lack of motivation for success and focus on agricultural production.²³ The phenomenon roots go back to the distant past of Singapore, as mentioned above. The idea that justified the situation of poor Malays was taken up by reform-minded Muslims, then by the Malay literary elite, and later even by some sociologists.²⁴

Although the position of the Singapore government on this issue is understandable, it is still trying to radically change the values of the Malay community. This activity is associated not only with the aforementioned involvement of the so-called middle-class intermediaries, but also with the creation of special organizations whose activities are aimed at raising the

educational level of the Malays. The Mendaki Foundation, already mentioned above, was created at the initiative of Malay MPs from the People's Action Party, who were alarmed by the low rates of Malays in the 1980 census in education and employment.²⁵

Much attention is paid to the problem of preventing radicalization of Muslims, and awareness-raising activities are conducted to combat terrorist propaganda and recruitment under the auspices of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS). The government of Singapore also seeks to prevent the development of Islamophobic attitudes in society. Minister for Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam, speaking at the opening of the international conference on the role of Muslim non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in strengthening peace, which took place in Singapore in October 2017, stressed that one should not associate any religion with extremism, citing the existing deep conflicts in the region, in particular, in the Philippines – between Catholics and Muslims, in Myanmar – between Buddhists and Muslims. He noted that the slogans of terrorists who allegedly acted in the name of Islam created a wrong mood in society when Islam began to be associated with terrorism. In his speech, K. Shanmugam also indicated that the Singapore government would make every effort to maintain harmony between people of different religions, adhering to a firm position in preventing interfaith conflicts, the emergence and expansion of racial enclaves.²⁶

The problems of remoteness of the Muslim community in Singapore from the rest of the population are solved with great difficulty. Unfortunately, we can say that this remoteness is only getting worse. The activities of the government of Singapore in the field of nation-building seem more like propaganda than the implementation of something real. There is a constitutional provision declaring the need to take care of the interests of national and religious minorities, and recognizing the special position of the Malays as the indigenous people of Singapore. But

does this give them a chance to occupy a position in society equal to the Chinese? Obviously not.

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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

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CRIMINOLOGICAL FEATURES OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
BY THE HAVALA SYSTEM // *The article was written for the
bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: terrorism financing,
money or value transfer systems, money or
value transfer services, informal money
transfer systems, informal money transfer
systems, hawala system, economic
security, financial security.*

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Citation: Dobayev A., Dobayev I., Ignatova T. Criminological Features of Financial Operations by the Hawala System // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, No. 3 (309), P. 117-136. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.03.10

Abstract. Based on the study of numerous foreign and domestic sources, the authors of this article determine the essence of financial transactions through the hawala system. It has been revealed that this system is historically determined in nature, it was used, first of all, in the countries of the Near East, Middle East and South Asia in foreign trade operations in the framework of various directions of the so-called Silk Road. This system is also practiced in our days, however, in a slightly modified form, since globalization processes fixed in recent decades throughout the world have influenced its transformation. However, in addition to traditional trading activities, hawala was often used in the criminal activities of various modern organized criminal groups (OCG), including radical Islamists. In this regard, the study of the criminological features of financial transactions through the Hawala system has gained particular relevance. At the same time, the analysis of available sources indicates the insufficient scientific development of this subject. This is especially true of the Russian Federation, which has faced since the beginning of the 90s of XX century with deviations on its territory, including numerous sabotage and terrorist acts, which were often financed through Hawala. As for the domestic law enforcement system, the term "Hawala" itself began to be used only from the middle of the first decade of the new millennium. However, in practice, the situation with countering the financing of terrorism in this area is still not up to par. By the way, in the USA they began to pay attention to this problem only after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but so far in this country it has not been possible to completely block unwanted financial flows.

The pragmatism of the issue requires further reflection on the phenomenon and building an effective system to counter it. In this regard, studying world experience, building up our own

research in terms of ensuring the national security of the country in the economic and financial fields seems to be one of the most important tasks in identifying, preventing and suppressing the use of the Hawala system for legalizing criminal proceeds and financing terrorism.

In the course of studying the available classifications of the Hawala system, an important conclusion was made, which is of both theoretical and applied nature: the “traditional” and “transforming” types of Hawala under certain circumstances can transform into a “criminal” one. It is also important that the authors of this article highlight five features that are characteristic of Hawala, which pose a potential threat to the security of financial and economic system at the global and national levels. It is proved that the current system of combating the financing of terrorism is not able to respond quickly enough to the use of the Hawala system in criminal activity. This circumstance additionally actualizes the subject under consideration and requires further research in this direction.

The Hawala system is one of the types of money and value transfer systems (hereinafter referred to as MVTs) that has strong historical, ethnic, cultural and religious ties with the countries of the Near and Middle East (primarily Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and UAE). The Hawala system, like most other MVTs, has served trade relations since its inception and for many centuries, creating the conditions for timely and safe mutual settlements between the parties involved. The functioning of the hawala system is based on the principle of a compensating balance, which consists in transferring money from a sender from the country “A” (SA) or in transferring money as payment for services rendered from another sender from country “B” (SB). “Hawaladar” from country “A” (HA) receives money in the same currency from SA and in response HA gives SA a password. HA instructs the counterparty (“hawaladar”) in the country “B” (HB) to transfer the appropriate amount in local currency to the recipient (RB), which must provide a password in order to collect

the money. After the transfer is completed, the stage of equalizing mutual obligations between the “hawaladars” begins [1].

Significant impact on the Hawala system in the XX-XXI centuries was made by technological progress and the emergence of the Internet, which led to the formation of a modern, upgraded model for the transfer of funds through the Hawala system. Under this model, the Hawala system operators (hereinafter referred to as the hawaladars) use banks and modern payment systems based on the Internet (the so-called Internet banking). It was this circumstance that expanded the capabilities of the “hawaladars” and provided them with a variety of payment tools, which allows implementing complex economic schemes for equalizing the formed mutual obligations in countries geographically distant from each other [2–4].

For the previously listed countries where hawaladars are active, high terrorist activity is characteristic. In this regard, in a number of scientific studies, speeches by executives and articles in authoritative international publications in recent decades (especially after the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001), the use of the Hawala system in criminal activities was noted: financing of terrorism; legalization of criminal proceeds [5–8] (including those from the drug trade) [9]; avoiding currency and tax control; other types of shadow economy, such as drug trafficking, smuggling (precious stones, precious metals), arms trade, as well as the transfer of money and material assets to corrupt officials [10–11].

In 2002, UN specialists estimated the amount of money transferred annually through the Hawala system at \$ 200 billion [12]. Taking into account the costs of the terrorist attack at the World Trade Center in the USA, which, according to expert estimates, reached \$ 500 thousand (that is, about 0,00025% of the amount of funds transferred in 2002 through the Hawala system), and the facts established during the investigation (they are reflected in the final document “The 9/11 Commission Report”) that the Al-Qaida members and their business connections used

the Hawala system at the preparatory stage, the version of circulation in the Hawala system of For the previously listed countries where hawaladars are active, high terrorist activity is characteristic. In this regard, in a number of scientific studies, speeches by executives and articles in authoritative international publications in recent decades (especially after the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001), the use of the Hawala system in criminal activities was noted: financing of terrorism; legalization of criminal proceeds [5–8] (including from the drug trade) [9]; avoiding currency and tax control; other types of shadow economy, such as drug trafficking, smuggling (precious stones, precious metals), arms trade, as well as the transfer of money and material assets to corrupt officials [10–11].

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In this regard, it seems appropriate to consider the “Hawala” system in the criminological context from the standpoint of threats to national security. It should be noted that a number of studies by Russian scientists state the use of the Hawala system in criminal activity, but its criminological classification is not given [13]. It seems that an accurate criminological classification of the Hawala system will allow us to properly build a set of measures aimed at preventing the use of the system’s capabilities in criminal activity. It should be noted

that the most accurate classification of the Hawala system, which has the greatest practical value, was proposed by the FATF experts [14], who distinguish its following types:

1. Pure Traditional - "hawaladar" serves the legitimate needs that circulate in the system money of mainly legal origin;

2. Hybrid traditional - sometimes not entirely legal, because the "hawaladar" can participate in illegal activities not intentionally;

3. Criminal - "hawaladar" deliberately acts as the organizer of a criminal channel (financing of terrorist groups; legalization of criminal proceeds; illegal withdrawal of funds from the country) or as an accomplice, providing the above services to criminals.

In addition, the position of the professor of criminology at Northeastern University, N. Passas, an expert in the MVTs, who draws parallels between the Hawala system models and their use in criminal activity [15], deserves attention. So, he highlights:

- Informal Funds Transfer Systems (IFTS) - traditional ("ancient") systems that are closely intertwined with the cultural characteristics of a particular ethnic group. IFTS operators have adapted to new realities and opportunities, which led to the diversification of payment instruments and economic schemes, but in fact the mechanism itself has not changed. The author admits that "hawaladars" that carry out operations mainly within the traditional model of the Hawala system can transfer dirty money / values or carry out financial transactions in criminal interests, but their volume is insignificant.

- Informal Value Transfer Methods (IVTM) received a powerful impetus for development, thanks to the emergence and development of the Internet, advanced technologies and the development of globalization processes, as well as the end of the Cold War. Here, the researcher suggests that "hawaladars" performing operations within the framework of the modern model of the Hawala system (in larger volumes than under the

traditional model) may more likely transfer dirty money / values, or carry out financial transactions in criminal interests.

- The area of intersection of IFTS and IVTM. Passas believes that within the framework of the transfer chain (interstate, interregional), there can be involved the “hawaladars” that carry out operations both within the traditional model of the Hawala system and within the modern one, hawaladars can also transfer dirty money / values, or carry out financial transactions in criminal interests. The researcher also implies that the area of intersection of IFTS and IVTM identified by him is quite complex from several angles at the same time.

Firstly, the direction of movement within this area can go both from developed countries to developing countries, and vice versa. Secondly, within the framework of transfer chains, a wide variety of payment tools can be used [16]. Third, schemes for equalizing mutual obligations between hawaladars can be very diverse, although the initial intent of the operators is criminal. Thus, within the intersection of IFTS and IVTM there are no clear financial and economic restrictions, which must be taken into account when regulating the Hawala system.

According to N. Passas, the greatest threat to the security of states is the area of intersection of IFTS and IVTM, as well as IVTM. This is due to the high economic efficiency and great opportunities available for transferring money by operators on a large and especially large scale, including the money of criminal origin.

There are simpler criminological classifications of the Hawala system proposed by other reputable researchers. So, P. Jost and H. Sandhu [17] divide the Hawala system into:

1. White Hawala, with in the framework of which money of legal origin is circulating;
2. Black Hawala, through which money of illegal origin is transferred, which poses a security risk.

Due to the importance of this aspect, it is necessary to consider in more detail the criminological classification proposed by the FATF experts.

So, the Pure Traditional type of the Hawala system is widespread in the countries of South Asia and the Middle East. Indeed, by “Hawala” they mean precisely the “Hawala” system in the traditional sense (the traditional model) – the one that has long been used in long-distance trade. The traditional Hawala system has been operating for many centuries in the economies of the countries of the specified region, where it is not regulated and where it is still used in some countries to finance trade and to transfer money. In some countries it is regulated, but mainly it functions autonomously.

The customers of the operations are low-income sectors of the population – migrants of certain ethnic groups who work in other countries. For example, transfers through the “traditional” type of the Hawala system are widespread in the UAE, since a significant number of labor migrants from other Asian countries (India, Pakistan, etc.) work there.

The traditional form of the Hawala system is in demand among migrants of certain ethnic groups for the following reasons: the presence of ethnic, fellow countrymen, and even family ties with hawaladars, which increases confidence in them; difficult access (for senders and recipients) to official banking institutions.

For the most part, the operators of the traditional Hawala system have adapted to new realities and opportunities, which as a result has led to diversification and complication of the payment instruments and economic schemes used by them, although in fact the mechanism itself has not changed.

The operators of the traditional Hawala system transfer money of legal origin, provide demanded money transfer and trade finance services to low-income clients, mostly law-abiding. The traditional form of the Hawala system is quite regulated both in the developed countries of the West and in the rich states –

members of the “Council for Cooperation of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf” (hereinafter – GCC).

Due to the fact that operators of the traditional type of Hawala system transfer money in a small amount because of the low solvency of customers, the traditional type of Hawala system poses a relatively low security risk in terms of the possible legalization of criminal proceeds and the financing of terrorism. At the same time, an insufficient level of regulation of this type of Hawala system can still pose certain risks.

The “hawaladars” of the transforming type (Hybrid traditional) of the Hawala system differ from the already considered type in that they can intentionally or unintentionally be involved in transfers of money of illicit origin across borders.

The purpose of this type is not to transfer money of criminal origin. However, it is possible that the money of legal and illegal origin obtained as a result of committing economic crimes (transferring money generated as a result of tax evasion, or in order to circumvent the current currency regime in the country, as well as, possibly, existing sanctions) at the disposal of a hawaladar may mix.

The operators of this type of Hawala system are not members of organized criminal groups or communities. In their activity, they use those tools and schemes for equalizing mutual obligations and ensuring transfers, as do operators of a traditional kind. This type of Hawala system develops where there is an unmet demand for transfers, where operators of this type of Hawala system can interact with other FATF operators.

According to N. Passas, the operations that are carried out within the framework of the transforming type of the Hawala system are characterized by the fact that they [15]:

- occur in the official financial system, but at the same time almost leave no traces in it;

- do not require the presence of a widely branched network of people involved in the activities related to its implementation

(most operations can be carried out by a group of several persons both simultaneously and permanently);

- are often embedded in a legal or legal-looking trading scheme (this implies the ability to make significant transfers of values);

- are criminal in nature, while different types of crime are intertwined (for example: avoiding taxation, withdrawing capital, circumventing the embargo, smuggling);

- have the ability to transfer money in large and especially large amounts (significantly exceed the amount of money usually transferred through this type of "Hawala").

The criminal type of the Hawala system is characterized by the fact in that it transfers money on a particularly large scale between people of different ethnic and social groups, as well as from different countries. This type is used to transfer money to countries with a developed and regulated banking system [14].

In some countries, there are well-grounded fears that the Hawala system may be used in criminal activities. The operators of the Hawala system in this case are actually criminals. This type of Hawala system is often controlled by organized criminal groups (hereinafter referred to as OCG). Money transferred within it is formed as a result of committing crimes. In this regard, it is precisely this type of Hawala system that poses a possible threat to security in terms of its possible use for legalizing criminal proceeds, or for financing terrorism.

The criminal type of the Hawala system is often one of the areas of criminal activity created to provide financial infrastructure for members of organized crime groups committing other crimes.

It should be noted that the "traditional" and "transforming" types of the Hawala system can be transformed into a criminal one. In particular, as the amount of money used by the hawaladar increases, its capabilities may become attractive to criminals who will seek to take control of it and subsequently carry out their operations through it.

N. Passas emphasizes that the capabilities of the Hawala system make it attractive to transnational criminal groups and terrorists. In practice, the criminal type of the Hawala system is manifested in the following activities [18]: transfer of secured valuables (credit cards, paid cards for paying for telephone communications and various services, gift certificates); making electronic payments (based on the Internet); sending expensive liquid goods; option trading; use of credit / debit cards by several users at the same time; using brokerage, correspondent accounts and bank guarantees. Moreover, the fictitious nature of the chain of transfers and transactions is often recorded, which poses a threat to the financial security of the countries involved.

World criminological experience indicates that when the Hawala system is used for illegal purposes, the hawaladars in the chain of operations involve the following elements: false accounts ("bename" accounts); offshore accounts, commercial organizations registered with shell companies.

For a deeper understanding of the Hawala system, the purpose of the transfers passing through it should be clearly understood. Let the transfers within the framework of the Hawala system be made in the directions from point "A" to point "B". In this case, as a rule, point "A" is developed countries, and "B" is developing countries.

As a rule, through the Hawala system, money from point "A", is sent for the following purposes [19–20]:

1. The primary needs of the relatives of migrant workers (food, utilities). From their point of view, the Hawala system is not only cheaper and faster, but also more accessible than the official banking sector. Through the Hawala system, money can be transferred to remote villages in Pakistan or Bangladesh, where there is no official financial infrastructure, in a short period of time. In cases where there are doubts about the possibility of making a transfer to a specific destination, a hawaladar can make a transfer by paying its money, and only

after receiving the money by the recipient of the transfer, take money and commission fees from its client.

2. Personal expenses. This should include expenses related to tourism, medical care, tuition fees, expenses for marriage.

3. Transfers from humanitarian, non-governmental, charitable organizations in conflict zones. MVTs and the Hawala system are often the only channel through which money can be transferred to and from countries where military operations are taking place or are experiencing the effects of wars. In such countries as Afghanistan and Somalia, where the banking system is weak, most charitable organizations use the informal financial sector to make international and domestic transfers. For the vast majority of the mentioned organizations (with the exception of the largest ones), the cost of transferring money is important, which also stimulates the use of the Hawala system. Of course, the leaders of NGOs or their representative offices, when traveling to countries in the conflict zone, often take with them money in large and especially large amounts in cash. These amounts are intended to cover the current costs associated with the activities of the representative office of NGOs, but cannot, as a rule, cover the arising needs for unplanned needs.

4. Payment for import / export.

5. Personal investments abroad. Payment for services provided abroad.

In this case, the Hawala system is used, first of all, to circumvent economic sanctions and the legislation aimed at combating the withdrawal of capital abroad.

In cases where the Hawala system is used for criminal purposes (the criminal type of the Hawala system), transfers are made for [15, 19, 20]:

- dispatching of proceeds from criminal business to other countries for their legalization and possible subsequent reinvestment in the official sector of the country where predicate offenses are committed;

-
- tax evasion, state duties, customs duties and reduction of tariff costs;
 - financing of terrorist groups (for their infrastructure and direct costs).

In turn, transfers from point "B" through MVTs and the Hawala system are intended for [14, 15]: payment for tuition and treatment; compensation of tourist costs (if they send amounts larger than currency control permits); payment for import / export.

In cases where the Hawala system is used for criminal purposes, the money transferred is intended to transfer bribes to public servants; tax evasion, state duties, customs duties and reduction of tariff costs; withdrawing money abroad for the acquisition of liquid property; return of legalized money belonging to members of organized criminal groups.

Thus, there is always the possibility that if "clean" money is sent from point "A", then "dirty" money can be paid in point "B", both at the stage of equalizing mutual obligations between "hawaladars" and in ensuring execution of the transfer (issue of money). Thus, there is always a risk of contamination of "clean" money.

The amount of commission charged for rendering transfers within the framework of the Hawala system varies significantly from 0% to 25%. The following factors affect the price of a transfer: location of the final recipient (in remote places the commission is higher); the amount of money transferred (when the sender wants to transfer large amounts, hawaladars, as a rule, provide discounts on the services provided); the nature of the relationship between the client and the hawaladar; frequency and regularity of transfers; urgency of a transfer (directly proportional); prepayment or payment upon receipt of money; payment currency and its rate (local or freely convertible); the situation in the "recipient country" (in the countries where the financial infrastructure is underdeveloped, or there are wars / revolutions, or embargoes, sanctions, etc., tariffs are charged

higher); the attitude of law enforcement agencies to the Hawala system; the Hawaladar's awareness of whether the money being transferred is of criminal origin.

From an economic point of view, the Hawala system operators manage to keep such a low commission charged for making transfers, primarily for moral and religious reasons, due to diversification of sources of profit, and also often due to the lack of state regulation and appropriate taxation.

The central institutions of the Islamic economy have a significant impact on the size of the commission charged by the hawaladars. In world practice, there have been cases when the hawaladars were involved in the operations of the Hawala system without any direct financial benefits for themselves. This can happen for charitable and advertising purposes (for the sake of the main business) and out of feelings of compassion for a poor migrant from their ethnic group.

World experience shows that hawaladars have branched and stable sources of income generation as a result of [21]: the resulting difference in exchange rates; microfinance (financing legal and illegal trade); placing customers' money on deposit; free cash sales; the maintenance of small branches of ethnic banks (in this case, the main service is currency exchange); implementation of export-import operations; trade (precious stones and metals, jewelry, antiques, carpets, souvenirs, books and flowers); the provision of tourist, telephone (including facsimile, telegraph, Internet) and real estate services; conducting hotel and pawn business, pharmacy, maintenance of various salons (beauty, flowers) and points of sale of tickets; maintenance of gas stations; withdrawal of funds abroad; legalization (laundering) of proceeds from crime.

In view of the foregoing, taking into account the results of published scientific and practical articles, as well as international operational, investigative and judicial practice, it should be recognized that the Hawala system poses the greatest public danger when it is used as a channel for financing infrastructure

and direct costs arising in the preparation and conduct of terrorist attacks [22–24].

It must be emphasized that MVTs in particular, the criminal form of the Hawala system, is attractive to terrorist groups in terms of transferring money or valuables obtained by criminal means, primarily because of its cross-system nature, due to the fact that hawaladars, for settlements with partners and for ensuring transfers (cash withdrawals), can use payment instruments and economic schemes of fundamentally different settlement systems. Moreover, often in the framework of the same translation chain, their sequential and simultaneous implementation can occur.

There are also other circumstances that stimulate the demand for services provided by “hawaladars” to finance the preparation and conduct of STA, to which the FATF experts include [25]:

1. Inadequate measures the MVTs regulation and the lack of political will among the leadership of some countries;

2. Equalization of mutual obligations by “hawaladars” through a large number of third countries (third parties) through goods, cash (possibly unaccounted for) outside the banking system;

3. Use in the process of equalization of the types of business that are not regulated by supervisory authorities;

4. Implementation of barter equalization schemes or compensation payments;

5. Splicing the proceeds of the offenses and crimes with the net proceeds, which simplifies the legalization of criminal proceeds and complicates the investigation of possibly committed illegal activities.

There are many examples of how MVTs, in particular the Hawala system, was used by terrorist groups. Thus, during the hearings held by the Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance under the US Senate Banking and Household Committee on the use of the Hawala system in unlawful activities, Senators

Evan Bayh and Senator Paul S. Sarbanes in their speeches emphasized that one of the systems used by bin Laden and his terrorist groups to transfer money around the world was Hawala. Attending the meeting, US Financial Intelligence Director (FinCEN) J. Sloan (James F. Sloan) noted that the Hawala system was actually used to support terrorist activities in the Kashmir region in the early 1990s [26].

Subsequently, the persons participating in the hearings drew attention to the specific facts cited from world law enforcement practice that testify to the use of the Hawala system in the financing of terrorism. It was established that through the Hawala system, terrorist operations against the Indian population were financed. So, in 2000, in the city of Red Fort, members of the Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist group killed three Indian soldiers, having received before this 3.5 million rupees through a "hawaladar" operating in Dubai [27]. The named terrorist group was involved in terrorist attacks in 2008 in Mumbai. It is noteworthy that earlier in 1993, when a series of terrorist attacks took place in Mumbai, the money was transferred to the terrorist members of Lashkar-taiba by the local hawaladar [28].

In addition, it has been ascertained by terrologists that through the Hawala system, money was transferred from Pakistan to the Mujahideen during the local military operations of the USSR in Afghanistan [29].

Noteworthy are the results of the work of the commission investigating the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States. Thus, it was established that Bin Laden used in criminal activity the capabilities of the hawaladar network operating in Dubai, Pakistan and some Middle Eastern countries [30].

The connection of the terrorist attacks with the Hawala system is also seen in the case of the terrorist attack at the embassy in Nairobi in 1998, when one of the terrorists, having escaped death, received money transferred by his business connection from Yemen through the hawaladar operating in

Somalia, who agreed to issue funds without presenting identification documents [31].

Thus, we can distinguish the following five features characteristic of the Hawala system, which pose a potential threat to the security of the financial and economic system at the global and national levels.

1. Each “hawaladar” uses affordable and convenient payment instruments, economic schemes to equalize counterclaims and make transfers.

2. Transfers through the Hawala system can involve a large number of intermediaries and countries involved (especially if equalization of mutual obligations occurs in a triangular configuration).

3. Unaccounted assets (cash, precious stones and precious metals and other liquid values) may be the subject of settlement between “hawaladars”. Types of businesses that are not regulated by supervisors can also be used, thus falling outside the formal banking system.

4. Material values transferred through the Hawala system may be modified (in cash – non-cash form - liquid tangible assets).

5. The process of mutual settlements (along with the use of transfers) is important as an object of regulation by law enforcement and supervisory authorities in terms of counteracting the possible “pollution” of money.

In connection with the above, it should be stated that the current global (40 FATF Recommendations), Russian “anti-legalization” (Federal Law of 07.08.2001 No. 115-FZ “Counteracting Legalization (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and Financing of Terrorism”) and industry legislation (Letter of the Bank of Russia dated December 27, 2002 No. 181-T “Recommendations on the regulation and reflection in the reporting of credit institutions of certain types of transactions that carry an increased risk”, Letter of the Bank of Russia dated March 31, 2008 No. 36-T “Recommendations on organizing the management of risks arising from the implementation of

operations by credit institutions using Internet banking systems”, Letter of the Bank of Russia dated August 8, 2011 No. 115-T “Recommended forms of bank account agreements concluded by the Bank of Russia with bodies that open and maintain personal accounts of organizations”, Regulation of the Bank of Russia dated March 2, 2012 No. 375-P “Requirements for the rules of internal control of credit organization for the purpose of countering the legalization (laundering) of proceeds from crime and the financing of terrorism”, Regulation of the Bank of Russia dated June 19, 2012 No. 383-P “Rules for transferring funds”, Bank of Russia Instruction dated 30.05.2014 No. No. 153-I “Opening and closing bank accounts, accounts for deposits, deposit accounts” primarily due to the global nature of transactions, the cross-system nature of Hawala, the involvement of intermediaries (high-level “hawaladars”), often delayed in time for hawaladars to close their obligations to partners with rapid progress in the field of payment instruments (primarily through Internet banking) is not quite capable of responding quickly to the use of Hawala in criminal activities.

The foregoing dictates the need for timely, proactive formation and adjustment of international, domestic profile, as well as related industry legislation. These measures can create conditions for a more effective use of the available tools, forces and means within the framework of the implementation of internal functions of state regulation, as well as potentially improve the quality of interaction within international organizations.

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2020.03.001. ELENA DMITRIEVA. WAYS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION. CONDENSED ABSTRACT.

Keywords: Islam, globalization, Muslim community, modernization, expansion, Islamic revival.

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1. *Sergey Zyazin*. Musulmanskaya obshchina v processe sociokul'turnyh preobrazovaniy [The Muslim Community in the Process of Socio-Cultural Transformation], Mir Nauki. Sociologiya, Filologiya, Kulturologiya, 2019. No 2. [V.10](#)

2. *Aleksander Rodrigues-Fernandes*. Islamskaya tradiciya i strategii nacionalnogo razvitiya arabskih gosudarstv [Muslim Tradition and Conceptions of National Development of Arab States]. Lokus: lyudi, obshchestvo, kultura, smysly. 2020. No 1. [P](#)

Sergey Zyazin, postgraduate, RSSU, Moscow, in his article (1) examines the role of the Muslim community in the context of modernization through the prism of interaction between Western and Muslim civilizations. The Muslim community has been and remains today one of the most influential and huge communities in the world, developing according to its own rules, regulating its religious norms and traditions. According to demographic projections, the global Muslim population will grow from 1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion by 2030, i.e. up to about 35%. In Europe: 19.5 million Muslims (3.8% of the total population in 2010) and 25.8 million (4.9% as of 2017). In Russia: there are 20 million Muslims per 145 million people as of 2017.

The process of the Arab world modernization has led the Ummah to contradictory consequences. Muslim society is not isolated from Islam, which regulates all public life aspects: family relations, law, politics, etc., so the consolidation of an initially

disparate community (representatives of different tribes), the formation of common rules and norms of behavior, and the establishment of a single value system is its main task. The perception of Islam by the Western world took place exclusively from the point of view of the geopolitical concept of Huntington for many decades, where Islam is interpreted as a threat to the present and future of the Western model of statehood. Sharia law regulates both religious and secular life in Islamic society, therefore, according to the author, there are too few opportunities for changing the Muslim community, for the development of civil rights and freedom of expression, which are key features of the Western pluralistic model of democracy. Both civil liberties and political rights are generally ignored in the vast majority of Muslim countries.

Despite the external stability, the Muslim Ummah is faced with the penetration of other cultural elements into everyday life and value systems, which leads to a transformation of established norms. For example, some representatives of the local spiritual and political elite in the North Caucasus are making attempts to politicize Islam, transforming it into the dominant state ideology in the conditions of the spiritual and ideological vacuum that has developed in local communities as a result of the collapse of the communist ideology.

Analyzing the processes in Western Europe in the context of the migration crisis, the author notes the beginning of the process of “vertical” and “horizontal” Islamization, aimed at strengthening the position of Muslims in various spheres of state policy and public life. The current models of multiculturalism in Western Europe promote the consolidation of Muslim immigrants rather than integration.

Social changes taking place within the Muslim community are clearly manifested in the state of the family institution, which is associated with a complex of reasons. First of all, the life values of Muslim youth are changing, and Islamic customs and spiritual

values have been in a long and difficult process of adapting to the claims and demands of the Western community.

Aleksander Rodrigues-Fernandes DSc (History), MPGU, (2) believes that the search for ways of modernization, the formation of state political ideologies and creative economic concepts in the modern Arab world is still based on the old Muslim tradition. The author identifies six schools within this tradition that have influenced the social structure of Arab countries and social behavior of people since the Middle Ages. The unifying feature of these schools is the primacy of spiritual and moral-ethical principles over the factors of material existence, the condemnation of extreme forms of mercantilism and individualism. The concepts and development strategies of Muslim countries are nationally distinctive and anti-globalization in essence.

But the often-denounced globalization is an objective reality. What is common in various assessments of globalization is the emphasis on its informative and intellectual side, and this circumstance largely determines the increasing dependence of the majority of former third world countries ("backward periphery") from the economy of the developed centers of the "world-forming community" (the U.S., Western Europe, Japan). This dependence has contributed to the development of numerous Western concepts and models as recipes for overcoming the "age-old backwardness" of the former colonial world. At the same time, many developing countries have put forward their own alternative models of social development based on their own values and traditions. The most authoritative alternative direction in the Arab-Islamic region remains the search for supporters of political Islam, focused on reproducing national development strategies based on Islam.

The author believes that even modern ideas of the most compromise current of Islamic philosophical and political thought - modernist (in contrast to the other two trends - conservative and fundamentalist) convergence of inter-

civilizational positions, since they still identify the Arab society in the traditional coordinate system, while the laws of Western global expansion require its reconstruction according to the standards of Atlantic civilization.

The differences in approaches to the implementation of the Islamic Renaissance among modern conservatives and fundamentalists are rather arbitrary. Conservatives emphasize “taklid” – traditional adherence to the guidelines of the authorities of the past, as well as a significant restriction or complete rejection of innovations. Fundamentalists have much in common with conservatives. They also advocate a return to the Koran and Sunnah, but they are irreconcilable with innovations and are more decisive in protecting Islamic socio-cultural foundations from the processes of Westernization. The modernists are most inclined to adapt. They advocate the observance of the principles of the Koran and the Prophet Muhammad, for the reliance on Islamic principles and values in solving socio-political problems, but they recognize the possibility of perceiving the best assets of other cultures, if such borrowings do not contradict Muslim values.

The author notes that socio-economic transformations are currently being implemented in the peripheral countries in terms of non-equivalent exchange with the developed world powers and mainly in accordance with their program settings, which provide a determining influence on the economic development of the third world countries and the orientation of their development strategies. Thus, the political factor becomes dominant over the economic one in North-South relations. The paradox associated with the periphery States is that these countries are reviving or importing what they fought against during the battles for the elimination of colonial dependence.

In conclusion, the author emphasizes that various forms of social structure in the Islamic world and the directions of their development are explained by the spread of the Muslim community – a closed and self-sufficient social system that

weakly interacts with the outside world and is a tool for preserving traditions and fighting external influences. The author comes to the conclusion that the Muslim community is under the influence of the processes of modernization and Westernization of culture. The Islamic communities will inevitably face the penetration of alien cultural elements into their daily life and value system as Muslim states develop, communication systems develop, and migration flows intensify, which will entail the process of further transformation of traditional norms and rules.

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Гигиеническое заключение
№ 77.99.6.953.П.5008.8.99 от 23.08.1999 г.
Подписано к печати 20 / IX – 2020 г. Формат 60х84/16
Бум. офсетная № 1 Печать офсетная
Усл. печ. л. 8,8 Уч.-изд. л. 8,3
Тираж 300 экз. (1–100 экз. – 1-й завод) Заказ № 113

**Институт научной информации
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**Отдел маркетинга и распространения
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Отпечатано по гранкам ИНИОН РАН
в ООО «Амирит»,
410004, Саратовская обл., г. Саратов,
ул. Чернышевского, 88, литера У
Тел.: 8-800-700-86-33; (845-2) 24-86-33