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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

AZIZ NIYAZI. UNDP REPORT ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 2018: TRENDS AND INDEXES IN THE WORLD AND RUSSIA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Human Development Index; living standards in Russia, global trends; UNDP report on human development 2018; education and healthcare, gross national income, gender inequality.

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Abstract. In the article there are global trends regarding human development. It is carried out a comparative analysis of quality of life indicators in the Russian Federation with similar measurements in the countries with booming economies.

On September 14, 2018 there was the latest report of United Nations Development Programme "Indexes and indicators of human development: updating of statistics in 2018." It is made on the basis of evaluated data calculated following the results of 2017 which cover 189 countries. Human Development Index (HDI) reflects changes of quality of life of the population of Earth,

particular countries and territories. As before, since 1990, this composite index shows achievements of countries on three principal measurements: long and healthy life, knowledge, adequate standard of living. Health is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is estimated by means of a combination of literacy rate of adult population and coverage of the population by three education levels – elementary, secondary and higher; material welfare is measured by means of gross national income per capita in purchasing- power adjusted dollars. In the area of income by way of limit value GNI worldwide average value per capita is used.

Criteria and indicators of human development are constantly improved. Over the last years for the purpose of more complex measurement of human development four more composite indexes are used. HDI corrected including inequality – applies correction for HDI including inequality level. The index of gender development compares HDI values for men and women. The index of gender inequality shows rate of spread of women's rights and opportunities, and the index of multidimensional poverty reflects the poverty measurements which are not connected directly with income. Also when determining rating of the country such factors are considered: a possibility of citizens to take part in public life, situation with human rights and civil liberties, social security, degree of territorial and social mobility of the population, indicators of level of cultural development of the population, access to information, unemployment rate, a share of skilled labour, crime rate, environmental protection and others. In total rating all states are ranged on the basis of HDI and are divided into four categories: the countries with very high HDI level, with high, moderate and low ones. Basic measurements are standardized in the form of number values from 0 to 1, an average geometric mean is made as a cumulative indicator of HDI in the range from 0 to 1. Then the states are ranged on the basis of this indicator. The countries with HDI less than 0.550 have the low level of human development; 0.550–0.699 – moderate level; 0.700–

0.799 – high level of development; from 0.800 and more – very high level.

In UNDP report 2018 it is noted that in general in the world it is observed the trend directed to further improvement of human development: from 189 countries, basing on which HDI is calculated, 59 countries are included into a group with very high level of human development, and only 38 countries are included into a group with low level of HDI. Only eight years ago in 2010 these figures were 46 and 49 countries respectively.

The five of the leading states in HDI rating from 189 countries and territories is headed by Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Ireland and Germany while Niger, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Chad and Burundi have the lowest points estimating national achievements in the sphere of health care, education and income. The largest growth of HDI rating from 2012 to 2017 occurred in Ireland which rose by 13 positions; also Turkey, Dominican Republic and Botswana developed intensively, each of which rose by 8 positions. All three cases of the sharpest rating decrease on HDI belong to the countries affected by conflicts: the greatest rating decrease on HDI happened in the Syrian Arab Republic – by 27 then Libya (26 positions) and Yemen (20 positions).

On a global scale level of health increased considerably as evidenced by life expectancy at birth. It grew up almost for 7 years. As for length of schooling today's children of school age can hope that they will stay in school for 3, 4 years more, than generation of 1990.

The moderate levels of HDI increased considerably from 1990 – by 22 percent on a global scale and by 51 percent in hard-core developing countries. It demonstrates that on the average people live longer, have higher level of education and bigger income. However in countries and regions of the world there are still large-scale differences in well-being of people. The analysis of components of cumulated statistics shows the remaining injustice

in distribution of public achievements in the sphere of education, health care and income.

Human Development Index corrected due to inequality gives the chance to compare inequality levels in the countries, and the higher inequality, the more HDI of this country decreases. Though considerable inequality is observed in many countries, including some of the richest one, on the average it is developed more in the countries with low level of human development (HD). The countries with low and moderate level of HDI lose respectively 31 and 25 percent of their HDI level because of inequality, and in the countries with very high level, losses of HDI on the average are 11 percent, – experts of UNPD conclude.

As for inequality between women and men, globally it is observed the reduction of a gender gap during the periods of childhood and youth while at mature age inequality steadily remains. One of the main sources of inequality in the countries is the gap in opportunities, achievements and distribution of the rights and powers between men and women. On a global scale the HDI average number for women is 6 percent lower, than for men which is due to lower income and educational level of women in many countries though the number of girls attending school increases. Worldwide index of economic activity of women is lower, than the corresponding index for men – 49 percent against 75. When women enter a labor market, unemployment rate among them is 24 percent higher, than among men.

Despite universal progress in the area of human development, it continues to restrain by essential disproportions inside and among countries. Among the states there is an enormous dispersion of the indicators characterizing quality of education, medical care and also many other key aspects of life. In the countries of Africa to the south from the Sahara there are 39 pupils at elementary school per one teacher, in the region of the Southern Asia – 35 pupils. At the same time in the countries of OECD, East Asia and the Pacific region and also Europe and Central Asia there is one teacher for 16–18 pupils at elementary

school. And if in the countries of OECD, Europe, East Asia and the Pacific region on the average 29 and 28 doctors are necessary for every 10 thousand people of the population, and in the Southern Asia – only 8, and in the countries of Africa to the south from the Sahara – less than 8.

“On the average a child who was born in the country with low HDI can hope to live a bit more than 60 years while a child who was born in a country with very high HDI is capable to live almost up to 80. In the same way, children in the countries with low level of HDI, most likely will spend at school seven years less, than children from the countries with very high level of HDI. Besides that this statistics in itself draws a severe picture of reality, it also testifies to the tragedy of millions of individuals whose life is saddened by inequality and unrealized opportunities, and, neither that, nor another is inevitable” - the Administrator of UNDP said in connection with a release of the last Report on human development Akhim Steiner.

* * *

In HDI rating following the results of 2017 the Russian Federation takes quite a good 49th place (with HDI 0.816) from 189 countries of the world and falls under 59 countries with very high rates of human development. Several years ago it was at the top of the second group of the countries with high rates of the index. Key indicators of Russia are the following: life expectancy at birth – 71.2 years; expected duration of getting of education – 15.5 years; the average duration of training – 12.0 years; gross national income per capita – \$24,233 a year in purchasing-power adjusted dollars in the prices of 2011. About 144 million people lived in the country in 2017.

Dynamics of points on HDI from 1990 to 2017. (Table № 1) shows, how seriously “shock therapy” of the neoliberal experiment of the 90s not only slowed down, but also rebounded achievements of the Russian citizens while the world was

developing. Then during a decade from 2000 to 2010 the fastest catching up of basic components, necessary for human development, was observed. The reached rates of human development of Russians from 2010 to 2017 decreased a little, but exceeded the average annual growth of HDI in the world in general. It is important that despite known economic difficulties which emerged since 2014 Russia nevertheless could keep and even to improve, although modestly, its positions on indicators of human development.

Table 1

**Russia and the world.
Trends in Human Development Index. 1990–2017**

Russia								
Years	1990	2000	2010	2012	2014	2015	2016	2017
HDI points	0,734	0,720	0,780	0,798	0,807	0,813	0,815	0,816
The world	0,598	0,642	0,698	0,709	0,718	0,722	0,726	0,728
Russia								
Years	1990–2000		2000–2010		2010–2017		1990–2017	
Annual average growth of HDI in %	-0,18		0,80		0,66		0,40	
The world	0,72		0,84		0,60		0,73	

In HDI rating Russia continues to advance the largest states in the world with quickly growing economy (Table № 2). Its partners in BRICS still considerably lag behind it in indicators of real formation and GNI purchasing-power adjusted dollars per capita. Nevertheless on life expectancy of birth of the Russian Federation lags behind indicators of Brazil, China and global reach. Brazil approached the Russian Federation on measurement of the expected duration of training of its citizens. It should be noted that statistics by the number of years of training demands also studying of quality of education – what and how teach including in Russia.

Table 2

**Human Development Index and its components
of the countries of BRICS according to the results of 2017**

<i>Place in the rating of 189 countries</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>HDI points</i>	<i>Life expectancy at birth (in years)</i>	<i>Expected duration of training (in years)</i>	<i>The average duration of training (in years)</i>	<i>GNI per capita (in purchasing-power adjusted USD dollars)</i>	<i>Rating by GNI per capita minus HDI rating</i>
49	Russia	0,816	71,2	15,5	12,0	24,233	3
79	Brazil	0,759	75,7	15,4	7,8	13,755	2
86	China	0,752	76,4	13,8	7,8	15,270	-9
113	RSA	0,699	63,4	13,3	10,1	11,923	-23
130	India	0,640	68,8	12,3	6,4	6,353	-5
	The world	0,728	72,2	12,7	8,4	15,295	

The last column of the table 2 – the rating of the countries on GNI per capita minus HDI rating shows the difference between rating on GNI per capita and overall HDI rating. The negative indicator means that the rating of the country on GNI is higher, than its HDI rating. This negative difference indicates that income gained in the country is not converted properly into development in the spheres of environmental protection, education and health of the population. The smaller HDI rating in comparison with rating on income is most characteristic for the countries, economy of which is based on extraction and export of minerals and energy resources. Though in Russia such segment of economy is very considerable, its position among BRICS countries is the best (3), nevertheless it is low, the same one the Central African Republic has, which is standing still in HDI rating on the second last 188 place. Negatives are observed in India, China and the Republic of South Africa: -5; -9; -23 respectively.

On the basis of the steps of the Russian government for the last 2–3 years focused on economic and financial improvement and also support of the social sphere there are bases to hope that the

reached level of human development of Russians will remain stable. Tendency data of the table 1, shows that at all times of the Post-Soviet period, even in the hardest times, the potential of human development in Russia remained and remains higher than a global indicator. Conditions for this purpose were put in the USSR – the advanced social state. In heritage it left not only powerful economic infrastructure, but also generally recognized achievements in science, education, health care, culture. Much is still kept on them. Besides, we possess huge natural resources and if to use them intelligently, it is possible to hope that development of Russia will become more stable.

2019.01.001. OLGA SHEVCHENKO, MARIA TIKHONOVSKOVA.
THE THREATS AND RISKS TO THE SPIRITUAL SECURITY OF
MODERN RUSSIA // *“Gumanitarniy Yuga Rossii,” Rostov-on-Don,*
2018, Vol. 7, № 1, P. 161–169.

Keywords: spiritual security, national security, spiritual sphere, mass culture, spiritual competition, social and cultural split, spiritual crisis.

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The problem of identifying threats to spiritual security of Russia and the search for ways to overcome them in the context of a deep socio-cultural split in Russian society is discussed in the article.

In the introductory part of the article the authors focus on the definition of the concept of spiritual security, which is an integral

element of the national security system of society. Spiritual security has not been considered a significant factor of national security for a long time, as military, economic, political, information, environmental and other problems came to the fore. However, the negative consequences of the crisis of spirituality and culture in modern Russian society have become evident and spiritual security is considered a leading factor in preserving national sovereignty and cultural identity in Russia in recent years.

Although the concept of "spiritual security" is still in the process of conceptualization, its introduction into Russian scientific discourse is conditioned by the need to revive and promote spiritual values that can become the basis for the consolidation of Russian society in the conditions of a deep socio-cultural split of the country.

There are several approaches to understanding the spiritual security of society. At present, a comprehensive approach has been developed in understanding spiritual security in scientific discourse, which allows considering it in the unity of three aspects:

- as the ability of the individual, society and the state to preserve and develop positive creative spirituality;
- as a state of protection of the vital interests and needs of the individual, society and the state;
- as a system of relations between the subjects of social life, which provides favorable conditions for spiritual life and spiritual evolution.

However, spiritual security is not just an element of the national security system, but is a rather complex system in itself, covering various spheres of society: cultural, religious, ideological, etc.

In addition, areas that are conditionally related to the spiritual sphere – political, economic, social, and the sphere of interethnic interaction – fall into the system of spiritual security. This gives reason to consider spiritual security as a multifaceted social phenomenon that ensures the normal functioning of all public institutions of the state.

The specifics of external threats to the spiritual sphere of Russian society are primarily attributed by scientists to the

negative impact of global culture on traditional Russian spiritual values. Moreover, Western norms and principles, which are considered fundamentally alien to the Russian mentality and have a destructive potential in relation to both the individual and society as a whole, are the core of global culture. Everything “non-Western,” original, something else in this strategy should disappear or occupy a modest niche in the established system of Western values. One of the vectors of globalization processes is cultural globalization, the strategy of which is cultural expansion.

The threat of the spiritual security of modern Russia is represented by mass culture, which is oriented towards imitating the most primitive samples of Western pop culture. The lack of educational countering to the corrupting influence of the media aggravates the moral problems of society at all levels and the issue of preserving the national spiritual culture in such a situation is a matter of preserving spiritual and political sovereignty in the country. The substitution of a national spiritual culture with the culture of another people or a cosmopolitan mass culture leads to the destruction of the state, both in moral and political aspects.

The process of tightening spiritual competition has been going on recently in the world, which is used to influence the opponent’s mentality for his spiritual disorientation, in which it becomes possible to influence the consciousness of society, with the goal of further mastering its natural and economic resources. Today, the main means of achieving geostrategic goals is the information-psychological, cultural, confessional, ideological and scientific-technical struggle between geopolitical competitors.

There are also internal threats associated with the destructive consequences of the post-Soviet transformations for the spiritual sphere of Russian society, as a result of which a change has occurred in the system of value orientations and the motives of human behavior that led to a reassessment of basic values. Among the main internal threats, the authors of the article focus on the sociocultural split that arose as a result of traumatic institutional changes in society. Today, the sociocultural split of Russian society is only

aggravated: civilization – to the West and the East, territorial – to the center and periphery, sociocultural – to the elite and the common people, etc. Moreover, it manifests itself in the violation of normal emotional ties between people, the growth of mutual alienation in society. Russian sociologists point out that there is a steady trend towards atomization in Russian society, which undermines the sense of belonging to a common culture, history and destiny.

Moreover, the sociocultural split of society is manifested not only in the loss of common spiritual and moral orientations, cultural meanings, a unified national and cultural identity of the peoples of Russia, but also in the political, legal, economic, social spheres of the public life of the country. Formed mistrust of people to the institutions of government confirms this thesis.

Analyzing the internal threats to the spiritual security of modern Russia, the authors identify the most characteristic factors based on the research of sociologists: the crisis of the institutional system of society; demographic crisis and the devaluation of traditional family values; intergenerational crisis; lack of formation of the all-Russian national-cultural identity; criminalization of society; increased social pessimism; lack of a culture of trust in society. Researchers believe that the reason for the spread of mistrust in society is the need of the individual in ensuring his own security zone.

In conclusion, the authors note that the spiritual state of modern Russian society should be considered as risky due to the presence of such factors as mutual alienation of the population and the state, the atomization of society, the disappointment of citizens in the activities of political institutions of the country, enormous social inequality, spiritual and moral degradation, the dominance of mass culture. It is necessary to define clear evaluation criteria of the ideas and phenomena, the ability to differentiate them on the principle of constructive / destructive and creative / it is necessary to define clear evaluation criteria of the ideas and phenomena, the ability to differentiate them on the principle of constructive / destructive, creative / destroying.

Today, the country needs an adequate state cultural policy, the national priority of which will be the quality of life of people, their spiritual and moral condition, the development of civic culture, overcoming inter-ethnic alienation, the formation of a single cultural space of the country. The activities on the revival and development of the spiritual potential of the nation cannot be effective without involving civil society institutions in this process, primarily the family, the education system, as well as the media, secular and religious organizations.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.01.002. ROBERT LANDA. THE REVOLUTION OF 1917 IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN COUNTRIES // *Works of Institute of Oriental Studies RAS. Issue 4. Economic, socio-political and ethno-confessional problems of Afro-Asian countries. Moscow, 2017, P. 20–27.*

Keywords: February and October revolutions of 1917, Eastern countries, Muslims, clergy, national minorities.

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The article examines the influence exerted by the February and October revolutions in Russia on Eastern nations. Special attention is paid to the reaction of the Muslims in the Russian Empire and the impact on the national-liberation movement of the Arab people on the territory of the former Ottoman Empire. As noted by Robert Landa, the conservative part of society, including the Muslim aristocracy of Russia, its military elite and clergy called the February revolution of 1917 “a great anarchy, which should have been done away with as soon as possible.” At the same time liberally-minded Muslims supported the February revolution. However, more influential liberals adhered to the old rule and

maintained that the overthrow of the “White Czar” undermined the prestige of Russia and its abilities to fulfill its liabilities concerning Muslims. On the whole, the unpredictable Russian reality born of February 1917 has provoked great dissent among the Russian Muslims and given rise to a certain feeling of separatism.

The Provisional government formally guaranteed all nationalities of Russia the property rights, freedom of movement, electoral rights, and the right to study in the native language. The Provisional government also allowed the Muslims to set up such organizations as the Committee of mountain dwellers of the North Caucasus and appointed influential representatives of Muslim aristocracy as commissars of the Provisional government and the State Duma. A Muslim People’s Committee came into being in Moscow consisting of Kasimov Tatar entrepreneurs loyal to the Russian authorities, who were later joined by the opposition members Ahmed Tsalikov, Menshevik faction member, and Tatar writer Gayaz Iskhaki. In St. Petersburg Ahmed Tsalikov organized the Temporary Central Bureau of Muslims, which convened the First All-Russia Muslim Congress in Moscow in May 1917. Part of its delegates came out for the victory on the Russian army in World War I, but most of them supported the chief delegate of the Cadet party Sadri Maksudi, who came out against partition of Turkey and destruction of Constantinople, but his speech for “a war with victorious end” was met with disapproval by most delegates, who denounced the “imperialist slogans of the Cadets.” Contrary to the view of the “traditionalists,” most delegates supported the idea of freedom not only in Europe, but also in Asia and Africa, among all peoples of the world, irrespective of their origin, religion, color of skin and race. For the first time solidarity was proclaimed between the supporters of the Russian February revolution and the downtrodden peoples of Asia and Africa. It was actually the first attempt of the supporters of the February revolution to emerge in the international arena. However, the February 1917 events in Russia did not evoke any tangible

response outside Russia. They had too many contradictions, disagreements, etc., factions fighting one another, and ethno-confessional trends and currents, whose interests clashed and leaders rivaled.

The collapse of the Russian monarchy in February 1917 gave great hopes to each nation inhabiting the country. The national minorities living in the territory of the old empire awaited equality proclaimed by the Provisional government. But the Petrograd Soviet put forward only the cultural-national autonomy, whose very idea was discarded by the train of events. The February leaders were paralyzed by World War I and adhered to formally legal approach to all major problems, while awaiting the forthcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly. Such approach disappointed national minorities living in Russia. During the summer of 1917 they began to move away from the revolution which failed to take the initiative and meet their hopes and aspirations. Supporters of the Provisional authorities did not understand properly the scope of the changes that had taken place after February 1917 events in Russia, primarily the sentiments of workers, peasants and soldiers and their thirst for immediate transformations. Besides, the authorities were not really interested in the wishes and aspirations of Russian national and religious minorities, thus alienating them. Although Muslims alone numbered twenty million in Russia in 1910 and thirty million in 1930 (despite the losses suffered in World War I and the Civil war). This force could have solved much in the course of the political struggle of 1917–1921, but the Provisional authorities did not take this factor into consideration, virtually overlooked it. This was why it was not only national minorities, but also entire social strata and organizations that began to abandon the Provisional government, which brought it to complete failure in October 1917. The crucial role in that process was also played by unreliability, indetermination and lack of support from the Provisional government, as well as cohesion, better organization and the

revolutionary drive of a numerically smaller Bolshevik party, which overpowered its weaker rivals.

The February 1917 developments in Russia did not have a broad response in other countries because they were concentrated on solving internal Russian problems, but did not succeed in it. In as much as Russia continued its engagement in the war, its Entente allies were not worried over its "behavior." The remaining countries are at war (there were 38 of them with a population of about 1.5 billion, including the inhabitants of China, India. Egypt and other colonies and semi-colonies were drawn in to military hostilities. As a result, of the 70 million men fighting in various countries in 1914–1918, nine-and-a-half million were killed, over twenty million were wounded and 3.5 million of them remained cripples. The great Muslim country – the Ottoman Empire – lost 600,000 in killed and two million in wounded. Industry and agriculture deteriorated almost three times over. Up to 40 percent of the population in Syria and Lebanon (parts of the Ottoman Empire) died from hunger and sickness in 1914–1916. The situation in Iraq, Palestine and other Arab regions was hardly any better. By October 1917 not a single Arab country was independent. Algeria was a colony of France, Libya – a colony of Italy. Morocco was under protectorate of France and Spain, and Egypt and Sudan – under protectorate of Britain, although formally the latter was considered a local possession of Britain and Egypt. Yemen and other countries of the Arab Peninsula were parts of the Ottoman Empire, except Aden, which became one of the first British colonies in the Arab world at the beginning of the 19th century, and a number of princedoms of the Persian Gulf turned into British protectorates by that time. In the Middle East from the very beginning of World War I military hostilities were going on: the British forces largely consisting of Indian Muslims and other inhabitants of British colonies under the command of British generals were engaged in fighting the Turkish armies which numbered hundreds of thousands of Arab soldiers under the command of German generals. At the same time the Bedouin

militia and certain Arab tribes led by Emir Faisal and the British Intelligence officer Colonel Lawrence staged a rebellion against Ottoman domination on the Arab Peninsula.

The Ottoman Empire devastated as it was by World War I and subjugated by Germany was inhabited by sixty peoples and ethnic groups of twelve confessions, and was by right regarded "prison of nations." The Young Turks who came to power in 1909 carried on mass reprisals against non-Turkish inhabitants of their empire, having intensified them during the war years, especially against the Armenian people. In those years up to 1.5 million Armenians lost their life due to persecution, harsh reprisals, torture, hunger and banishment of peaceful civilian population from their traditional place of residence. The plight of other national minorities – Greeks, Assyrians and Arabs was also heavy. The latter (10.5 million) surpassed in number the ethnic Turks living in the empire (7 million). However, they had only 60 deputies in parliament representing them, as against 150 of those representing the Turks. There was a forcible assimilation of national minorities, persecution of their national organizations. Closing down of their native schools was an ordinary thing. This was why within the empire, as well as outside it and also in the Ottoman army illegal patriotic organizations of the downtrodden peoples began to be formed.

After the start of World War I the situation in most Arab countries has deteriorated. Hundreds of thousands of Arabs died from hunger and disease, were killed, wounded or maimed while serving in the Ottoman army. All this contributed to the growing revolutionary crisis in the Arab world. The phenomena of economic and political collapse exacerbated due to the impact of such factor of world importance as the October revolution of 1917 in Russia. An upsurge of the liberation struggle of the Arabs was stepped up by the fact that the Entente troops were deployed in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, where they attempted to stamp the fight of the Arabs for freedom, thus stepping up their resistance.

The developments in Russia in October 1917, as well as the position of the Russian Muslims in the course of the Civil war in Russia and its turning into a federative state became the factor preventing the Muslim ummah to disintegrate. This followed a stubborn struggle, which was also waged by Russian Muslims, contrary to assertions of certain western researchers.

In December 1917 the Soviet government proclaimed the annulment of the secret treaties of the former czarist regime with the Entente imperialists. Among these treaties was the secret Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France signed in 1916, with participation of the Russian czar's government, which envisaged the partition of the countries of the Arab East, which were dominated by the Ottoman Empire at the time. The Soviet government disclosed the essence of that document, which evoked an upsurge of patriotic sentiments of the Arab people. That treacherous deal was unmasked by the Soviet government in Petrograd in December 1917 and later published in Beirut, which had an effect of a bomb blast. In January 1918 the news became known in Cairo about the decision of the 2nd All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which rejected the methods of secret diplomacy, annexations and seizures. At the same time the Congress supported the right of nations to self-determination.

In the spring of 1918 action committees began to be formed in Arab countries against the Sykes-Picot agreement. The denunciation by the Soviet government of this secret plot of colonialists against the Arab people was an incentive to an upsurge of the Arab liberation struggle. Proof of this was the revolutionist movement of 1919-1921 in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Tunisia and Morocco. At the same time the Paris Peace Conference evolved, on the U.S. initiative a system of mandate rule, which was subsequently applied to the Arab countries, whose partition was envisaged by the Sykes-Picot agreement. In the implementation of their program the imperialists, despite their military superiority, came across a powerful resistance of the Arabs: one thousand Syrians died in

battles with the 50,000-strong French army at Maysalun Pass. The French army captured Damascus, but the struggle continued. By the summer of 1924 the French army lost up to nine thousand men and officers. The Arabs of Morocco were fighting the French and Spanish colonialists until 1934, and the Libyan Arabs resisted the Italian fascists up to 1932. For them, just as for the people of Algeria, Palestine and other Arab countries, the October 1917 revolution in Russia served as an example of courage and fortitude, concludes the researcher.

Author of the article – Valentina Schensnovich

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

IGOR DOBAYEV. ISLAM IN BLACK SEA-CASPIAN REGION:
GEOPOLITICAL ASPECT* // *The article was written for the
bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: geopolitics, Islam, Islamism,
Sunnism, Shi'ism Sufism, Black Sea –
Caspian region.*

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Abstract. The article examines the state and development of Islam and the Islamic movement in the Black Sea – Caspian region and the influence of the re-Islamization process on geopolitical transformations. Islam is not monolithic in the region, it is represented by various trends, groupings, currents, sects, etc. The most dangerous of these forms are religious-political extremism and terrorism camouflaged by Islamic faith.

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"Transconflict regions as a phenomenon of the geopolitical competition:
social risks and resources of adaptation to humanitarian calls."

In this article the Black Sea – Caspian region includes a vast subregion of Eurasia, that is, Iran, Turkey, states of the Southern Caucasus and the Southern part of Russia.

Today's Iran is the only Muslim country in the world whose state religion is Shia Islam.

After the victory of the February 1979 revolution in Iran power in the country was seized by the Shia clergy headed by the great ayatollah R. Khomeini under whose guidance the "Islamic state" was built. Its creation presupposed radical transformations in Islamization of all socio-economic and political institutions of the country, Legislative bodies were formed in accordance with the Sharia law, all branches of executive power were organized according to the Islamic model of society, including "Islamic economy."

The experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has existed under Islamic rule for almost forty years, is of a natural interest. The leader of the Islamic revolution, the great ayatollah R. Khomeini has undertaken an attempt to realize the concept of "Islamic rule," which he evolved but which contradicted the Shia dogma that just rule is impossible in an Islamic state until the arrival of the 12th imam ("mahdi"), inasmuch as according to the Shia dogma it is only through him that the connection between the Shia community and Allah is established and carried on. R. Khomeini broke up with that scholastic approach, having proclaimed the existence of the third Islamic development way on the principles of justice and welfare of the entire people as a result of the correct and just rule of one leader.

Despite non-acceptance of this concept by many high religious authorities in Iran, who uphold the principle of non-interference of the clergy in state management, Khomeini's initiative and practices are the determining ones in the state construction matters in Iran.

According to them, the bodies of power in Iran are organized in such a way that the leading position in the political system at all levels are held by high religious figures, and the main link of the entire system is the spiritual leader of the state – "rahbar" (first the great ayatollah Khomeini, and after his death – ayatollah

Khamenei). According to Article 110 of the Constitution of Iran, he has unprecedentedly wide powers in the legislative, executive and judicial spheres, takes decisions on solution of questions of war and peace, appointment and removal of official persons, etc.

Although the Constitution says (articles 58 and 114) that it is the people who elect President and members of the "Islamic Council" (or parliament) the major role in determining all aspects of politics is played by religious figures. They comprise the absolute majority at the Council, which fulfils mainly executive, rather than legislative functions - search for premises and grounds in "sacred sources," which would answer arising vital problems. It should be noted that the "Council's" work is supervised by the "Council of Experts" ("Observation Council", or "Council of Protection of the Constitution") consisting of experts on Sharia law. As a rule, they represent the conservative wing in the political spectrum of the Shia clergy in the country. Of its twelve members six are approved by parliament and the rest are appointed by the spiritual leader. This Council has the task of checking parliament's decisions and verifying their correspondence to Sharia laws. This body has the right of veto concerning any decision.

A characteristic feature of Iran's political course, especially after the victory of the representative of the reformist trend Khatami at presidential elections in 1997, is that the growing differences in the ruling upper crust become more evident over the years. They increased during the presidential rule of Ahmadinejad, but softened a bit in the period of the rule of Rouhani, the current President of Iran. Certain essential elements of Shia Islamic radicalis, which helped the promotion of the interests of the opposition to the Shah's dictatorship during the Islamic revolution, at present serve the interests of the conservative wing of their Islamists. This was why the liberal wing headed by M. Khatami was working to build "a civil society" within the framework of the present Islamic system and win certain democratic gains, for one, freedom of speech. Ahmadinejad went still further, having curtailed the political opportunities of the Islamic conservatives.

At the same time, during the past two decades the “export of Islamic revolution” has diminished. The “Islamic rule” in Iran turned from extremist ideas to Islamism in its moderate form.

From the beginning of the 16th century and for four centuries Turkey fulfilled the role of the leader of Sunna Islam, and Turkish sultans played the role of caliphs already in 1517. However, after the defeat of Germany in World War 1 and the following surrender of Turkey in October 1918, the new leadership of the country headed by Mustafa Kemal staked on the ideology and practice of Turkism, having abandoned the ideas of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism of the Ottoman Empire. Religion was separated from the state, and the Sharia system was replaced by a secular system of a western type. Islamic customs were banned, and Arabic alphabet was replaced by Latin. An important milestone of that process was the deletion from the Constitution in 1928 of the premise that Islam was the state religion of Turkey, and in 1937 it included the principle of a secular state, which should not be removed.

However, this huge work was only begun under Kemal Atatyurk, but it could not finally change the consciousness of the big masses of the rural population. The changes touched primarily the inhabitants of big cities. After Atatyurk’s death in 1938 the Islamization process began in the country. As a result, in the view of champions of secularization, there is very little what was left today from Kemalist secularization. School and university curricula now included special courses on Islam, many theological departments at higher educational institutions have been opened, new mosques are built with active state participation, religious communities and other organizations are revived, as well as legal Islamist parties, etc. One of the first such parties was the Islamist Party of Well-being – Refakh financed by foreign and local organizations and foundations. In the mid-1980s the party unfolded an active organizational and propaganda work, promising to establish in the country the Islamic “just order,” if it comes to power. Its social support broadened noticeably, which

enabled it to score great success at the national elections, and in July 1996, in a coalition with the Party of True Road, it entered the government headed by the leader of the Islamists N. Erbakan. He and his supporters proclaimed themselves ardent enemies of a pro-western course and came out against Turkey's membership in the European Union. At the same time they advocate the country's development in the family of other Islamic nations as one of its leaders.

During his stay in power which lasted from July 1996 to June 1997, the Erbakan government undertook resolute measures to implement its Islamist doctrine. For one, in the economic sphere in April 1997, to counter the existing "Seven" of advanced capitalist countries, the Islamic "Eight" was created, including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria. Simultaneously, steps were taken to promote Islamization of the educational system. The number of imam-khatib schools was increased, as well as that of various Islamic courses and seminars. The Islamists have even persuaded the authorities to agree that officials in government offices and parliament adhere to Islamic standards and were dressed accordingly.

All this could not but cause opposition on the part of the circles interested in a secular way of life and in pro-Western course of Turkey's development. As a result, in June 1997 the N. Erbakan government resigned under pressure of the Turkish military.

Erbakan's resignation opened the road to further attacks on his party. In February 1998 the Constitutional Court took a decision to disband his party for "actions incompatible with the secular nature of the state proclaimed in the Constitution." However, instead of the banned "Refakh" party a new Islamic Party of Virtue - "Fazilet" was set up which was joined by deputies of parliament and former members of "Refakh." The new party came third in the parliamentary elections of 1999, but soon it was also banned and disbanded.

However, another Islamist organization came to replace it - the Party of Justice and Development, which won parliamentary

elections in Turkey beginning from 2007. Actually, the electoral hegemony of the PJD has been established in the country. Thus, the “old” Kemal political system was reformed through the expulsion of the military elite from it and the ousting of the PJD rivals from the political field. Apart from that, the present opposition has no real alternative program. To boot, Islamist tendencies were markedly growing in previously secular Turkey. The ruling Party of Justice and Development which won the presidential elections in August 2014 (T.R. Erdogan) is restoring its foundation of traditional Islamic values. One of its major gains was the neutralization of generals as a result of the referendum on changing the Constitution as a result of which the army was deprived of the ability to remove the country’s leadership from power. Thus, during the recent years the ruling party has succeeded to gain an upper hand over the old Kemal elite, having pushed it to the background from real influence and power and discredited it in the eyes of society.

Apart from that, it should be noted that in the activity of the ruling party we come across another paradox of Erdogan’s political strategy, namely, a combination of neoliberalism and paternalism. The ruling party has fulfilled its promise given back in 2002, namely, to lead Turkey along the road of new modernization, reform the social infrastructure and bring it to the European level. The definite successes of the Islamists in domestic policy doubtlessly enabled them to take a course at intensification of their foreign policy, which is now termed “neo-Ottomanism,” in as much as it is aimed at broadenings and deepening Turkey’s influence on the Middle Eastern states, which were earlier parts of the Ottoman Empire, continuing at the same time to move along the western vector. Experts note that the “New Ottoman Porta” successfully balances between East and West.

In the South Caucasus Islam is developed very unevenly. In Armenia the leading religious force is the Christian Armenian Apostolic Church. In predominantly Orthodox Christian Georgia there are regions, predominantly in Ajaria, Pankisi Gorge, and in some Eastern districts where groups of people believe in Islam.

On the whole, the influence of Islam in Georgia is gradually growing. But we turn our attention to Azerbaijan whose population believe in Islam. Part of the local Muslims was Sunnites, part – Shi'ites, and they were in constant confrontation with each other. In the 16th – 18th centuries the territory of modern Azerbaijan was the arena of sanguinary Sunnite – Shi'ite wars. Up to the beginning of the 19th century two-thirds of the local Muslims were Sunnites. However, as a result of Turkish-Russian wars by 1916 the confessional composition changed in favor of Shi'ites, and their number increased to 62 percent.

Besides, in the first half of the 19th century the territory of settlement of Azerbaijani Turks was divided into two parts: the smaller, northern part was included in the Russian Empire, and the bigger, southern part became part of Persia (later Iran). Practically immediately, the intellectual and political elites of the country unfolded a campaign for unifying these Azerbaijani lands. However, at the beginning the 20th century the Azerbaijani elite, split as it was into Sunnites and Shi'ites, divided still more into supporters of pan-Islamist ideology coming out under the banner of Islam, and into supporters of pan-Turkism fighting for unity by ethnic origin. These two factors (split into Sunnites and Shi'ites and into supporters of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism) multiplied by the factor of Soviet atheism have determined the mentality of many Azerbaijanis in the 20th century, and after the collapse of Soviet power in 1991 they played the decisive role in the religious-political processes in the country.

In 1991 Azerbaijan proclaimed its independence, but it could be regarded an Islamic country only formally. Real believers in that period (those who observed all rites and rituals) did not exceed one percent. Most people, although deemed themselves Muslims, did not have real knowledge and understanding of Islam and its main principles, did not attend mosque, did not pray, and did not observe the rites and rituals required by the Sharia law.

However, soon the process of "re-Islamization" began, when people were coming back to their faith. The number of believers

was rapidly growing. In ten years after gaining independence their number reached ten percent, and twenty years later – about twenty percent of the total population. It should be said that most of them are young people.

Serious changes have taken place within the Islamic community. Various Sufi tariqas have resumed their activity, and new ones appeared.

However, a special place in the Islamic life of Azerbaijan is taken by Islamic fundamentalists (Salaphites), who have never been in Azerbaijan's history. In turn, they have divided into moderates and radicals, which exerted influence on the politicization and radicalization of Islam in the country.

Serious changes have taken place in the Shi'ite community of Azerbaijan. Now, with the appearance of religious figures who have received religious education at Islamic institutions of Iran, the situation is becoming different. During the past years four Azerbaijani graduates from Iranian higher Muslim educational institutions received the religious status higher than the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus.

Thus, people in post-Soviet Azerbaijan turned to be divided into three big groups: Shia organizations, Salaphites, and a generation, oriented to western values and a secular model of statehood, which is supported by the political elite of the country.

Azerbaijani experts forecast the development of Islam in their country on the basis of the Turkish model, which is considered more acceptable inasmuch as it is more liberal and tolerant. However, in their view the official authorities use too harsh measures to oppose the spreading of political Islam, which leads to an increase in the number of radical Islamists. This is reflected, among other things, in a steadily growing number of young Azerbaijanian volunteers who take part in military hostilities in the Middle East, as well as in the North Caucasus. In other words, Islam during the post-Soviet period turned into a serious factor in the political life of Azerbaijan.

Prolonged historical contacts of Georgia with the Muslim world of the Ottoman Empire and Persia influenced not only the

ethnic composition of the population of Georgian lands and their confessional affiliation, but also the language, literature and culture of the Georgian people.

According to the population census of 2002, there were 433,784 (9.9% Muslims living in the republic). However, researchers claim that the real number is much higher and it reaches about 800,000. Georgian Muslims are mostly followers of Sunni Islam.

All questions connected with Muslim communities of the South Caucasus, and partly North Caucasus and control over their activity were supervised by the Board of Muslims of the Caucasus set up in Baku in 1993.

In 2011 the managerial system was changed. The higher level of professional training of the Muslim clergy, development of religious education, increase in the number of mosques and prayer-houses, and greater legalization of their judicial status have largely improved the activity of Georgian Muslim community. This called for the formation of the autonomous Spiritual Board of Muslims of Georgia.

As a result of a serious preparatory work a non-governmental organization – Board of Muslims of Georgia – was setup in May 2011. One of the basic tasks of the new body was to control the activity of the Islamic community, mosques and religious educational institutions of Georgia.

Under patronage and with support of Turkey and Iran local Muslim communities take part in building and opening new madrasahs and prayer-houses. Two Shia madrasahs for girls function in Tbilisi (capital of Georgia).

In Western Georgia 55 religious schools work under the supervision of mosques. In the foreseeable future a higher Muslim educational institution is to open in Georgia.

From the early-2000s two Shia Islamic cultural centers have been functioning in Georgia which are engaged in educational activity, publish journals and necessary literature in the Georgian and Azerbaijani languages

As to the Crimea which returned to the Russian Federation in 2014, it should be noted that the Crimean-Tatar movement on

the peninsula is not monolithic, but is split into several ethnic and religious groupings. The radicals are in a minority among the Crimean Tatars, however they are rather active and supported by outside forces. In their activity the ethnic and confessional factors merge, which increases the influence of the confessional factor on the political processes among Crimean Tatars.

After the Crimea has joined the Russian Federation the activity of the radical Crimean-Tatar organizations of Islamist and nationalist trends have been stepped up. Among these organizations experts name Milli Majlis, as well as Islamist organizations, groupings and sects – Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Crimea, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, “Wahhabis,” “Nursists,” “Gyulen-members, “Muslim Brothers” represented by “Ar-Raid” organization, etc.

The Crimean Milli Majlis, although it is situated beyond the bounds of the Crimea and is supported, by experts’ estimates, by less than twenty percent of the Crimean Tatars, today claims the right to represent the interests of all Crimean Tatars. The most active members of them – its leaders Ahtem Chaigoz, Lenur Islamov, Remzi Ilyasov, and others are supported by various American, European, Turkish foundations and other organizations and develop relations with the present Ukrainian authorities. As a result, the Milli Majlis leaders and the radical part of the Crimean Tatars supporting them continue to make provocative statements of an anti-Russian character, putting forward various demands. Among them – granting the Crimean Republic the status of national-territorial autonomy, adoption of laws guaranteeing the effective representation of Crimean Tatars in legislative and executive bodies of the Crimea, and recognition of the kurultai and majlis as representative bodies of the indigenous people of the Crimea.

The Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Crimea controls the activity of about 300 Muslim communities on the peninsula, and no less than half of them, are under the influence of radicals oriented to foreign Islamist groupings. The Board is financed by the international organization of “Muslim Brothers,” whose branches operate in many regions of Ukraine. The “Muslim Brothers”

finances various youth organizations, radical mass media, and sponsors anti-Russian actions in Ukraine. It also maintains contacts with other radical Islamist groupings in Ukraine and in the Crimea.

Experts emphasize that Milli Majlis does not represent all Crimean Tatars, and the Board is not the only religious structure in the Crimea embracing all Crimean Muslims. There is another organization – the Khabashite Spiritual Center of Crimean Muslims which opposes the Board of Crimean Muslims and is against politicization and radicalization of the Islamic movement in the Crimea.

Thus, Islam in the Black Sea – Caspian region is not a monolithic phenomenon, it is split into trends, fraternities, sects, religious-political groupings, and ideological and politicized currents. There is also a radical component. All this calls for further investigation of the processes going on in the above-mentioned geopolitical area.

2019.01.003. ALEXANDER KASHKAROV. THE RADICALIZATION OF ISLAM IN THE CRIMEA, AS A THREAT TO CRIMINOLOGICAL SAFETY OF THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA // *“Problemy primeneniya ugovnogo i ugovno-processualnogo zakonodatelstva” (Collection of material of an international scientific conference in Simferopol, April 19–20, 2018), Simferopol, 2018, P. 65–66.*

Keywords: extremism, terrorism, criminology, security, radicalism.

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The author of the article examines certain specific features of the radicalization of Islam in the Crimea. Defining radicalism, he points out that it is aimed at attaining a definite social, political and

religious aim and is based on extreme, aggressive ideologies and extraordinary resolute actions directed to changing the entire existing socio-economic and political system. Radicalism can be seen and felt in various social spheres, however, it exists more often than not in one or another ideology. Ideology is inherent in such spheres as politics and religion.

The author notes the interpenetration of politics and religion, which has historical roots of long standing. Modern secular states have succeeded to separate religion from politics with the help of legal mechanisms, having sealed the premise that state power is separated from religion, which cannot be said about most states of the Middle East and Central Asia, where state power and religion are closely connected. Islam as a relatively “young” religion has now been passing through the stages of historical development, just as Christianity. Similarly, Muslim religion has also passed through a split into various trends, and extremely reactionary currents have sprung up which are trying to oust and destroy not only other religions, but even traditional Islam.

Challenges of religious extremism and terrorism to the security of the Russian state are not new. Reality shows that interethnic and inter-religious conflicts in territories with a complex ethnic and religious composition are especially acute. The same is true concerning territories with predominance of any one or two nationalities, but which attract migrants, for some reason or other.

Along with “traditional” seats and territories of religious conflicts and confrontations, the threat of religious radicalism becomes more acute for the Republic of the Crimea whose security is threatened by political and religious extremism. Terrorist activity is supported organizationally and financially through various “humanitarian, missionary, educational, religious, and human-right organizations and movements, which have their representatives on the Crimean territory. These organizations are run by “opponents of Russia” abroad. They also finance and supervise the publication of propaganda stuff of extremist nature.

This provokes chauvinist sentiments, interethnic, religious and armed conflicts.

The author notes that the radicalization of the Crimean Islamist movement has a rather long history – up to 2014 there were “public organizations” in the peninsula which functioned quite openly in conjunction with all and sundry emissaries of various extremist and terrorist organizations popularizing radical ideas and recruiting new members for extremist organizations. When the Crimea has become part of Russia the activities of quite a few radical cells was stopped, however, some of them went underground, seemingly supporting the authorities, even receiving financial assistance and placing their representatives in the republican bodies of power, but pursuing quite different aims. They are striving to get access to financial, organizational, media and other resources and step up the spreading of radical ideas in society.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2019.01.004. ZAREMA TAUKANOVA ETHNIC FACTOR OF GENDER RELATIONS AND PROCESSES: THE CAUCASIAN PERSPECTIVE // “Gumanitarniy Yuga Rossii,” Rostov-on-Don, 2017, Part 6, № 6, P. 317–325.

Keywords: gender, ethnos, structure of ethnic society, gender processes, gender relations, intergenerational relations, relations of rivalry and solidarity, institute of senior.

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In the article the author analyzes particularities of gender relations in the Caucasus. Speaking about history of studying of the matter at the beginning of article the author gives a short historical review of gender perspective. Since 50–60s of the 20th century gender studies get systemacity and activity under the

influence of the feminism originating in the same years against the background of post-colonial transformations of the world.

Russia remains a place of the special civilization including tens of traditional ethnic cultures along with the Europeanized culture of megalopolises, but realities of the global world interfere in life of ethnoses, adjusting all aspects of ethnic culture, including models of gender relations that was brightly developed in sociocultural transformations at the beginning of the 90s of the XX century.

In this article the author makes an attempt to give the analysis of a gender factor in the context of Post-Soviet transformations of the Caucasian ethnoses. It is referred to the results of long-term observations of sociocultural transformations of a number of ethnic communities of the Caucasus (Kabardinians, Balkarians, Adygeis, Circassians, Chechens, etc.). The listed communities are studied and described in details in generally excepted ethnographic measurements, but the problem is that in the Russian ethnology and gender studies the Caucasian ethnoses are taken today as conservative, immune to innovations and progress also as hermetically consumed with the archaic cultures. There is a prejudice about female secondariness in the Caucasian cultures and "captivity of women."

Ironically, for many years of existence of the Soviet system the Soviet model of equality of men and women which literally equalized all did not catch on in the Caucasian ethnoses. The Caucasian women throughout all the Soviet era up to the 90s remained in "space of the second sex" – tutors of children, teachers, saleswomen in shops, housewives; they didn't strive to occupy "men's" professions that prompted to consider the Caucasian ethnic communities and their cultures as "backward," "medieval" where enslavement is prepared for women.

The situation changed considerably in the 90s of the last century. The answer to a question how it became possible, is in accounting of specific features of sociocultural life of the Caucasian ethnoses. The author points out three such features.

1) An exclusive role and importance of the horizontal and sectoral relations in the Caucasian ethnosocieties. Such structures of the Caucasian ethnosocial life as family (community of families of cousins and brothers and sisters, nephews and grandsons having common ancestors), family line, teip, tukhum, actively (financially and morally) encourage any member, protecting him in difficult situations and ills of life including excessive pressure of external factors and circumstances (the opinion formed outside this community, religion and even government institutions).

2) Legitimation in the considered ethnosocieties of only one form (model) of marriage and new family formation – in the form of marriage. It is all about that in the Caucasus a woman literally marries, i.e. leaves her family and moves to her husband's family though at the same time she still has clanship from where she leaves, and support of this clan. Thus, active carriers and builders of relations between clan and patrimonial sectors of ethnosocial space are women that is hardly coherent with the role of "the second sex."

3) The polar nature of the relations is solidarity – competition in communities of men and women in the Caucasian ethnosocieties. The situation here is that in the relations of men (between men) competition dominates up to its sharpest forms while between women (in their public relations) solidarity does.

Further the author attacks a key aspect of the analysis – culture which is first of all the all-embracing mechanism of adaptation of a person to living conditions (natural, social) and ups and downs of conditions of life of any social community are the challenge demanding an answer from this community, i.e. active actions from its party, say, of evolution of forms and mechanisms of the life, changes in culture. It concerns also the Caucasian ethnosocieties, including also gender culture.

History of the considered ethnosocieties developed so that during the 20th century they were propelled into a situation of radical change of socio-political living conditions twice, i.e. in situations of

an acute challenge. In particular, this refers to the revolution of 1917 and “shock” reforms of the 90s.

How did social life and cultures of the considered ethnoses, including their gender component react to these challenges?

Paradoxically, but radical changes in culture, in particular in gender balance, in the Caucasian cultures, occurred not during the time of the Soviet reforms under the constructivist slogan “We Will Build the New World,” but in the 90s. In this context it is necessary only to note that Post-Soviet reforms were a more radical challenge to traditional norms, forms and ways of ethnic life. Reforms of the 90s led to erosion of national economy and its domestic markets. In this situation so-called shuttle business which was developed in the conditions of total absence in the country of market infrastructure (strong banks, available credit, marketing, consulting, logistic services) became the dominating form of economic activity in the country for some period. How to get starting money, to buy goods abroad and deliver them home, to ensure at the same time own safety and safety of the commodity-money operations? It turned out that all these issues can be resolved, having stepped over a psychological barrier of fear of the unknown by the name of “shuttle business” – with a support of female solidarity and collective interaction inherent in the Caucasian ethnic cultures while the men competing among themselves did not manage to do it. At the same time modest money from sale of the (women's) jewelry saved in rather poor Soviet period became the starting capital quite often.

So, in extreme conditions of the 90s when the Russian population was threatened by mass hunger, in ethnocultural space of the Caucasus there was something outstanding – “gender revolution” when women got positions of “the first sex” and supporters of the family, having removed the man for roles of “the second sex” who needed only to look after the house and children. However, this revolution (to be exact – gender inversion) was followed by serious charges – fast growth of alcoholism among men that was not before among Caucasians. This negative aspect

overshadowed an essence of the gender inversion which happened inside the belly of the Caucasian ethnosocial life in perception and interpretations of regional (local) ethnology.

The most important thing in this case is in another – the course of the Russian ethnosocial history in the 90s put a stop to the popular myth about archaism of the Caucasian cultures (including gender culture), so, their impermeability for innovations, changes, progress in regards to response to challenges, self-correction, development.

The gender inversion in the Caucasian ethnocultural world which happened against the background of Post-Soviet transformations of Russia has nowadays a bulk of consequences which are shown in culture and everyday life in the most various forms – in fashion, dynamism of everyday life, the behavioural strategy of female population. So, according to our observation, Nalchik (the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria) in number of women driving cars or girls in fashionable trousers and denim clothes, it will compete with any Russian megalopolis.

But the strangest and hard – to – explain in the history of the Caucasian gender inversion is the fact that it did not happen in Soviet period. The ideology and the strategy of the Soviet system placed a premium on social constructivism – formation of the new person free from any vestiges of the past, i.e. from patterns of ethnic cultures, first of all from their gender models which were interpreted as vestiges of the past and characteristics of underdevelopment. Focus on policy of “national autonomy,” on the one hand, and on rural economy – on the other one, did not give revolutionary effects in the sphere of family morals and manners and gender relations in life of the Caucasian ethnos.

It is revealing that by the 90s of the 20th century, i.e. on the eve of the Soviet system collapse, urban population in the republics of the North Caucasus did not exceed 40–50% of the population, i.e. most of the population of these regions remained in archaic and communal way of rusticity and culture.

As follows from the analysis the author comes to some conclusions:

1. Model of gender relations, being one of basic characteristics of social community (ethnos, in particular), it is determined by other specific sociocultural characteristics of this community.

2. Gender model and its changes can serve as the indicator of depth of social and sociocultural transformations in society.

3. Transformation of gender model is one of the forms of response of society to critical challenges to the address of it; they occur spontaneously and cannot be caused by methods of political mobilization or ideological pressure.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.01.005. IDRIS RABADANOV. GEOPOLICY OF THE CASPIAN SEA // *"Strategiya Rossii,"* Moscow, 2018, № 2, February, P. 35–42.

Keywords: the Caspian region, security, the Caspian states, geopolitical interests, Russia, the U.S.

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The author of the article considers events which take place in the Caspian region, within the national interests of the Caspian states and geopolitical processes in this region. According to some political scientists, the U.S. and their allies purposely stoke controversy between the countries of the Caspian Basin to gain control over energy supply of the region and change positions of Russia on key issues in economic and military-political context.

The author notes that the Caspian region is traditionally the territory of Russian national interests, which has great importance

for economy and security of the state, especially in view of geopolitical standoff in the Middle East. The Caspian region is a space where the interests of the leading world powers meet: such as the USA, European Union, India, Turkey, China and some other countries of the Eurasian continent.

The main stressor in the region is unstated legal status of the sea. After the collapse of the USSR division of the basin remains a subject of unsettled controversies connected with division of the Caspian sea shelf of oil, gas and also unique biological resources. The Caspian Sea is the largest enclosed body of water on Earth, its length from the North to the South is about 1200 km, width from the West to the East – from 195 to 435 km, and its area is about 44% of total reserves of lake waters on Earth. More than 130 rivers mouths into the Caspian Sea among which Volga which is considered to be the largest of them, being the main central waterway of Russia, which connects the Caspian by Volga-to-Don Canal with the World Ocean. Moreover, the Caspian Sea is deemed to be one of the richest tanks of oil, gas, and biological (90% of world reserves of sturgeons) resources in the world.

Speaking about historical background, the author notes that in the Soviet period the Caspian Sea practically was an inland water within boundaries of the USSR and only in the south a part of the coast belonged to Iran with which there were treaties regulating interstate relations on which only watercrafts of the USSR and Iran could be in the Caspian Sea (both countries had a right to use marine environment of the sea and also have maritime forces there and fish). However, the treaties didn't have clear regulations about delimitation of the water area. The Soviet Union, being a global superpower, unilaterally designated the line of agreed upon delimitation "Astara – Gasan Kuli." And though Iran legally didn't recognize this line as sea border, but actually didn't violate it.

Today the status of the water is not officially defined. The Caspian states can't agree more than twenty years about its delimitation. Behind the scenes is that de facto there is a sectoral

delimitation, and de-jure outdated Soviet-Iranian agreements on the Caspian Sea which install free regime of navigation for the Caspian states and common use of bioresources of the sea. Internationally there are no analogs of a similar complicated legal situation and there are no precedents of its solving, though it is understood that the Caspian Sea has to have own legal status.

Considering military-political questions of the Caspian region the author notes growth of its conflict-generating potential. For example, signing between Kazakhstan and the U.S. in July, 2017 of the next five-year plan of military cooperation for 2018–2022 details of which are confidential. Kazakhstan is interested in creation of own Navy in the Caspian Sea where the U.S. will actively help.

China also cooperates with Kazakhstan which carries out large-scale economic expansion there. Astana considers cooperation with Beijing as an opportunity to get rid of the involvement into Russian area of interest. Both states realize the New Silk Road project where Chinese party invests eleven-figure of dollars for construction of Kazakh part of transport infrastructure, including construction of the new city Nurkent on the border with China where up to 100 thousand people will live, for serving freight flows China.

Azerbaijan having huge oil and gas reserves also became the strategic partner for the U.S. and since the beginning of the 90s of the XX century without any noise gradually integrates into NATO, realizing programs of military cooperation in modernization of National army on NATO standards. It should be noted, nevertheless, that interstate relations between Russia and Azerbaijan remain rather good, and positions of both countries coincide with the majority of questions.

Turkmenistan, as well as other countries of the Caspian region, doesn't lag behind in questions of cooperation with the American side. On the pretext of fight against international terrorism Ashgabat repeatedly resorted to Washington. The policy of the U.S. referring to Turkmenistan is very pragmatic - the States

show interest in gaining access to the Turkmen industrial and military infrastructure. Over the last years the West tries to diversify cooperation and holds a course towards rapprochement with Turkmenistan.

The situation with Iran is another, as sovereignty is important for it and in consequence of which it pursues independent national policy. Iran long was under sanctions, because of suspicion in nuclear weapon development, and the U.S. tried to achieve its international political isolation, and an ultimate goal of the U.S. is shift of power in Iran and its involvement in the U.S. sphere of interests. Therefore in the conditions of political and economic oppositions of Tehran with the West its understanding on the main questions on security in the Caspian region coincides with Moscow position. The positive aspect is that Russia and Iran have no common land border, and, therefore, they have nothing to divide and it is easier to agree. From military-political point of view Tehran stands for Moscow on key issues of the Caspian cooperation, considering that safety in the Caspian Sea is a prerogative of exclusively Caspian states. Such position on a question extremely important today for security allowed "the Caspian five" to reach the agreement not to let presence of armed forces of not regional powers in the Caspian Sea.

Such states as China, countries of the European Union, India, Turkey exert an impact on the situation in the region. Beijing can crucially deprive Russia and the U.S. of leadership in economic terms in the Caspian Sea. Priority orientations of Beijing foreign policy are interaction with the states of the Asian-Pacific region, however as import requirements of energy resources grow the role of the Caspian region in policy of China will increase. The reserved attitude of the People's Republic of China on key questions of regional security allows it to establish easily dialogues with the states of Central Asia and South Caucasus.

Unlike the western partners Russia works for maintenance of peace and security in the Caspian Sea as the situation in the region is tense. Geopolitically the Caspian Sea is a strategic military point

of the Russian Federation in the Middle East and in Central Asia in proximity to which there is warfare. So, during the military campaign in Syria the Russian Navy demonstrated its unique capacities, having made missiles launching "Kalibr NK" from a distance of 1500 km from the water area of the Caspian Sea on rebels' positions of the ISIL terrorist organization banned in Russia.

Due to the growing threat of international terrorism, the military-political leadership of Russia seriously increases presence and possibilities of the Armed Forces in the Caspian Sea. The flotilla in the Caspian Sea for 90% will consist of latest patterns of armaments, military equipment and will strengthen defensive capacity of Russia in this area though at the same time Russia constantly shows its readiness for cooperation with all interested countries for maintenance of security in the Caspian region.

Summing up the author draws conclusion about future of this region.

1) The interest of world politics in the Caspian region will only increase. There is a number of factors: uncertain international legal status of the Caspian Sea; energy security; transport safety; environmental compliance; information security; military safety.

2) Live conflicts in the region are an essential obstacle for regional cooperation, and the Caspian Sea for foreseeable future can turn into one of the most unstable regions in the world.

3) Russia shouldn't allow loss of its economic and political influence in the Caspian region as it directly threatens its national security.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

RUSLAN SULEIMANOV. THE TURKISH FACTOR OF THE AZERBAIJANIAN NATIONHOOD // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Azerbaijan, Turkey, independence, nationhood, Azerbaijanian-Turkish relations.

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Abstract: The author considers a role of the Turkish factor in establishing of the Azerbaijani nationhood. It is described the history of contacts of Azerbaijanians and Turks, since 9-12 centuries and up to our time. Particular attention is paid to a role of the Ottoman Empire in formation, and then destruction of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) and also to relationship between the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Turkey these days.

In 2018 in Azerbaijan there were celebrated several age-long anniversaries of events which in a varying degree are important today for consciousness of the Azerbaijanian people and also for modern Azerbaijanian nationhood in general. Among all memorable dates of 1918 a specific place was occupied by declaration of independence of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) (May 28) and access of the Caucasian Islamic army into Baku (further – "Islamic army") headed by the Turkish commander Nuri pasha (September 15-17).

If the first symbolizes succession of the Azerbaijanian nationhood from existed for 23 months (till April 28, 1920) ADR to the present Azerbaijan Republic (AR) formed owing to the collapse of the USSR, so the memory of the second event is aimed at showing that feasible role which was played by Turkey (then still the Ottoman Empire) in establishing of the first democratic state in the Muslim East.

At a military parade on September 15, 2018 in the center of Baku there was also the president of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan who, addressing high-level officials and the military of both states, noted that Azerbaijan and Turkey – “two fraternal countries” which have “one history, one culture, one language and one religion.” According to him, liberation of Baku by troops of “Islamic army” 100 years ago as nothing else “symbolizes brotherhood, friendship, unity and solidarity” of two nations. “The fact is that joy for Azerbaijan is also our joy; pride [for Azerbaijan] is and our pride; grief, agitation, a problem [for Azerbaijan] is also our problem,” – the Turkish leader summarized.

The president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev in his speech also emphasized inviolacy of fraternal ties between two nations. “We were together 100 years ago, and today we are together,” – he told.

Both Erdogan, and Aliyev in their speeches traditionally noted the considerable success got by two countries in recent years in military, political, economic, cultural and other spheres. Both leaders also reminded that Turkey was the first state which recognized independence of Azerbaijan in 1991.

In this article we will consider, on what such proximity of two states is historically contingent. Whether throughout history the Azerbaijanian-Turkish relations were always at such a high level? And the most important – why to the leaders of the Transcaucasian republic it is so important the memory of a role of Turkey in establishing of modern independent Azerbaijan?

Thorny way to unity

As it is known till 1918 history did not know the Azerbaijanian state as it is. We mean the state in which at the official level Azerbaijanians would be declared as a titular nation. In this context it will be helpful to remind that establishing the principle of the nation states in the world political system began to take place only approximately from the middle of the XVII century, i.e. after the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648).

Throughout all history until creation of ADR Azerbaijanians were a component of whichever states or the protostate entities, in many of which there was even no marked titular nation.

In a national historiography there is no consensus about ethnogenesis of the Azerbaijanian people. In the Soviet years, especially after the end of the World War II, there was the concept of median origin of the Azerbaijanian ethnos according to which its ethnogenesis derived on the territory of the Iranian speaking Median kingdom (the predecessor of Persia and modern Iran) existing in the VII-VI centuries BCE which can even be designated as the first Azerbaijanian state. The main argument of this concept comes down to the fact that considerable part of the territory of this state entity was on lands of modern Southern Azerbaijan.

Later in Soviet Azerbaijan, and then and in AR there was popular a concept about purely Turkic origin of the Azerbaijani ethnos. According to this idea, it is wrong to consider Media as the Azerbaijanian state as its language cannot be referred to Turkic language family.

According to E.R. Ismailov, both concepts are very vulnerable. First, the idea of search of origins of Azerbaijanian, though in disappeared, but obviously not Turkic, in itself looks quite absurd. Secondly, the non-Turkic language which reached us in documentary records it is unlikely that it was the language of all tribes inhabiting Media.

More or less clearly it is possible to speak about the first relationship between predecessors of modern Turks and Azerbaijanians from the date of increase of a Turkic element in the Middle East. Process of a turkification of the region was actually summarized by penetration of Oghuz tribes into it in the XI-XII centuries. A number of Azerbaijanian historians are convinced that the Turkic element was very much in evidence in the territory of modern Azerbaijan even long before penetration of the Oghuz. In particular, Z.M. Buniatov claimed that "it is wrong to consider Turkic people a strange element in Azerbaijan as then

it is necessary to close eyes to presence of very big and influential Turkic associations in the early going."

The relations between the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijanians inhabiting various states in the territory of modern Northern Azerbaijan and Southern Azerbaijan (the State of Shirvanshahs, the State of Ildegizids (Atabeks), the State of Karakoyunlu, the State of Akkoyunlu, etc.) in the period of the late Middle Ages and at the beginning of Modern times were quite difficult, often even hostile. Inhabiting the states competing among themselves predecessors of modern Turks and Azerbaijanians were divided in terms of ideology, culture, language and even religion.

The apogee of this dissociation of two nations can be considered opposition of the Ottoman Empire and the State of Safavids (1501 – the middle of the XVIII century). There was a permanent fight for spheres of influence in the region between two countries with small pauses.

Echoes of that opposition are heard and today. In particular, in popular (including in Russia) the Turkish historical series "The Magnificent Century" Safavid governors, in particular the shah Takhmasib I (1514–1576), are presented quite coward and weak against the background of sultan of the Ottoman Empire Suleyman I (1494–1566). In this regard a number of Azerbaijanian historians tear into similar interpretation of the Azerbaijanian-Turkish relationship during that historical era. In particular, the director of Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan Republic Ya.M. Makhmudov considers "The Magnificent Century" "a big insult concerning both Turkish and Azerbaijanian history."

At the same time, besides numerous resource and turf wars, by surviving documental records, we can give evidence of trade and economic relations between Turks and Azerbaijanians which, however, were also very complicated. Approximately at the end of the XV century with development in Europe of the early capitalist relations demand for raw silk sharply increased (in particular, at the Venetian silk-weaving enterprises) which at that moment was

abundantly got in the State of Akkoyunlu (1468–1501). Meanwhile the policy of the sultan of the Ottoman Empire Mekhmed II (1432–1481) was so as to that the raw silk delivered from the East to the European countries was processed in Turkey so that in such a manner the Ottoman Empire actually became the key exporter of these goods popular with European consumers. Today similar practice is used by Turkey concerning energy resources. For example, for many years Ankara buys natural gas from Baku on the most favorable terms for itself and at the prices below the market (approximately for 30%) that, thus, allows Turkey to remain one of the key suppliers of hydrocarbons for the European consumer.

In the XVI century active rapprochement of the Safavid Empire with Russia began. Both states looked for allies for opposition of the Ottoman Empire which was at zenith of its potency at that time. Confessional distinctions were not an obstacle for Moscow and Isfahan in opposition to the general enemy. Nevertheless friendship between two states escalated into no more than strengthening of trade and economic ties – they didn't succeed to create the full-fledged military alliance.

After collapse of the Safavid Empire in the first half of the XVII century on its fragments several feudal states (khanates) were formed. After exhaustible internal wars by the end of the eighteenth century in Iran the dynasty of Qajars led by Aga Mohammad khan became stronger (1742–1797). It defeated other applicants for a shah throne and managed to bring the most part of Iran under his umbrella including territories of modern Northern Azerbaijan and Southern Azerbaijan.

During the same period the policy of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus becomes more active. During Peter I (1672–1725) era when Russia began to develop actively its own flotilla and to win the status of the sea power, not least of all turned its attention to the Caspian Sea.

With accession of Northern Azerbaijan at the beginning of the XIX century Russia began to attract actively Azerbaijanians in

those wars which it waged then. In particular, as T. Svetokhovsky notes, the empire used Sunni and Shiite contradictions thanks to which Azerbaijanians were attracted for confrontation to Turkey (at least, in the Russian-Turkish war (1828-1829) and in the Crimean war (1853-1856)) and also for suppression of the anti-Russian movement falling on in Dagestan.

Accession to the Russian Empire also promoted formation of Azerbaijanian intellectuals which in the second half of the XIX century were engaged in search of consciousness. This process was in many respects stimulated by distribution of Pan-Turkism in the empire, one of pioneers of which was the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinsky (1851-1914). In the Terdzhyumen newspaper ("Translator") published since 1883 in Bakhchisarai he expounded unity of all Turks of the Russian Empire. The first step towards unity of all Turks, according to Gasprinsky, must have been creation of one literary language eligible for all Turks – from the Balkans to China. According to him the Istanbul dialect of Turkish could become such language, i.e. official language of the Ottoman Empire in which, actually, and Terdzhyumen was published.

In Azerbaijan similar attempts of osmanization generally came under criticism for artificiality. In particular, the Keshkyul magazine for the first time differentiated the concepts of nationality and the local religious community designated during that period by one word "Miletus." The edition offered the concept "Azerbaijanian Turki" designating people living on both sides of the Russian-Iranian border.

In Turkey citizens of Russian descent had a great influence on intellectual life, – generally Tatars and Azerbaijanians – which headed the movement of promotion of Pan Turkism. In particular, the Azerbaijanian Ali-bey Guseynzade (1864-1940) formulated the slogan "Turkization, Islamization, Europeanization" which was subsequently modified by the Turkish thinker and one of ideologists of a Pan Turkism Ziya Gyokalp (1876-1924). In Azerbaijan these three words will become a basis of a tricolored flag of the independent republic.

Thus, by the beginning of the XX century gradual approach of Azerbaijanians and Turks on the basis of the ideas of Pan-Turkism took place, creation of a single Turkic nation with common language on Turan's space immense territory from the Anatolian peninsula to China. In some degree in Azerbaijan the party of nationalist orientation Musavat became the spokesman of these ideas headed by Mamed Emin Rasolzade (1884-1955) who was meant to be one of the founders of the first independent Azerbaijanian state.

Turkey's role in establishment and then destruction of the Azerbaijanian Democratic Republic

Since first days of its emergence (on May 28, 1918) bridge building with the Ottoman Empire was one of the key problems of ADR. Formation of the Turkish-Azerbaijani military-political alliance lasting from May to November, 1918 was legalized on June 4 by the Treaty of peace and friendship. In the fourth article of this agreement it was emphasized that in case of evaluation of security threat the authorities of the Ottoman Empire engage "to help the government of the Azerbaijan Republic by means of armed power".

Significantly that Turkey did not ratify this document officially and until the end of September did not extent recognition to Azerbaijan as an independent state. According to T. Svetokhovsky, "Turks regarded Eastern Transcaucasia as a part of appeared Turanian empire where, besides, the North Caucasus, a northern part of Persia and Turkestan were to be included."

Anyway at the end of May, 1918 in Ganja courtesy of the Turkish officers it was formed "The Islamic army" which was formed by parts of two Turkish divisions - the 5th Caucasian and 15th Chanakhgalinsky and also "The special Azerbaijanian corps" entered was created. The number of the Turkish contingent as a result was about 15 thousand bayonets and sabers, the Azerbaijanian parts - about 5 thousand. As a result of warfare during the summer - an early autumn of 1918 Azerbaijanian-Ottoman army succeeded in retaking all territory of Azerbaijan.

Liberation of Baku on September 15–17 which was at that time under the reign of the government of Centrocaspian Dictatorship supported by the block of social democrats, the right Socialists Revolutionaries and the right Dasnaks became the culmination of those events.

Despite the progress on the Caucasian front line, position of the Ottoman army and its allies on other directions was catastrophic: in sequence positions in Palestine, Syria, in the Balkans were lost. As a result already on October 30 Turkey actually had to recognize its defeat in World War I, as it was documented in the Armistice of Mudros, one of articles of which voiced the following, powers of the Entente take under its control railway service in Transcaucasia and occupy Baku, and Turkey is obliged to withdraw the troops therefrom.

Humiliating defeat in World War I and the acute socio-political crisis in general which overwhelmed Turkey during that period demanded from its authorities to look for allies. The Soviet Russia was actually the only country with which strategic ambitions of the Kemalist Turkey coincided with.

Independent Azerbaijan which since its first days of existence was surrounded by the whole circle of enemies became a small coin for Moscow and Ankara pursuing vested interests in the region. As R.S. Mustafa-Zadeh notes, “having failed “to export” world revolution to the West, Bolsheviks counted on extension of influence to the East, first of all to Turkey and Iran.” The role of Azerbaijan was considered not only as a corridor capable to connect Turkey and Russia, but also as a source of raw materials for support of further Bolshevization of Turkey. “The solidarity of purpose in consolidation of their regional positions and mutual interest in support of each other led to the fact that in Azerbaijan both Moscow, and Angora (nowadays Ankara) started talking in one “geopolitical language” and didn’t feel the need of “the Azerbaijanian translators” any more,” – R.S. Mustafa-Zadeh emphasizes.

On the opening day of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) which took place on April 23, 1920 (5 days before elimination of ADR) in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) demanded "admission of the Soviet troops to the borders of Turkey for their defense against English attacks" from Baku.

Several days later – on April 26 – M. Kemal appealing to the Soviet government, apart from the suggestion to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Russia, promised "to force the Azerbaijan Republic to enter a number of Soviet states."

It was beneficial for Bolsheviks that a considerable part of the Turkish officers which was in Azerbaijan was a priori ready for change of the power in this young republic. According to T. Svetokhovsky, "the Turkish officers looked forward to shift of power in Baku, because emergence of the Soviet Azerbaijan would draw together Lenin Russia with Islamic Turkey. The prevalence of such moods among the officer corps accelerated psychological dislocation of soldier's ranks."

By April 27 troops of the XI Army of Bolsheviks almost without delay passed through all the territory of Azerbaijan from the North to the South and almost wholly occupied the capital of ADR – Baku. On the night of April 27th to 28th the parliament of ADR under the chairmanship of M.E. Rasulzade made the decision to transfer of authority to Bolsheviks. Final occupation of Baku and all Azerbaijan was completed by May – the beginning of June, 1920, though in some districts resistance zones remained all the year 1920.

Speaking about the contradictory character of the Turkish-Azerbaijanian union, T. Svetokhovsky emphasizes that "Pan-Turkism as ideology, significantly promoted growth of national consciousness, and Azerbaijanians all the more realized their affiliation with Turkic people however the pro-Turkish orientation was hardly congruent with ambitions (authorities of ADR - author's note) to manage the country independently."

In 1919 M.E. Rasulzade famous for his affection for Turkey, addressing the Azerbaijani parliament, told: "We knew that our

people have some habits – distinct style of life, and Turks – other. And if Constantinople wanted to run Baku, then Baku would turn against Constantinople.”

“One nation-two states”

It is quite problematic to speak about the Azerbaijani-Turkish contacts during the existence of the USSR as they directly depended on the relations between Moscow and Ankara. As it was already mentioned, these relations, especially after World War II, were utterly uneasy. Close contacts between the Republic of Turkey and the Azerbaijani SSR actually were missing.

The collapse of the USSR and independence induced authorities of Azerbaijan, as well as other newly-formed republics, to appeal to the past for the purpose of designing of own identity, as if carrying on those traditions of nationhood which were set up almost 100 years ago.

The leader of National Front of Azerbaijan (NFA), the second president of the republic Abulfaz Aliyev (1938–2000) better known as Elchibey who came to power in June, 1992 was one of the brightest exponent of the ideas of new Azerbaijanian nationhood and identity of the Azerbaijani people. He considered Azerbaijanians to be Turks, and Azerbaijani – a dialect of Anatolian Turkish. He pointed the finger at I.V. Stalin (1878–1953) for change of the language name.

As noted by Z.M. Ali Zadeh, during one-year ruling of NFA Turkey, being the first country, which recognized independence of Azerbaijan, “gradually began to open up the place of “the elder brother” voluntarily left by Russia.”

The pro-Turkish orientation of Azerbaijan, though less unconcealed, was continued also by Heydar Aliyev (1923–2003) who came to power in 1993 and to whom it is attributed a formula of relationship of Baku and Ankara live up to now – “One nation – two states.” Azerbaijan, in particular, placed reliance in military aid from Turkey in bringing about resolution to the Nagorny

Karabakh conflict that, however, did not occur. Nevertheless the Azerbaijani leaders continued strengthening trade and economic, military and other relations with Sunni Turkey, but not, say, with Shiite Iran where today about 30 million of ethnic Azerbaijanians live. According to R. Motik, disreputation of Iran in Azerbaijan is driven by, at least, the following three factors: heritage of anti-Iranian propaganda in Soviet times, friendship of Tehran with Yerevan and also unattractiveness of the Iranian model of state building based on religious doctrines.

Despite the unity shown by the leaders of two countries, many contradictions on a number of foreign policy issues remain between Baku and Ankara. So, Azerbaijan does not recognize independence of Kosovo, standing with Serbia while Turkey was one of the first countries which baked Kosovo Albanians. In 2003 Baku supported military intervention of the U.S. in Iraq and even allocated military forces while Ankara refused Washington even admission of troops through its territory. Because of unsettled Nagorny Karabakh problem Azerbaijan does not recognize independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

As R.N. Musabekov writes, signing in October, 2009 of so-called Zurich protocols on normalization of the relation between Turkey and Armenia became "the real pressure test of the Azerbaijani-Turkish partnership." Baku interpreted this event extremely negatively and threatened Ankara to review conditions on energy supplies. For short period so-called "war of flags" began between two countries when at first in Turkish Bursa on October 14 during the football match between Turkish and Armenian national teams it was forbidden to carry Azerbaijani flags to the stadium, and then on October 21 in Baku the Turkish ensigns were hoisted down that led to mutual exchange of notes between foreign services of two countries. As a result, it was able to cancel out the short conflict, and Ankara refused rapprochement with Yerevan.

Thus, after several centuries of rivalry and hostility only by the end of XIX – the beginning of the XXth centuries gradual

rapprochement of the Azerbaijani and Turkish people against spread of the ideas of Pan-Turkizm which overtook then the Ottoman Empire and some Muslim people of the Russian Empire. The Turkish factor was due in no small part to establishing of the Azerbaijani nationhood as in 1918, and in the 1990s. Meanwhile interest of Turks in elimination of ADR in 1920, unwillingness of Turkey to be involved in a full-scale war on the side of Azerbaijan in war for Karabakh in 1991–1993, the situation around the Zurich protocols of 2009, non-recognition of TRSK by Azerbaijan, existence of other disagreements on international issues between Baku and Ankara show, that both parties first of all are guided by own interests and existing foreign policy condition, but not an aspiration to correspond always and in all ways to the above-mentioned principle “One nation – two states.”

ELENA DMITRIEVA. IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN KAZAKHSTAN AND IMAGE OF KAZAKHSTAN IN RUSSIA: AS WE SEE EACH OTHER // *The review was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: Russia, Kazakhstan, factors of formation of social perceptions, historical-cultural context, stereotypes, integration, image of country.

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Introduction: The study of problems concerning the perception of an image of one or another country becomes ever more important in the modern world. The security of countries, their welfare and place on a political or economic map of the world largely depend on the development of their relations between themselves, and especially relations with neighboring

countries. Many states which devote much attention to the important problem of forming a positive image of their country spend large means for the purpose. The perception of the inhabitants of the two neighboring countries – Russia and Kazakhstan – is influenced by quite a few factors: among them traditional customs and habits and social-cultural ties between the people of the two countries play an important role.

Perception of Image of Kazakhstan by People of Russia. Scholars V. Kolosov and Zh. Tokbulatova in their work “The Image of Kazakhstan in Russia in the Mirror of Public Opinion” analyze the perception of Kazakhstan, which has taken shape in Russian society on the basis of public opinion polls carried out in the period between 1993 and 2017 by several sociological agencies. Russia has one of the world’s longest land borders with Kazakhstan, a common historical past and supposed future. By the poll results Kazakhstan is in the category of the most important potential partners of Russia, but has never taken the central place among them. Most Russians note the importance of the development of the economic ties with Kazakhstan, but at the same time, in their view, their spheres are few and far between.*

Kazakhstan looks a reliable partner in Russian public opinion. Stereotypes concerning Kazakhstan as a former Soviet republic are gradually disappearing. Although certain cultural and economic associations are now seldom mentioned, and the role of old notions, subjects and persons is not mentioned any longer, the subject of integration is gradually taking more important place in public opinion polls. This includes various questions – from the setting up of common borders to the creation of joint integration ventures with Kazakhstan.

* V. Kolosov, Zh. Tokbulatova. *Obraz Kazakhstana v Rossii v zerkale obshchestvennogo mneniya* [The Image of Kazakshtan in Russia in the Mirror of Public Opinion] // “*Regionalniye issledovaniya*,” Smolensk, 2018, № 2, pp. 58–67.

Kazakhstan is culturally closer and friendlier to Russia than other post-Soviet republics. However, a shortage of visible common aspects of development in the economic sphere between the two countries does not allow Kazakhstan to enter the circle of promising partners of Russia in the sphere of investments, technologies, scientific developments, etc., whereas the ideas of Russians about strategic allies and rivals are not stable and quickly react to changes in the current foreign-politic situation.

Citizens of Kazakhstan about Relations with Russia. The work entitled "What do Kazakhs Think of Their Relations with the Northern Neighbor?" by N. Kosmarskaya and I. Savin (Institute of Oriental Studies RAS) is devoted to factors forming the image of Russia in Kazakhstan.**

The article has the aim to show Russia to the Kazakh people as an economic resource, and also its role in the historical-cultural aspect. The article is based on field research of its authors in 2016 (on example of dwellers of the city of Petropavlovsk, North Kazakhstan), as well as on an analysis of the two leading Kazakhstan's newspapers in the Russian and Kazakh languages. We should mention that for Kazakhstan's citizens Russia is the friendliest country – 81 percent. In 2016 more than 40 percent of those polled welcomed economic and technical cooperation with Russia (in 2015 their number was 49 percent). The growing interest in receiving education in Russia is registered in Kazakhstan (32 percent for the second year running). Russian integration initiatives play an important role in the perception of Russia by Kazakhstan's citizens. (It should be noted that Kazakhs support only the economic variants of integration and show great caution toward other initiatives (joint currency, united army, common information area, etc., whereas Russians welcome any integrations). Kazakhstan continues to show a certain bent to the Russian information area

** N. Kosmarskaya, I. Sonin. Chto dumayut kazakhstanbtsy ob otnosheniyakh s severnym sosedom? [What Do Kazakhs Think of Their Relations with the Northern Neighbor?] // *Tsentralnaya Evraziya, Moscow, Institute of Oriental Sciences RAS, 2018, № 1, pp. 175–195.*

(69 percent of Kazakhs favored the setting up of a joint TV-radio company of the Eurasian Economic Corporation.

In the sphere of military-strategic partnership, however, there is another picture. In 2016, 34 percent of Kazakhstan's citizens believed that CIS countries threatened their country, whereas Russia was a subject of a possible military support – 59 percent. The European Union was not mentioned as such. However, in 2016 pro-European sentiments in Kazakhstan grew from two to 11 percent, having reached a five-year maximum.

About 24 percent of those polled in Kazakhstan regard a possibility of temporary work in Russia desirable for themselves, and 22 percent express interest in moving to any of the former Soviet republics and staying there.

As to an analysis of the press in the Russian and Kazakh languages, it should be noted that the bulk of information in Russian has a neutral or positive connotation, and some publications in the Kazakh language show that part of Kazakh citizens express concern with the position of Russia on the questions of economic cooperation with Eurasian countries, interaction with neighboring states, etc., and these tendencies persist in polls and questionnaires.

Conclusions. As we see, despite the evidently good relations between the people of Russia and Kazakhstan, there are signs that the situation is dynamic enough, which can lead to a change in priorities of the population of one country in relation to that of the neighboring country. A great significance for the formation of the image of Russia among Kazakhstan's citizens is played by ethnicity, although this factor is not decisive. For Russian citizens the most important issue is the living standard and economic indices in Kazakhstan in examining the problems of integration. A separate role is played by the influence of the mass media on the views of the respondents. An analysis of the perception of one another by citizens of Russia and Kazakhstan is a very important subject, inasmuch as this subject helps reveal a multitude of various factors influencing relations between the two countries.

2019.01.006. ELENA GARBUZAROVA. GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE OF NON-REGIONAL ACTORS ON RELIGIOUS SECURITY OF KYRGYZSTAN // *"Islamovedenie," Makhachkala, 2017, Vol. 8, № 4, P. 5-16.*

Keywords: Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism, Islamic states, Islamist ideas, terrorism.

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The author of the article considers problems of religious security of Kyrgyzstan, analyzes geopolitical influence of non-regional actors on a situation in the country. The author notes that considering social and economic difficulties the idea of Islamic radicalism gain traction among the Kyrgyz population, and the Fergana Valley where there is the southern border of the republic, is the potential heart of instability.

The geographical location of Kyrgyzstan attracts Islamic states of the region which hope to get geopolitical superiority. Saudi Arabia and Qatar manage focused effort in this direction, investing money in social and economic projects, and such help is carried out alongside export of wahhabism ideology. Islamic radicals basing on the territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan pose risk to Kyrgyzstan. They consider this country as the back from where it is possible to stage a strike on Russia. Far-reaching activity in the republic was developed by the movement of the Turkish religious figure F. Gülen - Hizmet. If to consider ideological preferences of this movement, that is probability to face its excessive influence in the country in the long term. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991 Kyrgyzstan got independence and at the same time faced threats among which it should be noted Islamic radicalism and terrorism.

At the moment the country is in process of transformation into the parliamentary republic and, the most important, is

preserving stability of political system in conditions of internal political contradictions and also global and regional processes. Religious security is a basis of national security of Kyrgyzstan. In the XXI century it is observed the expansion of religious values in world politics, radical trends at the same time gain momentum. Recently there have emerged many terms connected with the Islamic world: "Islamism," "political Islam," "Islamic fundamentalism," "Islamic radicalism," "Islamic extremism." The author of the article gives various definitions of these terms to political scientists, but notes that there is still no concurrent views on the matter. After the collapse of the USSR the flow of earlier inaccessible religious editions and also Islamic radicals came from Afghanistan to the Central Asian republics which borders became transparent. Unstable social and economic situation, corruption and unemployment in Kyrgyzstan simplified a problem of Islamic radicalism ideologists – they successfully propagandized their ideas and enlisted the Muslim population of the country.

The religious factor plays a special role in the Fergana Valley, the most populous part of the Central Asian region where about 14.5 million people live. Here the boundaries of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan pass which after the collapse of the USSR had territorial claims to each other. The difficult situation in the region is aggravated by radical movements.

The author, basing on studying of experts' opinions, gives three main stages of radical Islam advance in the Central Asian region:

- activity of foreign prophets training local youth for particular interpretation of fundamentals of Islam and direction of persons wishing to study deeply the theory of Islam to the foreign centers (jamaats);

- promotion of the extremist ideas and expansion of followers;
- organization of mass riots, terrorist attacks, civil wars aiming at overthrowing of the political system.

After the collapse of the USSR all Post-Soviet states, including Kyrgyzstan, faced a problem of an ideological vacuum, and as a result Islam began to have significant influence on life of

society. Currently revival of Islam is connected with a problem of politicization of this religion, its radicalization in favour of certain forces. Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, take interest in Kyrgyzstan, trying to involve it in their geopolitical sphere of influence. The second group of the states is made by Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon where terrorists base and where their training camps, arsenals with weapon and financial centers which in turn sponsor realization of large-scale terrorist attacks are located.

The author of the article emphasizes a few tendencies, which pose threat to national security of the republic.

1) Factor of monarchy of the Persian Gulf. The excessive generosity or “diplomacy of purses” of such states as Saudi Arabia, Qatar investing millions into Kyrgyzstan disquiet. Saudi Arabia is the country which population professes Islam of wahhabite sect and aspires to a key role in the Muslim world, proving such claims by the fact that in the territory of the kingdom there are major Muslim holy shrines. Saudi Arabia is interested in implementation of various agricultural and infrastructure investment projects in Kyrgyzstan and it is not unthinkable that together with these investments ideological values of Wahhabism will be exported into the country.

A test case in this context may serve relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the XX century which development was defined by an Islamic factor. The authorities of Saudi Arabia promised to lend support to Pakistan only after the leadership of Pakistan expressed its intention to use Shariah tenets in the activity. The process of spreading of Islam of wahhabite sect in Kyrgyzstan is started and, most likely, will increase in prospect. In 2012 in Kyrgyzstan it was opened the Embassy of Qatar – the richest country in the Middle East which population professes Islam of Sunni sect. It is considered that Qatar is a proponent of American interests in Central Asia. The interest of Qatar in Kyrgyzstan gains momentum recently. Representatives of charitable organizations from Saudi Arabia and Qatar allocate money to construction of new mosques in Osh in the south of the republic, plan to provide \$30 million for construction of public schools.

2) Factor of Pakistan. The extremist threat to Kyrgyzstan goes also from Pakistan being a part of the states in the territory of which extremists and terrorists actively act. From the beginning of the antiterrorist drive in Afghanistan (2001) Pakistan turned into administrative base of a radical Islamic underground where Talibs and fighters of other allied organizations – “networks” of Haqqani, Al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and etc. hid. The Afghan Talibs find a shelter in Northern Pakistan which territory is of main interest for Islamists as it is a part of Great Khorasan where besides the regions of Pakistan there are some regions of Iran, Central Asia and Afghanistan. The Islamic State (ISIL, banned in the Russian Federation) formed in the territories of Syria and Iraq extrapolates influence on Pakistan, and through it and to Central Asia. At the end of 2016 it got about that ISIL scaled up its activity in Pakistan, carrying over local extremists and fighters from IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).

3) Factor of Afghanistan. Afghanistan for already several decades is the place of instability in the Central Asian region and peaceful settlement in this country is very problematic. Considering the situation in Afghanistan, it should be noted that geopolitical interests of global powers (the USA, Russia, China, Iran) which have different strategy for current situation can become the destabilizing factor. Fight against IS demands joint actions of the participants of international anti-terrorist coalition, even in that case, it is referred to cooperation with Talibs. The U.S. prefers to deal with Talibs without intermediaries. It confirms their absence at a conference concerning the Afghan settlement in Moscow in April, 2017. Staying long time in Afghanistan within the anti-terrorist mission, the U.S. came in contact with Talibs and ignores efforts of Russia in the solution of the Afghan problem. It is supposed also that the IS has far-reaching plans for Afghanistan from the territory of which radical Islamists will try to strike Russia to the rear – from Central Asia. To the territory of Kyrgyzstan terrorists can come from Afghanistan through Tajikistan.

4) Turkish factor. Religious influence of Turkey increases in Kyrgyzstan. The question is about Sebat educational institutions the founder of which is the Turkish religious prophet Fetkhulla Gülen who is admittedly connected with CIA and whose activity is financed by the U.S. Government. Teachers of Sebat schools are faithful, and respectively are not impartial in estimating of religious matters.

Purpose F. Gülen and his followers is transition from a secular society organization to the Caliphate. In Kyrgyzstan there are 28 objects forming part of educational network "Sebat:" 9 elementary schools, 16 lyceums, 2 international schools, international university "Ataturk – Ala-Too." They are located in different regions of the republic. In total about 12 thousand pupils and students study in these institutions. The students studying at Sebat schools show great interest in Turkey as a country which achieved significant economic growth. Sebat lyceums possess a developed modern material and technical basis, and many universities in Kyrgyzstan concede to the Turkish schools in this respect therefore the Kyrgyz youth willingly chooses them for education.

To estimate what is the movement "Hizmet," it is necessary to use a research technique of modern Islamic sectarianism. It is about the following recommendations: to make subject of the scientific Islamic studies analysis all groups which declare themselves Islamic; to pay attention to existence of a spiritual leader in all these groups; to consider all groups as some kind of organized expression of a certain opinion; to find out correlation of their ideas with traditional Islam. It is possible that the movement "Hizmet," gradually expanding the number of its followers, can serve as a proponent of Islamic ideas in Kyrgyzstan and become a threat to its security, spreading its understanding of Islam differing the traditional one for the republic.

To sum up, the author brings out that now it is about national survival of the Kyrgyz republic which can be provided, based on own forces, or the aid of allies through the CSTO and SCO. The last variant is represented to the author as the most effective in so far as these integration structures have more opportunities and resources

to protect national security of their member countries. The economy of Kyrgyzstan is at the level of the weakest developing countries and the government of Kyrgyzstan needs to develop cooperation with partners in the Eurasian integration to place the country at an adequate level.

In the conditions of numerous global challenges and threats cooperation at the world and regional levels becomes more than vital. The author considers that only jointly Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China and the U.S. will be able to combat effectively and decisively terrorism and extremism. In the world there is an erosion of traditional balance of forces - there are new centers of influence and new forces and Kyrgyzstan has to build its foreign policy taking into account its national interests to take a rightful place in international relations, correctly choosing partners for fight against modern challenges and threats – about 11700 p.ch.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2019.01.007. SAODAT OLIMOVA, MUZAFFAR OLIMOV. CONFLICTS ALONG THE BORDER OF FERGHANA VALLEY: NEW REASONS, NEW PARTICIPANTS // *“Russia and New States of Eurasia,” Moscow, 2017, № 1, P. 21–40.*

Keywords: Central Asia, disintegration, border conflicts, Ferghana Valley, water consumption, territorial disputes.

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This article analyses the reasons for worsening relations between Central Asian states. The authors examine the traditional

national-territorial conflicts in this region, as well as the new ones that have emerged in the post-Soviet period.

During the past 25 years Central Asia including five previously friendly Soviet republics, has turned into a disintegrated region in which independent states were unable to establish good-neighborly relations between themselves, despite their participation in similar organizations (CIS, CSTO, SCO, etc.).

One of the reasons for such disintegration is border conflicts. A source of the territorial claims of these states to one another is national-territorial division of these republics in the years of Soviet power according to the border lines of living of different nationalities. However, it was not possible to be guided by this principle in the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural area of Central Asia, and this was why each republic has enclaves and irredentists breeding inter-ethnic rivalry.

Having become sovereign states, the formal borders between these five republics of Central Asia should have been turned into their real borders. It was only Turkmenistan and partly Kazakhstan that have delimited their land borders. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have not solved the border problem between themselves until now.. The most acute border conflicts occur to this day in the Ferghana Valley divided between three states – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The authors of the article examine border problems on the example of the Ferghana stretch of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. During the past five years there have been more than eighty incidents in the border zone between these two countries. Certain problems could be solved through negotiations (for instance, “the War of Banners,” in February 2016), however, a multitude of unresolved problems has remained, which may trigger off border conflicts at any time.

Such conflicts demonstrate the difficulties of the post-Soviet national construction in Central Asia. At present citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan regard one and the same territory “the land of Tajiks,” “the land of Uzbeks,” and “the land of Kyrgyzs”. The sides base themselves on different sources and

are not going to make concessions to one another, which turns the delimitation of borders practically unrealistic.

In January – July 2016, with support of the UN development program, an investigation of border conflicts and prospects of their settlement took place in the region.

The authors note that the rapid demographic growth continues to remain the main reason for conflicts in the border districts of the Ferghana Valley. For example, the population of Vorukh, one of the Tajik border mountain villages increased 20-fold during the 20th century, and in the quarter of a century of Tajikistan's independence – four-fold.

Territorial ideas of the local population about lands belonging to these or other villages formed back in the 18th – mid-19th century, when legal grounds began to appear which sealed the rights to land of communities and individual persons. A sum total of these documents is the foundation for the right to one or another plot of land recognized by local Tajiks or Uzbeks, irrespective of official borders. As to the rights to land by the formerly nomad Kyrgyz population, as long as Kyrgyzs were engaged in traditional nomad cattle breeding and whose legal ground was the distribution of territories between their tribal groups, and also between them and the settled Tajik population, there were no reasons for inter-ethnic conflicts between them. On the contrary, differences in the methods of economic activity caused the need for exchange of goods of one's own make and, consequently, friendly contacts.

In the early 20th century the Kyrgyz population was not big. Due to the nomadic way of life the borders of Kyrgyz settlement changed considerably. In the 1930s the Soviet authorities began to implement a policy of transferring the nomads to a settled way of life.

Taking into account the fact that in Batken district, due to a shortage of water, there are few convenient places for settling Kyrgyzs, part of the latter moved to the Isfar River valley, lands which were traditionally recognized by Tajiks as their own. The population grew rapidly due to natural surplus, which also caused

tension in the zone. Thus, the processes in Isfar and Batken districts led to growing tension in inter-ethnic relations, and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the formation of national states became fatal for this part of the Ferghana Valley.

Further on, the authors examine the border situation at the present time. Apart from the old problems – overpopulation, acute shortage of land, water disputes – new ones have emerged, which were the consequences of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and sovereignty. They also include unemployment, which was caused by the structural reorganization of the labor market largely due to a drastic curtailment of industrial production. The population has returned to agriculture, which has sharply increased the need for land and water.

The post-Soviet deurbanization and deindustrialization have contributed to an increase of employment in agriculture and retraditionalization, which have led to a rapid growth of the number of the population in the Ferghana Valley and a sharp rise in competition and rivalry for land and water, not so much between ethnic groups as between settled land tillers (Tajiks and Uzbeks) and cattle breeders (Kyrgyzs). The most acute situation takes shape in mountainous regions where hostilities go on for pastures and water.

The authors name the market reforms as another reason for the emergence of new border conflicts. An important role is played here by the elaboration of national legislation in the sphere of agrarian relations (introduction of private ownership of land and formation of a land market in Kyrgyzstan).

Although in the Kyrgyz part of land the border problem of its shortage is not too acute, private ownership of land and rapid procedure of legal confirmation of land ownership tend to speeding up the seizure of disputed plots of land. There is no private ownership of land in the Republic of Tajikistan, this is why people rely on the state which is the only owner of land. But its government is interested in Kyrgyz road infrastructure and this is why is anxious to avert a crisis in land disputes with the neighbor.

As a result near-border settled communities of Tajiks and Uzbeks retreat under pressure of Kyrgyzs, given the indifferent position of their own authorities. One of the consequences of the differences in the agrarian legislation has been the formation of latifundium, belonging to ethnic Kyrgyzs in the near-border zone of Kyrgyzstan, on which Tajiks and Uzbeks work as agricultural laborers.

The authors of the article pay much attention to conflicts caused by the water situation. Certain districts of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have common borders established in the Soviet period and trans border water systems. The source of water for these systems is the basin of the Isfara River formed on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, and the basic principles of the use of water were agreed on in the Soviet period. After the border ceased to be formal, water disputes became more violent. Water is often used as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the opponent during the exacerbation of border conflicts. The reasons for conflicts connected with access to water are as follows: growing requirements for water caused by an increase in the number of its users and the intensification of agriculture; obsolete system of the division of water, obsolete irrigation systems with common irrigation installations; worn-out sluices and gates; bad water management based on personal contacts and agreements; weakness of the institutions managing the water systems. True, in recent years a change has been made in appointment of the main actors in water relations.

On the whole, water conflicts are closely connected with territorial conflicts. The growing Tajik population is trying to enlarge the area under gardens and tillage, tackling irrigation projects. The Kyrgyz side, fearing that Tajiks will get more water for irrigation and will plough up disputed land does not agree with it. Thus, any technical solution to the water supply problem comes across territorial contradictions and access to water as a lever of pressure in disputes.

Another problem causing conflicts is that of pasturelands. Historically, pastures have not been someone's property and their use was determined by tradition and agreements between communities. In Soviet time part of these pasturelands was redistributed in favor of Kyrgyz economies on the lease basis. The deadlines of these agreements have expired a long time ago, however, now the problem of returning the land is regarded as disputed one.

Up to 2014 all pastures were used jointly in accordance with local traditions. In the first years after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the local authorities of the two countries signed agreements on the use of pastures. More often than not, local inhabitants, on the basis of tradition, succeeded to find a compromise and used pastures jointly. Inhabitants of Tajik villages often hired Kyrgyz shepherds who tended their cattle in summer. But in 2015 a law adopted in Kyrgyzstan came into force banning the lease of pasturelands to foreigners. Thus, citizens of Tajikistan were deprived of an opportunity to pasture on lands under the jurisdiction of Kyrgyzstan. After that Tajik cattle owners had to cut their livestock number.

Another factor of emerging conflicts is the road network. Both Tajik and Kyrgyz populated centers are connected by a single transport network built in Soviet time. Although the question of enclaves in border zones is still open right up to the completion of Tajik-Kyrgyz border delimitation, in the period of the aggravation of conflicts, both sides put up customs-border posts on roads and close them. When roads and borders are closed, prices of food products rise sharply and fragile mutual dependence of border existence is violated.

Still another cause of conflicts is the work of the border services. They violate mutual dependence of the communities of the Ferghana Valley, come out in the role of protectors of law, often aggravating or even provoking conflicts. They often use fire arms in their actions, which only worsens the situation. All this

forces the border services of the two countries to conclude an agreement on neutrality of border guards in conflicts.

Smugglers and criminals are also an influential force in creating conflicts. They buy plots of land to set up their material bases and try to seize control over water sources.

Finally, migration networks and diasporas. They unite their fellow-countrymen in common activities, which are sometimes detrimental to one of the sides in conflicts.

In conclusion, the authors write that during the past 25 years the border territories of the Ferghana Valley have turned into a dangerous zone breeding numerous conflicts and recreating old contradictions. Ethnicity, citizenship, territorial matters have been transformed and made their contribution to growing conflicts, including in them border guards, criminals, diasporas and even international organizations.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2019.01.008. NINA MAMEDOVA. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND RUSSIA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS // *"Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Irana v politicheskoy, ekonomicheskoy i kul'turnoy oblasti kak faktor ukrepleniya mira i bezopasnosti v Evrazii: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii 19 oktyabrya 2016"* Moscow, FSBEI HE MSLU, 2017, P. 54–61.

Keywords: Russia, Iran, economic relations, trade, scientific-technical cooperation.

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The researcher notes that economic relations between Russia and Iran have constantly been characterized either by uplift or by downfall. We should say that economic ties influence political relations and vice versa. Russian and foreign (including Iranian) experts unanimously noted that in recent years the level of our economic ties was much lower than that of political relations. The coincidence of political and geopolitical interests of Russia and Iran and their assessments of the situation in the world and the region gave grounds to talk of the formation of Russian-Iranian strategic partnership as of a possible trend of the relations between them. Nevertheless, a sufficiently close partnership of the two countries has not reached a strategic degree, having come across the sanctions undertaken against Iran. Russia's joining the international sanctions against Iran (all UN Security Council members, including China) have joined them was received by that

country very badly, which was reflected on the economic ties of the two countries. Iran positively received the fact that in discussing the sanctions against Iran Russia was striving to minimize them, and in the work of the “six” on solution of the nuclear crisis Russia took a constructive position toward Iran.

In 2000 the trade turnover between Russia and Iran began to grow, but after the sanctions of 2010–2011 it began to fall rather rapidly. Having grown from 2000 up to 2010 by 5.5 times and having reached \$3.5 billion, by 2013 it dropped by almost 2.5 times up to \$1.6 billion, and in 2015 – \$1.3 billion. A drop in mutual commodity turnover in 2015 was largely due to the crisis phenomena in the economies of the two countries. A growing trend of mutual cooperation began to be observed after the signing of the Vienna agreement of July 15, 2015, when a new legal basis of conditions of mutual actions. President V. Putin’s visit to Tehran in November 2015 played a major role for changing the psychological climate and brought the two countries closer together in stepping up economic cooperation. Although the official reason for Putin’s visit to Tehran was his official participation in the proceedings of the Forum of countries-exporters of gas, his meetings with Iran’s leaders Rouhani and Khamenei showed that in actual fact these meetings and talks could well be interpreted as a bilateral summit. On the eve of Putin’s visit to Tehran Moscow was the venue of the 12th meeting of the Standing intergovernmental commission at which important agreements were reached on the most diverse technological spheres. In the spring of 2016 a Decree was issued on lifting a ban on supplies of C-300 complexes to Iran, which boosted the activity of Russian companies. On the eve of his departure to Tehran President V. Putin signed a Decree on lifting a ban on the import of equipment necessary to nuclear power industry. On March 11, 2016, V. Putin signed a Decree on measures to fulfill the Resolution of the UN Security Council on measures to lift sanctions from Iran.

Although Russia’s trade with Iran does not exceed one percent, Iran is important to Russia as a market for Russian

industrial commodities. Even during 2014–2015, when Russia sharply increased its deliveries of grain to Iran (more than 40 percent of Russian export), more than half of its export consisted of industrial commodities. In 2015, according to the data of the Russian trade mission in Iran, food products and agricultural raw materials comprised 47.1 percent in the Russian export to Iran, metals and metal goods – 20.5 percent, wood and cellulose-and-paper goods – 17.1 percent, machines and means of transport – 10.9 percent, chemical goods – 3.0 percent. The main share of Russian import from Iran consisted of food products – 78.3 percent; chemical products – 8.8 percent; mineral products – 6.7 percent; machines, equipment and means of transport – 3.7 percent. Foreign trade balance for Russia is always positive as far as commodity trade is concerned and also technical services and expansion of economic ties, which can become a factor in long-term and short-term perspective.

Nina Mamedova singles out the main problems in the development of economic cooperation conditioned by external and internal factors: worsened relations between Russia and the West. The Iranian side may interest the West in using its energy and transit potential; persistent sanctions against Iran, especially the U.S. Energy sanctions can retard participation of Russian companies in oil-and-gas projects; low prices of energy-carriers. The possibility of preserving this trend for a short term is highly likely, and their export provides the main part of currency proceeds of both Russia and Iran for paying for import of commodities and services; repeatability of Russian and Iranian export dominated by the energy component; prevalence in the structure of Russian and Iranian export of companies closely connected with the government, and they, as a rule, are interested in large-scale projects and do not display much concern or attention government, and they, as a rule, are interested in large-scale projects and do not display much concern or attention to regional specificities of business and its potential, and besides, they are more vulnerable due to sanction control than small-scale or

petty business; low level of social and cultural ties which hampers doing business properly; limited ideas about the specific features of doing business.

After signing the Vienna agreement, rivalry for the Iranian market has intensified between companies of different countries. Iran has signed multi-billion deals with European countries, China, India, and Japan. It is important for Russia that Iran's ties with Turkey in the gas sphere have broadened and that competition on the gas market, including in the European direction, has intensified. Nina Mamedova notes that both Russian and Iranian experts hope for a speedy restoration and expansion of virtual trade volumes. Russian industrial products are in demand, as before, on the Iranian market, mainly production market. Russian export to Iran consists of traditional commodities – metals, wood and products of it, electrical machines and equipment, paper and cardboard and floating structures. Although in 2014–2015 the export of grain to Iran exceeded that of metal for the first time, this article of import for Iran is changeable. Iran supposed to have enough grain of its own in 2016–2017, and even begin its export. Import of agricultural products from Iran becomes a sizable share in Russian transactions; in 2014 its share in Iranian export to Russia exceeded 81 percent. In 2015 Iranian fish and sea food began to be supplied to Russia. Iran is prepared to sell more than one million tons of dairy products. Their automobile market of Iran is also of interest to Russia. So far there is only one powerful KamAZ truck representing Russia. True, a draft agreement on cooperation of the “GAZ” Company with the Iranian “Zam'yad” has been included in the protocol of the 12th meeting of the Standing Commission on trade and economic cooperation.

Iran is interested in coordinating the energy policies of our countries, participation of Russian companies in prospecting for oil and developing the gas deposit “Southern Pars,” as well as in taking part in possible gas supply to Europe via Turkey. The new rules for foreign investors taking part in oil-and-gas projects considerably enhance their rights, including property rights to part

of the product. The construction market of nuclear power plants remains quite profitable for Russia. The nuclear energy department of Iran at present has corrected the construction plan of such plants. According to this plan, it is envisaged to build ten new nuclear power plants, but not more than two simultaneously. In August 2016 an agreement was reached with Russia to build two such plants.

In aviation the most promising plane to be delivered to Iran is the civil airplane "Sukhoi Superjet-100". The main problem lies in the plane's power and quality.

Iran is interested in resumption of scientific-technical cooperation in space research. Russian companies may take part in joint work in such traditional branches as construction and modernization of railways, construction of electric power plants, especially in connection with the Russian credit of \$5 billion for these infrastructural projects.

The two parties wish to expand cooperation in the sphere of innovative development. According to Iran's Prospective plan, it is expected to increase the share of scientific research work in the GDP up to 2.5 percent by 2025. Special attention is to be paid to the development of information technologies. In May 2016, during the work of the 5th International Exhibition of innovations and technologies in Tehran an Agreement was signed on cooperation of the Russian "Nanocertifica" and the Center of Development of nanotechnologies of Iran, and in June a decision was made to set up a joint investment fund between Iran and "ROSNANO". Technological exchanges in the field of pharmaceutical research and production are also promising. In 2016 a number of agreements was signed on the production in Iran of a vaccine against flu'. The Iranian company "Sobhan" transferred to Russia the production technology of the vaccine against the hepatitis B virus. The Russian market is short of medicines, therefore, according to the Iranian sixth five-year plan (2015/2016 - 2020/2022), the pharmaceutical industry should become an export

branch. The most up-to-date medicines are created in Iran to combat cancer, diabetes and blood diseases.

The companies of the two countries are interested in joint work in the national free-trade zones, in setting up a special free trade zone between Russia and Iran, drawing closer together the legal basis of the use of foreign capital, expanding participation in foreign-trade exchange of small and medium-size business, and better using the possibilities of participation in regional organizations and regional projects, specially within the framework of SCO and EAEC. After the lifting of sanctions it can be predicted that economic cooperation between the two countries will greatly develop and may reach the figure up to \$10 billion. The Russian side has decided to open a credit line for cooperation with Iran of up to \$5 billion to step up Russian-Iranian economic relations. This shows our striving to create a solid economic basis for political cooperation between Russia and Iran.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. AFGHAN CRISIS AND
THREATS TO SECURITY OF CENTRAL-ASIAN REGION //
The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."

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Introduction. The authors of articles examine the Afghan crisis conformably to the security of Central Asia and the threats, risks and challenges from Afghanistan with an emphasis on their religious component. Researchers pay attention to the problem of drug trafficking from Afghanistan all over the world. Their articles single out the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in maintaining security in Central Asia and analyze the basic measures aimed at

stabilizing the situation in the region. The authors also turn to the problem of Islamization of the Central Asian region.

1. *Dina Malysheva. Afghan Crisis and Post-Soviet Central Asia // World Economy and International Relations. Moscow, 2017, Vol. 61, № 8, P. 14–34.*

Keywords: Afghanistan, post-Soviet Central Asia, security, crisis, Islamist radicalism.

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The author analyzes the situation in Afghanistan in the context of the acute regional crisis developing there, which draws foreign forces to take part in it. The author examines the new approaches of Russia to the problem of Afghan settlement and assesses its initiatives in maintaining security in Afghanistan and Central Asia and lowering tension in the entire Asian region. An attempt is made to determine the conditions under which cooperation of the Russian Federation with China and Central Asian states – partners by the CSTO and SCO – may bring positive results.

While the American-NATO military presence in Afghanistan was being curtailed in recent years, and world leaders and the mass media concentrated their attention on other international developments, the countries of the post-Soviet Central Asia with their troublesome neighbor Afghanistan remained somewhere in the periphery of world interests. Meanwhile, as the author of this article notes, the intensity of the armed confrontation in Afghanistan has not diminished, and this international crisis, retaining its ever-explosive potential can create serious problems in the security sphere for the post-Soviet Central Asian states, which are of importance for Russia due to their mutual interest in

the development of economic, military, political, cultural, and other connections.

Afghanistan is still split ethnically and religiously. The vitality of the state is in great danger, its economy is ruined by the war and fully depends on foreign donations. The Kabul authorities are fully dependent on the United States patronizing them and can hardly cope with the most difficult problems in stabilizing the situation and ensuring peaceful construction; maintenance of public order in a country torn asunder by the struggle between various political forces is a task beyond the strength of the local police and army units. The Taliban grouping, who do not lose hope to score victory over the government forces, remain the leading opposition force, winning new areas. The number of victims of the conflict is growing all the time, which hampers the efforts undertaken by international sponsors to step up the process of the peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan. The situation with drug production and drug trafficking remains alarming in Afghanistan. By the beginning of 2017 the country continued to be the world's leading supplier of heroin. According to the UN data, the area sown to poppy continues to grow. UN experts connect such situation with the growing territory under the Taliban control for which drug trafficking is one of the major sources of income.

The attempts to normalize the Afghan crisis by political means, with the participation of the United States, Pakistan and China, have not brought any tangible results.

There can be an increase of foreign military forces in Afghanistan due to more active operations of Islamist radical forces there, who use reprisals and terror for promoting their idea of a "new caliphate." So far the Islamists prefer to stay calm and quiet due to their negative image in Afghanistan and its neighboring countries in Central Asia. Besides, the Middle Eastern roots of the "al Qaeda" and the Islamic State are considered "alien" in Afghanistan.

Although the threat from the Islamic State is often exaggerated, there are grounds to believe, the researcher asserts,

that it has a prospect to gain success. Indeed, inasmuch as the Islamic State does not recognize either national or ethnic affiliation and state borders and proclaims itself transnational organization, its opportunities to draw representatives of various ethnic group are much broader than of the Taliban, which is mainly a monoethnic Pashtoon movement.

The author emphasizes that the emergence in Afghanistan of the bearers and propagandists of the idea of building a “new caliphate” connected with their Middle Eastern fellow-thinkers, transnational terrorism and drug dealers increases the potential of threats to Afghanistan itself, and also to the secular regimes of Central Asia. The unpredictability of developments in Afghanistan and a possibility of the resumption of a large-scale armed conflict there with drawing third parties in it is a constant cause of alarm for Central Asian countries. Their people connected with Afghanistan by many-century history, ethnic-religious traditions and culture are not indifferent to the situation in Afghanistan: whether it is peaceful, the position of the Taliban with regard to its southern neighbors, the possibility of the “al Qaeda” to broaden the sphere of its influence in Afghanistan, and explode the situation in Central Asia.

The researcher notes that the security system in Central Asia is distinguished by a complex, multi-level character. It is bolstered up by such organizations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The elements of the global security level are also connected with the membership of states in the UN and OSCE, as well as interaction with NATO. For a short-time perspective the Central Asian states will not be of any direct interest for the Taliban or any other units of radical Islamism. However, in case of the broadening of the influence of these forces in districts bordering on Central Asian countries, tension may arise again. As a result, in the author’s view, there can be more risks for the post-Soviet Central Asian region:

First, a large-scale civil war may be resumed in Afghanistan and military actions may spread to the territory of neighboring

states in Central Asia. The main threat will emerge from foreigners, that is, ethnic Uzbeks Tajiks, Uighurs, Chechens, and others. They now live in Afghanistan, but they do not abandon the desire to go back to their native parts with a view to changing the secular rule to the Islamic one there with support of outside sponsors.

Secondly, the ousting of religious radicals and Talibs may cause additional risks in the zone of the Afghan-Pakistani crisis. This will make vulnerable the Tajik-Afghan and Turkmen-Afghan borders. In contrast to Turkmenistan with its officially recognized neutral status, excluding its entry in any military structures, and Uzbekistan, which stopped its membership in the CSTO in 2012, the three other Central Asian republics (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) may rely on military assistance from Russia as the CSTO members,

Thirdly, the possibilities to implement an Islamist project in Afghanistan may result in the radicalization of the Central Asian ummah and the strengthening of terrorist activity and drug trafficking there. To boot, the drug mafia feed religious extremism, and they both become a strong element destabilizing the situation in the Central Asian countries.

For Russia the Central Asian region will remain a strategic buffer against threats from the outside, and its role in maintaining security in Central Asia will be growing due to the need to oppose drug trafficking combined with opposition to growing Islamist radicalism. Central Asia represents for Russia a valuable communication hub and a precious fuel-and-energy center. Russia's relations with the countries of the region will also be influenced (although indirectly) by its interaction with China, as well as with the United States and its allies. Russian participation is also necessary in protecting the security of this region within the framework of the SCO and CSTO organizations. There are imperatives to raise the effectiveness of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) among whose members, along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are Armenia, Belarus and the Russian Federation. The

latter is trying to evolve a strategy aimed at regulating the Afghan crisis and establishing security in the entire Central Asian region. Conformably to Afghanistan, D. Malysheva emphasizes, Russia could have not so much military influence there, as diplomatic and political.

2. Anton Degtyarev. Growing “Afghan Threat” in Central Asia. New Challenge to CSTO // *Fundamental and applied research: Hypotheses, problems, results. Collection of materials of II International scientific conference, Novosibirsk, 2017, P. 29–35.*

Keywords: Central Asia (CA), Afghanistan. NATO, CSTO, collective security, fight against drug criminals.

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The author discusses the problem of growing “Afghan threat” which is manifested, among other things, in an increasing number of the supporters of the “Islamic state” on the territory of Afghanistan. The article also pays attention to the drug trafficking problem throughout the world. The role of the CSTO in ensuring security in Central Asia is dealt with, and measures to maintain stability in the region are examined.

The situation in Afghanistan causes serious concern in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, because the number of Islamic state units is growing in Afghanistan. Certain units of the Taliban, both Afghan and Pakistani, have declared their support of the idea of building the Caliphate. Recruitment of fighters for the units is going on in the country. The CSTO is the guarantor of ensuring military-political stability and security on the territory of the post-Soviet area. For the purpose the CSTO has created the Collective forces of operative response. Their task is to rebuff armed attacks against the members of the Organization.

An analysis of the prospects of the evolution of the situation in Afghanistan and post-Soviet Central Asia gives grounds to suppose that the Islamic state can become the center of the unification of the enemies of the state regime, which is characterized by a certain dualism – a split in the Afghan government into supporters of President Gani, who is a Pashtoon, and supporters of the Premier Abdullah, a Tajik. It is indicative that the ranks of Islamists are often joined by non-Pashtoos, that is, the enemies of the Taliban. An intensification of the propaganda of extremist organizations in Central Asia is noted. Another problem is the turning of Afghanistan into a training base of militant fighters, whose aim is to destabilize the situation in the Russian Federation.

On November 2, 2016, a meeting of the Coordination Council of the heads of special bodies to combat drug trafficking took place in Astana (Kazakhstan). Representatives of the CSTO member-states singled out a serious problem – drug production and distribution organized, supervised and developed by Afghanistan. It was specially noted that the main part of growing production and distribution of synthetic and psychoactive preparations come from Southeast Asia. The participants in the meeting agreed to continue to organize international anti-drug operations.

From May 29 to June 2, 2017, the CSTO member-states carried out a joint operation aimed at blocking the channels for Afghan drug trafficking in the areas of the Baltic, Caspian and Black seas.

From 2107 Russia began to strengthen its military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in order to prevent the transfer of terrorist activity from Afghanistan to Central Asia. In November 2017 in Tajikistan (near the border with Afghanistan) military exercises of the CSTO Joint forces were held with a view to training for joint actions to do away with illegal armed units in the mountains.

Thus, A. Degtyarev notes in conclusion, the Afghan problem can be regarded in two aspects. First, this is drug trafficking not only to the Russian Federation and the CSTO countries, but also to other places in the world. And we can already talk of certain positive shifts. Secondly, the numerical growth of militant fighters on Afghan territory worrying the entire world community is now openly recognized by the public and mass media. The Central Asian countries are under threat, but the 2017 exercises have demonstrated that the positive forces are always ready to counter aggression

3. *Shirin Amanbekova. Influence of Afghan Crisis on Islamization Process of Central Asia // Post-Soviet Research, Moscow, 2018, Vol. 1, № 3, P. 318–320.*

Keywords: Afghanistan, CIS, Central Asia, terrorism, Islamization, radicalism.

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The author notes that the Central Asian region is now one of the “most dangerously-explosive” places. Various organizations of the radical Islamic and pseudo-religious nature wish to strengthen and consolidate their positions there. One of the major sources of threats to security in the Central Asian region of the CIS is the unsettled Afghan problem. The restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan is one of the most pressing international and regional problems. Primarily, for the Central Asian countries directly suffering from the negative consequences of the prolonged war in that country. The conflict in Afghanistan engendered threats and challenges to stability and security in the Central Asian countries, which are living through a difficult period of consolidating their statehood, complicated by religious extremism, ethnic intolerance, terrorism, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling. Apart from that,

the possibility of transferring the conflict situation from Afghanistan to CIS countries is not at all hypothetical. Because on both sides of the state borders live representatives of one and the same people, often connected with one another by family ties for centuries, to say nothing of historical and cultural affinity.

Among the threats the greatest one for the secular regime of Central Asian countries is religious extremism, the author emphasizes. Today, the problem of Islamization in Central Asia has assumed threatening proportions, which is largely connected with the situation in the Middle East. Islamization processes, due to objective historical and cultural reasons, as well as their own value and political preferences of the key regional actors, the most active Islamization processes develop in Central Asian countries.

After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991 certain radicalization of Islam began to take place in Central Asia. This was manifested, among other things, in the emergence of Islamist organizations and movements (often appearing and acting illegally). Radical Islam in Central Asia has long become no less tangible than that in the Middle East or Africa. Influence of radical Islam is felt in Central Asia especially acutely, if compared with other regions of the post-Soviet area, due to the border with Afghanistan, which makes a destabilizing influence on the situation practically in all five Central Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. It should be borne in mind, the author notes, that the Islamic tradition and its opposition to secular manifestations have a rather long history there and proved quite strong.

For a long time Islam was dominant religion in Central Asia. Approximately three quarters of the 20th century Islam, and religion in general, were practically outlawed in Central Asia, because the region was part of the Soviet Union, where free confession was banned, and the general religiousness of the population was going down. In the 1980s, when the war was in progress in neighboring Afghanistan ideas of radical Islam began to get through. The disunited religious population of Central Asia

took up both nationalistic and religious extremist ideas. In the early 1990s, along with the downfall of the U.S.S.R., the role of radical Islam increased, just as the freedom of action of radicals. Radical Islam was manifested in different forms. The researcher mentions the most striking events:

1. Civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997);
2. Batken developments in Kyrgyzstan (1999–2000);
3. Andizhan developments in Uzbekistan.

Prerequisites for the region becoming a major center in world Islamist strategy and creating favorable ground for major expansion have existed earlier. For example, this region has historically been a link between the centers of Islamic civilization of the Middle East and the Muslim population of Russia, Xinjiang, Uighur autonomous district of China, Uzbek cities of Samarkand, Bohara, big cities of the Ferghana Valley: Kokand, Namangan, Ferghana, Andizhan and Osh, as well as southern cities of Kazakhstan – Shimkent, Turkestan, Taraz, which were one time spiritual centers of Muslim culture in Central Asia. They were quite well-known as big theological centers independent from the official authorities. It is not for nothing that many radical forces set themselves the aim to create an Islamic state in the Ferghana Valley, which should become part of the so-called “World Islamic Caliphate.”

A sum total of definite historical, geopolitical, cultural and economic factors largely explain the vulnerability of Central Asian states before the threat of religious extremism. The threats to security of Central Asia from radical Islamism in Afghanistan and certain Middle Eastern countries become stronger due to a number of negative domestic challenges, in the author’s view, which are responsible for the necessity to include most countries of the region in the category of “fragile states.” Their “fragility” is due to the potential of collapse and formation of “frustrated states” unable to control their own territory. It is such states that are an ideal nutrient solution for breeding radical terrorist groupings of the Islamic state type. A major factor contributing to the growth of

radical Islamism is high corruption in the region. First, corruption is connected with organized crime, especially with drug trade, which finances terrorist groupings. Secondly, it greatly hampers the activity of government institutions, including in the struggle against radical Islam. Thirdly, high corruption and social inequality connected with it is one of the main propaganda arguments against existing secular regimes used by radical Islamists.

The influence of radical Islam is felt well enough in Central Asia as compared to other post-Soviet regions due to the closeness of the border with Afghanistan, which exerts a destabilizing impact on the situation in all Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Radical Islam is the strongest in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The researcher emphasizes that religious extremism and terrorism is at present one of the major threats to stability in Central Asia. Its forms and methods are constantly improved, and it draws more and more people into its orbit, especially young people.

It is necessary to tackle economic, political, and social problems in the region more thoroughly. In the view of the author of the article, their solution is the most effective form of struggle against religious extremism and terrorism.

Conclusion

The conflict level in Afghanistan, researchers note, is high enough, and this causes great concern in all neighboring states. In the event of the exacerbation of a conflict the threat of destabilization begins to loom over not only post-Soviet Central Asian countries, but also China, India, and Iran. Russia, too, as a strategic partner of Central Asian countries, can be drawn in the destabilization process, which may end with a major explosion threatening Eurasian economic integration. In the conditions of the growing polycentric world order, Central Asian and South Asian

countries could use a chance to become a unifying center of Asia. In this context, in the view of these authors, it would be quite logical to set up with participation of the CSTO and SCO a cooperative security system which could allow Russia, China, Central Asian countries and their allies in Asia effectively to tackle the problems of Afghanistan and other security problems in Asia. It is also necessary to improve the measures, methods and forms of opposing religious Islamist currents of Central Asia, which are a grave threat to security.

2019.01.009. ALEXANDER ROGOZHIN. ARAB COUNTRIES OF PERSIAN GULF – COURSE TO ASIA // *“West – East – Russia 2014. Yearbook IMEMO RAS,” Moscow, 2014, P. 116–121.*

Keywords: Arab countries, Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, OAE, Asia, PRC, India, negotiations, contracts, trade, investments, fast-developing countries, migrants, immigrants.

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The author examines the stepping up of diplomatic activity of Arab countries in Asia, primarily in their relations with China and India.

In September the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Saud Al-Faisal held talks with his Chinese colleague Wang Yi, in which he promised to contribute to speeding up the creation of a free-trade zone of Cooperation Council of Persian Gulf Arab States – PRC and take part in the formation of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new financial institution, in which China has shown a great interest. In November the Emir of

Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Tani and the Chairman of the PRC Xi Jinping signed an agreement on the setting up of strategic partnership of China and Qatar. In the course of the negotiations the Emir spoke in favor of the speedy formation of the Persian Gulf Arab states – PRC free-trade zone and expressed a desire to take part in the Chinese project of the Maritime Silk Road and enter the board of the founders of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Last January Saudi Arabia was visited by India's Minister of Finance P. Chidambaram to discuss questions connected with financing investments projects of mutual interest,

A reply visit was made to India by the Vice Premier and Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Salman ben Abdel Aziz al-Saud, who had negotiations on cooperation with India in the defense industry, science and technology. At the beginning of 2014 Qatar and India prolonged their contract valid since 2004 on supplying India with liquefied natural gas, and in November the Qatar Minister of trade and industry Taufiya Fauzan al Rabiah headed a delegation of the business circles of his country to the 4th Indian-Arab conference on cooperation in New Delhi. Following a visit to India of the Prime Minister of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber al-Mubarak al-Hamad as-Sabah in 2014, a meeting of the Intergovernmental commission was held which resulted in signing numerous contracts envisaging the construction of joint enterprises in such spheres as oil extraction, petrochemistry and transport, and energy infrastructure. The biggest of them all will be an iron-and-steel combine which India will build in Kuwait. In February 2014 the King of Bahrain Hamad ben Isa al-Halifa made his first royal visit to India during which a number of agreements were reached on investment cooperation in various branches of the manufacturing industry, in information-communication technologies and in banking.

In the view of the researcher, the stepped-up activity of member-countries of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf is connected with potential threats (especially for mid-

term) to the sale of their oil and gas in Asia from new competitors – the United States and Russia. The former may emerge on the Asian markets of oil and gas due to technological innovations and full self-sufficiency in energy by 2020 and begin to export its hydrocarbons to Asian countries. Russia is undertaking a no small effort to come out to the oil and gas markets of China (primarily) and such markets in other Asian countries. The CCASG forecast that quite soon Russia may become a major actor on the Asian market of oil and gas. At the same time the Gulf states concentrate attention on the economic sphere of cooperation with Asian countries, not confining to regarding them as purchasers of oil and gas only.

Asia today is the major trade partner of the CCASG countries as far as the export of oil and gas and import of industrial commodities and food products are concerned. The share of Asia (excluding Japan) in the total volume of trade of the CCASG countries amounts to 40 percent and tends to grow. The growing trade ties of these countries with the developing countries of Asia are accompanied with the intensification of bilateral relations in the sphere of investments. Being supported by the further growth of the share of Asia in the structure of global demand for energy in the nearest decades, the present shift of the CCASG trade toward Asia is expected to continue. It is precisely the growing demand for energy-carriers of Asian countries that will help these countries maintain economic growth and retain important oil and gas markets. Asia is rapidly becoming the main trade partner of the Persian Gulf monarchies, having left the United States and the European Union countries far behind. During the past decade significant changes in the structure of the CCASG countries' trade were noted. Japan remains the major export direction for these countries, however its share lowered from 23 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2012. At the same time India moved from 10th to 2nd place, and now it accounts for more than ten percent of the export of the CCASG countries. This change of the trade structure reflects a shift of the global economic weight

in favor of rapidly developing countries, especially in Asia, which now account for more than forty percent of the entire CCASG export. More than half of it is now delivered to rapidly developing and developing countries. China and India become the biggest trade partners of the CCAGS countries.

The importance of trade relations with the Asian continent is reflected in the trade policy of the CCASG member-countries toward Asia. A milestone was the beginning of the operation of the agreement on free trade in September 2013 between the CCAGS and Singapore. It became the first such agreement signed between the CCAGS and non-Middle Eastern country. It is exempt from customs duties by 99 percent of the total goods volume imported from Singapore to the CCAGS countries. This agreement envisages preferential relations in other spheres, including trade in services, investments, rules of determining the country of origin of commodity, and customs procedures. At present talks are conducted on these subjects with other Asian trade partners, including India and China.

The PRC Chairman Xi Jinping in January 2014 called on other states to speed up the signing of an agreement on free trade between China and the CCAGS, and this is a subject of negotiations for a decade. As to China, this agreement will not only secure a large import of oil by more favorable price, but also open up for it new opportunities in the sphere of investments and business.

The growing trade ties of the CCAGS countries with Asian developing countries were accompanied with the increasing flow of mutual investments. For the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf investment projects in Asia promise access to expanding markets of energy-carriers, as well as other attractive sectors of the economy, such as the financial sector (including the "Islamic" one), and telecommunications. In turn, Asian countries, and first and foremost China, are striving to bolster up their energy security through strategic investments in the CCAGS zone. China's direct investments in CCAGS countries by the end of 2014 reached almost \$30 billion, having comprised about eight percent of the total

flow of investments to the region. Thus, China has taken 6th place in the group of the leading foreign investors in the CCAGS, outstripping Germany and Britain. Almost fifty percent of all Chinese investments were channeled to the energy sphere of countries of the region, more than one-third to infrastructure objects – from telecommunication to entertainment centers. Over fifty percent of Chinese investments to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf were channeled to Saudi Arabia and about thirty percent – to the UAE.

In 2011 India became the seventh investor in size to the UAE, having accounted for three percent of the total volume of investments to that country and fourth source of investments by volume in Oman, which received \$06 billion. It is indicative that if the means of the main investors – Britain and the United States – are channeled preferably to oil and gas prospective work, Indian investments are concentrated in industrial production (almost fifty percent) and financial services (21 percent). The volume of Indian investments in Saudi Arabia in 2014 reached \$1.6 billion.

As to direct investments of the CCASG states to Asian countries, they not only grow in volume, but are also diversified by branches, going beyond the boundaries of the traditional spheres – energy and the transport infrastructure. The UAE is the 10th in volume investor in India: they amounted to \$2.6 billion by 2014. Qatar is also quite active in this respect in Asia. The head of the Qatar Investment Authority Ahmad Mohamed Al-Sayed has announced the plans of his fund for cooperation with the Chinese investment corporation CITIC Group, and also of its intention to invest \$10 billion within the framework of diversifying assets. Qatar investments in Asia in health service, construction of infrastructural objects, and also an intention to invest \$20 billion more in Asia within the next five years. In the next three-to-four years Qatar will invest \$5 billion in Malaysian petrochemical enterprises.

Apart from trade, and investments another important linking elements between the Persian Gulf monarchies and Asian developing countries is a vast community of migrants from Asia living and working in the CCASG countries. They form a

considerable section of the settled population there (about forty percent for the entire region, for Qatar and the UAE – 80, in Bahrain – 50 percent, and 30 percent in Oman). About 70 percent of workforce staying in the CCASG have come from Asian developing countries. Their money transfers to the home countries are estimated at \$70–80 billion a year. Indians form the biggest migrant community about six million (30 percent of all migrants), then follow people from Pakistan, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Two-thirds of all money transfers from the CCASG countries are sent to Asia. For most Asian economies they are an important source of the flow of foreign currency and foreign workforce. A. Rogozhin notes that expanding mutual ties between the CCASG and Asia creates new risks for the region. On the one hand this makes the CCASG countries more dependent on the economic development and stability of their biggest Asian partners. On the other, their socio-economic problems can become more complex since they will become more closely connected with the rapidly growing community of people of Asian origin in the CCASG countries.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.01.010. OLGA BIBIKOVA. ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC // “*Studies of Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS, № 4. Economic, social and political, communal problems of Afro-Asian countries,*” Moscow, 2017, P. 326–339.

Keywords: atheism, Muslims, refugees, identity, xenophobia.

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After disintegration of Czechoslovakia the Czech Republic appeared on the map of Europe in 1993. As the researcher notes,

the most part of the population of the country (59%) refers to non-religious that allows to designate the Czech Republic as the least religious country of Europe. Traditionally in the Czech Republic Catholicism dominates. About 27.4% of the population are adherents of the Roman Catholic Church. Representatives of different nationalities and religions live in the Czech Republic. Up until recently there were no non-Christian religious communities (except Judaism) in the country. Open society and freedom of worship made possible emergence of new communities, first of all Protestants of the American type. However, the distrust in the state forces believers not to document their religious affiliation during polls and censuses.

Statistics recorded small number of Muslims: a little over 3 thousand. However, there are massively more natives of Muslim countries in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic, being in the center of Europe, long since dealt with Muslim countries. The main contacts with Muslims were made with natives of neighboring countries - Bulgaria and Croatia which at the end of the 14th century came under influence of Ottomans. It is known that in the 10th century merchants from the East came to the Czech Republic for fur and slaves. The main information on Islam came from visiting merchants. Jan Hus (1369-1415), the ideologist of the Czech Reformation, mentioned in his works the Koran. During 1867-1918 the Czech Republic was a part of Austria-Hungary where there were also the territories inhabited by Muslims. In particular, Bosnia possessing a large number of the population islamized in the period of Ottoman domination in 1878 came under influence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In these conditions Bosnians began to move on the neighboring lands.

Some of them settled in the Czech lands. In 1912 the emperor Franz Joseph accepted the rights of Muslim community of the country. Then the Koran was translated into languages of Austria-Hungary including Czech. In 1918 failures at the fronts of World War I and an economic crisis led to disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Bosnian Muslims who once moved to the

Czech Republic remained to live on the Czech lands. In 1934 hundreds of Muslims united and appealed to the authorities for recognition de jure of the Muslim organization. However official recognition did not happen. After World War II the Muslim community continued to be rather small, besides the policy of the government in the socialist period did not provide support of religious communities. During the rule of the president E. Benesh (1940–1945) a number of decrees of nationalist character was passed. In particular, Hungarians and Germans were almost expelled from the country. Concerning others, there were adopted laws limiting their rights. New attempts of Muslims to achieve registration of the community in the Prague spring of 1968 also weren't successful.

Return to a question of registration of Muslim association took place only in the mid-1970s after that in 1968 formed Union of Muslim communities appealed to the authorities for recognition. By that time in a number of the cities there were small, spontaneously created Muslim communities. The author notes that the aspiration to unite with compatriots or people of one belief – is the line particular to natives of Islam habitat. In 2015 the Muslim community of Karlovy Vary consisting of 10 people appealed to the city leaders to organize a stationary room for prayers so much so Karlovy Vary attracts foreign patients, including from Muslim countries. In particular, considering the high level of care in the Czech perinatal centers, there come women from rich Arab families.

In 2004 the Czech Republic became the member of the European Union. New opportunities for citizens of the country opened, many Muslims who were in the country temporally, immediately decided to use this situation – students, businessmen, especially as the new law allowed to apply for gaining citizenship for those who lived in the country more than 5 years. Among students the natives of the Arab countries dominate who arrived to study in the Czech universities. The education level in the Czech Republic meets the highest European criteria therefore natives of

different countries traditionally aspired to get here. Tellingly that 80% of students of the Arab origin, both Muslims, and Christians, get or already have the diploma of medical universities, and 20% – engineers. These are prestigious professions, demanded and well paid both on their homeland, and in the Czech Republic.

There are also large communities of Muslims from the neighboring European countries in the country: Albanians, Bosnians and also Caucasus natives. In general, among new immigrants of Muslim origin, both among students, and other categories men prevail. This circumstance, Olga Bibikova writes, logically assumes that thanks to marriages with Czech women the number of newly-converted Muslims grows. The number of Muslims in the country can't be exact owing to a traditional custom not to specify religious affiliation during a census. The sociologist from Charles University Caryl Chessman gives figure – 22 thousand people. Muslims of the Czech Republic profess Sunni Islam of hanafi sense. There is a small group of Shiites in the country (about 300 people).

In June, 1990 the Czech socialist republic which soon confirmed the rights of citizens, professing Islam was proclaimed. In spring, 1991 a meeting of the Union of Muslim religious establishments took place in Prague. The same year two Muslim communities – in Prague and in Brno – received the official status. In 1992 prayer hall was opened in Brno for the first time. It does not differ from neighboring buildings and has no minaret. Before Muslims gathered for a Friday prayer in tenancies and even in one of premises of Egyptian Embassy in Czechoslovakia. Two years later it was opened the Islamic fund which purpose was a creation of conditions for performance of acts of worship. Thanks to donations the Fund could get in 1995 a ground for construction of a mosque. In 1998 the mosque was built. Subsequently and in Prague near Wenceslas Square it was allocated and arranged a room (in Jiri Grossman's passage) used as mosque. In several years on the skirts of the city the cathedral mosque was built. The imam of the central mosque of Prague is Vladimir Sanka, a Czech

converted to Islam. Some more chapels emerged in Prague. The Czech press mentions "the Turkish mosque" in Pivovarnitsk Street where the imam is a native of Turkey Sadreddin. Natives of Turkey and Uzbekistan became its visitors. The number of Uzbeks constantly grows in the Czech Republic.

In the 2000th the number of immigrants from Muslim countries increased. First of all, at the expense of students and also members of families of those foreign Muslims who already obtained Czech citizenship. In 1993 in the Czech Republic the Union of Muslim students and young people was created. Subsequently it was renamed as the Union of Muslim youth and students where except arrived from abroad, children from mixed marriages joined. People, whose relatives twisted fortune with Muslims, having married the students and businessmen who arrived to the Czech Republic, created a Society of friends of Muslim culture (the head – Saleem Vladimír Voldan). This organization was renamed later as the Islamic union and became a member of World Islamic League. The important event for Muslims of the Czech Republic took place in 2004 when the Ministry of Culture registered the Union of Muslim Communities (UMC) as the official religious organization having relevant rights, including the right for state baking. UMC includes several communities in different cities, the Union of Muslim youth and students, Society of friends of Muslim culture and also Islamic fund in Prague and Brno. The organization publishes materials about life of the Czech Muslims, trying to form public opinion of the country about Islam values and also renders assistance to the Muslims who found themselves in the hot seat. Activity of Islamic fund in Brno and Prague includes work in Muslim community and work focused on familiarization of the population of the country with Islam and life of the Czech Muslims. In the community it is carried out traditional for Islam charity, collection for refugees, religious and legal support. Due to a lack of right amount of mosques actions regularly take place in branches of the Islamic fund, which comes under non-profit organizations. Possibly, the

author writes, its activity is carried out by means provided from abroad. The fund considers necessary to help local Muslims with maintaining of their belief, identity, to carry out educational activity and to extend reliable information on Islam. Every Friday at the premises of the Fund in Prague it is held communal prayer which brings together about 200 people. Besides, there is also a lecture which can be heard not only in Czech, but in translation in English and Arabic. On Saturdays school for children and courses for adults function. Children and adults are acquainted with Arabic, also subtleties of theology are explained (fiqh).

Presence of Muslims in traditionally Christian, and nowadays to a large extent atheistic country which the Czech Republic is, outwardly looks quite safely. However with increase of acts of terrorism in Europe and also destruction of statehood of a number of Arab states and growth of a flow of immigrants, Czechs, also as well as other inhabitants of Europe, are leery of their life and the future of their children. In return, the country leaders rather carefully take requests of Muslim community, considering possible discontent of indigenous population. So, religion lessons are not allowed at public schools, separate Muslim schools with a full educational cycle are also prohibited. The situation around Islam which aggravated after declaration of ISIL and migration crisis of 2015–2016 forces the authorities to pay close attention to activity of Muslim organizations in the country.

The problem of refugees, since 2015, also promotes emergence of economic, political and social problems related to necessity to accommodate immigrants, to promote their adaptation and socialization in host society. The host society also has to be ready for meeting with foreign culture. In the first instance there are usually xenophobic sentiments. Possibly to some extent this way it can be explained refusal of the authorities to accept the refugees who arrived in Europe through Greece and Italy in 2016–2017. In the height of the migration crisis in 2015, Ministers of the Interior of the EU established quotas on accommodation of migrants in the European Union countries. But many countries

wouldn't agree with acceptance in their territory of people of other culture. The provided quotas for countries of Eastern Europe were rather small – 7 thousand people for Poland, 1.6 thousand for the Czech Republic and 1.3 thousand for Hungary. Representatives of these states voted against acceptance of refugees. However the decision was taken by a majority vote. The Czech Republic considers that the policy of the European Union concerning new members of the EU leads to deprival of national identity. In the context of the conflict between the Czech Republic and the European Union the Czech Muslims supported the government of the country because they believe that among “new Muslims” there can be also former terrorists whose presence on the Czech territory can destroy the interethnic concord which was being created during many years.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

IRINA BABICH. STATE MUSLIM POLICY IN CONTEXT OF MODERN RELIGIOUSNESS IN SWITZERLAND // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

Keywords: Switzerland, Islam, Muslims, Islamic ideology, state power, Swiss, citizenship, tolerance, identity.

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Abstract: Switzerland is a country, where migration flows have constantly been growing during the 20th and 21st centuries, and whose authorities have to think constantly of how to restrain them. This article, prepared on the basis of two sources: newspaper material and field ethnographic material collected by the author, examines state Muslim policy in the context of

modern religiousness in Switzerland. The author emphasizes that Switzerland has become the first country which renounced the idea of cultural tolerance so widespread in Europe in postwar time. The authorities themselves call their political course a “policy of zero tolerance,” which they actively pursue toward Muslim migrants.

Switzerland is a country where migration flows have constantly been increasing for the past two centuries. This is why its authorities have to think constantly of how to restrain them. In the past decades there has been an intensive emigration to the country of Russians Kurds, Turks, Frenchmen, Portugueses, Caucasians and Muslims from all corners of the world (primarily, Balkan, and Eastern Muslims).

Swiss Muslims form a well-organized community headed by the Central Islamic Council of Switzerland (CCIS) headed by a Swiss citizen Nicolas Blanchot, who adopted Islam. He is not the only one among the native Swiss citizens who have adopted Islam in recent decades. Naturally, among them are, above all, women who have married Muslims. Besides, there is the Federation of Islamic Organizations of Switzerland (FOIS) headed by Montassar Ben Mrad.

We should note that the civilian community of Switzerland is represented not only by Muslim émigrés living in the country, but also by Muslim tourists whose flow has increased considerably over the past years. According to press reports, in 2015 Switzerland was visited by almost one million well-to-do people from Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the OAE.

One of the aims of the Muslim community in Switzerland is the promotion of their people to various posts in the state or cantonal management. For example, a Muslim medical doctor named Khisham Maizar became the head of the Swiss Council on Religion in 2014. He was born in Jerusalem, studied medicine in Heidelberg, and is working in Switzerland. The aim of this Council

is to ensure a peaceful dialogue between representatives of all confessions.

This article examines state Muslim policy in the context of modern religiousness in Switzerland and on the basis of two sources: mass media material and field ethnographical material collected by the author.

Switzerland bases its entire migration policy on the preservation of Swiss identity. Everything is subordinated to this idea. The religious policy of the Swiss authorities has undoubtedly become a major part of migration policy and one of the instruments of the preservation of Swiss identity. Migrants and their specific life should in no way weaken Swiss identity based on the combination of civilian, territorial (cantonal) and national-cultural identity. There are at minimum four basic models of cultural identity – German (covering the German cantons of the country, which is in a majority; Italian (covering the Italian part of the country, mainly Ticino), French (covering French cantons), and Ladin (covering cantons with predominantly the Ladin language)

The Swiss authorities have to display much flexibility and understanding to keep four different people – Italians, Germans, French and Ladins – within the bounds of one country. This is why the migrants are the additional “pay in the neck” for the Swiss authorities in their complex situation.

On the whole, migration policy in the country is rather strict. There are quite a few laws legalizing advantages of the local population in different spheres of life, primarily in the sphere of employment. This is why, there is nothing surprising in a harsh attitude to Muslims and Islam as religion and religious institutions in Switzerland. Here are a few examples. First of all, we should note that although there is no open radical confrontation or terrorist acts, the authorities have earmarked considerable means for preventing the emergence of extremism in the nearest decades. This is why even the smallest manifestations of radicalism are thoroughly investigated. For instance, in 2016 Swiss Muslims were shown a film made by one of the leaders of the Islamic Council of

Switzerland Naim Cherni about his trip to Syria without any special mentioning that he did not support the activity of terrorist groups. As a result an action was started against the heads of the Council for their alleged propaganda of the jihadist movement. Or another example: One of the imams distributed a Salaphite pamphlet of Saudi origin among the Muslim inmates of the Zurich prisoners praising the Sharia law and corporal punishment. The prison administration confiscated the pamphlets and destroyed them.

Nevertheless, loyal Swiss Muslims are trying to create a comfortable situation for themselves to live in the country in accordance with their religious and ideological values. Here is an example:

In 2013–2014 Muslims in Folketsville commune (Zurich canton) and the “Al-Huda” association decided to set up an Islamic kindergarten. Presenting their idea and submitting concrete plans the teachers promised to train the children for entering the local schools in accordance with the curricula worked out and endorsed by the Ministry of Education of Switzerland, but organize additional lessons of Arabic and Islamic theology. The children had to be reared in Islamic traditions. However, the cantonal authorities of Zurich not only banned the opening of such kindergarten, but also deprived the “Al-Huda” Association of its license. It became known that the Swiss citizen Melanie Muhakseri is an active member of the Islamic Council. The canton authorities did not like the idea that the curricula for the children would be compiled by a representative of a fundamentalist organization.

In 2015 a campaign began in Switzerland against wearing Muslim women’s head-dress and garments. In 2016 one of Swiss cantons – Ticino (Italian part of the country) – adopted a law prohibiting wearing this dress. Similar law have already been in force in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Several well-off Muslims specially walked along the streets of one of Ticino cities – Locarno – to see whether the law was observed. The Swiss Muslim Nora Hilli, together with the Algerian millionaire Rashid Nekkaz

and his daughter were detained by a local police patrol and fined for wearing Muslim dress. Rashid Nekkaz born in a migrant family near Paris, graduated from Sorbonne University, went in trade of real estate, and amassed huge fortune. He had French citizenship and had paid fines several times in France. As a result Rashid Nekkaz renounced French citizenship and came out against the ban on wearing Muslim dress in Switzerland and other European countries. He proclaimed himself fighter for human rights everywhere, including Arab countries. We should note that in other cantons of Switzerland, especially in Montreux, where rich Muslims have settled on the shore of the Geneva Lake, one can always see Muslim women with covered face and body, even in 40-degree heat.

The Swiss authorities tried to spread the law banning purdah all over the country, but failed. The lower house of Swiss parliament adopted the law by 88 votes, with 87 against. The violators of the law are to be fined 9,200 euros. Control over its fulfillment was entrusted to the police. A special duty officer was appointed at the police department to supervise the observance of the law - "intercultural mediator," who is to teach employees of the law-enforcement agencies to deal with its violators. Meanwhile, the Federal Council has examined this proposal and turned it down, because it envisaged a uniform decision for all cantons, which contradicts the principle of federalism. The standards and rules regulating behavior are in the competence of the cantonal, but not the federal, authorities. In other words, the government will not make changes to the Constitution and grants the cantons the right to decide what to ban or what to allow. The cantons should decide themselves how to deal with women-tourists wearing purdah.

Views on this problem in various regions of Switzerland differ. The cantons of Zurich, Solothurn, Schwitz, Basel and Glarus come out against the ban. Opposite views are expressed by Ticino and St. Gallen.

But the biggest complications arise in connection with the attempt to introduce Islamic canons in the educational system of Switzerland. We should note that it is shown by interviews with Caucasian emigrants, the educational system of the country is aimed not so much at teaching school pupils as at creating a system of comprehensive integration of schoolchildren in Swiss society. Children of emigrants studying at Swiss schools become one hundred percent Swiss, following the Swiss way of life, right up to never crossing the street at red light. An adolescent of Georgian nationality on leaving his school building in Switzerland will never violate traffic rules.

In 2016 debates began in the country concerning Muslim schoolchildren's unwillingness to shake hands with their lady schoolteacher (traditional handshake is common at Swiss schools). One of the leaders of the Islamic Council Nicolas Blanshot maintains that handshake is not one of the values mentioned in the Constitution of Switzerland, and this gesture contradicts the religious beliefs of the Muslims of the entire world (a woman should not be touched by man if she is not a member of his family). First, at certain schools in Switzerland, for example, in the Basel rural canton the local authorities allowed school pupils to ignore this habit. The head of the educational department of Geneva Anne Emery Torracinta announced that pupils should abide by the rules set by the school authorities, otherwise they may face expulsion. The teachers' association of Basel was also against this instruction, regarding it "discriminatory with regard to woman" and at variance with Swiss traditions. The Chairman of the Committee of Heads of Educational Departments of Switzerland Kristoph Eimann said: "We should not allow deviations from the rules on religious grounds." As a result, the school administration annulled its permission not to shake hands, and even envisaged a fine reaching 5,000 francs.

Muslim school children refuse to attend swimming lessons. One such case has taken place at a school in a Basel commune, or another case was registered with the Muslim emigrant from Bosnia

Emir Tahirovich who did not allow his 14-year-old daughter to attend swimming lessons at school. Sometimes Muslim school pupils do not want to attend summer or winter sports camps, which the authorities regard as their unwillingness to integrate in Swiss society. Swimming lessons and sport camps are an inalienable part of the Swiss educational system. Simonetta Sommaruta emphasized that "handshakes are part of our culture and daily life."

The main argument against the introduction of a number of Islamic canons in the Swiss educational system was the contention that due to certain Swiss habits and methods used by the Swiss school migrant children go along the path of integration in Swiss society. This is quite important for the country. This is why if school children refuse to fulfill the major requirements of the Swiss school, this is the basis for refusal to grant Swiss citizenship. This rule concerns not only Muslims, but all migrants. Their representatives told us that when they submitted documents for citizenship, they were asked to present documents testifying to their participation in various Swiss societies, for example the "Red Cross." The Swiss authorities, indeed, attach great importance to the wish and ability of the applicant to become a Swiss citizen and integrate in Swiss society. And the educational system of Switzerland is one of the key instruments of the émigré's adaptation to Swiss life, culture daily behavior, etc.

In 2017 the European Court on Human Rights turned down the complaint of two citizens of Switzerland of Turkish origin who banned their daughters to attend mixed swimming lessons. The Swiss authorities did not violate the religious rights of these Muslim schoolgirls having ordered them to attend these lessons together with boys. The European Court on Human Rights turned down the complaint against the Swiss authorities, who demanded the fulfillment of the curriculum for the successful integration of Muslim girls in Swiss society. The Court decision noted that the Swiss authorities acted within the framework of the law aimed at protecting students of foreign origin from public isolation.

The Federation of Islamic Organizations of Switzerland (FOIS) has told Swiss Muslims that handshakes of man and woman “is theologically allowed.” The FOIS head Ben Mrad said: “I recommend school pupils to shake hands with their lady teachers, thus demonstrating their respect for them. But one should also display tolerance toward people who think different. A talk to pupils and their parents will help find out their motivation and explain the importance of this greeting in Swiss culture.” Muslim leaders say: “impermissibility of handshaking with woman may be justified by Hadis standards, but it is not mentioned in the Koran.” True, the head of the Central Islamic Council of Switzerland (CCIS) Nicolas Blanshot said that “handshaking is one of the values mentioned in the Constitution of Switzerland.”

The Swiss Muslims are striving to take active positions in the country. In March 2014, for the first time in the country’s history a Muslim was elected head of the Swiss Council on Religion. A medical doctor by education Hisham Maizar was born in Jerusalem studied in Heidelberg (Germany) and lives and works in Switzerland. He is in charge of organizing a peaceful dialogue among the representatives of all confessions.

Conclusion

As we see it, Switzerland has become the first country in Europe, which renounced the idea of cultural tolerance so widespread on the continent in postwar years and up to these days. Switzerland actually combined such concepts as civil, Swill and cantonal identity. In essence, all aspects of the Swiss way of life include elements of these three identities. Even handshaking can become, under certain conditions, an element of Swiss identity. The values of Swiss identity are more important for the people of Switzerland than the observance of the rights of religious minorities in the country.

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2019.01.011. RAISA SHARIPOVA. BRITISH SCIENTISTS OF MUSLIM ORIGIN ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF MIGRANTS' ADAPTATION IN GREAT BRITAIN // *"Studies of Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS. № 4. Economic, social and political, communal problems of Afro-Asian countries,"* Moscow, 2017, P. 303–315.

Keywords: migrants, hegira (migration), wasatiyyah, loyalty, identity, integration, intercultural dialogue, islamophobia.

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Muslim communities in Great Britain want to keep commitment to their traditions, but host society ignores their interests.

In Great Britain, the author notes, now there are about two million Muslim immigrants. Outman they win first place among immigrants of the country. Difficulties which they have to face are the same that immigrants from other countries experience. They are unemployment, poverty, poor housing conditions, under education, life in constant fear and anxiety substantially connected with strengthening of anti-Islamic and racist sentiments. Muslim historians, political scientists, sociologists, culture specialists, theologists actively research these problems – lecturers of universities. Among them: Mahomed Anwar is a professor of the Center of ethnic relations researches, the lecturer at Uorvik and Lester's universities, Imtiaz Ahmad Hussein is the graduate of Institute of Islamic studies, Bobbie Said is a lecturer at the university of Salford City, Malikha Malik is a teacher at School of the right and in Royal college of London, etc. In their works they adhere to two positions – the traditionalist, relying on historical experience of early era of Islam and on attitudes of the Koran and Sunnah, and modernist, considering political, social and economic and cultural realities of today. Modernists consider that intellectual

acquiring of tradition is possible only with its inclusion in a political context.

Raisa Sharipova notes that the variety of immigrant problems considered by Muslim analysts, is much wider, than in works of non-Muslim scientists, and in content they considerably differ from them. In their articles much attention is paid to examination of psychological aspects of life of migrants. Today, when bloodshed in the Middle East (BSV) doesn't stop, when terrorist attacks in different places happen, in particular in London (2005, 2017) people live in fear, and the fear felt by immigrants who came to a strange land, living in the atmosphere of communal isolation, oppression, humiliation, discrimination, experiencing difficulties with education, with employment in the society where containment of "strangers" acts beyond. Besides, each terrorist attack wherever it was made, is followed by accusations of Islam and Muslims in cruelty, hatred to nonconformists, tendencies to extremism and terrorism. At the same time Islamophobia and racism strengthen, attacks on mosques, residential areas of migrants become more frequent.

The British migrants are sensitive to everything that occurs in their native countries. How to resist to a wave of abyss of despair characterizing life of migrants how to get rid of depression and to find serenity, analysts Tim Vinter and Malik Badri write. They address the Koran, common for all Muslims, uniting them on the spirit giving them feeling of specific sort of strength, security. In ayahs of the Koran there are mechanisms promoting the solution of many problems, including psychological ones. Among them "at-takaffur" ("reflection"), being one of the most soaring forms of worship. Reflection promotes deep perception of an essence of ayahs telling about creation of the Universe, heaven, the earth, fine creatures of different forms and colors, mind-bending and exercising when reading, strong emotional and psychological and calming effect. Another tool promoting getting rid of stress and anxiety is the principle of "as-sakina" which means tranquility, peace, firmness, confidence, consent, conviction. In the

ayahs containing this concept there is an appeal to stand prosecutions fearlessly. It concerns those who are subjected to persecution for religion in others countries and also those who suffer persecutions and travails at home. The concept "as-sakina" reminds believers that victory is reached by courage, devotion, belief and patience. One more salvation from depression is the principle of "al-vasatyya," in translation "moderation," i.e. observance of the golden mean in questions of private and social life. It also warns against extremes under any circumstances, helps not to fall into despair in a trouble and not to feel euphoria in case of a bright spot. "Al-vasatyya" constrains from radical actions.

Another way of freedom from psychological crisis for migrants, according to Muslim researchers, there can be an appeal to early history of Islam, learning of lessons from the prophet Mohammed life and his associates. For example, to the migration which is not a new phenomenon in Islam history. At the beginning of the prophetic mission of Mohammed Muslims because of cruel prosecutions from Arabian polytheists were forced to make two resettlements (Hijra – in Arabic). The first one was to Christian Abyssinia. Leaving immigrants, the prophet warned that there they would find the tsar under the reign of whom nobody experiences injustice. Indeed, its tsar Negus gave the chance to new – fangled Muslims to practice their religion freely and openly. The Christian community rendered them all help, both moral, and financial. Between communities there was reached mutual understanding though that and others faced new customs, traditions and culture. Muslims, remembering Mohammed's homilies, behaved adequately, amicably, adopting some habits not contradicting Islam. But the major role in this relationship was played by freedom of faith. Muslims as a token of gratitude showed loyalty and respect for the magistrate. Negus, wishing to better understanding an essence of the Islamic doctrine and to learn more about Mahomed, sent a delegation to Mecca consisting of monks and priests, to hear Mohammed's sermon and reading of

the Koran, some of them converted to Islam, and Negus also became a Muslim later.

The second resettlement happened in 622 (from this year Muslim chronology, the first year of Hijra began) to Medina. The prophet and his associates were forced to leave Mecca because of prosecutions and persecutions on the part of their own brothers and sisters, representatives of native clans. The resettlement was objective necessity for the believers who didn't have an opportunity to practice their religion. Having settled in Medina, the Prophet didn't require of anybody to convert to Islam and formulated his positive attitude to the new society: to interact on the basis of equality. He concluded agreement for mutual aid between Muslims and Jews inhabiting the oasis. At the heart of terms of the contract Recognition of a confessional variety became the main core of the agreement – without requests of converting to another religion. The principles of equality and equal dignity applicable to all signed the contract, whether it be a Jew or a Muslim, an inhabitant of Medina or an immigrant were established. The prophet Mohammed showed great regard for the personality and religion.

The Muslim immigrants who appeared in Britain, as well as their ancestries, who also came to a strange land, faced new customs, new type of social relations, absolutely new role of women who are much more socially active. All this is unusual for Muslims. Remembering lessons of the past, they should from the very first learn to distinguish according to researchers what belongs to the principles of Islam, and what to the culture of society where they are. Immigrants should study new culture, both on compliance with the principles of Islam, and on discovering for themselves other culture and enrichment by it. Hijra stimulates open-minded attitude towards all new, to customs, life another way of thinking. Hijra teaches tolerant attitude to the power, acceptance of a variety of cultures and another way of life that has great importance for migrants, in general, taken away from their

roots and who are in new conditions for the British Muslim immigrants, in particular.

The British authorities accuse immigrants of the lack of loyalty to the country of domicile when they condemn aggressive military operations of the West on Near and Middle East and refuse to accept the western values contradicting norms of Islam. Immigrants in response to accusations say that they as faithful Muslims first of all are loyal to God, and then – to the country of domicile, and all this stands together. And as for the western values, according to the principle of freedom of worship nobody, as analysts note, has the right to demand practicing of any values from anybody. The requirement of the state to observe laws, migrants, according to researchers, observe.

The western scientists claim that in Islam there are no mechanisms promoting integration of Muslims into another confessional and cultural space, considering that Asians can adapt to other environment, and Muslims can't. However, it is enough as Muslim authors note, to remind about resettlement of Muslims to Abyssinia and Medina in the times of the prophet Mohammed and their successful interaction with Christian and Judaic communities to be convinced of baselessness of such statements. The category of loyalty as researchers emphasize, is quite limited for Islam. The words "al-vasat" ("middle") and "as-sakina" ("tranquility") mean loyalty in the Islamic discourse. According to Imtiaz Ahmad Hussein, accusations of Muslims of the lack of loyalty can be based on some facts from British history when the loyalty and identity in Britain were closely connected with the sovereign and state religion. The one who practiced the same religion, as the king was considered to be a traditionally loyal. He came down on the lieges to practice state religion and pursued nonconformists. For example, Henry VIII pursued Catholics, bearded the Roman Church.

Zakhid Parvez considers that, the fact of their expulsion from public life of Britain can affect loyalty of Muslim migrants. They always speak simply about the loyalty to the country of domicile so there is no doubt left. Paying attention to the isolated,

insulated life of migrants, Zakhid Parvez notes that the historical examples connected with the Muslims living as minority community don't speak about existence of peculiar ghettos. He explains that it is a recent phenomenon, perhaps, arisen as a way of maintaining cultural identity and spiritual values. Traditionally, he emphasizes, representatives of Muslim community took active part in rivalry for the crown and the country, many of them died in the years of World War II, being soldiers of armed forces of Britain, but, unfortunately, they aren't remembered.

At the present time, Parvez writes, less Muslims are admitted into the British armed forces, it is possible because there are memories about the colonial past, or it is the fact confirming racism discourse in the armed forces. The institutionalized racism, according to Zakhid Parvez, makes social integration very problematic in modern societies where the idea of communality is blurred. Besides, racism creates insuperable obstacles for communication of people and their mutual understanding. In this regard, Parvez considers, the British Muslim immigrants should draw an important lesson from Abyssinian model where there were no religious persecutions, and consent, mutual understanding, interaction, good will between the Christian and Muslim communities took place and to show, in such a way, that Hijra is quite a natural process. It would give them confidence and would promote cooperation with representatives of other religious communities and more active participation in British society life. According to Imtiaz, rapprochement of Muslims and Christians is promoted by resemblance and reconcilability of Islamic and Christian values.

Necessity of mutual understanding and dialogue among people belonging to different religions, cultures and ideologies is great today, more than ever. It becomes a prerequisite to survival and support of all world community. "Peace attend you" is told by Muslims, exchanging salutations. "And to you" sounds in reply. This greeting, according to professor Zakhid Khurshid, is a plea for peace in family and society. Really, he claims, peace-making is the

main purpose of all relationship in Islam. Pursuance of peace on the earth is the main basis of all world religions. Zakhid Khurshid calls for dialogue and considers that it is necessary to begin it with Muslims living in the West. But it is hard as the British are halfway to identity crisis, and it occurs not only in the United Kingdom, and around the world. At the same time Khurshid warns against the danger which is that many people cling to religion as a sort of armour protecting them from problems of public life, becoming at the same time unconditional fanatics in the face of the world becoming harder. But, as professor considers, it is simple to use religion to find identity, means to refuse other components of identity. Khurshid explains that Islam calls for activity in public life, in social and political spheres. At the same time, as the scientist notes, interaction with the public has to have good-minded and peaceful character. He reminds that Islam opposes monkhood, emphasizing an important role of family, community, integration, cooperation and mutual respect.

Zakhid Parvez notes a big role and considerable potential of mosques of the British community. He claims that mosque can be the center where studies, meetings are held where a lonely can get support, help in acquiring citizenship and in surviving in this unequal society. The consolidating role of mosque, according to Muslim analysts, increases more and more in view of growing foothold of the market led by world consumer and financial corporations that leads to devaluation of religious values. At the same time, according to scientists, it helps to become more resolute and resistant in the face of such threats. With that, scientists say, life in the West in conditions Cufra (disbelief), constant prosecutions and restrictions helps immigrants to remain loyal to articles of belief, prescriptions of the Koran.

Muslim researchers consider that for Muslims, and first of all immigrants, it is necessary to establish a dialogue with representatives of other religions, in particular with Christians, to adopt their experience of successful participation in all spheres of life of the British society. For Muslims, scientists write, it is

necessary to take an active position in protection of faithful against conflicts based on racial and religious belief. Most of Muslim researchers believe that the solution of migrants' problems is possible only as a result of reform of all government agencies of Great Britain imbued by Islamophobia and racism.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

MAKHMUD RAVSHANOV. CONCEPT OF "ISLAM":
THE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE AND MIND // *The article
was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World," published
in abridged form.*

*Keywords: Islam, Quran, concept,
meaning, meaning, lexicography, logical
semantics.*

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The author explores the concept of "Islam" in the article from the point of view of philosophical, cognitive, logical semantics and applied lexicography as an object of theoretical linguistics. The meaning of knowledge and reason in the concept of "Islam" are studied by him in terms of linguistic parameters.

There is an endless stream of information in the world. It will take a long time to master all the knowledge and why it is necessary to live many lives. This we can not afford, the author writes. For example, if you aim to study a person or the structure of the world, then this knowledge goes far into infinity, and then comes to a dead end, reduced to God, for God is present in everything. It makes no sense to further study, for God is unknowable, inaccessible by anyone. God is the eternal absolute truth and the highest wisdom. God is the source of everything, and everything emanates from God, as well as the truth.

The truth is the beauty and polyphonic eternity and infinity. It is multifaceted, where each face reveals the essence and depth of the reality of the existence of an object or subject. The truth is that which really exists. That is real and is the truth, which is connected with Eternity, and everything that is not connected with it and is not really – is not the truth. The truth is imperishable, non-temporal, unchanging, indivisible, but everything that has a contradiction, duality, separation, change – is not the truth.

In the 19th century, the opinion spread among Europeans that the Islamic religion is the enemy of the progress of thought. Let us try to consider, on the basis of the Quran and historical facts, how reasonable such an opinion is.

In fact, the leaders of other religions once declared war against science. It is widely known as scientists-naturalists were subjected to brutal persecution by the church in the Middle Ages in Europe. Special courts of the Inquisition were created to convict scholarly thinkers, whose opinion contradicted official religious installations. They were either forced to repent and abandon their ideas forever, or they were executed. This went on for quite a long time and many prominent medieval scholars were subjected to torture and terrible death until Protestantism emerged. This branch of the Christian religion, being closer to real life and trying to strengthen its position, was forced to allow free-thinking.

Thus, it can be said that science prevailed over religion. However, scholars who suffered from dogmatically minded clergy began to “revenge” the church, making fun of the contents of religious books and successfully manipulating the latest discoveries in science. It should be noted, in fairness, that such scholars have managed to turn a lot of people away from the church. Some began to say that religion is ignorance. To get a better idea of this, it is enough to refer to some dictionaries published in the 19th century, in which religion is characterized very negatively.

However, Islam did not lose, but multiplied the number of its supporters over 14 centuries of existence. And not least because

it obliges Muslims to follow the path of progress, knowledge, and commitment to science, since without science it is impossible to ensure the development of the individual and society. Considerable attention is paid to knowledge, reason, which is put on a high place according to Quran.

Islam is not a religion of speculation. Science (knowledge) forbids if the unclear is called clear, the wrong assumption is called true. The correctness or incorrectness of a certain thought is determined by the strength of its evidence. If the evidence is strong, then the thought is correct, otherwise it is conjecture. Such a scientific justification corresponds to the Quran. The Quran calls to beware of speculation and assumptions, for they mislead people and destroy faith. A number of statements caution against following one assumption without reliance on facts.

Islam is against blind imitation, the author writes. Knowledge forbids imitating anything without deep and reliable study. In this aspect, modern science does not meet the science of the past. In the Middle Ages, people assessed certain things or events based on the opinions of famous personalities. For example, they believed that every thought of Aristotle was absolutely true and infallible. Both the Quran and science are against such fruitless inertia of thinking and consciousness.

Science is completely unanimous with the Quran in banning blind imitation. The Quran criticizes those who do not want to reflect on their actions. The author claims, quoting the Quran, that no one can become a believer until he believes, and no one knows Islam, until he ceases to blindly imitate others. The Quran encourages people to beware of blind imitation.

"Mind," the author writes, is a term by which is meant the ability, essential for man as such, to comprehend the universal, in contrast to the directly given single facts, which are exclusively occupied by the thinking of other animals. Specific characteristics of a person as a rational person (*Homo sapiens*) are associated with this property. Since antiquity, the mind has been the subject of reflection on philosophy.

The author writes that comprehension of the universal by the mind is intimately connected with human speech (language), which fixes an indefinite set of real and possible (past, present and future) phenomena similar or homogeneous to one sign. If a linguistic sign is considered inseparably in its integrity with what is expressed by it, then one can recognize that the real essence of rational thinking is expressed in words, from which rational analysis distinguishes its various forms, elements and laws.

Mind and Deity rule in ancient philosophy, after Aristotle (who defined Deity as self-thinking - τῆς νοήσεως νοήσις) and the Stoics (who taught about the world mind) recognized absolute value for rational thinking, the author writes. Skeptical reaction was resolved in Neo-Platonism, which placed mind and mental activity on the second plan and recognized the highest significance from the objective side – for a super-rational good or indifferent unity, and from the subject – for an understated delight (ἐχστασις). Such a point of view has received a more definite and moderate expression in the generally accepted medieval distinction (scholasticism) between mind as natural light (*lux naturae*) and supreme divine or fertile enlightenment (*illuminatio divina* s. *Lux gratiae*).

Knowledge means the rational accomplishment of an action, and the mind is able to comprehend everything that is tangible. The Quran encourages the use of the mind in all matters and sharply criticizes those who do not. The author points out that the Quran considers the mind great grace. In the Quran, the words relating to the mind occur 50 times, and the phrase owners of the mind – more than 10 times.

The author believes that science calls for faith and argues with those who think that an educated person and a scientist are necessarily unbelievers, and the more knowledge a person has, the stronger his rejection of religion. In fact, science itself never led its representatives to unbelief. A real scientist is becoming more and more convinced of the infinity of the world in the course of scientific research, and at the same time of the amazing

organization of the world order, where there is nothing accidental, chaotic, meaningless. Understanding this ultimately cannot but lead to faith in God, the author believes

The author cites a microbiologist, Louis Pasteur, who believed that his faith never slowed down progress, since all progress revealed those miracles that were laid in God's creation. If there was more knowledge in the present than on the previous day, then this meant that faith in the Lord was strengthened compared to the previous day.

The author concludes that, like many other semantic categories, Islam, spirituality, kindness include linguistic cultures of antonymic content: godlessness, lack of spirituality, etc. A large number of more specific subclasses are included in this semantic series, for example: religious folk holidays, customs, customs, names of clerics, etc. This defines the main feature of the Uzbek national identity, which closely interacts with other hierarchically subordinate nominations, and as it wraps around the most important classes of the linguistic culture with their specific content, including antonymic names and is neutralized by the realities of the antonymic nature, opposite to it.

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The Druzes are a peculiar ethno-confessional community living in a number of Middle Eastern countries. The history of this community began in Egypt under the Fatimides dynasty in 969.

For a long time the Ismailite outlook was widespread among the ruling upper crust of Egypt, whereas the absolute majority of the population adhered to Sunna Islam. During the rule of Calif al-Hakim bin-Amrillah in Egypt (996–1021) a number of Ismailite sheikhs began to preach radical views deifying al-Hakim. The start of the movement and doctrine of the Druzes is connected with the activity of the Calif al-Hakim himself and the former Ismailite preacher Hamza ibn Ali. The name “Druze” originates from the name Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ismail ad-Darazi, who at first joined the Druze movement, and later broke with it and proclaimed himself imam. Modern Druzes regard ad-Darazi an apostate, but his name remained in the title of the community. The Druzes call themselves “monotheists.”

The Druze emirate reached its heyday under Emir Fahr ad-Din II, when his power spread throughout Lebanon. The independent policy of the Druzes was not to the liking of the Ottoman Turks, and between 1609 and 1613 two expeditions were sent to Lebanon by Hafiz-Pashi and kapudan-pashi Mehmed-pashi Okyuz from Damascus. The people of the emirate rose against the Turks, however, the Druzes suffered defeat. In 1634, in another uprising the Druzes were defeated again. The emir Fahr ad-Din II was taken prisoner and executed in 1635. In the 19th century conflicts between the Druzes and Maronites exacerbated. After Ibrahim Pasha I (the adoptee and co-ruler of Muhammad Ali) captured Syria, he found an ally in the person of the Lebanese emir Bashir II Shehab. Meanwhile, the introduction of conscription caused resistance among the Druzes. To suppress their protests an Egyptian army was used. These events led to death and destruction, many houses of Druzes were destroyed and their sacred books burned. In 1840 European countries helped drive Egyptian forces from the region. And in 1843 Europeans persuaded the Turks to give over power in the North of Lebanon to the Maronites who were supported by France, and in the North – to the Druzes supported by Britain. Social contradictions led to an open confrontation between the Maronites and Druzes. In 1858

Maronite peasants rose against Maronite landowners and in 1860 they also – did against Druze landowners. In 1860 clashes between Druzes and Christians moved over to Syria and brought about a pogrom in Damascus, after which a French expeditionary corps was dispatched to the region with the help of Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain. The developments in Lebanon led to the adoption of a Special Statute in Mount Lebanon, which regimented administrative management in the region.

The author examines the specific features of the structure of the community and the main premises of its faith of the Druze community. It is divided into two basic classes of dedication degrees – the ignorant, a greater part who have not passed initiation and the understanding capable to provide spiritual guidance. The latter are subdivided into several categories depending on their level of dedication to the secret of the doctrine. The most honorable place is taken by the perfect. Each time when questions arise concerning the behavior of the community members, the view of the religious elite is held high. Other members of the community obey the decisions of the community.

The Druzes have evolved the basic premises of their doctrine and created sacred texts. The main manifestation of the universe was God, or the One, embodied in al-Hakim. His first manifestation was Universal Reason embodied in Hamza Ibn Ali, a contemporary of Ad-Darazi and one of the authors of the Druze teaching. The Druzes believe that the One and Only reveals Himself in consistent incarnations. In subsequent reincarnations the soul of a Druze may take shape only in the body of a Druze. Hence, a non-Druze will not be able to become a member of the Druze community. Usually Druzes keep their sacred book “Rasail al-Hikma” in the House of meetings and read it aloud on Thursdays. The Druzes also revere the New Testament and the Koran. Annual donations are regarded by the Druzes as a voluntary mutual assistance to the community members, and the fast as abstinence from revelation of secrets to profanes. The Druzes regard Hajj as an expression of the striving to know one

God. The modern Druzes are considered courageous warriors, there are many people with a higher education among them. The Druzes originate from Ismailites, but they severed confidential contacts with them in the Middle Ages, and went through more essential changes. In 1948 Lebanese parliament adopted the Code of Family Law compiled by Druzee sheikhs, which was also adopted in Syria in 1953 and in Israel in 1961. The Druzes reject polygamy and repeated marriage, but in the 20th century there were cases of the violation of this ban. The Druzes are regarded an ethnic-confessional community. During the formation of such communities ethnic origin was a secondary matter. The most important factor was ethno-confessional affiliation. The Druze community includes descendants of people from many countries. There are families originating from Turks or Kurds. They are united by adherence to religious ideology, which is more important than ethnic origin.

The text of "Messages of Wisdom" shows that their authors – the Leaders of the Druzes – were acquainted with Ancient Greek philosophy, Gnostic teaching and Sufizm. The Druzes believe that the one and only source of these teachings is Knowledge passed from generation to generation. These texts contain formulas revering Allah and Prophet Mohammed, despite the fact that for the "enlightened" Druzes Allah is only one of the names of al-Akl – Universal Reason and Mohammed, according to their teaching, is not "the seal of the Prophet." The first message names al-Hakim "the emir of the faithful, our Master and Allah's governor." And a letter message devoted to Christians opens with the sentence "I rely on pur Master -- God Hakim." Perhaps, it is connected with the fact that the community members have gradually learned the essence of faith. This text cites the Gospels from Matthew and John, and Christians are censured for failure to fulfill Commandments. Most messages are anonymous, but Druze theologians ascribe them to four authors: al-Hakim himself; Hamza ibn Ali, and also Hamza's followers – Ismail ibn Muhammad al-Tamimi and Baha ad-Din al al-Muktan. Ismail ibn

Muhammad al-Tamimi is one of the first preachers of the Druze teaching. At-Tamimi's messages are mainly devoted to explanation of the theses of Hamza ibn Ali about the hierarchy of the higher persons of the Druze community.

Baha ad-Din al-Muktana became the successor of Hamza ibn Ali on the post of the head of the Druze community after he resigned from all his duties in 1021. Baha ad-din announced proclaimed a stop to propaganda, which contributed to turning the Druzes into a closed religious-ethnic community. However, the practice of admittance of people to the community was preserved. The founder of the Jumblat family, the Kurd leader Ali Jumblat in the early 17th century seized vilayet Haleba and with the help of the Lebanese feudal lord Fahr ad-Din II started an uprising against the Ottoman authorities. The uprising was crushed, Ali Jumblat was executed, and his family fled to the Shuf Mountains, where it was accepted to the Druze community. The researcher notes that all messages were collected by the Druze sheikh Seyid Jamalladindin Abdallah al-Tanuhi.

For the first time Druze texts were examined by French scholars of the Orient, who published a collection of Druze religious texts in 1826. Notes about Druzes were left by the Russian Consul in Beirut K.M. Basili in 1830–1840. The first volume of the series "Cultural Monuments of the Orient" ("St. Petersburg scientific series") came off the press in 1995. It included the facsimile of the first volume of manuscripts of "Messages of Wisdom," selected translations and articles by M. Rodionov and V. Polosin about Druzes and their texts. The very fact of the publication of texts in Russian shows that the modern Druzes have discarded their closed secrecy.

At present, most Druzes live in four Middle Eastern countries: Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan. A major role in turning the Druze community modern was played by the late Druze leader Kamal Jumblat and his son Walid Jumblat, their present leader. Quite often Druzes look for their new place of residence far from their present abode. For example, during the

19th – early 20th century communities of émigré-Druzes were set up virtually all over the world: in Australia, Canada, Europe, the Philippines, South and Central America, the United States and West Africa. The Druzes are doing everything possible to preserve their traditions and maintain contacts with coreligionists. In 1908 the American Druze Society (ADS) was set up. From 1946 onward the ADS has organized annual congresses of Druzes. They also came to Britain at the end of the 19th century and set up the British Druze Society. There is a Druze center in Brazil – the House of Brazilian Druzes and the Association “Druzes of Brazil.” A Druze community is also functioning in Argentina from the late 20th century.

In conclusion, the researcher notes that the Druzes form one of the most interesting cultural and scientific communities in the world. Despite a very complex history of this community, its members have succeeded to preserve their original customs and habits. And the extant sacred texts “Rasail al-Hikma” help study their faith and trace its philosophical sources.

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