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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2019.02.001. ANATOLIY RUDAKOV, SERGEI USTINKIN.
ABOUT PERSPECTIVES OF POLICY FOR FORMING AND
STRENGTHENING RUSSIAN IDENTITY // "Vlast," Moscow,
2018, № 6, P. 104–110.

*Keywords: politics of identity, global
political confrontation, humanitarian
technologies, socialization institutions,
integrity of cultural space, intergenerational
continuity.*

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The authors believe that the modern context of global political processes is associated with the factors of weakening the identity foundations of society. The loss of traditional national

cultural identity, the deformation of the Russian mentality and the erosion of basic cultural and moral values are a threat to national security and require the improvement of the theory and practice of implementing public policy. According to the researchers, the concept of the policy of formation and strengthening of the Russian identity can become the basis for the development of the promising direction of Russian state policy.

The authors note that the strategies and technologies of identity transformation used in the course of the modern global political confrontation are able to influence the defining characteristics of the processes in the media and cultural space of the state. Thanks to the potential for constructing or destroying certain types of identities, they can create the basis for fundamental transformations of the system of state and public institutions and state policy.

These technologies can be used to discredit traditional values in the public consciousness, to falsify history, to form destructive social and political stereotypes of behavior. These technologies destroy the integrity of the cultural space of Russia, make it impossible to achieve a national consensus, lay the foundation for social nihilism, sometimes embodied in various forms of radicalism, extremism and terrorism.

A broad interpretation of identity policy, based on the analysis of subjects and practices that form the identity of political communities, is established in modern political science. It is associated with the activities of the state and its institutions to maintain common values of belonging to the political community and common guidelines for its development.

The authors of the article believe that it is necessary to use such concepts as "formation" and "strengthening," speaking of state policy regarding the phenomenon of unifying national identity. Moreover, the term "formation" in relation to the concept of identity and used in relation to state policy does not mean the creation of some kind of artificial ideological product imposed on society.

In this case, the term "formation" means giving form to the actual existing content. This is a special activity of the state and

society at the level of expert environments, and the presentation of a system of value orientations to society. The term “formation” in relation to identity implies the conceptual view of the state on national values and priorities officially presented to the society. The term “strengthening” in relation to state policy and identity implies the institutionalization of concepts and strategies through various mechanisms for the implementation of state policies, as well as specific social practices. In addition, this term implies the protection of traditional values, worldview, historical memory in the context of countering destructive threats.

The authors conclude that state policy in the sphere of formation and strengthening of Russian identity should be defined as a special activity of the state and society aimed at achieving national consensus and solidarity in relation to national goals, priorities, as well as protection of historical consciousness, traditions and mechanisms of intergenerational continuity that form the basis Russian identity.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.02.002. IGOR KUZNETSOV. VALUE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERRELIGIOUS CONSENT OF ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS OF RUSSIA // “Vlast,” Moscow, 2018, № 6, P. 136–144.

Keywords: interreligious consent, traditionalist value meanings, secular-rational (modernist) value meanings, Orthodox and Muslims of Russia.

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In the article the author substantiates the approach to the study of the values of the Russian society, which allows finding out the common value foundations that ensure interreligious

consent of Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia. It is shown on a large number of empirical data that implements this approach that the coordinated perception of the current Russian realities is provided by representatives of different religions in Russia with the same traditional understanding of the basic guidelines of value. The author of the article understands interreligious consent as a coordinated perception and assessment by representatives of different religions of actual realities both within Russia and abroad.

The set of values in the concept of the researcher remains relatively constant in time, and the process of their replacement is reduced to a change in the content of the concepts denoting social values. These gradual changes in the content of a value can be placed between two poles – the traditionalist interpretation of value and the modernist (secular-rational) one. The presented approach was used in the study of the axiological foundations of the consolidation of Russians in the framework of the project 2014–2018 “Resource interethnic harmony in the consolidation of the Russian society: the General and the specific regional variety.”

The modern Russian society cannot be called existing on traditional values. For the most part, Russians are in the process of rethinking value priorities, although there is a relatively large proportion of those who systematically adhere to traditionalist interpretations of certain values.

Comparison of reactions to the standard life situations of representatives of “traditionalists” groups and those who are in the process of rethinking value meanings showed that the reactions of “traditionalists” are more consistent. Moreover, the consistency of views of “traditionalists” can be traced for respondents of different ages, and at the level of different regions, nationalities and faiths.

According to the study, Russians adhere to the “traditionalist” value guidelines in the vision of Russia's place in the world mainly, as well as in the unconditional priority of moral norms over rational considerations. Respondents choose the pole

of “modernism” when it comes to guidelines for economic activity and innovations related to changes in the principles of functioning of the Russian economy. According to the overwhelming majority of respondents, self-identification with the Russians is associated with loyalty (or at least with the manifestation of loyalty) to such values as recognition of a special, different from the European way of historical development of Russia, respect for the established traditions, the priority of moral norms over rational efficiency, the vision of Russia as a great power. These are the “braces” that today consolidate Russian society in its social, cultural and ethnic diversity, according to the research data.

The author considers the question: to what extent these values can contribute to the maintenance of interreligious consent, especially consent between the most numerous religious communities of Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia. The researcher believes that the interreligious consent of the Orthodox and Muslims of Russia can be based on common traditionalist interpretations of basic religious values.

The researcher comes to the conclusion that the coordinated perception of the current Russian realities by representatives of different religions is provided by the same understanding of value orientations in Russia. The traditionalist understanding of value orientations ensures a stable existence of the community – not only religious, but also Russian, in which representatives of the community live.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.02.003. NATALYA SKOROKHODOVA. RUSSIA AS OBJECT OF INFORMATION WAR OF THE WEST // *“West – East – Russia,” 2017. Yearbook, IMEMO RAS, Moscow, 2018, P. 45–49.*

Keywords: information war of the West, confrontation in information space, mass media, “foreign agent” status.

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The author of the article notes that new ways and means for information confrontation are constantly searched for and found. In the experts' view, in 2017 the information war was divided into two: war in cyberspace and war in the space of contents. The former includes hackers, cyber threats, violation of information communications, business in the sphere of digital economics, dealings with no smaller assets than those of arms or oil dealers, and international-legal battles around the Internet at a state level. The latter war is the one of contents plus the struggle for control over the channels of content distribution. And our country, as an independent and sovereign, state has to take part in that war. The main subjects of this war were the means of mass information and communications. Especially indicative in this respect are information attacks against Russia. Russia has to take part in that war as an independent and sovereign state

In 2017 the information onslaught of the West against Russia unfolded, mainly, under the slogan of “struggle against Russian interference in the political affairs of western countries.” The main counter-attacks fell to the lot of the Russian foreign broadcasting channel RT and the information agency “Sputnik”. They were accused of being the agents of the Russian political leadership, meddling with the world information field, and seriously influencing political developments in the West. For instance, these

Russian agents contributed to Britain's exit from the EU. In November 2017 the U.S. Department of Justice demanded, in the form of an ultimatum, that the RT should become registered in the U.S. as a foreign agent. If it does not, the heads of the American section of the RT and "Sputnik" could be arrested, and these companies' assets blocked. The Russian side answered in the same vein, namely, the State Duma (Russian parliament) adopted a law under which the mass media in Russia financed from abroad may be regarded "foreign agents" with the ensuing legal consequences.

The Ministry of Law of the Russian Federation has posted notifications to certain mass media companies in Russia financed from abroad, including the "VOA," "Radio Free Europe," "Radio Liberty," "Die Deutsche Welle," and some others that they can also receive the same status. As Maria Zakharova, an official representative of the Foreign Ministry of Russia has said, this law was a forced answer to reprisals adopted in the United States against the Russian mass media.

The struggle against the "pro-Kremlin" information aggression has been joined not only by the traditional mass media, but also the social networks, which began to turn into an instrument of the information war in 2017. The Director of the Facebook security service Alex Stamos said that the platform of this social network was used by Russia for "distributing false information with a view to interfering with fake news in the U.S. presidential elections." Another official representative of Facebook, Samid Chakrabarty, said that Russia used the social network platform for waging a cyberwar to split American society. The social network intends to raise the "transparency" of political information in Facebook. The company is going to hire over ten thousand employees to monitor the content of the social network and counter "fake" news. In order to oppose the "Russian information threat" in September 2017 the site "Euvsdisinfo" in three languages - English, German and Russian was opened sponsored by the East StratCom Task Force EDSCITF. Its aim is "to vacuum clean" the mass media in the EU area and beyond its

borders, register and collect “pro-Kremlin materials” and publish denials.

The chief method of the West in fighting the “Kremlin propaganda” is to brand analytical and information materials by Russian authors as one hundred percent fake, however, there is no reliable proof that it is so. Thus, the reader or listener should form his or her own opinion as to what is right and what is wrong. A situation is created in which it is difficult to be sure whether a certain thing is true or false. This is one of the main methods of western confrontation with Russia in the sphere of information, N. Skorokhodova writes.

In 2017 a new form of bringing pressure to bear on Russian Internet-publications was found. It is the “rating” of materials, or, to be more exact, the lowering of inquiry in the Internet. The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the “Alphabet” Holding, which includes Google, Erik Schmidt, said that a forced limitation in the issue of news in answering inquiries of users may lower the attendance of the RT and “Sputnik” in the Google News Facebook. The Russian-language Facebook unites people primarily by their social, business and political interests. “Rating” is already taking place on the basis of the “trust level to information.”

The new strategy of the American establishment is aimed at restricting the distribution of information about Russia in the world and the growth of its international prestige, the researcher concludes.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2019.02.004. RUSTAM GIBADULLIN, ROZA NURULLINA.
POST-SOVIET MUSLIM “ACTIVISTS” IN TATARSTAN:
INVESTIGATION AND TYPOLOGIZATION // “Islamovedenie,”
Mahachkala, 2018, Vol. 9, № 4, P. 22–37.

*Keywords: Muslim active core,
typology of imams, Spiritual Administration
of Muslims, Muslim community, religious
education.*

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The authors of the article examine a range of problems connected with the institution of imams in Tatarstan (typology, structure, social portrait, contradictions, development trends). The authors explain their close attention to this subject by the fact that the imams form an original Muslim “team of activists” which can be viewed as an indicator of mass sentiments and ideas in the local community.

The authors of the article believe that the development of Islam and the Muslim community in Russia is largely determined by the condition of the institution of the imams, representing the grassroots of religious figures. In their work the authors use the term "imam" in its micro-social connotation (leader of collective prayer and or Muslim community - initial meaning of the word in the Muslim world). The authority of imams is based on their informal status and election tradition. In the religious practice of Muslims in post-Soviet Russia the imam is an "attendant" at a mosque who is chosen by the leader of a local community as the most authoritative and knowledgeable person in the questions of faith and who can conduct a collective prayer and read a sermon. The imam is also the leader of the "primary" link in the structure of official spiritual boards.

At the same time the authors point to the fact that due to the Soviet "anti-religious" policy the Russian imams have largely lost their basic professional qualities and the deterioration of the Muslim medium to the level of simplified "popular" Islam contributed to their role of only conducting certain rites. But by virtue of their position they still represent a kind of the "active Muslim team" at a lower level, which, as previously, serves as an orientation point for rank-and-file Muslims, and this is why it may be regarded as an indicator of public sentiments ruling Islamic society.

The authors note the cultural and ideological heterogeneity of the "Muslim activists," which is due to the influence of different factors, as a result of which various forms of religious practice emerge, from "popular" to "fundamentalist." The heterogeneity of the body of the Russian imams can largely be explained by the contradictory conditions of the post-Soviet epoch, when it was being formed.⁰⁰ The main factor influencing this process in Tatarstan and the Volga area was the tumultuous growth of the number of mosques, communities and the absence of the necessary number of well-trained imams. The situation was worsened by the fact that the educational infrastructure necessary for tackling this

problem has only started to be formed in Russia, and the possibilities of the education of Russian Muslims in foreign centers were very limited.

The authors single out a quite essential factor, which influenced the formation process of the institutions of the imams, namely, the autonomy of Muslim communities based on the tradition of Islamic self-organization, which allowed them to elect their leaders independently, without agreeing this with official bodies and their approval. In practical terms it meant that the statute of imams could receive even persons without any religious education.

The internal heterogeneity inherent in the imam community can be seen and perceived differently. First, ideologically - in the imams' adherence to various trends in Islam. Secondly, there are differences in the level of religious education and skill, which may vary rather widely. This should be regarded as a factor, which is negative for the development of Islam and Muslim community in Russia.

In this work the authors examine the post-Soviet "Muslim activists" on the example of Tatarstan, one of the oldest regions of Islam in Russia. The authors analyze the results of a sociological survey (2011-2016) carried out by the Center of Islamic research of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan in cooperation with the Russian Islamic Institute (city of Kazan) and Kazan Federal University. Seven hundred respondent-imams in Tatarstan (about half of their overall number) have been polled, and they were offered an opportunity to choose themselves the questionnaire either in Russian or in Tatar; the latter comprised about 90 percent, which reflected the ethno-linguistic composition of the entire body of imams in the region. (Such is a social portrait of the post-Soviet body of "Muslim activists.")

Having analyzed the existing typologies of imams compiled by such researchers as R. Pateyev, R. Muhametshin and V. Yakupov, the authors of this work suggest a typology which more fully reflects a social portrait of "Muslim activists" and

makes it possible to take into account the multidimensional character of its characteristics. According to the typology, the body of present-day imams includes two generations (Soviet and post-Soviet) and their groups.

1. Generation of imams which took shape in the Soviet period. It consists of two groups;

a) Former imams who received religious education in the Soviet period (madrasah "Mir-Arab" in Bohara), who began their activity in mosques working at the time. They are distinguished by traditional authority among believers and great experience of work at official religious bodies in the post-Soviet period.

b) Former people's mullahs - numerous rural mullahs working in the Soviet conditions unofficially and legalized during the post-Soviet period. They have a weak religious preparation and represent "popular" Islam characterized by apartness from official religious and power bodies.

2. Generation of imams who began to work in post-Soviet time. It consists of three groups:

a) Imams-"specialists" - graduates from post-Soviet Russian Muslim educational institutions, which became certified specialists. They are distinguished by rather high quality of their religious preparation (Islamic universities and institutes, higher and middle madrasahs) and the form of study (daily and correspondence).

b) Imams from abroad - young imams who received religious education in foreign countries. They are characterized by a comparatively high level of theoretical (theological and legal) preparation and often by fundamentalist orientation. The latter feature makes them an object of criticism by part of the official Muslim bodies of the Volga Region, which adhere to the traditional Hanafite mazhab. Although this group of imams is often regarded as bearers of alien religious traditions and agents of foreign influence, it is they who are respected for intellectual supremacy and ideological rivalry, which is seen during various informal open discussions.

c) Imams-“neophytes” who became practicing Muslims on the wave of the post-Soviet Islamic rebirth and were put forward to the post of imams as active members of Muslim communities. They represent various social groups and are characterized by activity in their religious quests and self-education. They are liable to influence by different ideological trends in Islam, including those upholding the idea of an autonomous Muslim community.

The authors emphasize the three mass groups of imams: the former “people’s mullahs” (1b), “specialists” (2a) and “neophytes” (2b). The group of former “peoples mullahs” is characterized by a greater number of Tatars (95 percent), Tatar-language speaking men (91 percent), rural dweller (90 percent), former workers (86.5 percent), elderly persons (76 percent), those from former “people’s mullahs” who do not know Arabic. Former “people’s mullahs” retain their adherence to “popular” Islam with its communal character, which has always been expressed in the striving of imams to distance themselves from official structures and get rid of their keeping and control. Many administrative initiatives of spiritual boards to strengthen their control functions cause displeasure of a considerable part of former “people’s mullahs.” A group of imams-“specialists” consists of Tatars (96.3 percent), Tatar-language speaking men (88 percent), rural dwellers (84.8 percent). In contrast to the previous group of imams, this group included men of a higher social status and intellectuals (26.1 percent). This group is distinguished by a higher educational level, both secular and religious. But 78 percent of people of this group do not speak Arabic and feel the need to raise their educational level. In contrast from former “people’s mullahs,” imams-“specialists” do not have experience of religious work. They connect their mission in their community with religious education (31.6 percent) than with rites and rituals (24.7 percent). Imams-“specialists” are the most trustful and loyal towards official spiritual and government bodies. The group of imams-“neophytes,” just as the preceding groups, is characterized by the preponderance (95.6 percent) of the Tatar-language persons

(95.8 percent), rural dwellers (88.5 percent). Their confessional specialization is typical which is explained by family succession. Imams-“neophytes,” by their major characteristics, take intermediate position between former “people’s mullahs” and imams-“specialists.” Imams-“neophytes” face the greatest difficulties in their professional activity due to a short term of work and inadequate qualification level. As to the imams-“neophytes,” their adherence to the influence of various trends in Islam can be explained by the activity of the leaders of communities who came to the fore due to their religious activity in the conditions of the pluralism of post-Soviet Islam. The ideological heterogeneity of this group can be explained, among other things, by the absence of ideological “tempering” usually acquired in madrasah, and also their self-realization in religion.

In conclusion, the authors of the article make the following forecasts. The former “people’s mullahs,” as a phenomenon borne of Soviet time are not reproduced in the post-Soviet conditions and gradually disappear from the scene of Russian Islam, however, they retain their influence on a definite part of Muslim public. The share and social role of imams-“specialists” are growing, and the interest of the official and religious authorities may result in the monopolization of the leading functions by imams-“specialists” in Muslim communities. Imams-“neophytes,” by their socio-cultural, professional and ideological characteristics hold the middle position between the former “people’s mullahs” and imams-“specialists.” Due to their “middle” characteristics the group of imams-“neophytes” acquires the key significance in the examination of the processes and tendencies determining the changes inside the entire post-Soviet body of imams.

A comparative analysis of the characteristics of imams-“neophytes” and imams-“specialists” enables the authors to make an important conclusion, namely, that the contradictions between official bodies relying on the conformists and the opposition existing in Soviet time who upheld “people’s” Islam and democratism and the autonomy of Muslim communities do not

disappear in the post-Soviet period, but are restored by the new generation of imams. Thus, conformist and unitarist rules are more inherent in imams-“specialists,” and the spirit of opposition and ideological pluralism is inherent in imams-“neophytes.” The essence of this opposition, which has latent forms as previously, is the same, that is, the unwillingness to recognize unquestionably the authority of the Spiritual Board in religious-legal questions and its administrative prerogatives as the controlling body.

At the same time the results of the examination make it possible to suppose that the real public role and authority of the imams-“neophytes” will depend on the specific conditions in which a greater part of the Muslim activists was formed during the perestroika and post-perestroika periods. So far the socialization of Russian imams is greatly determined by the formation model of imams-“specialists.”

Author of the abstract - Elena Dmitrieva

2019.02.005. KSENIYA GRIGOREVA. THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS IN BASHKORTOSTAN? AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF S. HUNTINGTON'S THESIS // “Vlast,” Moscow, 2018, Vol. 26, № 7, P. 190–197.

Keywords: S. Huntington, Clash of civilizations, bashkortostan, orthodox, muslims, political orientations, values, religious radicalism.

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S. Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations is verified by the materials of an empirical research conducted in the Republic of Bashkortostan. The author refuted the thesis about the incompatibility of the values of Muslim and Orthodox Slavic

civilizations, based on the results of the study. The thesis on the rallying of civilizations is verified by data on the attitude of the local population to visitors of different civilizational affiliation.

In his famous theory of the clash of civilizations, S. Huntington put forward the statement that the boundaries separating humanity and the prevailing sources of conflict will be determined by culture in the near future, and not by ideology and economy [Huntington 1994: 33]. Moreover, it is religion that will play a key role in the confrontation of cultures. According to S. Huntington, it is religion that divides people more than anything else.

Religious differences, according to S. Huntington, entail disagreements on a wide range of political issues, including interaction of citizens and the state, the importance of political freedoms, human rights. Following the theory of the clash of civilizations, the conflict occurs on two levels. It takes place between countries belonging to different civilizations at the macro level (Western, Islamic, Confucian, etc.), while the micro level is represented by a clash of groups living within the borders of one national state.

The theory of S. Huntington was repeatedly criticized, it was tried to be tested empirically. As a rule, these studies were aimed at confirming or refuting the thesis about the prevalence of armed conflicts between countries belonging to different civilizations. The obtained results showed its fallacy in the absolute majority of cases.

Despite repeated empirical refutation of the theory of the clash of civilizations, it has not lost its popularity yet. The argument cited quite often for verifying the theses of S. Huntington based on the analysis of data for the 1990s (this period accounts for most of these empirical studies) is not sufficiently correct. One of the main ideas of the political scientist was that inter-civilization conflicts would dominate in the future, some time after the end of the Cold War, which meant that the studies conducted immediately after its completion would not be

able to detect the predicted changes. The author believes that nowadays, after 25 years after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, such arguments no longer work: S. Huntington's predictions, if they are correct, must be reflected in reality.

The author of the article attempts to test the theory of the clash of civilizations on the materials of empirical study conducted in the Republic of Bashkortostan in 2017. Bashkortostan, a region with a complex ethno-confessional composition, fully meets the description of the territory along which the intercivilizational fault passes. Here Turkic and Slavic peoples adjoin, between which historically the struggle was waged, as S. Huntington emphasizes. Using the categorization proposed by S. Huntington, the author classifies the Tatars and Bashkirs, professing Islam, to Islamic civilization, and the Russians, professing Orthodoxy, to Orthodox Slavic.

The initial hypothesis of K. Grigorieva was the assumption that representatives of these civilizations have different views on the relationship between the individual and the state, the state and religious institutions; they are committed to the values of freedom, equality, and the rule of law in varying degrees. In addition, the researcher verifies the statement of S. Huntington that support for religious radicalism is spreading, especially among young people, people with a high level of education and representatives of the middle class. Finally, the author verifies the thesis about the "consolidation of civilizations" (the syndrome of "fraternal groups"), using data on the attitude of the local population towards visitors belonging to different civilizations.

The empirical base of the study is based on the materials of a mass survey conducted in Bashkortostan in July 2017 on a quota area sampling representing the population of the republic. The sample included 14 cities and 15 rural areas representing 6 geo-economic zones of the Republic: Central, Western, southern, North-Western, North-Eastern and Ural. Quotas were set for gender, age, education and nationality (Bashkirs, Tatars, Russians). A total of 1035 respondents were interviewed.

The results of the study refute the hypothesis of fundamental differences in the political orientations of representatives of Islamic and Orthodox Slavic civilization. On the contrary, the latter show complete solidarity on issues of common goals that could unite Russian society, and whether a citizen should rely on his own strength or wait for help from the state, and whether the ROC and the DUM should influence political decision-making.

Representatives of both groups believe that ensuring law and order in the country, the welfare of the people and justice in society are key goals that can unite Russian society. This shows that the values of the rule of law, equality and justice are shared not only by representatives of Western civilization, but also by representatives of Islamic and Orthodox-Slavic civilizations and are not a source of contradictions, despite S. Huntington's assertion.

The respondents of both groups demonstrate unanimity on the issue of the relationship between the citizen and the state as well. The overwhelming majority of respondents believe that the state should take care of the welfare of its citizens.

The issue of the admissibility of the influence of religious institutions (ROC and DUM) on government decision-making is not a subject of disagreement between representatives of Islamic and Orthodox Slavic civilization, too. Approximately equal proportions of respondents from both groups believe that religious institutions should (not) influence policy decisions. Moreover, the results show that neither the Orthodox nor the Muslims are inclined to show favoritism in relation to "their" religious organizations.

As for value orientations, representatives of the two civilizations also demonstrate not differences, but similarities. The respondents from both groups consider the most important to have a good family; to live well, in prosperity; to have an interesting job. The author emphasizes that it would be a considerable exaggeration to speak about the support of religious

radicalism both by representatives of Islamic and representatives of Orthodox Slavic civilization.

Only 3.3% of Muslims and 6.7% of Orthodox are positively assess the activities of those who are ready to defend the purity of the religious faith with arms in their hands. Moreover, contrary to the statement of S. Huntington, the share of young people who hold this position does not exceed the same share in older age groups. The level of education also does not have a significant impact on the attitude towards the activities of religious radicals. The statement that they are supported by highly educated people does not find empirical evidence. The financial position of the respondents also does not affect the support of religious radicalism. Representatives of the middle class approve of those who are ready to defend the purity of faith with weapons, not more often than representatives of the lower and upper classes (5.1% against 4.7% and 5.7% respectively).

The author also notes that the data obtained did not confirm the thesis of “consolidation of civilizations,” according to which residents of other countries and regions are perceived as “their” if they belong to the same civilization. The study showed that residents of Bashkortostan (both Muslims and Orthodox) have approximately the same attitude to all visitors, regardless of their “civilizational” affiliation. About half of all respondents (both Muslims and Orthodox) support restrictive measures against visitors. It should be noted that the level of support for these measures remains at the same level or even slightly increases, if we are talking about “civilizationally close” visitors.

In conclusion, K. Grigorieva argues that the study conducted in the Republic of Bashkortostan in 2017, once again did not provide empirical confirmation of S. Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations. The obtained data refuted the thesis about the incompatibility of political and value orientations of representatives of Islamic and Orthodox-Slavic civilizations. The statement about the spread of support for religious radicalism, especially among young people, people with a high level of

education, and representatives of the middle class, was not confirmed either. There was no confirmation of the provision of "Rallying civilizations." The results of the study demonstrated the complete absence of favoritism from both Muslims and Orthodox Christians in relation to "civilizationally clos" visitors from other regions of the Russian Federation.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.02.006. TATYANA SENYUSHKINA. ISLAMIC FACTOR IN THE CONFESSIONAL SPACE OF THE CRIMEA // *Nacionalnaya bezopasnost i strategicheskoe planirovanie. 4 Mezhdunarodnaya nauchaya konferenciya "Tavricheskaya perspektiva". 25 let MPA SNG aktualnye problemy i perspektivy evrazijskoj integracii. St.Petersburg, 2017, P. 175-182.*

Keywords: Islam, Crimea, reunification of the Crimea with Russia, nontraditional Islamic trends, fight against religious extremism.

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The article examines processes going on in the Muslim community of the Crimea, beginning from the historic stage connected with the emergence of Islam in the region. Special attention is devoted to Islam in the Crimea in the period between 1991 and 2014, when the Crimea was reunited with Russia on the basis of a referendum. The new model of relations between the state and Islamic religious organizations is analyzed, which took shape in the Crimea in 2014–2016 in the conditions of the integration of the Crimean Muslim community in the Russian socio-cultural and legal area.

Historically, the Crimea is characterized by a polyethnic and poly-confessional composition of its population; but at different time the peninsula was dominated by definite faiths which were preserved to this day in the form of rather small ethnic groups. Christianity and Islam were an exception – they are the dominant traditional religions on the Crimean Peninsula.

Crimean Islam is a moderate Sunna trend of the Khanafite mazkhab, which began its history in the region from the 13th century along with the Mongolian conquest of the Crimea and its inclusion into the Golden Horde. The first mosque in the Crimea appeared in 1219. In 1443 the Crimean Khanate was formed, which became part of the Ottoman Empire. Since then Islam became state religion in the Crimea. In 1783, according to a manifesto of Catherine the Great, the Crimea was incorporated in the Russian state. By the end of the 18th century, there were about 1,600 mosques, two madrasahs and a network of Muslim schools in the Crimea.

The next stage of Crimean history is connected with the Russian revolution of 1917 and the formation of the U.S.S.R. The Crimean Autonomous Socialist Republic was formed in the peninsula, which was part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) up to 1954, and then it was transferred to Ukraine. Religious life in the Crimea during that period was similar to that in other republics and regions of the Soviet Union. The destruction of religious buildings, including Muslim mosques, was a common phenomenon in the country, just as reprisals against the clergy. The system of religious education was also destroyed, including Muslim education. Religion was ousted from the public discourse, however, among the Muslims, it was preserved at an everyday level and was passed on from generation to generation through family values and traditions.

In order to better understand the confessional processes in the Crimea it is necessary to become acquainted with certain facts connected with the deportation of Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Germans and Crimean Tatars from the Crimea during World War II. The Crimean Tatars were deported from the Crimea on May 18, 1944,

having been accused of collaboration with the German Nazi troops during the occupation of the peninsula. They were sent to Central Asia, and their return home began in the latter half of the 1980s. The integration of Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Germans in the local community bore a peaceful character. At the same time, along with the return of Crimean Tatars to the peninsula, conflicts began to flare up, including in the sphere of religion. Assessing the development of the conflict situation in the Crimea, the author notes that the most acute confrontation in the past was not connected with the religious factor. Among the reasons for mass protest actions of Crimean Tatars, whose peak was reached in the 1990s, was the problem of the absence of citizenship and access to land resources. Along with this, a number of conflicts were due to the religious component, for the most Crimean Tatars are distinguished with coincidence of the ethnic and religious identities, which was often influenced by ethnic and political leaders with a view to fanning inter-ethnic and inter-confessional discord in the region. As a result, the conflict potential was presented by ethnic leaders as an argument and used as a resource in their own conflict with the state authorities, which was of a permanent character right up to 2014. On the basis of the referendum carried out in March 2014 and according to the will of the majority of the Crimean population, the peninsula entered Russia as an independent subject of the federation.

Confessional processes in the Crimea, which acquired a new vector in 2014–2016 have special features in connection with religious distinctions within the Crimean community. This is due to the presence and coexistence of the three dominating ethnic groups: Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. According to the 2014 population census, representatives of 175 nationalities live in the Crimea. The most numerous are Russians (68.3 percent), Ukrainians (15.8 percent) and Crimean Tatars (10.6 percent). Russians form not only the ethnic, but also religious majority. Both Russians and Ukrainians are Orthodox Christians, Crimean Tatars are Muslims.

Beginning from the spring of 2014, in the conditions of Crimean integration in the Russian political and legal space, changes have occurred in the religious sphere. The organization Khizb ut-Tahrir has ceased its activity on the peninsula, inasmuch as it is banned in Russia. From March 2014 onwards, a new system of relations between the state and the Islamic religious communities has been formed. All Islamic religious organizations have joined the Tauric muftiyat, part of the official Board of Muslim religion, which made it possible to overcome an internal conflict in the Crimean ummah. Special courses for preparing imams have been opened. After the Crimea has joined Russia, the financial donations from abroad for the construction of mosques have been stopped. Great financial assistance to the Islamic religious organizations in the Crimea is given by Muslim regions of Russia, for example, Tatarstan and Chechnya.

The researcher concludes that all conditions have been created for the Muslims living in the Crimea necessary for satisfying their religious requirements - mosques and religious schools are functioning, and the Muslim clergy are trained.

The Crimean ummah is integrated in the Islamic community of Russia, interregional cooperation is developing with Tatarstan and Chechnya.

A new system of relations between the state and Islamic religious organizations has been formed, creating better conditions for the activity of religious communities, and at the same time preventing the spreading of religious extremism.

Along with this, there is the need to overcome stereotypes circulating in the European public opinion about the violation of the rights of the Crimean Tatars. These stereotypes are invented by foreign political forces in order to worsen the ethno-confessional situation in the Crimea. In actual fact, this situation is characterized by the lowering of the ethno-conflict potential. The situation on the peninsula now is calmer and more predictable than in previous years.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.02.007. SVETLANA APAZHEVA, ALIM MAMSIROV, TAMERLAN TSOLOEV. NORTH CAUCASUS: MODERN ETHNOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND PROSPECTS OF ITS STABILIZATION // *"Istoriya: fakty i simvoly,"* 2017, № 4 (13), P. 101–111.

Keywords: North Caucasus, interethnic relations, ethno-cultural identity, religious extremism, national policy, ethno-territorial contradictions.

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Currently, Russia faces the need to rethink its own historical and international experience in building national policies and interethnic relations in order to develop a “soft” pragmatic regulation of interethnic relations. Domestic inter-ethnic relations of multinational and multi-confessional Russia are becoming a key issue of national security in the context of geopolitical confrontation with the Western world, information and hybrid wars, the intensification of radical Islam and international terrorism, the increase in uncontrolled population migration, and diverse economic and financial pressure from outside.

According to the studies of national politics and inter-ethnic relations carried out by the authors, ethno-territorial contradictions in the North Caucasus are the most complex, most dangerous and potential sources of inter-ethnic, ethno-political conflicts.

Interethnic relations have always been not only one of the key factors in the social history of Russia, but also acquired critical

importance at the turning points of history, as happened in 1917 and in the 1990s.

The North Caucasus has always been and remains a region of confrontations of the strategic interests of world powers. At the turn of the new Millennium, the region remains a zone of acute economic and political rivalry, where geopolitical and geostrategic lines aimed at weakening Russia and strengthening the influence of the West are clearly visible.

More than 30 states, many transnational organizations and companies have declared the Caucasus to be a zone of their strategic interests. There was a direct threat of the transformation of the North Caucasus into one of the centers of international terrorism. The active penetration of religious extremism (Wahhabism), attempts to politicize Islam, manifested in Chechnya and Dagestan in recent years, increasingly affect the ethno-political situation in the region.

One of the reasons for the rapid growth of ethnic conflicts in the North Caucasus is the forms and pace of globalization, which maximize economic, cultural, inter-religious and inter-civilizational contacts. The form of complete westernization that this process has acquired in recent decades leads to the emergence of new and expanding old inter-civilizational faults. The most tangible of them pass through Russia, separating the western civilization from the Islamic world.

A peculiar local form of the existence of Islam (known as “everyday” and “popular” Islam in religious studies) took shape during the natural historical process of adapting Islam to the national moral and legal codes of the peoples of the North Caucasus. Nevertheless, there are different views and approaches to this issue in modern North Caucasian society, including, in some cases, unreasonably distorting historical realities and overly politicizing problems of the correlation of religious and national traditions of the North Caucasian culture.

Such phenomena as the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition of the population of the region, the presence of

national-state entities in it and the complex history of relations between local peoples, both among themselves and with the Russian state, should be removed from the framework of political analysis. All this is subject to careful study. It is impossible to carry out a substantive policy, it is impossible to exclude these phenomena as factors of interethnic tension without competence in the relevant issues.

In the context of the growth of ethno-nationalism, spiritual leaders of mass movements in the North Caucasus tried to rely on historical or pseudo-historical precedent, which was intended to legitimize statements of self-determination or independent statehood and mobilize the masses to achieve the goal. In order to substantiate some ethnic and national claims, a myth was often invented. Most disturbing in this activity is that such myths penetrate the mass media, creating the danger of the formation of aggressive ethno-nationalism and xenophobia among the younger generation and condemning the country to inter-ethnic conflicts and the growth of extremism.

Author of the abstract - Elena Dmitrieva

2019.02.008. YUSUP DJABRAILOV. INTRACONFESSIONAL RELATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTACTS OF ETHNIC COMMUNITIES // *"Islam v sovremennom mire,"* Moscow, 2018, № 14 (3), P. 167-178.

Keywords: religion, clergy, ethnos, ethnic conflict, interconfessional relations, land disputes.

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Yusup Djabrailov examines specific features of connections between ethnic and religious identity in Daghestan during the

post-Soviet period. Among the main indicators of socio-political stability in this republic a special place is taken by the processes going on in inter-ethnic and intra-confessional relations.

Islam has exerted a great influence on the formation of ethno-cultural traditions of the Daghestani people. As shown by this researcher, the attitude to the nationalities problem in Muslim religion is based on two premises: the first is that division and opposition of people to one another on the ground of nationality is impermissible and is regarded a feature of pre-Islamic self-praise. The second – God divided all human beings into tribes and peoples so that they could borrow from one another positive experience of social organization and presented a spiritual value oriented to social equality, lofty morality, care for and attention to people around, concern for nature, etc. In principle, for a large part of the republican population the priority of religious affiliation is ethno-cultural identification rather than profound adherence to uniform moral parameters. People quite consciously refer themselves to believers, but such identity bears a formal or even conditional character.

The ethnic motive in the confessional sphere has become especially clear soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when individual religious activists tried to set up national spiritual boards. These attempts have not got broad support, and were soon banned: in other words, the state authorities did not allow the believers to set up an Islamic republican religious organization on national grounds.

In certain publications, the researcher notes, these tendencies were described as the opposition of the Avar mountainous people to the flat-land Turkic-language Kumyk and Lezghin people. Nevertheless, in the early-2000s an attempt was made to set up a parallel spiritual board with support of certain political forces displeased with the growing influence of the republican religious organization.

The author of the article notes that religious consciousness on the territory of Daghestan exists in different forms. In the

mountainous part of the republic the activity of Sufi sheikhs did not stop.

On the whole, the process of re-Islamization is going on in Daghestan. It is the most intensive among the Avars, slightly less among the Darghins and Kumyks, and much weaker among other ethnic groups. Rebirth of traditions, knowledge and elites in the republic coincided with the growing activity of national movements in socio-political life. Having emerged with a view to developing and protecting ethnic culture, languages, habits and traditions, quite a few of them were subjected to politicization and devolved to nationalistic positions, which largely contributed to the actualization of the problem of mutual connection and mutual influence of the ethnic and religious factors.

The spiritual Board of the Republic of Daghestan is aimed at promoting general Daghestani consolidation. It is very cautious when dealing with land disputes. The official clergy in recent years has been trying to avoid arguable subjects causing lack of understanding and offense. The periodic tension in the ethno-contact situation in certain districts of the republic is largely due to territorial issues. They are the most acute in connection with territorial disputes.

In Soviet times large-scale resettlement of mountain-dwellers to flatland territories was taking place.

The results of sociological research show the controversial attitude of Daghestanis to reforms, especially, land reform. On the one hand, it is characterized positively, and on the other, it is viewed as having a conflict potential. The most optimal solution of the problem, in the author's view, would be the inclusion of lands of outwinter cattle-breeding in flatland districts. This would make it possible to lower the tension around, and dwellers of outwinter settlements would be able to deal with their day-to-day affairs in the nearby municipal districts.

In this connection experts come to a conclusion that there should be no changes in the borders of municipal districts, otherwise a conflict situation may arise.

The controversial character of the situation, the researcher maintains, shows that without legally well-substantiated approach any solution of conflict situations is impossible, inasmuch as infringement of any ethnic positions of socio-economic character in a polyethnic region can become a factor of tension in intra-confessional relations.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

RUSLAN SULEIMANOV. ISLAM VS POLITICS. PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE BORDER BETWEEN CHECHNYA AND INGUSHETIA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Chechnya, Ingushetia, administrative border, Islam, Sharia court.

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Abstract: The author examines admissibility of the use of religious norms for resolving the political and legal problem of the administrative border between Chechnya and Ingushetia, which has caused broad public repercussions in the autumn of 2018. Special attention is devoted to the role and place of the Sharia courts to which a whole number of Russian religious and public figures recommended to turn in order to resolve the issue.

On September 26th, 2018, the heads of Chechnya and Ingushetia Ramzan Kadyrov and Yunus-Bek Evkurov signed an agreement on the establishment of the administrative border between the two republics, which was supposed to settle the issue left unresolved from the early 1990s, after the disintegration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

At the time, in 1993, the first head of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev and the President of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Dzhohar Dudayev signed an agreement under which the border between the Chechen and Ingush autonomous regions existing within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic prior to 1934 was taken as the basis. However, after the beginning of the military hostilities on the territory of Chechnya, the question of the border between the two subjects has lost its timeliness. After the restoration of the life of peace in Chechnya, Magas and Grozny have repeatedly confirmed their readiness to solve the border question without conflicts, however, an ultimate treaty has not been signed.

The agreement reached between Kadyrov and Evkurov, according to which "Chechnya is given mountainous-forest stretch of land in Sunzhen district of Ingushetia, and Ingushetia is given a similar-in-size territory in Nadterechny district of Chechnya, proved not to the liking of certain inhabitants of Ingushetia." On October 4, the inhabitants of Ingushetia dissatisfied with the signed agreement staged a meeting and demanded that the agreement be widely discussed and objected against its ratification in parliament. The main reason for their objection against the agreement was the fact that it was signed clandestinely, and the people of Ingushetia were not duly informed about its essence. "We favor the agreement, we favor the border between our republics... But we are against clandestine transfer of territories on which many historical monuments stand..." The head of the Republic of Ingushetia Yunus-Bek Evkurov has said that he specially prepared the transfer of this land with a view to making everything possible to avoid an armed conflict. The situation in the vicinity of the border settlement Arshty where a conflict between local Ingush dwellers and Chechen road workers took place in August induced special commissions of the two republics to work to determine the administrative border. The results of its work made the heads of the two republics Ramzan Kadyrov and Yunus-

Bek Evkurov determine the border along the line of the previous one without any changes.

Meanwhile, on October 30, the Constitutional Court of Ingushetia recognized the agreement reached on September 26 illegal, because it was not endorsed by a referendum of the Republic of Ingushetia and did not have legal consequences for the bodies of state power, organs of the local self-government, organizations, and citizens. However, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized the border agreement between Chechnya and Ingushetia legitimate on December 6.

At the same time, the opponents of the agreement reached express their readiness to continue the struggle for its revision. The well-known Russian and Ingush lawyer Kaloi Ahilgov, said in an interview to the "Echo Moskv" Radio, among other things, that the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ingushetia cannot be called off, inasmuch as this procedure is not envisaged in the Russian legislation. Thus, the contradictions which have arisen following the agreement on the administrative border between Chechnya and Ingushetia are exclusively of a political or legal nature and, evidently, can be resolved within the framework of the legal ground and the current secular legislation of the Russian Federation.

However, certain religious and public figures assert that the border question between Chechnya and Ingushetia and other controversies connected with them should be resolved on the basis of religious norms.

For one, in an Address of the Council of Teips of the Ingush people to the population and the leadership of Chechnya published on December 7 it was suggested that the question of the border be solved by the Sharia law court.

The Sharia law courts became widespread in the North Caucasian republics of Russia in the 1990s. They are elected and can have a consultative council consisting of people well-versed in local Muslim customs attached to them. Usually, these informal judicial bodies are confined in their activities to dealing with petty

crimes, compiling marriage and divorce contracts according to the Sharia law, inheritance matters, etc. Sharia law courts can be set up and function in accordance with the Federal Law "On Courts of Arbitration" of July 24, 2002 No 102 F3 in the Russian Federation. These courts can deal with any disputes on the legal basis through the form of settling disputes in the form of mediation. More often than not they are used in family disputes and can settle matters only between physical persons.

The Council of Teips of the Ingush people suggests to settle problems between the entire two regions of the Russian Federation with the help of the Sharia law, which definitely contradicts the legislation existing and operating in this country. Apart from it, on December 13 the Council of Teips of Ingushetia invited deputies of its parliament to attend the sitting of the Sharia Law Court. On December 15, its sitting was held in Nazran at which the need was declared to receive additional information about the course of the voting by the deputies of the Ingush deputies for the ratification of the border agreement with Chechnya. The actions of the Sharia Law Court of Ingushetia and the head of the Spiritual center of Muslims of Ingushetia Isa Khamhoyev were censured by the Coordination center of Muslims of the North Caucasus, which pointed in its statement of December 19 to the incompetence of the Sharia Court in the matter of adjusting the administrative borders between parts of the Russian Federation. The document emphasized that the Sharia Court of Ingushetia can have competence within the framework of the operating legislation of the Russian Federation to mediate in peacefully settling disputed issues.

The operation of such courts can have disastrous consequences on the territory of the Russian Federation. The actions of Khamhoyev and his people should be qualified as nothing but an attempt to "bring religious pressure to bear on the Russian citizens."

In the concluding part of the document the North Caucasian clergymen called on the head of the Spiritual Center of Ingushetia "to stop and think on the fate of people whom he, instead of

calling for peace and calm, is calling to take the path of turmoil and distemper.”

It should be added that the conflict between the Council of Muftis of Ingushetia and the republican leadership has continued for more than a year. For one, in May, 2018, the Central Spiritual Council of Ingushetia decided to ex-communicate the head of the Republic Yunus-Bek Evkurov from the Muslim community due to his discriminatory policy toward its Muslim clergy.

The main reason for the contradictions between the position of Evkurov and the republican clergy is his unwillingness to work together with some of their communities. As a result, the purely legal and administrative aspect of the problem connected with the Chechen border was used by the head of the Spiritual Council of Ingushetia against the republican leadership headed by Evkurov.

Summing up, we may safely say that the question of establishing the administrative border between Ingushetia and Chechnya can be solved exclusively within the framework of the existing legislation in the Russian Federation and the Republics in question. Religious leaders, naturally, have the right to express their views and take part in solving such political and legal problems on conditions of their not turning into religious ones, in other words, resort to the norms of the Sharia Law opposing the secular Russian legislation.

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2019.02.009. DMITRY MALYSHEV. THE INTEGRATION OF FOREIGN CULTURE MIGRANTS IN CENTRAL ASIA // *Russia and New States of Eurasia*. Moscow, IMEMO RAS, 2018, № 3, P. 147–155.

Keywords: foreign culture migrants, socio-cultural adaptation, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Central Asia, oralmen.

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The author of the article considers problems of integration of foreign culture migrants in the Central Asian region on the example of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Immediacy of the problem of integration of foreign culture migrants into society of the host state is taking on greater and greater importance in the modern world. The Post-Soviet Central Asia (CA) itself is a donor of migration generally to Russia. But there are countries in CA, being recipients of migration are more Kazakhstan, to a far lesser degree

Tajikistan therefore the author suggests considering this problem on the example of these two republics. Integration of foreign culture migrants into public structures of recipient countries is a difficult process which significantly affects stability in states.

Fixing on common problems of migration the author notes that nowadays the discourse of migration and the interethnic conflicts caused by this phenomenon within the context of host country became urgent as migration processes became new forms of risk, essential feature of which comes down to expansion of contacts with groups which are strange in relation to ethnocultural communities of this or that state.

The author of the article allocates several types of migration and the subsequent adaptation of migrants to the foreign culture environment:

1. The voluntary migrants, refugees looking for shelters and staying. They should be integrated into the host society, the case is only about duration of the period of such integration.

2. Cultural distances between migrants and residents of the host country: the smaller it is, the easier it is for a migrant to be integrated into foreign culture society. It is much easier for the citizens of the Post-Soviet republics leaving one republic to another to overcome cultural distance than when leaving for Europe, for example, as all of them lived in one culture for a long time, know Russian that does not raise barriers in socialization. As a result of migration within one region, for example CA, cultural distance here is minimized.

3. A context of acceptance is developed in host society policy in the relation of migrants which can roughly be divide into 4 subspecies: assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization. The last subspecies generates the greatest risks and contains conflict potential and promotes an intensification of processes of society split.

4. The status of groups of migrants that means the attitude of host society towards visitants from other countries and regions. For example, Tajiks are negative to Uzbeks coming to their country

and on the contrary, and Armenians – to Azerbaijanians and vice versa, etc.

Further the author passes to consideration of the problem of migration by the example of Kazakhstan. The migration status of the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) is composed of three levels: outcome of migrants, their reception and transit of migration flows. The main migration trend of Kazakhstan is a departure of its citizens from the country for permanent residence, mainly to Russia and also relatively limited number of labour migrants, especially in comparison with the mass migration flows going from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Qualified specialists and workers (mainly – Russians and Tatars) leave Kazakhstan. The main flows of migrants arrive in Kazakhstan from the Central Asian countries – Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, minority is made by hailed from far abroad countries – China and Turkey.

Peculiar feature of Kazakhstan is that since 1991 repatriation to the country of ethnic Kazakhs (oralmen) both from the republics of the CIS, and from other countries, first of all from China became an important segment of migration policy of the republic especially – from Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People's Republic of China. However not all oralmen got citizenship of RK, many remained citizens of the People's Republic of China and circulate business in China, particularly in SUAR. The problem of the Chinese migration for Kazakhstan is acute as Kazakhstan has an extended border with the People's Republic of China and Chinese migrants' flow increases every year. It raises fears among the population and the authorities as Chinese, as a rule, do not get integrated locally, and unite into ethnic communities standing directly against local population. Living abroad, Chinese everywhere contribute to the development of Chinese economy: Chinese diasporas try to attract investments into the People's Republic of China, withdrawing funds out of the country of residence. In Kazakhstan hundreds of joint ventures, Chinese banks, shopping and cultural centers, Chinese cafes

function, there are Confucius's centers which turned into the instrument of "soft power" of China in the region long ago.

Besides reception of Chinese migrants, Kazakhstan has recently become an active recipient of labour migrants from Central Asia as it is getting more preferable than Russia for them. It can be explained both by economic difficulties, and recent increasing legislative pressure on migration in Russia.

The author notes the fact that at the expense of migrants the population of Kazakhstan grows. Though this state occupies the ninth place in the world by its territory, the number of its population is extremely moderate - for the beginning of 2018 - only 18,157.1 thousand people. Elements of so-called "sinophobia" as historical memory of the Kazakh people often connects China with bloody Junggar wars during which many Kazakhs died from Junggar troops and Qing army, are very widespread in the public consciousness of Kazakhstan. Also there are fears that if lands are freely sold to foreigners, then their considerable part will be bought up by China, that became one of the reasons of mass "land disorders" in Kazakhstan in 2016.

The author of the article, considering migration situation in Tajikistan, in the first instance notes that this republic is the country of emigrants, and outflow of the population got catastrophic proportion at the moment. As for immigration, here experts from China, Turkey and Iran generally live. China directs to the republic labor for construction of public and economic infrastructure. Besides China sends to Tajikistan people serving sentence for criminal offenses that in general corresponds to the population policy of the Chinese authorities as delinquency rate in the People's Republic of China is very high and to support such number of prisoners is an overwhelming task for the state. Therefore, they are send for works to other countries where the Chinese companies function. Tajikistan also became a place of application of excess Chinese labor. Here Chinese are mainly involved in construction of roads, cement factories and in agriculture.

There is no precise data on the number of Chinese arriving in the country. Many of them drive to Tajikistan through Kyrgyzstan with which China has a visa-free regime, and, getting married to Tajik women, many of the arrived Chinese remain in Tajikistan forever.

The author points out that integration of Chinese into Tajik society has its specifics – many of them learned Tajik and Russian languages that facilitates communication with local population. Chinese try to study national Tajik traditions also. In Dushanbe and Khujand there is a Chinese restaurants chain where pork isn't cooked though Chinese widely eat this product. In general the number of Chinese in Tajikistan in 2015 exceeded 150 thousand people with a quota for foreign labor migrants – 8 thousand.

Also it is observed the aspiration of Tajiks to establish cultural ties from Celestial Empire. For example, thousands of Tajik school and university students learn Chinese, and for acquirement many Tajiks go to study it to universities of the People's Republic of China.

The growing economic dependence of Tajikistan on China becomes an important factor also that is the additional channel of replenishment of labor migrants army from the People's Republic of China to the RT. In April, 2018 Tajikistan transferred to China development licenses of seven gold fields and also the rights for development of coal fields. This is for a reason as in 2017 the external debt of Tajikistan was 2.3 billion US dollars, from them 1.2 billion – a debt to China.

In some areas of Tajikistan Chinese are already firm enough integrated into local society. The Ministry of Agriculture of Tajikistan farmed out 500 hectares of lands to the Chinese farmers for 49 years. China actively develops territories of Tajikistan on Pamir which make more than one thousand sq.km that is equal, for example, with an area of nine such cities as Dushanbe. It turns local population against Chinese even more and if to take into consideration a serious linguistic divide – Chinese almost without exception do not speak in Tajik, and the local population almost

does not know Chinese – contradictions between migrants from China and local population are strengthened.

As for migrants from other countries, generally from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, it is hardly possible to call them “foreign culture.” Many of them have relatives on both sides of the border, are well familiar with customs and culture of the neighboring country, use Russian actively for international communication. Besides, as surveys show in Uzbek-speaking villages of Tajikistan, more than 52% of respondents consider important marriage with representatives of their ethnic community, however for 36% this factor is important, but not obligatory.

Moreover, it stands out that circumstance that the authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan do not give due consideration to migration policy including because as it was already noted above, Tajikistan is now and, most likely, will remain in the near future the state – the donor of migration. The attention of the authorities of the RT is generally concentrated on arrangement of the Tajik emigrants.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2019.02.010. DMITRY POPOV. BILATERAL RELATIONS OF THE U.S. AND TAJIKISTAN AT THE PRESENT STAGE // *“Problemy natsionalnoy strategii,” Moscow, 2018, № 5 (50), P. 87–106.*

Keywords: the U.S., Tajikistan, Central Asia, Afghanistan, “soft power,” the fight against drugs, “North route,” the New Silk Road, Russia, China.

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The interest of the American diplomacy in Tajikistan (RT), Dmitry Popov emphasizes, is traditionally caused by two major factors. The first one is proximity to Afghanistan (RA). The

republic has the most extended border among the Post-Soviet states with it – 1344 km, and Tajiks make the second largest ethnic group in the RA. The second one – the allied relations with Russia. In this regard the analysis of the U.S. strategy for Dushanbe is obviously important both in the context of geopolitical opposition with Moscow, and in terms of evolution of the American policy in the Middle East.

In the history of cooperation of the U.S. and Tajikistan the researcher emphasizes three main periods. The first of them fell on the 1991–2001s. For the first time the countries got along with each other, but civil war in the RT troubled their relations for several years. The second period was between 2001–2014 and was connected with military intervention of the U.S. in Afghanistan. At this time interaction of Washington and Dushanbe reached culmination and concentrated first of all around security issues. After withdrawal of the main part of American contingent from the RA in 2014 it was initiated the current stage of development of their relations which is characterized by gradual reduction of bilateral programs both in intensity, and in subject. During the period from 2010 to 2016 on an initiative of Washington annual bilateral consultations were held. There was discussed implementation of specific projects of cooperation at the level of the ministries and departments. Since November, 2015. The State Department additionally started multilateral dialogue of “C5+ 1” in which all states of CA and the U.S. take part.

As amended in the National Security Strategy of the U.S. published in December, 2017, Tajikistan as well as other countries of CA, separately it is not mentioned. The doctrine documents main goals of the White House in relation to the whole region. The American government intends to encourage economic integration of Central and Southern Asia. It follows from the doctrine that the American diplomats consider cooperation with the states of CA particularly in the context of preservation of long-term presence in Afghanistan. In its turn, in the Concept of foreign policy of the RT accepted in January, 2015, Dushanbe confirms readiness to

develop the multidimensional relations with the U.S. on a mutually beneficial basis. At the same time in the list of regional priorities Tajikistan puts the U.S. only on the sixth place - after Russia, the states of the CIS, China, Afghanistan and Iran.

Addressing to the topic of “soft power,” the author notes that the U.S. finances activity of branching network of public, information and humanitarian organizations in Tajikistan. Formally they are aimed at developing democracy and market economy, but in practice often interfere in internal processes and advance foreign - policy initiatives of Washington. These structures actively work in the republic since the beginning of the 1990s when it was reached the Collaborating agreement in the furtherance of rendering the humanitarian and technical and economic aid between the U.S. and the RT.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is engaged in administration of a bulk of projects. Since 2001 in the RT there is the “democratic commission” at the American Embassy distributing small grants. Remotely there is the National Endowment for Democracy co-financed from the federal budget of the U.S.

The main recipients of the American grants are transnational western NPOs and media. In Tajikistan there are: active Soros Foundation, radio “Svoboda,” Aga Khan Foundation, Institute of war and peace, Eurasia Foundation, Internews and some other. In total 3 thousand non-profit organizations are registered in the RT.

However, the U.S. couldn't create the strong westernized movement in the RT. After a series of “color revolutions” in the former Soviet Union the RT applies tougher legislation on NPO and gradually extends control over this sphere from the state. The possibility of work of a number of well-known foreign structures, including Freedom House, National democratic Institute and Peace Corps is limited in the country. According to D. Popov, in the short term the trend of weakening of the U.S. role in “democratization” of Tajikistan, most likely, will remain.

Considering economic relations of both countries, the author notes that Tajikistan is of no concern for the U.S. as the trade and investment partner. Goods turnover in 2017 fell to the lowest mark since 2000 – 17.9 million dollars. Difficult investment climate, low profitability and rivalry with Chinese companies alienate the Western business. Instead of this the American side prefers to involve other instruments, in particular credits and grants. Generally they are distributed through the international financial institutions with dominating role of the West. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provide funds under obligations of carrying out of liberal transformations in Dushanbe. Allocations are stood out from the budget of the U.S. for a number of programs, the largest of which – Economic Support Fund. These means are intended to improve the international image of the White House and aimed at advance of foreign policy interests of the U.S. From the beginning of work of D. Trump administration expenses on the Tajik direction are cut down, but it goes slowly, than in other Central Asian countries.

The listed instruments are used by the U.S. for counteraction to contacts with Russia, preservation of its influence in the region as a part of “global leadership.” Need to decrease economic dependence of CA on Russia is directly enshrined in the budgetary documents of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. First of all on this rout it prevents Tajikistan from joining the Eurasian Economic Union. In various ways Washington “torpedoes” the project since 2010 when there was a question of accession of RT to “the customs troika” of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. At the beginning of 2013 the western consultants achieved accession of Tajikistan to the WTO on conditions which complicate possible membership of the republic in the EEU. Along with that, in 2011 the U.S. put forward the alternative integration project – the concept of the New Silk Way (NSW). It is based on the idea of merger of Central and Southern Asia into single economic macroregion.

The main interaction of the U.S. and Tajikistan is based on security issues. Overriding interest of Washington in this area

support of operations of the western coalition in Afghanistan, drug control, non-proliferation of weapon of mass destruction and preparation according to the standards of NATO of separate divisions of high - degree alert. The U.S. Department of Defense considers the republic as the potential platform for deployment of own military facilities. In February, 2009 Tajikistan joined the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) - the system of transportation corridors for supply of U.S. Armed Forces group in Afghanistan through the states lying to the north from the battleground. Participation in the NDN promised to the country transit fees, and members of the CSTO did not object to it. Nevertheless in fact the Tajik part of the NDN was not popular. In the long term, the author considers, the need for the NDN can increase against the background of the new approach promised by D. Trump in Afghanistan and increase of pressure upon Islamabad.

The second in order of importance point on the bilateral agenda in the sphere of security there is counteraction to drug trafficking. In total the U.S. allocated more than 200 million dollars for the war on drugs in Tajikistan by 2017. In terms of volume of such support the republic is in the lead among all states of CA. However, with a focus on traffic of opiates, i.e. on the consequences of the problem the American side indulges its reasons - to expansion of drug crops in Afghanistan, the researcher emphasizes.

Other direction to which the U.S. pays special attention is connected with equipping and preparation of the separate militarized divisions according to standards of NATO. In Tajikistan Americans take interest in two formations - to the peace-keeping battalion and the National Guard of the RT. The peace-keeping battalion of Tajikistan is created with financial support of the U.S. in 2010. Today the American government rendered about 8 million dollars for its development. The National Guard of the RT is a military reserve force of direct- action of the head of state. Programs of interaction with the Tajik military

became a part of broad initiatives of the Pentagon in the states of the former USSR and pursue quite bottom-line aims. First, the White House is keen to engage sponsored peacekeeping forces in foreign operations under the auspices of NATO. Secondly, peacemaking is used as covering action for distribution of military activity of the North Atlantic Alliance on the states of the CSTO. Thirdly, exchange of experience through special detachment allows obtaining information on defensive capability of allies of Russia and serves preparations of own special troops for actions abroad.

Thus, D. Popov concludes, the analysis of the American-Tajik relations shows that at the current stage the republic is not among the main foreign policy priorities of the U.S. in the post-Soviet space. However, it does not mean that Tajikistan is completely out of the Central Asian strategy of the U.S. Keeping it in the focus of attention of the American foreign policy will be the aspiration of Washington to maintain access to Afghanistan and to constrain development of geopolitical competitors such as Moscow and Beijing. It is not drawn a line in the question of possible membership of the RT in the Eurasian Economic Union.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

ELENA DMITRIEVA. POLITICAL ELITE OF TURKMENISTAN. POST-SOVIET PERIOD // *The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

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Keywords: Central Asia, Turkmenistan, political elite, clan-tribe factor, tribalism, national identity, foreign policy.

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Abstract: The review examines specific features of the formation of Turkmenistan's political elite in the post-Soviet

period, characteristic is given to the modern Turkmen political elite, factors are analyzed, which influence the adoption of outside and inside political decisions by the political elites in power, and the role of the clan system in the country's political system is described.

Introduction: Central Asia in the post-Soviet period is a zone of instability (high ethnic fragmentation, pendency of border problems and the use of water reserves, demographic problems, radicalization of Islam, etc.). The situation in the countries of the region remains tense, despite the authoritarian rule existing there. In this situation the emergence of a vacuum of power in one of the Central Asian countries may lead to catastrophic consequences.

Turkmenistan remains today one of the most closed states of Central Asia. Its geopolitical position and raw material resources (the country holds fourth place in the world in gas extraction) make it possible to regard Turkmenistan one of the key states of the region. The concentration of political power in the hands of the head of the state is greater than among other leaders of the Central Asian countries. Clan-tribal regulators exert tremendous influence on the formation of the country's political elite. Belonging to a definite clan in Turkmenistan plays an important role in appointing to a high post. The country's President relies on representatives of his own clan and forms political elites from among them. The most numerous in Turkmenistan are the Tekin tribes and the Yomud tribes (more than 50 percent of the population and more than 60 percent of territory). Apart from them there are many so-called regional "provincial:" family-tribal groups (Mary, Kizil-arvat, Chardzhou, Balkan, Tashauz).

The first head of sovereign Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, came to power in Soviet time, when he was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Turkmenistan in 1985, and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union became President of Turkmenistan. Saparmurat Niyazov belonged to the Akhal-Tekin clan, which controls the capital and a

number of other regions of the country, and this is why its positions have strengthened still more in the period of Niyazov's rule. From the 1950s until the mid-1980s the leading posts in Turkmenistan were taken by people from regional clans, because the leadership of the Soviet Union constantly carried out the rotation of the personnel in the struggle against the clan character of state and republican power. It was precisely representatives of the Akhal-Tekin clan that comprised the bulk of Niyazov's administration, gradually ousting and replacing representatives of other groups on the leading posts. They managed to retain their positions in state power after Niyazov's death in 2006. The new President of Turkmenistan, G. Berdymuhamedov, is also a representative of that clan. Taking into account these tendencies, the expert community has begun to view the domestic political life of modern Turkmenistan as a struggle of the Akhal-Tekin clan against the regional groups of the elite during the last years of the existence of the U.S.S.R. and in the entire period of the existence of modern Turkmenistan.

Turkmen Elite and National Identity

Examining the problem of national identity of the Turkmen elite O. Vasileva, PhD(Politics)* notes such characteristic features of the ruling elite as traditionalism, closeness, and non-acceptance of democratic transformations. Tribalism is a phenomenon inherent in the domestic life of Turkmenistan. The author believes that Turkmens up to the present are a community of tribes, but not a nationality in the traditional meaning of the term. Differences between tribes and the clans heading them are so essential that many researchers deem it possible to study them as independent small peoples. The years of Soviet power have not led them to erosion of inter tribal borders, and Turkmenistan has remained a full-fledged feudal society with a characteristic set of political institutions and traditions.

* O. Vasileva. "Political Elites of Turkmenistan and the Problems of National Identity" // *"Caspian Region: politics, economics, Culture," Astrakhan, 2018, No 18 (57), P. 200–206.*

According to ethnological data, there are thirty tribes, which historically formed in Turkmenistan uniting more than five thousand family groups. Each clan was represented in the high echelons of power, and exerted influence on the first persons differently. At present, the author notes, the family-tribe division of Turkmens remains a major condition of the existence of the modern political system of Turkmenistan. The problem facing the Turkmen people is the fact that they have not become a single and united nation. A search for identity of local political elites is, in essence, a search for support on clan and tribal traditions. As is known, nationalism is opposed to tribalism, inasmuch as it unites a nation, eliminating estate, clan and tribal differences. In Turkmenistan tribalism still scores victory in the struggle against nationalism.

A search for identity takes the leadership and elites of Turkmenistan into the thicket of traditionalism. Back in 2001, at a meeting with members of the Association of Turkmens of the world Saparmurad Niyazov noted that among the top priority tasks of domestic policy facing the people of Turkmenistan was that of eradicating tribalism among them, which was in the past the main reason for their inability to build a national state. But despite correct and well-meaning thinking, tribalism still scores victory and does not allow the political system to become modernized according to the laws of an open democratic society. Turkmenistan does not have foundations and opportunities so far to realize this project. The leadership of Turkmenistan, in its majority, remains patriarchal conservative. This conservatism is based precisely on clan traditions and prejudices.

Despite its proximity to Iran, Turkmenistan is not going to move along the road of Shia theocracy, because the Turkmens are not Persians, but Turks, and all the more so Sunnites. A monarchic

scenario is hardly probable, either, in the vein of Arab Middle Eastern regimes. Turkmenistan, just as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, slightly similar to it, is likely to go forward along the road of creating a secular authoritarian regime.

Finally, the author comes to a conclusion that tribalism has deep enough roots in Turkmenistan, and the Turkmens remain to this day a community of tribes whose development level of civic self-consciousness remains low enough. Along with this, in professional thinking of the political elites themselves tribalism occupies strong positions and is not regarded as a threat to national unity and security.

Influence of Political Elite on Foreign Policy of Turkmenistan

The Central Asian region attracts the attention of many regional and global participants in international relations. In this connection much attention is paid to the questions of the formation of the foreign-policy course of the Central Asian countries. Political analysts from the National Research Nizhni Novgorod State University D. Belashchenko, I. Ryzhov and I. Shodzhonov* have analyzed the influence of the factor of the elites on the adoption of foreign-policy decisions.

** D. Belashchenko, I. Ryzhov, I. Shodzhonov. "Forming of Political Elite of Turkmenistan and its Influence on the Process of Foreign Policy Decision-Making" // "Herald of Belgorod State University." Series: History, Political Science, 2018, Vol. 45, No 4, pp. 766–774.*

The authors of the work characterize modern Turkmenistan as a state, which is the most closed from the information point of view. Many processes and tendencies taking place in the country remain either unknown, or emerge in the information field much later. The geographical situation of Turkmenistan, its economic and raw material potential attract an ever growing attention of the neighboring countries, and also influential world powers (Russia, China, Iran, and others). One of the major achievements of the country in the years of independence was the official recognition

of the neutral status of Turkmenistan, which does not actively participate in any integration projects.

With the coming of the new President of the country G. Berdymuhamedov to power in 2007, the political system began to be transformed toward certain liberalization. He pursues liberalization of the political life of the country, makes shifts in the ruling elitist circles (transformations in the special forces, changes in the ministerial groups created by S. Niyazov, setting up new government posts, a number of key posts were filled with relatives of the new president. Representatives of the Republican Foreign Ministry, except the Minister and certain big bosses, only guide the foreign-policy course of G. Berdymuhamedov and his close entourage/ The President has "shadow advisers", that is, a group of influential persons formed from people who are not representatives of the titular nation. They are people from the presidential administration of S. Niyazov. Their position has remained unchanged, as before. We now mean advisers and consultants of Russian origin - A. Zhadan and V. Umnov (economic questions), V. Khramov (main ideologist of the country), I. Maiman (construction and jewelry business). According to information, I. Maiman put forward the ideas of the Trans-Caspian pipeline, lobbied Turkmenistan's interests in the United States, Germany, France, Turkey, Israel, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Among other influential business companies mention should be made of construction firms from Turkey and France. After coming to power of Berdymuhamedov various changes in traditional society took place in Turkmenistan. The head of state surrounded himself with well-tested people on the basis of personal acquaintanceship. Processes of consolidating personal power were taking place, potential rivals were ousted, conflicts within elites were eliminated, and the institution of "shadow consultants" preserved and strengthened.

One of the factors influencing the process of adoption of foreign-policy decisions is clan-tribal connections. Prior to the establishment of Soviet power each Turkmen tribe had its own

area of living, and it could only be violated during raids. When Soviet power came to the country, geographical and other borders between tribes began to disappear, people began to travel quite freely, yet, the newly-acquired freedom was not broadly used by Turkmen people; they preferred to stick to traditions and conservative habits. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the old socio-cultural mechanism was restarted in order to return to the traditional features of public life. An archaization of the main political institutions took place, which was typical of tribal-family bodies.

S. Niyazov's autocracy has led to the over centralization of power, and the concentration of functions of adopting decisions in the President's hands, which has largely simplified the formation of a foreign-policy course. President Berdymuhamedov now faced serious rivalry of clans in the struggle for political heritage of S. Niyazov, and was forced to correct the mechanism of their interaction.

As to the role of the tribal factor in Turkmenistan's foreign policy, the authors of the article single out three aspects of influence:

1. Affiliation of the President and his entourage to concrete tribal groups.

2. Territorial distribution of tribes inside Turkmenistan. A great role is played here by the tribes living in the border districts.

3. Contacts of Turkmen tribes with members of the diaspora (the biggest communities live in Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Pakistan and Russia).

Among the tribes influencing Turkmenistan's foreign policy are the Yomud tribe living in the western, Caspian regions and controlling transport routes, trade, and mineral extraction, and the Ersar tribe living in the eastern districts bordering on Uzbekistan. A definite role is played by the tribes bordering on Afghanistan.

In the 1990s - early 2000s Turkmenistan succeeded to establish and maintain maximally favorable relations with the

“Taliban” movement and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and participate in the attempts to accommodate the sides to the Afghan conflict.

Changes began to occur after Niyazov’s coming to power, who invited to leading posts in politics, business and other spheres his countrymen, who gradually formed a powerful Akhal-Tekin grouping and practically closed the road to power for other clans. The positions of the Akhal-Tekin clan have strengthened still more under President Berdymuhamedov who drew a still greater number of Akhal-Tekin men to state power. They actually control the ministries and departments responsible for security and defense. Thus, it is the regional-ethnic origin in modern Turkmenistan that exerts the decisive influence on official and public career.

Representatives of the Chardzhou clan have lost their influence as compared with the Soviet period, but preserved a number of posts among officials of the middle link. The Mary clan also has a certain influence; its representatives held posts in political affairs, culture, science and other spheres. The Tashauz clan has the least influence at present, its representatives have lost influential government posts under S. Niyazov. Nevertheless, the activity of other clans also exerts a certain influence on the domestic and foreign political course of Turkmenistan. Among other things, the territorial ties of clans should be taken into account, especially the positions of the clan elders should thoroughly be considered. Among them special mention should be made of the positions of the clan elders living in border districts. Clans also have ties with Turkmens living beyond the borders of their historical Motherland. Accordingly, this factor is also used in planning and implementing the country’s foreign policy. Apart from that, with account of the growing importance of energy resources and dependence of Turkmenistan’s economy on their procurement and export, the clan’s influence increases in the territories rich in natural gas.

In conclusion, the authors note that the adoption of foreign-policy decisions in Turkmenistan is not transparent, inasmuch as in this process the sides which are not interested in publicizing

their activity take part. Among the specific features of the process of adopting foreign-policy decisions in Turkmenistan is the presence of the “shadow elite” in the person of the President’s advisors and consultants of non-Turkmen origin who seriously influence the formation of foreign policy. The “shadow advisors” had a serious influence on S. Niyazov and were able to become part of a close circle of the current President G. Berdymuhamedov. Another group of influence is foreign companies having branches and affiliations, as well as serious business-interests in Turkmenistan. They are engaged mainly in the sphere of mineral extraction. Apart from that, the country’s foreign-policy course is influenced by tribes and clans living in border districts, which have stable connections with clan and tribal groups in neighboring countries, as well as clans having active contacts with Turkmen communities abroad. Influence on the President is also made through his close entourage, and also personal meetings with him.

Conclusion

The political elite in post-Soviet Turkmenistan is in the state of constant transformation. Two stages can be singled out in the formation process of the political elite of post-Soviet Turkmenistan: the period of the rule of S. Niyazov and the period of the rule of G. Berdymuhamedov. During the former the political elite was represented by people with working experience received in Soviet time on posts in the state and party apparatus of the U.S.S.R. The regional-ethnic principle of personnel alignment continued to play the key role. Turkmenistan has overcome comparatively easily the change of power and the struggle between the elites after the death of S. Niyazov. There were no clashes between various groups of the population, and the change of the rule was not reflected in the domestic life of the country. After G. Berdymuhamedov came to power the clan structure of the political elite and the whole Turkmen society and business was mainly preserved, however, new leaders came to life, who will be

able to join political rivalry in the future. With the outward external stability of the modern situation in Turkmenistan, the clan system is fraught with a constant danger of internal strife. In this case the previously reliable clan structure of power may give in, and power struggle in the upper echelon of power may cause destabilization of the situation in the country.

On the other hand, the Turkmen elite will not gain much due to changes in society; on the contrary, it may lose power and sources of personal wealth. It can be expected that clan relations taking shape on the regional-ethnic principle and on the basis of personal loyalty to one's patron will further dominate in the political life of the country.

2019.02.011. DINA MALYSHEVA. UPDATING THE FOREIGN POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN // *"West - East - Russia,"* 2017. *Yearbook, Moscow, IMEMO RAS, 2018, P. 92-95.*

Keywords: Uzbekistan, foreign policy, strategic partnership, Central Asia, new development strategy.

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The author notes that 2017 has become one of the most dynamic stages in the history of independent Uzbekistan for all the years of post-Soviet development. Therefore, new trends in the relations of Uzbekistan with its closest neighbors deserve special attention. Uzbekistan is the only country in the region that has borders with all the republics of post-Soviet Central Asia.

Analyzing the relations of Uzbekistan with neighboring countries, the author notes a breakthrough in the Uzbek - Kyrgyz relations, which were previously characterized by tensions due to long-term border disputes.

The stalled relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan also managed to get off the ground. These relations have become unfriendly, mainly due to disputes over the water and energy problem. For geographical reasons, Uzbekistan is on the first “line of defense” in this water conflict because of possible threats to the water potential of Uzbekistan created by the Rogun hydropower plant being built by Tajikistan. In November 2017, the commission on delimitation and demarcation of the border between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan resumed its work, which was interrupted in 2012.

Positive trends in relations between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2017 were also consolidated. In March 2017 the President of Uzbekistan signed a number of important documents, including the Joint Declaration on further deepening the strategic partnership and strengthening good neighborliness between the countries, during his official visit to Astana. So, contacts with Turkmenistan on issues of mutual interest were continued.

As for Russia, the following areas have retained their priority: trade and economic, military and political, cultural and humanitarian. The interaction plan aimed at strengthening stability in the Central Asian region was jointly formed by the defense ministries of the two countries. As for the CSTO, the position of Uzbekistan remained unchanged – the issue of the resumption of the republic’s participation in the CSTO was not on the agenda.

Uzbekistan has become more active in various foreign policy areas, taking part in various formats of various projects on the regionalization of the post-Soviet space (the Chinese transport and logistics initiative “One Belt – One Road”; The American program “C5+1” – a new format of interaction between the U.S. and the five post-Soviet countries of Central Asia in a dialogue on foreign policy problems and security challenges; The free trade zone of the CIS and the EAEU).

Also, a certain “reset” of Uzbek-Turkish relations took place in 2017 mainly within the framework of intensification of trade and economic contacts and cooperation in the military sphere. A protocol on inter-state cooperation in the field of military

education was signed, which provided for the dispatch of Uzbek military personnel to Turkey for training. At the same time, the possible propaganda of the ideology of “moderate Islamism,” which is now popular in Turkey, but rejected by Uzbekistan, may become an obstacle to the development of full-fledged relations between the two countries, which consistently defend the secular nature of their political system. In addition, there are many Uzbek oppositionists, religious leaders and businessmen in Turkey who have fled from persecution in their homeland and which also creates some discomfort in Uzbek-Turkish relations.

Uzbekistan expected the provision of military and technical assistance from the United States, and so contacts between the two countries became noticeably more active in 2017. As for relations between Uzbekistan and Germany, as well as some other EU countries, the economy remains a priority.

The author also notes the activation of Uzbekistan in the Afghan direction. Afghanistan was perceived solely as a threat in Uzbekistan before because it was home to radical Islamists, such as the “Islamic movement of Uzbekistan,” who aimed to overthrow the armed government of the Republic and change its secular political system to a religious one. Now Afghanistan is declared a resource for new opportunities, although the Islamist threat has remained and gained new shape, “enriched” by the ideology and practice of the “Khorasan Emirate” based in the Northern regions of Afghanistan, which is nothing more than a branch of the “Islamic state” banned in the Russian Federation. But the conjuncture considerations seem to have prevailed in Uzbekistan.

The author concludes that the authorities of the republic act in accordance with the guidelines stipulated by various American strategies (“Greater Central Asia,” “New Silk Road,” etc.), which are aiming post-Soviet Central Asia to deepen economic and political cooperation with Afghanistan instead of Russia and its integration projects (EAEU).

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2019.02.012. TAI SIYA RABUSH. MUSLIM STATES AND THE REGIONAL VIOLENT CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN (1979-1989): MOTIVATION BEHIND INVOLVEMENT // *"Islamovedeniye," Mahachkala, 2018, Vol. 9, № 2, P. 58–68.*

Keywords: Afghan war, the Mujahedeen, protection of Islam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran.

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The author considers the motives for the participation of some states of the Middle East in assisting Afghan anti-government armed groups in the course of the Afghan military conflict with the direct participation of Soviet troops, also known as the "Afghan war" (1979–1989). Particular attention is paid to the reasons for involvement of such states as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt in the Afghan armed conflict (on the side of the mujahideen).

When analyzing the motives for involving Saudi Arabia in a regional military conflict in Afghanistan, the author of the article believes that the main role was played by the religious factor. First, the Saudis claimed leadership (at least "moral") throughout the Islamic world, and the struggle of Afghan anti-government groups

with the official government of Kabul (and with Soviet troops later) was declared a jihad even before the act of entering a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan.

Since the 1970s, the revival Islamic trends have been traced in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Saudis declared their commitment to the common cause of protecting Muslims and spreading Islam, helping the cause of Afghan "jihad" financially. The second reason is the intention to receive military support from the United States, considering Saudi Arabia as one of the closest allies in the Gulf and Middle East region after the fall of the Shah regime in Iran; Of course, the joint "cause" of the military and financial support of the Afghan mujahideen rallied the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

The third reason was quite widespread phenomenon of "Arab Afghans," passing from the mid-1980s. Training camps were created specifically for Arabs in Pakistan, and a number of people from the Near and Middle East took an active part in the Afghan "jihad," having undergone preliminary military training. Thus, the priority task for Saudi Arabia in maintaining jihad in Afghanistan was to strengthen its image as a state - a defender of Islam and contribute to strengthening the position of this religion and protecting co-religionists. The varied assistance provided by Saudi Arabia to Afghan insurgents throughout the Afghan armed conflict with the participation of the Soviet troops was aimed precisely at this.

Financial and military assistance from Pakistan to the Afghan mujahidin was provided to a small extent. Its role in the Afghan armed conflict was different: there were numerous training camps for insurgents on the ground (mainly along the perimeter of the Afghan-Pakistan border), and it also accepted the bulk of the Afghan refugees. In addition, it was on the territory of Pakistan, the diverse military assistance coming from the United States, the states of Western Europe, the countries of the Near and Middle East, was stored and distributed among the groups of rebels.

Unlike the motives of Saudi Arabia, the religious factor in assisting the Afghan mujahideen was secondary to Pakistan.

The author of the article shows the main motives for the government of Pakistan in assisting the Afghan anti-government groups. First, an important aspect in this matter is the national aspect. A large part of the population of both Pakistan and Afghanistan is a single people - Pashtuns, and the question of the border between these countries (the so-called "Durand Line") remains unresolved since the very beginning of Pakistan's existence as an independent state and is a constant stumbling block in interstate Afghan-Pakistani relations. Pakistan intended to favorably influence the resolution of the national and border issues with the support of the Afghan mujahedeen. Pakistan's second motive was the same as Saudi Arabia - that is, the Pakistani government was counting on an increase in military, military-technical, and financial assistance from the United States. Thus, the researcher concludes, the protection of Islam and co-religionists was by no means the leading motive of Pakistan in the process of assisting the Afghan anti-government groups in spite of the officially used slogans on the protection of Islam. Important were, firstly, the desire to resolve the national and "border" issues in its favor; and secondly, the desire to receive military and financial assistance from the United States, positioning itself as a "front-line state" and a barrier to Soviet communist aggression.

The author examines the role of Iran in the regional armed conflict in Afghanistan. One of the primary foreign policy tasks of Iran after the Islamic revolution in 1979 was the spread of Islam and the promotion of the ideas of the Islamic revolution in other Muslim countries. It can be argued that the motive for the protection of Islam and the spread of the ideas of the Islamic revolution was the main one in the decision of the leadership of Iran on indirect participation in the Afghan armed conflict 1979-1989. However, Iran's capabilities in this matter were limited - firstly, due to the fact that the official ideology of Islamic Iran is the Shiite branch of Islam, which is not widely spread in Afghanistan; and secondly, due to the fact that Iran was involved in a long and

bloody war with Iraq in 1980, participation in which required it to exert maximum effort.

Speaking about the role of Egypt in the Afghan regional armed conflict, the author notes that since 1980 the Egyptian leadership provided military assistance to the Afghan insurgents (mainly through the supply of weapons), which lasted until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, the Islamization of Egypt began and its inclination was marked towards the countries of the West and the Arab countries of the Near and Middle East with simultaneous distancing from the USSR. According to the researcher, the motives of the Egyptian leadership regarding the decision to indirectly participate in the Afghan armed conflict on the side of the Afghan mujahedeen were similar to the motives of the Pakistani leadership. The main factor for Egypt in this matter was the expectation of receiving comprehensive American assistance and rapprochement with the West, which Egypt was able to achieve in the end.

Taisiya Rabush concludes that the motives for the protection of Islam and the struggle against the “infidels” were not decisive in the decision-making process of rendering assistance to the Afghan insurgents by the governments of these states. The religious factor was most significant in this issue for Saudi Arabia and Iran (although Iran’s ability to provide assistance to Afghan insurgents was limited), while completely different motives played a key role for Pakistan and Egypt (rapprochement with the West and receiving military aid from it, and ethnic and territorial factors were also important for Pakistan).

The situation in Afghanistan, the author concludes, is still far from a peaceful settlement, and neighboring Islamic states are still interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, using a radical version of Islam to destabilize the political situation in that country. But, nevertheless, it is the Islamic factor that is actively promoted and used as one of the reasons for outside interference. Thus, the main motive may be not only religious (the protection of Islam and Muslims, the spread of the Muslim religion), but also

other, often quite far from religion, motives in the process of involving Muslim states in regional armed conflicts in neighboring countries.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2019.02.013. ABOLFAZL DELAVARI. LESSONS OF HISTORY: RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND IRAN. (On the Need for a Transition to Multivector and Symmetrical Relations) // *"Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Irana v politicheskoy, ekonomicheskoy i kul'turnoy oblasti kak faktor ukrepleniya mira i bezopasnosti v Evrazii: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii 19 oktyabrya 2016."* Moscow, FSBEI HE MSLU, 2017, P. 37–43.

Keywords: Russia, Iran, multi-vector relations, symmetrical relations, expansionist policy, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, strategic cooperation.

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As the researcher notes, the relations between Russia and Iran were often unidirectional, asymmetric and had a tactical character for a long period. In the first decades of the 19th century, the two countries fought wars that ended with the transition of a large part of Iran to Russia, as a result of which Russia received political and legal privileges and economic concessions. Over the next 180 years, relations between Iran and Russia have never been strong enough. However, in some periods the ties were strengthened and there were temporary alliances between the governments of the two countries.

In the first half of the 19th century the shahs and nobles Qajars took the ideology of Russia through connections with it (including on relations with England and Germany, as well as on the command of Russian officers – the only organized military force in Iran – the Cossack brigade). Nevertheless, Iranian ruling circles were often dissatisfied with the country's dependence on Russia. Dissatisfaction with the Russian socio-political non-governmental forces was most evident during the Constitutional revolution. Iranian constitutionalists viewed the Russian government as a force supporting the Qajar dictatorship. The steps of this government played a role in dispersing the first Majlis with the open support of Muhammad Ali Shah and the Shah's Cossack brigade in the fight against the constitutionalists, while the Russian government issued an ultimatum to the Iranian side, demanding the removal of the mission of American financial advisers, which the second Majlis hired to carry out financial reform. Russian troops occupied the northern regions of Iran as a result of an ultimatum; subsequently during World War I, Russia occupied a large part of Iran. These events had a negative impact on the attitude of Iranian society to the Russians.

In the first years after the end of the First World War, the promises of the leaders of the Russian Revolution, based on the completion of the expansion policy of tsarist times and its compensation, were brought to life. In the years between the two world wars, the Soviet Union was in opposition to Western countries, which caused a cooling of relations between Iran and Russia in the field of economy and technology. Gradually, the trend of expansionary state policy emerged during the Second World War and after the introduction of Russian armed forces in Iran (taking into account strategic interests and security considerations as opposed to Western influence). The support of the compromise movements in north-western Iran from the Soviet government, as well as attempts to benefit from the oil concession produced in northern Iran, as well as the refusal to withdraw troops (according to the 1941 Treaty) also significantly worsened

the attitude towards the Soviet Union. At the same time, some of the left-wing forces of Iran, such as the Tudeh party, openly supported the policies of the government of the Soviet Union in those years. When strong anti-imperialist nationalism arose in Iran, the people of Iran once again awoke distrust towards the policies of the Soviet Union during the movement to nationalize the oil industry. When Mosaddyk became prime minister, the Soviet government did not support his struggle for the nationalization of oil resources. Such actions were perceived as a program of imperialist policy, and a little later the Soviet government refused to pay wartime debt to Iran.

In the period after the 1953 coup d'état and before the 1979 Islamic revolution, Soviet-Iranian relations were unstable and depended on ensuring security, building strategic relations with Western countries, as well as limited and short-term economic interests. After the 1979 Islamic revolution, it was expected that relations between Iran and the USSR would become more stable thanks to the anti-American sentiment that prevailed in Iran's political life and the attempts of the Soviet government to develop relations with Iran. Despite this, the difficulties that existed previously in relations between the two countries were not resolved. This was especially evident during the Iran-Iraq war. The Soviet government chose to maintain strategic relations with Iraq and supported it, in particular, supplied weapons and ammunition, although it officially took a neutral position.

The end of the Iran-Iraq war was accompanied by the beginning of changes and the internal political conflict within the USSR. Iranian politicians expected that favorable conditions would emerge for the development of stable strategic relations between the two countries after Russia had bid farewell to communism. The gradual build-up of the U.S. military contingent in the region (first during the Iraq attack on Kuwait, and then the US attack on Afghanistan and Iraq) became a cause for concern for Iran. Iran's limited capabilities and the U.S. influence on Russia in the 1990s did not help improve relations between Iran and Russia. At the

beginning of the 21st century, Iran's need for support from the new political figures of Russia has increased again as tense relations with the world community arose as a result of Iran's nuclear program. It seemed that a suitable occasion appeared for strengthening and developing relations between the two countries. In this situation, Russia sided with Iran and agreed to complete the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. To strengthen the relations between the two countries in the field of politics and security, an important factor was the agreement on the sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran. Despite this, cooperation between Iran and Russia depended to a large extent on relations between Russia and the West.

Relations between Russia and Iran became more "cool" with the onset of events related to the "Arab Spring" in 2012, accompanied by the fall and weakening of Russian-supported governments in countries such as Syria and Libya, as well as changes in the situation in Ukraine. Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, relations between Russia and Turkey have deteriorated, and vice versa - the cooperation between Iran and Russia has expanded. Over the past two years, Iran has given permission for the first time to use its country's airspace for Russian aircraft and long-range missiles to suppress Assad's opponents, in addition to close cooperation between the two countries in support of the Assad regime. Russia also shipped several S-300 systems to Iran. In mid-summer 2016, the authorities of the two countries confirmed that Iran has given Russia the opportunity to use one of its military bases near Hamadan for aviation flights. Thus, the current state of affairs clearly shows the unprecedented rapprochement of the two countries and the development of strategic cooperation. Despite this, there have been several cases demonstrating the distrust of the parties and the instability of relations even in such conditions. For example, there were restrictions in the trade turnover between Russia and Iran (especially with regard to food) immediately after Russia improved its relations with Turkey. Some Iranian officials (including the defense minister and military adviser to the

supreme leader) did not hide their displeasure and mistrust after it became known that Russia was using the Iranian military air base.

The researcher concludes that relations between Iran and Russia went up and down during the 19th and 20th centuries. Political relations between states did not affect the socio-cultural sphere. Having considered the dynamics of development of relations at the state and socio-cultural levels over the past two centuries, Abolfazl Delavari considers it necessary to make some suggestions:

1) Russian politicians need to rethink the structure of relations with Iran and make efforts to eliminate the negative consequences;

2) The development of the socio-cultural sphere should take place not only through governments, but also through intellectual and cultural elites, economic leaders, civil society organizations and the development of bilateral tourism;

3) The development of academic and scientific contacts can contribute to the strengthening of comprehensive relations and strategic balance between the state and the society of both countries.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

AZIZ NIYAZI. SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN LOSSES OF THE WAR // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World"*.

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.02.02

Keywords: Human Development Index; quality of life in Syria, violent conflicts, refugees, humanitarian losses, poverty rate, food security.

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Abstract. In the article there are provisional results of humanitarian losses in Syria, since 2011 on the basis of the UN

reports and data of some authoritative international organizations. It is considered a problem of decline in quality of life upon indicators of human development, destruction of social institutes, mass displacement of refugees.

It is not possible to measure destructive results of war in Syria conclusively. Though large-scale military operations are completed, coals of the violent conflict still smolder in certain regions of the country and continue to bring Syrians travails. Nevertheless, provisional results of this humanitarian disaster of the 21st century look appallingly. In pre-war days Syria was rather safe middle-income country in economic terms, but at the end of 2014 four of five Syrians lived in poverty, 64.7 percent of them in the conditions of desperate poverty. These people were not able to provide the main needs necessary for survival of households and had no opportunity to satisfy own basic needs, including for food. 30 percent of the population appeared to be in extreme poverty, many of whom experienced chronic hunger in severe forms.

According to the last report of United Nations Development Programme on human development published in 2018, the level of quality of life of SAR citizens during 2012–2017 in the world ranking by Human Development Index (HDI) fell by 27 positions. Thereby Syria showed the highest rate in the world in terms of abrupt public regression. Conflict-ridden Libya and Yemen follow up. The quality of life in them for the same period in the world ranking by HDI decreased by 26 and 20 points respectively. It's worth reminding that HDI is counted by such basic measurements of people's wellbeing as: long and healthy life, duration and education level, gross national income per capita, level of poverty, safety and inequality, including gender, ecological situation, condition of the rights and opportunities of citizens, social and economic stability.

According to the specialists' research of the World Bank in the beginning of 2017 from 400 to 470 thousand people died in Syria in war-time, 7% of housing space was destroyed and 20% –

partially damaged, about a half of medical and educational institutions were damaged or completely destroyed. Since 2011 until the end of 2016 cumulative losses in GDP were 226 billion dollars that exceeded GDP of Syria approximately four times in 2010. More than a half of the population of the country had to leave their houses that became the largest crisis related to refugees since World War II. According to the report of the World Bank in the first five years of the conflict 538 thousand workplaces on the average were annually destroyed. In 2015 unemployment rate among youth reached 78 percent, 6.1 million of young Syrians did not work and did not study in any form about 6 of every 10 citizens of SAR lived in desperate poverty. Damage caused to infrastructure led to the general health deterioration of the population throughout the country and to renewal of spread of such infectious diseases as poliomyelitis. Data for the beginning of 2017 show that more Syrians died because of inaccessibility to medical care rather than owing to warfare. Cumulative losses of GDP as a result of failure in social and economic system by 20 times exceeded the losses caused by physical destruction within first six years of the conflict. These failures reduced impetus to participation in production activity, interrupted economic ties and supply chains. Destruction of social and economic structures and relationship, credibility gap uniting people are more considerable factors impeding rebuilding of the country than physical injuries. Their recovery will become more difficult task, than restoration of physical infrastructure - analysts of the World Bank come to conclusion.

In fact collective losses of the human capital can be restored quite long time - throughout life of several generations. There is reason to hope that this process will not drag on for so long period in Syria. Nevertheless, in development planning of the country it is necessary to consider inevitable shortage of proficiency of the Syrian citizens due to outflow of highly qualified specialists, high unemployment rate (57% of able-bodied citizens in 2017), permanent disappearance of proper school and other education,

malnutrition causing retardation of growth among children, outflow of more than 5 million refugees abroad. In Syria there are about 6 million people – the internally displaced people who left their houses during war. Mass displacing population (in total more than 60% of citizens of SAR) leaned hard on the resources of accepting communities and countries.

Miseries of war in Syria caused negative humanitarian shifts in the nearby states. Migration of Syrians mainly to neighboring states brought to notable tension on housing and labour markets, loss of quality and availability of public services, lack of food security. As estimated by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the middle of 2017 in the territory of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, bordering on Syria, and also in Turkey there were 5.05 million registered Syrian refugees. For comparison in disproportion in comparison with the European region specialists of the UNHCR note that from April, 2011 till May, 2017 there were given 884,461 requests for asylum in Europe by citizens of Syria. The most difficult situation in connection with acceptance of refugees developed in Lebanon. Though the country was not directly involved in the Syrian conflict, it sharply felt its destructive side issues. For June 30, 2017 in Lebanon there were registered 1,011,366 Syrian refugees (99% of the number of all refugees). They made 23% of local population of pre-war time.

Crisis in SAR made exclusively notable impact on Lebanon. As the Lebanese economy was closely connected with Syrian, with the beginning of the conflict a sharp slowdown of growth rates followed. If in pre-crisis years this indicator was at the level of 10%, then in 2011–2014 it was hovering around 1–2%. Traditional trade routes were interrupted, credit of investors and consumers was undermined, safety level decreased. From 2013 to 2014 export volumes and direct foreign investments decreased by 25%, and tourism, since the beginning of crisis, by 60%. The public debt to the middle of 2014 reached 141% of GDP. With inflow of Syrian refugees the labour supply increased by 50%, the number of pupils in public schools grew by 30–35%. There was peak demand for

services of state health care. Crisis made disproportionately strong impact on already vulnerable households. It was promoted not only by increased competition at the market of unskilled labour also by unreasonable demand for public services, but also that fact that a half of refugees lived in a third of the poorest regions of the country. According to calculations of the World Bank, owing to the Syrian conflict the share of the population living in poverty by the end of 2014 made 3.9%. Poor people in Lebanon became even poorer. Thus the war in Syria aggravated already intense internal situation in intercommunal relations in Lebanon.

The Syrian conflict first being of internal orientation very quickly gained cross-border, regional character and moved to the international level. Parallel to this trend it became more complicated and got more and more long form. Its destructive cumulative impact on economy, infrastructure, food systems, agricultural industry, social institutes and in general on ability of people to overcome shocks increased. Huge humanitarian losses of war in Syria is a misfortune not only of its citizens, it is spread over the borders and continents as echo.

2019.02.014. Naima Nefliasheva. HOW "NEW MUHAJIRS" FROM RUSSIA LIVE IN TURKEY. MIGRATION OF RUSSIAN MUSLIMS IN THE 2000s // "Azia i Afrika segodnya," Moscow, 2018, № 8, P. 27–34.

Keywords: Turkey, Russia, North Caucasus, temporary migration of Russian Muslims, "new muhajirs" Islam.

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The article analyzes the reasons for the migration of Russian Muslims to Turkey, and singles out groups of so-called "new muhajirs."

The researcher notes that Russian Muslims began to arrive in Turkey back in the 1990s, in the period of the Chechen wars, and in the 2000s. Among the Muslim arrivals to Turkey from Russia in 2013–2015 about ten percent did it due to their sympathies for radical groups and also for going further to the Islamic state. A group of Muslims adhering to radical views is concentrated in Istanbul and in some provincial towns. A flow of these people from Daghestan in the North Caucasus markedly increased in 2012–2016. Another group consists of Muslims who arrived in Turkey to do business, and they are free from religious or psychological grounds. And the most numerous group comes due to socio-psychological and religious reasons.

“New muhajirs” is the name of Muslims from Russia who have emigrated to Turkey in the 2000s and later. The name is related to the resettlement of the Prophet Mohammed and his followers from Mecca to Medina and reason for resettlement was the failure of the many-year ceremony in the home-town. A search for followers outside his native city brought Mohammed to an agreement with the Arabs, who recognized him their arbiter and leader. He led his community from the narrow bounds of just one tribe, having created conditions for turning it into a state and elaborated a religious doctrine. See: *Al-Hijra*. Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1991, p. 278.

Among those who emigrate are mainly men, young families with children of pre-school or school age, widows of militant fighters killed during anti-terrorist operations. The average age of these migrants is 30–40. A relative economic welfare of “new muhajirs” in Turkey is also a weighty factor in adopting the decision to emigrate. Turkey is considered a well-to-do country, comfortable enough for Muslims

The socialization and integration of Russian Muslims in Turkey, the author writes, begins with their legal status. The country’s Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2014) in accordance with the standards of the European Union and international legal standards determines the rules of the stay of

non-residents on Turkish territory, the rules of entry in the country, procedure of issuing visas and residence permits, as well as the order of deportation. In connection with the developments in Syria and the flows of refugees to Turkey the law pays special attention to refugees and their migration rights. The status of illegal migrant, according to Law is given not only to those who have crossed the border without the necessary documents, but also to foreigners with overdue visa, residence permit, or permission to work.

Muhajirs preferred, upon the expiry of their visa-free stay in Turkey lasting 60 days, to get another, short-term stay up to two years, which could be prolonged for one more year.

Almost all muhajirs from Russia stay in Turkey on tourist visas, which does not give them the right to work.

The muhajirs working officially are socially secured, have medical insurance for the entire family, and get regular payment in case of sickness. But such muhajirs are few and far between due to a complex procedure of getting permission to work, as well as a high competition with native Turks in all spheres of work – from agriculture to high technologies. Most “new muhajirs” work illegally: open small restaurants and cafes, work as waiters, truck drivers delivering pizzas, at car-service depots, at construction sites, etc. Women, as a rule, do not work, sometimes offer their hand as baby-sitters or old people helpers. Only very few muhajirs enroll Turkish colleges or universities and got stipends and, ultimately, corresponding degrees.

The author of this article mentions one of the attempts to create an intellectual product with the use of Russian muhajirs, which was called “Salamword,” or social network for Muslims, which was planned to be started in 2012. The project was headed by the President of the Islamic Cultural Center of Russia – Social Wing of the Council of Muftis of Russia Abdul Wahel Niyazov. A considerable portion of the capital for its organization and development was granted by private investors from Russia and Kazakhstan. The sponsors of the project at first positioned it as a

platform for an alternative life of Muslims in the virtual area sans frontiers. This system was supposed to function in English, Arabic, Persian Turkish, Russian, French, Urdu, Malay and Indonesian languages, and will become not only a social network for Muslims, but also a place for public discussions, and source of information for Muslims, as well as an instrument of transformation and development of Muslim communities. At present this project has been frozen.

The project of the first free Islamic Russian-language on-line academy “Medina” proved more successful. Its author and director is the former mufti of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alanya Ali Khaji Evtseyev. The Academy began to function in September 2017. It has three educational stages – school, institute and courses in special fields. A week later after its opening the Academy had already 2,500 students from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and other countries. Most students – 34.6 percent – are young men of 22–29 years of age. The “Medina” presents a complex Islamic program, that is, teaches tafsir, sire, khadis, Islamic ethics (adab), Arabic, etc. Each student of the Academy may choose a curriculum on one of three maskhabs – Hanafite, Shafiite and Khanbalit. The student body of the Academy, upon graduation, will become imams, madrasah teachers, and simply persons well-versed in Islam.

Their language adaptation passes, as a rule, without any special problems. Turkey grants broad opportunities to foreign students studying the Turkish language: there are special language courses in each district of Istanbul, in some of them there are several such courses. The government-run Turkish language courses are better and more expensive. Muhajirs usually prefer courses with symbolic prices attached to public /organizations. There are also special language courses for women and men at the organization of Russian-language women-muhajir – the Women’s Club “Ummah.”

The Turkish legislation, this author emphasizes, presupposes registration of public organizations without red tape, which makes

it possible for muhajir to organize them selves more rapidly. The most active and effective is the registered and free organization of Russian-language Muslim women entitled "Source of Knowledge" in Istanbul, which renders consultations on the problems of living, medical service, education, and other vital problems

Within the past two years public organizations of Russian-language women-Muslims appeared in Istanbul. They are engaged in setting up various courses, arrange charity functions, etc. Women-muhajir organized the Islamic Education Center Al-Huda, which functioned in 2015–2016. At a Muslim school children studied the ABCs of Islam and the Koran, khadis, siru, tafsir, as well as mathematics, Russian and literature, biology and the surrounding world. The school had to close down periodically due to a shortage of money. Muhajir also tried to open their kindergarten, where children could study the Koran, and the Russian and Arabic languages.

In September 2017, a congress of public organizations of muhajirs of Russia, Egypt, Central Asia, Turkey, Mali and Ghana was held in Istanbul. Its participants emphasized that the basic problems facing the muhajirs are the legalization of their stay in Turkey, medical aid, education, cases of deportation, and unfounded persecution of the Turkish special services. At the congress a decision was adopted to set up a Federation of public organizations of settlers under the name "Dunua Muhacirler Federasyonu" (Federation of Muhajir of the World).

In conclusion, the author of the article puts forward a question: "Is the name 'New Muhajirs' well-founded enough for Russian migrants to Turkey?"

It is a known fact that those who call themselves "muhajir" have business in Russia and freely travel from one country to another. Today it is quite possible to talk about a further increase of the migration flow of Russian Muslims to Turkey. This researcher asserts that emigration of Russian Muslims to Turkey reflects a serious methodological problem, namely, their presence in the official political discourse of non-working categories of

“traditional Islam” and “new Islam,” as well as “traditional clergy.” The Islamic policy of Russia has no approach to the “new Muslims and methods of their integration in political and social life, as well as the use of them as a resource of social stabilization. Actions in Daghestan, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, and the Volga Area in the form of closing mosques, apprehension of Muslims with great beards or purdah, bans on some Muslim books, tend to make the “new Muslims” emigrate from Russia to Turkey. In connection with the economic crisis and the deterioration of the standard of living in the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus the migration of Muslims to Turkey from this region will grow, Neflyasheva concludes.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

OLGA BIBIKOVA. UYGHUR JIHAD IN CHINA AND SYRIA // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia and the Moslem World.”*

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Keywords: the Uyghurs, Han, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, separatism, jihad, “Turkistan Islamic Movement,” “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.”

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Abstract: Muslim Uyghurs live in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China. In this area separatist sentiments are strong. In recent years Uyghur radicals will often organize acts of terrorism. Several thousands of Uyghurs are involved in military operations in Syria on the side of opposition. They consider their participation as a training for struggle for independence.

Sunni Islam in China is professed by more than 20 million people. A half of them are the Uyghurs living mainly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). There is a significant amount of Uyghurs also outside the People's Republic of China. Except Uyghurs Islam in China is professed by Kazakhs living here, Dungans, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tatars, etc.

XUAR occupies the sixth part of the territory of China (1.66 million sq.km). It is the biggest territory administration unit of the People's Republic of China. Among predecessors of Uyghurs there are representatives of disappeared Turkic and Mongolian nomads. XUAR borders on Kazakhstan (1718 km), Mongolia (1400 km), Kyrgyzstan (1000 km), Tajikistan (450 km), Russia (55 km) and also on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. The neighbourhood with such number of countries predetermined presence of representatives of 47 nationalities living in XUAR, but Uyghurs - indigenous population of the region. Total length of the frontier of XUAR is over 5600 kilometers. Every third frontier guard of China serves exactly here.

The modern ethnonym Uyghurs was assigned to settled Turkic-speaking people on the assembly taking place in Tashkent in 1921. Uyghurs speak language of Turkic group that brings them together with people of Central Asia and also Turkey.

XUAR is included in the Economic Belt of the Silk Way (EBSW) program that gives once depressive area the roadmap of infrastructure and economy in general. This region is rich in minerals (40% of reserves of coal, 1/3 oils of the People's Republic of China). Through the territory of XUAR to Central China it is being constructed a pipeline from Turkmenistan and a petrol one from Kazakhstan. Besides, it is planned a construction of the gas pipeline from Altai Krai of Russia. Thus, power supply of economy of the People's Republic of China to a great extent depends on a stable situation in XUAR.

The problem of Uyghurs in China is connected with the fact that in ancient time these people lived in an independent state. Two thousand years ago, during an era of the Chinese Han

dynasty, China occupied the territory of this state. In the 8th century Uyghurs were a part of the Turkic khaganate. Process of ethnic consolidation of Uyghurs culminated after disintegration of the Turkic khaganate and formation of the Uigur early feudal state (The Uighur khaganate) on the Orkhon River. In the middle of the 9th century the Uighur state dissolved. A part of Uyghurs moved to Central Asia. In the 17-18 centuries in East Turkestan there was a state of Uyghurs which in 1760 came under power of Manchurian governors of China. Being under the power of foreign governors, Uyghurs revolted at times. Six large revolts in Xinjiang took place in the 19th century. In the 20th century two attempts of creation of an independent states of Uyghurs – the Islamic republic of East Turkestan (1933–1934) and the Revolutionary republic of East Turkestan (1944–1949) took place. In 1949 after integration of the Uighur territories in the People's Republic of China Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region was created.

Considering separatist sentiments of Uyghurs, China, since 1950th, implemented measures to reduce domination of the Uighur population in XUAR. For that end Han – representatives of the title nation began to move here. At Mao Zedong Uyghurs, due to high birth rate, still were in the majority of the population of XUAR. However over the last 50 years as a result the government encouraged moving of Han to XUAR, Uyghurs became minority on their homeland. It is natural that Uyghurs, aborigines of the region, perceive all attempts to dilute the population of XUAR with Han negatively. Historical memory of the population keeps recollections of the independent national state.

The problem of Uighur separatism is directly connected with demographic problems of China which extremely disturb Beijing. In 1953 the first nation-wide population census was held, which results showed that with population – 581.390 million people the state cannot provide the population with food. However till 1956 the government did not attach great importance to demographic factor. Moreover, continuous growth of population was considered as a source of well-being of the country. The population ratio (more than

20% of the population of the globe) and available arable lands of China (about 7% of world arable lands) forced the power to take severe measures for reduction of birth rate in the state. Besides for various reasons the tilled areas are annually reduced almost by 300-400 thousand hectares.

In the 1960s there was an understanding of harmfulness of lack of fertility control policy the Chinese leaders were forced to assume stringent measures against violators of the One Family - One Child program. The system of punishments, penalties, deductions from salary was developed. The second or third child was not taken in kindergarten, it was limited training of such children in universities, the students getting married were expelled from institutes. "Surplus" of children was considered even while pension accounting. In December, 1973 at the all-China reporting meeting on fertility control it was proclaimed the course "later, rarer, less" that assumed late marriages and 4-5 year intervals between of children's births, availability of contraceptives.

During "Cultural revolution" (1966-1976) multi-child Muslim Uyghurs faced reprisals. For Muslim Uyghur forced refusal to have children was insult of their religious feelings because Islam considers each newborn child as a "barakah" (grace) from Allah. Besides, for the Uyghurs, living in villages, children were always domestic helpers. Having ignored religious feelings of people, the authorities resorted to violent sterilization of many Uighur women and men.

Sinologists consider that during this period the Chinese authorities made mistakes in national policy, also there were infringed so long strengthening relations of friendship and respect between Han and representatives of ethnic minorities.

It only makes sense that mistakes in national policy, measures of forced reduction of presence of indigenous population in XUAR (nowadays the number of Han in XUAR increased up to 40%) due to forced relocation of the Uyghurs far inland gashes consciousness of people.

In the 1980s in XUAR there were more than 20 thousand mosques. In 1987 the authorities organized in Urumqi, the capital of XUAR, an Islamic academy for training of imams. Besides, there were courses on studying of the Koran and Arabic. Communications of Muslims of China with their coreligionists in other countries extended. Uyghurs went on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, in 1990 in the city of Bazhen there was a revolt under the religious slogans. Beijing had to use regular army for its suppression. Then there were disorders among Taliban students in madrasa of Yarkand city and explosion in the cinema of Kucha city (1991).

As the Turkish newspaper "Vatan" noted: "assimilation process really deepens the problem. Such tendency suppresses language and cultural bases, and fight of people interested in preventing it, is beyond legitimacy."

After the Central Asian republics of the former USSR gained independence as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were organizations in XUAR which set out to win independence of East Turkestan. Among them there was formed in 1992 the World Uighur Congress led by Rabiye Qadir preferring peaceful means, and the Turkestan Islamic Movement (TIM). The last one soon contacted with foreign radical Muslim groups.

Contacts with foreign groups of Islamic doctrine allowed TIM to organize training camps in the territory of the neighboring Pakistan (the region of Waziristan). There were effected contacts with ISIS. Besides that, since 2009 interethnic conflicts constantly took place in the country.

With the course of time Uyghurs acquired the methods of terrorist fight taking place in other countries. Members of TIM became the initiator of terrorist attacks.

Members of this organization made propaganda among believers in mosques of XUAR. In 1992 terrorist campaign began: explosions in hotels, shopping centers, in public transport, in cultural centers, in hospitals, in prison (!), on markets and bus stops. Five years later mass riots and murders of officials began.

One explosion occurred in the bus passing the center of Beijing near Tiananmen Square. In 2015 fighters blew up several houses. It became obvious that Uyghur fighters receive explosives and weapon from abroad. At the same time many of them used cold weapon. Particularly, in August 2014 people armed with knives wearing black masks attacked police station. A little earlier (in March 2014) a group of men with knives 60-70 cm long attacked passengers at the station Kunming, (the province of Yunnan in the South-West of China). As a result of the attack about 30 people died, 143 were wounded.

TIM headquarters of which is located abroad officially assumed responsibility for more than 200 terrorist attacks, carried out on the territory of the People's Republic of China. Islamic priests also caught, they were killed by radicals, accusing them of "complicity with the authorities."

Inside XUAR calls for separation from the People's Republic of China sounded more often. Before the Olympic Games in Beijing (2008) there was the whole terrorist campaign, including an attempt of attack with explosives on an air liner. Next year there was a conflict between the Uyghurs and Han living in XUAR as a result of which more than 150 people died, several hundreds were wounded. The government had to send military units and armored elements into the region.

There were adopted laws forbidding students and state officials to visit mosques. Control of children's education in kindergartens was strengthened. In 1997 the campaign against illegal madrasahs was conducted. There were imposed restrictions for visiting of the sacred cities Mecca and Medina in the period of Ramadan by Chinese Muslims. In 2017 in China camps of reeducation appeared where the Uyghurs and other Muslims (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, etc.) were banished who aroused suspicion by their behavior. Besides, in the list there are bans on solemnization and funeral ceremonies by religious traditions, punishments for parents who do not let their children go to public schools.

At the same time, as noted by observers, “the policy pursued by Beijing in relation to Muslim Uyghurs includes also a number of preferences in comparison with other residents of the country, including on religious ground. For example, restrictions on birth rate which are imposed on Han do not concern them, they can have more than one child in family, there are privileges for college entrance. For the last decade the government of China made great financial injections to the region, having constructed numerous large plants and enterprises.” Nevertheless, along with the ideas of separatism in Xinjiang the Salafi ideology began to extend.

It only makes sense that authorities of the Turkestan Islamic Movement came in contact with ISIS that predetermined participation of its fighters in the Syrian conflict. First there were about 300 people who were involved in the battle which was conducted by the Jabhat al-Nusra organization (nowadays “Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham”) for Aleppo.

Uyghurs come to Syria through Turkey together with their families which representatives Jabhat al-Nusra settle apart in the houses left by Syrians generally in Idlib province seized in 2015. It was the result of the special propaganda campaign appealing the Uyghur families for leaving their homeland and living in the caliphate where the shariah laws prevail. What is more visas to Turkey provided consular agencies of this country in other states, including Afghanistan and neighboring countries of Central Asia. In some cases, Uyghurs obtained Turkish citizenship right away. Certainly, that Beijing voiced protest to actions of Ankara.

The authorities of Thailand paid attention to mass obtaining the Turkish passports by “tourists” from China. In the middle of 2015 Thailand expelled more than 100 Uyghurs to China. Later it has transpired that the authorities of Indonesia locked up several Uyghurs accused of terrorism.

For recruitment of the Uyghur men into their folds, ISIS Information center distributed in 2015 over the Internet the anthem urging Muslims of China to join fighters in the name of the caliphate. Tellingly that Uyghurs, unlike other fighters, in the

territory of Syria do not cover their faces, that demonstrates that they are not going to return home. Moreover, Islamic propaganda is actively carried out also among children. In particular distributing among the Chinese Muslims information on their activity in Syria, jihadists do video with children who say: "Chinese Kafirs! Know that we already are on the land of the caliphate. We will come to you and we will run up our flag in Turkestan."

According to some reports about 4-5 thousand Uyghur fighters were already at war in Syria in 2018. Most of them is concentrated in Idlib province in which Al Nusra initially provided training of newly arrived, including children.

It is no secret that the Turkish intelligence under the instruction of the U.S. recruit the Uyghur together with Turkmens, Kazakhs into the Syrian opposition ranks. Turks have their interest here, hoping to receive thus a part of the territory of Syria where the Uyghur families are already settled. Erdogan patronizes the Turkic people, hoping for their loyalty especially that many Uyghurs understand that they will not be able to return home.

The U.S. has more ambitious aims: due to activation of an Islamic factor, to weaken China, to interfere with implementation of economic plans, including the project the Great Silk Way as the southern corridor of this route passing through XUAR will run into danger. This project assumes to create new infrastructure which will promote trade expansion of China with other countries. Besides, destabilization of the situation in this area threatens to disrupt also construction of the Turkmen gas pipeline to China.

It only makes sense that repatriation of the Uyghurs who got fighting experience in Syria is not desirable for Beijing as fighters can really destabilize the situation in China. It is impossible to forget also about the neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan where the Uyghur separatists gain experience in training camps. All these factors combined slow down the process of integration of Eurasia in a common economic space that quite answers the purpose of the U.S. to weaken China as a competitor and not to allow the united

efforts of Russia, China and other countries to create strong Eurasia and to resist the American capital. China which strengthened its economic positions in the world in collaboration with Russia prevents the U.S. from imposing its will to other states. Through the example of China it becomes obvious that Islamic Jihad is used as a lever of pressure on undesired countries for Washington. Having begun with support of the Afghan mujahedeens, an Islamic appeal, with financial support of the U.S., NATO and Qatar extended first among Albanians – Muslims in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, among the Caucasian separatists in the Russian Federation, promoted radical jihad in Libya, disintegrated Iraq and tried to disintegrate Syria. Now, probably, there is a project to weaken China...

Uyghurs are included into the biggest group of foreigners who are at war together with “Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham” on the territory of Syria. The correspondent of Associated Press agency in a conversation with fighters from China found out that not hatred of Assad's regime was the main cause of their participation in military operations in Syria, but “desire to gain military experience for the subsequent fight against Chinese authorities.”

Realizing it, Beijing thought of the prospects to return Uyghurs home. In December, 2015 China adopted the first Anti-Terrorism Law allowing the Chinese army to conduct warfare on the territory of other countries. There were carried out the first military maneuvers outside China. However, it was not specified in what country. Possibly, in Somalia where in Djibouti where Beijing organized its first military base. In 2016 Beijing sent to Syria military advisers with the purpose to render assistance in training of contingent of armed forces. The Chinese military also wanted “to study methods of conducting combat operations – for example, counteractions to tunnel blowing up (when radicals dig tunnels under positions of government forces and blast them, causing collapses of armed objects exteriorly), fight against the equipment operated by suicide bombers.” Besides, Beijing cooperates with the governments of Kazakhstan and the states of

Central Asia for which the problem of repatriation of compatriots who were at war in the ranks of radical Muslim groups also became extremely relevant.

By the end of the Syrian war (and there is no doubt any more) foreign fighters from China and countries of Central Asia concentrated in Idlib. According to Murat Yetkin, the editor-in-chief of the Turkish newspaper "Hürriyet," "in Idlib province there are 60 thousand jihadi fighters, 15 thousand of them "foreigners": about 600 of the European countries, about 6 thousand from Chechnya and the Russian Caucasus and about 7 thousand from Central Asia, generally from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and also from China." In the summer of 2018 the Uyghur fighters concentrated around the city of Jisr al-Shughur (20 km from the Turkish border) where there is a base of the Uyghur TIM.

In September, 2018 Russia and Turkey signed the memorandum of stabilization of the situation near Idlib. It was also decided to create a zone of de-escalation which will separate the Syrian government forces and dissident armed forces. The refusal of clean-up operation on this territory demonstrates that there is an understanding of presence of a large number of civilian population there – wives and children of fighters and also locals. On September 28, 2018 the Russian minister of foreign affairs S. Lavrov said that heavy armament is being removed from Idlib. At the same time, along a humanitarian corridor Tel Sultan – Abu – al-Duhur, created by the Russian military, the city was abandoned by thousands of civilians. Fighters released only old men, women and children. There are grounds for believing that Turkey is engaged in the fate of the remained fighters and their families.

At the end of September, 2018 the Al Arabiya TV channel, reported that between Russia and Turkey there were serious disagreements concerning withdrawal of fighters. Russia demands to transfer the fighters leaving Idlib to government forces from Syria. In return, Turkey declaring concern of the prospect to receive a new wave of immigrants insists on sending fighters to territories controlled by Kurds. It confirms our thought that

Turkey seeks to strengthen its presence in the east of Syria, including at the expense of ethnically close fighters that is connected, first of all, with the aspiration of Turkey, not to allow creation of the Kurdish autonomy within Syria.

It should be noted that affiliation of the Uyghur jihadists with fighters “Hayat Tahrir al- Sham” (HTSh) can be costly for Uyghurs as this association where together with Jabhat al-Nusra other organizations of fighters joined, gained reputation of the most aggressive part of the armed Syrian opposition. HTSh which in November, 2013 was announced the only legal representative of Al-Qaeda in Syria is accused of numerous war crimes. Therefore wherever it is – in Idlib or in the east of Syria – it will be destroyed.

Nevertheless, the Uigur fighters have no other way out. Those who managed to leave Idlib earlier perhaps already moved to Afghanistan or Pakistan, but Beijing which does not want to return Chinese jihadists home, will try to make maximum effects to solve this problem outside China.

2019.02.015. FLERA SOKOLOVA, MARIA SHAVRINA. THE ISLAMIC DIASPORE IN FINLAND: DYNAMICS OF EVOLUTION, THE MUSLIM DIASPORA IN FINLAND: ITS DEVELOPMENT, ETHNIC SELF-ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION // “Islam in the Modern World,” Moscow, 2018, Vol. 14, № 2, P. 111–126.

Keywords; Islamic diasporas in Finland, Muslims, ethnic self-organization, socio-cultural adaptation and integration of migrants, language barrier, Tatars, Somalis, migrants of new wave.

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The article analyzes the dynamic changes of the Muslim population in Finland in historical retrospective and reveals the process of its ethno-cultural self-organization and the level of integration in Finnish society.

The authors turn to the history of the appearance of Muslims in Finland. The presence of representatives of Muslim religion in Finland has deep historical roots and is connected with the events of the early 19th century, namely, with the gradual process of resettling Finland and it becoming part of the Russian Empire due to the outcome of the Russo-Swedish war of 1808–1809. The ancestors of the present Tatars living in Finland began to resettle from the Russian Empire to Finland in the 19th century. Among the first were Tatar army soldiers dispatched to the fortresses of Vyborg and Sveaborg. In the 1870s – 1920s Tatars were moving to Finland from Sergach districts of Nizhni-Novgorod province on the Volga. As a rule, among them were quite a few merchants trading in furs and textiles. They settled in such Finnish cities as Helsinki, Turku, Rauma, Tampere, Pori, and others. At the turn of the 20th century the Tatar community in Finland numbered about 1,000.

After the proclamation of independence of Finland in 1917 the Tatars living there received Finnish citizenship and on the legal basis were named “historical traditional religious-ethnic minority.” Their number reached 800 and the overwhelming majority lived in Helsinki and Tampere. The Tatars are completely integrated in Finnish society, but at the same time they continue to preserve the

traditional features of their ethnic culture. On Finnish territory an Islamic Society of Tatars was set up in 1925, whose members also speak the Tatar language. The Society makes a tangible contribution to the preservation and development of the Tatar language and culture, organizes courses to study the foundations of Muslim religion and the native language, and issues the only Tatar-language magazine *Mahalla habarlale* (News of the Community). There is also a Tatar Cultural Society which organizes artistic performances, poetic readings, etc. since 1935. Prayer rooms for Tatar Muslims have been opened in several cities. The only mosque with a minaret working in Finland was built in Jarvenpyyaya in 1943. The House of Islam was opened in Helsinki in 1960, which is the venue for official meetings and ethno-confessional functions. The official authorities of Finland consider the integration of Tatars in Finnish society very successful. The Finnish Tatars are working practically in all branches, as entrepreneurs, lawyers, engineers and teachers, some of them hold high posts of the country's economy, including industry and cultural sphere. Tatars are represented in the Consultative Commission on ethnic relations at the Ministry of Justice of Finland. The Islamic community of Finland is taking part in the activity of the National Forum of cooperation of religion in Finland.

GORE, Finnish name - ISKOT, which unites representatives of three confessions - Christianity, Judaism and Islam - is called upon to help harmonize relations between representatives of different religions and the protection of the rights of religious minorities.

However, modern world realities, namely, differences in demographic development, intensification of migration processes, and greater scope of regional conflicts have considerably changed the number and ethnic composition of the representatives of Muslim religion in Finland. Finland has agreed to receive refugees from "troubled spots." At the end of the 1980s Finland began to accept forced migrants from Somalia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and

Kosovo Albanians. Simultaneously, there was an inflow of labor migrants from Turkey. As a result, in the period between 1990 and 1995 the number of people from Muslim countries coming to Finland reached 12,270. A big influx of refugees from Iraq, Syria and other countries has also reached Finland on the wave of the European migrant crisis. As a consequence, by 2016 the number of the Muslim population of Finland reached 82,000. Their share among the country's population grew from 0.05 percent in 1990 to 1.5 percent in 2026. At present the total number of foreign dwellers in Finland is 354,000, or 6.4 percent of the entire country's population. Twenty-three percent of them are Muslims, primarily Arabs from Iraq, Turks, Iranians, Kosovo Albanians, and people of Somali origin.

There are functioning mechanisms of interaction of state power with representatives of the Muslim communities in the country. For example, in 2006, at the Finnish government initiative the Islamic Council of Finland was set up, whose aim was to consolidate ethnically heterogeneous Islamic communities. The country has evolved mechanisms of socio-cultural adaptation of migrants, however, the efficiency of integration policy is determined by the duration of migrants' stay in the country and the level of their knowledge of the country's languages. Due to the weak incorporation of Muslims of the new wave in Finnish society, they are unable, so far, to become full-fledged citizens of the country and are subjected to a certain discrimination as far as employment is concerned. Trades and professions in which immigrants are engaged are mainly in the sphere of service and do not require high skill. The main problem of integration of Muslims is the language barrier.

Against the backdrop of a powerful migrant influx of the past few years Finnish society displays serious concern in connection with possible negative consequences of the phenomena, besides, nationalist sentiments have increased in the country.

The data of the sociological poll carried out by the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat show that 52 percent of Finns call

for the restriction of the number of migrants accepted by the country. After the terrorist act on August 18, 2017, in Turku committed by a migrant from Morocco, who had been denied permission to enter Finland earlier, concern of the country's population has noticeably grown.

Summing up, the authors of the article note that the Muslims living in Finland are represented by Tatars and migrants of a new wave at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. During the period from 1990 to 2016 the number of Muslims in Finland grew by 24 times over, from 0.05 percent to 1.5 percent. At present, it is only the Tatars that have been fully integrated in Finnish society. The adaptation centers are unable to cope with the influx of migrants of the past few years. Interethnic relations are made still more difficult by a poor knowledge of the native languages of Finland and penetration of extremist views with religious tint in Finnish society. A dialogue has been established and developed between the authorities and representatives of ethnic minorities and confessions, conditions have been created for the preservation and development of ethnic cultural public organizations. At the same time, this is accompanied with increasing xenophobic and nationalistic sentiments and manifestations, which put the need to correct Finnish migration policy to the fore.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

ANATOLIY KHAZANOV. REVIEW OF MONOGRAPH BY A.I. VAVILOV "CATAclysms OF THE 'ARAB SPRING'"* // *The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

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The Muse of history Clio often creates scenarios, which no writers with the richest imagination can invent. The "Arab spring" is among the most enigmatic historical phenomena of the past centuries. However, it is clear to all that this event was of crucial nature for all mankind. A historian should answer five questions pertaining to the event, namely, what, where, when, how, and why?

The main question is why?" Answer to it turns any historical work into an investigation, takes it beyond the limits of empirical description, and lends it analytical character.

And so, question No 1 – "What are the reasons for the 'Arab spring,' which destabilized the regions of the Middle East and North Africa for such a long time and created a serious threat to international security on a global scale?

A scientific reasoned answer to this question we can find in a new monograph by the well-known Russian scholar of the Orient, Professor Andrei Vavilov, DSc(History), entitled "Cataclysms of the 'Arab Spring.'"

On the basis of an analysis of a broad range of various sources and scholarly literature the author thoroughly studies the nature of the historic phenomenon, which was called the "Arab spring," and reveals its deep-lying internal and external reasons, and also vividly shows the crude outside interference in its affairs, which brought about a great ascent of terrorist activity, which then turned into a global challenge and threat to peace and security.

* "Biblos Consulting" Publishers, Moscow, 2018, 759 p.

Analyzing the reasons for Arab revolutions the author shows that a considerable role in them was played by the socio-economic, demographic and religious factors. A great many unresolved social problems have emerged in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa: unemployment, poverty, great class differentiation, social polarization, ethnic and confessional contradictions, diseases, etc.

The first heroic generation of the revolutionary leaders who headed the national-liberation revolutions (Nasser, Ben Bella, King Abdullah of Jordan, Arafat, and others) has passed away long ago, and new men came. As is known, revolutions are conceived by idealists, made by romantics, but it is scoundrels that use their fruits.

The first heroic generation of leaders in Arab countries was replaced by the second one of pragmatists of corrupt pragmatics.

As A. Vavilov justly emphasizes, along with these internal reasons of the "Arab spring," a great role was played by the external factor, namely, the interference of western powers, primarily, the United States, and the latter desires to preserve its dominating position in the life of the world.

The author cites concrete examples of certain Arab countries (Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and some others) to show the destructive influence of the West on processes of political and socio-economic transformation in Arab countries which gave birth to the dangerous phenomenon of the "Islamic state."

Rich factual material continued in the monograph vividly confirms the author's conclusion that the United States tried to force its political will and values on the independent countries of these regions. As a result, they have turned into a dangerous zone of permanent instability and protracted sanguinary conflicts, which maimed Syria and Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Destroying their statehood and vitally important infrastructure, undermining their territorial integrity, it threw them back for many long years into the backward past, and deprived of prospects of peaceful and beneficial development. Simultaneously, conflicts in certain countries created

favorable conditions or dangerous destabilization in the neighboring countries of Africa, the Mediterranean area and in Central Asia.

It should be added that bloody wars unleashed by western powers in Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria have exerted pernicious influence on the culture of Arab countries (just remember the tragic fate of the famous Palmira). Culture is fragile; it is the first to be destroyed in the epoch of conflicts.

The author of the monograph pays much attention to the position of Russia toward the "Arab spring." He shows that from the very beginning of the "Arab spring" in 2011 the Russian leadership consistently proceeded from the need to find peaceful political solutions to any conflicts. Russia welcomed the legitimate strivings of the Arab people for liberation from all shackles of the past and independent development. Moscow has always called for settling all disputes through a broad dialogue, taking into account the interests of all sections of society in each country.

A. Vavilov's monograph reveals the deep-lying internal and external reasons of the Arab revolutions early this century. It describes true facts and ideas about the "Arab spring," and also gives an opportunity for a further elaboration of this problem.

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

IGOR DOBAYEV. ISLAMIST "TAQFIR": DEFINITION OF "ENEMIES OF ISLAM"* // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World". Published in abridged form.*

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Keywords: jihad, Islam, Islamism, Koran, radicalism, taqfir.

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Abstract. The article examines the emergence and development of the term "taqfir" (accusation of "kufr," that is, impiety). This phenomenon is presented as it existed in early Islam, and also its changes in later years. The article also examines the views of representatives of orthodox Islam to and ideologists of radical Islamism. The point is that theorists of radical Islamism interpret the sacral sources of Islam and the Koran quite literally, augmenting the circle of the "enemies of Islam" and accusing them of "taqfir." The ideologists of radical Islam demand that their

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views be taken into account and followed, and that the offensive jihad be carried on against the “enemies.” In this connection the adepts of radical Islamism are justly called “taqfirite-Jihadists.”

Islam as a quite tolerant world religion comes out as one of peace, mercy and tolerance, which lie at the basis of the Koran and Sunna. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the inner factors, which radicalize Islam can be found in the texts of the sacred sources of Islam – the Koran and Sunna, as well as works by certain Islamic scholars, from Ahmad ibn-Hanbal (783–855) and Ibn-Taimiya (1263–1328), right up to the modern fundamentalist ideologists Al-Maududi (Pakistan), Sayyid Qutb and Aiman az-Zawahiri (Egypt), and others.

Analyzing the basic political and philosophical premises of the main doctrines in Islam one could single out certain common specificities lying at the basis of its radical component.

Among them is the “youth” of Islam, inasmuch as Muslim religion is the world’s youngest, it came into being much later than other world monotheistic systems, and has not exhausted its opportunities as yet. At its “young age” Christianity, for example also demonstrated its radicalism, having organized a whole series of “crusades” against Muslims. Today Islam is at its prime, playing a very active role in the modern world.

Another specific feature of Islam is its totality, which means its broad sweeping of all spheres of activity of believers. This includes not only faith, but also the economic and social order, state management, the family, and everyday life. The Sharia determines both legal and ethical relations. In a sum total it leads to Islam coming out as a way of life fully determining the world outlook and behavior of people. The ideologist of the fundamentalist organization “Muslim Brothers” S. Qutb notes in this connection that “Islam is the last complete message to mankind heralding prudence and including all-embracing understanding of human life leading people from ignorance to

divinity, real life, to the Sharia of Allah, their conscience and the fear of God.”

A characteristic feature of Islam as a system is its indissoluble link with politics. The Iranian author M. Sanai emphasizes that as compared to other religions Islam has the closest and broadest ties with politics and power as the most important means of the realization of its principles. This is why Muslims preserve a great interest in politics supported directly by Islamic teaching.

Another specificity is the idea of “completion of prophecy,” which means, in the interpretation of Muslim theologians, that Prophet Mohammed was the last envoy of God on this Earth of ours, “the seal of prophets,” and he brought the ultimate truth to mankind.

“The Islamic Appeal made by Prophet Mohammed is the last link in the long chain of appeals to Islam made by a whole range of noble envoys...” This testifies to the exclusive character of the Muslims as the chosen community and the special position of Islam as compared to other religions. “Islam has declared that people are disunited not by the color of their skin, their sex, origin, or territory but by faith, which is the connecting link between them and God and between themselves.” In other words, Muslims of all countries are similar, irrespective of ethnic, race or any other distinctions. These people formed by Islam comprise the uniform community – “ummah.” This is why Muslims, irrespective of the country they live in or come from are drawing to one another as brethren in faith. This explains the emergence of all and sundry pan-Islamic concepts propagating unity of all Muslims of the world in a single state.

In the perception of a radical Muslim the religious community of co-believers Muslims comes out as the main world value. S. Qutb writes that “the Muslim ummah of the people chosen and sanctified by God is the world’s best.” The fundamentalist current in Sunna Islam is also distinguished by idealization and mythologization of the state-political system, which existed in the Muslim world in the period of the rule of

Prophet Mohammed and the first four "righteous" caliphs (Abu-Bakr, Omar, Osman, Ali) as well as the striving to its rebirth.

The intellectual and political movement aimed at the return to the foundations of the religion of Islam was called "Salaphism (or fundamentalism in western science). Supporters of Salaphism demand that Muslims should in all their actions, beliefs, standards and rules follow everything what existed in the period of initial Islam.

It should be noted that the very logic of returning to the primary source material in order to correct shortcomings has emerged along with time, and human imperfection is quite legitimate from the point of view of religious consciousness. Moreover, for Muslim civilization such logic seems to be a basic model ensuring the preservation and development of the spiritual tradition and social and religious self-consciousness. Throughout the entire history of Islam the turning to the sources and foundation of tradition has been a means of overcoming a crisis and degradation during the transition epoch. However, as the author of the article "Wahhabism: History of the Problem" Idris Abdullah emphasizes, "the real overcoming of this crisis could be achieved only along with the fully adequate understanding of the spirit and letter of Islamic teaching."

Modern Salaphite literature is full of loading the period of the "golden age" of Islam. For example, the Pakistani author Al Maududi, the founder of the modern fundamentalist organization "Jamaat-i-Islami," idealizes the state of early Islam and writes: "Modern Muslim believer is dreaming of the ideal society founded by Prophet Mohammed. Each Muslim regards that stage as a blessed period and wishes it to return." S. Qutb repeats his thoughts by saying that "there were never so many good people as during the first year of the emergence of Islam."

Another specific feature of radical Islam is its fatalism, Muslim enthusiasm, bellicose character, and striving for world domination.

One of the first problems in monotheistic Islam was the predestination and compatibility of the existence of autocratic God with evil present in this world of ours. Supporters of the theory of absolute predestination were named "Jabarites" (from the word "jabar" - "coercion," "violence"). Ideas about dependence of all human actions, just as of everything taking place in the world. On divine will were explained by Jabarites in the Koran.

The main aim of the dogma of divine predestination is the absolute fulfillment of the will of God, and in real life its Prophet and Caliph on earth. The theory of Jabarites about predestination of human behavior and deeds through divine will had a great practical significance inasmuch as on its basis the rights of any persons or groups, who have gained political power, were asserted. The dogma of predestination proved an important spiritual instrument in the period of aggressive wars, for from it followed that no matter what danger threatened a Muslim's life, he will not perish, if he has not been predestined to die, and that is why it led to fanaticism and fearlessness.

Muslim enthusiasm is in direct connection with fatalism. It also stems from the ideological essence of Islam and its system. Religious enthusiasm in Islam is expressed very emotionally, especially in relation to co-believers. Islam demands that all its adepts should strictly adhere to the Koran and its ideas and premises in all practical deeds.

The development of religious fanaticism in Islam was also due to such premises as belief in after-life and Dies Irae, paradise and hell, and also belief that the "shahid will get to paradise..."

The outstanding Muslim legal expert Abu-Yusuf (733-798) and Supreme Judge at the time of Harun ar-Rashid, telling about Islamic fanaticism in the conditions of Muslim expansion, said that it played an important role as one of the ideological factors. The conquest of alien territories was taking place under the slogans of Islam, all the more so because the Koran fixes the ideas of the need to seize the entire world by the Muslims as the executors of the

mission of Allah. Islam in this case fulfilled the ideological function of justifying Muslim wars of conquest.

Modern radical Islamic thinkers do not abandon the ideas of world domination, claiming that the future of mankind belongs precisely to Islam. For one, S. Qutb in his work "Future Belongs to Islam" writes that "Islam in compasses all mutually connected and mutually dependent elements regulating all spheres of human life." He is seconded by theologian al-Maududi, saying: "...Islam is not a substance of the past or the future. It is the immortal, eternal truth evident and indisputed already millions of years ago, and it will remain such until the heaven and earth exist."

Islam as a religion is characterized by intolerance, which is expressed in that the orthodox believers feel their superiority over the infidels, and it has existed since a long time ago at the state level: the Muslim pays lighter taxes and is exempt from capitation. The infidel has always been regarded in a Muslim state as unequal person. One of the most characteristic features of Islam is superiority and intolerance toward the adepts of other religions. The feeling of a better way of life combined with totality and all-roundness of Islam has always been the earnest of extreme conservatism and conformism of Muslims. Naturally, all this could not but be reflected in the standards of behavior and value orientations of all members of the Muslim ummah, but ultimately on the mind of people, or to be more precise, on their social psychology.

Hence, the aim of radical Muslims to fight the enemy ("kafir," "infidel"), that is, people born Muslims, who do not use their abilities and intellect for recognizing their God and Creator. Moreover, they use wrongly the freedom of choice, choosing the rejection of God. Such people become unbelieving, who are called "KAFIR" in the language of Islam.

In a broad sense of the word, under "infidels" the radicals mean the non-Muslim society, as a whole, including communist society, as well as societies of India, Japan and Africa, which adhere to deification of anyone else but Allah. These include

Christian and Jewish societies. Similar views of radical Islamic fundamentalism are shared by the well-known adept of Islamic fundamentalism E. Khattab from Jordan. Indeed, Islam contains numerous calls for fighting the infidels. It is permeated with enmity toward the apostates of Islam and all those who do not recognize Allah as the only God.

The Koran forbids friendly relations of Muslims with non-Muslims. It fosters intransigence and enmity toward them. Quite a few premises of the Koran even call for physical punishment of unorthodox people. Moreover, in some ayats there is a call on Muslims to kill the obstinate unorthodox people.

No wonder that radical Islamists are quite hostile to people of Scripture. In the view of Islamic radicals, the Koran also outlines "the ultimate aims of Judaists and Christians with regard to Muslims. We should emphasize that in theories of practically all radical Islamist groupings and organizations there are two systemic premises inherent in fundamental Islam - one on Taqfir and one on jihad. The main object of taqfir is, above all, those Muslims who do not agree with the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and therefore are proclaimed unbelieving by Salaphites.

Radical fundamentalists concluded that there are only two varieties of human societies: Islamic society and jahidist society. Islamic religious convictions and Islamic ethical standards are realized in the former, but Islam is not realized in jahidist society.

Islamists, in contrast to representatives of orthodox Islam, broaden at will the circle of objects of taqfir, absolutizing the concept of "unbelief" ("kufir") and "polytheism" ("shirk").

Proclaiming strict monotheism, Islamists and their followers brand "infidels" and "polytheists" all those, who, in their view, are not "monotheist". According to them, the category of the "enemies of Islam" includes: Judaists and Christians.

However, it is not only works of Islamist ideologists, but also the Scripture of Islam, as we have already noted, that contains calls to fight the infidels. It is permeated with enmity and hatred for

apostates of Islam and those who do not recognize Allah as the only one God.

Muslims-apostates (murtadd) retreat from the principle of monotheism. These retreats include glorification of the righteous, warship of idols, astrology, forecasts of various type, glorification of any person, and other things and actions. In the view of ideologists of radical Salaphism, such people do great harm to Islam, inasmuch as they are capable to deceive, lie, envy, etc., as a result of which "non-believers may think that Islam allows all these crimes.

According to a traditionalist approach, accusation of taqfir is a Sharia decision which should be taken on the basis of the Koran and Sunna. In dubitable cases the punishment prescribed by the Sharia law is not applied.

Following a warning of the Prophet and Muslim tradition no Muslim can call another Muslim non-believer until the moment when he himself publicly admits it. This premise has specially been stipulated and considered very important, because apostasy was considered one of the gravest sins and punished by death.

In order to pass a Sharia decision on non-belief it was necessary to have several reasons and conditions and also the absence of certain obstacles.

Radical Islamists have a different approach to "taqfir." For instance, the chief ideologist of the Egyptian "Muslim Brothers" Sayyid Qutb directly says that there are only two parties on this Earth of ours: the party of Allah and the party of shaitan. The party of Allah exists and acts under the Banner of Allah. And the party of shaitan includes all the rest who are not shaded by the banner of Allah.

Adherence to atheist currents like Communist, secular, democratic, capitalist, or the like is regarded apostasy by the religion of Islam. This list also contains "antireligious secularism, oppressive capitalism, Marxist socialism, and atheist masonry. As to Judaism and world Zionism, they stand behind each of these

destructive doctrines undermining morals and spiritual values and rejecting the Sharia law.

2019.02.016. OLGA CHIKRIZOVA. "ECUMENISM" IN ISLAM: HISTORICAL MILESTONES IN OVERCOMING OF SUNNI-SHI'A ANTAGONISM // *Ekonomicheskie, socialno-politicheskie, etnikonfessionalnye problemy afro-aziatskih stran. Pamyati L.I. Rejsnera. Yearbook 2018, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS. Moscow: IW RAS, 2018. – 228 p.*

Keywords: Sunni-Shi'a antagonism, "ecumenism" in Islam, Najaf conference (1743), pan-Islamism, Jamā'at al-taqrīb, R.M. Khomeini.

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This article is devoted to the problem of overcoming Sunni-Shi'a antagonism in the history of Islam. The author dwells on two major Islamic trends and proves that they are initiated "from above" and caused by political rather than religious motives.

The author examines the problem of overcoming Sunni-Shi'a antagonism in the history of Islam, and analyzes attempts to draw these two Islamic trends closer. The urgency of the subject is prompted by the more frequent confrontations of these trends accompanied by frequent bloodshed.

At the beginning of the article the author points to the fact that the problem of the confrontation of the two trends – Sunna and Shi'a – in Islam becomes very urgent again today. After the intrusion of the U.S. troops in Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, after the "Arab spring" events, the situation in Islam has considerably aggravated. Sunni-Shi'a conflicts are ripening in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Struggle for

regional leadership in the Middle East is going on between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in which the two states often play on Sunni-Shi'a contradictions.

In this connection the author notes a very timely character of investigating the problem of ecumenism in Islam, historical attempts to draw Sunnites closer to Shi'ites and their analysis with a view to finding peaceful ways to resolve Sunni-Shi'a contradictions. The author determines the concept of ecumenism in order to understand whether it fits to describe the processes of overcoming Sunni-Shi'a differences. The concept "ecumenism" was initially used to term the Christian movement based on the idea to reach religious unity of all trends of Christianity. However, subsequently, the interpretation of "ecumenism" has become broader, meaning "inter-religious dialogue." But "ecumenism" in Islam will represent not philosophical deliberations on the subject of overcoming dogmatic distinctions between the Sunnites and Shi'ites. The author proposes to use another term, more apt to describe the process of Sunnite-Shi'ite contradictions, which took several stages.

Turning to history, the author notes that having begun as an argument concerning the views on the principle of electing the descendant of Prophet Mohammed, that is, due to the problem of succession of power, Sunni-Shi'a antagonism has acquired the nature of confrontation between the principles of faith, system of the perception of the surrounding world, and views on relations between religion and the state. In reality the dogmatic differences between Sunnism and Shi'ism are insignificant.

As to the world outlook, the Sunnites accept reality as a success and glory of Islam, and the Shi'ites regard the world as the kingdom of injustice and suppression.

The first attempt to overcome Sunni-Shi'a antagonism in the prolonged history of internal Islamic confrontation was undertaken by Caliph al-Mamun (813-833), who accepted moderate Shi'a concepts compatible with Sunni principles and tried to unite them ideologically in a single community of

believers. Another attempt was undertaken by Abbasid caliphs al-Qadir and al-Caim, who initiated joint accusing manifestos (in 1011 and 1052) signed by Sunni and Shi'a legal experts.

The most popular attempt to draw Sunnism and Shi'ism closer was made at the Najaf conference in 1743 organized by Nadir-Shah with a view to stopping theological disputes concerning the status of the followers of the Prophet. Nadir-Shah was striving to overcome religious and ethnic confrontation in his multinational army, which consisted of Uzbeks and Afghans believing in Sunna Islam, and Iranian Shi'as called "infidels" (kyafirs). "Ecumenical" policy of Nadir-Shah, which had mostly political than religious aims, came to an end after his assassination in 1747. At the end of the 19th century the Osmans also examined a possibility of drawing closer to Shi'ites on the basis of the ideology of pan-Islamism. This step was conditioned by two factors: outside threats weakening the Empire and propaganda of Shi'ism in Iraq, which led to mass conversion of Iraqi Arabs into Shi'ites. The Young Turks also pursued this policy, having mobilized Shi'ites who were fighting hand-in-hand with the Turkish army in the "sacred war" against the British.

In the 20th century nationalist ideology in two forms - pan-Arabism and state patriotism - was able to reconcile both Sunni and Shi'a on the basis of the common language, ethnic origin and striving to oppose western intrusion in their region. Moreover, the ideology of Arab nationalism opposed confessional predilections which threatened to undermine loyalty to the Arab nation and, consequently, fought against what was called "confessionalism." Nevertheless, Arab nationalism was unable to overcome Sunni-Shi'a antagonism. Arab nationalism, in its essence, was not fully secular and contained Islamic gradations, such as lauding the first generations of Muslims, or the Arab dynasty of the Omayyades, which negatively influenced Sunni-Shi'a relations. Many Shi'ites felt that Arab nationalism was a synonym of Sunnism aimed at preserving the domination of Sunnites and relegating Shi'ites to the position of second-grade Arabs. "Confessionalism" has become

the main derogatory term in Arab political thinking, and both the Sunnites and Shi'ites used it as a weapon, accusing each one of pursuing confessional policy.

The common outside threat to the independence and identity of the Muslim community has helped the Sunnites and Shi'ites to reach temporary solidarity. For example, this was demonstrated by demonstrations against the conquest of Libya by Italy in 1911, proclamation of jihad by the Shi'ites against the allied states at the beginning of World War I, joint actions at the early stages of the anti-British uprising in Baghdad in 1920, as well as the Shi'ite support of the Palestinians in their anti-Zionist struggle at the Muslim congress in Jerusalem in 1931. However, these episodes have not brought them to a prolonged peace between the Sunnites and Shi'ites.

In the late 1950s Iran and Egypt undertook another attempt to overcome this antagonism. In 1947 Islamic scholars of history of Iran and Egyptian political figures set up an association to bring Islamic sects entitled "Jamā'at at-Taqrīb" closer together. This movement reached the peak of its activity in 1959. This organization fell victim to the break-up of relations between Egypt and Iran after the latter recognized the State of Israel in 1960.

"Ecumenism" was used by states as an instrument of overcoming periodic political crises through religion, but all attempts failed through, and the sides have not reached religious reconciliation.

The ideology of ayatolla R.M. Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979, whose aim was to create a single Muslim community - "ummah" - was of a general Islamic character. After the "Islamic revolution" in Iran the "ecumenical movement" in the region has spread considerably largely due to the fear of Iran's leadership disliked by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. Anti-Shi'ite literature emphasizing the destructive role of Persians and Shi'ites in the Arab history of Islam was spreading far and wide.

“Islamic renaissance” inspired by the Shi’ites has turned against the Shi’ites themselves. The Iranian regime and its ideology have become the main challenge to the Sunnite states and played the role of a factor consolidating the Sunna part of the Islamic world on the anti-Iranian foundations. This was graphically demonstrated by the creation of the Council of Arab states of the Persian Gulf in 1981 on the initiative and under the domination of Saudi Arabia. Tension in the relations between the Arab Sunna states and Iran continues to grow. In this connection Iran has started to implement the “soft power” policy in order to demonstrate to the world community that for the Iranian leadership Sunnism and Shi’ism are “twin-brothers.”

Finally, the author makes a conclusion that all attempts to overcome the Sunni-Shi’a antagonism have been due not to the desire of the two sides to do away with disagreements in the Islamic world, but only to political expediency. In this connection the most correct term which could aptly describe the attempts to overcome Sunni-Shi’a contradictions would be not “ecumenism,” but “rapprochement.”

At present a process is going on, which is opposed to rapprochement. Sunni-Shi’a contradictions are purposefully fanned up by various forces with a view to aggravating them still further, and also sharpening the competition for regional leadership, broadening the religious foundation under the traditional struggle of states for the implementation of their national interests. However, in this situation there is still an opportunity for a new rapprochement on the ground of opposition to the common enemy - religious extremism and terrorism. Iraq headed by Shia al-Abadi demonstrates the first steps on the road to national rapprochement of the Sunni and Shi’s communities which are trying to overcome their differences for the sake of the destruction of such a threat as the “Islamic state” grouping. But it is not possible to predict whether another attempt to reach Sunni-Shi’a rapprochement will prove successful, inasmuch as too many

factors influence the Middle-East policy and relations between Islamic countries.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

MUSLIM ATAEV. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN ISLAM // *English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: children's rights, family problems, matrimonial relationships, family law, Qur'an and Hadiths, Ustrushani, Sahib al-Fusul.

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Abstract: This article examines the significance and role of the rights of children in Islam, which are interpreted in the work of Muhammad ibn Mahmud Ben Hussein Majuddin Al-Ustrushan "Jami' ahkam al-şighar" ("Rights of minor children"), their peculiar properties, socio-economic, cultural educational background.

Uzbekistan embodies experience of the state starting with the ancient Sogdiana and Khorezm, Samanids state, Khorezmshahs, Timur and the Timurids, and the historical experience of our ancient nation with its age-old dream of its own state. The Uzbek state and law are inseparably combine unity of universal and national statehood, and develop in accordance with spiritual potential of our civilization accounting more than three thousand years.

Legal culture of people in Maverannah derives from its civilization, common and state culture, morality of the nations. Long-living cultural tradition part of which is the legal tradition is operating not only in area of official statehood, but also in the moral regulation in the nations and people. Here is the value of historical, cultural and legal traditions of people of Maverannah.

A notable feature of the historical development of Uzbek ancestors in antiquity and the Middle Ages was the impact and interaction with the cultural and legal traditions not only of China, India, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, but also the Assyrian-Babylonian, Achaemenid law. It is almost impossible to separate the Uzbek legal culture from the Arab-Islamic culture of *fiqh*, which is in its essence not only religious, legal, but also social and regulatory in a wide sense.

Interference and interaction of different legal cultures and traditions have existed always and everywhere as one of the sources of law enrichment and human mind. As a rule, fastening and mixture of different cultures brought to reality new people and nations, new civilizations and traditions.

Islam emerged as a religion in the VII A. D., gradually becomes faith and ideology, philosophy and way of Muslims life at the same time, their divine law. In this sense, it has played a vital role for future of the East as a unifier of various cultures, traditions, customs, and contributed to a merger and cultural enrichment of the nations, as well as to a formation of new cultures and nations on the basis of Islamic civilization.

The Arab-Islamic civilization apprehended and subsequently transferred to the Europeans a variety of achievements of ancient Greeks and the later achievements of the Hellenistic period and the Roman domination in the Middle East, having learned certain elements of the Aramaic, Iranian, Indian and Chinese cultures. Already in the first century of Islam, Muslims have appeared in India, Spain, and in the west of China, and south of France. Of particular significance the intercultural and interethnic communication occurred in the Muslim Spain, or, as it was called by Arabs, the country *al-Andalus*. For the Ottoman Empire, a conglomerate of various peoples and quite colorful in the national and cultural sense, Islam was often the only common thread. It acted not only as the state religion and official ideology, but also as a cementing start in life of such a diverse power and mixed in terms of national and religious respect society as a powerful

culture-forming factor despite a significant proportion of non-Muslims.

As a result of the Arab conquest of Maverannahr, the country with rich cultural and legal traditions was introduced with Islam and Sharia. From that time it started the centuries-old interaction, which incorporates elements of the Middle Eastern civilization and law with local cultural and legal traditions.

The term “Maverannahr” is derived from the Arabic “mavara’a an-nahr” – that side of the river. First the word appeared in the third quarter of the VII century, when Arabs conquered Khorasan and came to the Amu Darya River and began to make the first forays into the land lying on the other side of the river. Gradually, with advancement of the Arabs to the north of Amu Darya, the geographical concept of “Maverannahr” filled with more specific content and expanded through addition of new territories, which included not only Sogd, Ferghana, Ustrushan, Isfidzhab, Huttal, Ilac and Shash, but even in some periods Mevra, Khorezm and partly Turkestan, although they were not part of the rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya. In the X–XIII centuries Maverannahr, due to number of reasons of political, economic and cultural origin, turned from the geographical concept into a political one. It started to imply the territory of Central Asia with the Muslim population.

Juridical and cultural value of Maverannahr to medieval people was in its integration capabilities that went beyond of only the Muslim world into the culture and science of India, that after the defeat Zoroaster preserved the knowledge of its scientists in Khorezm.

Ethnicity of Central Asia was multinational. In addition to the Uzbeks and other Turkic nations, Maverannahr was inhabited by representatives of other countries and nations – Indians, Tibetans, Arabs and vice versa: in many Eastern countries lived immigrants from Maverannahr. In these cities there were even rabad of Khorezmians, street of people from Fergana, Ustrushan, Bukhara, etc.

Despite the geographical distance from a center of the Muslim world, Maverannahr was one of the regions with a developed economy, culture, science that found manifestation in the extensive cultural, trade and other ties.

Cultural links was in a wide mutual flow of scientists, poets, writers and theologians. Bukhara and Khorezm, Samarkand and Merv were considered as major educational and research centers, where people come to study from the Maghreb, Andalusia, Azerbaijan, Tabaristan, Khorasan and other places. However, scientists of Maverannahr in a search for knowledge reached Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.

Wide links of Maverannahr with the world and a relatively high level of literacy of its inhabitants have contributed to a widespread dissemination of once famous such humanitarian professions, as "faqih" - lawyer, "alim" - scientist, "mutakallim" - theologian, "adib" - writer, "nadim" - counselor, teacher, etc.

The links were largely influenced by religious situation in Maverannahr with specific religious tolerance. Religion played an important role in the lives of the nations in Maverannahr and to some extent influenced on social progress. The major part of population of Maverannahr were Muslims even though the representatives of Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism also inhabited this territory. At the same time, Islam itself represented variety of gossips and movements.

Despite belonging to the Sunni some of the residents of Maverannahr were Shiites of various sects, particularly, the Shiite sect of Alavists who every morning were leaving their village in a direction of the sun to meet their messiah. In addition, there were representatives of such schools as Mutazilism, Nadzhzharizm, Dzhahmizm, Kerramizm, which were subdivided into smaller directions, as well as the representatives of Sufism, dwellings of which (khanaka, rabats) gradually were transformed into trading centers, in particular, into Caravanserais changing its original function and starting to play a major role in trade relations.

It is necessary to emphasize not only the influence of Shiites, Karmats and Sufis on development of legal thought in Maverannahr, but also of Sunnis like Ghazali, Bukhari, on their commonality in understanding of human value.

The main Sunni legal and theological madhhab (gossip) in Maverannahr was hanifism. However, according to al-Muqaddasi, some areas of Maverannahr, such as Shash, Ilac, around Bukhara, Taraz, Sugnak, Khiva were dominated by supporters of the right-wing Shafi legislation. One can also find reference on the existence of adherents Maliki school of law in Maverannahr. These data allow us to clarify the statement that "the Turkic people in line with adoption of Islam also adopted the Hanafi law."

Legislation of any country is an inseparable part of the national heritage, in a sense is a product of tradition, heritage of ancestors and a way of expressing of a given society. It is impossible to imagine the law of Maverannahr apart from sharia or Islamic law. Maverannahr jurists while referring to the works on Islamic law created earlier, made a significant contribution to doctrinal design and development of Shariah. They came to forefront as the scholars of Islamic law famous throughout the Islamic world - the commentators of the Qur'an, collectors of Hadis, fakih and muhaddith. Their works had a significant influence to development of the Islamic culture and law.

For more than ten centuries legal consciousness of the people of Uzbekistan and throughout Central Asia was primarily determined by the norms and traditions of Shariah and adat. Sharia acted not only as a religious system, but also was a complex of institutions including social and spiritual life of society and have a profound impact on historical and legal traditions, moral views of people and their way of life. Social life has not created for the Muslims other rules than the religious rules integral part of which was the Sharia.

The legal system of Maverannahr was based on the principles and provisions of the Sharia. Similarly to all Muslim countries of the Middle Ages, in Central Asia civil, contract, land,

marriage and family, inheritance relations were governed by the Hanafi direction of Islamic law. Criminal cases and legal proceedings were conducted based upon the same norms. In addition, the Shariah has incorporated many of the provisions of local customary law, i.e. the traditional setting of the Central Asian nations that have the generalized Arabic name of "adapt."

Starting from the tenth century in Maverannahr mainly in big cities were established madrassas, Islamic schools for the training of lawyers and preachers, i.e. theological and legal education institutions teaching Sharia.

Maverannahr gave to the Muslim world extensive theological and legal literature. Only the Bukhara madrasa in 1843 accounted for more than 103 manuals of the Islamic law, which indicates on origin and spread of the unique Maverannahr's Sharia school of law.

Application of Sharia in real life is possible only at its legal development, systematization and clarification by the Muslim faqih. Works of the Maverannahr jurists had not only local importance, but also general Muslim, became widely known in all Muslim countries. "We can say without exaggeration that Central Asia has given to the Muslim world the latest edition of Sharia." Maverannahr jurists have played a crucial role in revival and development of Hanafi centers in Syria, Egypt and Asia Minor, creation of the most authoritative books of Sharia which are also followed currently Sunni Muslims of the world - such as "Ḥidāya" written in Margilan, "Akaid" - in Bukhara, "Ḥikmat-ul-'ayn" - in Samarkand, Fakhrudīn Ḥasan bin Maḥmūd from Ferghana and Ubaidullah-bin Maḥsud from Bukhara wrote papers "Kazyhan" and "Mukhtasar" respectively which were translated from Arabic into other languages and reprinted in various places.

Among the most popular and famous legal proceedings of jurists in the Maverannahr can be distinguished "Fasoul-i-Ist-Ravshani", "Fasoul-ul-Inari", "Baḥr-ar-Raiḥ", "Jāmi'-ur-Rumūz," "Tagzib-ul-Fakhri" and others. The authors of these works have been the unquestioned authority in interpretation of Sharia norms

and enjoyed wide popularity in the whole Muslim world. Therefore, their opinion has had a mandatory power on a resolution of specific legal disputes. Agreed or unanimous consensus of the Muslim jurists called *Ijma* and was the third most important source of *Sharia* after *Quran* and *Sunnah*.

In their writings, Muslim jurists have sought to adapt to some extent the separate legal norms to local conditions. To resolve a specific issue on the basis of *Sharia*, judges usually addressed not to the *Quran* or *Sunnah*, but one of those books or collections, which were considered in the state as authority. Judges and other religious clerks who applied *Sharia* in solving specific legal matters had to refer to the particular books or collections, and not to the primary sources of Islamic law. In this sense, works of the Muslim jurists were some kind of source of law.

Thus, scientists of *Maverannah* made great contributions to the development of various Islamic disciplines such as *Sharia*, wrote works that gained a worldwide popularity. Many libraries of the world contain the manuscripts of *Maverannahs* jurists in *fiqh*, *uṣūl al-Din*, the *hadith* written back in the IX–XII centuries. Part of these works is reflected in the directories of *Brockelmann C.*, *Rio*, *Kitab*, *Celebi*, the other part is presented in the manuscript collections and libraries of the world.

Maverannah was one of the main centers which designed and developed *Hanafi mazhhab* of law. *Hanafi mazhhab* of law is one of the four *Sunni* schools of *Islam*. *Yaḳqūb Abū Yūsuf* (died in 795) of *Kufa* and *Muḥammad bin al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī* (died 805), disciples of a founder of this school of thought, famous *faqih Abū Ḥanifa* (698–767), played a significant role in design, development and spread of *Hanifism* that arose in *Iran*.

Hanafi school of law was widely spread in many parts of the *Arab Caliphate*, including *Maverannah*. This is explained by such specific features of the *mazhhab* as flexibility, liberalism, wide use of local customary law (*adat*, *urf*). Only *faqih*, expert of the sacred religious law, could publicly speak out about the actions of the authorities, to judge about the compliance of local customs and

traditions to the ideals and norms of Islam, to make judgement that issued in the form of a fatwa. When making a decision, jurists were independent of the authorities, which often led to their persecution by the latter. Fakih who enjoyed respect in his community was addressed by the residents of the region regarding to various issues of life, work, personal and social life. Fakih tried to keep up with life. Provisions of the Hanafi school of law allowed for changing outdated solutions based on changes in the human lives. Maverannahs faqih took credit for fixing the local customs, traditions and legal systems in the Hanafi school of thought.

Scientists of Maverannah during XI-XIII centuries made up of more than 300 works on fiqh, which occupy an important place in the history of world of religious and legal thought. They are important in two respects:

First, make a separate stage in the scientific development of Hanafi mazhab in overall Muslim scale;

Second, reflect characteristics of the regional form of Islam in Central Asia.

However, a study of the legal heritage of the fiqh school of Maverannah is in infant stage. Several works on the Islamic theology (kalam, akaid) methodology of the Islamic law (“Uṣūl al-fiqh”) have been published. Most works on the practical part of law (“furū’ al-fiqh”) remain in manuscript. In such situation, a rigorous study of the heritage of the Hanafi fiqh becomes an urgent task.

Study of works of such a prominent scientist as Majd al-dīn Abū al-Faḥ Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd bin al-Ḥusayn bin Aḥmad al-dīn al-Ustrūshānī, author of many outstanding works, a follower of great faqih Burhān al-dīn al-Margīnānī is of a double importance. On the one hand, his life and works fall on a last period of flourishing of the Samarkand school of fiqh interrupted by the Mongol conquest. On the other hand, his creative activity continued during the Mongol period, about which in science there are still conflicting opinions. It was during this period when in the life of Muslim community upheavals occurred which are still

unknown to science. To clarify some aspects of these issues a valuable material provided in the works of Majd al-din al-Ustrūshani, who lived during these two distinctive periods.

In Uzbekistan recently there has been a great interest in the teachings of Hanafi mazhab and contribution of Maverannah scholars to the development of theological and legal school of Islam. Under the framework of studying the Maverannah school of fiqh the following questions become relevant:

First, degree of interaction of Islamic and national elements;

Second, how absorbed the old religious experience of the local population;

Thirdly, whether it will be able to resist to the process of politicization of religion, whether it contains the features of non-political religious ideology;

Fourth, is there any point in reanimation of the medieval doctrine, whether it will be able to resist to penetration of foreign studies under the banner of fundamentalism and reformation?

To our opinion, study of activities and works of such an outstanding faqih as Majd al-Din al-Ustrūshani provides positive answers to these questions.

Abū al-Faḥ Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd bin al-Ḥusayn bin Ahmad al-Ustrūshani came from Ustrūshana, lived at the late XII and early XIII centuries in Maverannah. Major part of the life of Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshani passed in Samarkand. His life coincided in time with the final period of the Samarkand school of fiqh and the start of the Mongols conquest of Samarkand. At the time, his fans and contemporaries called him "Jalāl ad-dīn" - "The greatness of the Islamic faith and religion." Value and historical significance of his scientific legacy is defined not only by a fact that he attempted to resolve the most pressing and not researched before him religious problems of the time, but also by a fact that he provided a fair, coherent, historically justified and life-backed characteristic to all issues he touched.

The formation and development of Islamic jurisprudence did not touch upon just theoretical issues, but also issues like how to

apply the codes and laws. His works served as guidelines of how and in what angles should be interpreted this or that disputed case, how to hold assize, as well as how to achieve a fair solution for both parties. He earned respect by the fact that a solution of various issues proposed by him did not cause any disputes or misunderstandings of the Muslim community. His works clearly and specifically provide an understanding on the basis of everyday examples of such rights and obligations as personal rights, responsibility for violations, civil rights, heritage rights, economic and rights to property, family law, procedural law, etc.

A scientist is briefly praised in the extant manuscripts and they mainly refer to his works. It is also reported about Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshanī in the works from the series of *tabaqat* limited and sometimes repetitive information. Authors such as ‘Abdulqādir bin Abī-l-Wafā’ al-Qurashī (d. 775/1373), Mustafā ‘Abdullah Ḥajjī Xalīfa (d. 1067/1657), ‘Abdulḥay al-Laknavī (d. 1304/1886), and Khayr ad-dīn az-Zirīklī mentioning al-Ustrūshanī give a short list of his works. Their information in many cases looks quite similar.

A. Muminov was one of the modern scholars in the Uzbek Islamic studies who first informed of Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshanī and his works. Sh.S. Kamaliddinov in his Candidate degree dissertation “*Kitāb al-ansāb*” Abū Sa’d ‘Abd al-Karīm bin Muḥammad bin Maṣṣūr al-Tamīmī al-Sam’ānī as a source on history and cultural history of Central Asia” gives information about the Ustrushan region and some Ustrūshans. But Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshanī lived in the late XII – the first half of the XIII century and that is why he was not mentioned in the “*Kitāb al-ansāb*” as-Sam’ānī.

Another found work by al-Ustrūshanī is the essay “*al-As’ila wa-l-ajwiba*” (“Questions and answers”), which was kept at the Institute of Oriental Studies named after Abu Rayhan Beruni of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan (hereinafter IOAS). This piece of work has still not been recorded in the works

of the *tabaqat* genre and has not attracted the attention of modern researchers.

As M.R. Atayev correctly pointed out, existing sources and studies provide evidence that Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshanī died in 632/1234–1235, but the year of his birth was not mentioned. The following is written in the final part of a newly discovered works of the scientist “*As’ila wa-l-ajwiba*”: “... But the days have turned away from me like a sixty-year-old limping woman, pulling her shawl. ... The next morning after finishing the book lit up the afternoon of the day of the sixth month of zu al-kada in 637 of Hijra.” Hence it is clear from this data that the scientist was still alive in 637/1240, he was 60 years old. Therefore, al-Ustrūshanī did not die in 632/1234–1235, as indicated in other available sources. If the scientist finished this work on May 28, 637/1240 at the age of 60, then one can determine his birth year as 577/1182. But the year of scientist’s death still remains unclear. M.R. Atayev comes to such a conclusion.

It should be noted that the family environment has played a large role in formation of thinking and scientific views of al-Ustrūshanī. There is every reason to believe that he was the successor of the faqih dynasty since his father Maḥmūd once had an honorable nickname *Jalāl al-dīn* (the greatness of religion), and his uncle, Aḥmad bin al-Ḥusayn al-Ustrūshanī was called *Burhān ad-dīn* (document of religion). There is also evidence that his maternal grandfather was called “*Shams al-a’imma*” (the Sun of Imams), and maternal uncle Muḥammad bin Aḥmad had the nickname “*Shams ad-dīn*” (the Sun of Religion). As pointed out by M.R. Atayev, Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshanī was a mufti and was considered to be one of the *muzhtahids* of his era.

Scientific contribution to the development of Islamic law by Ustrūshanī was determined by a fact that the scientist tried to answer many public, interpersonal, social and legal issues of the contemporary period from the angle of logic and the observance of rights of all parties involved. His known works are “*Kitāb al-fuṣūl*”, “*Jāmi’ aḥkām al-ṣiḡhār*”, “*Qurrat al-aynayn fī Iṣlāh*

al-Dāryn", "al-Fatāwā", "al-Qurūḍ wa-d-duyūn", "al-As'ila wa-l-ajwiba" and others.

The second work of Majduddīn al-Ustrūshanī is called "Jāmi' aḥkām al-ṣighār" ("Law on minor children"). He finished the work on 28 July, 625/1228. The work "Jāmi' aḥkām al-ṣighār" is considered to be the largest and most significant works on fiqh. It is necessary to emphasize the fact that this treatise is on the rights of children in Islamic jurisprudence. The treatise was written in 1228 and is the most significant and important work of al-Ustrūshanī. It contains about one hundred laws and precepts that define the rights of children and minors. The treatise is a unique work of the Middle Ages, which encompasses many aspects of the real life of society and its relation to minors.

Since the "Jāmi' aḥkām al-ṣighār" is a valuable source of the Islamic jurisprudence, his many manuscript copies are spread around the world. This work was first published with modern print in the Republic of Iraq in 1982 by professor 'Abd al-Ḥamīd 'Abd al-Khāliq al-Bayzālī. Four copies were used, which remain under a number 1704 in the Library of Princeton University, USA, 1/9626 in a Baghdad library "The National Museum of Iraq", 3741/1 and 7460/1 at the "Central Library of Waqfs" in Baghdad and the manuscript number 9/7 at the "Central Library of Waqfs" in Mosul, Iraq.

The second edition of this work in two volumes is prepared by Professor Abū Muṣ'ab al-Badrī and "al-Azhar" university professor Maḥmūd 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Abd al-Mun'im in the Egyptian capital Cairo. In this issue, researchers have made great use of the manuscript by the number 901 in the Egyptian library "Dār al-Kutub" and microfilm by the number 9334, and the first edition of this work.

There are 11 manuscript copies of "Jāmi' aḥkām al-ṣighār," six of them are stored in the funds of libraries in other countries and five - in the assets of manuscripts in Tashkent.

Comparing the second edition of "Jāmi' aḥkām al-ṣighār" prepared in Egypt with manuscript copies stored in Tashkent,

M.R. Atayev has found errors at copying of most of the sentences and phrases in Farsi and serious errors in the instructions of the chapters of the book and a brief background of the faqih.

A major part of the work “Jāmi’ aḥkām al-ṣiḡhār” is dedicated to the social, economic and legal issues, and a minor part to the upbringing and Ibadat. In this work created on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence the problems that arise in children’s rights are resolved justly. Apart from this, thousands of issues ensuring child safety and privacy rights have been discussed. Numerous arguments and instructions to law enforcement agencies are given in the present work. Having embodied the most important and sophisticated systems of Islamic law, this work is one of the preferred sources which has proven its indispensability for eight centuries. Deep and thorough study of this work provides a comprehensive view on a history of the religious legal system of our region.

The study of scientific works of Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshani, which began just after independence, pleases with its results. Research on a creation of the critical text on one of the works of Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshani “Jāmi’ aḥkām al-ṣiḡhār” (“Law on minor children”) was started over ten years ago by a young talented scientist M.R. Atayev. A young scientist of the Tashkent Islamic University had the courage to get to work on a creation of critical text of the source. This work required the academic rigor and integrity, loyalty and perseverance, patience and high efficiency. Therefore, it is pleasant to acknowledge that the work has come to a close and critical text of the treatise taken on the basis of all known lists of manuscripts has been prepared.

It is necessary to mention the fact that this work is dedicated to children’s rights in fiqh, i.e. Islamic jurisprudence. This work was written in 1228. The treatise is the most weighty and important work which discusses the rights of children and minors. It contains about one hundred laws and precepts that define the rights of children and minors. This book is a unique work of the Middle Ages which encompasses many aspects of the real life of

society and attitude of society regarding children and minors. Therefore, the research and study of the treatise in the Islamic jurisprudence and law in terms of history, legal science, the status of minors in Islamic society, identifying a special relationship with the children on a global scale is scientifically interesting and unique.

While preparing the critical text M.R. Atayev attracted the lists from funds and libraries of Iraq, Princeton University, USA, Egypt and Tashkent that increases the scientific level of the given publication. The book created a detailed scientific apparatus which allows to consider all possible discrepancies on the lists.

The publication of the treatise Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshānī “Jāmi’ aḥkām al-ṣiḡhār” with comments, notes, research and translation of this treatise in Uzbek is an important event in the Islamic studies of Uzbekistan, in particular for the following reasons.

What is the value of the publication of this work of al-Ustrūshānī? It consists of the following points.

First, this edition introduces another name of the Muslim scholar and faqih and theologian, a native of Uzbekistan, since the work contains an original and detailed scientific analysis on the life and works of legacy of Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshānī.

The work of al-Ustrashani “Jāmi’ aḥkām al-ṣiḡhār” can be correctly considered as one of the first sources of the Middle Ages, which addressed the rights of children. It is noteworthy the fact that even in the Muslim tradition we do not find another similar tract after Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshānī which is devoted to the rights of child. It is so far the only such treatise in the world, which has reached our days.

The book “Jāmi’ aḥkām al-ṣiḡhār” (“Law on minor children”) consists of 1280 fatwa, i.e. vaults or articles which can be divided according to the ethical, social, legal, and economic topics. The formulation of some questions which are relevant to contemporary person are interesting, namely – “Should you consider a human

embryo as a person?" "Since when does the life of an embryo start?" and etc.

In his work, Muḥammad bin Maḥmūd al-Ustrūshani emphasizes that the embryo is a human basis and cannot be divided from the man who was born and that child from birth to his full age is especially in need of love and compassion and the help of their loved ones. The author raises this postulate to Shariat requirements and standards to be followed by every Muslim.

Second, publication of al-Ustrūshani's work on the rights of child introduces into scientific use the work on medieval Islamic jurisprudence and law to the academic which is unique in the sense that this treatise is on the rights of the child and minors. It is known through world practice that the first historically extant scientific papers on various social problems of children and minors date back to 1923, when the English scholar Eglantine Jebb created her council to help children. Then, in 1959, the Declaration on the Child Rights and in 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child are signed.

Third, the publication of this work allows to realize a scientific view of development and establishment of the Islamic law, particularly in the field of children's rights. The data presented in the manuscripts helped to create a historical perspective of implementation, coverage and interpretation of various legal codes.

Fourth, publication of this work is important to the overall cultural aspects with human and social interests as it is a legacy of the global order, common cultural values and allows to discover the essence of Islamic law more thoroughly.

Fifth, one of the aspects of deepening and development of the state independence of Uzbekistan along with full-fledged entry of our nation in the historically proven, truly humanistic and democratic legal ideas and procedures of a modern lifestyle is a revival of spiritual values of Islam, rule of law and democratic principles of Shariat and greatly increased interest of elaborate

traditions and stereotypes of the Islamic legal awareness among the public.

Sixth, life persistently demands, in particular from legal scholars, to finding the concept, designs, historically proven and adequately reflected peculiarities of the legal world-view, the legal consciousness and experience of people in the region on the traditional spread of Islam to somehow attract their interest in legal issues and reveal their capacity for lawmaking in general. For legal mankurtism is not only the cause of passivity of legal consciousness of our people but also in many ways just irritates them, prevents the transition to normal life and work in accordance with current legal regulations.

Thus, "Jāmi' aḥkām al-ṣiḡhār" al-Ustrūshanī gains a great interest not only among lawyers, oriental scholars and historians, but also for those who seek to understand the Oriental reality. Meanwhile, it is quite difficult to master. First of all, it is a language barrier. "Jāmi' aḥkām al-ṣiḡhār" is written in Arabic. But such books are rare. Even in those cases when there are books and manuscripts they are scattered in libraries around the world.

This reprinted publication will help all students studying the Orient, in particular, to students and teachers, professionals as an important guide for documentary work on a history of state and law, Shariat, Islamic law, and overall on the history and culture of Maverennahr.

We express deep gratitude to all those who participated in reprinting of this fundamental monument of the Islamic law.

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