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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2017.01.001. A. LUBSKY, O. POSUCHOVA. NATION BUILDING PROJECTS AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION MODELS IN RUSSIA // "Vlast", Moscow, 2017, № 8, P. 39–48.

Keywords: nation building, integration, nation civilized identity, value statement.

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The theoretical challenges concerning nation building projects study in Russia are associated with the different ideas about nation building subject in scientific literature. In foreign literature the term nation building is associated with the nation formation in some cases but in other cases – with state formation and national identity population formation using a state power. In national literature some authors suppose that nation building is a process of nation identity formation the main point of which is a sense of solidarity and patriotism forming in the society in relation to its state. The others suppose that nation building is

people formation by many interrelations and obligations which becomes possible when the most part of the population feels its solidarity with fellow citizens and assumes a concern and an obligation for them. Some researches considering nation building as a way of a state control of inter-ethnic relations pay attention to define, first of all, conceptual approaches to such phenomenon as nationalism. It is stipulated by the fact that not a nation forms nationalism, but nationalism forms a nation according to many specialists opinion so they specify civil and ethnic types of nationalism: the first one unites people in large nations but the second one separates nations and peoples into the small ethnic communities.

The theoretical challenges associated with nation building projects study in Russia are also stipulated by the present different approaches to understand a nation. Within one of such approaches developed under the influence of the nation building practices in the west-European countries a nation is considered as a social community having the same national interests and civil values united by a common political system. By that a French tradition is outlined to understand a nation where a nation is considered to be a political and a civil community and also a German tradition to understand a nation as ethno-nation, i.e. a community of a cultural origin. The other approach to understand a nation is associated with a practice nation building in USA as immigrant state where the Americans and the American nation concepts are identified as a political community based on the faith to the American state and a devotion to the American values.

The authors of the article distinguish several ideal types of nation building in dependence of socio-cultural and historical contexts particularities. First of all, it is mono-ethnic nation forming based on the entity of ethnic origin, the language, religion, economic interests and a political system. Secondly, it is forming of poly-ethnic political nation based on the entity of national (governmental) interests and political values. Thirdly, it

is poly-ethnic civil nation forming based on the common civil values. Fourthly, it is trans-ethnic ideological nation forming based on the entity of governmental interests and ideological values. Fifthly, it is trans-ethnic nation-civilization forming based on the entity of civilized values and cultural codes of life activity.

At present one started the discourses about the nation in Russia at the level of political projects associated with the unified Russian nation forming, on one hand, but on the other hand, - at the level to discuss a problem if the nation exists in Russia and if it exists what its particularities are. The National union of public associations «The Russian nation» appeared in 2008 and its purpose was to distribute political and civil nation ideas in the society in Russia. As a result one proposed a new project of nation building orienting to the Russian nation forming both as a political nation uniting the citizens of Russia and a civil nation based on a civil consent. There was also the idea for the Russian nation as multinational Russian people.

Sociological studies show that a particularity of the modern Russian identity is not only national but also civil. The reasons for such identity uniting the Russian society are: a common state (66% of respondents according to the polls), the territory (54%), state language (49%), the historical past (49%), common symbols - a flag, holidays (32-37%), a responsibility for the country destiny (32%). In modern Russian society a dominant idea of the state-civil identity is a self-identification of individuals, first of all, with the citizens of the Russian Federation (75-80% in 2013-2015 across Russia as a whole). This identity is also characterized by such elements of national-civil identity as a sense of community and solidarity with the country citizens, responsibility for their destiny and a life of the surroundings. The results of the polls also show that the most part of the Russians think that state-civil identity consists with ethnic identity. So, answering the question: "Who are you to a greater extent?" - 47% of the respondents across the country called themselves "most likely the Russians", 25% consider themselves both the Russians

and the representatives of a concrete nationality. However, the respondents among the representatives of title ethnic groups in the republics consider themselves as the representatives of their nationality. This suggests that ethno-national identity of individuals forming ethnic communities aiming to a national identity strengthening plays a big part in the national regions together with a state-civil identity prevailing in the country as a whole.

Analyzing the processes of nation building and national identity forming in the modern Russian society one can draw the following conclusions. Firstly, the idea about the Russian people as a consolidated nation didn't happen to be a realized project of nation building in post-Soviet Russia. Secondly, a political nation and a specific state-civil identity were formed in Russia but a national integrity was based on the principle: "one nation - many ethnic cultures". Thirdly, macro-political community (political nation) and a state-civil identity being formed happened to be insufficient to overcome inter-ethnic and inter-confessional contradictions and to become a real base of cultural-axiological community of the Russians.

Inside of the idea about the Russian multinational peoples as a single nation one proposed a new project of nation building aimed at the Russian nation forming as a political and civil nation maintaining cultural diversity of Russia peoples. This project allowed forming a poly-ethnic political nation unifying the Russian citizens. A state-civil identity predominates in the Russian society including some elements of national-civil identity. Ethno-national identity gave some competition to state-civil identity prevailing in the national regions among the representatives of title nationalities. As a result a state-civil identity happened to be insufficient to decrease disintegrated potential of ethno-confessional distinctions in the Russian society. In this regard one had a need to develop new projects of nation building and national integration models. The realization of one of such projects is associated with trans-ethnic nation-civilization

and national-civilized identity building in Russia as a state-civilization being capable to overcome ethnic and confessional contradictions in the society.

The author of the abstract – E. Dmitrieva

2017.01.002. S. NOVOSELOV. RUSSIA IN THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER // “Kaspiyskiy Region: Politika, ekonomika, kultura”, Astrakhan, 2016, № 2 (47), P. 83–88.

Keywords: Russia, unipolarity, the U.S.: political instability, the systemic crisis, the global transformation, the change of the world order model, multipolarity, foreign policy, national interests, a world power, a sovereign state, international isolation.

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The author considers that the geopolitical vacuum after the collapse of the Soviet Union had to be filled with the help of the leading countries in order to assist Russia to transform its economic system as the successor of the Soviet Union or to help it to recover as a great power.

The Western partners prevented the restoration of Russia's economic potential in the difficult conditions while pumping out the natural wealth and financial resources from the country. The West sought to take advantage of the situation to get rid of Russia as a great power once and for all. The U.S. and its allies were trying to solve many problems in spite of world history, and even at the expense of the interests of Russia. In the current international situation, "unipolarity" has begun to take shape rapidly with the imposition of rules of conduct, norms and values suiting the U.S., but not the majority of political actors at the same time. The world has entered a period of political instability,

the war has been unleashed in the Balkans, the intervention carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan, transnational terrorism has intensified.

The author points out that Russia is not a country that can slide on the "backyard of history", which gives way to challenges. Russia focuses on gathering strength and responds to any challenges adequately. But it took enormous exertion of efforts, the mobilization of all resources of the country to collect and return it the status of a geopolitical entity. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Russia began to advance on the path of recovery, finding an independent place in world politics.

Today the world faces a serious systemic crisis: the contradictions are exacerbated, associated with the uneven global development, a widening gap between levels of well-being of countries, the struggle for resources, access to markets and control over the transport routes.

All this is accompanied by the growth of the global and regional instability: old regional armed conflicts have been revived in the former Soviet Union, Middle East, Africa, and there were new centers of conflict. Western Europe has faced with an unprecedented influx of a large flow of migrants that would have serious implications for its internal political stability and economic development. And the question of preserving the integrity of the EU is already on the agenda.

All the visible manifestation of instability indicate the beginning of the transition to the new "multipolar" world order model that will be long and painful

The U.S. tries to do everything to preserve the "global domination" and "global leadership", and these concepts are still defining and fundamental of the U.S. foreign policy, since it is much easier to lead and dominate in a weakened, fragmented and devastated world in the absence of strong national states, as the author indicates.

The author notes that there was a need for a new geopolitical self-determination for Russia, which would

correspond to its possibilities and aspirations of the modern, complex economic, politico-ideological and military-strategic terms. Russia re-formulate its foreign policy objectives, re-defines its interests in the field of economic, political, social, ideological and national security. This relates directly to both domestic and foreign policy of Russia.

Russia opposes unilateral power dictates of the West throughout the world. Supporting the construction of a "polycentric world order," Russia is opposed to the policy of forced establishment of democracy, the strategy of replacing political regimes, undesirable for the West, through "color revolutions", the imposition of the idea of the superiority of the Western values, the monopolization of human rights issue for political pressure and use it as a tool of unfair competition.

Noting the central coordinating role of the UN in the regulation of international processes, Russia first and foremost insists on the supremacy of international law in approving just and democratic international system based on equitable and partnership relations among states, on collective approaches in solving world problems, on the formation of flexible non-bloc alliances with active participation of Russia.

The world community considers Russia as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. This range of estimates is very large - from "superpower" to the second-rate or even third-rate state on the sidelines of world politics.

The author emphasizes that Russia ensures its status as a great power on its geopolitical location, economic potential, the arsenal of conventional and nuclear missile weapons, membership on an ongoing basis in the UN Security Council, cultural and scientific heritage, a return to democratic values, religious tolerance and willingness to integration into the world community.

Russia being on the 7th place by population among the nations of the world, taking up 1/8 of the world geographical space, can not play a critical role in the interaction with the most

influential countries in the world. Russia "by definition" can not but takes part in world affairs. Therefore, Russia plays a key role in the modern system of international relations, taking the position of one of the centers of regional and global influence. At the same time Russia does not claim to some kind of superpower. The author notes that the strengthening of Russia and the implementation of the independent foreign and domestic policy by it is opposed by the U.S. and its allies. The impossibility of a direct Russian military deterrence by means forces the U.S. to act a roundabout way to maintain its global dominance.

During the last fifteen years, the West led by the U.S. has been creating the "exclusion zone" around Russia, increasing power and potential of NATO, giving it global functions, carried out in violation of international law; the military activities of the bloc countries are activated, the further expansion of the alliance and the approach of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders is carried out, the missile defense system, directed against Russia, is created.

The West seeks to maintain a constant tension on the borders of Russia, as well as to foment the armed conflicts directly where possible. The most visible example is the United States and the European Union support for the coup in the Ukraine. Washington does not aspire to create a strong Ukrainian state. The West needs an unstable buffer zone between Europe and Russia. The situation around Transnistria can be considered as an addition to the situation in the Ukraine. Thus, the U.S. contributes to the emergence of disagreements between Europe and Russia, taking advantage of the situation created in Moldova and the Ukraine and hoping to draw Russia into conflict with Europe, preferably a military one.

The Western countries have strengthened direct and indirect military pressure on Russia through the application of economic methods, tools, financial, trade, investment and technology policies. Sanctions measures, imposed against Russia, have a negative impact on its economic security.

But the high level of reserves is maintained in the Russian economy, and the economy will gradually go to stabilize and rise according to the opinion of the government. A number of programs have been adopted for this purpose, including on import substitution.

The Russian economy demonstrates the ability to preserve and strengthen its potential in the instability of the global economy and the application of restrictive economic measures. In addition, the sanctions are a certain chance of revival of the Russian economy, for the necessary changes in the balance between commodity and non-commodity sectors of the economy.

There is a choice to the Western countries - to prepare for a long siege and to tighten sanctions or start a search for ways to resume the dialogue with Russia, as no important contemporary international and global issue, conflict resolution, ensuring strategic stability and the rule of international law in international relations can be solved without Russia.

The author emphasizes that Russia intends to ensure its security and national interests further by the most active and meaningful participation in world politics, in solving global and regional problems, it is ready for business, mutually beneficial cooperation, to open dialogue with all foreign partners. It seeks to understand and take into account the interests of its partners, but asks to respect its national interests.

The author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

2017.01.003. SH. SULEYMANOVA. POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF ISLAM IN THE 21st CENTURY // "2 Bigievskiye Chteniya – 2015. Moslem Thought in the 21 Century: the Unity of Tradition and Renewal: proceedings of the 2 International Scientific-educational Conf. St. Petersburg, May 17–20, 2015", Moscow, 2016, P. 243–250.

Keywords: Islam, religious extremism, media, politics.

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At the present stage the significance of the religious factor in politics has actualized notably. Different political actors use religious factor as a resource for achieving political goals and in political rhetoric too, predetermining diversification of political subjects as well. The possibility of using the concept of "religious extremism" appears in this context as one of the forms of extremist activity, the content of which is always directed towards the domination of some subjects over others.

Religiosity interventions of other cultures, existing in different forms, act as a factor of radicalization and politicization of a religion, which, as the most ancient, conservative and stable element of culture is designed to perform in society the function aimed at protecting traditional values. Today in Russia the manifestations of religious extremism are largely the result of purposeful influence over the existing spiritual foundations of the society.

The cultural-civilizational specificity of Russia, the centuries-old traditions of peaceful coexistence of different religions make one of the main obstacles to the spread of religious extremism. However, it should be noted that the lack

of a well-defined policy, including the state policy, in the sphere of reporting the religious relations in the media contributes to the growing inter-religious tension. The capacity of the media is used by different political actors in different directions, which implies the possibility of both constructive and destabilizing effects. The main channels of dissemination of the ideas of extremism in modern Russia are traditional print publications, religious-propaganda books.

Using the media and Internet resources simplifies dissemination of the ideas of extremism, providing almost unlimited opportunities for dissemination of extremist ideas and slogans by different political subjects. The pendency of the question of delimitation of the religious and the secular aspects in the political space in contemporary Russia and definition of the boundaries of their applicability lies in the lack of a clear vector of using the media, as well as its policies.

Ambiguous approaches to the definition of the content of the principle of secularism and characteristic features of a secular state makes the problem of political and legal implementation of the principle of secularism of the state very complicated. So do different patterns of relations between the state and religious organizations. It should be noted that in a multi-religious Russian society the secular state power can be the only guarantor of focusing on the search for public consensus.

In Russia religious extremism is regarded as an integral part of political and ethnic extremism, not as an independent phenomenon. Interpretation of the emergence of religious extremism in Russian politics offers a variety of opinions: from the impact of foreign anti-Russian forces, including the use of intelligence and subversive services of foreign states, to internal causes: the difficult socio-economic situation, the spiritual and moral crisis, etc.

The majority of Russian citizens, to the greatest extent, see potential extremists in the adherents of Islam under the influence of the military conflicts in the North Caucasus and the terrorist

acts in Russian cities associated with the adepts of the so-called "radical Islam". It should be also noted that in mass consciousness of Russians the first place in the terms of public danger belongs to the representatives of destructive religious movements, usually of foreign origin, whose practice demonstrate physical and psychological violence. However, the followers of different religions and ideologies in the vast majority do not take the infidels as potential extremists, which fact paves the way for their constructive cooperation.

The history of Islam in the territory of modern Russia counts over 1400 years. Throughout the course of the Russian history Moslems have quite peacefully lived next to Orthodox Christians for their religious mentality was characterized by absence of religious radicalism, even in the absence of normal conditions for the confession of faith. Russian Moslems have always honorably fulfilled their civil duties, while remaining committed to their faith. It should be also noted that in Russia Moslems have all the opportunities, much more than in many Moslem countries, to live in accordance with the canons of Islam.

In Moslem countries, the problems of education are the key ones for understanding the situation of the modern world. The countries of the area of traditional spread of Islam are not only the youngest ones but also those who still have serious problems in the field of education and literacy, and the States of Western Europe and the United States toss a historical challenge to them. And for Russia, which for the reasons of history and geographical location is between the Christian West and the Islamic East, these issues are vital.

Lack of sufficient knowledge of the creeds of their religion and of a clear ideological position makes people defenseless against spiritual aggression of new religious movements. From the part of new religious movements, missionary work and proselytizing are widely used as a means of a deliberate policy of destruction of the spiritual space of the Russian civilization by

anti-Russian forces. And it is aimed against the traditional Russian religions.

The use of legal political tactics in the activities of extremist organizations makes them more effective in the long term. Destructive religious organizations operating in the territory of Russia receive financial, methodological, informational support from foreign funds and extremist centers and use financial opportunities of the "shadow" economy. It must be also noted that training of young citizens of Russia in foreign religious educational institutions under the educational programs that do not conform to traditional religious faiths, make the policy of combating religious extremism vulnerable.

The comparative analysis of the socio-political situation in certain regions of the country shows that the political implications of religious relations directly depend on the activities of state government institutions. The effectiveness of policies for combating religious extremism depends on the level of public confidence in the activities of public authorities. The activities of destructive religious organizations of the radical wing seem more dangerous in political and spiritual projections, first of all, those of non-traditional religious movements.

The traditional Islam in Russia having no strictly institutionalized hierarchical structure, in the recent years expresses its concern at the emerging, in a very acute form, of the problem of finding ways to preserve their own national, religious identity and traditional social institutions.

The modern West is extremely secularized and in the context of erosion of criteria and identifications cannot rely on its traditional religion, Christianity. The pride of place goes to liberal understanding of the mechanisms of functioning of society, when freedom of expression appears for holiness and dogma. It also leads to the encounter with any form of traditionalism, whether Islamic, Catholic or Orthodox. That is, the divide is not between Islam and Christianity, but between the conservative tradition

and its liberal negation. And each of the sides of this conflict tends to behave still more assertive and dogmatic.

However, at the present stage, given the humankind faces global challenges related to demography, resource use, ecology, nuclear weapons, the world more than ever needs unity and solidarity, joint actions of all peoples and countries. And in such a situation the unilateral commitment of one or several countries or a separate civilization to the attainment of world leadership and imposition of a unipolar world system can lead to disaster.

There is a need to active use of the potential of the media in implementation of the state policy aimed at neutralizing the negative factors, influencing spiritual development of the society. This applies in particular to electronic information networks and the potential of traditional religions, it is important there is a clear focus for cooperation of state government institutions with all the Russian institutionalized confessions, which, together with the state, should undertake social responsibility for believers

The author of the abstract - V. Schensnovich

2017.01.004. M. Yahyaev. FACTORS OF REPRODUCTION OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN MODERN RUSSIA: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS. // "Islamovedenie", Makhachkala, 2016, № 3, P. 26–39.

Keywords: extremism, terrorism, prevention, fight, religion, Islam, the ideology, the government, civil society, social destructiveness.

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The author analyzes the essence of the social and personal destructiveness of extremism and terrorism, solves the

methodological issues of differentiation of general and single in their manifestations, proceeding from the fact that all the social phenomena are of a specific historical character. The possibility of developing and implementing a comprehensive program to counter extremism and terrorism by identifying objective and subjective, internal and external reasons for its reproduction is presented in the article.

The analysis suggests an answer to the question, why it is impossible to neutralize the extremist ideology and to reduce the activity of the terrorist underground in Russia, despite the costly efforts of the authorities and institutions of civil society; and suggests ways to improve the effectiveness of anti-extremist ideological and practical work.

The author concludes that the definition of extremism as a method of social and political activities of organized communities has to be at the core of the complex program of counteraction to extremism. If there is no ideology at the heart of the destructive activity of the specific subject of social action, then there is no extremism, and there are cases of banditry, organized crime and other crimes.

The author writes about the possibility of preventing the transformation from normal to extremist ideology in the process of reforming the humanistic society, about the implementation of the systemic complex changes in the socio-economic, political and legal spheres, radically changing the systemic quality of the modern Russian society, that eliminates the causes and deep roots of extremism, which is utopian, destructive form of activity in itself, not improving social or political situation, but only directing people spontaneous aggression in a destructive course.

The reorganization involves:

1. The implementation of socially oriented market reforms that could at least minimize social inequality and stratification of Russian society;

2. The political and legal reforms, creating normative preconditions to eliminate the alienation of a person from the authorities;

3. The spiritual and moral reform for radical changes in the content of social ideology and psychology.

In general, the author points to the need to create not only a decent material conditions of existence, but also the conditions for a free realization of creative potential for each citizen of Russia.

The author suggests that the prevention of extremism and combating its manifestations is not repression against extremist communities or individuals, exposed to extremist doctrines and ideas, but in a sequential cultivation of their own ideology and humanistic morality. The ideology of extremism can be permanently expelled from the consciousness of our fellow citizens only in the process of humanization of the entire Russian society.

The manifestation of the ideology of extremism in society is minimized, while the realization of social justice and equality of all citizens in society is enhanced, as well as the effectiveness of the provision of basic human rights and freedoms.

The author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

2017.01.005. V. ZORIN. THE MOSLEMS OF RUSSIA: FUNDAMENTALS FOR CIVIL IDENTITY FORMING // *“Islam v sovremennom mire”*. Moscow, 2016, volume 12, P. 117–126.

Keywords: Islam, the Moslems in Russia, civil identity, inter-confessional relations, Islam-governmental relations.

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For Russia inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations have always been a priority for the interior and national security. As the practice approved the fundamental statements concerning the necessity of a principle «unity in diversity» correspond not only to daily needs to provide a civil content in the state but it is the only principle realized to establish multi-ethnic and polyconfessional country. V. Zorin underlines that a new ideology of civil nation building doesn't mean a negation or blending of the Russian nationalities by no means (a meaning of this word in ethnic sense) in some multi-cultural community named "the Russian nation".

Russia is the multi-confessional state. A population inhabiting nine federal regions of the Russian Federation differs not only by ethnic make-up but also by religious identity. In Russia there are no official data concerning citizen number based on religious identity. All Russian polls don't take a religious identity into account. The researchers use the different indirect methods to evaluate a religious identity of the population: opinion poll findings, official registration data of religious organizations. There also exists a so-called ethnographic method when some or other nationalities are announced as adepts of concrete confessions: the Russians – the Orthodox Christians, the Tatars – the Moslems, the Kalmyks – the Buddhists and etc. However, one neglects the fact that there

are adepts not only of one but many religions in each nationality and there are also unbelievers. None of the above-mentioned methods can point the number of the unbelievers – they can be used only for approximate value of the population number according to cultural-religious tradition.

One should distinguish concepts “population structure due to a religious tradition” and “the number of unbelievers due to confessions”. The first concept includes not only the believers but also those consider a concrete religious-cultural tradition to be close to them (owing to their upbringing, education, a way of life, conditions traditions and etc). Analyzing the National Census data of 2002 and 2011 more than 70 nationalities can be added to the orthodox cultural tradition with a total number 124,3 millions of individuals or 86% of the population. But this number doesn't concern the orthodox believers and all the more the number of the believers. Some part of this stratum refers itself to the other religious trends. For example, many people of the North refer themselves to both the Orthodox and to the people's cults, shamanism what is typical for some people of the Republic of Altay and the Volga region. The concrete part of the Russian population is the followers of the different trends of Protestantism and so-called new (for Russia) religious trends. The “Russian Moslems” also appeared. Some researches define their number about 10 000. Some part isn't bound with the religion at all. According to the data of the sociological polls the population number of the Orthodox cultural tradition in Russia can be estimated as 100–110 millions of people (about 72% of population). More than 65 nationalities can belong to the Islam cultural tradition – it is 16,1 millions of people or 11% of the country population. According to data of the sociological polls the population number of the Islam cultural tradition can be estimated as 7,2 millions of people (about 5% of the population).

According to a general expert's opinion the Moslem problem in Russia (pre-revolutionary Russian empire, in the USSR and in modern post-Soviet Russian Federation) was always

urgent and demanded its concrete-historical approach. The state authority in Russia always understood that ignoring of the Islam factor is fraught with serious consequences when making and conducting the internal and foreign policy. For modern Russia the solution of a problem on the political integration of the own Moslem population is linked with a problem on the territorial integrity and the national security and also with a possibility to form a stable political system. In modern Russia there are specific Islam-governmental relations including some political and ideological problems associated with ethnic tradition, culture and migration. These relations influence on a stability of the public relations. V. Zorin illustrates this situation on the example of the North-West region. At the territory of the North-West federal region the biggest ethnic groups traditionally professing the Islam are the Tatars, the Azerbaijanis, the Uzbeks and the Tajiks. Their total number is 141,3 thousands of people and a little bit more than 1% of the federal region population according to the National Census data. The Tatar-Bashkir community inhabiting the North-West from the Peter's reforms greatly influences on the activity of the official Islam structures. The friendly association of the northern Caucasian ethnos notably emerged during the last decades and it brought to the new Moslem communities formation (the Chechens, the Dagestans).

Migration dynamics makes a strong impact on the population and the ethnic composition of the macro-region ummah. Till 2015 a quarter of the migration in Saint-Petersburg and Leningradskaya oblast was ensured owing to the citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (these two subjects of the Russian Federation absorb 80% of the whole external migration in the North-West federal region so these data are of a great importance to analyze the migration). In 2011-2013 a migration from the Central Asian countries was especially intensive. According to the polls 1,3% of the population was placed among the Islam followers in the federal region as a whole and it corresponds to

the data on the ethnic population composition. The Moslems sojourning at the territory of Russia aren't in the extracts.

The data on religious organizations also show that this religion is of a great importance at the confessional territory of the federal region: about 40 out of more than 2100 registered organizations or 1,8% belong to the Islam. There are also many non-registered Islam groups praying in the tenure dwellings or in the utilities rooms independently or under a supervision of amateur imams. There are five mosques at the territory of the federal region including two cathedral ones (Saint-Petersburg and Vologda) and also some chapels. As a whole the activity of the Islam official organizations is stable and provides the inter-confessional consent.

The Islam education is included in the process for international and inter-religious relations harmonization. One of the reasons promoting the growth of the radical mood youth is a low level of training of the Moslem clergy and as a result – the radical preachers studied abroad are very popular. At present imam is a basic element for the Moslem community development in Russia. Increasing their level of training the religious boards will form a regular reserve with the help of the authority. To the researcher's opinion the native personnel training will lead to a system of competitive native training and native theological school.

At present one of the functions of religion and religious organizations is that they can be a resource for the political and social consolidation. They provide the national interests and consolidation of the native speakers of the Russian civilized identity with the help of the civil, cultural and religious moments promoting the interests of Russia. "People's democracy" and "gentle force" of the traditional Russian organizations will promote to improve the international image of Russia and to solve strategic geopolitical tasks.

At the present stage as V. Zorin points out the Christian and the Moslem religious and secular cultures cooperation

becomes the important resource of the community in the political life of Russia. It is necessary to achieve harmony in relation to basic values of the community in the political life taking into the account the Russian civilized and cultural context and the Eurasian choice of the country.

The author of the abstract - V. Schensnovich.

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2017.01.006. A. GASSANALIYEV, Z. ABACHARAEVA. THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMATE REGULATION OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN THE TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION / "Vestnik Dagestanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya 3. Obschestvennye nauki", Makhachkala, 2016, Vol. 31, № 1, P. 56–64.

Keywords: Islamic banking, legal regulation, interest (riba), Shariah Council, the experience of foreign countries.

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The article deals with formation and development of Islamic banking in the Russian Federation, which today has acquired a special urgency in connection with the socio-political and economic situation, sanctions imposed on Russia by a number of states. The researchers outline approaches to solution of the problems of legal regulation of activities of credit institutions, which conduct these activities on the basis of legal norms of Islam.

The authors characterize Islamic banking, the main feature of which is compliance with the basic principles of Sharia as an alternative to the classical (traditional) banking. According to

Sharia, it is forbidden to invest in the businesses that provide goods or services considered forbidden, such as production and sale of alcohol, arms trade, bookmaking, etc. The fundamental difference between "Islamic banking" and the classic banking is the ban on payment of guaranteed interest both on credits and deposits, the so-called "riba". "Riba" means any interest on financial transactions where one party receives income at the expense of the other. The profit from financial-economic activities in Islam must always be associated with the assumption of the investment risk. The amount of interest on deposit is directly dependent on the outcomes of the activities of the bank, and payments for credits – from the success of implementation of the investment project funded by the loans. Any interest rate set in advance dependent on the terms and size of the loan and not dependent on success of the investments is called "riba" and is considered forbidden.

Islam favors deriving income, but condemns the use of interest in order to draw income. Social justice requires that borrowers and lenders received the reward or bear the losses on an equal footing and that the process of accumulation and creation of wealth reflected a real contribution to economic development. The Islamic bank has three main allowed sources of income: banking operations based on the principles of the Islamic economy, financial market operations and commission transactions.

The main types of banking operations, consistent with the principles of Islamic financing models are the following types of banking contracts. Mudaraba is a contract whereby the owner of free capital entrusts it to a person, capable to use it efficiently. Murabaha is a contract of sale and purchase of goods on a predetermined price that includes profit from the sale of goods. Musharaka is a partnership contract. According to a Musharaka agreement, the revenue is divided between the client and the bank in pre-agreed proportions. The losses are distributed in proportion to the contributions. Sukuk are the bonds meeting the

standards of Sharia. In its simplest form sukuk is ownership of the asset, or life interest of the asset and the incomes from it. Sukuk entitles you not just to a share in the cash flow, but also to the right of ownership. This distinguishes sukuk from conventional bonds as the latter are just interest-bearing securities, whereas sukuk are, in fact, investment certificates.

The question of legitimate regulation of Islamic banking has emerged in relatively recent times. It is not the only question, but a fundamental one. There is a number of obstacles on the way to development of credit institutions, operating on the basis of the principles of Islam. These include the lack of trained specialists in this field and existence of legal obstacles to establishment of Islamic banking as a full-fledged player in the financial market. All this is forcing Russia to look for internal reserves and new sources of foreign investment. The unused funds of citizens-Moslems of the Russian Federation and foreign citizens from the republics of Central Asia, located on the territory of the Russian Federation can be used as internal resources. The states of the Middle East and Southeast Asia with which Russia maintains friendly relations are very attractive as sources of foreign investment.

With the purpose of intensification of these processes it would be timely, according to the authors, to develop an alternative Islamic model of economic relations, providing it support at the state level. The idea of development of financial institutions operating on the principles of Islam, declared by the government, will immediately resonate with Moslems both within the country and abroad, which fact, in its turn, will attract substantial resources to the Russian economy, permitting to make up for the cash outflow caused by the sanctions.

In contrast to the Moslem law, which regulates relations predominantly in Moslem society, the Islamic economic model can be used by representatives of various religious communities and not only the representatives of the community of Moslems. The basic principle of the Islamic economic model is to search for

an alternative to interest financing. Nowadays principles of Islamic banking prevail not only in Moslem states, but also in Europe and America. Among the Western banks there is a trend to open and maintain the so-called "Islamic Windows" (bank departments providing the services according to the rules of Islam).

As for the experience of the development of Islamic banking in the territory of Russia, both banks operating only according to principles of Sharia, and Islamic "Windows" in traditional banks, we have to admit there is little experience in this field. We only know about the existence of a small number of fully Islamic banks and a few banks that tried to introduce an "Islamic window". Among them are: the Kazan "Amal" and "Bulgar Bank" (CJSC) providing services in absolute accordance with the requirements of the Islamic law and the current legislation of the Russian Federation, the bank "Ak Bars", numbered among the thirty largest Russian banks.

One of the main problems is the lack in the legal field of the Russian Federation of statutory Islamic banking terminology, analogues of concepts used in the framework of the activities of banks, corresponding to Islamic principles in international practice. The Russian legal documentation does not stipulate what an "Islamic financial institution" is. In some non-Moslem countries there is a regulatory basis governing the activities of Islamic financial institutions. According to the authors, it is the Russian legislation that makes an obstacle to the formation of similar structures in Russia, in particular, certain provisions of the Civil Code, Tax Code, Banks and Banking Act, as well as many of the provisions and instructions of the Bank of Russia, which not only regulate, but encourage usurious banking activities.

In conclusion, the researchers argue that lack of financing instruments leads to concentration of risks in Islamic financial institutions. The uncontrolled formation of Islamic financial institutions within the frames of financial system may reduce its

resistance and increase financial instability. That is why legal regulation of Islamic banking in Russia should become one of the key questions which must be solved by legislative authorities.

The author of the abstract - V. Schensnovich.

2017.01.007. O. SENIUTKINA. MOSQUES OF THE VOLGA REGION IN SOCIAL PROCESSES IN MODERN RUSSIA // "Religioznye missii na obschestvennoy arene: Rossiyskiy I zarubezhnyy opyt. IE RAS", Moscow, 2016, P. 255–260.

Keywords: mosques of the Volga region, multi-confessionality, traditional Islam, Imam, Ummah.

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Nowadays, in the fast-changing Russian and international reality the Moslems including the Volga ones have to think more deeply about the role of mosques as centers of mahalla life and more efficient use of the potential of Moslem communities. Of course, mosques should continue to be the centers of uniting of the Moslems offering prayers to the Almighty. They must be, as before, the places of communication and convergence of co-religionists. The original function of the mosque and its social purpose were purely internal to the emerging Ummah. That is, the mosque performed the tasks that it was to perform according to the norms of the Islamic doctrine: the tasks of the Moslems' prayer place. But from the very beginning of their history, mosques were not only prayer but also public buildings with a variety of functions.

The mosque in the beginning of its history at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the righteous caliphs was not separated from state activities: even the religious buildings were constructed wall to wall with the residence of the Governor, it

was in the mosque that the treasury was kept, the decrees were declared, rulers and governors addressed the people with political speeches. Until 10–11 centuries trials had been held in the mosques. Before the advent of the maktabas and madrassas classes were held in mosques. If we turn to the Moslem of middle ages, we shall see that the social functions of the mosque were already changing at that stage of development of the Moslem society.

In medieval Western Europe there was coming up the separation of the secular and the religious spheres of society. In relation to the history of the Islamic world, this did not happen. But there is a certain stereotype that for it, such separation is not typical: the whole history of the Islamic civilization consists of social movements according to the Quran. This is not quite true and sounds too categorical. Still, historically, the life of any society had been developing in such a way that the process of separation of the secular and the religious principles were inevitably becoming more active – and this was characteristic of the Moslem community too. For the Ummah that was also the case, but not on the same scale as for the West.

If we talk about mosques, they were gradually left by the Cadi (judges), elements of any cultural activities in mosques ceased to exist, there appeared special people – imams: the rulers did no more act as leaders in charge of the prayer, etc. These processes were rooted in the life of the society: from creating of the multi-ethno-confessional composition of the population of the Arab Caliphate to the globalization processes of modernity. Social role of mosques was changing in the specific conditions of life of the Islamic civilization.

The Russian society, in contrast to the West, is a society for which Islam is an integral part of the Russian culture. Russian Islam was gaining foothold in the framework of the Imperial civilization. And, in particular, this is confirmed by the situation in the Volga region. The mosques of the Volga region in the modern history period were increasingly manifesting themselves

as the defenders of public policy. And in the context of politicization of the Russian society in the early 20 century the Moslems did not take the radical way, trying to find compromises in relations with the authorities.

The more secularism was gaining foothold in the life of society, particularly in the Soviet period of history, the more the Tatars of the Volga region were moving away from the traditional religion. Although in the understanding of the Tartars, bearers of Islamic values, the religion remained and remains the most important part of their past culture. A certain gap between the disbelieving Tatars and the Tatars-Moslems is clearly felt today. But the gap is not so wide if we talk about the Volga Tatars, since the beginning of its manifestation refers only to the last century. In the conditions of modern life, when the processes of not only secularization but desecularization too are going in parallel, the role of mosques can and should increase, although not every Tatar is on the path of Islam.

Contemporary social processes in Russia functionally change the role of mosques in the society. First of all, one should speak of the migration processes affecting the ethnic composition of the mahalla of the Volga region. A Moslem community, traditionally Tatar by composition, has to make extra efforts to bring people of other ethnic culture into its membership, moreover, representatives of other states. As for religious beliefs of the migrants, these people represent different trends and directions in Islam, which also complicates the tasks of spiritual leaders of the Volga region.

Imams today are still more often talking about the need for a serious dialogue not only with authorities but also with public organizations, representatives of other confessions, with the academic community. Imams feel an increasing need to look for opportunities of communication with migrants, and this raises the issue of the language of sermons. In addition to the Arabic language, the language of Islam as a world religion, it is necessary to speak the native language of the listener. In the

mosques of the Volga region sermons are delivered in Russian, Tatar languages.

Lately there has been a debate over the concept of "traditional Islam". Some participants believe it useless to apply this word combination to and to argue about it. In this case they refer to a certain conservatism of the religious denotations: once the Moslems did not use such a thing earlier, there is no need of it today. But then the question arises, how to maintain contact of the Moslems with the greater part of society, which, not being versed in the matters of Moslem faith, are totally confused: what is meant by traditional Islam, a notion which keeps appearing in the media. Even in the Ummah there is no unified view about how to eliminate those "faults" that exist in it. These are the mosques of the Volga region, as is evidenced by all their rich history, that are the traditional centers of Islam, the "state" Islam. And the imams working in them have always strived to maintain the tradition. And the most important thing in this Moslem tradition is to accept the Only God in your heart, and everything else that is at first unclear to the Moslem whose ancestors were forced to interrupt the connection between generations, can be learned gradually.

The most important task for the contemporary Moslems and their leaders is the formation by the efforts of the whole of the Russian Ummah of their own identical tradition not deviating from the basic principles of the doctrine, but consistent with the accumulated experience of their predecessors-Moslems. The ancestors of the Volga Tatars-Moslems, being law-abiding and peaceful people of Russia, did not contradict the Quran and the Sunnah in their activities. In their worldview and actions Quranic and historical traditions have intertwined. In the mosques of the Volga the imams proclaimed the ideas that came from the Prophet Muhammad. The adherence to the religion and lifestyle of their ancestors saved and protected the people even in the most difficult and tragic moments of their history. Incitements to violence have never sounded in the mosques on

the banks of the Volga, on the contrary, all the rhetoric was aimed at the establishment of peace, sobriety, good neighborliness and mutual aid. The potential of traditional Islam is great and it must be used for the benefit of people.

Despite centuries of tradition, changes in the living conditions in Russia and in the world in general (the rise of extremism in the first place) not only require that mosques were more active in keeping the traditional style of activity, but also call for some innovations. The Russian Moslem elite pays attention to necessity of innovation in the current conditions. Not only imams and chairmen of the Spiritual Directorate of Moslems, but also ordinary believers join the discussion of problematic issues of Moslem life. For all those who want to argue what should be the function of the mosques today vast opportunities are afforded by the Internet forums. Today, the mosque requires close interaction in the course of social practices with all the emerging civil society. The mosque is designed to solve the tasks which the society has never put before it earlier. It is necessary, the author concludes,

- to develop the culture of all congregations (Tatar, Azeri, Tajik, Uzbek, etc.);
- to carry out social service on a large scale;
- to create conditions for deployment of a more active dialogue
 - with all members of the society at least at the level of the region, confessing
 - different religions or being purely secular people;
 - to strive in every way to prevent any tendencies of the parishioners leaning for extremism, and, especially, the recruitment of Moslem parishioners for terrorist groups.

The author of the abstract - V. Schensnovich.

2017.01.008. V. CHIGRIN. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE CRIMEAN ETHNIC GROUPS INTEGRATION IN RUSSIAN POLYETHNIC SOCIETY // *"Gumanitarniy Yuga Rossii"*, Rostov-na-Donu, 2016, N 4, P 84–94.

Keywords: the Crimea, Russia, integration, ethnos, society, poly-ethnic environment.

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There were periods in the history of our country when ethnos inhabiting the former Russian empire were unified but there also the periods when the inter-ethnic conflicts appeared because of disbelief and xenophobia. The ethno-national and regional relations were greatly misrepresented to the moment of the soviet empire breakup as a result of the subjective interferences and it determined a particularity of a crisis development for some post-Soviet republics, in particular the Ukraine. As it was shown during the last period this particularity leads to both the internal inter-ethnic conflicts and the inter-governmental ones. Russia is in active search to find the ways to avoid such conflicts. But still there is no universal formula. In fact one can confirm that this formula must include a regional segment providing a full integration of ethnos into the poly-ethnic environment of Russia. And for this reason the republic Crimea is a very important region because its integration into the All-Russian poly-ethnic environment is characterized with some internal and external particularities.

The external negative factors are the Ukraine's and the Turkey's actions which try not only to isolate the half-island in relation to resources and economy but form the so-called Crimean-Tatar self-government at the territory of Kherson

region. The paramilitary groups are being formed there. The ethnic Meskhetin Turks will be recruited there from the territory of Turkey to take part in sabotage operations. As the Ukrainian politicians and their patrons announce the Crimea belongs to the Ukraine and the Crimean people suffer “under the oppression of the Russian occupants”. But on the other hand, how to explain the sanctions used (artificial isolation of the half-island from the continent Ukraine and a shutdown of the North-Crimean channel) with relation to “whimpering” in spite of the fact that there are the ethnic Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars among them.

The author considers the internal particularities of ethnos integration of the Crimea into the Russian poly-ethnic space. The Crimea has some geopolitical particularities concerning a historical continuity with a way of life and socio-cultural experience share for generations. During its millenary formation there were many people and tribes in Crimea leaving behind a concrete cultural heritage. Some people having set foot on the Crimean ground had stayed there forever having enriched a mixed ethnic range with their cultural color. The list of these people is wide- the Tavrs, the Cimmerians, the Scythians, the Hellenes, the Romans, the Sarmatians – they have left a mark in the history of the Crimea. The Russians, the Tatars, the Armenians, the Greeks, the Karaites, the Germans, the Ukrainians and other nationalities live alongside in the Crimea. The Russians and the Ukrainians, the Greeks and the Bulgarians and also the German, Czech, Estonian and Polish colonists began actively settling at the territory of the Crimea after the Crimea had been joined to the Russian empire in 1783.

Today the Russians being the most numerous ethnos live in all the areas and towns of the Crimea. But there are some definite differences about a distribution of representatives of this ethnos at the territory of the Crimea. So, the greatest number of them live mainly in the towns (their share is 70–72%) – Kerch, Feodosia, Simferopol, Yevpatoria, Yalta, Alushta and others.

They also live in the villages of the central, the southern and eastern areas of the Republic Crimea. The Ukrainians also live along its all territory but the most part of them mainly live in the villages of the northern and western areas of the half-island.

The Crimean Tatars are the third largest population in the Crimea and live at the territory of the republic – both in the towns and the villages. Their settling is characterized with a great number of groups living tightly. It is explained by their organized coming from a banishment; having a land property located tightly in the concrete areas and towns; settling in the places being historically an inhabitant place of the Crimean Tatars living and etc. If to analyze a map of ethnos settling one can note a particularity: the most part of the Crimean Tatars live in the center, the north-east, the east and the south-east of the Crimea (steppe and piedmont areas) but their population is less in the west, the south-west, the south and on the Kerch Peninsula.

The most of the Crimean Germans live in Simferopol, Yevpatoria and Yalta. Besides, the Germans live tightly in Simferopol, Krasnogvardeiskiy, Chernomorskiy, Nizhnegorskiy and Kirovskiy areas. The representatives of the rest small ethnos living in the Crimea are placed at its territory distinctly, by small groups, the part of which is assimilated with the representatives of the larger ethnos. Many these ethnos founded their national-cultural associations and lead an active work to continue and develop their national cultures.

The attitude of the Russian ethnos - the most numerous community of the population – towards the distancing itself from Russia was hypersensitive as they have found themselves in the other state because of the USSR breakup so the related contacts have been complicated. Besides, from 1990-s the Russian-speaking population of the Crimea faced problems on education in the Ukrainian language, many documents weren't expected to be written in the Russian language and were to be presented

only in the state language. Population was employed for the public service only knowing the Ukrainian language. A problem to assign a status to the Russian language as the second state one was opened several times on the threshold of the presidential and parliamentary polls but wasn't solved. The language problem itself became not only ethnic but also political.

The Ukrainian ethnos in the Crimea was less conflictogenic during this period of time. The recognition of the Ukrainians at the state level as a title ethnos to the comparison with the other nationalities played a positive role and compensated their status of "little Russian".

The Crimean-Tatar ethos is potentially the most problematic. There are some objective reasons. Against this background one should consider the Crimean-Tatar people integration into the Ukrainian environment. Integration dynamics of the Crimean people is controlled since 1987. For our purpose this process can be divided into two stages: the first one - from 1987 until 1994-1995; the second - from 1994-1995 until now. The first stage is characterized with a hypersensitive adaptation of the Crimean Tatar expressed in their uncomfortable well-being, depressed behavior. The Slavic population experienced a sensation of alienation and antagonism of the Crimean Tatars. The reason is that the Crimean Tatars presence will principally change their (the Slavic) life in the Crimea, the Crimean Tatars will infringe on their living space, they will act as a competitor at the quite limited labor market and they will bring aggression. The concerns turned out to be groundless and the Crimean population accepted the Crimean Tatars. The Tatars psychology has greatly changed during the second stage of integration. The Crimean Tatars begin realizing themselves as the indigenous community; they make a request for an active significance in the Crimean society and integration into power.

At once after the USSR breakup the Crimean Tatars in the name of their political structures demanded to recognize them as

the indigenous community in the constitution. The attempts of the Crimean Tatars to define their status in the Crimea as the indigenous community, discussions on this topic in political, scientific and civic circles cause a negative response and alienation to the Crimean Tatars from the side of the other ethnos living in the Crimea. The last serious conflict between the Slavs and the Crimean Tatars was caused by winter events in 2014 as a result of a takeover in Ukraine and the citizens of Crimea decided to return in the Russian Federation composition. It is important that not all the representatives of the Crimean-Tatars population supported the decision of the Majlis leaders that the Crimea must be in the composition of Ukraine. But nevertheless, in February the events happened having given the Crimean Tatars a label "objectors".

The ethnic situation in the Crimea is ambiguous. On one hand, the Crimea is in complex ethno-political situation by virtue of its geopolitical position (crossing of Asia and Europe, crossover point of cultures) and historical facts and has a status of a region having potential possibilities to develop ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, there is no radical ethnic confrontation in the Crimea during the last two years.

The author of the abstract- V. Schensnovich.

2017.01.009. N. GARUNOVA. THE QUESTION OF CULTURE AND INTERACTION OF TOLERANCE PROBLEMS OF COUNTERACTION TO YOUTH EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN DAGESTAN // «II Bigievskie chteniya – 2015. The Muslim thought in the XXI century: the unity of tradition and renewal: Materials of the II International scientific – educational conference, Saint-Petersburg, 17 May 20, 2015”, Moscow, 2016, P. 310–317.

Keywords: traditional religions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, moral and spiritual ideals, Dagestan, Wahhabism.

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The author writes that there is a unique experience of interaction among religions and peoples in Dagestan, generated over the centuries. Poly-ethno-confessional environment, formed in the country, helped to avoid conflicts and wars. Traditional religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) have a high spiritual and moral potential and play an important role in ensuring social and political stability, as well as approval of the humanistic, moral and spiritual ideals and values in the Dagestan society.

The author underlines that the emergence of religious extremism in the Republic, causing the escalation of the situation in the social and religious environment, is not a typical phenomenon for the modern Islamic renaissance of Dagestan. Extremism causes the confrontation between supporters of different currents of Islam. Religious extremists try to radicalize the situation in the Caucasus, in Dagestan. Such version of extremism as a religious and political movement "Wahhabism" is not peculiar to the peoples of the Caucasus at all.

Wahhabism is not so much a theological as a political phenomenon. The goal of radical Wahhabi groups is to discredit

the traditional Islam and the Russian government; to undermine the credibility of the center; to strengthen the position the "reformers and modernizers Islam"; to weaken the positions of authority and traditional clergy; to expand the area of regular attacks. Radical political extremism and terrorism are in Dagestan, on the one hand, the response of discontented strata of the population to the solution of socio-economic, political and ethnic problems, and on the other - a religious activity aimed at violent change of the power system or seizure of power, incitement of religious, national, racial enmity and hatred.

The author points out that there is a difficult situation in Dagestan: value guidelines in social relations have been distorted, clanishness and corrupt relationships have ousted, legal ones almost completely. Ignoring of the public interest, law and morality has become the norm. The worst types of Western "progressive" culture are imposed to the society unceremoniously, crushing much more humane and ancient culture of the peoples of Dagestan.

Dagestan, as well as other republics of the North Caucasus, is inhabited by mostly Muslims, for whom loyalty to the community and the prevalence of public interests over private ones are the basic social values. For centuries, the life and relationships of the mountain peoples have been based on unwritten and written laws - adats and sharia. As a consequence, a special mentality and values have been formed, such as: a heightened sense of justice and freedom, a strict traditionalism and family life, indisputable authority of parents and respect for elders, initiative and sense of responsibility. The people are not ready to accept today the implanted ideology of immorality, venality and treachery and this is perceived as an encroachment on ancient national values.

The fight against religious and political extremism, and especially with the massive discontent of the people, relying only on military force is the way absolutely hopeless and dangerous for all citizens of the republic since every war takes the best. The author

argues that the government should face the problems of the population, because the region will remain a generator of destabilization across Russia in all investments and counter-terrorist operations, and the youths will play a huge role in this process.

The author compares the current situation of the youths with the same in the Soviet times when the state took care of the younger generation, and with the situation in the post-Soviet Russia, when the youths were left to themselves. The hardships of everyday life, mass impoverishment and unemployment, distrust of people in power, disadvantages of family and school education, unfavorable situation in families have created a social and psychological distress among young people. Under these conditions, some radical religious, ethnic movements, criminal organizations have taken the so-called "Care" about these people in Dagestan. They explain simply and clearly for young people, that apostates from the true faith, people of other nationalities, the corrupt pro-Russian power, migrants are guilty of all their troubles.

According to the author, it is impossible to solve the problem of inculcating of social and cultural qualities to younger generations without reviving traditional, organizational and pedagogical methods of training and education.

The revival of the traditional culture of education and training is directly related to the revival of the national culture. Acceptance, respect for other people and their culture, history, rights, interests, traditions and the awareness of belonging to the common state is the result of centuries of joint struggle of different peoples against foreign invaders for independence and prosperity. Ignorance and lack of understanding of cultures and traditions of other nations have a negative impact on constructive international cooperation, whereas understanding and tolerance is a source of constructive inter-ethnic cooperation.

The author notes that nowadays Wahhabism also acquired a fanatical religious ideology in Russia. The core component of

the fanatical ideological doctrine and socio-political practices of Wahhabism is the idea of the protection of strict monotheism as the main principle of Islam.

The author concludes that the modern youths of Dagestan have absorbed a lot of negative phenomena and processes, taking place in our society, and a significant part of it has become a destabilizing factor in social development. This situation requires immediate intervention of the state, all the healthy forces of the society in solving the problems of youths in the development of culture. Today Dagestan is unable to cope with these problems on its own.

The author of the abstract - E. Dmitrieva

2017.01.010. S. ZHEMCHURAEVA. ON THE QUESTION ABOUT THE POSITION OF RELIGION IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHECHEN IDENTITY // "II Bigievskie chteniya – 2015. The Moslem thought in XXI century: The renewal and tradition unity: materials of II International scientific-educational conference, Saint-Petersburg, 17–20 May 2015", Moscow, 2016, P. 27–281.

Keywords: the Chechen identity, religion, a language, taip, ethnos.

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The identity problem emerges full blown under current conditions more and more. The interaction of a human-being with environment during operating activities influences on the national character, life values constituting people's mentality in many respects. It is a form of spiritual adaptation to the life environment to a great extent. The Chechen identity was historically formed under social-political conditions of immense complexity having considerably impacted on constituents of its

components. Harsh nature conditions where the Chechens lived, numerous wars where they have taken part in made their character hard, they became courageous and brave soldiers. A man-Chechen must act as not to shame a credit, not to lose respect of the associates. The environment formed the people whose principle meaning of life was to keep credit, dignity and freedom.

The Chechens' vision of freedom isn't something external, minor but it is implicitly to the being and included in the everyday their language. The Chechens' vision about a category "freedom" is associated with the different states of their social dynamics. The native language reflecting ethnically dependent picture of the world presents a primary symbolic medium of any people. The native language was always the enduring value for the Chechen ethnos and was the core of its culture. It is necessary to place the efforts to preserve the Chechen language in recent times of ethno-cultural development of ethnos because the Chechen language is under a threat of dying out according to data of UNESCO.

In the course of the historical development the Chechens' mentality was shaped by particularities characterizing them. The common social-psychological features of this ethnos are: hospitality, respect and unquestioned authority for the elders, love of country, devotion to a friendship, a high level of tolerance to the representatives of other ethnos and confessions. Multilayer structure of the Chechens' identity is characterized with a devotion to the ancestral territory. Each ethnic Chechen has a spiritual liaison with its ancestral village. The Chechens instructed to bury them just in their ancestral villages.

A sacral attitude towards Homeland is given for the Chechens by means of knowledge for generations. The Chechens are also characterized with a notion of their genealogy. Each Chechen must know his genealogy, at least, the names of seven forefathers. Their ethnic origin of the Chechens is placed in

question if there is no corresponding data of a generation genealogy.

Addressing to a problem of a type identity of the Chechens S. Zhemchuraeva argues with those who consider each serious event in Chechnya as clan, taip or vird. The Chechens themselves find out taip or vird belonging of each other occasionally having lived alongside during the decades but sometimes in connection with emergency circumstances. The Chechen social institute origin is associated with long-term historical and socio-economic transformations in the Chechen society.

According to a social research devoted to the study of taip apprehension by the Chechen youth in 2012 the students were suggested to point out in what status it is easier for them to recognize and feel themselves to confirm the above-mentioned the most significant identities. The results of answers were important to verify the initial hypothesis of the research that taip belonging isn't significant for the modern Chechens. The results of the research showed that a confessional belonging is the most important component for the youth and the core of their identity (73,5% of respondents are for this variant of the answer), 18,2% of respondents consider their identification with the Chechen status to be the most comfortable. A cosmopolite status attracts only 3,8% of the youth. It is easier to be aware of themselves as the representatives of their type only for 1,9%. 1,2% of respondents count themselves to be the Europeans and 0,5% of respondents marked that the status "a human being" is the most convenient for them. The results of the research showed that taip in the modern Chechen youth apprehension is a myth relationship based on historical memory. At present it doesn't fulfill real social functions but only related solidarity ones. Taip identity considerably concedes to a religious, family and ethnic identity.

A confessional identity of the Chechens is worth of individual attention. The Chechens are the Moslems-Sunni where the Islam is presented in the form of Sufism. The sheik Kunta-Khaji born in the mountain village approximately in 1830 is the

brightest, widely recognized Chechen saint-Sufi in the whole Islam world and a founder of the Sufi Brotherhood of Zikristov. Kunta-Khaji appeared in the most dramatic period for his people and actually saved his people' spirit not only from the existing but the expecting troubles.

During the deportation the Islam acted a consolidating role in the Chechen life. The Chechens kept their credit, the national language, the best customs and traditions, religious faiths bringing up the kids as appropriate in cruel conditions of the deportation. The national idea of the Chechens during this period is a faith in God, brotherhood, mutual support, self-preservation and hearty-emotional determination for the Caucasus. Being physically in the deportation the Chechens was in the country of their ancestry in their dreams, emotional stress and they didn't imagine their life without it.

Socio-cultural and confessional particularities evolution was unevenly because of the difficult state-political development so the main characteristics of their identity were formed: maximum solidarity, togetherness, a human being dignity, individual liberty; succession and orthodoxy; a special role of religion being inherent to ethnic belonging; sacral attitude to Homeland, the ancestry land; individual and collective responsibility.

The author of the abstract – E. Dmitrieva

2017.01.011. D. POPOV. TAJIKISTAN FACING THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM // "*Problemy natsionalnoy strategii*", Moscow, 2016, № 5 (38), P. 126–147.

Keywords: Tajikistan, Central Asia, terrorism, civil war, Batken events, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, ISIS, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, the 201st Russian military base.

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The author notes that the top political leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) perceives terrorism and extremism as the "primary threat" to the national security. The reasons for terrorism are the open financing of terrorist and extremist organizations by some circles, states and foundations, policy of double standards, use of force in international relations, conflict of interest of global and regional powers, destruction of statehood and international law. The current assessment of security threats is dictated by the history of the establishment of independent Tajikistan. In 1992–1997 the Republic experienced a civil war, in which there were a confrontation between secular forces and military units of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).

Events at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries have demonstrated the seriousness of the terrorist threat hanging over the former Soviet republics of the region. Another result of the war was the most extensive outflow of the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the civil war is over, almost all modern security problems of Tajikistan proceed from this "tragic period of opposition to extremism and terrorism," as President E. Rahmon called it.

By the early 2000s, about five thousand militants were formally integrated into the power structures of the country. After receiving the official status, many field commanders have

formed their parallel control systems in the regions. A wide and almost unprotected corridor has been arranged into the inner regions of Central Asia from Afghanistan, used for the smuggling of Afghan opiates and transferring of manpower of terrorist organizations. In the late 20th century, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the IMU), whose raids went down in history as "the Batken events", used this route. The question of the actual involvement of the Tajikistan leadership to the displacement of the IMU troops on its territory is still open after more than fifteen years of the Batken events.

United under the pseudo-religious slogans, radical bandit formations have challenged territorial integrity and secular nature of the Central Asian states. The transnational nature of new risks became obvious: representatives of many nationalities fought in the ranks of the bandits, their ideologists and sponsors were scattered over a wide area of the Middle East - Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in countries - monarchies of the Persian Gulf, etc.

There was a series of attacks on Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, coincided and probably coordinated with the next opening of the Islamic front against Russia in the North Caucasus, where the mercenary troops of Basayev and Hattab attacked Dagestan in August 1999, unleashing the "second Chechen war".

This situation has demonstrated the vulnerability of the southern flank of the CIS, as well as the vulnerability of the state borders, and weakness in the training of the army and intelligence agencies of Central Asian countries to fight the radical bandit formations in mountains. The contradictions between the former Soviet republics and the lack of unity in relieving common threats were profitable extremists.

The response of Russia and Central Asian countries was the intensification of intergovernmental cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism in addition to military operations. As for Tajikistan, its further efforts were aimed at blocking free transit

through the Pamir-Karategin zone for effective resistance to breakthroughs of the bandit groups.

Balance of power has been changed considerably due to the military campaign "Enduring Freedom" of the Western coalition, initiated by the U.S. officially against the Taliban in response to the terrorist attacks "on September 11th". Having started the massive bombing attacks from the air, the U.S. command made a bet on the field commanders of "Northern Alliance", where representatives of national minorities of northern Afghanistan were prevailed, and first of all – the Tajiks and Uzbeks. The Government of Tajikistan (as well as Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran, and India) provided military and technical, and material assistance to the alliance against the Taliban before the U.S. entry into the conflict.

Terrorist organizations were driven into remote mountain regions on the Afghan-Pakistan border, having lost the previous possibilities for attacks on targets in Central Asia. The authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan have supported the efforts of the U.S., especially in the first stage. In 2001 Tajikistan opened corridors in its airspace to NATO aircraft, in 2009 – allow land transit "non-lethal" goods under the so-called Northern Distribution Network.

Tajikistan has made its contribution to the Western military campaign. At the same time, he took advantage of the changed geopolitical reality for a gradual solution of internal problems. Republic took another ten years almost to concentrate enough power for a full investigation with the centers of instability in the east.

The author notes that since 2012 the situation in the Pamirs is controlled by the government as a whole. The number of "blind" spots on the map of modern Tajikistan, where the central government has existed only nominally, has been reduced considerably. There were many active participants in the civil war in Tajikistan, who did not recognize the conditions of the inter-Tajik peace and who preferred to escape to neighboring

countries. They are a threat to the security of the country as before, and those who fought on the side of Joint Tajik opposition and those who were on the side of government forces.

The author notes that the Tajik leadership still sees the Islamic Revival Party as the main internal enemy. This confrontation is the essence of the political process in the Republic of Tajikistan for the past quarter of a century. Contrary to the arrangement for peace, official Dushanbe systematically limited the possibilities of the IRP, accusing the structure of subversive activities and repressing its activists and leaders. At present, the legal political opposition (formed as a result of the civil war in Tajikistan), has ceased to exist de facto. The negative effect is the imbalance of ethno-territorial groups. IRP represented not only the organization of "political Islam", but also expressed the interests of "the Karategin zone".

Another dangerous consequence of the events can be a transition to the armed methods of struggle, and the outflow of an opposition-minded part of the Tajik society into the ranks of the international radical Islamic organizations. There is every reason to believe that the number of Tajik citizens who joined the terrorist organization of ISIS in 2013–2015, is significantly higher than official estimates. Most Tajik citizens were initially involved for Salafi. The graduates of religious schools in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Pakistan, receiving financial support from various public organizations of the Arab countries, acted as its emissaries. Dushanbe is concerned about not only cooperation between ISIS and followers of extremist organizations based in Tajikistan, but also the growing number of militants in neighboring Afghanistan, sworn allegiance to the "Islamic state".

Despite the complexity of the current operational situation, the special service of Tajikistan manages to avoid the resonance of terrorist attacks on its territory in recent years. Operational measures to combat extremist organizations are accompanied by attempts of the state to organize the religious life of the country,

where the rate of the spread of Islam is one of the highest in the whole of Central Asia.

In January 2016, President E. Rahmon gave instructions to Office of Public Prosecutor in cooperation with other government agencies to develop a National Strategy for the Republic of Tajikistan to combat extremism and terrorism for the period of 2016–2020. He called for increased legal responsibility for commitment of crimes against the constitutional order and security of the state, for the crimes of terrorism and extremist nature, treason.

Tajikistan participates in all the regional formats of international cooperation in countering terrorism – in the Regional Antiterrorist Structure of the SCO, the relevant committees of the CSTO and the CIS. The Russian Federation provides the basic external support for the republic on the military-technical line. The tenure of the 201st Russian military base (the successor to the 201-th division) in Tajikistan was extended until 2042 under the agreement of October 2012. The base is the largest compound of Russian armed forces abroad.

Weakly protected line of the state border in the direction of the Tajik remains a vulnerable point in the system of collective security. The Border Guard Service of the Republic is badly equipped and prepared. At the CSTO session in Sochi in September 2013 was made an important decision for the development of a long-term recovery program of border infrastructure of Tajikistan, which provides financial and technical assistance from the members of the organization and does not imply the return of the personnel of the Russian border guards.

In conclusion, the author emphasizes that the actions of Russia are aimed not only at strengthening the military capabilities of its ally, but to ensure its own safety. We are talking about the formation of the defense echelon rendered beyond Russian borders and designed to meet the enemy on the distant approaches. Moscow and the Tajik partners create a barrier from

the breakout of armed groups, the spread of hostile ideology, traffic in drugs and arms.

The author writes that today Tajikistan has ceased to be the weakest link on the southern borders of the former Soviet Union. Now the open spaces of the desert of Turkmenistan, which remains outside the CSTO, seem more vulnerable to possible intrusions of big bands from the territory of Afghanistan.

Selected strategic line of Russia to modernize the 201st RMB, and re-training of Tajik Armed Forces, the restoration of border infrastructure along the Tajik-Afghan border is optimal under the circumstances, and should be continued. It is important to avoid the growth of the number of Russian troops in Tajikistan in the future, at the same time increasing their mobility and ability to conduct remote hostilities in which the main burden of ground operations should be taken by the updated army and Border Service of Tajikistan.

The author of the abstract – N .Ginesina

2017.01.012. I. VOLKOV. A SYSTEM OF INTER-CONFESSIOANAL RELATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN TURKMENISTAN AS A BASIS FOR THE INTER-CIVILIZED COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA // "Islamovedenie", Makhachkala, 2016, № 2, p. 5–15.

Keywords: Turkestan, the Islam, ethno-confessional relations, the Christianity, Judaism.

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In the article the problems of the inter-confessional relations in the pre-Islamic Turkestan are considered during the period of the religion supremacy of the Prophet and also when this

territory was as the part of the Russian empire. The author points out that ethno-confessional relations impacted on the religious life in the region at different times adding unique features. Owing to it the Christian and other non-Islamic confessions of the Russian Turkestan coexisted peacefully with numerous followers of the Islam.

A system of ethno-confessional relations built up by Tsarist Russia in the region where practically absolute majority preached the Islam - 93%, encouraged intensive socio-economic development of the Russian Turkestan. The Russian Turkestan has existed since the 12-th of February 1865 when the Turkestan region was established up to the 9-th of March 1917 - when the Turkmen Governor-General, A.N. Kuropatkin, has issued the injunction to dissolve (liquidate) this territory. The Russian Turkestan as a reality, administrative-territorial and historical-geographical idea has lingered on as the part of the Russian empire 52 years. From the ancient times Turkestan (before Islam) was the center of the different religious confessions - the Christianity, the Buddhism, the Zoroastrianism, the Judaism, the Manicheism and etc. There is no information about inter-religious conflicts during that period in the existing documents. Concerning the mutual relations of the Turkestan confessions it is improperly to exclude heathen beliefs and cults from this "circle" because the most part of the population of Turkestan of that time followed them as both settled and wandering. They were inherent to a great extent to those people or clans and tribes who have joined some of the above-mentioned cults.

We first heard the Moslems in Central Asia in the middle of VII century when the Arabian troops attacked Maimurg in 654. Then they periodically made incursions on territory of the region but without the attempts to Islamize its population. One marks the attempts of the total Islamization of the indigenous population at the beginning of 8 century being followed by both the violent and the political acts when the Arabian commander Kuteiba ibn Muslim really began to conquest Turkestan.

The Arabians announced all the religions to be false and the Islam to be the only correct faith. They destroyed the temples and chapels, first of all, Zoroastrian, Buddhist, Christian, Manichaeism and etc. having changed them into the mosques. The unknown religious literature was burnt.

However, in spite of the Arabian “missionary” efforts the Islam couldn’t finally win all the religions of Turkestan though it had won the strong positions in the region. Islam acted as a formal “state” religion during the Sumanid and the Karakhanid dynasty period, therefore the life of all the non-Islamic confessions of Central Asia continued but not under such free conditions like during the pre-Islamic period. In many respects these conditions were relaxed during the Mongolian conquest and their control of Turkestan. The Chingisids tried to come to an understanding with all the religious communities of the region patronizing them. According to the documents inter-religious and ethno-confessional relations were peaceful and good neighbor in Turkmenistan during the Mongolian period. It has been lasted until the middle of 14 century till Catholics put a bee in political bonnet at the turn of 1330–1340-ss and it resulted in almost total depopulation of Christians. By Timur (Tamerlan) Christianity disappeared in Central Asia that is to say having left the existing system of inter-religious and ethno-confessional relations for centuries in the region. Soon Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manicheism followed it.

In spite of Islam total control in Turkestan it wasn’t the only religion in the region even in this period, besides, the followers of Judaism and Hinduism lived here. Though the both lived under ignominious terms in Central Asia, however, the mere fact of their presence testified that the inter-religious and ethno-confessional relations existed to any extent but after all.

Everything cardinally changed when Central Asia has joined to Russia. Christians of all the trends returned here in 500 years (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Armenian-Gregorian, Protestantism and etc.). But the followers of Buddhism and all the

more Zoroastrianism weren't presented here but Judaism adepts have been increased for the account of a so-called "the European Jews from "internal provinces of Russia. Therefore, a principally new religious situation and correspondingly, the adequate system of ethno-religious and ethno-confessional relations have emerged owing to a regime confirmation of Russia in Turkestan. However, the main "actors" in the regional religious life - Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism - remained the same in spite of the fact that a number of their followers were different to a great extent. The religion of the Prophet remained to be the main and dominant confession of the Russian Turkestan. As for Islam relations with Christian confessions one should note its inter-religious and ethno-confessional connections with the Russian Orthodoxy. The Moslems in Central Asia understood well that the Orthodox Christians were the followers of "dominant" religion of Russia with a privileged status being different from others. It indirectly impacted on a character of inter-religious and ethno-confessional relations of the Islam with Orthodoxy in the Russian Turkestan. The Moslem clergy being officially acknowledged by the crown glorified not only civil authorities but also hierarchy during the festive occasions and ceremonies. As a whole, according to many contemporaries declaration the Islam-Orthodox relations in Russian Turkestan were tolerant enough. With that it should not go unspoken that Islam in Central Asia differed by a remarkable "faith devotion". Everywhere where it was possible it hurt the positions of "dominant faith: It was especially sensibly in the field of the proselytism. Islam managed to involve many dozens of the Orthodox believers in the rows of its adepts.

The Russian Separatists - Baptists, Molokans, Stundists, "Khlysty" and etc. - were mostly close to the Turkestan Islam among the Christian confessions. The Moslems consider that the "separatists" (as they were officially named by a crown) are "persecuted" religious communities being in need for help. And

they got it from the Moslems to “spite” to the Russian government.

The main point of inter-religious and ethno-confessional connections of the Christian communities in Central Asia was their attitude towards the Islam. The military administration of the Russian Turkestan understood this fact so it initially opposed to a missionary activity of the Orthodoxy among the Moslems in Central Asia because it was forbidden for the other confessions. However, The Separatists were beyond “dominant faith” in the field of Christian proselytism in the system of inter-regional and ethno-confessional relations in Turkestan region. In the national archives of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan there are hundreds facts concerning petitions of the Orthodox believers to renegade: Baptism, Adventism, Molokans and etc. In the pre-revolutionary period the Orthodox piety came down in the country and it also happened in the Russian Turkestan. Some governmental and church figures were ready to consider it as Islam intrigues and appealed to tighten a struggle against them by legislative and administration measures.

A system of inter-religious and ethno-confessional relations was complex and varied in the Russian Turkestan. Islam being confessed by the majority of the region population tried to adapt to the indicated system. The Moslem clergy conducted friendly and tolerant regulations with Christianity, first of all, Orthodoxy but “dominant faith” was sympathetic and respected the Turkestan Islam. This system was an effective basis for the Moslems in Central Asia to cooperate and interact with Orthodox Christians and the representatives of other confessions in the Russian empire and create the conditions for a rapid modernization of Russian regions with the prevailing Moslem population.

The author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich.

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2017.01.013. A. SAMOKHIN. PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF GEOPOLITICAL STUDY VALID FOR THE SYRIAN CRISIS (2011–2016). // "Vestnik Adygeiskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta", Maikop, 2016, № 1 (174), P. 50–54.

Keywords: Syrian crisis, international terrorism, military intervention, national interests, energy policy.

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For Russia, participating in settlement of the Syrian crisis, growing influence of ISIS factor and other radical groups all over the post-Soviet area and its own territory has paramount importance. In case of ISIS's activity expansion in Central Asia and beginning of a regional war there, Russia's participation is predestined. Syrian operation is an entry into a substantially imminent war for Russia on easy terms - away from the former Soviet Union frontiers and without Russian ground-forces participation. Therefore, intervention in Syria permits at the worst-to stave off a full-scale warfare on land with involvement of Russia in former-Soviet Central Asia, and at the best- to preclude it. The Soviet-Syrian alliance was created in the Cold war years. After the end of the Cold war Syria- a client of Russian armaments industry- left one of the Middle East countries where Moscow reserved its geopolitical positions during the Soviet era. The Syrian army uses Soviet and Russian armament. It is thought that 72 % of the weapon bought by Syria is Russian. Furthermore,

during the war years Syrian demand for the armament has increased fivefold, and it became major buyer of the Russian defense industry.

Staying of B. Al-Assad in power meets the Russian interests. Russia aims to prevent the regime change in Syria from the outside by abusive means that would be fraught with harmful consequences for ex-USSR countries on the Russian periphery and regions of North Caucasus and the Volga region of the Russian Federation inhabited by Moslems.

Syria occupies an important place in geopolitical ambitions of Russia. Russian naval forces have a remote sustainment center in the Syrian harbor Tartus, which is a unique Russian military post beyond the former USSR territory. The base in Tartus is capable of guaranteeing the presence of Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea, even in the event of growing animosity with Turkey, dominating the Black Sea straits. This strategic target is essential in terms of Russia's inclinations to strengthen its geopolitical role in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East.

Estimating the Russian interests in Syria it is necessary to contemplate an energy-political dimension of the conflict. The war in Syria is an echo of scramble, which was initiated by the leading players of the global gas market. The grand prize in this campaign is an access to the largest gas market in Europe. Making a selection from all existent energy resources European countries placed stake on natural gas as the most environmentally safe of all hydrocarbons.

The European Union gives particular emphasis on developing economic relations with Saudi Arabia, in putting up the Middle-Eastern strategy. Alongside cooling in relations with Washington, Riyadh tends to enhance relations with Europe. It is noteworthy that the EU came out on top in the quality of defense industry production provider for Saudi Arabia in 2010. B. Al-Assad's Syria is the one seriously problematic territory. It should be no surprise that Qatar became one of the encouragers of

fighting against the Syrian regime. In case of its victory in the civil war entanglement on the way of the gas pipe from Qatar to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea will vanish. The EU countries' activity can be interpreted by the similar logic. In the struggle around Syria preferences of the USA are on the Qatars and Europeans side. However the Syrian regime has a potent ally, it is Iran. Teheran has not less energy-political motivation in its activity of supporting efforts of Damascus than Qatar and the EU.

For a long time the Iranians have brooded over plans about building a gas pipe line to a shore of amicable Syria. Great while the Sunni regime of S. Hussein has thwarted that purpose. Nevertheless a pass for the Iranian gas to Syria was open after the toppling of the Iraqi dictator. The Shia majority took power in Iraq, and influence of Tehran on neighboring country increased drastically. In July, 2011, Syria, Iran and Iraq signed an energy deal whereunder the pipe line was to get through from the Iranian port in Assaluyeh in a region of gasfield South Pars in the Persian Gulf to Damascus in Syria through Iraq's territory. Project realization of the pipe line can mainly anchor Shia axis by strong economic support. In fact, there is a fierce competition for a selection of gas-transportation route from the same field, one part of which is controlled by Qatar and the second one by Iran. In accordance with the researcher's output, both pipe line projects are not profitable for Russia. Both of them are able to provide competition to Gazprom at the European market, but in case of the Iranian project realization, it will be easier for Russia to negotiate with Islamic Republic rather than with Qatar.

From the outset of the Syrian conflict the Russian Federation is seriously concerned with keeping B. Al-Assad's government in office. From this perspective the Syrian government was insistently recommended to establish a contact with the opposition not to provide an opportunity to an armed revolt.

From Moscow's point of view, continuation of the Syrian conflict creates danger of quantitative growth of ideologically prepared jihadists who can go back to native land (and already do it), which includes Russia and neighbouring countries of Central Asia. Prevalence of jihadist elements within anti-Assad forces in Syria aggravates efforts of peaceful settlement of the conflict. Engagement of the Russian Federation in the Syrian conflict is established by two main strategic aims: issue a challenge to American hegemony on the global stage and help the government of the Syrian president B. Assad in battle with radical Islamists, who are the real danger to national security of Russia.

The author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich.

2017.01.014. K. AZIMOV. WHO IS BEHIND THE COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY? // *Ekonomicheskie sotsialno-politicheskie i etnokontsionalnye problemy afro-aziatskih stran. Pamyati Pahomovoy L.F., Moscow, 2016, IOS RAS, P. 46–53.*

Keywords: the military coup, the Kurdish rebels, R. Erdogan, F. Gulen, Turkish nationalism, Justice and Development Party (AKP).

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The author analyzes the situation preceding the military coup attempt in Turkey July 15, 2016. There were several coups in Turkey in the 20th century: in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 years. The military were the initiators of change of power every time, considering themselves as the guarantor of the state created by Kemal Ataturk precepts. R. Erdogan has repeatedly and successfully attempted to limit the role of the army in the country. It seems that recently the situation has normalized with

the army, which was due to the volatile situation in neighboring countries - Syria and Iraq, and the Kurdish separatists has entered into conflict with the central government in the South-East, seeking recognition of the autonomy.

The government gave permission to conduct military operations in the country because of the activation of the Kurdish rebels in the autumn of 2015. R. Erdogan implicitly recognized the error of his former policy to oust the military from political life in Turkey to reach agreement with the commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces.

The most popular version in six months after the coup in Turkey is that the U.S. tried to remove R. Erdogan as he allegedly prevented the creation of a Kurdish state, planned by Washington. List of claims of R. Erdogan against the U.S., has increased significantly since the failed coup. He believes that the mastermind of the coup was Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish preacher who lives in the U.S. and that the U.S. does not extradite to the Turkish authorities. It is precisely F. Gulen, whom Ankara accuses of organizing the coup attempt on July 15.

F. Gulen was born in 1941 in the imam's family. The first sermon he read in 14 years, and became an imam in 19 years. His sermons were different from lectures of other imams, as he drew attention to the need for Muslims to improve and develop themselves, in particular, he promoted the study of many natural and technical sciences, as well as the economy. In the 1990s F. Gulen published works, promoting dialogue between the different ethnic communities and religions.

He founded about 1400 schools, lyceums and other cultural and educational institutions in different countries, where not only Muslims, but also representatives of other religions studied. The main idea of F. Gulen - is to educate the elite in countries where Muslims are. Most researchers believe that his movement does not seek to undermine the secular character of the Turkish state, urging fellow Muslims who observe all the precepts of religion, and to use the benefits of modern society.

F. Gulen tries to combine Islam and modern time. His ideas are imbued with Turkish nationalism and tendency to combine religion and neoliberal economic policies. The author believes that F. Gulen has positioned himself as the bearer of the modern peace-loving Sufi Islamic tradition, adapted to the present day.

F. Gulen believes that the main value of the modern world is knowledge, he has established a network of educational institutions for this purpose. Thus, the main purpose of F. Gulen is to involve Muslims in the modern processes, democracy, market economy, as well as to return status of a regional superpower for Turkey.

In 2013, F. Gulen was included in the hundred most influential people in the world under the version, of the American weekly magazine "Time" (New York), and the list of 500 most influential people in the world according to another American magazine "Foreign Policy", as he took 11th place in the list of most influential Muslims. Thanks to his ideas discussion platform "Rumi Forum" originated in the United States where representatives of Islam, Christianity and Judaism were invited together to discuss the pressing issues of the day.

Followers of F. Gulen promoted formation and establishment of pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the years of military rule. He also played a significant role in the rise of the current President R. Erdogan as a political figure. We can not say for sure yet if F. Gulen supporters have organized a coup or R. Erdogan himself hoaxed it to get rid of people, hindering to realize his own ambitions. The unequivocal willingness of R. Erdogan to restore traditions of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey is the evidence in favor of the second version, but he probably fears that supporters of F. Gulen and the Kemalists prevent him to implement it. R. Erdogan said personally call to prayer in his palace in Ankara, which was broadcast to the entire country, when it became obvious that the coup has failed (or hoax coup failed!), the author writes.

Ankara tried to impose a version for the Turkish public opinion immediately after the suppression of the coup attempt that F. Gulen is the main initiator of the coup. However, the image of the preacher, which enjoys enormous respect in Turkey and abroad, does not allow a definite conclusion, especially since there is no irrefutable evidence. However, the absence of evidence does not mean that the F. Gulen movement has no relation to the coup. Accusations against F. Gulen and his followers have allowed R. Erdogan to purge the army, the security services and the state apparatus.

Author of the article points out that the actions of the Turkish authorities have caused a mixed reaction across Europe. Members of the European Union accused the Turkish authorities of violating the international law. The head of European diplomacy F. Mogherini declared that intention of Ankara to introduce the death penalty again closes the prospects of EU membership for Turkey.

There was a new version a few days after the failed coup attempt that the coup organizers were the U.S. It seems that Ankara decided to play on the traditional anti-American sentiments this time, very popular among the Turks. According to this version, F. Gulen looked like a perfect culprit, planned by the Turkish authorities in order to achieve the national unity. He has been represented as a "traitor" protected by the treacherous America.

The author states that R. Erdogan got a chance to get rid of all those who did not inspire confidence in him, and from the top of the army - in the first place. This allowed R. Erdogan to accuse F. Gyulen again to reduce the authority of the preacher among the Turkish people, and to divert attention from his own mistakes. R. Erdogan almost sure of the support of the people, which once again will strengthen the national unity and allow to assert his authority.

R. SULEIMANOV, K. KHIKMETOV. THE ROLE OF THE 'KURDISH FACTOR' IN THE COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY ON JULY 15, 2016 // *The article is written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World".*

Keywords: Turkey, coup d'etat, parliamentary elections, Justice and Development party, People's Democratic party, Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK), Turkish Kurdistan, anti-terrorist operation, Turkish armed forces.

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Abstract. There was a military coup attempt in Turkey on the night of July 16, 2016. According to official data, 240 people were killed, and 2,200 were wounded during the disturbances. Quite a few factors pointed to the possibility of a coup in the country, the main one being the growing tension and instability during the past several months preceding the event (major terrorist acts in Ankara and Istanbul serve as an example).

This article shows the role of the Kurdish factor as one of the key reasons for the coup attempt. It also describes in detail the current situation in the region of Turkish Kurdistan, where bitter fighting resumed in July 2015.

On the night of July 16, 2016, a coup attempt took place in Turkey organized by military officers. It is a generally recognized fact that the ruling Justice and Development party during its reign since 2002 has succeeded to lower the role of the Turkish army in the country to a great extent. However, the military operations developing on the territory of Turkish Kurdistan from the summer of 2015 (after the ruling party lost its parliamentary

majority necessary for the formation of government at the elections to parliament on June 7) have shown that the military elite has gradually returned its former influence in the country, and the coup attempt was its consequence and confirmation. The investigation of the developments carried on by the Turkish authorities has given a clearer picture of the “Kurdish factor” playing a major role in them.

Background

On June 7, 2015, elections to parliament took place in Turkey at which the Justice and Development party lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002, having gained 40.87 percent of votes (258 seats in parliament). The People’s Democratic Party supporting the rights of the Kurds won 13.12 percent of votes (80 seats in parliament). Now the representatives of the Justice and Development party had to come to agreement with other parties in parliament in order to form a coalition. Otherwise, new elections should have been held.

From the very beginning it was clear that a coalition could not have been formed largely due to the unwillingness of the ruling party leaders, and President Erdogan personally. Realizing this, the Justice and Development party, with a view to reducing the number of potential voters for the People’s Democratic party, provoked an armed conflict in the volatile region of Turkish Kurdistan. On July 20, 2015, a terrorist act was committed in the town of Suruc in the south-west of Turkey, in which 32 people were killed and 104 injured. Responsibility for this act was laid on the Islamic state. Two days later two policemen were murdered near Suruc. Responsibility for this was initially taken by the PKK (banned and branded as terrorist in Turkey) and declared as the act of retaliation for the explosion in Suruc, but in several hours the PKK representatives announced that they were not to blame. On July 25 Turkish planes bombarded several

targets on the territory of Iraq. Officially the bombing attacks were made on the Islamic state positions, but in actual fact all air strikes were aimed at the positions of the Kurds living in Iraq and their military units.¹ At the same time the Turkish authorities began a massive anti-terrorist operation in Turkish Kurdistan. Due to this, representatives of the PKK declared that it was absolutely impossible to observe the truce, which existed in the region of Turkish Kurdistan since 2013. (The truce was proclaimed in order to unite efforts in the fight against the Islamic state. That was how another relatively peaceful period in the history of the “Kurdish problem” has ended, and real military operations began with the use of heavy artillery and aviation, which continue to this day.

As a result of the unfolding conflict hundreds of thousands of the population of the Turkish Kurdistan had to leave their homes, and hundreds of peaceful citizens, soldiers and policemen were killed.²

The Military Gain More Influence

From the very start of military operations in Turkey the role of the army began to grow. As is known, during the stay of the Justice and Development party in power the army’s role has been reduced considerably, which was shown by the referendum of September 12, 2010, which abolished the role of military tribunals and lifted legal immunity of the participants in the military coup on September 12, 1980. Several months prior to the conflict in Turkish Kurdistan, from the summer of 2015, the Turkish military received certain concessions and privileges. For example, on June 7, 2016, the Council of Ministers of the country adopted a special law concerning servicemen. According to it, criminal proceedings against all military men could only be started on approval of the Minister of Defense.

The Turkish leadership rendered all-round support to the military. Most Turkish mass media which are under complete

control of the country's authorities due to the present-day legislation³ have been lauding the military, calling them "heroes and defenders of the nation from the terrorist threat." President Erdogan himself has time and again stated that the military should receive everything they need for "successful struggle against the PKK terrorists." However, several days later, after the abortive coup, it was announced that many of those who had been proclaimed "true patriots of the Turkish nation" turned out to be "traitors."

On March 1, 2016, the "Anadolu" News agency circulated an article highly praising General Adem Huduti, who was later arrested as one of the active rebels.⁴

Five thousand servicemen of the Turkish special forces had to be redeployed to Ankara. However, the population of the locality of their former deployment, together with the local police, prevented the operation by blocking the airport⁵ An important role was planned for six F-16 fighter-planes which were supposed to bomb administrative buildings in Ankara. ⁶

The military, who captured the TRT TV-studio on the night of July 16, publicly announced the true aims of the coup. It became clear from their statement that one of the reasons for the coup was the desire to stop the military hostilities in Turkish Kurdistan. It was said, among other things, that "the basic rights and freedoms in the country are in jeopardy..., our country is under an autocratic regime based on fear..., today innocent people lose their life for nothing..." ⁷ In this way the military and representatives of the security forces taking part in the operations in the southeast of Turkey expressed their desire to end the war in the country, come out as "saviors of the nation," and raise their prestige among the Turkish population.

The Coup Attempt as a Possibility for Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Problem

After the abortive coup a new opportunity has emerged to resolve the Kurdish problem peacefully, return to : and cease military hostilities. Immediately after the coup of July 16, the cochairman of the People's Democratic party Selahattin Demirtas said the following: "The emerging opportunities should be regarded positively. It is now quite clear that our society, which has been divided by great polarization for a very long time, has now become a single whole."⁸

But the Turkish leadership has taken a course aimed at pursuing a harsh policy toward the Kurdish population and all people of Turkey, which shows that the Turkish establishment is now dominated by the hawks. After the events of July 15 and up to this day, more than one hundred mass media of the opposition have been closed down. Out of 106 cochairmen of municipal councils, who are members of the Democratic Regions party, thirty-nine have been arrested.⁹ In Kurdistan cochairmen of 24 municipal councils have been removed from their posts, and dozens of local officials have been arrested. To date twenty Kurdish radio and TV companies have been closed down on the order of the Turkish authorities, and dozens of local officials have been fired and thrown into prison. On September 2, 2016, Turkey's Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced that "from July 24 of last year onwards the country has been waging the fight against terrorism according to new rules."¹⁰ Two days later he said that about 14,000 teachers would be fired on suspicion of ties with the PKK.¹¹ According to the data by November 24, 2016, about 5,530 Kurdish political and civic leaders were arrested during the past year.¹²

Moreover, representatives of the Turkish authorities today accuse the deputies of the People's Democratic party of maintaining ties with the "Hizmet" movement and personally with Fethullah Gulen, who is regarded in Turkey as the

ringleader of the failed coup. The Turkish mass media actively spread rumors and information about the movement's direct participation in the coup in 1980.¹³ In turn, President Erdogan, in one of his public speeches in 2012, invited Fethullah Gulen to return to Turkey from the United States where he lived in exile for 13 years while being on the wanted list.¹⁴ As is known, the Justice and Development party has played a considerable role in the assimilation policy of Kurds by sponsoring the "Hizmet" movement (schools, lyceums, universities), which was granted *carte blanche* on the territory of Turkish Kurdistan.

It should be noted that three months before the events of July 15, the newspaper "Hurriyet" in its April 6 issue published a statement of the former military prosecutor Ahmet Zeki in which he warned the authorities and Turkish public of the forthcoming coup.¹⁵

Some people asserted that under the guise of fighting anti-government rebels an open struggle against the democratic forces was going on. Besides, there were quite a few important persons among government officials and those in the Justice and Development party who were well aware of the preparations for the coup. And President Erdogan also knew about it. But he did nothing to nip them in the bud. He was solely concerned of strengthening his personal power.¹⁶

More and more facts come to light showing that Erdogan knew about the revolt, and the events on the night of July 16 could be viewed as beneficial for the powers that be, because the failed coup gave a free hand to the Justice and Development party in its campaign against the opposition: mass arrests of journalists, university teachers and scholars, closing down of newspapers, magazines, radio and TV channels, and civil societies continue to this day.¹⁷ Actually, it is the massive struggle against the opposition forces in Turkey. By November 2016 nine deputies to parliament from the People's Democratic Party, including its leader Selahattin Demirtas, were arrested.

The leader of the Republican People's party Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who has previously supported the ruling Justice and Development party, but later became disappointed in its activity, commented on the present-day policy of the Turkish authorities by saying that the real coup was going on in Turkey now. TV channels, newspapers and magazines are closed and journalists and writers are thrown into prison.¹⁸

The Justice and Development Party Is Toughening Its Policy Towards the Kurds

On September 4, 2016, the Prime minister of Turkey Binali Yildirim announced that right after the events of July 15, the Turkish government disbanded the PKK cells in Hakkari province which had been active there during the past thirty years.¹⁹ However, statements issued by the People's Defense Forces (the armed wing of the PKK) disprove this. According to their information, in special operations they have carried out, fifteen members of the Turkish gendarmerie were killed and twenty-five wounded.²⁰ From August 30 until September 10, 2016, as a result of land and air operations ninety-nine men and officers of the Turkish army were killed.

Fourteen Kurdish guerillas lost their homes as a result of bombardment, one drone was brought down, and one tank and three helicopters were destroyed.²¹

Parallel with this, from August 30 to September 2, 2016, eighty-six Turkish soldiers were killed and fifty-eight soldiers wounded.²²

According to the data of the People's Self-defense Headquarters, there were 1,199 armed clashes between the Kurdish fighters and the Turkish army in the period between July 24, 2015, and July 23, 2016. As a result of military hostilities 2,982 men and officers were killed and 1,146 men and officers wounded. Guerilla losses are estimated at 435 men.²³

The command of the People's Self-defense Forces (the PKK armed wing) has informed that in the military operations in Turkish Kurdistan 1,736 soldiers of the Turkish army and policemen were killed and four tanks and 120 armored vehicles were destroyed from August to October 2016. The Kurdish guerillas lost 214 men during the same period.²⁴

The Chairman of the People's Republican People's party Kemal Kilicdaroglu, commenting on the latest losses of the Turkish army, stated that "it is the political leadership of the country that is responsible for the death of so many of our children. It is they who must explain where our country is heading to."²⁵

The Workers' Party of Kurdistan has changed its tactic with a view to protecting the life of peaceful citizens. Now its operations are mainly directed to the key positions of the Turkish armed forces and it cautions Kurdish young men against taking part in any military actions. The main armed clashes are now taking place in mountains, where the Turkish army suffers serious losses. However, in the period from July 15 to 19, 2016, the Kurdish fighters did not take part in any clashes with the government forces.

On August 20, 2016, the Union of Communities of Kurdistan distributed the following information: "Recently, quite a few states, international and Turkish organizations, as well as organizations of Southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan asked the Kurdistan Workers' Party to resume negotiations with the Turkish authorities. After their request we deemed it necessary to present our view to the world public.

We propose the following steps for a solution of the Kurdish problem. The ruling Justice and Development party should show good will in its desire to resolve it and take the necessary steps for their implementation. The party should organize and hold a meeting with our leader Abdullah Ocalan, with Turkish parliamentarians taking part. If all conditions for negotiations are created and representatives of all political forces

of Turkey (including parties outside its parliament), representatives of civil organizations and religious groups – those who support movements for democracy and freedom are drawn in this process, we guarantee agreement with all necessary actions on our part and full responsibility for the due procedure of negotiations.²⁶

The Invisible Hand of Ocalan

Right after the abortive coup the Kurdish population began to worry over the fate of its permanent leader Abdullah Ocalan who, incidentally, predicted the possibility of a coup in 2014 already. In the past four-five months preceding the abortive coup he repeatedly stated that if the Kurdish problem was not solved peacefully, the country might face a coup.

On September 5, 2016, fifty Kurdish politicians went on hunger strike and demanded that the Turkish authorities arrange their meeting with Ocalan. On September 11, 2016, there was a meeting of Abdullah Ocalan with his younger brother Mehmet. Through him he gave the following message: “My incarceration continues but I have no health problems. Several of my colleagues are also here and we continue to work on our project. If the state is prepared to talk about it, we could reach an agreement within six months. First of all, it should be stated that we are not to blame for violating the peace process. The Kurdish problem is a very difficult one. It has not been solved during the past twenty years. Neither had it been solved during 150 or 200 years. Thirty people die every day. If the government were honest, there would not have been so many deaths. All people with conscience should realize this. If the government is ready for negotiations, it should send its representatives here. We have worked out the necessary proposals and we shall be able to settle the problem within six months. The war makes people blind. There can be no winner in this war, which lasts for forty years already. And it can continue for another eighty years. This must

not happen. There should be no more blood and tears. The Kurdish problem cannot be solved unilaterally by the biggest party in the country. If the state had realized this, the war would not have lasted for such a long time, and the problem would have been settled.”²⁷

The cochairman of the People’s Democratic Party Selahattin Demirtas, speaking about the meeting of Ocalan with his younger brother and addressing the Turkish leadership, said the following: “Both the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Turkish leadership should have understood a long time ago that the Kurdish problem could not be resolved by military means and methods. We adhere to the same positions which we outlined in our election program on June 7, 2015. And we are quite sincere in it. If we have the slightest opportunity for a dialogue, we are sure to use it as fully as possible.”²⁸

In conclusion we would like to note that the Kurdish problem is one of the key issues for the entire state. The abortive coup of July 15, 2016, and the subsequent toughening of the policy pursued by the Turkish leadership, have evidently exacerbated the situation in Kurdistan and revealed quite a few problems of modern Turkey which have been in the offing for a long time.

As is known, the Justice and Development party is forced to enter into allied relations with the ultranationalist organization “Ergenikon” in opposition to the “Hizmet” movement. It can be expected that having smashed the coup supporters the Justice and Development party will enter into a conflict with “Ergenikon.” Mention should also be made of the ultranationalistic politician Dogu Perincek, leader of the Turkish Vatan Party, who positions himself as an enemy of all supporters of Erdogan and Gulen. And all of them come out against the Kurdish movement.

The ruling Justice and Development party is unable to take an independent and effective decision for solving the Kurdish problem. It enters into alliance with chauvinistic organizations,

such as the Nationalist Movement party and “Ergenekon,” which can hardly help resolve the Kurdish problem.

In the past several months, especially after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, the Kurdish problem has become ever more pressing. And the harsh measures taken by the country’s leadership only aggravate the situation around Turkish Kurdistan.

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2017.01.015. A. YAKOVLEV. POWER AND VIOLENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA: EVOLUTION OF THE GOALS AND METHODS IN THE EARLY 21st CENTURY // "*Vostok (Oriens)*", Moscow, 2016, № 2, P. 116–129.

Keywords: monarchy, modernization, conflict.

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The author describes the changes in political life of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the first decade of the 21st century, showing the status of the government and society in the transition from traditional to modern. For half a decade of this century there have been major political changes in the Arab

world, associated with both internal political processes as well as external factors. There are serious changes in the global system as well. All this could not but affect the political culture and the political life of the Saudi society and the Saudi government, forced to answer the challenges of the times and adapt to the modern world.

The author examines the history and principles of the modern Saudi state. In the early 20th century during the formation of absolute monarchy, the population existed in medieval times, considering themselves as free members of the Ummah, obeying not only the power, but the authority of the Sheikh of sheikhs. The ideal of the Saudi political culture was the first state, "of righteous" caliphs, based on the continued compliance with Sharia; tribal principles, as a symbol of communal democracy; rigid power vertical, organizing a centralized state; delegating of political rights of the general population to the top of society.

Changes in the political culture of the kingdom are directly connected to the modernization of the society in the 1960–1970's. A natural part of this process became, on the one hand, the gradual development and complication of a variety of state and legal institutions (Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Law Council), and on the other - a more noticeable change in the worldview of the educated part of the Saudi society. Graduates of Saudi and American universities could not help but be unaware of the contradiction between the norms of the Western model of industrial and democratic world of the second half of the 20th century and the reality of Saudi Arabia with the dominance of a patriarchal way of life. Some changes in the state apparatus did not affect the foundations of statehood - its authoritarian nature, a direct connection with the principles of Islamic and tribal traditions.

The author underlines that there was no separation of politics from religion in Saudi Arabia, as the whole social and public life of the kingdom was sealed by Islam. The main subject

of political life remained the same state, often – the leader of the state, so the struggle to change the balance of political forces was unfolding around him. The author underlines that there was no separation of politics from religion in Saudi Arabia, as the whole social and public life of the kingdom was sealed by Islam. The main subject of political life remained the same state, often – the leader of the state, so the struggle to change the balance of political forces conducted around it.

At the same time, traditional Western political institutions (executive, representative and judicial authorities) were not so important, especially since there were no political parties and labor unions, free media. Only one state institution – the army – saves and stores the value in the political life of the Arab countries, and potentially more in the kingdom.

The form and the base type, of statehood (Islamic absolute monarchy) are not questioned. However, the new foundations of statehood significantly complement the traditional – the Quran, Islamic law and the tribal way of life. In just a few decades, new social forces were formed: the urban middle strata – small, medium and big bourgeoisie, national intellectuals, a layer of bureaucracy and employees, salaried workers and technicians, military personnel. Not only the data of GDP and oil revenues, but also modern infrastructure, high standard of living of the majority of the population indicate the results of modernization in Saudi Arabia.

However, the statistical success rates only cover the negative trends in the socio-political sphere: the problem of unemployment among the educated youth of the indigenous population could potentially result in the explosion of "youth rebellion", as happened in the Arab countries in the spring of 2011. Through oil revenues the government can reduce the discontent for a long time, while maintaining an adequate level of material consumption, and to stop manifestations of social discontent, but only for the native population.

Another threat still remains: eight million of foreign workers, and "stick", but not "carrot" will obviously be necessary

to fix the problem. In 1980-s the detailed rules of residence of foreign workers have been developed in Saudi Arabia in order to minimize violence against them, and some forms of independent activity were admitted later.

The author writes that the politicized Islam serves as an ideology, as well as partly forming Saudi patriotism, and Arab nationalism, sometimes identified with the "Arab (or) Islamic socialism". Religious activities of the government and the religiousness of the society itself are performing policy functions in society. The ideas of justice and equality were based on socialist doctrine in the western political life, while these ideas were an integral part of the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed in the Arab-Muslim world.

Thus, the purpose of government and society in political life are changing in the new century, the political culture of society is also changing, but the principles of the political system remains intact.

Socio-economic processes are ahead of socio-cultural processes, many of the structures and elements of traditional Bedouin and Islamic societies have not been eliminated. Socio-economic processes are ahead of socio-cultural, and many of the structures and elements of traditional Bedouin and Islamic societies have not been eliminated. Therefore monarchy corresponds to the level of consciousness of the majority of the population, and the tasks that modernized society has to solve, as well as the challenges posed by the outside world.

Tribal traditions and principles of Islam have not been called into question in the process of modernizing of the Saudi society, on the contrary, they have been kept at the heart of its social system and the modified statehood.

The author writes that the ruling regime in the kingdom exists in the transition period. This is a generational change in the dynasty of Saud, a change in the worldview of young and educated Saudis, challenges from a number of Arab States, where society activity, has gained its formal framework, diverse influence

of the era of globalization, a potential threat of the presence of millions of foreign workers on a permanent basis in the country.

In general, the political culture and political system in Saudi Arabia have been upgraded significantly (based on the logic of internal development), experiencing the impact, but avoid borrowing from formal political structures of the Western model. It is possible to see the connection of traditional Arab and Islamic as well as the Western borrowed features, standards and elements in the political life of the kingdom. The Kingdom has managed to avoid the revolutionary disasters is, without abandoning the traditional Islamic and tribal bases.

At the same time, the growing complexity of economic life and the steady social development are generating new problems and contradictions in the Saudi society, which require resolution by political means. That is impossible without certain reformation of the political system, religious life and religious institutions in the Kingdom. Such processes are already underway, the author writes in the conclusion.

The author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

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Keywords: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Islam, religious conflict, the Shia-Sunni differences, regional policy.

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The author believes that the 21st century in the political aspect was characterized by the fact that Islam has become

nominated at the cutting edge of modern processes more and more insistently. This trend has an ambivalent character. On the one hand, the second largest world religion often appears as a source of negative emotions in numerous media reports, representing a picture of "Islamic extremism," scourge of war in Syria, steady stream of Muslim refugees in European countries and related conflicts.

On the other hand, it is clear that the Middle Eastern countries, where the majority of the population is Muslim, are beginning to attract worldwide attention as active participants in the global processes and actors having their own agenda and strategic plans. Actions of such significant actors in the Middle East, like Iran and Saudi Arabia are proof of this.

According to the author, the views of Hans Kippenberg have to be taken into account with the respect to the Islamic world: to identify the religion as the "cause of the fire" is not true, but it is better to compare it to the role of oil, poured into the fire. It is the political, social and cultural conflicts that exacerbate religious feelings in the modern world. The author believes that it is legitimate to say that a certain type of religious community begins to mobilize its power potential if it sees a threat to their livelihood, their identity and their well-being in particular political, social and cultural development.

Thus, the roots of the modern conflict of Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia are to be found in any other dimension, but not in the religious, leaving attempts to explain the theory of regional confrontation, "the revival of religion." The author believes that it is necessary to depart from the orientalist discourse that has emerged in the modern research tradition, and pay due attention to the numerous forms of Islam as a religion, cultural traditions and socio-political system. This approach will help to evaluate the events more objectively, isolating the cause, as well as help to project the possible consequences. Consideration of the Iranian-Saudi conflict will take place in this direction.

Events in January point to the deliberate escalation of tension in the region by the Saudi authorities. The author asks a legitimate question: What was the reason? Gregory Gause sees the reason for this turn of events not in the dogmatic differences between Shiites and Sunnis, but in the fact that many governments of the Persian Gulf countries have to balance between internal and external threats.

According to Marc Lynch of George Washington University (USA), the ambivalence of the provisions of the Saudis is as follows. On the one hand, Riyadh has a strong political position in the Arab world today: the Saudi authorities could rely on the support of the UAE, is actively reaching rapprochement, the weakening of traditionally dominated in the region in the face of the forces of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In addition, the constant enemies of the Saudis in the Sunni world, Turkey and Qatar slowed degree charges as a result of numerous failures of their own and seek to restore relations with the authorities of the kingdom.

On the other hand, the continuing war in Syria and Yemen, the emergence and vigorous activity of the Islamic State, as well as the Iranian nuclear program, make the Saudi rulers very vulnerable. They should also add the problems of domestic policy – budgetary implications of falling oil prices and the struggle of bidders for the right to inherit the throne. However, the external problems required immediate reaction, expressed in the escalation of inter-communal confrontation, in the presence of serious internal problems.

M. Lynch identifies three main foreign source of tension:

1. "Iranian issue".

2. Failure of international policy.

3. Issue of the leadership in the Sunni Muslim world. In the current conditions, the situation is further aggravated due to the media that create a social base for the continuing civil wars in the region, supporting the idea of separation.

The author comes to the following conclusions: Shiite-Sunni religious differences can not be ignored. Religious and community

component is intertwined with ethnic, tribal, regional, ethnic, class, age and social in the Middle East. Often some differences perceived as religious or doctrinal disagreements at first glance, are by-products of political repression or lack of equal access to economic resources. In addition, the Middle East represents a conglomeration of communities where the local context is particularly important: the religious dynamics in Bahrain is radically different from the dynamics in Lebanon or Syria.

Studying relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia to date, the author believes that the religious factor is not an innovative component of modern public life to this part of the Middle East region, but continues to be an integral part of it, working in a peculiar way.

The author believes that it is impossible to speak of dogmatic differences as the root cause. Rather, actors conceal some political ambition behind them. Riyadh uses the Sunni-Shiite conflict as a habitual means to shift the attention of the parties between internal and regional problems, in which the kingdom is directly involved, but can not solve.

The author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

V. KIRICHENKO. THE SHIITE COMMUNITY IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF KUWAIT // *The article is written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem world".*

Keywords: Shiism, the Shiite communities, ethnic religious minorities, Kuwait, the Gulf states, "Arab Spring", terrorism.

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This is analysis of the situation around the Shiite communities in a number of Arab states. Particular attention is

paid to the situation of Shiites in Kuwait and their impact on the Kuwaiti relations with other countries in the region.

The Shiite communities exist in all the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. They are about 30% of the population of Kuwait. There are descendants of immigrants from the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain among them. Some Kuwaiti Shiites come from Arab families who moved to Iran at one time, and then returned. Some Kuwaiti Shiites have Iranian origin, and support business or family ties with their homeland. The Shiite community is represented in the Kuwaiti parliament, and occupies an important position in the political establishment and in the national economy. Shiites are particularly noticeable among large and medium-sized enterprises in commerce ¹.

Shiites are represented by organizations, of socio - religious nature in the political arena, "National Islamic Alliance" is the leading among them. These Shiite associations are formal structures in the emirate, because the main organizational, social and financial activities (collecting donations) are held in the mosques, and at meetings of Shiite religious authorities; positions on political issues are coordinated there.

In Kuwait, Shiites do not tend to flaunt their own specialness. This is largely due to the fact that only 45% of the population has Kuwaiti nationality. High material status of citizens of Kuwait (including Shiites) and wide campaign to eradicate illiteracy contribute to leveling the differences between Shiites and Sunnis in Kuwait greatly. The illiteracy rate has decreased from 48% in 1970 to 11.5% on the eve of the Iraqi aggression in 1990 ².

Authorities are working to reach a consensus in the Muslim community. The idea of "al-vasatyya" - the concept of "moderation in Islam" has been developed in this context. Naturally, the idea has been supported by the ruling family of the Emir of Kuwait.

Shiites consider themselves as part of the Kuwaiti people. They have shown their loyalty to the country during the Iraqi

occupation of 2 August 1990. The intention of Saddam Hussein to seize the enormous reserves of Kuwaiti oil and take the place of a regional leader in the Persian Gulf was the cause of the attack on Kuwait. Saddam considered Kuwait part of Iraq, torn away during the colonial regime. In addition, both countries develop a single oil field. After unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations to force Iraq give up its intentions, the international coalition under the auspices of the United States was established, and a large-scale military operation code-named "Desert Storm" was held (January 1991) ³.

Division of the U.S. and its allies defeated the Iraqi troops in Kuwait and in the southern border areas of Iraq for a month of fighting. The main military, industrial and infrastructure facilities in Iraq have been destroyed by air force and missiles, of allies. Regime of Saddam Hussein was compelled to cease hostilities and to admit defeat in the end of February.

The Shiites of Kuwait have shown patriotism during the Iraqi occupation. They participated in the resistance movement along with Sunnis. It should be noted that these formations, suffered great losses in manpower, because their members have not received proper training.

The Shiites of Kuwait have a relative religious freedom. Although Shiites meeting on the occasion of Ashura (commemoration day to the memory of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad) are allowed, but the funeral processions are not allowed to organize. At the same time Kuwaiti Shiites feel their inferiority. So, the government does not fund the construction of Shiite mosques in contrast to Sunni. The government does not allow the creation of training centers for the Shiite clergy. Shiites, who would like to become imams, have to be educated abroad (primarily in Iraq and Iran). Shiite madhhab al-Jaafari, is not taught at Kuwait University, in contrast, for example, Al-Azhar, where the departments of all madhhabs are represented. So there is a lack of qualified specialists in Shiite law in the country⁴. Muslims strictly adhere to

Shariah of Ja'fari sense in family matters. So the absence of Shiite Cadi is a big problem.

During the 1980s, the growth of distrust between the authorities and the Shiites of Kuwait was intensified after the Islamic revolution in Iran. Relations between Shiites and Sunnis have been particularly strained after the attacks of 1983-1985.

In December 1983 the terrorist groups have carried out bombings at the U.S. Embassy and the French consulate in the capital of Kuwait, which resulted in victims. Kuwaiti security services have arrested 14 people involved in these bombings, most of them were belonged to the Shiite "Da'va" extremist organization. In the spring of 1984 three terrorists were sentenced to death, others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In December 1984, Iranian and Lebanese terrorists hijacked a Kuwaiti plane, Flight Dubai - Karachi - Tehran, and demanded the release of terrorists, convicted earlier in Kuwait. The hostages were released, but Tehran has refused to extradite the hijackers to the authorities of Kuwait.

In May 1985 assassination attempt on the life of the Emir of Kuwait, Jaber Al-Sabah was organized. Pro-Iranian organization "Al-Jihad al-Islami" took responsibility for the attempt, having carried out this action in support of demands for the release of militants of the organization operating in Kuwait earlier. In Al Kuwait (the capital) the arrests were made again. In addition, more than one thousand Iranians were deported from Kuwait to Iran in June and July of the same year.

The position of Shiite Muslims in the country has been severely impaired by all these acts. Not all members of the Shiite community were supporters of Khomeini, or approve of Shiite terrorists. However, the Kuwaiti leadership began to refer to Shiites with suspicion, accusing them of supporting Khomeini regime and participating in anti-state activities. It produced mass dismissals of Shiites from senior positions, as

well as spheres of national education, the police, the army and the oil industry.

It should be noted that Kuwait still has a rather complicated relationship with Iran. The official authorities of Kuwait, as well as other member countries of the Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf States (GCC), believe that Iran seeks to destabilize the situation in the Middle East and increase its influence in the region.

In 2011 the court of Kuwait has sentenced to death three people accused of spying for Iran. Two Iranian citizens and a citizen of Kuwait were brought to justice. They were convicted of passing classified information to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). After that, the emirate has recalled its ambassador from Tehran. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait Mohammed Al-Sabah warned that any Iranian diplomat would be expelled, suspected of involvement in espionage activities. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran categorically rejected these allegations. The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement accusing Kuwait of irresponsible behavior.

Relations between the two countries have deteriorated significantly since the beginning of the military operation "The Shield", under which the Arab states of the Persian Gulf sent military aid to the King of Bahrain to suppress the Shiite protest actions in the spring of 2011. Hundreds of Kuwaiti Shiites staged a demonstration to protest against the violent repression of the Shiite riots in Bahrain ⁵.

The events of the Arab Spring have led to demonstrations in Kuwait. The representatives of the lower strata and the working class, persons without citizenship, citizens of the country, protesting against their powerless position, took to the streets. In Kuwait, 70% of the population (as of 2010) was immigrants. The authorities have taken steps to resolve the situation under the pressure of demonstrations: the salaries of civil servants were significantly increased (indexed to 100%); and salaries for the military, police and firefighters were increased by

approximately 100%); scholarships for students were increased to \$ 700–1200, grants were paid to the indigenous inhabitants of the country (1000 dinars) ⁶.

It should be noted that Kuwait recalled its ambassador from Tehran on January 5, 2016 after Saudi Arabia and some other countries. The reason for the deterioration of relations between Iran and the Arab states was the defeat of the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Tehran after the execution of Shiite preacher Nimrah al-Nimrah in Riyadh. Also, there was an attack on the Consulate General of the Kingdom in the city of Mashhad. The authorities of Gulf Arab countries have accused Tehran of inciting riots.

In April 2011, Foreign Ministers of the Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf States accused Iran of interfering in the internal affairs of Kuwait. The special statement was made, in which Foreign Ministers of the GCC condemned the blatant Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Kuwait, carried out by creating spy networks on its territory. The document also stated that the organization would promote the special services of Kuwait to ensure any measures taken by that country for its own security⁷. The severance of diplomatic relations between Iran and Kuwait was followed after this statement, but the diplomatic relations were restored in May 2011.

The ruling circles of the Arab Gulf countries believe that Iran began actively support Arab Shiite religious and ideological organizations, after the end of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which occupy a prominent position in Arab societies and act legally. It is about Shiite parties, the armed forces and the Alawite regime in Syria, "Hezbollah" in Lebanon and the movement of Huthis in Yemen ⁸.

Kuwait joined the coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, which launched a military operation against the motion Huthis in Yemen sponsored by Iran, on March 26, 2015. At the same time, the authorities of the country are not sponsors of the Syrian opposition fighters. However, the collection of funds to help the

Syrian rebels is carried by private individuals. Some Kuwaiti officials are concerned that funding of extremist militant groups companies will warm up the violence in Syria and will contribute to sectarian tensions in Kuwait⁹. However, in August 2016 the chairman of the Kuwaiti parliament gave an interview to the Qatari newspaper "Al-Sharq", focusing on the need to create the necessary conditions for strengthening the relations between Kuwait and other Council member states with Iran (the Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf states - author of the article.)¹⁰ Improvement of relations between Iran and the GCC countries would have a positive impact on the situation in the region of the Middle East.

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2017.01.017. YU. ZININ. KEY ACTORS OF INTERNAL POLITICAL CONFLICT IN LIBYA// "Ezhegodnik IMI. Mezhdunarodnaya politika v menyayuschemsya mire" MGIMO-University, Moscow, 2016 Vol. 1 (15), P. 87–97.

Keywords: Libya, Tripoli, Tobruk, the UN, Hefter, Gaddafi, Al-Tini, Zintan, Russia, disintegration.

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The author examines the effects of the "Arab Spring" that shook the Middle East region in 2011, assuming authoritarian leaders' displacement in some countries is one of such consequences, including the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. There has been a collapse of the previous government of Libya institutions, and there was a power vacuum, and destructive processes in the country began to condemn the new government on a systemic crisis and conflicts, especially aggravated in the summer of 2014. The author examines the turbulent events that led to the establishment of dual power in Libya in 2014. There were two control poles confronting one another: one – in Tripoli, the other – in Tobruk, in eastern Libya, each with its own parliament, government and the armed forces.

The author analyzes the ongoing conflict, which has claimed thousands of lives. The picture of the balance of forces is diverse and mobile, and it introduces an element of great unpredictability in the further course of confrontation between opponents. The speedy end to the conflict and the normalization of the overall situation is unlikely. The author also considers the UN attempts to mediate for reconciliation of the warring parties and the restoration of a unified state.

The society has been divided into winners and losers after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Those who came to power were not uniform in their composition: there were irreconcilable enemies of the previous regime who fought against it as part of the jihadist groups still in the 1990s, there was a radical foreign opposition, which did not accept the remaining "henchmen of the former government," calling for their elimination.

There was an unstable and contradictory balance of interests and forces in different groups, which are the product of the previous era of the Board in many ways and have its clan and tribal mark.

The policy of demilitarization and integration of militias into a single professional army, proclaimed by the new leadership of the country has failed. Most units, organized by the regional-clannishness principle, retain their autonomy. Their militants have refused to join the armed forces under a unified command.

As for the clashes between the military organizations of the two Libyan governments, they are more focal, chaotic at the moment, and take place in the east, west and south of Libya. Today it is difficult to give an objective assessment of the correlation of forces of the conflicting parties and the prospects for their further confrontation.

The author believes that the accuracy of the information base on the coverage of events by the Libyan media is doubtful. Rigid state monopoly in the field of mass media has been left in the past after the fall of the Muammar Gaddafi regime. The country now has at least 35 channels of satellite TV in the absence of the official state television. About 300 newspapers are issued. A number of cities and tribes have their own page on "Facebook". The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) concludes that the media in Libya have been polarized and become a key instrument of propaganda influence of the opposing sides in recent years.

In general, a low intensity is typical for the dynamics of the current conflict. The actual number of combatants on both sides is unknown. The author notes that according to the assessment of Libyan and foreign experts, both military education segments have weak internal connections and their units are often linked by not long-term interests, but opportunistic ones.

The UN assists in establishing contacts and negotiations between the warring factions of Libya with a view to reconciliation. These groups involved in the struggle, seek to obtain a share of revenue through a complex network of influential intermediaries. They are often linked with their tribes, clans or fraternities, religious groups, and seek to convert their military power, and the "revolutionary legitimacy" in the real economic and political capital.

Today, the ruling circles and the elite in Libya are showing signs of ideological disorder and loss of confidence in the canons of democracy, where the West pushed hard their country. They can not find a support in the local community living with their archaic ideas, religion and commandments of ancestors. Therefore, the automatic copying of the Western values has not been and will be unlikely a panacea for all the troubles in Libya in the immediate future.

The author claims that the majority of Libya's population is still not ready to perceive these values, just as it was far away from the conscious understanding of the reform program under the socialist slogans that Muammar Gaddafi tried to implement over the years. Revolutionary rhetoric of Muammar Gaddafi and its implementation have provoked the rise of Islamist movements and organizations that operated under the guise of "defending" the faith from the influence of "foreign ideas" that are alien to the traditions of the people.

Today, a number of heads of modern Libya make claims to the West regarding its Libyan policy after February 17, 2011 that the Western countries and NATO have stopped halfway, "leaving

of the Libyans to their fate," and it is not care about freedom and progress of the Libyans, but their own goals are driven by them.

The Libyan phenomenon is a sad example of how the rich and stable country has been bled dry by internal conflicts, and how its unity and territorial integrity have been called into question, and how the country has been turned into a hotbed of potential threats to neighboring countries in North Africa and the Middle East. According to the UN report, Libya is included among the main suppliers of illegal weapons to the illegal armed groups in the region. The authorities are not able to close the border with a total length of up to 6 000 km.

The sad experience of Libya - is a warning to Syria that has undergone the pressure on the Libyan scenario after February 2011. Libyan weapons have been supplied in war-torn Syria, and followed it in transit through Turkey and Lebanon.

The author notes that ties between our two countries did not stop after coming to power, the new authorities in Libya. One of the latest evidence of this is the visit of the Prime Minister of the recognized Libyan government, Abdullah Al-Tini, in the Russian Federation in April 2015. He gave a good assessment to the relations between the two countries, stressing that his country has often appealed to Moscow for help and support in difficult times, when other countries refused it. He recalled that 90% of the weapons in the Libyan army are of the Soviet and Russian production, and that communication has always been developed in the military-technical terms. Al-Tini has confirmed the desire of Tobruk's authorities to enhance cooperation with Russia in the sphere, as well as in the field of economy and trade, to meet the requirements of the moment and the current situation. Russia has been and remains to be a supporter of the restoration and development of mutually beneficial cooperation and ties between our countries and peoples.

The author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

2017.01.018. A. VAVILOV. MIGRANT "FLOOD" IN EUROPE // "Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo lingvisticheskogo universiteta", Moscow, 2016, № 17 (756), P. 120–135.

Keywords: conflicts in the Middle East and Africa; Western interference; aggravation of the humanitarian situation; channels of terrorist migration; Leading Russian line.

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The author analyzes the reasons for the emergence and exacerbation of the problem of migrants and refugees in Europe, examines its impact on the situation in regions and countries of the continent, and also gives forecast for ways to resolve it in the conditions of growing terrorist threat for global peace and security.

The author points out that the flow of migrants, which reached its peak in 2015–2016, was one of the most severe effects of unreasoned actions of western politicians in the Middle East and Africa to the European and world politics. Many analysts called it a humanitarian catastrophe of modern times, comparable in scale and suffering of disadvantaged people with the great disasters of human history.

The origins of the problem are in the widening gap between the living standards of the "golden billion" living in developed countries and owning half the wealth and resources of our planet, and the rest of humanity. Many inhabitants of Asia, Africa and Latin America have long been left for Europe and North America, swelling the ranks of migrants in search of better lives and happier future for themselves and their children.

A serious risk of activation of terrorists, "leaking" to the continent under the guise of refugees, has appeared for Western

countries along with the economic burden of the content and arrangement of the uninvited guests. They are increasing the explosive potential of poorly educated foreigners, naturalized in the past, and ready for a battle, driven by resentment and social protest.

The experience of the Western countries shows clearly how the ranks of extremists continuously replenished by disaffected immigrant youth, failed to find a decent place in a prosperous and closed for "outsiders" Western society interested only in labor force.

The author notes that the influx of people seeking a better life has caused a stir late in the European Union. However, it was not easy to coordinate urgent collective measures, including due to the growing demand in the inflow of labor force, as Western Europe is rapidly grew old.

Europe is shaken by the mass demonstrations and meetings to stop the inflow of the "guests" from unsafe regions. As a result, the leaders of Britain and France, followed by Spain, have rejected quota allocation for the reception of migrants, scheduled by the EU leadership.

Europe has created a severe humanitarian problem since the Second World War, according to the UN estimates, supporting the anti-government demonstrations in Libya and in Syria (with the U.S. submission), causing a sharp increase in the flow of refugees, and, as a result, it was completely unprepared to address it.

The author writes that Russia is ready to cooperate with European countries in the UN Security Council and beyond for the solution of the aggravated problems of illegal immigrants. The Russian government emphasized that it was necessary to solve humanitarian task of receiving internally displaced persons, but at the same time also eradicate the causes of this phenomenon in international life - restoring stability and government administration in the Middle East and North Africa and on the

African continent, which had been violated by the voluntaristic policy of the U.S. and their Western partners.

The migratory influx split the Old World society even more and as a result European countries quarreled, accusing each other of violating migration rules. Countries of "Balkan road" were dissatisfied with the states of Western Europe, which have caused an influx of refugees by their political actions in Libya and other countries in Middle East and North regions, and slowed the reception of migrants. The split was observed not only along the vector of: East - West but also North-South. Southern EU members have dissatisfaction with the slowness of wealthy northerners to accept a non-decreasing number of migrants.

The terrorist attacks have complicated the problem of migrants and displaced persons even more: many European countries have closed the border in a panic. The increased violence has caused a further aggravation of the political situation in Europe. Many EU leaders, and A. Merkel, in particular, were attacked by right-wing nationalists due to the inability to curb the aliens. It was found that law enforcement officers received "recommendations" from the authorities not to exaggerate the facts of the criminal acts of aliens, in order not to aggravate the internal ethnic situation.

The growing polarization of European society, as well as increasing Islamophobia have been profitable for the Islamists, representing a "caliphate" as the only reliable support for Muslims in the hostile environment of the infidels.

The author notes that the migration crisis has become a serious test of strength for the entire European Union, which failed to mobilize its resources to address it. West European economy can not do without migrant workers. The influx of foreign labor in the continent will continue. The EU leaders need to put it under a reliable, anti-terrorist control, to establish an effective and versatile everyday cooperation of the intelligence services for that purpose.

At the end of the article, the author writes that it is impossible to do without the creation of the international anti-terrorist coalition in this regard. Russia has long called for and calls for it now. The Western countries should stop trying to impose their recipes for the further development of the peoples of sovereign states. All the recent history demonstrates their full counter-productivity, leading to the deprivation of millions of people, forced to seek refuge and food far from their destroyed native homes.

The author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

2017.01.019. O. BIBIKOVA. MIGRATION CRISIS IN 2006 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES // *“Ekonomicheskie, sotsialno-politicheskie, i etnokonfessionalnye problemy afro-aziatskih stran. Pamyati L.F. Pakhomovoi”*, Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS, Moscow, 2016, P. 31–45.

Keywords: migration crisis, Syria, Turkey, R. Erdogan, EU, Germany, A. Merkel.

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Migration became one of the main factors for social changes in globalizing world. Migration was previously controlled by host countries because the states made an agreement to replace labor forces but at the turn of 20 and 21 centuries illegal immigration began increasing.

Migration resulted mainly in negative consequences for the countries having lost the part of population. Migration causes concrete changes in the society structure. More and more one feels a lack of labor forces owing to a departure of the most active

young and healthy, professionally trained people. Besides, migration results in manhood number decreasing in some countries and brings to negative demographic consequences as a result. However, incomings sent back in their countries back give capital to develop national economy of these countries, improves socio-economic status of the immigrants families. It is difficult enough to define sums of money sent in the countries of origin as sometimes this money is illegally sent. A high concentration of ingenious people negatively influences on social relations, culture, national identity and police of host countries. It is most pronounced under current conditions when the European countries with demographic problems and a high level of unemployment are forced out of receiving migrants from the non-European countries. By that one should note that there is no agreement within the EU concerning the necessity to receive this people. Some countries are opposed to such decision in spite of the demographic (low birth rate) problems. However, one doesn't observe other decision within the EU. German Chancellor A. Merkel' is an active supporter for receiving the new immigrants though the most part of her country don't consider this decision to be correct.

Germany is one of the EU countries where the immigration is a burning issue. In Europe just Germany receives immigrants most of all. The most number of immigrants beginning from 1970-ss arrived from Turkey. Manpower needs was initially supplied on the basis of the German-Turkish inter-governmental agreement. Today the Moslem community of Germany mainly consists of the Turkish immigrants as a result of it. Besides them there are some Maghrebs and also the Moslem-immigrants from the former Yugoslavia and Albania and, in these latter days, immigrants from the West Africa. However, the most part of immigrants from the countries of Maghreb prefer France, Belgium, Italy and Greece. The reason is, first of all, the long-standing connections of the countries of Maghreb with France and Belgium and also the French language studied at schools of

Maghreb and the West Africa till now. The Romanians, the Albanians and other immigrants from the former Yugoslavia more inclined to Italy.

In 2015 migration crisis happened in Europe when about 1,2 millions of migrants arrived at the territory of the EU countries only during the first 10 months. First of all, it is the unwanted migrants who have left the regions where the military-political situation is especially instable including Afghanistan, Syria and there is a civil war going on and also from Eritrea with a very highly dictatorial regime. The European Commission announced that the present migration crisis in the world is the most serious one in the years since the Second World War.

In more recent times a number of migrants trying to get across to just Europe was considerably increased. The problem is that the European population of the continent is tragically decreased. Until recently Europe has joined its ranks owing to the third generation of migrants being born in Europe, the migrants from the countries of Yugoslavia, the citizens of the former socialist countries of the Eastern Europe and Baltic countries and also owing to unrelenting illegal immigrants. The main supplier of immigrants were the former colonies of the European countries, first of all, the countries of the North Africa when their representatives swum across the Mediterranean Sea and reached the island Lampedusa had done a vanishing act. In all cases the deportation is possible only when an immigrant or a refugee presents a petition on granting refugee status and gets a negative answer. So there were always the numerous illegals in Europe waiting for the next amnesty which will provide them to establish themselves within a given country. Today the mechanisms have already been formed to help immigrants to come over to Europe. There emerged a general industry which profits off of the potential refugees needs. According to the International organization data on migration (IOM) the contraband of migrants brings the same return as narcotics trade. According to some data the carriers have earned 16 billion

euro transferring immigrants in Europe from the beginning of 21 century.

In 2015–2016 there were regular shipwrecks with several hundreds of immigrants on the board. In spring 2015 the EU made a decision to change an attitude towards those who tried to reach the sacred European land after the European Commission had rejected a suggestion to sink the ships with refugees near the African land. The patrol ships were suggested not to haul the ships back the African seaside but to take migrants on the board and deliver them to the territory of the EU. This adopted decision has ignited the criminal carriers to enhance their activity. The chances of immigrants to reach Europe were increased owing to increasing of a number of the patrol ships and their presence near the African shores. Having modern communications lines the rumors on this fact have flired all over the Mediterranean world. Those who traditionally transferred migrants from the territory of Turkey have used a possibility to expand their business.

Today the most part of refugees arrive at Europe from Turkey. This fact makes to be deep in thought about a role of Turkey in the immigrant transference in Europe. One of the oldest migration ways is the Afghan one and it passes through just Turkey. Until recently it was controlled by the Kurds. The Balkan countries which a main flow of refugees goes through don't cope with a migration flow. In this context it is logically to close the border for refugees. But the European politicians confess that it is impossible to make E. Erdogan doing it; One can only agree on with him. The Chancellor A. Merkel' promised 3 billion euro and also the German support on a problem to take Turkey into the EU.

The study of a modern migration bam brings to the conclusion that it had been previously well-organized and planned process which not only migrants and the receiving countries were interested in but also other political actors. This poses many questions. For an example, why do the newly arrived

refugees at the Italian island Lampedusa, get a sim-card free of charge? One gets impression that owing to this card the refugees can independently establish themselves in those countries where their compatriots had already established themselves. The Island turned into a transit location for illegal immigrants, mainly, the Africans who had arrived at Lampedusa hoping to emigrate in Italy because of the island nearness to Africa.

The present migration mobility is different from the previous migration insertion to a great extent. The problem is that a multinational community under the mask of "the Syrian refugees" takes place the part of which has a protected status long ago. Until quite recently Syria itself was a habitation for refugees. Today there are refugees from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Eritrea, Mali and Sudan, calling themselves "Syrians" and even having the Syrian passports (according to data such passports are bought in Turkey or Bulgaria). Such original "bunch" suggests that among the refugees there can be the soldiers taken part in the military operations alongside the ISIS. Besides, one should remind that the soldiers in the occupied Syrian towns released convicts from jail making them to take part in the military operations. There are grounds for believing that just the Syrians destroyed their documents at the door of the European countries in order not to be recognized later and more than other refugees are eager to get the right for a permanent stay in Europe. However, the most part of the refugees moving to Europe in 2015 was represented by no means by the Syrians. The Syrians were less than one third and the Afghans were approximately the same number. The rest were immigrants from the other countries including the European not being co-opted into the EU.

Since the European authorities made sure that there are many those under a mask of "the Syrian refugees" but they aren't the Syrian Arabs the migration authorities divided refugees into categories. The refugees from the countries where a war is going on, first of all, Iraq, Syria and Eritrea stand more chances in

comparison with refugees from Afghanistan, Pakistan or Nigeria. One should prove the facts of pursuit. In November 2015, a weekly deportation of the Albans from Germany was organized by charter flights.

A migration process impacted directly on the national policy of the European states. Parties of the right got an access to the European Parliament and the parliaments of Great Britain, France and some Scandinavian states. But R. Erdogan becomes a beneficial owner who could send a great mass of humanity from the country and owing to it the Turks have earned good money. The Europeans gave hope to Ankara to take into the EU.

The European Commission promised to settle refugees regularly having developed a new system for a legal settlement of migrants.

Turkey considers a membership in the EU as one of its strategic goals. No doubt that Ankara will use the openings in order to transport the Moslems in Europe as many as possible. Turkey itself reckons on that it will be able to have the equal number of Euro-MP with Germany and then become a leading state of the EU after having joined the EU.

The author of abstract –V. Schensnovich

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

I. DOBAYEV. EVOLUTION OF IDEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES OF TAQFIRI-JIHADISTS // *The article is written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: jihad, ideology, Islamism, radicalism, taqfiri, terrorism, extremism.

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Abstract. Terrorism is a complex socio-political phenomenon consisting of an ideological doctrine and based on specific political practice of unrestricted violence. This concerns all types of terrorism including religiously motivated one. In recent decades this type has been the Islamic terrorism of taqfiri-jihadists. The importance of determining its nature and mutations lies in the fact that it is not possible to do away with modern terrorism without conquering it in the ideological and information war unleashed by radical Islamists. In other words, it is necessary to fight not only terrorists but terrorism as such. This fight can be crowned with success only in case of the complete debunking and compromise of terrorist ideology.

An important component of modern terrorism is the ideological doctrines of radical Islamists, according to which specific practical activity, including the terrorist acts of suicide assassins, becomes so widespread nowadays.¹ It is theoretically

substantiated that Islamism consists of two wings – moderate and extremist.² Both of them have the ultimate aim of building an “Islamic state” based on the Sharia law. However, there are certain essential differences between them: the former is striving to reach the coveted goal by evolutionary, peaceful means based mainly on “Islamic call” (*daawat*, that is, information and propaganda work among people), whereas their extremist fellow-thinkers are ready for forcible capture of power, including armed violence and terrorist attacks.

The extremist wing of Islamic radicals consists of organizations, groups and individual leaders who use armed struggle, including terrorist activity, as the main means to reach their aims. Propaganda work is a subsidiary means for them in order to draw more supporters. Among the most well-known theorists of this wing of Islamists are Sayyid Qutb, Abd as-Salam Faraj, Abbud al-Zumr, Tariq al-Zumr, Aiman al-Zawahiri, and others. These theorists of radical Islamism rely in their writings and speeches on works by such authoritative ulemas of the Muslim past as Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taimiyya, Ibn Qassir, Al-Qurtubi, an-Nawawi, M. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and others.³

Ibn Hanbal and his followers – Ibn Taimiyya, Ibn Qassir, Al-Qurtubi, an-Nawawi, and others called for returning to Islam of the “golden age” of the life and activity of Prophet Mohammed and the four *al khilafa al rashida* (610–661), which was the period of life of the first three generations of Muslims. During that period (the “golden age”) Islam was uniform and there were no splits, different interpretations, ideological currents, Sufi brotherhoods, etc. In this connection Ibn Hanbal qualified all changes in Islam after the “golden age” as sinful innovations and demanded that Islam be “purged” from them. In other words, their ideal was “pure” Islam and they insisted on Islam returning to this fundamental ideal of Muslimism. In this connection, true, considerably later, western opponents began to term them “fundamentalists.” They called themselves “Salaphites,” which term originated from the Arabic words “as-salaf as-salihun”

(righteous ancestors), which coincided in time with the life and activity of the first three generations of Muslims, or the life and activity of Prophet Mohammed and *al khiilafa al rashida*, or the “golden age” of Islam. Today, the terms “Salaphite” and “Salaphism” are widely used not only in the Muslim East, but also in the West and Russia.

The creation of Islamist political parties in the form of Salaphite renovation in the 20th century exerted a strong influence on the radicalization of the modern Islamic movement in different parts of the world. Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) founded “Al-ikhwan al Muslimun” (“Muslim Brotherhood”) organization in Egypt in 1928 and Maulana Abu al-Ala Maududi (1903 - 1979) set up “Jamaat-e-Islami” (“Islamic Society”) in India in 1941. Both of them had similar convictions, especially concerning unification of Islam as the all-embracing teaching in the life of the Muslim Ummah. They emphasized the need to create a genuinely Muslim state by the introduction of the Sharia, which they regarded not only as the Law based on the Koran, but also as the way of life of the Salaphites.

Decolonization in the middle of the 20th century gave a hope to the Salaphites to create genuinely Islamic states. However, the new Muslim leaders have chosen the road of simulation reforms. Their ideas about secularism, public sovereignty, nationalism, women’s rights and constitutionalism have led to a direct conflict with the Salaphites, who put to doubt their legitimacy as Muslim leaders, which led to an explosive situation. As a result, many regimes began to pursue inconsistent policies, fluctuating from compromises to reprisals.⁴

A new group of Salaphite theorists has emerged in this situation, which began to elaborate modern ideological doctrines of radical Islamists. Among them, the Egyptians S. Qutb, M. Shukri, M. Faraj, A. al-Zawahiri, and others. As the authoritative Russian scholar of Islam A. Ignatenko noted, the ideological doctrines of Islamists are based on the two categories – taqfiri (accusation of infidelity) and jihad (sacred war for faith).⁵

In this connection the radical Islamists are often called “taqfiri-jihadists.”

The concept of “taqfiri” presupposes, according to modern Islamist theorists, the need to single out all non-Muslims (“Kafirs” - infidels) and Muslims who do not adhere to the ideological views of Islamists (apostates, or “Murtaddun”), as well as hypocrites, or “Munafiqun”, that is, those who are wrong or hypocritical in their faith. As to the concept of jihad, it was now interpreted, contrary to Muslim traditional interpretation exclusively as the war against the “enemies of Islam,” which should always be offensive.

S. Qutb, a theorist and ideologist of the Egyptian association of “Muslim Brotherhood,” wrote a whole series of works in the 1950s - 1960s, in which he expounded various aspects of the ideology of “Islamic revival.” His concepts divided society into two types: Islamic society which recognizes the power of Allah and is based on the Sharia law, and “jahiliyyah” society (pre-Islamic heathendom, where people establish laws themselves and violate the main principle of tawhid (the sole rule of Allah). According to this conclusion, most modern societies are heathen, including those which regard themselves Islamic, but do not live by the Sharia laws. And this means apostasy and infidelity. Islam and jahiliyyah are absolutely incompatible, they cannot coexist peacefully, and there cannot be even gradual transformation of the latter into Islam. The power of Allah over this Earth of ours can only be restored after jahiliyyah is destroyed by force, and each Muslim must take part in this fight.⁶

However, in the 18th century, two hundred years before S. Qutb, the concept of jahiliyyah was actualized by Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), preacher from Arabia, who denounced widespread people’s beliefs and customs of the Arabian Peninsula tribes for depravity, asserting that they had returned to the state of jahiliyyah, become idolaters and therefore had to be executed for apostasy. He preached a very harsh form of Islam based on a strict interpretation of the Koran and the

cleansing of Islam from later accretions. The basis of his doctrine was "tawhid" ("unity of God") denouncing any possibility of mediation in contacts with God as idolation. The conclusion by al-Wahhab of an alliance with the head of one of the Arabian tribes Mohammed ibn Saud had been a prelude to the formation of a new state on the territory of the Arabian Peninsula, which was named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab based his interpretations of the Koran on fetwabs of the Syrian theologian Taki ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taimiya (1263-1328), who lived in one of the most difficult periods of Muslim history when Islamic countries had been conquered by Mongolians converted into Islam, but who continued to live by their own legal system. In this connection Ibn Taimiya was faced with the problem whether it was legal to proclaim jihad against other Muslims (Mongolians). In his famous "Fetwabs about Tatars" he said that inasmuch as Mongolians continued to adhere to the legal standards established by Genghiz Khan, but not the Sharia, they were not true Muslims, but apostates who should be killed. Jihad against them was not only a right, but a duty of Muslims.⁷

In his works Maududi, a moderate Islamist from Pakistan, has revived the concept of jahiliyyah as an abstract notion for describing the system of beliefs and ideas in India. However, his works do not contain even a hint on his intention to use it for justifying an armed uprising. As to the hard radical S. Qutb, he took Taimiya's premise about the duty of jihad against apostates and Maududi's concept of jahiliyyah, combined them, and thus gave broader interpretation of Abd al-Wahhab's ideas. Proclaiming the existing Muslim societies jahiliyyah, S. Qutb calls for isolating and fighting them, but trying to avoid civil disturbances. In his version, faithful Muslims do not fight other Muslims, they fight idolaters. Soon after the publication of his main work called "Milestones on the Road" the Nasser government of Egypt arrested him for incitement to uprising, and

on August 29, 1966, he was executed in one of Cairo's prisons. Qutb's martyrdom gave his ideas more truth and weight.⁸

Qutb's ideas made a great influence on Shukri Mustafa, who brought to the logical maximum the premises of the jahiliyyah doctrine, having founded in Egypt the sect "Jamaat al-Muslimin" ("Muslim Society"), whose main principle was motivated isolationism of its members from the evil jahiliyyah society. However, his group became an object of mockery in the press, which depicted it as a crowd of fanatics or criminals crazy about the dual concept of excision and banishment (at-Taqfir wal-Hijrah); it was under this name that M. Shukri's community became part of the history of the Islamist movement. In 1977, after persecution by the ruling regime of Egypt, this sect disappeared, but its ideas were not forgotten by the later generations of radical Islamists.

The most well-known follower of S. Qutb was Muhammed abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–1981), who was the head of the Cairo section of "Tanzim al-jihad" ("Organization of Jihad") which masterminded the assassination of the President of Egypt Anwar Sadat in 1981. Faraj formulated his ideas in a pamphlet entitled "The Forgotten Duty" ("Al-farida al-gaiba"). In it he wrote, among other things, that "the establishment of an Islamic state is the duty of Muslims: something without which the necessary thing cannot be achieved becomes necessary itself. If such a state cannot be founded without war, then the latter becomes necessary... The laws guiding the life of Muslims today are based on unbelief (ilhad), they have been created by infidels who dominate Muslims... After the disappearance of the caliphate, evidently, in 1924 and renunciation of Islamic laws in their entirety and their replacement with the laws introduced by infidels, the position of Muslims became like what they had been under the Mongolian rule."⁹

Faraj emphasized that Islam had been spread with the sword, and that jihad in Islam was not defensive. To substantiate

his position he cited "The Verses of the Sword" from the Koran calling for capture and execution of polytheists (kafirs).

Faraj also denounced a dangerous modern innovation of differentiating "great jihad" (efforts aimed at self-improvement of a Muslim and fight with bad habits) from "small jihad" (fight against the enemy), because it belittled the value of the fight by the sword. Similarly, in his view, the absence of a caliph is not justification for postponement of jihad. Jihad is all the more important for bringing back Islam to the Muslim peoples. Renunciation of jihad is tantamount to "baseness, humiliation, division and factionalism in which Muslims live today."¹⁰

The general strategy of jihad, in the view of Faraj, is determined by ideas about the "close enemy" (Muslims who do not share the ideological premises and practices of radical Islamists) and the "distant enemy" (non-Muslim enemies of the radical Islamists, primarily representatives of western Christian civilization), and about jihad as an individual duty of each Muslim (*fard ain*). In the view of Faraj, jihad becomes also obligatory if the ruler of a Muslim state rejects the Sharia as the guiding line. In that case this ruler must be overthrown, and jihad becomes the individual duty of each Muslim. To wage it there should be no special permission of Ulemas, jihad becomes a must just as a fast or prayer.¹¹

Thus, Salaphite jihad is a renovated movement justifying violent overthrow of local Muslim governments as the "close enemy" with a view to establishing an Islamist state.

At the same time it should be borne in mind that like other sacred books the Koran is open to different, sometimes opposing, interpretations. It contains calls for love, as well as calls for hatred and violence, and it would be an illusion to try to interpret canonic texts exclusively as calls for peace. All the more so today, when certain Islamic theological schools and leading Muslim dignitaries openly preach hatred to the "infidels," deny the right of other religions to exist, and bless terrorism. Using excerpts from the Koran and other sacred books of Islam (as, for example,

the call “kill them wherever you find them and pull them out from wherever they hide themselves”), Islamic theologians justify the seizure of alien land, enslavement and murder of non-Muslims. Modern Muslim schools proclaim the “worldwide jihad” against the “infidels” and demonstrate their contempt of Jews whom they call “descendants of pigs and monkeys.”¹²

In the 1980s – 1990s the new leader of “Al-Jihad”: Abbud al-Zumar enriched the ideological doctrine of the organization with new concepts. Apart from him, there was another prolific author and leader of the movement – Tariq al-Zumar. The concepts of these figures practically do not differ from the ideas of A. Faraj. In the view of Abbud al-Zumar, jihad is *fard ain*, that is, the duty of every Muslim who must take part in it to the best of his abilities.¹³ Tarik al-Zumar maintained that the best form of jihad is armed struggle. He sharply criticized those Islamic radical leaders who confined to ideological struggle.¹⁴ Moreover, he claimed that jihad should have an offensive character and it was not necessary to wait for an attack of the “infidels.” “Suffice it to see that they have traits of the people who should be fought and killed.”¹⁵

By the end of the 1990s one of the leaders of the “Al-Jihad” – Aiman al-Zawahiri, who became the chief ideologist of “al-Qaeda” and the “World Front of Jihad” in June 2011, after the murder of Usama bin Laden, put forward new ideas. First of all, he substantiated the idea of global jihad against the “distant enemy,” that is, western countries, primarily, the United States and Israel. Now this list includes Russia, which joined the criminal alliance of the world *kufr*. A. al-Zawahiri writes that “it is not to be considered that the struggle for the creation of an Islamic state is a regional war. The alliance of the Crusaders and Zionists headed by the United States will not allow the Muslim forces to come to power in any Muslim country. We should be prepared for a war not just in one region. It will be waged against the internal enemy – the apostates and the external enemy – the alliance of the Crusaders and Zionists.”¹⁶ In his view, jihad

against the “distant enemy” should not be postponed. This is why this war should be waged beyond the boundaries of the Islamic world, on enemy territory. He also spoke in favor of waging successful jihad for the liberation of Muslims not only in Afghanistan and Chechnya, but also in the very center of the Islamic world.¹⁷

On the eve of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, in his book “Knights under the Banners of the Prophet” A. al-Zawahiri wrote that the new jihad was the struggle between Islam and the hostile world forces: world powers and Russia which use the following means: “ 1) The United Nations Organization; 2) Friendly rulers of Muslim peoples; 3) Transnational corporations; 4) International communications and data exchange systems; 5) International information agencies and satellite information channels; 6) International aid organizations, which are used as a cover for espionage, proselytism, preparation of coups and arms transportation. This enemy is confronted by the new Islamist fundamentalist collation consisting of jihadist movements in various lands of Islam. “It is a growing force acting under the banners of jihad in the name of God.” Al-Zawahiri described the new phenomenon of “young mujahids, who left their families, countries, wealth, studies and jobs for the battlefields of jihad in the name of God.” In his view, there is no other solution of the current problems without jihad. “The treachery of the peaceful Algerian fundamentalist movement has shown the meaningless nature of all other methods which tried to avoid the adoption of the burden of jihad.”¹⁸

Al-Zawahiri declared that jihad should demonstrate the treachery of Muslim rulers and their apologists which is due to their lack of faith and support of the infidels. This is why the Islamist movement should establish an Islamic state in the very center of the Islamic world from where it will enter into fight for the restoration of the caliphate based on the traditions of the Prophet. “If successful operations against the enemies of Islam

and serious losses suffered by them do not help achieve the ultimate aim of the creation of the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world, they will be nothing more than a violation of the habitual order which can be tolerated, even if they last for some time and cause definite losses.”¹⁹

In order to achieve success, al-Zawahiri demanded that his followers come closer to the masses of common Muslim people, do more charity and educational work among them, and share their cares and concerns.²⁰

There should be a strong and efficient leadership in order to mobilize the popular masses, a leadership whom they will trust and understand. There should also be a quite definite enemy who should be fought mercilessly and defeated without fear in the hearts and minds of its opponents. Al-Zawahiri describes the main goal of the Islamic jihad as follows: “The liberation of the Muslim nation, opposition to the enemies of Islam and the beginning of jihad against them demand Muslim power established on Muslim lands, which will raise the banner of jihad and gather the masses of Muslims under it. Without this our actions will be nothing more than simple and repeated disorders, which will not lead to the coveted goal, that is, the restoration of the Caliphate and banishment of the invaders from the land of Islam.”²¹

After the terrorist acts in the United States and the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation al-Zawahiri in his book “Al-Walaya wa-al-baraz” emphasized that nowadays every Muslim must actively oppose the occupants. He included in his book a fetwah, which forbade Muslims to draw closer to kafirs, demanded that Muslims keep their plans secret from infidels and have no business with them. Muslims must not accept or agree with any theories or ideas of infidels. Kafirs should not be helped in any way in their wars against Muslims, and it is forbidden to justify Crusaders. Muslims must wage jihad against faithless aggressors, apostates and hypocrites (the latter two are the Arab regimes which have granted their territory for the anti-terrorist

campaign, and also the ulemas who issue mendacious fetwahas paid for by the authorities).²²

In turn, the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarkawi killed in Iraq in June 2006, who was the leader of the local al-Qaeda organization, said in one of his lectures that “jihad is the war against the infidels and each Muslim must take part in it.”²³ He asserted that the term “civilian population” is wrong, because Islam does not divide people into civilians and military, it divides them only into Muslims and infidels. And if the blood of a Muslim is sacred no matter what he does and where he is, the blood of an infidel can be spilled no matter what he does and where he is, if there is no special agreement with him or his life was not spared.”

Al-Zarkawi divides people into three groups: 1. Muslims; 2. Infidels peacefully disposed to Islam, that is, under its protection (*zimma*), who concluded truce with Muslims (*hudna*) or those spared by them (*aman*). 3. All other people. Al-Zarkawi declared the latter “the belligerent side”: he reminds that the Sharia deprived them of protection and gives Muslims the right to kill them, except women and children. On this ground, al-Zarkawi maintains, “non-belief in Allah is sufficient for killing the infidel, no matter what he does or where he is.”

Thus, the efforts of foreign, above all, Egyptian Islamic theorists resulted in the emergence of a consistent ideological doctrine of Taqfiri jihadists by the beginning of the 21st century, which serves as the ideological foundation of modern terrorism under the guise of Islamic faith, as well as justification of cruel political practice of the radical Islamists and terrorists. All modern radical Islamic groupings, including the “Islamic state” practically use the premises of this doctrine.

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The author describes the main Islamic terrorist groups in accordance with the tasks, he describes the use of appropriate models of "soft power", and also examines the possible development of the situation in Syria.

The main ideological goal of ISIS is to create a quasi-state entity "worldwide Islamic caliphate", copying Muslim autocracies of the Middle Ages and living on medieval canon. This idea is not modern at all, it does not lead to the creation of the state, capable to compete with existing national formations, and therefore short-lived.

A state doctrine of the Taliban consists in a simple formula: "The country without crusaders", without assuming any change of state borders of Afghanistan, but only a change of the form of government and political regime. "Al-Qaeda" denies the sovereignty of the nation-state and does not recognize the demarcation lines drawn "by crusaders" to determine the territorial boundaries of nation-states, arguing that the terrorist network of "Al-Qaeda" is extraterritorial, by definition.

One of the main factors of stability of terrorist groups is the system of ideology and propaganda (as well as the smuggling of oil and cultural values), which is called more and more

often "soft power" of Islamists in recent years. Recruiters of ISIS, "Taliban", "Al-Qaeda" in their activities involve not only the Muslim youth, but also new converts among the Christians due to the well-organized ideological, agitation and propaganda activity.

Islamists of ISIS, "Al-Qaeda" and other groups can lead an armed struggle against the entire Western world over the years through their own model of "soft power", replenishing resources at the expense of support from political parties, movements, associations, diaspora communities, legally operating worldwide and sharing their views and political positions. They compensate for combat casualties, hire professionals to information warfare and cyber-intelligence, economy, oil production and exploration of mineral resources, public administration and local government.

This is especially true for the association of "Muslim Brotherhood", which actively involves highly educated intellectuals, university professors, leading scientists, analysts, representatives of national political elites in its ranks. They are used as agents and distribution channels of "soft power" for the development of new models of ideological influence on individual and mass consciousness of citizens in the different countries.

Concepts such as social justice, equality, absence of caste, clan, tribal differences, fraternity, mutual help and mutual support, i.e. collectivism is actively used in the ideology of all these Islamic groups.

Young people are taught that they will live even in a tough, but fair world, where there is the same justice for the rich and for the poor, and for warlords, and ordinary mojaheds. It is sufficient to leave home and go to war on the side of ISIS in Libya, Syria or Iraq.

Not only young people from the lowest, poorest sections of society, but also the children of wealthy parents go to ISIS, they give all their possessions in the ISIS property under

the influence of emotional impulse, supported by "soft power", and become as poor as mojaheds who came from distant villages. None of the political scientists can explain this phenomenon properly.

The author suggests that officials of the party "Baas" have developed a pseudo-revolutionary ideology for ISIS, taking many of ideology of the "Baath", the Arabic revival and pan-Arabism. It is no coincidence, as many administration officials of Saddam Hussein and his military have been educated in the Soviet Union. Propagandists of ISIS often say that they have replaced the Soviet Union in the struggle for justice, equality and brotherhood in the world.

In 2006, when ISIS was formed on the basis of the Iraq "Al-Qaeda" cell and under participation of the CIA, twelve Sunni groups consisting of former soldiers and officers of the army of Saddam Hussein and former officials of the party "Baas" entered its ranks.

The author writes that "soft power" "of Taliban" consists of three levels, as it was. There are ideological foundations and ideological concepts for each of them. This is due to the fact that there are three different generations of leaders in the "Taliban", and they have different values and world views.

The older generation is represented by the warlords, who fought with the Soviet Union, and then with the Northern Alliance. They were uncompromising in relation to the enemies; as "foreign invaders" and their opponents within the country. Today, they realize that their life has passed in the battle, and there was no opportunity to enjoy the wealth and high position, they are quite peaceable, restraining the enthusiasm of the younger generation of warlords.

The second generation is the field commanders who joined "Taliban" during the fight with the Northern Alliance, but prior to the invasion of the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan. The basic ideology of this generation is patriotism. They believe that the war will end, when the last foreign soldier leaves the land

of Afghanistan; or be killed. Ideology and "soft power" of the second generation of the Taliban are of a distinct national character of the state. They are in irreconcilable hostility to the jihadists of ISIS and other similar groups, for which national interests, sovereignty and borders of any state are nothing, but the global jihad is the only purpose of their existence.

The third generation of fighters are born and brought up in a permanent war of all against all in Afghanistan, who joined "Taliban" movement after the start of the fight against KFOR. They are jihadists who believe ISIS to be an example of true Islamic state. Members of the older generation of "Taliban" commanders are an annoying hindrance to them, which should be eliminated.

These features of the generations define ideology and "soft power" of "Taliban" that can not but interfere with each other even within the same movement. In contrast to "Taliban" and ISIS, "Al-Qaeda" is a terrorist organization, based on the network principle and consisting of separate, independently operating terrorist cells. They have a high degree of freedom in the choice of strategies, tactics, goals, targets and forms of terrorist attacks.

The ideology of "Al-Qaeda" is based on two main principles. The first is the fight against the infidels and foreign invaders, which they call "Crusaders." The second principle is to ignore state borders and other formal separation barriers, defining the modern world order. The terrorists do not accept the nation-state as the main actors of international relations.

"Al-Qaeda" is a transnational corporation, which aims to transform the political world. There are its own corporate values at the core ideology of the "Al-Qaeda" to ensure the cohesion of all the participants in the network, regardless of the geographical distance of its cells and the control center. Only then the ideologies of pan-Islamism, jihadism, the struggle with the onset

of the Christian world - with those "Crusaders": Russia, the U.S. and the EU - are appearing on the background.

"Muslim Brotherhood" is a terrorist group, which many politicians and experts like to call "soft Islamist" for some reason. "Muslim Brothers" prefer to buy local elites and do the same thing by proxy.

"Muslim Brotherhood" is based on its own corporate values in the model of "soft power", being a geographically distributed network of the terrorist organization as "Al-Qaeda". The most important of them, after the imperative of "the unity of all the faithful Muslims", is the reliance on a high level of intelligence and education of among the leadership; on the production of management decisions by using their own resources, "think tanks" where intellectuals accumulated from across the Muslim world. "Muslim Brotherhood" works through sympathizing representatives of political, scientific and financial elite, which representatives are holding the real levers of control of these or other countries.

"Muslim Brotherhood" has its own foreign policy concept, where nation-states and international organizations are integrated. The leading role in this concept is given to the form of the participation of "Muslim Brotherhood" in the formation of the global agenda and in solving international problems with which it plans to fight creating its own "volition coalitions."

The Russian Federation has to fight with these models of "soft power" of various terrorist organizations on different fronts, both virtual and very real, like the war in Syria. At the same time Russia is using its own model of "soft power" in counter-ideological struggle against Islamist groups, based on the firm determination to defend the legitimate right of peoples to choose their own destiny and leaders. Russian "soft power" is also based on the concept of justice, but fundamentally different from what it meant by Islamists.

The author believes that the armed conflict in Syria will continue for a very long time. The complexity of the Syrian situation is that the influential world powers have been involved in it - the U.S., Russia, the EU and regional leaders. Their vital interests diverge significantly in the region. The main thing for Russia - a quick victory over international terrorism, the destruction of ISIS and other terrorist groups and the restoration of peace; for the Syrian people - the ability to live peacefully, to raise children, vote freely for the future of the country; for the U.S. - the destruction of ISIS is not a priority, more important - to remove Assad, using ISIS and other "opposition" at first, and then make its European allies to deal with the terrorists. That is the strategic goal of the U.S. - to send Syria along the Libyan way.

Syria may be facing the threat of a color revolution that will be developed under the classical scenario. If Assad will receive a majority of votes in the elections (the author believes that it will be, as the population in the territories liberated from ISIS, will vote for Assad unanimously), the "moderate opposition" will challenge the election results, declare their non-recognition, and a color revolution will grow into armed rebellion rapidly. Then there will be a civil war and the Syrian army will keep the front line against the terrorist international of jihadists from around the world. That is the same as is happening now in Syria. However, there is hope that Russia will destroy the plans of enemies of the Syrian people again.

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The authors examine the reasons and the main stages of the political phenomenon of the Arab Spring on the basis of the analysis of the British and French sources, classify scenarios of development of the political process and analyze consequences and interim results of the Arab Spring.

The wave of uprisings, called the Arab Spring, has awakened great expectations, but failed in the end. The events of the Arab Spring have arisen in Tunisia in early 2011, and then continued in Egypt. Arab countries have embarked on the path of democratization, following the domino effect. Fierce military confrontations started in Libya and Syria.

These events have changed the public opinion of the West - Arab Spring began to be perceived as a threat to its political and economic interests, its safety. Sympathies have been replaced by mistrust and anxiety. To summarize the results of the Arab Spring in 2016 it seems necessary to analyze the phenomenon of the Arab Spring.

The revolutionary movements did not lead to the establishment of the Western model of democracy and even to the launch of democratic process. However, it should be noted that these movements have developed in different settings and

contexts, depending on the country. In fact, there are as many scenarios as there are countries, i.e. 221.

The authors identify seven basic scenarios.

1. Countries in which there was no «Arab Spring». The phenomenon of the Arab Spring has not been observed in the countries where there were working democratic institutions. So it was in Lebanon, in Iraq after the 2005 elections, in Palestine.

2. The Arab Spring has been completed quickly. In the Gulf countries, with the exception of Bahrain, the revolutionary movement was modest, and public order was restored immediately.

3. Spring neutralized. The revolutionary movements have had a significant swing in Morocco, Algeria and Jordan, but were neutralized by the hard restore order in conjunction with superficial reforms.

4. Spring neutralized. Revolutionary movements were rather severe in Morocco, Algeria and Jordan, but have been neutralized by the hard restore order in conjunction with superficial reforms.

5. The Arab Spring becomes an uncontrollable chaos. A good example of this type of scenario is Libya. The self-proclaimed militia chiefs and heads of the traditional clans are fighting each other for power, but the power does not go beyond boundaries of the city, and even certain quarters or zones of influence, in some cases.

6. The Arab Spring turns into a civil war. This scenario is demonstrated on the example of Syria. Besides the confrontation between the self-proclaimed regime and the democratic opposition other actors with conflicting objectives are joining to the movement as well.

7. Revolution generates counter-revolution. This is what happened in Egypt.

8. The Arab Spring causes democratic processes. Only two countries belong to this type of scenario: Tunisia, and Yemen – but to a lesser extent.

In general, summing up the interim results, the authors believe that it is possible to talk about the failure of the Arab Spring. This is the result of a combination of reasons specific to each country, as well as the more common reasons that reflect the behavior of the main actors of the protest movement.

The authors identify the following reasons:

1. Fugitive action.
2. The ability of the authorities to resist.
3. Changeable public opinion.

The authors also believe that the summarizing would be incomplete without mention of the side consequences of the Arab Spring both in political terms and in economic one, in social terms and in terms of security.

These events have led to a decline in production and in the services sector in several countries in particular the tourism sector has been hit. The unemployment rate rose to a critical level, especially among the younger population. The deficit of the state budget has grown impressively since revenue declined and costs increased. The growth of public debt has led to a shortage of state budget

The authors write that the consequences of the revolutions were expressed in the weakening of state structures. The role of a state is challenged, especially when new people come to power. Traditional structures such as the police and the courts follow the instructions of the new governments without enthusiasm, and sometimes sabotage them at all.

Revolutionary movements have a negative impact on the economy. The subsequent disruption of the economy, civil commotions (strikes, the seizure of factories, salary requirements), which are the inevitable companions of revolutions - all this has influenced on the economy of countries. This effect was even stronger considering the fact that it is a country with an already weakened economy, undermined by the financial crisis.

The authors write that the Arab world has entered a transitional phase, but it is not known, either as or when it will end. This period may be further delayed because these disturbances are associated not only with the Arab spring: they are also based on the rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites, which reached a new level, or on a hidden war between Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to find out which of them is a leader.

It also looks like a time bomb, which is the unresolved issue of Palestine. The authors write that the Arab world is going through a turning point in its history. These revolutions have had and will continue to have important consequences in the future and lead to the fact that in this strategically important region will be the new leader.

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