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**INFRASTRUCTURE OF LABOR MIGRANTS**

**IN MODERN RUSSIAN CITIES**

**(Migrants from Uzbekistan**

**and Kyrgyzstan in Moscow, as an example)**

**Brief Description**

**of the Migration Situation in Russia**

The Russian Federation has developed as an immigration receiving state only in the 2000s, although the influx of foreign migrants in Russia continued throughout the post-Soviet period. According to the Federal Migration Service, there are 10–11 million foreign nationals in recent years in our country at the same time. As of August 2014, almost 9 million of them are from countries that were part of the Soviet Union, more than 40% or about 4.9 million people – from Central Asia, 2 million – from Ukraine, 600 thousand people – Moldova and the same came from Azerbaijan [Official statistics in 2014]. It should be noted that the share of foreign workers from the three Central Asian countries has changed significantly since the second half of the 2000s: in 2005 the total flow of migration from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan was 16.8%, then since 2008

it has already been 55% of all formally employed foreigners in Russia, and almost three-quarters (73%) of workers from the CIS countries. [Florinskaya 2013].

Cities are the centers of attraction of migrants, in particular – megacities, that is quite clear, as the urban population prevails among the Russians. It is much easier to find work in the cities on the socio-economic reasons, especially in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as in Moscow and Leningrad regions. Although statistics are not available, the various expert estimates record quantity of 1 million workers (referring to FMS data).

External labor migration in the Russian cities leads to significant social, political and ethno-cultural transformations, which, in turn, are serious challenges for the Russian government, and for society as a whole. Moreover the reaction of the state and the receiving society are delayed, or the execution of migration policy is very distant from the provisions prescribed in the Concept of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation [Concept of the state migration policy of 2012]. Migrants are looking for their own way by means of different self-organization strategies when faced with multiple daily needs and finding no way to satisfy them with the existing institutions in the Russian cities. In other words, the incorporation of foreign migrants is a two-way process, the success of which depends not only on the policy of the receiving state, but also on the behavior of migrants themselves. Migrants in this case act as an object of the migration policies and practices of the receiving society, and as a subject and an equal actor of the incorporation process.

It should be borne in mind that the arrivings in Russia in the composition of different waves of migration throughout the post-Soviet period are not homogeneous in their socio-demographic characteristics. Interaction of the old-timers, who arrived in the Soviet period, and the

newly arrived migrants plays a significant role in the organization of formal and informal migrant communities and relationships. As a result, communities are formed with their economic needs and which are heterogeneous in their needs, relocation stories, strategies and level of self-organization. There are new economic niches and original migrants-oriented infrastructure, primarily in the area of consumer and intermediary services. Do the social institutions promote their incorporation (created and targeted to migrants) or provoke the formation of a parallel social space and lead to exclusion or segregation? What role do ethnic and non-ethnic strategies take in this? This article attempts to answer these questions by the example of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz migrant workers in Moscow.

The article is based on the data of several research projects. The first, made in 2009–2011, was dedicated to the media of diasporas, and was based on 25 in-depth semi-structured expert interviews with editors and publishers of newspapers and magazines of diaspora, with activists of ethnic public organizations, as well as qualitative analysis of the thematic content of the print media of diaspora (not less than 40 names total). The second research was conducted in 2012 and in 2013<sup>1</sup>: it was focused on the study of “ethnic” cafes and their role in the incorporation of migrants and the transformation of the capital's urban space. The empirical part consists of a series of participant observations (about 40 cafes: 21 Kyrgyz and 15 Uzbek), the analysis of media publications, expert interviews with the employees of the cafes (20 interviews), visitors' survey (collected 210 questionnaires) and in-depth interviews with the cafe visitors (20 interview). Finally, the third study of 2013–2014<sup>2</sup> has been focused on adapting to the social and urban space of the Russian capital by migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, how is the settlement and the formation of urban spaces with migrant-oriented infrastructure. The empirical base of this

project was made up of 60 in-depth interviews with Kyrgyz and Uzbeks (ethnicity was determined by the mother tongue), collected 397 profiles<sup>3</sup>.

**Western approaches to the influence  
of the settlement of migrants  
onto the formation of ethnic  
and migrant communities in the cities**

The study of immigrant settlement is an integral part of most Western theoretical work aimed at explaining the formation of ethnic communities and the integration / segregation. The English-language scientific tradition (it is the American one), begins its countdown with the beginning of the XX century, when the Chicago school was founded, which was the single dominant paradigm for understanding the spatial migrant mobility for a long time, and the way in which there is the incorporation of immigrants' into American society . There have been isolated and studied forms of migrants settling in cities like ghetto or ethnic enclaves, which (according to the Chicago school) are the result of a combination of both external push factors (for example, discrimination and prejudice), and internal reasons (ethnic solidarity and mutual interest).

The model for the settlement of the American immigrant communities were the New York ghettos, located in the city center, as a rule, [Wirth 2005]. The majority of the inhabitants of these settlements had to live in them because of the limited social and human capital, in addition, frequently based on ethnic relations, and this led to segregation of migrants [Flippen, Parrado 2012; Logan, Wenquan, Alba 2002; Massey 1985]. But many immigrants were eager to move out of ethnic enclaves in areas not inhabited by immigrants, and gradually assimilated, with the improvement of material conditions as well as the

growth of education level and knowledge of the English language. This process is described by the well-known Chicago-based model of the spatial assimilation of immigrants [Burgess 2000; Park 2002].

Changes in the composition of international migration, as well as new trends in urban development (the emergence of multiple cores of settlement, multi-functional zoning, gentrification) have been reflected in Los Angeles School of Urban Studies [Dear, Dishman 2002; Marcuse, Kempen 2000; Bolt, Burgers, Kempen 1998; Brettell 2005; Kavita, Holloway 2005; Ray, Halseth, Johnson 1997]. Its representatives have noticed that the number of immigrants to the United States from Latin America, East, Southeast and South Asia has increased since 1960–1970's, many of them settled just in the suburbs<sup>4</sup>. The growing number of immigrants from one country to the suburbs has led to the formation of regions, known as “ethno suburbs” or “multiethnic suburbs”, which were the settlement and business enclave with a significant cluster of people from one country [Li 1998]. An ethno suburb functioned as a type of settlement, which had some of the characteristics of both a suburb and an enclave simultaneously, but distinguished by the fact that high-resource migrants often settled in the ethnic suburbs [Li 2006].

Despite the changes in the external migration, the Chicago school of immigrants settling in the cities and its spatial pattern of assimilation have not lost their importance so far in many cases [Katz, Berube, Lang 2005; Krase 2012]. The fact remains relevant up to this day, that the social and human capitals affect the dispersed or concentrated settlement of immigrants (especially at the initial stage). In other words, migrants settle, both in the central areas of the city and in the suburbs, not only because of their economic situation, but also because of kinship and friendship networks, intermediary institutions. Thus, the limited financial and social capital, forces them to settle in overcrowded



low flow areas, which provide the ethnic and social support. Both types of settlement (as in the central areas of the city and in the suburbs) are combined by ethnic businesses, service providers and institutions that are created by migrants, and focus on them (for example, churches, media and communication network, travel agencies, shops, restaurants, taxi service, hotels, dry cleaners, etc.) [Brettell 2005; Jenkins, Sauber, Friedlander 1985; Fong, Elic 2010; King 1996].

European researchers have also attempted to explore the applicability of these two major immigrant settlement patterns (developed in the US) to the situation in Europe. Comparing Little Italy in San Diego to Chinatown in Trieste, L. Ford and his co-authors note that initially, American society reacted to the ethnic character of a particular region in the negative (“Chinatowns”, “Little Italy”), But after the Second World War, the situation has changed, and specific ethnic theme parks were established in many American cities, which led to the improvement of the welfare of the region and increase in housing prices. In Europe, since the concentrated resettlement of migrants are often the result of ethnic conflicts, authorities (mostly) opposed to “ethnic branding” and ethnicity of one or another urban area [Ford, Klevisser, Carli 2008].

### **Selection of an area of residence, and special conditions of migrant workers’ resettlement in Moscow**

Changes in Russian society, caused by external migration, incorporation of migrants and migration policies are reflected in the works of many Russian sociologists, geographers and demographers [Zaynchkovskaya 2009; Malakhov 2014; Mukomel 2012; Ryazantsev, Horie 2010]. Also of note is the work of researchers of the Centre for Independent Social Research in Saint Petersburg [Brednikova,

Pachenkov 2002; Baraulina, Karpenko, 2004; Brednikova Weaver 2012; Abashin, Chikadze 2008]. However, there was no special study of migrant infrastructure and its role in the incorporation of migrants, and, as shown by numerous foreign studies, it is necessary to analyze their settlement in the town before embarking to the consideration of the institutions created by migrants and migrant-friendly.

It is obvious that the Moscow city space is inhomogeneous: there are industrial, hyper-industrial, post-industrial, service and sleeping areas in the Russian capital at the same time, due to a variety of factors such as: the evolution of urban development, including the features of the Soviet urban planning, settlement stages, different economic structures etc. [Muratov, Vendina 2013; Vendina 2014]. On this basis, as well as the tradition of studying the mutual influence of the city and migration, it can be assumed that there must be a differentiation in the resettlement of migrants in Moscow, too, defined as urban socio-economic structuring, and the resources of migrant communities. The approach for cultural geography has been used to test this hypothesis, according to which there are both traditional and mental enclaves in the urban space [Kalutskov 2013]. The main thing in determining the vernacular area is the localization of a separate urban area, in the perception of residents. This, on the one hand, affects the spatial behavior and self-identification, and on the other – it is defined by them [Pavljuk 2007]. The following real administrative areas of the capital have been selected on analysis of such indicators as the economic and social development (welfare-trouble, prestige and non-prestige), building characteristics, as well as the alleged resettlement of migrants: the East District as a problem area, the center of the North and South-Western districts as the advantaged areas with possibly a small concentration of migrants, and finally, the West District as a part of the city with a tendency to the appearance of migrants [Demintseva,

Peshkov 2014] One vernacular area was selected in each of the districts. This two-step selection and comparison of particular areas of Moscow in order to analyze the differentiation of urban space under the influence of external migration allowed to make interesting conclusions about the interrelation of city and settlement Kyrgyz and Uzbek migrants. This two-step selection and comparison of particular areas of Moscow to analyze the differentiation of urban space under the influence of external migration led to interesting conclusions about the interrelation of city and settlement Kyrgyz and Uzbek migrants.

Moscow development begins with the choice of place of residence, and in most cases, the first area is a part of the city, where either relatives or friends, countrymen, fellow villagers live.<sup>5</sup> Since employment – the main purpose of coming to Moscow for the majority of migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, then the choice of the area is determined by the interests and capabilities of the employer, who arranges accommodation for the migrants.

Migrants are becoming more mobile as they acquire experience of life in the capital, increasing the circle of communication, expanding the geography of living and working. On the one hand, it is expressed in frequent changes of place and sometimes the district of residence, and on the other – this mobility makes it easier to search for a new housing and employment. One common cause is a change in family circumstances or worsening of relations with neighbors in a shared apartment, but the key principle (especially when changing area) becomes the proximity of their place of work to their place of residence. Sometimes, even a husband and wife are forced to live in different parts of the capital and suburbs, because it's more convenient to get to work for everyone.

Two-thirds of migrants, participated in the survey, spend on the way up to 30 minutes, because their work is in the walking distance, as a rule, they follow the principle of proximity of the house to work.

There is not and can not exist the trend towards the consolidation of migrants on any studied territory at present because the duration of residence in one area and the experience of work in the same place do not exceed two years for the majority of the surveyed. One of the reasons is that a considerable part of migrant workers do not have time to take root because of the relatively short-term stay. The vast majority of migrants work in the service industry – catering, trade, housing and communal services, and this kind of work can be found in any area of Moscow. Thus, if we consider the average migrant worker from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the living conditions for him are almost identical in all four vernacular administrative districts of Moscow.

## **Migrant infrastructure**

You can use several approaches for the analysis of urban infrastructure, which is used by migrant workers. The first one involves infrastructure assessment, which is used by workers in "their" area and / or in other parts of Moscow, and in the city as a whole. The second approach is useful for identifying infrastructure of weekday, weekends and holidays. The third approach allows us to see the city's infrastructure, which is determined by the needs of the migrant. This echoes the previous approach to a certain extent, so you can select the weekday infrastructure, recreational infrastructure and the infrastructure that provides educational, medical, and other intermediary services. On weekdays, it is primarily transportation, grocery shopping and other essential items; It is buying clothes, airline tickets, banking services treatment, meeting with friends and relatives, family celebrations, etc. in his spare time after work and especially on weekends. Last, the third

approach focuses on the use of city-wide infrastructure (shops, markets, public places of recreation, etc.) and / or the infrastructure created by migrants in the first place “for them”, often in the service sector.

However, it proposed to use the fourth approach and consider the infrastructure created by migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, mainly in Moscow. It includes ethnic associations, ethnic and migrant associations, various brokerage firms (agencies for the sale of tickets, real estate agencies, issuance of documents, etc.), ethnic” media, health centers, cafes and clubs, migrant networks, which largely form the basis of migrant institutions. The development and location of migrant or migrant-oriented infrastructure in Moscow is related both to the peculiarities of the structure and infrastructure of the post-Soviet city, and the peculiarities of migrants settling in the capital [Demintseva, Peshkov 2014]. Migrants live in all districts of Moscow, and therefore migrant-oriented institutions are located in different places of the capital.

### **Ethno-migrant associations**

There are two types of non-governmental organizations in Russia, aimed at representation of the interests and satisfaction of ethno-cultural needs of different groups, including migrant communities: non-profit organizations and public associations, which (in turn) are divided into the national-cultural autonomy (NCA) and civil society organizations (in various forms : association, foundation, cultural center). According to the Federal Law № 74 dated 17.06.1996 “On national-cultural autonomy”, NCA were non-territorial form of self-organization of ethnic communities from the beginning. Their functions were limited to cultural issues and some official functions [Osipov 2004]. Intermediary social, legal and household assistance to

migrants has been added to them in recent years. The founders and members of the NCA may be citizens of the Russian Federation only<sup>6</sup>.

With respect to other organizations focused on specific ethnic groups, which activities are regulated by the Federal Law № 82 of 19.05.1995 “On Public Associations”, it is important to note that individuals can create this kind of association, and their members, in contrast to NCA, can be aliens of the Russian Federation; such ethnic organizations cover a larger audience than NCA. In addition, a number of ethnic associations are not included in the NCA. The local and regional autonomy are not created in some minorities in general<sup>7</sup>.

Most of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz organizations have been registered in recent years. According to the Ministry of Justice on July 2014, 100 Uzbek public associations have been registered in the Russian Federation, 30 of them had the status of nonprofit organizations, and 87 – the status of public organizations, including 18 regional and local national-cultural autonomies. 10 organizations are fixed administratively in Moscow, including 1 local Uzbek NCA, non-profit foundations, 2 non-profit partnerships and 5 regional public organizations; also registered 1 regional public organization in the Moscow region [Information from 2014]<sup>8</sup>.

As for Kyrgyz organizations in Russia, 60 associations are currently registered: 11 non-profit (5 funds and partnerships 3), 1 religious, and 47 public (including 11 regional and local NCA). 12 organizations operate in Moscow (6 public and 6 non-profit). Some Uzbek and Kyrgyz organizations are specialized in one kind of activity, but the majority declare several areas: the implementation of cultural and educational programs and activities; Interaction with public authorities, local government bodies and interested non-profit organizations; Cooperation with organizations in the country of origin; Publishing and information activities; protection of the rights of

migrants and assistance to their legalization. However, the cultural mediation activity is a significant part of it, and in spite of the status of non-profit organizations, this practice is of a commercial nature. These organizations do not have the dominant role in migrant communications, however they should not be underestimated: the link between organizations, other institutions and migrant labor migrants is much more complicated.

### **Migrant-oriented media**

One of the areas of the most active ethnic organizations is publishing. The three categories of publications can be allocated conventionally on the basis of the analysis data set [Peshkov 2013] – founder and publisher, the main topics of the project, financing and distribution, frequency, and volume of circulation, number of readers; One of the categories is migrant publications which appeared in the mid-2000s, public information, periodic, practically-oriented, midsize (up to 15 000 copies.) bilingual (sometimes monolingual) newspapers<sup>9</sup>.

The language problem is vitally important, since most of the audiences of these free print media<sup>10</sup> are recent migrants, many of whom do not speak Russian, and fall into the information vacuum.

The leading function of migrant editions is an informational that gives insight into the activities of the Russian authorities in the field of migration policy; on the rules of entry and employment; on the legal registration and status of visitors to Russia; on issues related to accommodation, health and education of migrant children. This is an important channel of communication between migrant communities, public space for the (self) representation and identity construction, as well as a source of alternative media in the representation of ethno-cultural diversity, trans-migrant identity and migration in Russia.

A significant part of the print media is also beginning to produce electronic versions in process of their development.

The range of Russian Internet resources focused on the interests and needs of migrant communities, is much wider: from the information-analytical portals and websites of organizations to dating forums, entertainment sites<sup>11</sup>. Thematic sites combine information of various kinds: historical, cultural, educational, household. Advertisement of “ethnic” estate agencies, cafes, various intermediary firms, medical centers occupies a significant part. But the most important function of the Internet is that it is a space for the creation of communities of interest: migrants use them to maintain relations that promote migration, and promote adaptation to the place of residence.

### **Ethnic medical centers**

The network of Kyrgyz health centers, the most well developed in Moscow, began with the doctor's office on the territory of the Kyrgyz embassy, then a clinic at its base has been opened on the territory of the All-Russia Exhibition Center. The number of such medical centers has grown from 3 to 20 in the last 5 years, with 70% of patients are migrants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, not so often – from Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, the locals also come. According to estimates of employees of these health facilities, up to 15% of the visitors are people with Russian citizenship, and sex and age composition corresponds to the structure of migrants, in other words, men and women predominate in the age from 18 to 45 years.

The reasons for the preferences of "ethnic" clinics are explained by the growing number of such centers in the past few years. Firstly, the cost of services is somewhat lower than in the general in Moscow, migrants can get free help in an emergency. Secondly, the minimum set of documents is sufficient to get an appointment with a doctor in such



medical institutions. The third very important reason is the lack of a language barrier between patient and physician, and there are cases when the doctor can explain to the patient, not only in Russian and Kyrgyz, but also Uzbek, and Tajik. Communication in their native language is of great psychological importance. The centers work and the weekend as that is the only option for some patients get an appointment with a doctor. According to formal status, all “ethnic” medical centers are private Russian clinics, but their staff is the Kyrgyz by nationality, citizens of Russia. They also work in other clinics, hospitals, and the work in the “ethnic” medical facility does not bring much income.

The main function of “ethnic” medical centers is that their experts perform initial reception, diagnose, and then either call an ambulance or sent a patient to a specialist in other private clinics in Moscow, and thus act as intermediaries between migrants and urban medical institutions. "Ethnic" centers are indispensable when a patient is unable to stay in the hospital, but still needs treatment. At least one of the Kyrgyz clinic has a small inpatient unit and a café. Sometimes these centers are the sources of information, offsetting some of the legal illiteracy of migrants. Information about the medical centers are distributed pretty quickly: through advertising in the “ethnic” print and electronic media, with the help of cards, as well as on migrants' networks.

### **Intermediary firms: real estate agencies, execution of documents, microcredit organizations**

In accordance with the federal laws on the rules of the residence of labor migrants in Russia, each labor migrant from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan must legalize papers for registration, and permission to

work [Migrant workers 2014]. Many formal and informal intermediary firms provide commercial services to the migration registration, registration of a patent or a work permit, in some cases – employment. Often these firms are created by fellow countrymen, and information about them is distributed by migrants' networks. Until January 2014 the organization of trips outside the Russian Federation every three months for the prolongation of stay in the Russian territory was one of the most popular services (most often in Ukraine)<sup>12</sup>.

For the last three or four years, the market intermediary services has also been supplemented by real estate agencies specializing to migrants. Some Kyrgyz real estate agency grew out of the activities of one migrant who found accommodation for himself, then for his friends, fellow countrymen – so the client base has been formed and real estate agencies have been created. As is the case with “ethnic” medical centers, most of the clients of these agencies are migrants from Kyrgyzstan, but their services are also resorted other labor migrants, mostly from Central Asia<sup>13</sup>.

Another category of mediation, migrant-oriented institution is formed in the area of financial services. Since Russian banks, as a rule, do not provide loans without registration and / or without Russian citizenship, the ethnic microcredit market is created, where the largest and most active is the company “Mol Bulak”. Currently, there are 11 offices in Moscow, 5 branches in the Moscow region and offices in 56 cities in Russia, belonging to the company. This is a Russian microfinance institution legally, the main clients of which are migrants from Central Asia. The advantage of this company is in the minimum package of documents required to apply for the loan: the existence of several guarantors or “solidarity group of three to five people, where everyone has to act as a guarantor for the other” to receive a loan (Russian citizenship is not required). These guarantors are usually

family members and countrymen, and other compatriots. The loan amount ranges from 20 to 40 thousand rubles in the first call, the loan amount can be increased by re-applying for a loan and a positive credit history, the loan term – from 3 to 12 months.

Microcrediting as a rule, is used in the following situations: medical examination, obtaining permits to work and accommodation, paying for children's education, improving housing conditions and even to start a business either in Russia or in the homeland of a migrant. However, as shown by the data of our research, the majority of migrant workers in the first turn to their relatives or fellow villagers in case of need to borrow money, they create “black cash” or a special fund for this purpose.

### **“Ethnic” cafe**

The most striking example of migrant institutions are “ethnic” cafe, focused on migrants from Central Asia. First they were opened at major metropolitan markets, but for the last 3-4 years such catering have gone beyond the territory indicated above. In addition, there is a constant increase in the number of café-oriented workers. According to expert data, if in 2012 there were 30-40 Kyrgyz cafe, then in 2013 their number increased to 60.

Two main categories can be distinguished Café Central. The first is a cafe-clubs, focused mainly on the migrants from Kyrgyzstan. Despite their absence in the list of the capital's restaurant guides, most of the coffee club is located within walking distance from the metro, but at the same time they can not be find, unless you know the exact location. The Kyrgyz predominate among the visitors to the cafe-clubs, they are people of different strata, professions, ages and with different experiences of migration. These cafes are tied to other elements of the infrastructure through a network of migrant relations. Some Kyrgyz

cafes have business relations with the Kyrgyz cultural and commercial center, with “ethnic” medical institutions, with small ethnic businesses (taxi services, print media and websites, with housing rental agents, etc.). In other words, business networks and relationships of fellow countrymen, intensify communication, supplementing one another.

The second category of the Central Asian “ethnic” café is Uzbek tea houses, focused on a wider target group, onto adherents of the Muslim tradition first of all, that the representatives of many ethnic groups follow to.

These categories of the cafes perform similar functions, in spite of the differences in the time mode, in the ethnic composition of employees and customers, visits models. Firstly, they are not only a place of leisure, but also a place where workers can receive wide range of assistance from their compatriots : from the free meal or dinner in debt and up to help in solving housing questions, and problems with finding a job. Secondly, the Kyrgyz cafes-clubs and Uzbek teahouses is a public urban space where representatives of migrant communities have the opportunity to communicate with their relatives and countrymen, to extend these societies, as well as establish new communities in the form of networks for business and for leisure activities. Third, these cafes are examples of ethnic entrepreneurship, because they provide jobs for countrymen and allow migrants to start their own business. They are not just a point of catering and leisure facilities, but also serve as a basis for the formation of economic units, serve as centers of communication and formation of various immigrant communities.

## **Migrant networks**

Migrant networks are compulsory elements of any migration process: they can be defined as a set of interpersonal ties that unite

migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin through networks of kinship, friendship and origin. Networks can also be defined in terms of organizations that include the recognized groups on interests, such as the ethnic businesses or interest groups, linked to the institutional structures, created by the sending and receiving countries. According to research of Western authors, migrant networks are strengthening clustered settlement patterns as attract newcomers with their availability, which simplifies the formation of social networks [Spencer, Petrice 2012; Kavita, Holloway 2005]. It is important to note that the formation of migrant networks, on the one hand, depends on the level of social and human capital of the particular migrant and on the other hand, participation is the capital by itself. This observation is true of the behavior of migrants in Russia.

It is obvious, that the basis of the most migrant infrastructure institutions of the above is different migrant i.e. family and fellow countrymen's communication. It can be assumed that the traditional system of relations (common for Central Asia) has some influence on the formation and composition of some of the social networks of migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in Russia, particularly in Moscow, namely Tribal and clan relations, enhancement of which was due to the actualization of the feudal-patriarchal, tribal relations, especially in the rural areas in the post-Soviet period in all the Central Asian Republics [Knyazev, 2012, p. 84]. According to some researchers, the activation of fellow countryman relations provided an opportunity to survive when the Soviet system of relationships has been abolished, and the new one has not yet formed [Dzhunushaliyev Flat 2000]. As for migrants from Uzbekistan, relations on the principle of Mahalla are more relevant<sup>14</sup>, and for migrants from Kyrgyzstan, especially in some southern areas – on the tribal principle and the principle of patronage.

According to the conclusions of a special study on the influence of tribal relations in the formation / deformation of mechanisms of state management in Kyrgyzstan, the traditional mutual assistance between relatives (all countrymen of the same village are often considered relatives) is a prominent practice of solidarity and a kind of informal institute, which play a positive role [National Institute report, 2013]. They played in the migration and are indispensable in mobilizing emergency. Mutual assistance practices are fixed in writing, that is one way of mutual control and maintaining the network. It should be noted that the collection of money happens not only on a sad occasion but also for the organization of social events with the participation of relatives and fellow countrymen in Moscow.

This practice of mutual aid through migrant networks, which may consist of both villagers and relatives and friends, classmates and fellow countrymen, sometimes referred as “fund-banquet.”

As a rule, there are senior or responsible for the maintenance of the network, including for collecting money. The fund is replenished on a regular basis and is spent on various occasions not only in Moscow, but also the needs of the fellow villagers of migrants in their home countries.

Territorial form of organization of social life, such as the mahalla is typical for Uzbekistan. Migrants continue to reproduce familiar relationships already in Russia: to assist in the search for residence and work, sharing money on a regular basis, food news. Information becomes known in mahalla in Uzbekistan of the countrymen who are in migration, and it also works as a kind of control.

## **Conclusion**

Learning the urban social space of the Russian capital by migrants is determined by many factors.

Firstly, dispersed settlement in all parts of Moscow for the majority of labor migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan affect the fact that such migrant-oriented institutions as cafes, medical centers and brokerage firms are also located throughout the territory of the Russian capital.

Second, the size of the social and human capital of migrants influences the development of migrant infrastructure, resulting in Kyrgyz migrants (compared with migrants from Uzbekistan) have higher levels of self-organization. Many migrant-oriented institution, especially the formal (health centers or “ethnic” cafes), were created by migrants from Kyrgyzstan.

Third, only the infrastructure created by the migrants themselves and initially focused on them, has been considered. However, this does not mean that all the strategies of self-organization of migrants are limited, and that all the needs of migrants are met with the help of such institutions. Migrants are actively developing a citywide infrastructure, such as city parks, shopping and entertainment centers, pharmacies, offices of mobile operators, etc. According to our study, the most commonly used, or at least widely known are “ethnic” café, medical centers, as well as semi-formal structure, document of these migrant-focused organizations. We should not underestimate the role of migrant infrastructure: migrants have to jointly mobilize resources within their network communities due to limited access to certain resources of the host society or lack of information about the possibilities of the host country, in which all elements of the migrant-oriented service sectors are interrelated. On the one hand, it can serve as a specific social exclusion of migrants, but on the other hand, it is also one of the dimensions of their social incorporation in the context of contemporary migration processes in Russia.

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2. Project “Transformation of urban spaces: the analysis of infrastructure of the migrant communities (on example of Moscow),” with the support of RFBR 13-06-00855, supervisor – E.B. Demintseva, participants of the project in 2013 – D. Yelmanova, V. Peshkova, A. Rocheva; 2014 – V. Peshkova, D. Kashnitsky.
3. Among the respondents: 17.6% have Russian citizenship, but this fact does not significantly change the status of migrant, as most of them did not plan to live in Russia, even having Russian citizenship . Read more about the research methodology see Ref. [Demintseva, Peshkov 2014.]
4. This phenomenon has taken a huge scale under the name of “suburban boom” (boomburb) [Katz, Berube, Lang 2005.]
5. Selection of area of residence and especially the resettlement of labor migrants in Moscow.
6. National-cultural local and regional autonomy [Information 2014]. Currently, according to the Ministry of Justice, 1034 of the national-cultural autonomy of different levels are registered in the Russian Federation, 84 of them are located in Moscow, 51 – in the Moscow region.
7. According to the Ministry of Justice on July 23, 2014, there are 225 983 non-profit organizations in Russia, 62 360 of them – public associations, 33 937 non-profit organizations in Moscow [About 2014].
8. One of the largest nationwide Uzbek organizations is the “All-Russian Congress of Uzbeks, the Uzbek people”, created in 2011, which interacts with the Uzbek cultural centers in more than 50 Russian regions. Infrastructure of labor migrants in the modern cities of Russia (as the example of migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in Moscow), pp. 129–151.
9. At present the most well-known Kyrgyz information portals, are “Moscow KG”, “Birge”, “KGinfo.ru”, “Salam-moskva.ru”, “Boorsok.ru”, “Bizde.info”, “M312.ru”, “Nurmoskva.ru” (it works Kyrgyz radio), and Uzbek information portals, such as the portal of the “All-Russian Congress of Uzbeks”, “12uz” other: radio station in the FM-band at 94.0 (in Kazakh, Uzbek or Tajik languages), the radio station “East FM”, Tajik radio Muhojir.
10. The newspaper is distributed in wholesale and construction markets, ethnic restaurants and shops, on various actions at embassies and consulates, cultural centers; sometimes in the offices of large companies (related to economic relations with the countries of origin); on scheduled flights of airlines.



11. Publications targeting migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are the most obvious example of migrant publications. At the present time, according to experts, at least 10 Kyrgyz newspapers are published in Russian, of which 5 – in Moscow (“Globus”, Moscow KG”, “Kyrgyzstan”, “Russian Kyrgyz”, “Nur advertising”) and several Uzbek newspapers, among the most famous “Uzbegim” in Moscow and “Turan” and “Uz Petersburg” in St. Petersburg.
12. According to the amendments to the law “On the Procedure for Exit from the Russian Federation and Entry into the Russian Federation” and “On Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation”, term of foreign nationals (who arrived in Russia in order not requiring a visa) can not exceed a total of 90 days within 180 days, unless there are other permits.
13. At the present time, such real estate agency, as the “Diamond City”, “Parity”, “IZHARA KOOM”, “Zhetigen-property” are most active. These firms offer services for rental housing as a long term, and on a daily and hourly basis, it is cheaper for the client than the hotel rent.
14. Mahalla – a form of local self-government, with the help of which the lining of socio-economic relations of Mahalla residents and the interaction with the higher bodies of municipal government; it is also a traditional institution of human communication, relations between older and younger, the traditional way of mutual assistance.

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**RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY OF MUSLIMS  
IN THE NORTHWEST AND THE NORTHEAST  
CAUCASUS\***

Modern Russian Islam is represented by a variety of ethnic groups<sup>1</sup>. There are peculiarities in the religious practices in each region, where Muslims reside. In addition, the degree of involvement of Muslims in Islamic practice varies considerably. Relationships are formed differently in the structure of the social identity of the representatives of the Muslim ethnic groups in Russia, in particular in the context of relations between the ethnic and religious (religious) identity.

The content of the concept of the “ethnic identity” in the social psychology is treated as a realization of one's own membership of a particular ethnic group<sup>2</sup>. T. Stefanenko allocates cognitive and affective components in the structure of the ethnic identity<sup>3</sup>. L. Drobizheva<sup>4</sup> describes the behavioral component in the structure of the ethnic identity. The author believes that the ethnic identity implies the existence of emotionally colored image of “we” and the ethnic interests, according to which the activity is carried out.

The religious and confessional identity has occupied a strong position in the public discourse in Russia and in the world in recent decades. Consideration of the religious identity takes place in the context of the individual identity as an acquisition of its own existential experience by religion<sup>5</sup>, and in the context of the social identity as

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belonging to a particular community (for example, the Muslim Ummah). Religion serves as a content, and as a tool for the identification process.

M. Mchedlova determines the religious identity as a result of self-identification of the person or the reference community, with a particular religious doctrine, or a part of it<sup>6</sup>. The author singles out the inner piety, i.e. faith as such, and the external piety – i.e. the observance of certain religious rites, ceremonies, rituals. Religious Identity covers the whole range of attitudes towards religion: from the unconditional faith to agnosticism, disbelief and atheism<sup>7</sup>. Confessional identity is regarded as an integral part of the religious identity, which is the result of relating oneself with particular religious doctrine or confession<sup>8</sup>.

Today, the most relevant is the question of the religious identity within the framework of Islam. Many papers are devoted to its research. In particular, the specificity of Islamic identity stems from the fact that Islam is “not only a religion but a secular social system”<sup>9</sup>. “Islam is institutionalized almost all spheres of human life and society, so we can say that Islam is the image of life”<sup>10</sup>.

D. Mukhetdinov expresses his views on the correlation of Islamic religious identity and ethnicity in the program article “Russian Islam: a call to reflection and contextualization,” published for the anniversary – the tenth International Islamic Forum. The author emphasizes that human socialization takes place within a particular society, particular ethnic traditions, a carrier of which is a man.

The study of the specifics of the religious, confessional (Islamic) identity is associated primarily with the problems of the last decades that have arisen in the North Caucasus. “Islam in the North Caucasus is one of the factors, forming the local identity and influencing the outlook of the individual, of the ethnic society.”<sup>11</sup>

Research carried out in the various republics of the North Caucasus, indicate a strong degree of Islamic identity, and the greatest is demonstrated by Chechens, Ingushes, Dagestan, Karachays<sup>12</sup>. A. Malashenko identifies several levels of Islamic identity<sup>13</sup>. The first (personal) level is associated with faith in God and has an ideological character. The second level is a traditional-ritual level, according to A. Krylov, forms one of the most important social functions of religion – identification.<sup>14</sup> The third level is closely linked to the level at which the socialization of Muslims as members of a community takes place.

A detailed study of the involvement of representatives of the traditional Muslim ethnic groups in the real religious practice, learning the specifics of the content of the religious identity, of its individual components, the relations between the religious and ethnic identity, seems interesting and timely nowadays.

The socio-psychological study carried out in order to study the specificity of the content and degree of the religious (confessional) and ethnic identity of ethnic groups of the North Caucasus (Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, Balkars, Adygs). In total, 1713 respondents participated in the study, 508 of them are Chechens, 478 – Ingushes, 470 – Adygs (435 respondents identified themselves as Kabardians, 35 – as the Circassians), 132 – Karachays, 125 – Balkars. The following methods were used to study the structure of the social identity: Test M. Kuhn and T. McPartland “Who am I?”, uncompleted sentences (author's version), Questionnaire (author's version). The distribution of the responses was obtained by means of the statistical package SPSS for Windows 18.0.

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version). The distribution of the responses was obtained by means of the statistical package SPSS for Windows 18.0.

Table 1

**Features of the ethnic and religious identity  
of respondents**

Respondents	The ethnic identity (EI)		The religious (Islamic) identity (RI)	
	% Reporting EI (the total number of respondents)	Of those reporting % EI by 1–5 place	% Reporting RI (from the total number of respondents)	Of those reporting % RI by 1–5 place
Chechens	62,6	86,2	46,9	77,3
Ingushes	67,4	79,5	59,4	65,2
Adygs	39,8	64,7	21,0	49,4
Karachays	61,4	69,1	53,0	70,0
Balkars	57,6	72,2	37,6	59,6

As can be seen from Table 1, the ethnic identity of all groups of respondents prevails over religious. If self-identification by belonging to an ethnic group of the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays and Balkars is expressed at the level of 57–67%, then Adygs barely reaches 40% of it. The ethnic identity occupies a leading position in the majority of respondents who indicated it. The religious identity was indicated as the most important by 50% of the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, while it is significant to a lesser extent for the Balkars and the Adygs. Only 21% of the Adygs identified themselves as Muslims, while it is on the first to fifth place only for half of them, which is significantly lower than other groups of respondents.

The Karachays and Balkars show different results, although they are a single ethnic group, in fact. It is obvious that a number of factors has a significant impact on the content and structure of social identity,



including living area, cross-cultural communication with other ethnic groups, i.e. the specificity of the social context.

The detailed analysis has shown that the ethnic and religious identities are merged into one, in the majority of Chechens responses (63.8%) and 41.8% of the responses of the Ingush<sup>15</sup>. They are given on the first place in the answers usually: I am a Chechen Muslim. I am a Muslim Ingush woman. “Ethnicity and piety for the Chechens are closely related, complementary, inseparable components of identity”.<sup>16</sup> “Religion is a powerful identity marker for the Ingush: it is impossible to be the Ingush and not to be a Muslim”<sup>17</sup>. There was not such a tendency among the representatives of the North-West Caucasus, almost (its signs have emerged in Karachays, but expressed in about 10% of cases). “According to I. Maremsheva, definition of oneself according to this or that confession is secondary, considering the general fear of the God of the Karachai-Balkars”<sup>18</sup>.

It should be noted that the dilemma of the hierarchy of the religious and ethnic identity – to be a muslim or a representative of the ethnic group first of all – is typical for the current situation in the North Caucasus. This problem is most acute in the Adygeys public consciousness, especially between young people and older generations<sup>19</sup>.

The content of ethnic and religious identity has been studied with the help of “Incomplete sentences” technique. By analyzing the answers of the respondents to complete the sentence: “To be a representative of one's people means to me...”, the vast majority of the respondents described the ethnic identity through its affective component in all samples: it is an honor, pride, responsibility: To be a worthy son of one's people; Love the people, and proud of it (the Balkars); Be nice son of one's people; Be a part of one of the greatest and the most beautiful people of the Caucasus; Be the best

in everything (the Karachays); Be proud that I was born in this nation that is respected, valued and loved; Proudly carry this title, not only in words but also in deeds (Kabarda); Become better; Feel proud of one's nation, and follow its traditions, customs and way of life; Follow the principles of Adygeia and glorify one's people (the Cherkessias).

The content of the ethnic identity has been presented by respondents not only through its affective component, but also through cognitive and behavioral components. A true representative of one's people has to know its history, customs, traditions, language and follow them in everyday life. Respondents of different ethnic groups were identical to each other, reflecting the sincere pride and love for their peoples and a desire to comply with the best examples of behavior.

The analysis of respondents' answers to the incomplete sentence: "To be a a true Muslim it means..." revealed the differences in the content of the religious identity of the respondents. Answers of the Vainakhs and Karachays revealed affective component of religious identity: to be a Muslim is a great happiness, to stand on the highest step, go on the right path (Ingush); For me it is all; To be a truly happy man; To be closer to paradise; (Chechens), To be the happiest man; To be very lucky (Karachai). Expanding the cognitive and behavioral component, the Vainakh and Karachay respondents denoted compliance with<sup>20</sup> pillars of Islam, the knowledge of the Koran, the Sharia; moral norms in dealing with people as the necessary component of meaningful religious identity.

The affective component of religious identity of the Balkars respondents also reflected the faith and pride in their religion, as in the previous examples. However, our respondents spoke a little differently in relation to the observance of religious practices. According to some respondents of the Balkars, to be a Muslim meant "not to do anything wrong, and abide by the rules, if possible." There were answers that

signified the relationship between religious and civil identity: to be a real Muslim is to know the laws, the norms of the civil state, where one lives (the Balkar.). There were examples of a change of religious affiliation: To be a Muslim – is to be obedient to God, but being an Orthodox Christian, I believe that it is complying with all the laws of God (the Balkar). A respondent-balkar, 18-year-old, marked his religious identity as the presence of faith, not related to the scope of a particular religion.

There were answers, similar responses of the Balkarians respondents reflecting concern of the Kabardians respondents due to attempts to actively believing Muslims to impose their religion to others and identified possible conflicts between religious and civic identity. Answers showed a great concern and anxiety, where the refrain was an appeal: do not kill; I am not a fanatic, not to kill and not kill people; Do not kill, pure heart, be kind; Do not lie, do not wish harm to another, not to avenge, not to kill, not to steal, to monitor the speech and much more; To be good, not to humiliate other religions, not to do evil, do not drink, do not smoke, and do not kill. The most important thing is to believe in Allah (the Kabarda.). Similar responses were also found in the questionnaires of the Adyghs respondents and showed that the number of Adyghs do not consider themselves Muslims.

The other side of certain difficulties related to the implementation of religious practice in the Kabardino-Balkaria, expressed such an answer: To be a true Muslim is to believe that Allah is and he is great, and that he will help in a difficult moment, when sincerely asked. It is unsafe to follow all the laws of Sharia now (Kabarda.).

Thus, the analysis of the responses that reveal the content of the religious identity of the respondents of the North Caucasus shows that

the degree of involvement of their representatives in religious practice and understanding of religion in the context of Islam is very different in the formal (ethnographic) allocating the majority of the North Caucasian ethnic groups of the Russian Federation to the Muslim space. In addition, there are persons among the Adyghs, and, occasionally, the Balkars, do not identify themselves to the Muslim Ummah.

Another interesting indicator to characterize the degree of religiosity of the respondents, and the relationship between the different types of identities, was an attitude to the polyjuridism, developed historically in the societies of the North Caucasus. Polyjuridism (legal pluralism) – this is when the rules of customary law (adat), Sharia law and the system of the modern Russian legislation operate in parallel.<sup>21</sup>. Specificity of the social life of the peoples of the North Caucasus is that different systems of law are complementary. Facts of legal pluralism are not unique features of the modern Russian Caucasus; they are present in Japan, USA, Switzerland, France, to some extent. For the peoples of the world, practicing Muslims, this situation is also quite common.

During the survey, we asked our respondents the following question: "What should your behavior be governed primarily at the present time (arrange the numbers 1 to 5 in order of increasing importance: 1 – the least important, 5 – most important):

- Sharia law;
- National laws;
- National customs and traditions;
- Rules of national ethics;
- The standards and requirements of one's clan / teip.

Answers to this question can be seen in table number 2.

Table 2

**Distribution of answers to the question**  
**“What should your behavior be governed primarily**  
**at the present time” (represented by averages in points)**

Ethnic group	Sharia law	National laws	National customs and traditions	Norms of national ethics	Standards and requirements of their teip
Ingushes	3,7	2,6	3,6	3,2	2,8
Chechens	3,1	2,7	3,7	3,0	2,6
Adygs	3,0	3,0	3,7	3,4	3,3
Karachays	3,6	3,0	3,4	2,9	2,9
Balkars	3,5	3,0	3,3	3,1	3,2

Tab. 2 shows that points distributed variously in different groups of respondents. The Ingushes and representatives of the Karachai-Balkar ethnic group prefer to be guided by the laws of Sharia. The highest score on the preferences of the traditions was put by the Chechens, Circassians and Ingushes. The Adygs and Balkars are guided by their family to a greater extent. In these societies, the concept of clan / family is connected not only with the concept of relationship, but with gentility, arising out of class differences, historical societies in the Northwest Caucasus. Highly statistically significant difference was found on the preference of the laws of Sharia ( $p = 0.000$ ) and national laws ( $p = 0.003$ ) between the Circassians and Ingushes, by preference between the traditions and customs of the Chechens and Karachays ( $p = 0.01$ ), the Balkars and Chechens ( $p = 0.009$ ), according to the standards and requirements of their taip / family between the Balkars and Chechens ( $p = 0,001$ ), the Cicassians and Chechens ( $p = 0,000$ ), the Cicassians and Ingushes ( $p = 0,003$ ).

Table 3

**The rank structure of the respondents conduct regulators**

Place in the rank structure	Ingushes	Chechens	Adygs	Karachays	Balkars
1	Tradition	Tradition	Sharia	Sharia	Sharia
2	Traditions	Shariah	Ethics	Tradition	Tradition
3	Ethics norms	Ethics norms	Clan	State laws	Clan
4	Teip	State laws	State laws	Clan	Ethics norms
5	State laws	Teip	Shariah	Ethics norms	State laws

Detailed analysis of regulators, of behavior, allowed to construct the rank structure of the regulators, of socio – typical behavior (see Table 3). Sharia law was in first place among the representatives of the Ingush and Karachai-Balkar ethnic groups, and the traditions and customs – among the Adygs and Chechens. It is noteworthy that Sharia law was in last place among the Adygs. The important regulator of social behavior for the Adygs is the norm of the Adyg ethics – “adyghe habze” along with the traditions and customs. The Vainakhs Karachays and Balkars are closely interwoven into the whole religious and traditional social norms.

Thus, the results of the socio-psychological research aimed at studying the content and the specific religious and the ethnic identity of ethnic groups of the North Caucasus, reflect the picture of the cultural diversity and the complexity of the relationships that are emerging in the social structure of the identity of the respondents.

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**GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY OF TURKEY**  
**IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY\***

Turkey has become one of the active players in contemporary international relations. In recent months, its actions in connection with the Syrian conflict have become the focus of experts' special attention. However, to understand the logic and the motives of its actions, it is important to consider not only situational, but also constant

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circumstances. In particular, we are talking about the geopolitical strategy of the country, which of late years has become more resilient and consistent.

From the point of view of geopolitics Eurasia can be divided into two components: central lands (Heartland) and marginal lands (Rimland). Many representatives of the classical geopolitics are of the view that the states with access to sea, have a better chance of success than continental states, i.e. the so-called marginal states have a huge advantage over the “central land”. For many centuries the seas and oceans have been and still are the trade routes making connection between states thus securing their wealth and prosperity. Such states named in classical geopolitics thalassocracy, are dynamic, mobile, prone to technological development. Their priorities – nomadism (especially navigation), trade, the spirit of individual entrepreneurship. Civilizations of this type develop rapidly and evolve actively, easily change their cultural traits, keeping intact only their internal identity.<sup>1</sup>

On the basis of these indicators the Republic of Turkey can reasonably be attributed to thalassocracy. The fact, that the country has access to several seas, and possesses strategically important straits, connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, significantly influences the orientation and the content of regional policy of the country.

The peculiarity of the geopolitical position of the Republic of Turkey, representing a single geographic region of Asia Minor, affects the definition and implementation of its domestic and foreign policy. Turkey is at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia, and Africa). The country has maritime borders, the length of which substantially exceeds the length of the land ones.

Besides, the control over Bosphorus and Dardanelles makes Turkey a “gateway” to the Eurasian continent and at the same time,

opens an important path from Eurasia to the countries of Europe, Asia and Africa. Thus, according to the theory of the unique role of Rimland in the opposition of Sea and Land, Asia Minor is a key regional zone of the geopolitical model of the world, the critical contact zone of Eurasia<sup>2</sup>.

As you know, Turkey is washed by four seas: the Black, the Mediterranean, the Marmara and the Aegean, and quite a few countries can boast of such an advantage. This geographical position of Turkey is of twofold consequences: access to the seas and oceans has always been of immense value for the state, however these watery wastes can be the source of in threats for the development of the country as a whole.

During the whole period of its existence, the Turkish Republic sought to determine its role and place not only in the region but in the whole world. This desire is caused by the peculiarities of its geopolitical position, historical way and the dominant ideology. This process of self-determination has not been completed so far. A confirmation of the thesis that Turkey for a number of reasons still fails to find its place, may be the statement of the Turkish historian Taner Timur: “Our society is facing a crisis that can be called a cultural crisis, the problem of self-identification. We could not determine our place in world history and our civilizational identity to the extent which would satisfy ourselves. We constantly address to history and try to understand it”.

Officially Turkey has its own state ideology. After the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 Mustafa Kemal Attaturk proposed a new national ideology of the country, named Kemalism after its founder . Kemalism is the main structure of ideas and principles of the state, ideologies, economics and social institutions, which are designed to secure full independence, safety and well-being of the Turkish nation at present and in future. Foreign researchers argue that individual and

national support of Kemalism and its protection is a guarantee of development, strength and prosperity of the Turkish state in future<sup>4</sup>.

The main aim of the reforms initiated by K. Attaturk, was modernization of the country. After the shock, which Turkey experienced after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the country needed radical changes. K. Ataturk chose Westernization as the main vector of development of the country. Westernization assumed borrowing all the progressive achievements of European civilization and their subsequent adaptation to local Turkish conditions<sup>5</sup>. In its relations with foreign countries, Turkey sought to remain neutral, maneuvering between several countries and continents, what in its turn corresponded to the geopolitical position of the country. The main objective of Kemalism at that time was to withdraw from the objectives and principles of the Ottoman Empire with its mostly aggressive and expansionist policy. All the presidents who came to power after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic followed this concept to a greater or lesser extent.

The collapse of the Soviet Union caused serious geopolitical changes that affected the entire system of international relations as a whole, Turkey was no exclusion: being an integral part of the international community, it faced the need to rethink the value priorities, as well as the priorities of regional policy of the country. After all, newly formed neighboring countries appeared near the borders of Turkey in the Central Asian region, and the situation in the Middle East and the Balkans changed. Therefore, the transformation of the geopolitical role and Turkey's strategy was predetermined.

For Turkey, as well as for the world as a whole, 21 century became a new stage in the development of mankind. In 2001 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, published his study entitled "Strategic Depth" which has become really popular at present. The

book presents a fundamentally new concept of foreign policy of the republic in the new millennium. From the author's point of view, Turkey must learn to maneuver between the interests of Europe, the USA, Russia and the Middle East, to enjoy the benefit of its geopolitical position. The author believes that Turkey should build and develop its foreign policy on the basis on its history. Davutoglu says that in order to become a regional and then a world power, Turkey should carefully consider and verify each step it makes in the direction of any region, whether it is the Middle East, South Caucasus, the Balkans or Europe. Only by consistent and deliberate action Turkey will be able to establish itself as a reliable ally building its regional policy on the basis of the policy of searching mutual benefits.

Turkey entered a new period of its history. The parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002 were won by Justice and Development Party (AKP) headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Its ideology is a fusion of the right Eurasianism, moderate Islamic traditionalism and focus on the US and the EU<sup>6</sup>. The AKP obtained 366 seats in the Majlis, won the right to form a one-party government, and immediately began to introduce reforms, waited for by the population. In 2010, for the first time since 1982, 24 amendments, designed by the ruling party were made to the Constitution.

The AKP has achieved impressive success in the economy. The fact that Turkey became the 17th economy in the world speaks of considerable merit of the party. The greatest achievement of Turkey during the last 10 years, are, no doubt, economic indicators. For their evaluation it should be taken into account that the country has almost no reserves of oil and gas, the price for gasoline is the highest in Europe. In these circumstances the country shows a strong momentum of growth. In 2010, GDP reached \$ 1 trillion, i.e. increased 5 times as compared with the results of 2001. Exports increased more than 3 times

and reached \$ 114 billion, and Turkey exports primarily the products of its industry, not raw materials<sup>7</sup>. Much attention is paid to the development of trade-economic relations with The Middle East, the trade turnover with the countries of this region has increased by 53%<sup>8</sup>. During the stay of the AKP at power, Turkey has become one of the largest tourist centers in the world.

In its foreign policy, the Justice and Development Party has emphasized the multi-vector course. The following main directions of the country's foreign policy have been developed:

1. Integration of Turkey into the European Union;
2. Implementation of the policy of “zero problems with neighbors”;
3. Turkey's transformation into a regional power;
4. Strengthening of cooperation with the United States;
5. Extension of cooperation with Russia;
6. Expansion of ties with African countries.

The difference of geographic and political vectors of the mentioned directions becomes evident even from the list, as well as the actual manifestation of claims to regional leadership and further spread of the country's influence beyond the Western Asia. In particular, as it can be seen from the political reality, it is rather hard for Turkey to maintain steady relations with global and regional actors in the context of constant conflict of interests. In fact, Turkey inevitably has to take the side of the participants of these conflicts. Besides, the real policy of Turkey, its geopolitical strategy for the last few years has been revealing expansionist aspirations still more clearly.

In 2009 the Foreign Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu suggested to regard the policy of “zero problems with neighbors” as an official vector of the development of relations with the neighboring countries. Officially, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains

the doctrine as follows: Being aware of the fact that development and progress in the today's world can only be achieved through security and stability of the global system, Turkey puts this objective at the center of its foreign policy concept. This approach reflects the policy of “order at home, order in the world”, put forward by M. Attatyrk. The policy of “zero problems with neighbors” is the epitome of Turkey's expectations regarding its relations with the neighboring countries. Turkey wants to resolve all the problems in relations with the neighboring countries, or at least minimize them as much as possible”<sup>9</sup>.

Officially, the democratic principles of organization of society, secularism and the rule of law are proclaimed by the base of the formation and conduct of the country's foreign policy. The level achieved by Turkey in the field of economy and democracy, expanded the range of the country's foreign activity and increased its influence in the area.

But the main feature of Turkey's regional policy is a “fast response” to the events, the country tends not to remain indifferent, waiting for negative effects. Another important feature of Turkey's foreign policy is its foresight. It is declared that Turkey aims to reach the stage of development where all countries will live in prosperity, creating a security and stability zone, beginning from the neighboring countries.

In general, the policy of “zero problems with neighbors”, as it follows from the official documents and statements, means actions aimed at ensuring the security of the country through the instruments of “soft power” and exclusively by diplomatic means. In regard to this policy, Davutoglu said: “The country, which is constantly experiencing difficulties in relations with the neighboring countries, is practically unable to build foreign policy at the global and regional levels. ...In the

course of establishing relationships it is necessary to find common ground in culture and economy.

It is necessary to work out a systematic plan for development of economic and cultural relations which would permit to overcome security problems with the neighboring countries”<sup>10</sup>.

In fact, the said doctrine is not really a guide to action, but it offers one of the variants of implementation of the regional policy. The “neighbors” are not only the countries, located near the borders of Turkey, but also, in a broad sense, those which have cultural and historical affinity and mutual strategic interests with Turkey. It is known that the said foreign policy course had been taken long before A. Davutoglu's doctrine appeared. The first example of it is that Turkey refused to provide assistance to the US and its allies during the intervention to Iraq in 2003. As stated, “this move of Turkey demonstrated to its neighbors and to the world, and even to itself, that Turkey can and will act on its behalf in the matters affecting its foreign policy”<sup>11</sup>. Such statement is actually a confirmation of the fact that in the first place Ankara analyzes the possible consequences for its country, not allowing the opinions of others to disorientate it.

The aim of current Turkish government is to establish trusting relationships with the countries of the region, in order not only to ensure their safety, but also to minimize the likelihood of arising of new or revival of “old” unresolved conflicts which could destabilize it.

Several years of consistent implementation of the new foreign policy guidelines have given their results. The authority of Turkey in the world and the post-Ottoman space has grown significantly.

Significant success was achieved in relations with the Arab world. In the years of the First World War the Arabs put forth much effort to bring the Ottoman Empire to collapse and up to the present Turkey did not have a serious meaning for them. Over time the situation



has changed significantly. In the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey also pursues an active economic and political line. In fact, Turkey aims to become a political and economic leader in the Middle East.

The popularity and successes in domestic and foreign policy, the AKP gained over the years of his reign, increasingly began to form in the minds of the Turkish society a new Imperial thinking, which later became known as neo-Ottomanism. The significantly improved economic situation in the country, closer and more trusting relationships with the players with whom such relations were not maintained earlier, indeed, suggests that the political weight of Turkey in the region is gradually increasing. Turkey is no longer a spectator who prefers just to watch, it is becoming an active participant that feels still more confident on this stage. The contemporary Turkey is not any longer an ordinary country in the region, but it is launching international initiatives, forcing the others to act looking out for the position of the Republic.

There is a belief that the ideas of neo-Ottomanism began to arise almost immediately after the death of M. Atatürk, the founder of the Republic. This policy became more definite at the time of President T. Ozal at the turn of 80–90-ies of the last century. Today, neo-Ottomanism is not just the ideology but the worldview of the Turkish society. Such opinions of the society and the government due, in the first place, to historical nostalgia, when Turkey was not a small state, but an Empire with a vast territory and possessed such power, which is now a secret dream of many Turks.

The term neo-Ottomanism is often associated with the policy of the governing Party of Justice and Development. Experts believe that the incredible foreign policy activities, which was characteristic of Turkey in the region with the arrival of R. Erdogan, is a departure from

the well-established for decades ideology of Kemalism towards the restoration of a prototype of the Ottoman Empire.

Starting serious reforms inside the country, Turkey also started to modernize the country's image in the region. The Republic has developed into an economically developed nation, which makes it the leader among all the others. The proclamation that henceforth Turkey would be a secular state, where previously incompatible trends such as democracy, modernization and Islam will exist in parallel, has caused a sense of respect for it with other countries. The result was that there appeared the notion of the “Turkish model” of a state, proposing the transfer of the Turkish experience to other countries which took the path of change. On the other hand one can suspect here a clear attempt of Ankara to impose its own development path on other states, assuring them of its viability and correctness, and spreading uniform thinking among them. Creating its own kind, the Turkish government facilitates the process of building connections with them and simplifies the process of imposing its own ideas.

The concept of “neo Ottomanism” in the policy of the country has been criticized by its neighbors. It is worth noting that to date, the government of Ankara categorically denies the existence of such a doctrine, and reminds once again that Turkey has the only ideology, chosen nearly a hundred years ago, which is Kemalism. President Erdogan and Prime Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu claim, that Turkey has left its “Imperial manners” in the past long ago, and is now developing in a completely different direction. However, many experts argue the opposite.

Returning to the doctrine of “zero problems with neighbors” it can be easily seen that through this policy, Turkey seeks to pursue the policy of soft power for greater confidence on the part of the countries

of the region and greater involvement in their internal processes, which will enable it in future to start controlling them for its own benefit.

It is believed that one of the reasons for the formation of the idea of neo-Ottomanism is a long and difficult way of Turkey to the European Union. After adoption of many Western principles and values, Turkey was still unable to meet the requirements of Europe, which in turn provided stimulated it to rethink the foundations of its foreign policy. A sharp turn towards the countries of Central Asia and the Middle East and the desire to extend their influence in these lands through cultural, economic and political initiatives, in fact completely coincide with the notion of neo-Ottomanism. In this case, A. Davutoglu claims that, due to its historical heritage, Turkey is obliged to be active in the region in all directions.

However, one should distinguish between the new form of neo-Ottomanism from the Ottomanism that existed during the Ottoman Empire. The modern neo-Ottomanism includes Kemalism or Westernization as one of the alternatives for development of the regional policy of the country, not excluding it altogether. Today Turkey actively supports the Turkic peoples of the Central Asian countries, the Moslem population in the Balkans, the Arab population in the Middle East and North Africa.

Despite the denial by the Turkish ruling elite the presence of such neo-Ottoman aspirations, we cannot ignore the fact that the country which was a great Empire in the past will seek, on a subconscious level, to increase its influence, to attain habitats for its spread.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the political doctrines and policies are reflected in real politics, which are constructed according to their settings<sup>12</sup>. Thus it is evident that the interests of true understanding of the politics of the Turkish Republic, assessment of its prospects

require consideration of the circumstances of geopolitical nature. On their basis certain vectors develop in the regional policy of Turkey, which seeks to have some benefits from relations with the Islamic and Western civilizations. The factor of the historical past of the Ottoman Empire is becoming still more and more prominent.

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## **RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION**

Understanding of global problems suggests understanding of the relationship of universality and the uniqueness of the current changes. The world in the global space involves the extension and the intensity of cultural, economic, political, and financial ties. In the context of globalization the barriers and the boundaries become erased. Phenomena and processes, the relationship between individual and nature, individual and society in the conditions of global world, assume universal dependence.

All this means that the momentary overcoming or solution of any single problem within the frames of a particular society, state or continent is not complete, cannot lead to trouble-free existence of mankind, as the successful solution of any global problem contributes to the overall progress of mankind, and the same time is a fertile ground for the emergence of new, more complex problems to be solved, which is the natural process of human development.

The religious factor, in some cases represented as extremist trends can rightly be considered one of the global problems in modern conditions.

In the second half of the twentieth century religious tradition in the world was broken. There appeared hundreds, if not thousands of non-traditional cults. They are sometimes called neo-religions, neo-cults, new age religions.

The majority of neo-religious movements result from the crisis in the public consciousness, economic difficulties, regional and global problems. In recent years, in many countries, in addition to traditional

religions, one may find the spread of new religious trends that are not inherent to spiritual and cultural matrix of an ethnic group, are not rooted on the mental level, but are spreading due to active missionary activity, often intrusive and aggressive [1].

Until the end of the twentieth century the emergence and dissemination of new trends on the basis of Islam had almost never been observed. It should be noted that Islam really exhibited significant stability, which was probably due to the extreme monotheism and quite simple religious practice. However, the events of 11 September 2001 clearly showed to the world that the Islamic factor should not be underestimated.

In recent times, religious extremism is often associated with Islamic radicalism only. What is extremism? How does it manifest itself in the context of globalization?

Extremism is a commitment to extreme views and measures. Religious extremism denies the traditional society values and principles, promotes the aggressive rejection of beliefs alien to it. Throughout human history almost in all religions one can detect religious views, calling for negation of traditional norms, the desire to impose their orders and foundations on society.

The objective of religious extremism is recognition of a single religion as the leading one, and on the way to it – suppression of other religious views and imposition of its dogmas.

In some cases, extremist groups set themselves the task of creating a separate state that would exist and be guided only by the religious ideas of this confession. Religious extremism is often based on the idea of fundamentalism, i.e. it tries to recreate the foundations of its religion in their pristine purity, “purifying” them from alien ideas and innovations [1].

Why has the Islamic factor become now a global problem? It has happened because in the conditions of globalization the radical Islamist sentiments of individual Islamist groups have no state, continental, ethnic or racial boundaries. Aggressive imposition of its model of the state is accompanied by military clashes. Today groups of citizens from different countries, including from the former Soviet Union go to fight to hot spots, where violence and lawlessness are used as attempts to establish a Sharia state.

The reason for such active spread of this phenomenon is nothing but the Internet space. Through online recruitment people's minds are infused with ideas of rejection of the modern way of life, of a secular state, liberal values, and after that seemingly modern, educated people, blindly following extremist ideology, go to fight for carefully disguised by religious motives political goals of certain ideologists or groups,. In this case we are talking about the radical Islamist movements.

In fact, the traditional Islamic understanding of peace differs from the modern Western understanding. While peace is commonly understood as the absence of war or tension, in Islam peace is harmony. World in Islam begins with God. God is world, because world is one of the “99 beautiful names of Allah”. World peace comes from the source of world and reflects the ultimate reality.

In Islam preference of nonviolence to violence and forgiveness to retribution stands clearly. The principle of unity is reflected in the Quranic aspire to regulate ordinary human attempts to respond with revenge to conflict and violence. Forgiveness is always shown as the best choice when you need to respond to blatant injustice. Islam exists not for imposing ideal patterns to the world, but for establishing God's Oneness and promoting harmony and justice of right relationships [2, p. 356].

Humanity today can rightly be called matured. In the recent past, the world, divided into capitalist and socialist camps, was in danger of extinction, a universal danger was felt everywhere. The issue of the “cold war” has been resolved, the world has become single, global, democratically oriented.

But today these achievements can be upset by radical Islamist movements with their idea of creating a unified Islamic state. They also promote the ideas of establishing the “separate Caliphate” in some regions the post-Soviet space.

No state, let its territory be at the present moment free of currently military conflicts on religious grounds, can ignore the phenomenon of religious extremism. Overcoming of this phenomenon must be consistent and deep. History shows that the imposition of a single model does not give positive results.

The unity of mankind in the context of globalization does not imply unification, but rather, unity includes myriads of cultural and social differences. People today cannot be limited only by their culture, geographic location and other subjective measurements. It follows, that such problem as modern religious radicalism, must be overcome and resolved at the global level.

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- \* See: K. Belozerov V. Doctriny i ideologii v sisteme politicheskikh institutov [Doctrines and ideologies in the system of political institutions] // Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo lingvisticheskogo instituta [Bulletin of Moscow State Linguistic University]. 2013. Issue 24. pp. 31–40.



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