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**CIVILIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA
IN THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESSES**

Globalization becomes an increasingly important concept as a phenomenon of the contemporary world development, which determines the direction of the functioning of national economies.

Globalization is generally understood as changes in all spheres of public life throughout the world, and the effects of these changes affecting the global climate change of the Earth, the complexity of the relationship between the East and West, Islam and Christianity, between rich and poor, between the “golden billion” and the rest of humanity. The technological revolution, the rapid development of information technology, a qualitative change in the human consciousness are suspected causes of the emergence and development of globalization. The consequences of this phenomenon are assumed to be from the very optimistic to catastrophic.

According to most opinions, globalization is a reality of the 21st century, the process of integration of humanity that combines scientific and technological revolution, the development of the world

economy, a qualitative change in market relations, interrelations in the world community. However, it remains unclear to what extent this process is objective and natural, what consequences can be expected from it by every state and every inhabitant of the Earth.

Globalization can be considered as another stage of modernization, as a necessary component of the development of society, imposed by the West, though it is not always and not for all desirable and useful, as a process of liberalization of the national economies, political systems, the assimilation of the Western way of life.

Each country has its own historical experience of economic life. Type of economy and methods of management, appropriate to historical, geographic, demographic and other factors, are produced on the basis of this experience, including the national mentality and customs, norms and traditions, that play a big role. Customs and traditions are forms of existence for the norms and measurement standards, accumulated and transmitted to subsequent generations. That preserves frequency of occurrence of certain socially significant situations. Traditional society is a system, aimed at their preservation. [1, p. 44].

Technological type of Western civilization has created a misconception under which traditions are thing of the past, a relic of bygone stages of the history, and traditional society is one of the intermediate (or early) stages of rectilinear motion of every human community (without considering the peculiarities of its historical development), to the ideal – a modern industrial society, “society of the welfare.”

The transition from traditional to modern society is a process of modernization, aiming to build a European-style civilization. The process of liberalization of the national economies and political

systems, adoption of the Western lifestyle are also meant by modernization.

According to supporters of the theory of modernization, all nations and countries have to go through it, and they pass on the only possible and historically predestined way. However, they take the path of modernization in different times, and their place in a number of developed countries and the achievement of well-being depend on it for today. All the states are divided into the echelons of modernization on this basis.

Centers of the world system of capitalism, European and then the global “world-economy” were in countries of the first echelon of modernization since the 15th century, i.e. the space, outlined by defined borders and having a center, around which the near and far peripherals were formed, which were the sum of private economies with different levels of wealth. This kind of inequality as the international division of labor, which is concretized in a spatial model of development and underdevelopment, which originated out of there as the division of labor, was not an agreement of equal partners at the scale of the world-economy [2, p. 14].

Pre-existing state of dependence accelerated the process of modernization in some countries and hindered it in the countries – suppliers of raw materials to the beginning of the industrial civilization. The economic inequality of partners of the world-economy has increased over time, as the primacy of the economy became increasingly important, and it divided the world into two parts – a privileged and deprived of privileges. The countries – peripheries of the world-economy have ceased to be content with such inequality. Their satisfaction was manifested in an effort to seek and find the model of independent development, taking into account the features of the internal economic and cultural life [3, p. 22].

The idea of globalization of national economies for the further global development and the transition to a unified world economy, based on liberalism, has become the reaction of centers of the world-economy on the changed position of the peripheral countries. Globalization should become an irreversible process of internationalization, not only for the economic sphere, but also for the social life by creating conditions for the free movement of financial, material and human resources according to the thought its supporters.

Globalization promotes the economy of various countries to a qualitatively new level, smoothing, and even destroying their cultural and historical features, as these national characteristics and traditions can be a brake on the process of modernization.

Globalization, as well as modernization in general, implements its culture, destroying some traditions, that are not compatible with the principles of globalization, and establishing others – the traditions of continuous change, the traditions of rationalism. Theorists of modernization and globalization emphasize the favorable and unfavorable factors of change, believing that it is necessary to eliminate the negative factors in the course of modernization.

Human being is considered as the most important of all the factors affecting the economic development, as a subject of economic activity and the element of generality. In this regard, the concept of national mentality plays a leading role today, but a change in the consciousness of a human being, his ideas, the way of economic thinking, action norms, the mentality, are the key points to modernization of the society.

Saving elements of traditional society and the lack of rationalistic minds at the majority of the population belong to the unfavorable factors of change. M. Weber admitted that «the first opponent at the

“spirit” of capitalism ... was type of behavior and perception, which could be called “traditionalism”» [4, p. 80].

Thus some scientists believe that the development of a new cultural stereotype forms the core of the whole process of modernization, and a high priority is seen the destruction, or at least the transformation of the traditional sector, the traditional socio-economic and socio-political institutions in the process of modernization. Thus, there is a definition of modernization as a rationalization of consciousness on the basis of scientific knowledge with the rejection of conduct in accordance with the traditions, as change of types of consciousness, transformation of public consciousness of the subject, changing the type of the human community [5, pp. 63–73].

The change, the adjustment of consciousness should lead to the possibility of the establishment and functioning of the new socio-economic, political and cultural institutions and the attitudes, values and norms, according to “the modernizers”. These institutions, attitudes, values, norms, must comply, or at least not to contradict the accepted ideals, precepts and institutions of Western civil society, having a basis in Roman law, and Western Christianity.

Different personality types, different national mentalities were formed under the influence of various natural and social factors. These differences resulted in a different understanding of economic freedom, the meaning and the basic principles of economic activity. However, the expansion of Western civilization determined the main features of world history during the last few centuries.

Representatives of Western civilization are characterized by pragmatism, practicality, thrift, resourcefulness, ability to take risks, coldness, emotional callousness, aspiration to independence, conscientiousness, a sense of superiority over other nations, the capacity for self-discipline and self-organization ... It is impossible to

reproduce the Western civilization, or to save it in its present form, and at the current level, with other human qualities. [6, pp. 46–47].

Socio-political and economic system of Russian civilization and Russian economic mentality formed under specific conditions, and their combination is not peculiar to any one country. The specificity and uniqueness of Russia is that the vast country has always been a special world-economy, with the formed certain stereotypes of economic behavior, due to the peculiarities of space and flow of historical time.

Russia has been a self-sufficient economic system for thousand years, functioning according to the laws of such macro systems, comes into contact with the neighboring economies, but not strongly dependent on them. Manufacturing in such a system has to be complicated and diversified. A country can not exist independent, if it does not provide for itself.

This truth, relevant for Russia, as in the beginning of the 21st century and a hundred years ago, was formulated by Russian scientist and economist L. Tikhomirov at the turn of 19–20 centuries. [7, p. 23]. «A world-renowned modern Russian writer, thinker, sociologist Alexander Zinoviev, who has lived in the West for a long time and knows it from inside, coined the term “Westernization” in one of his last books, meaning “ambition of the West to make other countries exactly the same for social order, economy, ideology, psychology and culture”. A. Zinoviev warns that the aim of this process is to bring other countries to the loss of the capacity for self-development, to incorporate them into the sphere of influence of the West, and not as an equal and equipotent partners, but in the role of satellites, or rather, the colonies of a new type» [6, p. 416].

This process is widely known as “globalization” and the doctrine reflecting the pattern of development of this process, explaining the logic of its existence is called “globalism”. There are positive sides of

globalization: the benefits of international division of labor, the increasing exchange of technological innovations, the high mobility of capital and labor, the expansion of product markets.

There are negative consequences, costs that affect not only the countries of the second and the third echelons, but the favorites of globalization – economically developed countries.

The first distribution cost is the deepening division between rich and poor, countries and individuals, residents of rich and poor countries. The gap between the active minority (elite) and the rest of the population of the planet, which can not or does not wish to participate in the accelerating race of technological and economic competition becomes more and more appreciable problem.

The second cost of globalization is the loss of independence and national sovereignty. Countries are no longer self-sufficient. “Continue to follow the path of global interdependence, is a betrayal of one's history. What is good, if a man gains the whole world and loses his own country?” [8, p. 68].

The third distribution cost of the global economy is the country's vulnerability to financial crises, the causes of which are outside the control. The world is always one step away from catastrophe in the global economy. Thus, the Soviet Union was not affected by the Great Depression of 1929–1933 due to the “Iron Curtain”, and North Korea was the only country in Southeast Asia that has not been affected by the 1997 crisis.

The fourth cost of economically developed countries is deindustrialization and denationalization of the industry, which resulted in the movement of capital from countries of the first echelon to the states with lower labor costs, and the inability of workers from the economically developed countries to compete with cheap labor from

the developing countries. Manufacturers seek their benefits in the low labor remuneration, and workers try to find a higher salary.

Thus, all States may be affected as a result of growing globalization process, regardless of their economic status. Transnational systems that combine industrial, financial, scientific and informational structures that define (or is seeking to identify) areas of economic, and not only economic development of the entire world system, are the winners.

It is possible to mitigate the negative effects of globalization by alternative development project, based on the full strengthening of national economies. Economics have to stand up in strong opposition to the free market, so that they are not deprived of sovereignty and became dependent on multinational corporations.

There should be national economies in the real world, interacting with each other. Critical decisions should be made considering the best for the nation in the separate national economies.

Accession to the process of globalization may result in loss of independence, poverty and extinction of the population for Russia, weakened by the reforms of the 1990s and breaking all socio-economic and political ties.

A certain ideology is necessary for the development of Russia as a great power to lift the economy, for the improvement of society and the emergence of faith in the possibility of the revival of the country corresponding to the socio-economic and political reality. Ideology should take into account the peculiarities of the mentality of the Russian people, which has been formed under the influence of many factors throughout the great and tragic history of our people.

Since Russia has found its answer -- imperial modernization -- onto the processes in the early 16th century, with increasing dependence on the West due to the modernization of the centers of the

capitalist world system, and now its way has to be found, corresponding to the interests of the Russian people and the country.

It is important to understand in what direction the global economy is growing, which deformations have occurred and are occurring in the capitalist system, despite its victory in the competition with socialism. Russia needs changes more than other countries, when every nation, every state feels the need to update and transform its own way in the transitional period.

Actions should be as more thoughtful and careful as possible, when they lead to transformation of the country. No one, even private, measure should be introduced, without solving the issue of the impact that may or will be exerted on all aspects of life of the people.

Any model of the national economy is not only a unique combination of internal and external factors that are determined by national or geopolitical features, but also has its own specifics, related to the different historical stages, and associated to the basic conditions in each of them. Therefore, a key issue in the process of any reform is the question of compliance the chosen model of economic development and related institutions to the national traditional institutional forms, worked out over the centuries, and one of the main forms is the national mentality. In other words, it is a question of compliance of the society traditions to the upgrade process.

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INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN TATARSTAN: CURRENT STATE AND NEW CHALLENGES

Tatarstan is characterized as a stable region of interethnic relations by almost all researchers and experts. However, the process of migration requires a new detailed study of the current trends on the possible changes of the interethnic cooperation and relationships for the recent years, as well as ascertain the singularities of ethnic identity of the citizens of the republic. The population of Tatarstan is represented by several ethnic groups: the title and the most numerous ethnic group are Tatars – 53,2% of the population, according to the census of 2010; the second largest ethnic group is Russian – 39.7%;

There are also Chuvash, Udmurt, Mordovia, Mari, Ukrainian, Azerbaijani and others – 7.1%.

Contemporary socio-cultural processes are characterized by variability and dynamism. The old forms are developed dynamically, creating new mixed identities. Ethnic, religious boundaries are gradually blurred, the structure of social identities becomes complicated, traditional classification is not always applicable. [5]

According to the materials of the empirical study of ethno-confessional relations in the Republic of Tatarstan, carried out by a research team of the Department of Sociology, Kazan Federal University in February–March 2012 (sample size – 1590 units) [12], the issue of ethnic identity is important for the majority of citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan: 71% of residents believe, that a modern man must feel himself a representative of any ethnic group (ethnicity is important for three-quarters of the Tatars and two-thirds of Russian). At the same time, the people are more loyal to the nationality of others: it is not significant for 58.5% of the population, 49% of Tatars and 68% of Russians do not pay attention to the nationality of others. It is worth emphasizing, that ethnic identity is ranked the third by the number of preferences behind civilian identities: Republican – 24% and Russia – 27%.

Ethnic identity is defined by ethnicity of parents, according to the absolute majority of the inhabitants of Tatarstan (90%). The significant criteria also are: the language for 36.4% of the population and religion for 28% of them. Name (including middle name and surname) is significant for 16% of the population, as well as compliance with national ceremonies, festivals and customs – to 14.4%. Residence on the traditional territory and availability of a husband / wife of the same nationality is much less important for ethnic identity, according to the residents of Tatarstan.

One of the main markers of ethnic identity is the native language. [6] The inhabitants of the Republic are presented in two equal groups on linguistic grounds: some consider Russian to be the native language – 48% of citizens, and others – Tatar to be their native one – also 48%. However, not all the Tatars consider their ethnic language to be native, unlike Russian. Every tenth Tatar believes Russian to be his native language (Tatars who do not speak or speak badly Tatar language, as well as Tatars of mixed marriages). An indication of ethnicity is also the significance of the ethnic language for future generations: it is important for 70% of the population that their children speak their native language.

The Republic of Tatarstan is a bilingual region: almost all citizens speak Russian, more than half – Tatar. The Law on Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan (adopted in 1992) secured the two state languages. That same year, the Tatar language was introduced as a compulsory subject in the curriculum of secondary education, which had to be studied by all students, regardless of ethnic origin.

There has been an activation of public debate during the past few years and the situation was caused by the introduction of the Tatar language as a compulsory subject for study by students in the republic. There are discussions among parents of students, regarding the optimal ratio of Russian and Tatar languages in the school curriculum up to the question of whether it is necessary to study Tatar in the established volumes in school. Parents of students are often dissatisfied that their language is not taught at the appropriate level, that the existence of the Tatar language in the school curriculum leads to deterioration of the Russian language teaching. [10] Nevertheless, a survey of residents of the republic shows that the majority of the inhabitants have a positive attitude to the compulsory presence of the Tatar language in

the school curriculum (72%), including 84% of Tatars and 57% Russian. The vast majority of the republic's residents (90%) say that they do not experience difficulties due to bilingualism either when communicating with friends, neighbors, relatives or at work nor in education or in public life.

The opinion that every resident of Tatarstan should know the Tatar language, is supported by 56% of the population of the republic – from “be able to speak” (22%) to the “least understood” (34%). However, the position depends on the ethnicity of the respondents to a large extent: a third part of Tatars, and only a tenth part of Russians assert that everyone should speak Tatar. [4]

There is a sufficient proportion of those who do want to learn the Tatar language: 43% of those who do not speak or speak slightly are ready to undertake it. Describing interethnic relations, social scientists often refer to the terms of willingness to allow people of other ethnic groups to certain positions that are significant on the social status or are in close proximity in relation to the respondent. Residents of the republic impose the highest demands on the people who are within the smallest social distance, and are included in the inner circle – husband / wife (as well as the spouses of children), only 10% would like to see representatives of other nationalities as their spouses, and 45% are neutral to it. The respondents are worried due to the ethnicity of the head of the Republic of Tatarstan: 9% of respondents admit a person of another nationality occupying this position, and 52% are neutral to this assumption. Tatars want to see a representative of their ethnic group as the head of the republic more than other nations wish the same.

Residents of Tatarstan are ready to have a person of another ethnic group as a friend, colleague or neighbor in the community – the vast majority of people think about it as positive or neutral (85.7%,

84.6% and 84.5%). We can say that the ethnic groups, living in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan traditionally show friendly attitude towards each other.

Let us consider the subjective assessment of the state of ethnic relations in Russia and the republic. The respondents noted that these relations are much more favorable in Tatarstan than in the whole country. Interethnic relations in Russia are called harmonious and favorable by 12% of respondents, and in Tatarstan – 20% of respondents; in Russia they are considered calm by 30% of respondents, and in Tatarstan – by 43% of respondents; evaluate them as satisfactory – 36% and 28%; call them tense and crisis – 15% in Russia, while only 5.3% of respondents- in Tatarstan. The Tatars assess the situation in the Republic of Tatarstan: as more prosperous than other nations. Residents of the republic look with a great deal of optimism at further development of interethnic relations in the Republic of Tatarstan: 8% of Tatarstan people expect that these relations will deteriorate in the Republic of Tatarstan.

However, according to our study, 12% of the population of the Republic of Tatarstan, have faced with the facts of ethnic discrimination in recent years. Although the vast majority of the population (80.4%) did not meet similar situations, but there is an interesting ethnic situation with those who have been subjected to a similar infringement. Comparing the Russians and the Tatars, we can say with confidence that the Russians feel less protected than the Tatars. 17.6% of the Russian population and only 6.4% of the Tatars have faced with the facts of discrimination and humiliation. Ethnic minorities feel even less sure – 23.6% of their representatives had to endure the cases of infringement by ethnicity.

However, if relations are still quite favorable between the Russian and Tatar population of Tatarstan, then a different picture is

observed in relation to newcomers from neighboring countries and Russian regions. [2, 11] Sociologist S. Akhmetova points out that many people express cautious or even hostility towards migrants, despite little experience of direct personal contact with them. The researcher identifies several reasons, including unreliable and tendentious information about migrants, distributed by media and everyday rumors. [1] The inhabitants of the republic do not strive for openness and tolerance, according to S. Akhmetova. The sociologist predicts the possible formation of risks, of ethno-religious rejection that can become difficult to manage by nature. Thus, the materials of sociological studies indicate that although ethnic portrait of Tatarstan community retains the features of stability, it is in the state of variability, accepting new challenges and risks, associated primarily with the migration process. Considering the experience of other countries, that have faced with the presence of migrants before and in large quantities, it can be stated that the continued distancing of the host community from groups of immigrants of other countries and other regions of Russia may be potential threats to tolerate inter-ethnic cooperation.

Summary:

The article is based on an empirical study, conducted by sociologists at Kazan Federal University in 2012. The question of ethnic identity is important to the majority of citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan. At the same time, people say they are loyal to the nationality of others and do not distinguish people by ethnicity. Social and cultural processes are characterized by variability in the modern world, the old forms develops dynamically, creating new mixed identity. Ethnic, religious borders are gradually “blurred”, structures of social identities become more complex, the traditional classification are not always applicable.

Successful interethnic relations in Tatarstan traditionally faced with new challenges in recent years: the complexity of the development of the balanced bilingualism and the influx of migrants. If the first problem is solved gradually, the presence of visitors from other countries and regions of Russia raises new questions and destabilizes interethnic situation to a certain extent. A significant part of the population relates to migrants with alarm despite the declared tolerance to representatives of different ethnic groups. Not all the residents of the country aspire to openness and tolerance. Unreliable and tendentious information about migrants plays an important role in the spread of such attitudes. Thus, taking into account the experience of other countries, that have been faced with the presence of migrants before and in large volumes, there is a possibility of formation the situation of ethnic and confessional rejection, which can lead to new risks and may carry potential threats to the tolerant interethnic cooperation.

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POWER AND EXPECTATIONS

IN THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN (1)

The North Caucasus region is complex, problematic, attracting wide attention, and requires urgent actions to reduce tensions in order to avoid social and other complications. There is one of the most difficult situations of the North Caucasus nowadays in the Republic of Daghestan. Acute social problems, specific features of the region, intra-religious and ethnic tension are not only solved, but on the contrary, become more acute.

The change of the political elite in Dagestan in 2013 has led to an obvious excitement, given rise to a rapid surge in expectations among the people of Daghestan. At that time it was difficult to find indifferent persons to the political transformations, happening in the society.

In January 2013, M. Magomedov resigned from the post of the head of Daghestan. R. Abdulatipov (Deputy of the State Duma, «United Russia» faction) has been appointed acting the head of the republic by the Decree of the President of Russia. The first speeches and actions of R. Abdulatipov have been discussed everywhere, often extolled and idealized and met with skepticism only by a few. September 8, 2013 Ramazan Abdulatipov was elected the head of the Republic of Daghestan in the 17th Session of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Daghestan (86 out of 88 deputies of parliament). There were no contradictions in the society about this. Much has been done during this period, but not as radically as people would like.

Modern political transformation is a very interesting period for research and its researchers, it gives a great opportunity to understand

the expectations of people: what they want, what society is concerned about the most.

Daghestan society is very complex and extremely multi-compound, and therefore the expectations of all its members are different. But at the same time, the quantitative data (obtained as a result of investigations) can clarify and identify the most common questions and problems. If significant place is given to the study of expectations in the foreign political science and sociological science [Simon 2009], there is little such investigations in Russia. One of the most important works on the study of the system of expectations, giving a comprehensive assessment of the socio-political situation in the Russian Federation, as a whole and in the Saratov region in particular, was carried by Mamonov [Mamonov 2007]. These expectations, their specific features are studied in most works. One of these specific features is a matter of trust. The position of Russian scientist V. Grishin is interesting for studying the trust [Grishin 2010].

Dissertations in sociology on the theme of “trust” were defended under the direction of Yuri Volkov. A. Starostin, A. Ponedelkov, S. Kislitsyn were engaged in research of certain aspects of this issue and the question of power in the framework of the Rostov school.

Comprehensive assessment of expectations, the investigations of the public opinion, the importance of their resolution for the population, ways and measures to stabilize the situation, almost have not been conducted in the North Caucasus republics. Comprehensive political analysis of the socio-political situation in the Republic of Daghestan, the collection of empirical data to identify the expectations and the most important issues for the citizens have not been carried out here , despite the relevance of the topic.

Series of sociological studies in the Republic of Daghestan under the common name “Expectations of Daghestan” during the period from

February 2013 to May 2014 have been conducted by the center for research of the global contemporary issues and regional problems “Caucasus. Peace. Development”. The total sample of respondents was 1950 people. (1250 – the first part of the study, which was conducted in 2013, and 700 respondents – the second part, held in 2014).

The studies have high representativeness, because different age (from 18 to 65 years) and social groups were interviewed. They were conducted in Makhachkala and in 9 regions of the Republic of Dagestan, both mountainous and lowland. The overall results of the studies reflected the dynamics of the most common sentiments prevailing in the Dagestan society.

Conducting such studies will clarify the situation in the republic, find sources of social and political conflicts and tension, assess their depth, find out the expectations the population of the Republic and apply this knowledge in practice to stabilize the situation.

According to the studies, in 2013 the masses’ attitudes were as follows: the joy of the arrival of the smart and intelligent person and experienced politician to power; satisfaction with the first steps of the head of the republic; desire to support the President and his course. Public moods were permeated by faith in Ramazan Abdulatipov and hope for him.

According to the respondents, the situation in the republic of Dagestan was evaluated as “difficult”, “bad”, “heavy” and “terrible” (76%). Some noted the complex and difficult situation in the country, the President of the expected difficult times and the need for a radical remedy the situation. Corruption as one of the most important characteristics of modern Dagestan was marked by 3.8%, the country was called a backward subsidized region, the most backward republic – about 3%. Another 3% said that Dagestan is a problem in Russia, its regions with a lot of problems which solution have been delayed.

10.7% of respondents in the country give a positive assessment of the situation.

There were answers such as “tolerably”, “no worse and no better than in other regions of Russia.” Some believed that the problem lay in the fact that the country was “like two poles of the planet: some are drawn to the West, the other in the East.” The statement of R. Abdulatipov of feudalism in the Daghestan society, on the transition from feudalism to the wild capitalism was quoted very often.

This period was perceived by the citizens as the expectation of developments, waiting for better due to a turning point because of the new president-elect (2.3%).

When they were asked: “What changes would you like to see in the country?” – 35.5% of respondents answered: “fundamental and radical”, 10% noted the importance of establishing order (which should be tough, according to most respondents), 8.6% would like to eliminate the clan system, 6.7% were in favor of the elimination of corruption, 5% of respondents wanted “quiet life”, “destruction of terrorism” and “freedom for the Republic from Wahhabism”, 4.8% of respondents noted the importance of a complete change of political cadres (“change of power, and not to play chess”), 4.7% wanted increasing salaries; 4.6% – jobs and raising living standards, 3.9% – attention to the formation of human resources, 2.9% – the cleanliness and measures to achieve it, 2.5% said that it was important to begin appreciate people, 2.4% noted the importance of enhancing the culture; the same percentage of respondents expected the social improvements, and 2.3% said that it was necessary to do so, as the current head doing.

2.2% of respondents noted the importance of improving the quality of education, and the emergence of an “honest education” in the country. The importance of improving the roads was emphasized by 1,7%. There were also mentioned laws, mutual understanding,

justice; many respondents noted the importance of prosperity, peace, stability and sustainability.

The study results showed that the people expected “noticeable” and “very large” changes (“almost all have to change in the country”). Changes are needed in all areas, but the people are worried about the political sphere and the sphere of security the most, it speaks about the great expectations and the complexity of the situation, because the people do not wish of something perfect, but only elementary order.

The political tone of expectations of the people in Daghestan (the desire to change the political elite) is the desire to change the methods and trends in policy to eradicate corruption, waiting for sweeping changes in the Daghestan society, the emergence of social mobility and the removal of the general social tension.

Analyzing the percentage of respondents' answers, it turned out that most people are concerned about issues such as the order, the replacement of personnel, the liquidation of clan politics and the eradication of corruption.

The current policy of Daghestan was recognized: as positive 6% (half of the responses included the word “now”, “today is positive, but in the past – not”) as normal – 3.8% (“currently satisfied”, presently “moderate”), as negative (negative) – 42.3%. Many noted that “the recent political changes have had a good impact”, “positive in February.” 4% of respondents noticed with surprise: “Is there a policy in Daghestan?” or “There is no politics in Daghestan.”

The issue of corruption, as one of the most painful for the population throughout the study, was raised in 2013 and in 2014 (“everywhere, a lot of corruption,” “everything is corrupt”). Opinions on this question have not been changed during the year of the new president in office. To the question: “What needs to change in the country?” – Prevailed the following response: “the power and the

political elite” – 27.3% (staff, management, power, political elite, heads of government, government, leadership, political figures, to appreciate smart people, the consciousness of the political elites, enhance the credibility of the government, to dismiss Amirov).

The next response was to eradicate corruption – 9.8% (especially in public institutions, in education). The third, by importance, was the proposal to break the clan system – 7.1%. Then, 5.6% of respondents thought it was important to do away with Wahhabism, terrorism and extremism; 3% believed it was important to fight the corrupt system of education, and irregularities in completion of the CSE. Also, questions: purity, justice, economics (2%), changes in stereotypes and consciousness of the people, and the relationship to the nation, were important for the people.

The majority of respondents saw Ramazan Abdulatipov as the leader of the republic (54% in 2013 and 40.5% in 2014). Most would like to see a person as a leader: honest (8.4%), intelligent (6.2%), Russian (impartiality – 4.1%), a person outside the Daghestan political elite, independent of them, honest and decent. Then answers followed, such as “educated,” “competent,” “decisive,” “strong, hard man”, “patriot”, “need someone like Stalin”, “any person who takes the responsibility” and “someone who can establish the order.”

The people see as the ideal head of the republic:

- 1) male, politically mature, adult, respected of elite (51.6%);
- 2) imam with a secular education (10.1%);
- 3) scientist (7.3%);
- 4) a beautiful, decent and cultured woman (6%);
- 5) Ramazan Abdulatipov – intelligent, educated, raised and living in Daghestan, about 3.5% were in favor of him. There were also “patriot” (loves his people, a patriot of his country, his land) and “determined person.”

The state ideal leaders were recognized as follows: Stalin – 11.6% (surprisingly, the answer was given by young people mainly, of which 76% were men); then, Ramazan Abdulatipov as an experienced politician – 10.7%; Ramzan Kadyrov, – 9.7%; Peter I – 4,1%; Vladimir Putin, – 3.5%; Daniyal, Said Amirov and Elizabeth I (Tudor) gained 1.5%.

Also, respondents mentioned: Vladimir Lenin, Abraham Lincoln, Genghis Khan, Alexander Macedonian, Pinochet, Bismarck, Caesar, Hugo Chavez, Alexander Lukashenko, Muhammadrasul Saaduev and Confucius.

The absence of the perfect leader noted 10.8% of respondents. 8% believed that “we do not have a similar one”, 2.8% of respondents – that “there are no ideal rulers (people).” Also, the selection of individual qualities, in addition to the selection of individuals, served as the answer to this question yet. Thus, such qualities as honesty, intelligence and justice were noted separately.

Respondents also gave the following explanations: “If the initiatives are carried out further, we shall have him”, “the person liquidating national discord”, “a man who loves his republic and the people,” “he should take care of his people”, ”charismatic” , “a man of his word.”

Dagestan residents consider such measures as: 1) job creation (“fight against unemployment”, “providing people with normal work”) – 7.4%; 2) the use of harsh methods of – 5.4%; 3) the fight against corruption and its reduction and elimination – 4.6%; the fight against terrorism – 5.1%, important steps to establish the situation in the republic. It was also deemed necessary to act in a peaceful way (3.4%), to pay wages on time, to keep the law, to fight the clan system to ensure order. There was an answer: “nothing can help already.”

These answers of respondents show the expectation of more stringent and radical measures from leadership. The Chechen Republic was cited as an example very often. But there were also supporters of a peaceful way, gradual reform, democratization, and coherence.

The most popular party was the “United Russia” – 46%, then the Communist Party – 21%, the Liberal Democratic Party – 3%. 21% of respondents noted a lack of popular party for them. 22% voted in favor of quotas on representation of ethnic groups in the government, noting that nationality was not important – 54.6%.

The main identified problems were: terrorism (Wahhabism, extremism) – 17.5%, – 15.4%, corruption, and unemployment – 8.7%. There were also identified such problems as the clan system, environmental and disorder. They were followed by banditry and crime, nepotism, lack of education, lack of culture, national problems and dirt. It was clearly noticeable the difference between the responses of the older generation and the young people: if corruption was a major problem for the older generation, then terrorism and radicalism – for the youth.

Respondents offered the following solutions to the problems: 1) rigidity in the leadership, the control of a strong central government, a strong president – 21%; 2) the creation of jobs, – 16%; 3) joint efforts – 13%; 4) the fight against terrorism, extremism and Wahhabism – 11%; 5) support of the law – 7%.

Responses showed contradictions in understanding what people really wanted. “What ideology is the best for the country?” – It turned out that the most attractive was democracy – 26%, while almost the same number of responses was gained by religious (Islamic, moderate) ideology – 25%, tolerance was noted by 17% of respondents, liberal ideology – 16%, and totalitarian and dictatorial ideology – 13% of respondents.

Thus, the preferences of the people are complex and internally contradictory as the society itself. The sympathies of the population are mainly on the side of the ideology, which is based on the combination of “religion and democracy” or “secular and religious.”

“How do you see Dagestan?” – The answers were:

1) democratic – 39%; 2) religious (at least “to some extent”) – 12%; 3) modernized – 9.2%; 4) socialistic – 8.7%; 5) anarchic – 7.6%; 6) communistic – 6.7%; 7) archaic – 3.9%; 8) liberal – 3.4%; 9) theocratic – 2.1%; 10) other (dictatorship, feudalism, chaos, anarchy and modernized the archaic, etc.) – 6,5%.

According to respondents' opinion, society should aim to golden middle (44%), the modernization (41%), traditionalism (8.3%) and “silver ideal” (2.3%).

The percentage of optimistic people, who believed that the current head of Dagestan could improve the situation in the country at the time of coming to power, was 74% (“I hope and believe in him”). Pessimists were only 14%. Many who answered positively, doubted and emphasized: “If it will help all”, “if not prevent,” “if you will.” By the end of 2014, 82.7% were disappointed in their expectations.

The primary measures, taken by the head of the republic, should be (according to the opinion of the population):

1) change of power and political elite (to recruit new people in power, to create a decent team, to get all ministries to work according to the law, to carry out certification of officials, to replace ministers, to remove old staff, to recruit new state structure and management, to change the corrupt officials, to pick up decent power structures, give a chance to young people) – 20%. It has been quite a lot of answers, «It is necessary to reassure Amirov, so that he “came down to the ground”», «dismiss S. Amirov»;

2) fight against corruption and its elimination – 15%

- 3) fight against terrorism and wahhabism – 10%;
- 4) establishment of order -8.1%;
- 5) fight against unemployment and job creation – 7%;
- 6) fight against clans – 5%.

There were such opinions as “act more,” “to agree with people”, “to find common ground with people”, “to listen the nation,” “revive the economy,” “fight against ignorance,” “to eliminate the abuse at the time of USE”, “improve education in the country”, “to do away with religious strife”, “peace in Dagestan”, “implement their plans”, “stop bribery”, “to hold the gas in the village”, “to restore order in the relations between people”.

All expectations are not realized, of course. According to the respondents, the majority of them are guided by: 1) Party ideas – 37%; 2) Ideology, – 31%; 3) Ethnic ideas, – 13%; 4) Personal characteristics, – 3%. The rest of the answers, “based on the decency of the candidate”, “judging by the human abilities,” “common sense, intuition,” “I do not vote – do not believe anyone.”

According to the respondents, there were changes for the better in 2013, though not radical. Respondents believed the situation was changed in the past 3 years in the country: a) for the better – 5%; b) for the worse – 47% (very); c) has not changed – 45%. During the year, the situation in the republic, a) was significantly changed for the better – 4%; b) slightly changed for the better – 39%; c) slightly changed for the worse – 23%; d) was not changed – 40% (but maybe Abdulatipov can change it). The survey demonstrates, that even though the situation was not significantly changed for the better, but the deterioration of the situation was significantly decreased in the eyes of society.

The opinion of the experts about the coming to power of Ramazan Abdulatipov is as follows: S. Kislitsyn believes that R. Abdulatipov is a not a temporary figure, because there are few large

(federal) politicians originally from the Caucasus. It is obvious that he is not the protégé of any lobbying structures in Dagestan, or in Moscow. He was not involved in serious political and corruption scandals. Nothing is known about the disreputable ties. He is an open statesman and an outstanding scientist-ethno-politics, who tends to be among the best representatives of the Soviet past. Ramazan Abdulatipov has introduced strict planning, so that the actions of the authorities would be ahead of events. Abdulatipov already drew attention to the lack of proper information, and personnel policy in the country. He will lead the fight against corruption, but considering that corruption is a way of life in the Caucasus. He will not be able to break the clan system at once, even if he wanted to. (This is the problem of mental character.) At present, his main task is to put an end to extremism and terrorism, as well as internal collaborationism, when part of the state apparatus and business representatives is sabotaging the fight against political gangsterism. This is possible, but requires considerable effort, personal control and personal courage. Conclusion: R. Abdulatipov will not have instant success, but general trend is positive, undoubtedly.

Sungurov notes that the situation should change with the coming of Ramazan Abdulatipov to power because his relationships with the Republican elite are much weaker than that of his predecessors. A certain independence of the former president was one of the reasons for his factual dismissal, as he did not support the initiative of his Ossetian colleague to abolish the election of the head of the republic. It can be assumed that the new president will be much more manageable.

As the results of the study, the people have high expectations for the authorities, and the authorities should know about the problems and expectations of the people. The authorities are trying to implement

some of the expectations, and some of them – ignore because of their falsity. Identified problems should be solved, as it is the path to stability of the society. But it is not easy. Public expectations are multiple, some of them are contradictory and difficult to implement. The complex poly-ethnic society affects the assessment of the effectiveness of the head of the republic by the population. This activity is assessed mostly through the prism of personal, group, religious or ethnic interests. There were a lot of expectations, but not all of them have been implemented and will be implemented soon.

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REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN – IMPORTANT LINK IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM

Tajikistan has experienced all the horrors of civil strife, with its segments of terrorism soon after receiving independence. Any instability and especially civil war creates a fertile ground for the

emergence of terrorists and terrorist organizations, which often grow from criminal elements, unclaimed in peacetime. So it was in Tajikistan: people were killed in the terrorist attacks, the economy and infrastructure were destroyed, private property and socialized economy were plundered. The victims of terrorist attacks during the civil strife became prominent figures of science and culture, high-ranking employees of state agencies, members of parliament, representing the different regions of Tajikistan. Overall, 25 terrorist attacks during the civil war have been committed, as a result 43 people were killed. Despite all these difficulties, the Government of Tajikistan realized that the way to eradicate terrorism could be found only at ensuring stability and mutual agreement between all strata of society in the country. The great work has been done considering this necessity, associated with the search for ways to resolve the conflict through political dialogue, along with the overall fight against terrorism. International organizations, primarily the United Nations and friendly countries, have helped Tajikistan seriously in this matter.

War and terror in the country managed to stop for more than three years of negotiations and got the joint efforts to sign the “General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan” in Moscow, 27 June 1997 [1]. It should be noted, that some of the militants of the United Tajik Opposition, who disagreed with this agreement and against the will of its leader, continued to engage in terrorist activities, and after the signing of the peace agreement. Therefore, a joint combat group was formed from the number of anti-terrorist forces of the Government and the former opposition fighters to effectively eliminate terrorist groups. It was at this time, Tajikistan has started to prepare the legal and regulatory framework for the fight against terrorism.

So, November 16, 1999 President of the Republic of Tajikistan approved the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Combating Terrorism”. Aims and objectives are listed as follows in Article 1:

- realization of state policy in the field of the fight against terrorism;
- implementation of international obligations of the Republic of Tajikistan in the field of the fight against terrorism;
- legal regulation of relations connected with the fight against terrorism;
- formation of intolerance to terrorism among the population of the republic;
- detection, prevention and suppression of terrorist activities, the identification of the causes and conditions that give rise to terrorism [2].

A detailed definition of terrorism is in Article 3 of this Law, and the basic concepts of the Law is in Article 4:

- act of terrorism, terrorist crimes, terrorist group, terrorist, terrorist organization, fight against terrorism, the anti-terrorist operation zone of the antiterrorist operation, a hostage, subjects engaged in combating terrorism.

The Law imposed general guidance on the fight against terrorism on the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (Article 6). Other actors involved in the fight against terrorism, are the State Committee for National Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry of Defense, the Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corruption, the National Guard, the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense under the Government (Article 7) [3].

The main subject in this field is the State National Security Committee (Article 8). Detection, prevention and suppression of terrorist crimes enter into its jurisdiction. The Committee holds anti-

terrorist operations with the support and in the framework of their competences: the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice, prosecution authorities and the courts. The concepts of terrorism and anti-terrorist activities are defined in section 3 of the Law. Legal Compliance and respect of human rights and freedoms, the inevitability of punishment for terrorist activity, a combination of public and secret methods in the fight against terrorism, the protection of priority are the principles of anti-terrorist activities. [4] The last section defines the zone of the antiterrorist operation and its legal regime. It is important to note, that the National Guard units, as well as the Military Forces can be engaged to prevent a terrorist act. But in general, national security agencies are responsible in this area. The given Law provided a reliable legal basis for the effective fight against terrorism, and in particular international terrorism in the post-conflict period in the history of Tajikistan.

Some militants, followers of extremist Islam, split from the United Tajik Opposition, did not want to integrate into civilian life, and continued their terrorist activities after the signing in Moscow “the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan,” in June 27, 1997. The law enforcement bodies of the Republic of Tajikistan in conjunction with former opposition fighting forces (integrated into the government security forces) have started the elimination of such groups. However, the competent authorities of the SCO member states have contributed morally and financially to Tajikistan in the elimination of terrorists.

Meanwhile, there was an urgent need for making amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On combating terrorism” by 2012, taking into account the expansion and strengthening of the fight against terrorism within the framework of the SCO, the adoption of new regulatory and legal documents within the SCO RATS and

international obligations of Tajikistan. Therefore, the Law “On Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan” On combating terrorism” was adopted on August 1, 2012 [13]. According to the law, the following additions were made to Article 17 (1) concerning the list of persons associated with terrorism:

The State Committee for National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan provides a list of persons connected with terrorism;

The State Committee for National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan is also making the list of persons associated with terrorism, individuals and organizations recognized by terrorists or terrorist organizations, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and (or) international legal instruments, recognized by Tajikistan [14].

In Article 17 (2), the following additions were made: Financial funds or other assets of individuals and organizations, included in the list of persons associated with terrorism, are frozen by the State Committee of national security of the Republic of Tajikistan in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan;

Defrosting of funds or other assets of individuals and organizations included in the list of persons associated with terrorism, is carried out by the State Committee of national security of the Republic of Tajikistan in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan [15].

It should also be noted that the Parliament of Tajikistan ratified the SCO Convention against Terrorism on February 16, 2011. Thus, the new additions to the Law became a reliable barrier in the way of money, laundering by international terrorist organizations. Another important law of the Republic of Tajikistan in the fight against the “three evils” is the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Combating Extremism”, adopted by the Majlisi Milli Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan (the upper chamber of parliament) on November 21 2003

[16]. Article 3 of this Law contains a broad definition of extremism. [17]. According to Article 6, the struggle against extremism is one of the priority tasks of the State. The Law empowers the state authorities to apply measures against extremism. The Law also defines the responsibility of the media for the dissemination of extremist materials and carrying out extremist activity (Article 14) [18]. Article 16 is devoted to measures on combating the spread of extremist materials, Article 17 contains the responsibility of civil servants for extremist activity. Article 18 describes the responsibility of individuals for extremist activity [19].

Thus, the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On combating extremism”, has formed a solid legal framework for the suppression of extremist activities and extremist organizations in the face of various political parties and movements, which are prohibited in many countries. In January 2007 the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Tajikistan announced 10 organizations as terrorist and extremist, that threaten the security of Tajikistan. Among them:

- Harakat Uzbekistan Islom (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan);
- Harakat Tabligot (Propaganda Movement);
- Dzhamiyati Tabligot (Propaganda Society);
- Al-Qaida;
- Hizb Tochikistoni Ozod (free Party of Tajikistan);
- Islom Hizb Tahrir (“Hizb-ut-Tahrir”) [20].

Another important law of the Republic of Tajikistan in the fight against terrorism and extremism is the Law “On counteraction to legalization (laundering) of proceeds from crime and financing of terrorism”, adopted March 25, 2011 This law defines mechanisms, measures and procedures for monitoring the implementation of the cash operations funds or other assets. The law establishes the requirements for organizations engaged in such operations, as well as a list of

operations subject to mandatory control (Article 6). The law imposes rights and obligations on organizations that carry out transactions with funds (Article 7). The law spelled out the rights and obligations of the authorized body that collects and analyzes relevant information and provides other measures to prevent suspicious transactions. The authority may request and receive information from public bodies. The law also regulates the issues of international cooperation in combating the financing of terrorism [24].

Thus, all the attempts of international terrorism to strengthen the position of its supporters in the Central Asian countries, and particularly in Tajikistan have failed after the adoption of the laws “On combating terrorism”, “on Combating Extremism”, “On counteraction to legalization (laundering) of proceeds from laundering and financing of terrorism”, On amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On combating terrorism”, as well as other laws and regulations. This is due to several important factors:

First, the international community supported the tough and uncompromising position of the Government of Tajikistan in the fight against terrorists and extremists;

Secondly, there was an understanding in the framework of the “Shanghai Five” as early as 1998, that the main danger to the region was international terrorism and religious extremism, and international regional organization should be created for effective control against them; the main task is to strengthen regional security by ruthless struggle against terrorism and extremism;

Third, the appearance of Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO (RATS) as an important coordinating unit for the competent authorities of the SCO member states has been a powerful deterrent and eliminate international terrorism in Central Asia in general, and in Tajikistan, in particular;

Fourthly, the Republic of Tajikistan ratified all the counter-terrorism conventions in a timely manner, adopted in the framework of the UN and the SCO. It is known that international terrorism is largely penetrates into the territory of the SCO member states from Afghanistan, with which Tajikistan shares a border with the length of about 1400 km. It should also be noted that the Republic of Tajikistan has always been and is on the forefront of the struggle against international terrorism and extremism, as a decisive, active and an important element of relations with the SCO in the fight against terrorism and extremism, and is actually a line of defense for all SCO member states.

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**РОССИЯ
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Научно-информационный бюллетень

Содержит материалы по текущим политическим,
социальным и религиозным вопросам

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