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## Contents

<b>Mikhail Khazin.</b> Discourse over the Map of the World .....	4
<b>S. Pasandide.</b> Salafites and Struggle against Radicalization in Russia .....	10
<b>E. Shcherbina.</b> Monitoring the Situation in the Karachayvo- Circassian Republic .....	13
<b>Aider Bulatov.</b> Salafism as Ideological and Political Movement in Muslim Ummah of the Crimea .....	16
<b>N. Rakityansky, M. Zinchenko.</b> Political and Psychological Dynamics of Re-Islamization of the North Caucasus .....	21
<b>Nazgul Mingisheva.</b> Modern Muslim Movements and Groups in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Certain Aspects .....	40
<b>Elena Ionova.</b> Foreign Policy Priorities of Turkmenistan .....	48

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## **DISCOURSE OVER THE MAP OF THE WORLD**

The development of the financial and economic crisis gives rise to processes of territorial clustering. The world is split into several groups, limited by means of economic relations and currency areas with the regional division of labor that will replace the single global system.

As everyone knows, a rule either exists or does not exist. The example of Kosovo clearly demonstrated that the principle of the inviolability of the postwar borders ceased to be an unspoken law and works no longer. Further, processes are going on which no country can control, including the United States. But what are these processes?

Many arguments in this article may seem incorrect, and many assumptions cannot be realized. But trends are described more or less adequately. However, if our crisis theory is wrong, then all our speculations have nothing to do with reality.

**Crisis as a factor in political geography.** It is necessary to recall the main conclusion that follows from the theory of crisis before talking about political geography: since the main tool for increasing the private demand, that is, the emission of the dollar, has stopped working, the excessive demand will fall. This concerns, above all, the developed countries – the United States and the European Union. As a result, the

infrastructure of the only division of labor based on the dollar becomes unprofitable, and smaller regional systems of the division of labor will be effective. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century there were four more or less identical systems: British, German, American and Japanese.

Today, many states and their associations (EU) have a high standard of living due to the redistribution of the dollar emission resource. For example, this is true of all oil-exporting countries. The destruction of the system of stimulating demand (and thus subsidizing individual regional economic systems) will inevitably create a situation, when new regional centers will be formed, the structure of groups formed around centers will be specified, and internal hierarchies will be built. The preservation and maintenance of the old relationships will be too difficult and expensive as a result of all these processes. We begin to describe the situation on the world map with the European Union.

**Europe.** It was assumed, that the economy of the modern European Union would be growing all the time, as well as the budgets of its member- states and the entire association. As a result, a well-regulated, institutionalized and legislative registration system of the redistribution of their constantly growing budgets was created. If they decline, the whole system will go hawking (as is the case now). Countries begin to disregard the ban on production (because import becomes too expensive, like unemployment), to ignore the financial restrictions, especially the budget deficit, and protective measures are in the offing. They are already used in relation to freedom of the labor market, and then the situation will quickly deteriorate, without any chance for improving.

Since the deterioration of the European Union's economy will be serious enough, all these circumstances play a certain role. The European Union resembles, in a way, the USSR in 1990: old

commitments do not allow to agree on any new principles of interaction.

Nevertheless, there is a high probability of the preservation of the European Union, but not in its full composition. Britain, for sure, will withdraw from the European Union (but Scotland and Northern Ireland will remain within it), and the European Union will have to give up East Europe. More precisely, all countries situated to the east of the Germany – Austria – Italy line will be forced to leave the union (perhaps, with the exception of Slovenia and the Czech Republic).

Numerous regional wars will begin in East Europe between countries and even civil wars in some of them. Most likely, the critical situation will arise in the Balkans, there are serious territorial issues between the neighbors of Hungary, and there may be a difficult situation on the border with Ukraine. All of East Europe (except Poland) will plunge in military conflicts. War will fade away only within the bounds of the Eurasian Economic Union. The tendency to join the EAEC will increase significantly in Ukraine (or rather, its parts into which it break), the Baltic countries and some countries of East Europe. The new European Union will meet with serious internal social problems, but they will not be associated with territorial changes. It is possible that West African countries – sources of minerals for Western Europe – will become associated. It is impossible to predict the situation, as it is not only economic factors that will play the main role.

**Middle East and Central Asia.** No less significant changes will occur in the Middle East. Henry Kissinger said that Israel would cease to exist by 2022. His opinion should not be taken as the final diagnosis, there are many scenarios and the main question is the candidacy for the role of a regional “inspector”. There are a lot of candidates and one of them is Iran.

The second applicant has not been determined: it can be both Israel and Egypt. The problem depends on the policies of Israel itself in many respects. Politics and ideology will stand at the forefront. It is clear that Israel will not survive on its own, and the Eurasian Economic Union, not the United States, will be its permanent partner.

The role of the main political actor is hardly be played by Turkey. Muslim leaders remember too well that Islam was in an administratively subordinate position in the Ottoman Empire in its time. Moreover, Turkey's attention is occupied almost completely by the situation in the Balkans, which it gradually subordinates with the help of economic levers. By the way, the heiress of the Sublime Porte will also enter the EAEC, as there are no other alternatives to it.

Iran will obviously increase its territory at the expense of regions on the west coast of the Persian Gulf mostly inhabited by Shi'ites. It will regain Bahrain, which had been taken away from, along with its rich hydrocarbon reserves, by Britain which did not allow it to enter into any major regional associations and pursue an independent policy.

The fate of Pakistan and Afghanistan is also a serious issue. Pakistan will support China at any cost, because otherwise it would be extremely difficult for it to resist India and Iran. Tension will remain at a high level in the region, but the new border lines are difficult to predict, because it is not only economic factors that will define them.

Central Asia will also face serious problems. The United States has a considerable force for the formation of the Islamic extremist movements in the region (they're already operating successfully). These extremist movements can dramatically change the map of Central Asia.

China is able to stop the Islamists. Russia can also provide support, but it should decide what is more important: the Middle East or Central Asia. Its resources are not enough to achieve both goals. It is

reasonable to concentrate on the Asian sector, considering the position of China, which declared the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the “Asian Century.”

**East and Southeast Asia.** Going further to the east, a question arises as to where China’s expansion will stop, for it is the main issue of today. There will be a number of economic problems, including rather complicated ones. China wishes to expand its influence in Asia. Russia should carefully consider how it can oppose this trend. China recognizes only the concept of power, not so much military power as “soft power.” The Chinese concept of the “center” is the Middle Kingdom, which can be defeated only by the “East” (Great Steppe, according to Chinese tradition). Therefore we have to choose the Scythian steppe among all historical scenarios in our relations with China. Otherwise, there is a probability that the Amur will become a Chinese inner river.

It is likely that South Korea and North Korea will unite. Accession to the EAEC will be the most advantageous step for Unified Korea and Japan (and also for Vietnam), because none of the countries, except members of the association will buy their products.

The United States alone will solve the problem with its products, as well as the EU will. High-tech products are not necessary to anyone in the world except the above-mentioned countries.

Southeast Asia will enter into the sphere of interests of China definitely, and Beijing will decide the question of its boundaries. And Taiwan will unite with mainland China.

**The Rest of the World.** India due to its vast territory, population, and economic and military potentials has a great resource of self-sufficiency – any major changes there are unlikely.

Australia may remain in the sphere of influence of the United States, but its rapprochement with China is also possible. Another option is more profitable from the economic point of view, but there are



also geopolitical and ideological factors, which should not be ignored. The probability of Australia's entering in the Chinese economic cluster will depend on a crisis situation.

Talking about Africa, it is only South Africa that is of interest, because that country is incorporated into the system of the division of labor in Latin America. The latter is likely to create its own system of the division of labor, including all countries up to Mexico. Countries, which are close to South Africa, will seek entry in this cluster, and it will gradually expand in the northern direction.

The United States will be trying to include Mexico in its economic cluster, maybe it will succeed. But the question is still open.

As to the dollar zone, which will include the United States, Canada, Britain and other countries inhabited by the Anglo-Saxons (considering problems of Australia and, possibly, Mexico) , there will be no big changes within their borders.

The Islamic world is not able to form its own system of the division of labor, and the situation there will be similar to the present one, but state borders there may change dynamically and spontaneously.

To sum up, borders are changed only in regions where they have been originally unstable. The map of the world will begin to change in parts of new economic clusters, rather than in administrative borders. The situation will be extremely volatile in the Balkans, the Middle East and some other regions in the coming decades.

*“Odnako”, Moscow, 2014, October-November, pp. 12–17.*

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## **SALAFITES AND STRUGGLE AGAINST RADICALIZATION IN RUSSIA**

Religious-political movement of Salafi is the radical militant Wahhabi movement, aimed at establishing an Islamic model of social order by the methods of deterrence, without taking into account national and historical peculiarities of a region. They have already been waging a war against the federal government in Daghestan and Ingushetia, having a strong underground in Kabardino-Balkaria and other republics of the North Caucasus. In addition, the position of the Salafites have strengthened in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, where they had an opportunity to preach in many mosques of these republics. In recent years, representatives of this movement have strengthened their positions in Moscow and considerably broadened their activities. Russia will face a gloomy future in case of the further development of this ideology in the country and an increase in the number of its followers. The wave of terrorist attacks does not decrease in the troubled regions of the federation, moving even to relatively calm regions from time to time, but this wave may grow without doubt. There is a danger of the emergence of the radical elements at the level of political relations in regions, such as Daghestan, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan.

Thus, the radical elements will be able to influence the authorities of certain regions, with a view to building an Islamic state (it is such model of their political system). If this scenario is implemented, there is no point to speak of Russia's territorial integrity.

All available resources of power: legal, ideological, and others should be opposed to dissemination of Salafism in Russia. The methods

of struggle against this threat should be many and varied, since only in this case will the authorities be able to achieve real success and stay as a real political leader.

The issue of banning Wahhabism has been raised in Russian society more than once, but it was not resolved because certain political circles feared to spoil relations with Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, this question should be decided in a political aspect, and its solution will be justified due to the growing religious and political confrontation in Russia and the policies pursued by Saudi Arabia, which is against Russian interests in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. Its policies could not be called otherwise than hostile. Sound-minded citizens will not oppose a ban on Salafism-Wahhabism, as this religious-political aggressive course denies traditional values of Russia.

Perhaps, the secret services should carry out operational work in the Saudi, Qatari and Kuwaiti direction to identify radical and dangerous elements which act under the cover of various commercial and charity organizations. In addition, it is necessary to restrict the sending of students to educational centers in those countries because young people come back with views contradicting traditional Islam and become a sort of “agents of influence” of the Arab monarchies and are sometimes recruited as their special services’ agents.

The entire social and economic policy of the Russian authorities in the country’s troubled regions, particularly in the North Caucasus, is an important factor in the fight against Islamic radicalism. Those people, especially young men, who are inclined to take up and adhere to the Salafite ideas, should have an alternative way of material, social and spiritual realization.

First of all, it is necessary to raise the educational level of the local imams and spiritual leaders and expel the persons discrediting their ranks. The Russian Government should support the Council of

Muftis of Russia, as well as other structures, preaching traditional Islam, and promote their activities. It is necessary to pay more attention to the work of the mass media popularizing the traditional religious beliefs in the fight against radical ideas.<sup>1</sup>

Some religious leaders are urging the authorities to establish contacts with the Salafites, but such contacts lead to negative consequences in the development of relations with the followers of traditional Islam. Now the Russian authorities have to carry on extensive work in three areas: training, education and social work of mosques<sup>2</sup>. This involves the entire Muslim educational system – from weekend courses and madrasahs up to Islamic universities.

Then there is educational work, which is a competitive alternative to foreign sectarian tendencies. It concerns the image of Islam, Muslims and the Islamic clergy in general. Another important point is the development of the proper Islamic mass media with the support of the authorities – the publication of pre-revolutionary theological and scientific works on this religion in Russian.

Another area is the promotion of social service, and, perhaps, this is the most important sphere. The humanistic social doctrine is extremely important to modern traditional Islam. Social problems are the main ones in solving the issue of Muslim radicalism. This is the root of and the reason for young people joining the radical groups.

For today only the mass media can preach the traditional form of Islam among Muslims, covering large audiences and opposing Wahhabism and radical movements which rebel against traditional Russian values. This is the shortest way to improve the low level of religious education, which has become the most important factor for the success of radical ideologies. Traditional Islam in Russia has a long and glorious history, allowing peaceful coexistence of all other confessions in this country. It is such Islam, strong ideologically and properly

presented in mosques and the mass media by honest and well-educated preachers that will be the most effective means to combat Salafites and Wahhabis.

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## MONITORING THE ETHNOPOLITICAL SITUATION IN THE KARACHAYEVO-CIRCASSIAN REPUBLIC

The Karachayevo-Circassian Republic, one of the parts of the North-Caucasian Federal *okrug* (region), was formed in 1992. Its Constitution was adopted on March 5, 1996, which noted the specific features of its functioning and development. The leading bodies of power in the republic are formed with due account of national representation.<sup>1</sup> Article 11 of the Constitution noted that the official languages of the republic are Abazin, Karachay, Nogai, Russian and Circassian. Article 109 sets the rules of the formation of bodies of local self-government whose structure is determined by the local population independently. Changes of borders of territories are allowed only on consent of their residents.

At present, a strategy of the socio-economic development of the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic up to the year 2035 is elaborated. The development of the republic will include all municipalities on the basis of thoroughly elaborated plans. While working out all relevant documents the opinion of the population was duly taken into consideration on the basis of the data of regular sociological polls.

According to the All-Russia population census of 2010, the ethnic composition of the republican population was as follows: Karachays – 41 percent; Russians – 31.6 percent; Circassians – 11.9 percent; Abazins – 7.8 percent; Nogais – 3.3 percent.<sup>2</sup> The number of the Karachay population has grown by 25,126, and that of the Abazins and Circassians has also increased, but slightly. The Russian population in the republic has decreased by 2.25 percent.

Beginning from 2001 an annual migration decrease of the population has been registered. The greatest number of people who have left the republic was noted in 2011 (14,108 people).

At the end of 2012 a strategy of state national policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025 was adopted, which determined the main directions in the sphere of nationalities policy at all levels, from the federal to local ones. The concept of the nationalities policy of the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic has been evolved and endorsed by a decree of the President of the republic on February 2, 2011.

A legal and legislative basis in the sphere of interethnic relations has been worked out in the republic, which also deals with opposition to extremism and terrorism and corresponds to similar federal legislative acts and programs.

Public organizations in the republic act as subjects of ethnic policy. There are 48 such organizations representing all nationalities living there.<sup>3</sup> The most active are the Karachayevo-Circassian public

movement “Rus,” the public movement “Abaza,” the “Adyge-Khase” public movement, the “Birlik” Nogai movement, and some others.

Small national groups in the republic – Ossetian, Greek, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Jewish also have their public organizations, whose activity is aimed at the preservation and development of culture of their people.

Young people form about thirty percent of the total population of the republic. Among the main directions of the state policy toward young people are fight against drug addiction, alcoholism and tobacco smoking, as well as the development of student activity, upbringing of patriotism, and propaganda of tolerance. Sports are also among priority matters of domestic policy.

A no small role in ideological work among young people belongs to public and religious organizations – the Spiritual Board of Muslims, the Muftis and representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church.

National television companies prepare and transmit monthly programs on religious subjects, explaining the essence of traditional Islam and extremist trends in it. “The World of Islam” in the Abazin language, “The Word from the Koran” in the Nogai language, “Azan” in the Karachay language, and “Minaret” in the Circassian language. The TV program in Russian is entitled “On the Road to Faith.” Orthodox Christian spiritual leaders regularly appear on the local TV and radio.

The leaders of public and religious organizations emphasize that the main role in the implementation of interethnic policy should be played not only by the authorities, but also by all these organizations. They can and must actively participate in preventing and regulating interethnic conflicts in the republic.

To sum up: a stable ethnic structure is formed in the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic;

Migration from the republic is of a sluggish character, but is continuing at the present time;

A vast legal-legislative base in the sphere of interethnic relations has been evolved in the republic, which is founded on all-Russia laws, but with due account of national and local specific features;

It is not only bodies of state power of various level, but also national-cultural public organizations positioning themselves as independent actors in political processes and interethnic relations that come out as subjects of ethnic policy in the Karachayevo-Cirkassian Republic.

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## **SALAFISM AS IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN MUSLIM UMMAH OF THE CRIMEA**

When talking of Crimean Muslims, mention is often made of Salafites (Wahhabis), along with such terms as “fundamentalism,” “radicalism,” “non-traditional,” “extremist,” etc. To date it would be necessary to present one of the Islamic trends in the modern Crimea,



which positions itself as Salafite, that is, it includes the adherents and followers of the righteous caliphs and the Sunna and is striving to return to the sources of faith at the time of the pious founders of early Islam. The multitude of schools of thought (Madh'hab) and various currents (branches) which had come into being after the death of Prophet Mohammed, had brought the Muslim ummah to face the constant dilemma of internal renovation and return to the early fundamental doctrines of Islam. One of the first theorists of the so-called fundamentalism was Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780 – 855) who had founded one of the strictest theological schools in Islam called Wahhabi Madh'hab. It preaches not only a return to the unshakeable doctrines of Islam, but also the use of Islamic precepts in the entire social and political life of Muslims. In this context, it is possible to speak of the modern adepts of Wahhabi teachings calling for social justice, stronger morals, and the preservation of national and religious originality. The Crimean Salafites have their own specific features connected with the return of the Crimean Tatar people to their historical Motherland, who became confronted with the serious problems of the development and revival of their national culture, language and religion.

It is no secret that outside forces have exerted a no small influence on the revival of Islam in the Crimea. Suffice it to remember one of the first Arab organizations officially functioning in the Crimea – the charity foundation “As-Suna” from Saudi Arabia. The assertion that Saudi Arabia has proclaimed Wahhabi teaching its official ideology is incorrect, inasmuch as the official documents of the kingdom say that its state religion is Islam, without specifying its interpretation. Nevertheless, the Salafite doctrine (this is how the teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab is called there) is recognized by the state. His works are always published, re-issued and studied. All the more so since modern “Salafite-Wahhabi” Islam, as it exists in

Saudi Arabia and a number of other states on the Arabian Peninsula, is a far cry from the “extremes” of early Wahhabi teaching. This is why the terms “Wahhabi,” and “radical” used in modern scientific circles among scholars of the Orient and Islam have a different meaning than that in the mass media.

In the conditions of a big shortage of religious literature in the Crimea, as well as educated imams and a proper network of religious educational institutions, many Muslims turned to be susceptible to Salafite ideology (Sunni fundamentalism), because they saw in it answers to a host of questions which they could not receive from their elders, who knew Islam at the level of popular habits and customs. Not accepting the principles of traditionalism, adherents of Salafism from Arab countries have become the first theologian-preachers among Crimean Muslims. Apart from rendering humanitarian assistance and purchasing prayer houses, the Saudi “As-Suna” organization, in cooperation with the Crimean charity foundation “Crimea-2000,” became the first sponsor of hajj of Crimean Muslims in 1997.

Islamic groups which call themselves Salafites have become more popular and greater in number. Their adherents are now full-fledged members of modern Crimean society. Basing themselves on the precepts of the Koran and Sunna they have taken their socio-political position in society, addressing demands to government bodies that senior-grade school pupils should pray at mosques each Friday, the sexes be separated in school, and women have their heads covered everywhere, even on photos for documents.

Their political activity has been growing. For example, on March 28, 2003, a meeting of Crimean Tatars was held in front of the Crimean Supreme Soviet building against the war in Iraq. They vehemently denounced the actions of the anti-Iraqi coalition and demanded that the war be stopped immediately and the occupation

forces be withdrawn from the territory of the Muslim states of Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Chechnya. They also demanded the withdrawal of a Ukrainian battalion from the conflict zone. The meeting denounced the actions of the Majlis, which supported the aggressors. The resolution of the meeting was sent to the government of Ukraine.

The Salafites have taken a resolute position on one of the most acute social and political problems of the Crimea, namely, the assignment of land to repatriates for building houses. Until, recently, the public organization “Avdet” (“Return”) has actively been working in this sphere, which has a powerful Islamic wing headed by Imam Daniyal Ametov, who is very a popular figure in the Crimea. His work has been continued by supporters from the new public organization “Sebat” (“Perseverance”), who have concluded agreements with the government of the Crimean autonomy on the land question.

It should be noted that their activity have gained positive results. Over one thousand people of different nationalities in the Crimea have received plots of land.

The Crimean branch of the All-Ukraine Association of public organizations “Alraid” is in charge of Muslim education on the basis of early Islam. This organization was founded in the mid-1990s, a period of mass return of Crimean Tatars to their Motherland, which coincided with a strong economic crisis in the post-Soviet republics. Tens of thousands of repatriates found themselves in very difficult conditions – without housing, water, medical aid, and other prime necessities. The Crimean Islamic organization managed to draw considerable financial means from Arab countries and use them for drilling wells, opening hospitals, and rendering one-time aid to the sick, disabled and orphans. Assistance was also given for building and repairing mosques. The “Alraid” Association has become

the leader in organizing various educational undertakings: seminars, round-tables, scholarly conferences devoted to Islam, inter-civilizational dialogue, etc.

Modern Salafism in the Crimea is not homogeneous. It includes different segments in the form of orthodox groups with the strict regimentation of everyday life and socio-political activity (they are popularly called Wahhabi). There are also Islamic romantics dreaming of the revival of a theocratic state, as well as implacable fighters against apostates in Islam. These groups often sharply criticize and accuse one another of deviation from true Islam.

At the same time, proceeding from declarations of these and other groups it is possible to determine the basic strategic trends uniting them: among them are broad Islamic education of popular masses, wider use of Islamic values in modern society, and adherence to the concept of a just and modern state. The Salafites constantly declare that their activity is taking place within the framework of the Constitution and the Ukrainian legislation, and that they absolutely exclude violence as a means to achieve their aims. It can be hoped that despite differences existing in their midst, Salafite Muslims will contribute to achieving and maintaining the standards of a modern healthy Muslim community of high moral foundations. This will help remove the myths and stereotypes existing around this religious current and make another step toward the strengthening of interconfessional understanding in the Crimea.

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### **POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF RE-ISLAMIZATION OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS**

The North Caucasus is a strategically important region of Russia, and the national security and territorial integrity of our country largely depend on its stability and development. Due to its special geopolitical situation at the crossroads of Eurasian civilizations it has always experienced a strong influence of different cultures, religions and political systems. The Roman Empire, Persia and Iran, Arabia, the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Mongolian Empire, Russia – this is a far from complete list of states which had had this politically unstable region as part of their territory. Nevertheless, the most prolonged heritage in the region was the result of the military and mental expansion of the Muslim Arab caliphate against the Khazar kaganat. It was at that time, in the 7<sup>th</sup> century A.D., that the first seeds of Islam were brought there, which were sown and actively cultivated by missionaries of the Golden Horde and emissaries of the Ottoman Porte.

The present activity of Islam in the North Caucasus is determined not only by its cultural-historical, mental and political specificities, but also by reasons of an international origin connected with the growing importance of Muslim religion.<sup>1</sup> Due to all these reasons the North

Caucasus has become one of the most problematic and vulnerable regions. It is an object of prolonged expansionist strivings of various western and eastern states, including Muslim ones.

Various Islamic centers, numerous foundations and special services of Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, the Wahhabi oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf, etc. demonstrate great activity in the North Caucasus, sponsoring and supporting politicized movements of a radical and extremist character. One of the specific features of our time is the emergence of Muslim states with unstable political regimes along and close to our southern borders.

Another generation of external and internal (North Caucasian) migrants has been growing inside Russia, which have not been integrated in its socio-cultural medium. In some five to ten years they will enter in the political area of Russia and put forward their demands for “human rights” to the Russian authorities. These migrants have become noticeably more active among Islamic fundamentalists.

The Islamic factor has been an instrument of subversive activity against Russia for quite some time. In this connection a study of the political aspects of Islamic mentality in the context of North Caucasian problems is an important task of our politically-minded community, all the more so since the struggle of active radical Islamists and ethnic separatists against state power has been going on for more than twenty-five years.

The difficulties and timeliness of the problem are conditioned by the absence of a clear-cut state strategy of the struggle with political Islam, or Islamism, ethno-political separatism and terrorism in the North Caucasus. The range of the problems, which cannot be resolved by minor solutions and forcible methods, includes inefficiency of political and social institutions, ethnocracy, a low level of political

culture, religious extremism, intolerance, poverty, overpopulation, mass unemployment, corruption, and glaring social inequality.<sup>2</sup>

It should be taken into account that the indices of the economic development of the North Caucasian region are the lowest in Russia. The basis of existence in the region is formed by a black-market economy combined with sizable financial donations from the Federal center. The ethnic clans controlling the local authorities present a great problem. They are blamed for embezzlement of the funds earmarked by Moscow and suppression of any opposition or discontent on the part of the local population. All this forces people to search for justice, which often leads them to looking for other means of self-identification or turning to the mythologized historical past. In these conditions many North Caucasian communities attempt to find self-identification in ethnicity, clanness, and archaic forms of identity. Quite frequently, this leads to cultural setbacks, and emergence of aggressive ideological sentiments of nationalistic and religious nature in the conditions of Russia's loss of its role as a moral arbiter.

### **Specific Features of Mental Dynamics in the North Caucasus**

The traditional form of Muslim faith has certain differences on this territory compared to canonic Islamic dogmatic theology. Among them is the close intertwining with autochthonous traditions, customs and habits of different ethnic groups which belong to the Sunna majority and Shi'ite minority. The most widespread legal-religious school in Sunna Islam is the Hanafite Madh'hab. There are also various Sufi tariqahs.

For a long time the mentalization processes combined Islam with family and ethnic specificities of local communities, and pre-Islamic faiths of these peoples with elements of other faiths in the multicultural

medium of the North Caucasus. Each local ethnos believes in its own version of Islam, which largely determines its mentality. The sum total of ethnic mentalities has formed original *polymentality*.<sup>3</sup>

North Caucasian polymentality, which has formed over several centuries, has objectively prevented integration and cohesion of the peoples inhabiting this region. It blocked the emergence and development of an aggregate North Caucasian *subjectness*. Instead of it *ephemeral polysubjectness* devoid of fundamental subject foundations – integral *self-consciousness*, political *self-determination* and strategic *project conceptions* has emerged.<sup>4</sup>

If we turn to the universal foundation of polymentality of the North Caucasian peoples, we see that the priority place there is taken by the *ethnic* component. Islam in its local diversity comes out as the *mobilizing* force of the *self-preservation* of ethnic groups in the conditions of outside civilizational pressure on original North Caucasian communities. Due to the unique combination of ancient community-family relations, customs and habits of everyday life, religious traditions, and identification of morality, law and religious dogmas, Islam has become an *adaptational-protective* system in the region. It contributed to survival in the years of the Caucasian war in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in the conditions of life in the Russian Empire, and then the Soviet Union.

Islam has been a source of special identity myths, values, norms, original thinking and faith, a system of original social and political ideas, psychological standards, and stable stereotypes. All this forms the elements of Islamic mentality which help to study it and carry on comparative mental analyses. Islamic identity as the major component of the mentality of North Caucasian ethnic groups has always been based on *community-family* relations, then the *ethnic* foundation, and only after that – *religious* foundation. The *family* basis was invariably



the major link in the hierarchy of the self-identification factors. Islam plays the role of not so much the foundation of the mentality of the North Caucasian peoples, as its form, thus fulfilling the “ethno-protective function.”

This is largely due to the fact that Islam has established itself in the North Caucasus comparatively recently – in the 17<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> century, although it began to penetrate the region much earlier. In view of this the mountain peoples of the region have not formed a well-established and prolonged experience of life in an Islamic theocratic state. Apart from that, the North Caucasian people lived in the conditions of a considerable influence of the Russian and then Soviet mental expansion.

They had witnessed the processes of growing secularization in all spheres of Russian public life. The most active of them had joined in social life, education and culture, and imbibed, to a certain extent, the national type of *Russian subjectness*. They became office employees, teachers, engineers, writers and journalists, scientists, army officers, and public and political figures. Representatives of the religious elite have gradually joined local state power bodies.

One of the most important consequences of almost 250-year-long history of the North Caucasus as part of Russia had been its multilingual territory having become dominated by bilingualism, that is, Russian became the language of interethnic contacts. In the use and impact it has surpassed all languages, which has largely predetermined the fact that the North Caucasus has mentally become a unique part of Russia.

It should be borne in mind that the introduction process of the North Caucasian ummah in the public, political and legal media of the Russian Empire essentially differed from that of the Islamic community in other part of the country having entered these media. For

example, relations with the Tatar and Bashkir Muslims were about the same as those between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state. Taking into consideration the fact that there is no concept and institution of the church as such in Islam, a special organization was created for the Muslim community of Russia, similar to that of the Russian Orthodox church organization.. Empress Catherine the Great decreed in 1788 to set up the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia – an administrative body which appointed mullahs and followed observance of Russian laws. This was the first representative official body of the kind, giving the Russian Muslims the possibility of political existence. S. Rybakov, a Russian scholar of Islam in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, noted that the Russian law created the Muslim clergy as a social category of mullahs with instructions, rights and duties, which were alien to the Muslim world and were not envisaged by Muslim law – the Sharia.<sup>6</sup>

The main duty of the Spiritual Board was to maintain the moral level of the Islamic clergy and observance of guarantees of its loyalty to the Sovereign. The uncertainty of the authorities in its loyalty was the main reason why such boards were not organized in the North Caucasus for a long time. The Islamic tint of the Caucasian war of 1817–1864 and the considerable prestige of the clergy gained during the fight against Russia caused mistrust in the Muslim elite on the part of the tsarist administration. Along with it, local communities had negative ideas and stereotypes with regard to Russia at the level of their collective subconscious. All this led to consequences going beyond the bounds of expectations of the Russian government. The Muslim clergy became an active ethnopolitical force, which was not always loyal to the Russian tsarist administration.

After the establishment of Soviet power the people of the North Caucasian region of the Russian Empire have become isolated from the Muslim world for the first time in their history. As a result, their

evolution within the framework of the world ummah was disrupted. The spiritual sphere was marked by setbacks, and a considerable part of the religious heritage continued to be recognized as part of the cultural and spiritual asset of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

A stepped-up stage of re-Islamization has begun after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. The mass of those calling themselves Muslims had very general, if vague and wrong, ideas about their religion. This situation still exists in Russia. Despite the growing number of mosques, madrasahs and other Muslim educational institutions, the level of Islamic literacy of the population is still low. Practically complete religious illiteracy of the population, absence of ideas about various interpretations and trends of Islam, and idealized and mythologized notions about it contributed to the emergence and popularization of reformist Muslim leaders calling for coming back to “*pure Islam*”<sup>7</sup> A considerable number of its adepts has appeared in this country at the time of the purposeful activity of *Wahhabi elements from abroad*.<sup>8</sup>

In 1989 adherents and supporters of “pure Islam” were able to overthrow the muftis of Central Asia and the North Caucasus. After the resumption of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1991 and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. that very year the Wahhabi expansion in the post-Soviet area has assumed an avalanche-like character.

Along with the re-Islamization process internal differences intensified within Muslim communities of the region. In these conditions a correlation between the ethnic essence and Islam as such began to change. Numerous leaders began to assert various *ideological* postulates in their activity and put forward *political* aims. Each of these rivaling groups began to claim its interpretation of Islam to be the essence of religious and political ideology.

As we see, the formation of the political-psychological identity of the North Caucasian peoples has been developing for quite a long time on the basis of their own laws. It was subjected to the influence of different factors and the impact of ethno-conflict situations against the backdrop of the absence of the uniform interpretation and understanding of Islam. The following factors could become the ground for the *identity crisis* of the North Caucasian Muslims. First, it was the *adaptive* and *subjectless* process of *spontaneous self-identification* not only in isolation from religious and cultural-historical traditions of the world ummah, but also non-admission of civil Russian identity. Secondly, it was *mosaic ethnicity* with an emphasis on the self-isolation of the North Caucasian peoples which was the antagonist of positive political identity. Thirdly, it was the narrowing down of social, cultural and mental areas of local ethnic groups to the size of individual communities.

Lastly, we should note that traditional Islam with its spiritual and cultural potential in the conditions of post-Soviet Russia was unable to play a consolidating role for the indigenous people of the North Caucasus. Neither did it become a source of positive political *subjectness* and systemic *integrator* of constructive socio-political processes in the region. *Derussification* in practically all republics of the region has become real as a manifestation of *negative identity*.

In the 1990s these processes were characterized by the striving for ethnocultural and ethno-territorial polarization with subsequent independence of ethno-national statehood, whereas in the 2000<sup>th</sup> they began to degenerate into a principally new phenomenon – *Islamism*. At present it is not so much religious-theological phenomenon as a *political* one in modern Russia and is, in essence, a *protesting, organizing, mobilizing* and ideologically *anti-state* and systemic *anti-Russian* project. Its strategic aim is the transformation of the traditional

North Caucasian *polymentality* into *monomentality* of a totalitarian type by creating a new anti-Russian *supranational religious identity*.

The ideology of Islamism as the foundation of a specific form of re-Islamization has begun to spread in North Caucasian republics and beyond their borders rapidly and aggressively, and claim the establishment of its own rules and way of life even in places where the Islamic population was in minority. We mean Stavropol territory, which is situated in the very center of the North Caucasian region.

### **Stages of Re-Islamization in Stavropol Territory: Political and Psychological Aspects**

Common borders with six North Caucasian republics have made Stavropol territory a zone of ethno-political and religious-political instability. Its exacerbation took place in 2010, and by the beginning of 2013 Stavropol territory became the most conflictogenic region of Russia. The problems of interethnic and inter-confessional relations, Islamic expansionism and Islamophobia have come to the fore as never before.

According to the data of the All-Russia population census of 2010, the population in Stavropol territory includes seven percent of representatives of traditional Islam, who are called *ethnic Muslims*. And their number is constantly growing.

Stavropol Muslims are mainly Sunnites. The number of Shi'ites is comparatively small, and they are mainly representatives of a small Azerbaijani diaspora.

There is no official clergy in Sunna Islam, any believer can become an imam, if he proves his loyalty to faith and demonstrates his knowledge of sacred texts. Hence, there are numerous conflicts and the problem of impersonation, when an imam may proclaim himself mufti. Sunnites belong to different theological-legal schools, which sometimes

causes an acute ethnocultural and religious-political polemics, including with representatives of new versions of Islam.

There is the Spiritual Board of ethnic Muslims of Stavropol territory which supervises the functioning of mosques and prayer-houses, and also Islamic educational institutions. One of the aims of the Board's activity is the revival of the Islamic religious tradition which has deep historical roots in Stavropol territory.

During the past two decades Islam has adapted to the new socio-political conditions and met ideological and spiritual challenges.

A study of the specific features of this process in Stavropol territory makes it possible to single out several stages whose examination gives an opportunity to see and understand the character and evolution of its political-psychological essence, on the one hand, and on the other, to determine the main aspects and points of the growth of Islamic presence in regional socio-political life at the present stage and in the foreseeable future.<sup>9</sup>

**Initial stage (1988–1991)** passed against the backdrop of radical changes in the country's political and ideological spheres. It was marked by spontaneous public and religious activity. The liberalization course contributed to the rapid formation of numerous and various religious organizations.

Under the Law of the RSFSR "On Freedom of Religion" adopted in October 1990 religious organizations received an opportunity to influence mass consciousness through their participation in public life. They began to organize educational institutions, publishing houses, mass media, and establish direct international contacts without mediation of the state. The simpler order of registration of religious associations, and the absence of state control have led to chaos in the system of state-confessional relations, and created prerequisites for the emergence of *destructive* forms of religious activity.

Assessing the course of this process in Stavropol territory, it should be noted that there has been not only “revival” of the Islamic religious tradition, but rather its original and qualitatively new “second birth.” All this was taking place when there was an acute shortage of the competent clergy and the absence of official religious organizations and corresponding literature. This was accompanied by bitter rivalry among new religious leaders which resulted in the creation of numerous *ethnically oriented* religious organizations of Muslims. Traditional Russian Islam, including that in the North Caucasus, was weak at the time, and was not ready to oppose foreign influence in the re-Islamization process.

At the same time “pure Islam” as a project for the North Caucasus has become not only a result of interference of the outside forces (mainly Saudi and Pakistani). It was a product of the internal forces’ activity. The radical-Islamist project appealed to world religion, which was “cleansed” from local “distortions” and traditions, to “universal values” – not connected with ethnic groups, clans, etc. It emphasized egalitarianism, and opposition to corruption and social injustice. Ideologists of “pure Islam” ably used psychological methods of influence, addressing themselves, first and foremost, to young people. Its success was largely due to the absence of a clear-cut and effective policy of the Russian authorities toward the North Caucasus.

Young people looked for opportunities to receive religious education abroad, at Islamic educational centers in the Middle East and North Africa. Islamic missionaries arriving in great numbers in the North Caucasus from abroad actively propagated Wahhabi ideology of “pure Islam.” Re-Islamization was regarded at the time as a spiritual-cultural phenomenon far from timely political problems of the country and the region.

**The second stage (1991–1994)** was marked by the intensive penetration of the ideology of political Islam – *Islamism* – in Stavropol territory and the neighboring regions. Its first active agents – *Salafite cells* – began to emerge in Stavropol territory. Their propaganda activity was aimed at criticizing and undermining secular power. Massive corruption and abuse of power by local officials, social differentiation, high level of unemployment, alienation of the local authorities and their negligence of the needs of the population have prepared the ground for the success of Salafite propaganda among local inhabitants. Salafite Islamists were striving for total Islamization of all spheres of public life. The Islamist movement comes out with the ideas of creating an “Islamic state,” the “Caucasian Emirate” and global jihad against “all enemies of Islam,” including not only Russia, but also the United States, the European Union and Israel.<sup>10</sup>

Representing foreign special services and relying on financial support of foreign non-governmental religious and political organizations, foreign missionaries have carried on active work on propagating the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism. In doing this they broadly used psychological means of influence and recruitment of ethnic Muslims. Arab and Central Asian instructors worked at underground “madrasahs” in several districts. At this stage fundamentalists did not put forward open anti-Russian ideas and slogans.

**The third stage (1995–1997)** was distinguished by intensive politicization and radicalization of Islam in the North Caucasus. On the one hand, it was connected with the first Chechen war, and on the other, with propaganda of the ideas of returning to “pure Islam.” All this was accompanied with a drop in the population’s living standards and the return home of graduates from Arab religious educational institutions who began to compete with the traditional Islamic elite. Having received theological education, they not only actively joined the re-



Islamization process, but also replaced their foreign tutors in the training camps of fighters in Chechnya. Young Islamists from Stavropol territory studied the Koran in its Wahhabi interpretation, learned lessons on ideological, psychological, recruiting and military subversion technique, and applied the newly-acquired knowledge in practical work.

Representatives of foreign religious-political organizations worked as supervisors, instructors and preachers in Stavropol territory. In their sermons they openly called for implacable armed struggle for “purity of Islam” and the need to physically annihilate the “infidels.” Their main audience was inhabitants of eastern settlements of Stavropol territory where most ethnic Muslims lived.

Extremist literature published in Stavropol territory was widely used for undermining the foundations of Russian nationhood and inciting intolerance and religious hatred. The Islamists did everything possible to increase their influence on the local power bodies. Islam was widely used by them for ideological substantiation of their activity and as a means of *uniting, organizing and mobilizing* the extremists.

Traditional Muslims in Stavropol territory found themselves in a difficult situation. Due to their low prestige and also because of insufficient knowledge and inadequate material position some of traditionalists tried to establish a dialogue with representatives of “new Islam,” and fell under their influence.

Meanwhile, the central and local authorities began to realize, little by little, the destructive nature of Islamism. In order to improve the regimentation of state-confessional relations the Law of the Russian Federation “On freedom of conscience and religious organizations” was adopted in 1997. It tightened the registration rules for new religious organizations and banned religious missionary activity of foreign nationals. Work of the law-enforcement agencies in Stavropol territory during that period was more closely connected with opposing the

extremist and terrorist activity of armed gangs, which made it possible to weaken the positions of fighters for “pure Islam.”

**The fourth stage (1998–2001)** was marked by the exacerbation of relations between the authorities and the traditional clergy, on the one hand, and the representatives of radical Islamic groupings, on the other. In this confrontation the leaders of traditional Islamic communities received a new powerful impetus for unity. They began to engage in work with the Muslim population of the territory to oppose the sectarian activity of the Islamists. In turn, the latter started a virtual psychological and subversive-terrorist war. During a period of four years they committed more than ten acts of terror in different parts of Stavropol territory.

The situation has seriously deteriorated in the region of the North Caucasian spa Mineralniye vody. In answer to the flare-up of extremist activity the local law-enforcement agencies have undertaken preventive measures, including the arrest of the most active Islamists. However, numerous shortcomings of the legislative basis and reliance exclusively on operative and forcible methods of fighting such crimes did not allow us to exclude terrorism and extremism from the list of threats to the region.

**The fifth stage (2001–2007)** was connected with the planned and continuous onslaught against the destructive forms of Islamic religiousness. Using a wide range of means – ideological, psychological, economic, political and forcible – the authorities continued to deal blow after blow at Islamism and its bearers. These efforts have resulted in the defeat of the military structure of the North-Caucasian Salafites, having driven it deep underground and contributed to forming its negative image among the broad sections of the population. The term “Wahhabism” became to be associated with terrorism and religious fanaticism.

Nevertheless, the underground Islamists have not abandoned their goals. In the new conditions they renovated their programs of ideological substantiation of terrorist activity connected with refusal from the nationally-oriented character of Islamic “resistance.” Thus, any ethnic or nationalist aim, like the struggle for independence of, say, Ichkeria, was declared fallacious.

In the view of Doku Umarov, the then leader of the gangster underground in the North Caucasus, Muslims had to abandon nationalism and switch over to religious-political positions of “pure Islam.” The North Caucasian terrorists created the organization “Imarat Kavkaz” in 2007, which included the eastern part of Stavropol territory and committed several acts of terror with human casualties.

**The sixth stage (2007–2010)** was marked with relentless struggle of the authorities against Islamic radicals, which stabilized the situation at the “Islamist front.” Having felt this, traditional Muslims became more tolerant toward moderate Salafites. Thus, two main principally different types of Islamic activity began to take shape.<sup>11</sup>

The first type was represented by the traditional Islamic clergy who satisfied the religious requirements of people and were regarded as an important social institution.

The second type, while rejecting the authority of the first, was oriented to the need to assert the Islamic political-legal and moral order in Muslim society. Thus, Islam became a propaganda and political instrument, and acquired a destructive character. All this was accompanied with growing confessional rivalry between the leaders of traditional Muslims, which led to another change in the structure of the regional Spiritual Board of Muslims in 2010.

**The seventh stage (2010 up to now)** coincided with the creation of the new federal *okrug* (region) – North Caucasian, which included Stavropol territory. This stage is connected with the formation of

a territorially and religiously unified Islamic community in Stavropol territory. With this aim in view the new Spiritual Board of Muslims of the North Caucasus was set up on May 5, 2010.

Today the Board includes 52 officially registered Muslim communities, each having its own mosque or prayer-house. Mufti Muhammad Haji Rakhimov is the head of the Board. His activity contributes to an improvement of relations between Muslim communities of Stavropol territory.

Despite the fact that Sunnism acknowledges equal importance of all leading religious theological schools for Islam, it seems that this is rather connected with an attempt of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the North Caucasus to find a compromise in answer to a dangerous challenge thrown by “new Islam” – a moderately radical version of Islamism.<sup>12</sup> In contrast to the actively operating terrorist underground in the region, this form of Islamic religious-political activity is quite popular among North Caucasian young people.

This is shown by the fact that about 80 percent of ethnic Islamic young people from 15 to 22 years of age are aware of Wahhabi ideas. This is also true of about 25 percent of ethnic Russian boys and girls living in the region.

The problem of the politicization and radicalization of Islamic young people in Stavropol territory and in the entire North Caucasian region, for that matter, remains quite acute. In this connection an anonymous poll has been carried out among 1<sup>st</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup>-year students of the Karachayevo-Circassian State University and the North Caucasian State Humanitarian-technological Academy with a view to ascertaining the supposed *motives* of involvement of young people in terrorist groupings. First of all, these motives were prompted by alienation, frustration, feeling of offence and loneliness (46.0 percent of respondents). Second place was taken by motives of self-assertion,

feeling of personal significance, belonging to an important cause, atmosphere of adventure, etc. (32.0 percent of respondents). Third place was determined by sum total of different psychological reasons, thirst for power, pathological thirst for destruction, etc. (10.0 percent of respondents). Then there are selfish (lucrative) motives and striving for greater prestige among coevals.

The overwhelming number of students (62 percent) named “psychological considerations” as the main reason for joining terrorist organizations. The most widespread psychological causes are susceptibility to outside influence (22 percent) and unbalanced psychology (18 percent). Twenty percent of students named social factors, six percent – economic reasons, four percent – religious reasons, and eight percent found it difficult to answer this question.

The results of the poll speak for themselves. They give a thorough characteristic to two basic personal qualities of young extremists – these are the high level of *infantilism* and a very low level of *subjectness*.

## **Conclusion**

The conflict combination of the processes of *self-determination* and *self-isolation* against the background of uncertainty of the future, disappointments, unfulfilled desires, low level of subjectness, etc. – all this determines the state of *frustrated identity* of North Caucasian society, which increases its political and psychological *instability*. There are also other specific features of local mental dynamics. First, an increase has been registered in the number of the Islamic population in the region as against the non-Islamic one. This makes its general psychological and emotional well-being better and lends it greater self-confidence. Secondly, it is freed from the “younger brother” complex characteristic of the Soviet period with regard to the non-Russian

population which is in a state of mental depression. Thirdly, there are fewer national-political manifestations of the *Russian state* and more signs of Muslim religious-political values, namely *Islamic civilization*.

All this enables us to speak of the stepped-up processes of the re-Islamization of the North Caucasus during the past twenty-five years. The growing ethnic self-identification of a greater part of North Caucasian society experiences a strong influence of aggressive Islamist propaganda, which is using the ideas of social justice and slogans of supra-national values of “new Islam.” The Russian North Caucasus risks to experience the national-political destruction of the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. At the same time the polymentality of traditional society prevents the development of Muslim fundamentalism. Historical rootedness of traditional Islam in Russia and the value of the *Russian Orthodox-Muslim consensus*, so evident for many people have definite prospects of conflict-free interaction with the world of Islam.

Nevertheless, at present the global operators of the Islamist political project are stubbornly implementing a strategy on restructuring *identification ideas and rules* of North Caucasian inhabitants, and first and foremost, young people. The organized Islamist groupings of both *ultra* and *moderately radical* character are actively implementing technologies of mental and political transformations. Their activity is aimed at transforming the *polymental matrix* of traditional Islamic society and laying the foundations of religious-dogmatic *monomentality of a totalitarian type*, with subsequent realization of the project of “new Islam” of the North Caucasus outside Russia.

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**MODERN MUSLIM MOVEMENTS AND GROUPS  
IN POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN: CERTAIN  
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS**

**Abstract:** This article examines the basic trends in Islam at the present stage, such as traditionalism, secularism, liberal Islam, Salafism, modernism, and neo-revivalism, and also how they are represented, or not represented, in Kazakhstan. It also analyzes and compares their approach to the women’s problem and certain economic aspects of our time. This work compares similarities and differences between the modern trends of Islam and analyzes the factors influencing Islamic traditions and their development. Apart from traditional Islam, the article attempts to determine and characterize such Islamic trends in Kazakhstan as secularism, modernism and Salafism, analyze their formation, development and prospects, using modern methodology.

There are six main trends in Islam at present: traditionalism, secularism, Salafism, liberal Islam, Islamic modernism and “neo-revivalism.” If we try to characterize, if briefly, these trends<sup>1</sup> we shall single out the following canonic and socio-political characteristics, beginning from *traditional Islam* (traditionalism):

Belief in the need to follow one of the classical Madh’habs and, accordingly, the traditional interpretations of the Koran and Sunna;

Islam is ideal and does not require modernization, and the trends of the classical period of Islam are prevalent;

Trend to growing piety as opposed to political activity;

Trend to obey the existing state power;



Trend to reject democracy and its principles, but sometimes it is acceptable to take part in democratic movement in order to achieve certain aims;

Suspicious attitude toward western ideas and rules, especially those which are not in line with the rules of Islam;

The Shariah should be followed according to the rules inherited from the classical period of Islam.

*Secularism* in Islamic countries has the following features:

Renunciation of the Koran and Sunna as the absolute authorities; rejection of the rules of Islam;

Belief in the need to separate the state from religion;

Perception of science and cause-effect relations as the standards of truth;

Trends to follow western models of social development, irrespective of whether these models are radical, liberal, or conservative;

Political predilections may vary from socialist and monarchic nationalism to authoritarian and liberal democracy.

*“Liberal”* of *“progressive”* Islam demonstrates the greatest pluralism and has such specific features as:

The use of the Koran and Sunna and adaptation of Islam to our time; openness to new interpretations; Islam is understood as a historical phenomenon;

Islam constantly changes and this is why there cannot be one and only Islam;

Islamic faith should be separated from the Shariah, and laws should be separated from religion;

Belief in the need to separate the state from religion;

Trend to emphasize the importance of social reforms in the sphere of social justice and gender equality;

Acceptance of democracy and all its principles, including pluralism and liberalism.

Despite the fact that *Salafism* is a heterogeneous and complex trend, nevertheless, Professor Ihsan Bugby tried to give certain general characteristics of this trend:

Faith in the need to follow the Koran and Sunna as they had been understood at the time of the first three generations of Muslims after the period of Prophet Mohammed; renunciation of the idea that Muslims should follow any Madh'hab; trend to the textual interpretation of the Koran;

Islam is ideal, but survivals and distortions, which had emerged during its classical period, should be eliminated;

Inclination to fulfill all formal precepts and instructions of Islam; trend to separate non-Muslims (kafirs) who do not believe in Islam, or practice it wrongly;

Trend to reject democracy and its principles, but possibility to take part in democratic political undertakings with a view to reaching one's own aims;

The Shariah should be followed as it was understood and used at the time of the first three generations of Muslims.

The next trend of our time is *Islamic modernism*, which has the following features:

The Koran and Sunna are used traditionally, but there is a desire to adopt more liberal interpretations;

Islam changes constantly, this is why it should be adapted to new circumstances;

Trend to emphasizing social reforms;

Trend to cooperation with the state authorities for making necessary changes;

The creation of civil society in which Islam can influence its formation; creation of an Islamic state is not the aim in itself;

Trend to adopt democracy with all its principles, modifying the classical Islamic standards in such a way that they should correspond to democratic practices;

The Shariah should be the source of law, but not the only one legal resource.

*Neo-revivalism* in the person of the “Muslim Brothers,” which laid the foundation for the formation of political Islam in the 20<sup>th</sup> century completes this classification:

Islam is all-embracing and should direct each individual and the entire society; religion should be separated from the state and public life;

Return to the Koran and Sunna, renunciation of the authority of Madh’habs, openness for flexible interpretations, but conservative ones are more preferable;

The Shariah should be the main source of law, but the main precepts and rules should be checked in accordance with our time;

Modernization is accepted, but Westernization is rejected; western education is accepted only in accordance with Islamic standards;

It is necessary to make actions, but not engage in talking and book reading, for changes in society;

Trend to political activity and creation of an Islamic state;

Trend to oppose the political authorities through political elections, but not through violence;

Trend to adopt democratic principles, provided these principles are modified in accordance with Islamic norms.

This classification gives an opportunity to use various interpretations. On the whole, it can be said that all trends, from

traditionalism to neo-revivalism, are, in one way or another, conservative ones in Islam. Secularism and “liberal Islam” are exceptions, representing a result of the influence of western colonial policy and post-colonial development in Middle East countries. It is also necessary to note certain affinity of positions of “traditional Islam” and Salafism. Despite their absolutely different attitude to Madh’hab, both these trends regard Islam as the ideal system, which does not need any modernization. They are non-political and do not always accept democratic principles.

Possibly, traditionalism in Islam is modifications of local nationalism, which were created in the form of Madh’hab in various cultural traditions, whereas Salafism is rather a manifestation of Arab nationalism and claims greater scope and influence in an attempt to return to the classical Islamic tradition of the time of the first three generations of Muslims, having united all Muslims by the right of priority, and having lifted all restrictions preventing this unity. In other words, it can be said that Salafism tries to reconstruct classical Islam, when all Muslims were a singly entity, in the present condition. Probably, this explains closeness of traditionalism and Salafism, as well as people’s susceptibility to Salafite ideas in the post-Soviet area.

Closeness of traditional Islam and Salafism is also manifested in their attitude to women and insurance. Concerning gender relations, these trends assert the following:

Men and women bear similar responsibility before God, but they are not equal by their human nature; women cannot lead men during prayers;

Women depend on men; woman is not an autonomous agent;

The role of women boils down to that of wife and mother; the social role is not envisaged for women; women should not work outside their home;

Men have the right to beat women, but they should not inflict great physical damage or injury.

In the matters of insurance traditionalism and Salafism put forward the following principles: all forms of insurance are banned; economic deals are banned when the product to be purchased is not known. The Koran bans interest on money; insurance can be used only in case of necessity.

Concerning other Islamic trends and their relations to the problems of women and insurance, there is the following classification (it belongs to Professor Iskhan Bagby)

### **Gender relations**

Neo-revivalism. Men and women are equal in religion and in their human essence, but they are different in prayer; women cannot lead men in prayer; women depend on men, but special attention is devoted to their rights and kindly treatment of them; the social role of women is recognized, but their primary role is motherhood; women can work outside their home, but only when their maternal role has been fulfilled; beating women is an extreme measure, and can only be used as a light punishment.

### **Insurance**

Neo-revivalism. Insurance including interest is banned, but other forms of insurance are allowed. Life insurance is banned. The Prophet allowed people to join money for sharing risks, this is why it is allowed to insure cars; insurance policy which follows Islamic principles should be used and developed.

## **Gender relations**

Islamic modernism Men and women are equal in religion and their human essence; special attention is paid to equality of sexes, whereas differences between men and women are recognized; women should not lead men in prayer; women are autonomous agents; adult woman does not need get permission from man; the social role is open to women; the roles of wife and mother are important, but women are entitled to choose their role; beating women in our day is counter-productive and banned; society has the right to start criminal proceedings for violence against women.

## **Insurance**

Islamic modernism Insurance is allowed; interest is an inevitable principle in modern economic system, and this does not presuppose injustice; but insurance policy should be based on Islamic principles.

“Progressive”. Islam Men and women are absolutely equal in religion and in human nature; differences between men and women are socially constructed; women can lead men in prayer; women are independent social agents; the social role of women is quite open; women should not be restricted in their choice; beating of wife is banned and punishable by law.

“Progressive” Islam Insurance is allowed; the Koran bans *usuri*, but not interest rate; Muslims can choose any type of insurance.

Proceeding from the above-said, it can be stated that modern Islam is represented by various movements and groups which makes it possible to speak of a stable character of this religion and its dynamic development. At the same time, there is no great variety in Islam at the official level in Kazakhstan; Islamic confessions are viewed, in the main, in the traditional form of Sunnism of Madh’hab Hanifah. But such policy is ineffective because it does not take into account the

variety of Islamic movements, and there is no reliable information about other trends in Islam. As to the academic medium in Kazakhstan, it can be characterized as conservative enough, claiming that other trends of Islam will not be accepted by the local population. Such views do not take into account the development and influence of the globalization processes and the present state of affairs, when religious traditions may emerge and change by various means.

To date, there are the following Islamic trends in Kazakhstan: “traditional” Islam (not only Sunna Madh’hab Hanifah), Salafism, Islamic modernism, and secularism. As we have mentioned traditionalism is close to Salafism, and this allows us to understand why the latter has taken root and spread in the post-Soviet area, including Kazakhstan, so rapidly. One lost tradition may be replaced by a new one, more accessible and understandable, but no less conservative, or even radical.

Islamic modernism in Kazakhstan is represented in the form of educational institutions of medium and higher levels. At present, there are about twenty Kazakh-Turkish lyceums in all regions of the country and one university in the city of Almaty. As a rule, graduates of these lyceums are quite educated and have more chances to receive grants for further education both here and abroad. It should be noted that modern Islam successfully uses educational institutions for ensuring stability of traditions when great attention is given not only to religious education, but also to secular one. This approach is widely used by Islamic modernists and neo-revivalists, which enables them to preserve tradition and at the same time adapt to the changing social conditions.

Secularism is state ideology in Kazakhstan, where the state is not only separated from religion, but also takes the forms of certain “militant secularism, when unwritten laws are introduced which ban wearing head-scarves at educational institutions, and many Islamic

movements and organizations are not permitted to function. The state strictly controls and regiments the activity of many religious associations, not only Islamic ones. As a result, extremist activity in Kazakhstan has been clamped down, and head-scarves can be seen in city streets less frequently. One can even notice certain changes in the appearance and behavior of religious women in the country. In other words, “militant secularism” has influenced certain modernization of the current Islamic tradition, and at the same time it should be noted that tradition could adapt to such “strict secularism.” It has been possible to smooth out “social bumps” so far, but no one knows how long this situation will last.

*“Islam v musulmanskoy mire: musulmanskoye dvizheniye i mekhanizmy vosproizvodstva ideologii Islama v sovremennom informatsionnom prostranstve,” Kazan, 2014, pp. 144–153*

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## **FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OF TURKMENISTAN**

The many-vector foreign policy proclaimed by Central Asian countries is not identical to equal-vector policy. At present, Turkmenistan’s foreign-policy activity is definitely dominated by the eastern vector, which is connected, first and foremost, with China becoming its main partner. The latter has firmly taken the leading position in the entire foreign trade commodity turnover of Turkmenistan. During the period between 2007 and 2013 the volume of mutual trade increased twenty times over and comprised \$10 billion by the end of 2013.<sup>1</sup>



The mutual interest of Beijing and Ashkhabad in drawing closer was expressed in the Joint Declaration signed in September 2013 during the Central Asian journey of the PRC Chairman Xi Jinping. The Declaration proclaimed the establishment of the relations of strategic partnership between Turkmenistan and China (similar agreements have been signed between China and all other Central Asian countries). This visit was a turning point in the relations of the two countries, emphasizing the leading role of the PRC in the oil-and-gas sphere of Turkmenistan.

A state visit to China by the President of Turkmenistan G. Berdimuhamedov in May 2014 served as a confirmation of the development of strategic partnership of the two countries. New agreements have been reached as a result of that visit, and a Declaration on the development and broadening of strategic partnership relations between Turkmenistan and the People's Republic of China has been signed. Apart from that, a Statement on the adoption of a plan of developing strategic partnership relations for a period between 2014 and 2018, and a number of other agreements were also signed.

It is a well-known fact that China's special interest in Turkmenistan is due, first and foremost, to its vast gas resources. China has invested, and continues to invest, billions of dollars in the development of gas deposits and the construction of gas pipelines in that country. One of the greatest successes of the China's National Oil Company (CNOC) has been conclusion of an agreement with Turkmenistan in 2007 on developing a gas deposit on the right bank of the Amudarya River. A part of the gas-bearing land was transferred to the company for a period of over thirty year on the basis of an agreement on sharing the product.

The prospected reserves of this deposit, which is the main basis of the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China commissioned in 2009,

comprise 1.3 trillion cubic meters of gas, more than twenty million tons of oil and twenty million tons of gas condensate. To date the CNOC has invested about \$4 billion in this project, including investment in building gas refineries for the trans-Asian gas pipeline. One of them was commissioned in 2009, when the first section of the system was completed, another one was commissioned in May 2014, on the eve of the state visit of G. Berdimuhamedov to the PRC. Thus, the CNOC could control the entire cycle of gas production – from the development of deposits right up to gas export to China.

Gradually, China has taken control over the development of the biggest “Galkynysh” deposit, whose reserves are estimated at 26 trillion cubic meters of gas. This block, which unites two biggest gas deposits, is considered the world’s second in its resources. It is indicative that at the first stage of the development of this deposit the CNOC was part of an international consortium with participation of companies of South Korea and the United Arab Emirates, whereas at the second stage the Chinese side took upon itself the entire financing of the project.<sup>2</sup> According to the data of 2013, Turkmenistan has invested \$10 billion in the development of the “Galkynysh” deposit, of which \$8 billion were granted by China in the form of credits.<sup>3</sup>

The beginning of the industrial development of this deposit was marked by the start of building a gas refinery with a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters, which is being constructed by the CNOC.<sup>4</sup> It is the “Galkynysh” and “Dovletabad” deposits that should become the raw material base for the Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan – India gas pipeline. Control over the raw material base of this pipeline gives China an opportunity to control its functioning.

However, the greatest success of the PRC in Turkmenistan to date is the construction of the gas pipeline system Turkmenistan – China. Its first section Turkmenistan – Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan –

China more than 1,800 kilometer-long was completed within three years and started working in 2009. Its creation was in line with the desire of Turkmenistan to replace the main purchaser of Turkmen gas and hydrocarbon raw materials – the Russian “Gazprom” Company – and find an alternative export route. In 2013, China received about 27 billion cubic meters of gas through the trans-Asian pipeline. In 2014, according to Turkmenistan’s President, the volume of gas deliveries was planned to be increased up to thirty billion cubic meters, in 2016 – to forty billion cubic meters, and in 2021, when the gas pipeline is fully commissioned, it should reach 65 billion cubic meters.

An increase of gas deliveries to China is conditioned by the broadening of the gas pipeline system of the trans-Asian gas pipeline. In June 2014 its third section was commissioned. According to the project, its capacity in 2015 will reach 25 billion cubic meters annually, twenty billion of which will be provided by Turkmen gas and five billion – by Kazakh gas. The fourth section of the trans-Asian gas pipeline has already been agreed on. During the journey of Xi Jinping to Central Asian countries in 2013 this question was thoroughly discussed. In contrast to the first three sections, the new section will be laid out bypassing Kazakhstan and will pass through the territory of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

These countries will gain considerable benefits from the transit of Turkmen gas to China: it is a known fact that China promised \$1 billion to pay to Tajikistan. Tajik officials in Dushanbe hope to receive this sum.<sup>5</sup> Taking into account all four sections of the gas pipeline, the entire length of the gas pipeline will reach seven thousand kilometers, which will make it the world’s longest pipeline. The choice of the route for the fourth section – through the most troublesome regions of Central Asia – has, most probably, a political background: the pipeline becomes an instrument of spreading China’s influence on

the greatest possible number of Central Asian countries. In any case, the Turkmen-Chinese gas pipeline, which is to pass through all countries of the region, becomes an important factor of China's presence in Central Asia.

Turkmenistan acquires the role of one of the main suppliers of natural gas to the People's Republic of China. This gives rise to a certain competition of Russia, all the more so since the planned volumes of Turkmen gas are almost twice as great as those agreed on with Putin during his visit to China in May 2014 (38 billion cubic meters annually). The very fact of G. Berdimuhamedov's visit to China on the eve of President Putin's visit there showed Turkmenistan's concern over the fate of the agreements with the People's Republic of China reached earlier in the context of the expected signing of the Russian-Chinese gas contract. While in Beijing President G. Berdimuhamedov received confirmation of unchangeability of China's policy toward Turkmenistan, which was shown by the agreements signed on greater stable cooperation in the sphere of natural gas and on safe exploitation of the Turkmenistan – China gas pipeline.

In the words of the PRC State Council Chairman Li Keqiang, the Chinese side hopes that on the basis of the successful exploitation of the pipeline section already commissioned the construction of new sections will be started and the volume of trade in natural gas will grow. He also emphasized that the Chinese side intended, jointly with Turkmenistan and on the basis of cooperation in the field of energy, to develop connections in new spheres. In his words, "it is necessary to develop interaction in the sphere of oil and gas refining, production of power engineering equipment, agriculture and cattle breeding, communications, and high-tech industries, and to form a new structure of developing interaction in all spheres on the basis of power production and engineering cooperation."<sup>6</sup>

Experts agree that successful negotiations with Turkmenistan were used by China for bringing pressure to bear on V. Putin's delegation during negotiations between Russian and China. In the view of the independent German expert A. Tibold in Berlin, "the Chinese side is bargaining with the Russian "Gazprom" Company on prices of gas, and Turkmenistan is Russia's rival in this respect. This is why successful gas negotiations serve as another instrument to bring pressure to bear on "Gazprom." The expert does not exclude a possibility of increasing this rivalry, if China begins to develop the recently discovered rich deposits of shale gas.<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, China urgently needs to purchase natural gas (in 2013 it took third place in the world in its consumption, which reached 168 billion cubic meters); in order to ensure its energy security China prefers to receive gas from various sources: apart from Turkmenistan and Russia, it also gets it from Australia, Qatar, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other countries.<sup>8</sup>

For satisfying its gas interests in Turkmenistan, China would also like to create a modern transport-communication system and is prepared to invest considerable means in it. Turkmenistan welcomed the idea put forward by the PRC leadership to organize "the economic zone of the Great Silk Route," which presupposed the creation of a transport-communication infrastructure with participation of Chinese investments, primarily in the zones of the construction of the gas pipeline to China. According to Chairman Xi Jinping, "joint construction of the economic zone of the 'Great Silk Route' will give our countries a new historic chance. We have a great potential in the field of building roads and in transnational cargo transportation."

The attention paid by the PRC leadership to the development of the transport-communication branch of Turkmenistan, which is second in importance in that country, is also conditioned by the geographical

position of Turkmenistan, which is strategically important for China. Turkmenistan borders on the region, which includes Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, which interests China a great deal. For its part, Turkmenistan has stated its intention to turn itself into “an important link of the world communications space,” and realize its transit potential, which is determined by the fact that “Turkmenistan occupies an exceptionally advantageous geographical position at a strategically important crossroads of communications ways.”<sup>9</sup>

With this aim in view, a ramified transport-communication system and large-scale projects in all spheres of transport are created there. Among them, the formation of the transit-transport “North – South” corridor and its linking with the transcontinental “East – West” transport route. Chinese investments have been made in building railway lines, airports, motor roads, terminals, and other engineering and technical objects. China supplies railway machines and equipment, goods vans, and locomotives. An agreement on the basic principles of cooperation in the sphere of transport has been signed after G. Berdimuhamedov’s visit to the PRC.

Apart from that, agreements have been signed on economic and technical cooperation, memorandum on mutual understanding on cooperation in the sphere of agriculture, an agreement on cooperation between the State Bank of foreign economic activity of Turkmenistan and the Export-Import Bank of China.<sup>10</sup> Special attention should be paid to an agreement on the development of cooperation in the sphere of outer space research.

Recently, Turkmenistan has shown interest in working out its own outer space research program. According to certain information, China is ready to render Turkmenistan technical assistance in launching its own artificial earth satellites into orbit (During his visit to China G. Berdimuhamedov went to the Chinese aerospace corporation).

A number of experts note the interest of Chinese military figures in creating an outer space monitoring station on the territory of Turkmenistan, of the type of the Russian complex “Okno” in Tajikistan. Thus, it becomes evident that Turkmenistan has preferred the eastern direction of its foreign policy rather than the northern or western ones, turning into a raw materials appendage of the People’s Republic of China. It is indicative that Turkmenistan is in no hurry to sell its gas to the West, although Europe is searching for alternative suppliers of gas due to its worsening relations with Russia. It looks likely that Turkmenistan ceased to place its stake on the construction of the trans-Caspian gas pipeline. As the Kazakh political analyst B. Kydyrgaliuly notes, “Turkmenistan is turning away from the unpredicted European direction toward the East and South-East, where a balanced approach and sound mind are always present, and where there are no standards of western pseudo-democracy, and, what is more important, a real economic boom is taking place.”<sup>11</sup>

The traditional importer of Turkmen gas – Russia – has lost its positions in the investment area of Turkmenistan. Moscow realizes full well the existing situation and attempts to undertake certain measures in order to make up for lost time and opportunities. At the end of May of 2014 the vice-premier of the Russian Federation Arkadi Dvorkovich said at the International Gas Congress in Ashkhabad that Russia was interested in taking part in the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline. Russia has time and again stated that it supported the project (its approximate cost is \$8 billion) which envisaged the laying out of a trunk gas pipeline 1,735 kilometer-long with a capacity of over 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually.<sup>12</sup> The Russian Ministry of Energy representative stated that they hope either to have a share in the company which would implement this project, or to have Russian companies participate in the project as contractors.

It is indicative that the former President of Afghanistan Mahmud Karzai supported Russia on this question. In his words, “Russian companies have a great advantage,” because the Russian Federation has already worked in Afghanistan, it has the necessary maps and data of geological prospecting, and it knows Afghanistan in this sphere better than anyone else in the world. Although, certain experts maintain that earlier Afghanistan, prompted by the United States, has blocked the project by postponing the construction tender for an indefinite time under pretext of the unclear situation concerning the withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup>

As a result, Turkmenistan’s intention to begin pumping its gas into this pipeline already in December 2014 remained unrealized. In the spring of 2014 the President of Turkmenistan G. Berdimuhamedov said that it was necessary to step up preparatory work on the project in order to begin the construction of the pipeline in 2015. It was planned to commission the TAPI pipeline in 2017.<sup>14</sup> Last July the 26<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Technical working group on the TAPI project was held in Ashkhabad, as well as the 18<sup>th</sup> meeting of its leading committee. They discussed the questions of the practical realization of the project, particularly those connected with the preparation of certain documents, including those on the prolongation of an agreement signed earlier to a sum of \$7.6 billion on gas supplies via the TAPI trunk pipeline.

On the whole, it can be stated that China, in one way or another, is present in all Turkmen projects of vital importance for Turkmenistan. These projects are also in line with the interests of China’s development. Evidently, the further relations of these two countries will develop on this basis, and ultimately Turkmenistan may lose control over the major spheres of its economy.



## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> <http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?id=6474>
  - <sup>2</sup> <http://m.gazeta.ru/business/2013/09/04/5637565.shtml>
  - <sup>3</sup> [http://www.newskaz.ru/world\\_news/20130904/5509823.html](http://www.newskaz.ru/world_news/20130904/5509823.html)
  - <sup>4</sup> <http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?id=6474>
  - <sup>5</sup> <http://www.centralasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1403555340>
  - <sup>6</sup> <http://www.fmpre.gov.cn/rus/zxxx/t1156240.shtml>
  - <sup>7</sup> <http://www.dw.de/>
  - <sup>8</sup> According to official data of the PRC, the country's annual gas consumption by 2020 will reach 400 billion cubic meters, and by 2030 – about 600 billion
  - <sup>9</sup> [http://www.chrono-tm.org/2014/gazovyy-kontrakt-veka-ili-neudachnyiy=...](http://www.chrono-tm.org/2014/gazovyy-kontrakt-veka-ili-neudachnyiy...)
  - <sup>9</sup> [http://russia.news.cn/china/2014-05/09/c\\_133321948.html](http://russia.news.cn/china/2014-05/09/c_133321948.html)
  - <sup>10</sup> <http://m.trend.az/ragions/casia/turkmenistan/2273278.html>
  - <sup>11</sup> <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1403555340>
  - <sup>12</sup> Having passed 200 kilometers on Turkmenistan's territory, 755 kilometers in Afghanistan and 800 in Pakistan, the gas pipeline should reach the Pakistani-Indian border.
  - <sup>13</sup> <http://abc.az/rus/news/75868.html>
  - <sup>14</sup> <http://1prime.ru/INDUSTRY/20140410/783405092.html>
- “Rossiya i novyye gosudarstva Evrazii: ezhekvartalny zhurnal IMEMO RAN,” Moscow, 2014, III (XXIV), pp. 100–106*

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