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MULTIPLE CRISIS

MULTI-VARIANT INFLUENCE OF UKRAINIAN

CONFLICT ON WORLD ORDER

The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the present world order proved to be so multi-variant that it is difficult so far to foresee its consequences, irrespective of its outcome (if only one could talk of it at all). In this short article I'd like to touch on several aspects of this problem.

First, **the world order**. The developments in Ukraine are also an outcome of the world crisis, and at the same time a factor aggravating it. The disintegration of Ukrainian nationhood can hardly be regarded in isolation from the general crisis of the entire international system. Among its causes are the erosion of the mechanisms supporting the traditional or artificial and distorted nation-state construction, collapse of ineffective management carried on by corrupt authoritarian rulers, spontaneous popular movements, sharp aggravation of interethnic and interconfessional contradictions, energetic efforts of western political leaders aimed at changing the ruling regimes in other countries, which are not to their liking, as well as the rapid growth of the activity of

societies and authorities striving to protect their identity from outside interference.

There are numerous groups of neoconservatives, including in the American establishment, who are painstakingly trying to reshape the world as they think fit. They believe that the instruments of the transnational mobilization of mass movements can be used for implementing their geopolitical ideas, deforming positive changes of the world order, and also for reviving the institutions of the Cold war and NATO. However, they have been unable to grasp the essence and direction of transformation processes. Apart from that, they display complete ignorance of the lessons of history, and without the knowledge and proper understanding of them all plans are almost always doomed to failure.

It is not accidental that the well-known American analyst William Pfaff wonders why Slav and Orthodox-Uniate Ukraine, whose history has closely been intertwined with Russian history, should become a part of the modern variant of the post-Roman Europe of Charlemagne. Provoking and subsidizing an uprising against the legitimately elected president of Ukraine and supporting its so-called democratic institutions have only created a crisis in American-Russian relations and fanned destabilizing ethnic tension in this crucially important region of the world. This is contrary to the national interests of the united States.

Another American political analyst, Raj Menon, turns attention to the fact that the NATO headquarters in Brussels has definitely tried to use the Crimean crisis as the *raison d'etre* for the alliance and a mechanism for strengthening the unity and resolution of its members. Alas, he concludes, the aggravation of the Ukrainian crisis will not save the alliance. Most sound-minded politicians realize full well now that the obsolete security systems of the Cold war epoch should be replaced

by new, inclusive and transparent systems based on the principle of “equal security for all.”

Now about **Russian-Turkish relations**. The influence of the above-mentioned crisis on them is not confined to the Crimean Tatar factor, although the latter is quite important. According to estimates, about five million descendants of the Crimean Tatars live in Turkey now. They have been moving there during the period of more than a century and a half (the present number of the Crimean Tatar population in the Crimea is about 250,000). The first wave of Tatar emigration to Turkey was after Russia’s victory in the war with Turkey in 1783 and the annexation of the Crimea, the second – after the end of the Crimean war in the 1850s, the third – after the 1917 revolution, and the fourth – during and after Word War II. The overwhelming majority of them has long been feeling and regarding themselves Turks, but some of them still have a strong historical memory. Among them there are quite a few people dreaming of the restoration of the Crimean Tatar autonomy, as well as those wishing to spread radical Islamist views among the Tatars living on the Crimean Peninsula. There are several nationalistic groupings uniting descendants of the immigrants from the Crimea who have followers in their historical Motherland.

Nevertheless, Turkey is not interested in destabilization of the situation, on the contrary, it could become an ally of Moscow in its actions aimed at drawing the Crimean Tatar minority to its side through its integration in public and political life and in management of the two new parts of the Russian Federation, and complying with the people’s national aspirations which have been ignored by Ukraine.

The Crimea could become a convenient and profitable place for Turkish investments with due account of its close proximity to Turkey. However, non-recognition of the Crimea’s reunification with Russia by

Turkey is an obstacle to this. Nevertheless, there are quite a few methods and means to overcome formal obstacles caused by “Trans-Atlantic solidarity.” Turkey is concerned over the fate of their five thousand citizens living and doing business on the peninsula. The Turkish Agency on cooperation and development (TICA), which is an analogue of the *US AID*, actively working in the Crimea almost to this day may cease to exist. About fifty imams from Turkey worked at Crimean mosques. Apart from that, there were cells of the transnational Islamist organization “Khizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami” banned in Russia working in the Crimea, as well as Wahhabi preachers reading sermons in mosques.

There is no doubt that the decree signed by President Putin on the rehabilitation of the peoples of the Crimea who had fallen victim to Stalin’s reprisals and the possibility to create national-cultural autonomies in the two new parts of the Russian Federation, including the Crimean-Tatar autonomy, will contribute to winning the hearts and minds of this important part of the Crimean population.

Finally, Ukrainians themselves should take part in negotiations on resolving the crisis. However, **no agreements can be fulfilled without accord between Moscow and Washington.** It looks likely that the West has realized full well that the “Crimean dossier” has been closed once and for all, and that Moscow has no intention to send troops to the south-east regions of Ukraine or interfere in its affairs. In my view, Washington should realize that having won the Crimean game, President Putin will work for solving two strategic tasks vitally important to Russia.

First, to help turn the southeast regions of Ukraine into autonomous entities through a constitutional reform, the parameters of which should be determined in a nationwide dialogue with participation of all regions (our Minister of foreign affairs Sergei Lavrov replaced

the term of federalization by the term of decentralization) to protect the interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking population and the worthy role of the Russian language.

Secondly, to ensure the neutral status of Ukraine. True, to continue drawing the bankrupt and half-ruined country in a military-political block would be utter lunacy.

One would wish to think that Ukrainians will agree on fulfillment the accords reached in Geneva. However, a negative turn of developments should not be excluded. Supposing, it will not be possible to disarm all illegal armed groups and stop escalation of violence. I'd risk to suppose that in this case an international peacekeeping contingent may be brought in to Ukraine (naturally, with Russian participation and strict observance of international legal standards). The West will also be interested in this, for it is also concerned with the preservation of integrity and stability of Ukraine and liquidation of the seats of tension there. By ignoring the Geneva agreements, the present Kiev leaders will make this alternative inevitable.

“Rossiya v globalnoi politike,” Moscow, 2014, No 2, March-April, pp. 18–21.

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**DEVELOPMENT OF TRADITIONAL ISLAM
IN TATARSTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FORMATION
OF INTERCONFESSIONAL TOLERANCE**

In the past decades the Republic of Tatarstan has presented itself as a region with stable harmonious interconfessional relations.

Researchers have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the region has a many-century experience of the tolerant coexistence of representatives of various religions, which is in demand all over the world. Tatar Islam belongs to the Hanafiyah Madhhab, which is distinguished by a high degree of tolerance.¹

This is a result of the painstaking efforts of representatives of traditional Russian confessions – Orthodox Christianity and Islam – and state and government bodies. At present daily work is going on in the region aimed at developing and improving the inter-religious dialogue. Among other things, the scholarly community of Tatarstan and the heads of the Spiritual Board of Muslims exert efforts constantly to revive the national theological heritage. Works by Tatar scholars and thinkers and theologians of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries are published, translated and studied. Much attention is paid to propaganda of the religious experience of the Tatar people, who, despite unfavorable political conditions, have been able to build civilized interconfessional relations in multinational Russia. “Our ancestors were wise and had evolved a definite model of Islamic-Christian cooperation,” R. Muhametshin, rector of the Religious University of Tatarstan, said at the 2nd festival of Muslim youth in June 2008.

Yet, as recent events have shown, the problem of religious extremism still exists in the region. The model of tolerant Tatarstan, which many states and regions took as an example, can be destroyed. This is due to the penetration of the ideas of Salaphism (Wahhabism) in the socio-cultural area of Russian Islam.

The history of Salaphism began in the 18th century, when the Hanabilah preacher Mohammed ibn al-Wahhab declared that Muslim religion had been distorted after the death of Prophet Mohammed, and therefore it was necessary to return to the sources of “pure Islam” (“as-salif as-salih”). The main feature of the new trend

was a literal and primitive interpretation of the Koran, which gave rise to negation of a considerable part of Muslim religious literature, as well as a whole number of dogmas and rites which were branded as “bida,” that is, prohibited innovations. The followers of Wahhabism declared a whole number of trends of Islam as heretic and branded their adepts as heathens. Certain adherents of Salaphism try to interpret it as Islam without Madhhab. The emergence and development of this trend in Islam is connected with the Hanabilah Madhhab of Sunnism, which is the most conservative of all four Madhhabs. In 1925 Wahhabism was recognized as official religion in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.²

By the beginning of the 21st century this trend of Islam has become widespread, in one or another form, all over the world. New realities of life have led to the formation of the political doctrine of Salaphism. Among its main features are intolerance and enmity toward civil secular society and striving to replace it with Islamic society based on the Sharia law, impermissibility of separate existence of religion and the state, opposition of the Islamic world to all civilizational models, and negation of all non-Islamic laws.³

The spreading of this trend of Islam in Tatarstan is connected with the features of the Islamic revival of the early 1990s, when the activity of foreign missionaries and the study of young Russian Muslims abroad played a major role in the conditions of the loss of a great part of our own religious traditions. Islam for a definite part of the ummah is, above all, world religion, which is not connected with a definite national tradition, and if this is not so, it is connected with the Arab, rather than the Tatar national tradition. “The key problem of the activity of graduates from foreign Islamic universities and institutes is adaptation of the knowledge received to Russian

reality, traditions and specific features of the development and present state of Islamic religion in Russia and its regions.”⁴

The character of ideological preferences of believers largely depends on the activity of imams of mosques and their ability to comply with spiritual requirements of their parishioners and form tolerant ideas and feelings characteristic of the traditional Hanafiyah Madhhab among them. However, despite the presence of a sufficient number of Islamic educational institutions in the region, mosques still need highly qualified priests. There is discrepancy between the objective need for well-educated imams to work in Muslim parishes of Tatarstan, and the absence of precise knowledge about the real level of training of mosque priests and their ideological preferences. To solve this problem the Center of Islamic Studies at Tatarstan’s Academy of Sciences is carrying on investigation work among the Islamic clergy with a view to determining their views and preferences and determining whether they correspond to the basic premises of the Hanafiyah religious-legal school.

According to the official data, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan supervises the activity of 1,300 religious communities united in 45 urban and rural sections. To date about 250 imams have been surveyed in various districts of the republic (they had to fill special questionnaires).

Despite the importance of the subject, only few respondents (nine percent of all those polled) included their ideological preferences in the set of problems, which they come across in their activity (*absence of unity, contradictions, Wahhabi problems*). Material and financial difficulties (60 percent) and shortage of parishioners (40 percent) were the most widespread problems. Next came the shortage of priests and familiars.

This situation can be explained by several reasons. On the one hand, there are views that the scope of the spreading of radical currents in the republic is exaggerated. Facts have been cited tendentiously in the Russian mass media, and it actually looks like an information war against Islam in Tatarstan. In April 2013 the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan organized a conference “Islam on line” for journalists, at which it was decided to evolve the rules and methods of presenting and publishing information in the Muslim mass media with a view to forming a positive attitude toward the Muslim ummah and eradicating anti-Islamic sentiments in society.⁵

On the other hand, in rural communities the problem of radicalism is not as acute as in big cities. A certain role can be played there by the inadequate level of theological education of rural imams, which does not allow them to see and understand dangerous views which some of their parishioners may have. Only 38 percent of rural imams said that they had some religious education, 18.5 percent of them – primary, 12.5 percent – secondary, and seven percent – higher.

It is possible that some respondents do not answer direct questions due to psychological reasons, thus, the real situation differs from the results of the survey. In any case, work should be continued in this direction.

Notes

- ¹ A. Malashenko. Foreword to R. Muhametrshin. “Islam in Tatarstan.” Moscow. Logos, 2006, p. 7.
- ² L. Yamayeva. Reislamizatsiya: traditsionnoye i novoye v religioznoi culture Bashkir // Sotsiologiya i obshchestvo: globalniye vyzovy i regionalnoye razvitiye [Re-Islamization: the Traditional and the New in Religious Culture of Bashkirs // Sociology and Society: Global Challenges and Regional Development]. Ufa, October 23–25, 2012. Moscow, ROS, 2012 – URL: http://www.ssarss.ru/iv_ovsk_full.html
- ³ Ibid.

- ⁴ A. Shapovalov. Problemy institutsionalizatsii islamskogo obrazovaniya v sovremennoi Rossii [Problems of Institutionalization of Islamic Education in Modern Russia] // Vlast. 2011, No 3, p. 4.
- ⁵ Official site of DUM RT – <http://dumrt.ru/node/8046>

“Sotsiokulturny potentsial mezkhkфессионального dialogoiga: materialy Mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii (Kazan, May 21–24, 2013),” Kazan, 2013, pp. 363–367.

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**POLITICIZED ETHNICITY: THE “CIRCASSIAN
PROBLEM” – ANOTHER SEAT OF TENSION
IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS**

Putting to the fore the crisis and conflict elements of the situation in the North Caucasus has become a stable feature of the public and scholarly discourse of the past two decades. The “images” of the region, which have taken shape recently, largely predetermine the picture of the past of this territory and its modern position. The most general characteristic of the position of the North Caucasus in the public discourse of Russia is an obvious discrepancy between its periphery place on the political-economic map of the country and the level of concern, even alarm, displayed by Russian society concerning this territory.

Strictly speaking, these discourse practices often render it difficult to make an unbiased and rational analysis of the regional socio-political and socio-economic situation. An alarmist vector of research prevents to see the real parameters of existing problems and phenomena. This also concerns the inadequate understanding of the aggravation of the “Circassian problems” (approximately from 2008).

The task of this article is to show how politicization of ethnicity turns a socially important problem into a conflict situation.

The Circassians and Circassia (in historical retrospect)

At present the Circassians are the titular nation of three republics of the North Caucasus and have different names in official parlance: in the Republic of Adygea – Adygeis, in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria – Kabardians, and in the Republic of Karachayevo-Circassia – Circassians. Nevertheless, the uniform self-designation – Adygei – is still preserved, and general self-identification has consolidated and existed over the past several decades.

The Circassians themselves regard the fact that a predominant part of the Circassian ethnos lives beyond the boundaries of its historical Motherland – in Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Germany, and even the United States – as a distinctive feature of their national existence. True, many people accept this “dissipation” as anomaly, which, although historically conditioned and explained, can and should be “rectified.” This is the essence of the “Circassian problem.”

Over the past several years this problem has invariably cropped up in the regional, Russian and international information field as a subject of active discussions in historical and political publications. It acquired a special urgency in connection with demands that the Russian Federation officially recognize the genocide committed by the Russian Empire against the Circassians in the course of the Caucasian war in the 19th century, and calls for boycott of the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. On the one hand, the modern interpretation of the “Circassian problem” is directly associated with the “tragic problems of the Circassian people,” which have a historically objective character. They come down to the Caucasian war and have remained

unresolved since then. Their essence boils down to the fact that the “Country of the Adygeis – Circassia – has disappeared from the map of the world, and the Circassian people were subjected to genocide by the Russian state and banished from their historical Motherland, having lost a large number of the population and a greater part of their territory.” Accordingly, the “just solution of the Circassian problem” is understood as the implementation of the natural right of the Adygeis to live on their land as a single nation, which should be guaranteed by international law.

On the other hand, certain aspects of the question under investigation, especially the subject of genocide, in connection with the Olympic Games in Sochi, were regarded as an anti-Russian political project of the radical wing of Circassian nationalist organizations and the outside forces hostile to Russia, a project which has no objective historical foundations. It is also mentioned that although the term “Circassian problem” has become quite widespread and acquired certain legitimacy, in actual fact a considerable part of Adygeis, Kabardians and Circassians does not regard recognition of the genocide of Adygeis and settlement of foreigners of Caucasian origin in the Russian Caucasus as “the most pressing problem bearing on their everyday life.” The “Circassian problem” is timely mainly for ethnic entrepreneurs, activists and ethnic ideologists concentrated in ethnic organizations or around them.

Does the “Circassian problem” really exist? A problem in socio-political life can be talked of when the status or position of a certain object or subject of relations is formally indefinite, unstable or arguable in a given system. Apart from the object, which is the subject of discussion, this system of relations includes, as a rule, several more participants. Uncertainty/instability of the situation is the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the emergence of one or another problem.

If the status quo is not disputed by anyone, there is no problem. It becomes a reality when one of the actors includes it in political field. It stays there until each of the participants is unable to resolve it in its interests, or its solution involves considerable losses or risks, or until an acceptable solution is found satisfying all participants in the process.

Historically and politically speaking, the “Circassian problem” emerged in the mid-16th century as the question of the international-political status of some or other Circassian territorial-political formations in the system of relations between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and its vassal – the Crimean Khanate. Conflicts between the main subjects of this system of relations and its evolution had ultimately led to the results which formed the basis of discussions of the present-day “Circassian problem.”

Kabarda has been in the focus of diplomatic confrontation and military-political activity of powers since the 1560s. The “Kabardian question” is singled out from the general Adygei context, acquires independent significance, and at the same time remains part of a broader context of the Caucasian problems. Solution of the “Kabardian question” took place in the 18th century. The Kucuk-Kaynarca peace treaty of 1774 fixed Turkey’s renunciation of interference in determining the status of Greater and Smaller Kabarda and virtually recognized their belonging to Russia.

However, Russia had to establish reliable control over Kabarda and maintain its imperial administrative order in Kabardian territory. It took half a century to solve a whole range of problems with the help of military-political pressure, punitive expeditions, and economic blockade. Characteristically, the final stage of this process in the first quarter of the 19th century was accompanied with a real demographic catastrophe. Due to the resettlement of Kabardians beyond the Kuban

River, numerous punitive raids, and epidemic diseases, including plague, the population of Kabarda had decreased dozens of times.

The Russian Empire began to annex the Trans-Caucasus at the beginning of the 19th century, which aggravated its relations with Turkey, including in the North-Western Caucasus. According to the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, Russia established its sovereignty over the Trans-Kuban Circassians. But the latter did not wish to recognize the power of the Russian emperor and stepped on the road of armed resistance. Britain did not recognize the legitimacy of the Treaty of Adrianople and openly insisted on independence of Circassia. Turkey secretly supported Circassian resistance.

As a result, the “Circassian problem” became one of the elements of the “Eastern question” in international politics of the second quarter of the 19th century. The significance of that problem was determined not by ethnic, but by geopolitical factors, and its dynamics depended on the alignment of the forces of the powers concerned and the efficiency of Circassian resistance. Despite Russia’s defeat in the Crimean war in the 1850s, the attempt of Britain to include solution of the “Circassian problem” in general diplomatic settlement at the Paris Congress of 1856 failed. Thus, it was taken off the international political agenda, inasmuch as nobody but Circassians themselves disputed the conditions of the Adrianople peace treaty. But just as in the case of Kabarda after 1774, Russia had to affirm its domination in Circassia by military force. The completion of the Caucasian war was accompanied with massive ethnic purge and mass banishment of the Circassian population of the North-Western Caucasus. In this way the “Circassian problem” was solved in its earlier stage.

Characteristically, the earlier stage, that is, the status of the Circassians, had been initiated by outside forces pursuing their geopolitical aims, and had never been determined in ethnic terms.

The Circassians in the Russian and Ottoman empires had no real forces and possibilities for an active mass struggle for their interests, and therefore their political national movement did not unfold in both countries. Theoretically, the “Circassian problem” could have been actualized in a situation of a sharp international conflict (war), in which these countries could have been involved, or in a situation of a deep-going internal crisis, revolution, or state disintegration. Coincidence of these external and internal factors took place in the period of World War I in both Russia and Turkey. They created an uncertain and unstable situation for the “Circassian world.” In this sense an objective political ground emerged for putting forward this question. The essence, forms and results of its actualization reflected historical heritage and realities of the first quarter of the 20th century.

All groups of the Circassian population on territories of the former Russian Empire and the former Ottoman Empire became had faced the need for ethnic self-determination in some or other forms. But the possibility of working out a single all-Circassian program to solve the problem had been very limited. This was also due to differences in the position of separate areas of the “Circassian world” and inadequate information exchanges, social ties, and personal contacts. As a result, the Circassian factor had not received a proper expression and manifestation in the ethnic-political processes in the North Caucasus.

In the Soviet Union it was partly realized in local complexes of interethnic relations in the process of the formation of Soviet autonomic republics. And in the former Ottoman Empire this factor was integrated in geopolitical projects of its ruling circles concerning the entire Caucasus, or at least its northern part. It was associated with local diasporas there. But the West-Caucasian Abkhaz-Adygei circle

predominated, and this changed radically the solution of the “Circassian problem.”

At the end of the Caucasian war the essence of the “Circassian problem” boiled down to fixing the territorial-political status of Western Circassia. The ethnic social and ethnic demographic consequences, namely, expulsion of the Circassian population from the North-Western Caucasus stemmed from geopolitical aims and military considerations. The situation at the beginning of the 20th century demonstrated a reverse correlation of territorial-political and humanitarian (socio-demographic) aspects of the “Circassian problem.” Now it presupposed the determination of the status of groups of the North Caucasian (Circassian) population, which had not entrenched themselves in the Ottoman Empire.

There are three most significant aspects. First, the Circassian subject had been formulated by representatives of the intellectual elitist sections of the diaspora and had not boiled down to supporting the military-political ambitions of Turkey. This subject had reflected the real historical experience and their own ideas and aspirations. A statement of the Circassian representative I. Badanok at the 3rd conference of the “Union of Nationalities” in Lausanne on June 27–29, 1916, expressed what could be termed “phenomenology of the Circassian problem.” He touched on the subjects dealing with the inner structure and concepts of every discourse of Circassian themes, which were current during discussions on the history of Russian-Caucasian relations. This was the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia, cruel methods of waging war, banishment and dispersion of Circassians, assimilation, and a threat of the complete loss of their originality.

In real political practice of that time a change in the state of affairs in the “Circassian world” largely depended not on the Circassians themselves, but on the degree of correspondence of their

interests and aspirations to the geopolitical interests of big powers. But in a social and political discourse, in public discussions of Circassian problems the ethnic historical context is not dissolved in the geopolitical context of the confrontation between the empires, but acquires independent interpretation.

Secondly, the initial point of departure in putting forward the “Circassian problem” in the first quarter of the 20th century was inevitably the assessment of the key historic event – the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia and the loss by a greater part of the Adygeis of their Motherland. But there were differences in the historical experience of different groups of the Adygeis. Inasmuch as the real relations and interaction of the foreign Circassian diaspora with the Russian state and society had ceased from the time of their banishment, their attitude to Russia was determined by this circumstance. For those remaining in the North Caucasus, their socio-legal, economic and cultural interaction with the Russian state and society continued after the conquest. Their attitude to Russia was formed not only by historical memory, but also by the close ethnic social experience and search for the future, and this was why they did not place the “Circassian problem” on the agenda in any form.

Thirdly, for groups of Circassian intellectuals in Russia and the Ottoman Empire, along with the consequences of the Caucasian war, another source of dissatisfaction with the position of their own people was realization of their relative social and cultural backwardness as compared to Europe and the most advanced sections of Russian and Turkish societies. Striving for a change of this situation was connected not with return to traditional social foundations, but with inclusion of Circassians in the modern development processes.

On the whole, viewing the period of wars, revolutions and disintegration of empires in 1914–1923, one can conclude that the

“Circassian problem” had not received clear-cut and promising political development against the backdrop of new political opportunities. But its complex phenomenology had become clear, reflecting a new socio-political structure of the “Circassian world” itself, and the existence of alternative development ways of the countries inhabited by Circassians, primarily Russia and Turkey. The “Circassian problem” of the period of World War I and the revolutionary upheavals caused by it now looks as a discourse formation, as an embryo form of its modern guise.

Modern Interpretation of the “Circassian Problem”

The mid-1980s can conditionally be regarded as the start of a new wave of actualization of this problem, when a sharp turn began in the living conditions of the Circassians in the U.S.S.R. and in Turkey, which was connected with the liberalization and democratization of the socio-political life of these two countries. The initial incentives for ethnic-national mobilization in the urban medium of Circassian intellectuals were given by the realization of the well-advanced assimilation processes and real prospects of the imminent complete loss of ethno-cultural identification in the diaspora and in the Motherland.

The Circassian national movement rapidly developed parallel in Russia and beyond its borders in the late-1980s. One of the reasons of this development was belief in the possibility to restore Circassian unity within the framework of an international organization symbolizing the prospect of real reunification of Circassians in their Motherland. The first All-World Adygei congress was held in Nalchik in May 1991. It formed the International Circassian association (ICA). Its Charter said that it was set up for the purpose of “ethnic preservation, self-determination and development.”

In other words, at the end of the 20th century the “Circassian problem” was posed for the first time as the problem of consolidation and prospects of the global Adygei-Circassian community within the framework of a national movement of the international character. The main subjects forming the essence of the problem became quite clear: they included opposition to the processes of cultural-linguistic assimilation of Circassians in the countries of their residence; recognition of the Caucasian war and genocide against Circassians on the part of the Russian Empire as the main source of their present problems; all-round assistance to repatriation. The idea of the restoration of historical Circassia as an integral territorial-political unit was not officially put forward by any influential organizations in the 1990s, but was used by their ethnic and political rivals for discrediting the Circassian national movement in the eyes of the Russian leadership.

During the 1990s the activity of this movement did not engender tension in relations with the Russian state, and the “Circassian problem” did not become a widely popular subject either in this country or abroad. But in the early 2000s a sharp turn began to be observed in the development of the factors determining its dynamics. The activity of the state leadership has now shifted from the subject of democratization and federalism on to the subjects of territorial integrity, uniform constitutional legal order, and the strengthening of the vertical of power. The illusions of coincidence of the vector of ethno-national aspirations of the Circassian community with the general trend of the state and political evolution of Russia are losing ground.

In the early 1990s the official administrative bodies and national movement in the “Adygei” republics of the North Caucasus had a common agenda and could be compared in the degree of their influence on internal ethnic and political processes, whereas a decade later their

tasks and functions came virtually to naught. The leaders of these republics deprived Circassian national organizations of independence (Kabardino-Balkaria), distanced themselves from them (Adygea), or ignored them as a marginal opposition (Karachayevo-Circassia). Meanwhile, by the 2000s it became clear that there was no real progress in the main aspects of the “Circassian problem”, as they were determined by the international Circassian movement. The national organizations of the “first echelon” did not have ideological and organizational dynamism allowing them to cope with difficulties and obstacles along the way of solving the “Circassian problem.” A short period of their influence and activity was replaced by prolonged stagnation.

During that period deep-going socio-demographic and cultural shifts took place in the “Circassian world.” New generations have entered social life, which have been formed in the urban medium, were more educated and mobile, were able to use modern information and communication technologies, and create network communities. They are free in expressing their ideas and attitudes, they exist in a multicultural medium, and nationalism as a means of confirmation of their group identity and the base of political activity is as legitimate as any other ideology. Such groups of Circassian young people exist in different conditions in Russia, Middle East countries, Turkey, and in Europe. They differ from one another, but have much in common, reflecting essential characteristics of the modern global world. The “new wave” of Circassian nationalism came into being in the 2000s, and the revival of its national movement was taking place against the backdrop of a relative lowering of importance of other ethnopolitical problems in the North Caucasus. In these conditions any exacerbation of the “Circassian problem” depended on the combination of

circumstances, existence of organized forces capable to respond to them, presence of charismatic leaders, etc.

New circumstances could arise in the sphere of current political life and an effective reaction to them could emerge from organizations regarding them as political problems essential for dealing with the “Circassian question.” The understanding of it as political strategy aimed at reaching the ultimate aim and determining the means and algorithm of its achievement was based on the following premises:

- Assimilation, loss of the language and culture by Circassians dispersed all over the world as a result of the Russo-Caucasian war are fraught with complete disappearance of the Circassian ethnos;

- These problems cannot be solved without solving the political problem – the return of banished Circassians, and recreation of the Circassian ethnos on its historical Motherland;

- The legal mechanism for achieving this goal can be recognition by the Russian Federation of the fact of genocide against the Circassian ethnos in the 19th – early 20th century.

At the same time a group of activists has been formed capable to lend this strategy greater public weight. Over several years a whole number of new organizations has come into being practically in all countries of Circassians’ residence. They use modern network methods of mobilization and coordination of public street actions, various manifestations and demonstrations for bringing their demands and problems to the attention of the authorities, international community and European institutions.

The general course of the political process has given the Circassian radicals various pretexts for staging various actions. Among the factors contributing to the further aggravation of the Circassian problem was an attempt to reintegrate Adygea in Krasnodar territory, thus lowering its status as part of the Russian Federation (2005–2006);

avoidance of discussion by the Russian authorities of the status of Circassians as an indigenous people of Eastern Black Sea region because of the decision to hold the Winter Olympics of 2014 in Sochi; and finally, the stepping up of public polemics around the “Circassian problem,” which reached its peak in 2011, when the parliament of Georgia officially recognized the fact of genocide against Circassians by the Russian Empire.

Organizations of the new generation representing the Circassian national movement have stepped up their activity. They put forward the political aspect and demand that genocide against their people be recognized officially. Circassian organizations of the foreign diaspora have become involved in political collisions with the Russian state, and this subject has been included in the agenda of an international scientific community, non-governmental organizations, and European institutions. At the same time the key elements of the present-day “Circassian problem” – attitude to the single “Circassian” unit of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus, ethnopolitical “collisions” around the Sochi Olympics, interference of foreign political forces – have become a tangible factor of political demarcation in the international Circassian movement. It is based on different approaches to building relations with the modern Russian state.

Politicized Ethnicity: Open Results

And so, the “Circassian problem” became a reality of the political life of the countries of this ethnos again at the turn of the new century and acquired certain characteristics of an international problem.

Its continuity is connected with the fact that the status of the Circassian community in the modern world retains structural analogy

with the situation of a divided people from the beginning of the 20th century. Hence, the stability of the phenomena of Circassian national consciousness: the Caucasian war and banishment as the “beginning”; dispersion and the ethnic crisis as a heavy reality; reunification and revival as the goal. But at the end of the 20th century the “Circassian problem” was put forward quite independently by Circassians themselves as a global ethnic community. In its previous historical forms and depending on the geopolitical interests of powers it was either connected to various fragments of the Circassian world (Kabarda, Western Circassia), or dissolved in broader geopolitical units (Caucasus, Northern Caucasus), and ethnic conglomerates (mountain dwellers, Circassians as North Caucasian diasporas as a whole).

In the conditions of the modern globalized world, intensive international communications and openness of information space the general Circassian national program has not been simply formulated. It has been institutionalized as a sum total of Circassian organizations acting all over the world. They have been present for over two decades in the international cultural and political area. It should be emphasized that this reflects not only the inner vital energy of the Circassian national movement, but also the general conditions of global integration and democratization.

The experience of the 2000s has clearly revealed that an attempt to transfer pure ideas about the ultimate national aims to the algorithm of political actions undertaken on the basis of the ideas of one’s own rights and interests would lead to political division within the Circassian national movement itself. This is an expression of the contradictory character of influence of international political factors on the development of Circassian self-consciousness and world outlook. On the one hand, the modern international context cannot be compared with the situation of World War I, when the “Circassian

problem” was inspired by the powers in the state of war with Russia in their military-political aims. Today the influence of the external factors should not be reduced to intrigues of geopolitical rivals. The practice of using democratic values and democratic motives by western powers in their interests does not give grounds for ignoring these values and motives as irrelevant or unrelated to the “Circassian problem.” The special services and “unfriendly” political forces abroad can try to use anything to reach their aims. Despite this, the activity of Circassian activists of the diaspora remains part of democratic civil activity in Turkey, Europe and the United States.

On the other hand, geopolitical rivalry and military-political conflicts remain a reality of the international medium in which the Circassian problem exists. It is not possible to isolate the forms of its political existence from their influence. The question is whether it will be turned into a means of solving its main tasks by other subjects, or it will preserve its essence and will be solved by those who are vitally interested in its solution. There are only two collective subjects of relations for whom the “Circassian problem” expresses or touches on their genuinely vital interests and its solution bears the character of an independent major task – these are the Circassians themselves and Russia.

The main problem of the modern Russo-Circassian “situation of discussing” the present state and prospects of the Circassian community lies in that its subject seems to the parties concerned as one non-coplanar. For Circassian activists and intellectuals their “problem” is an embodiment of results and prospects of the ethno-historical evolution of the Adygeis. This is another crossroads of the trajectory of national existence, which puts the ethnos before the alternative of existential nature: continuation of ethno-national being in institutionalized forms through self-organization and its recognition by the state, or ethnic

entropy and dissolution of Circassian identity in the chaos of the “big world.”

For Russian state consciousness the “Circassian problem” is another expression of ethnic nationalism fraught with a threat to socio-political stability, territorial integrity and international interests of Russia. Thus, the present-day “Circassian problem” is a dual historical-political phenomenon by its nature.

The political and historical prospects of the problem depend on what will prevail in the actions of the sides vitally interested in its solution. It may be a search for either means to “overpower” another pole of argumentation, or the foundation of a solution which would be broader than the Circassian ethno-historical perspective, and politically – broader than the Russian sovereign tradition.

This foundation can be found in the sphere determining the conditions of existence and development prospects common for Russia and the Circassian community – in the sphere of the modern processes of globalization, modernization and democratization. These fundamental trends of world development, which throw a challenge to and at the same time open opportunities for all social, national and political subjects involved in the system of relations, which is termed today as the “Circassian problems.” Both Russia and the contemporary Circassians should search for means to reach their aims within the global process of changes. If their strategy and tactics are based on these trends, the forms and consequences of the development of the “Circassian problems” may become predictable and acceptable.

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MODERN CENTRAL ASIA: SOCIAL TRENDS AND POLITICS

Central Asia is living through a period of great changes this century, which will be truly unique by their scope. Even the transformations, which took place in the region last century, cannot be compared with what is in store for it. The vast dimensions and complex

character of the current processes make it possible to call the impending changes “Great Transformation.” This will be an entangled complex of social, economic and political changes in Central Asia, which will include the following elements:

1. Completion of the demographic explosion. In the first half of this century the growth of the population in Central Asia will continue. There are several factors which will contribute to this: a considerable share of young people, comparatively low level of urbanization, and large-family traditions among the Muslim population. However, its growth rates will diminish, and the number of the population of the regional countries will gradually stabilize.

2. “The Great Transmigration of peoples.” Migration at the turn of the century seriously changed the ethnic picture in the region. Mass departure of the “European” population in the 1990s, labor migration in the 2000s, and spontaneous migration seriously touched millions of people. In Kazakhstan alone, according to experts’ estimates, internal and external migration processes influenced 9,475,000, or almost 58 percent of the republic’s population during the past twenty years. At present Central Asia stands on the threshold of more serious changes in the sphere of migration, which can rightly be called “Great Migration of peoples.” We shall note the basic elements of this process.

First, due to large-scale emigration, a sharp reduction in the number of the “European” population in Central Asia has taken place, and this process will continue. In 1970 there were more than 11 million “Europeans” (about one-third of the population), whereas by 2010 their number dwindled to 5.6 million, that is, nine percent of the population. In all, during the twenty years that have passed since the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., about five million people left the region mainly for Russia, Ukraine, Germany and Israel. The only country in Central Asia where “Europeans” comprise a considerable share is Kazakhstan.

According to forecasts, in the first half of the 21st century the share of the Russian-speaking population in the region will continue to diminish due to low birthrate and emigration. By the middle of this century the complete “de-Europeanisation” of Central Asia will take place. However, the question as to who will take their place in the economy and social sphere remains open so far.

Secondly, the active urbanization of aboriginal ethnic groups is going on in Central Asia. Emigration of “European” city-dwellers and the acute crisis of agriculture and overpopulation of rural districts have contributed to the hundreds of thousands of rural inhabitants moving to towns in search of work, housing and better living conditions. This process has been more rapid and noticeable in Kazakhstan. Beginning from 2010 the share of the Kazakh ethnos in the urban population of the republic exceeded sixty percent. More than two-thirds of Kazakhs now live in towns and cities. The share of the urban population in Uzbekistan is high enough, too (51 percent), and in Turkmenistan (50 percent). The bulk of urban dwellers consists of representatives of the indigenous people. In Tajikistan, where the de-urbanization process has been going on, a considerable part of the population has experience of urban life, it is actively involved in labor migration, and lives and works in big cities of Russia and Kazakhstan several months a year.

Thirdly, Central Asia may expect a greater scope of external labor migration. The population of the region is relatively young – average age of its inhabitants is about 26. The able-bodied part of the population (from 15 to 64 years of age) will comprise 65–67 percent, on average, in the foreseeable future, which means a continuing load on the labor market as a long-term prospect. In the conditions of the inability of the countries of the region to ensure the necessary number of jobs, the only way out is greater export of manpower.

3. The formation of new identities. The 21st century will be distinguished by the formation process of new identities. Mass migration of the population within the region and outside it, urbanization and industrialization, new processes in the religious sphere, etc. will contribute to the disintegration of traditional social ties, formation of new communities and identities, and, possibly, the emergence of new nations. The formation of new identities will, doubtless, take place on the basis of religion. The growth of religious consciousness in Central Asia has contributed not only to the revival of traditional confessions, but also the emergence of new religious groups. It is worth mentioning two “new” religious currents.

The first includes the emergence of “new” religious Islamic groups in the region in the mid-1990s. Many international Islamic organizations have unfolded their activity in Central Asia, for instance, “Khizb-ut-Tahrir.” After it was acknowledged as extremist in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999–2003, many “new” Islamic groups went underground, and the system of their management was decentralized – a great many small autonomous and semi-autonomous groups have emerged. They constantly broaden their activity, despite mass arrests of their activists and pressure of the authorities. At present it is not possible to establish even the approximate number of underground Islamic groups, although, there are tens of thousands of their members, primarily in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The growth of their members cannot be stopped by the fact that in the past fifteen years more than ten thousand people in Central Asian countries were sentenced to various prison terms for propaganda of radical religious ideas. Members of the “Khizb-ut-Tahrir” try to create cells of their organization even in prisons and forced labor camps. Islamic radicals are recruited mainly from poor uneducated people. However, among the members of “new” Islamic

groups are many people with a higher education and entrepreneurs, and they carry on propaganda of their ideas mainly in cities and suburban settlements. Along with the growth of the urban population, their activity will also increase.

The second religious current worth attention is the “new” Christians (primarily, Pentecostalists, Evangelists, Jehova Witnesses, etc.), who have unfolded energetic missionary activity in Central Asia after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. The number of their members is constantly growing, despite serious pressure of the authorities, and they are increasingly joined by representatives of local ethnic groups who are traditionally Muslims (Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks). According to certain data, in Kyrgyzstan, among the local Protestants forty percent are Kyrgyzs. Although there are no exact data, one can safely say that there are hundreds of thousands of Protestants in Kazakhstan, and dozens of thousands in other countries of the region. In the number of the officially registered religious organizations the Protestants are ahead of the Orthodox Christian communities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The opportunities of Protestant missionaries are illustrated by the situation in South Korea, which from a country of Buddhism and traditional cults turned into a country where Christianity became the faith of thirty percent of the population in the latter half of the 20th century.

The problem of identities will touch on national minorities, too. The emigration of “Europeans” from Central Asia, which will continue in the first half of the 21st century, will not take off the agenda the problems connected with the ethnic minorities in the region. First, representatives of the ethnic groups which are titular in some countries, are minorities in others (for instance, Uzbeks). Secondly, in Central Asia there are many small Asian ethnic groups, both autochthonous (Uighurs, Dungans, Kara-Kalpaks, Pamiers, and others), and

representatives of peoples who settled in the region in the 20th century (Koreans, Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, and others). Representatives of these people, in contrast to “Europeans,” do not intend to emigrate en masse from Central Asia. Their number remains practically unchanged (Koreans), or increases (Uighurs, Dungans). Besides they live compactly and form rather stable communities. The place and role of ethnic minorities in the region remains indefinite. Pressure on the part of “titular” nations, the problem of the preservation of the native language and religion, complex socio-economic situation – all these factors will serve as an impetus to search for support and may become the foundation for new identities.

All these changes will evidently play a serious role in the development of international relations in Central Asia and around it.

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SECURITY IN KYRGYZSTAN

Security in modern Kyrgyzstan has become a vital aim for the survival of people, society and the state as a whole. The integrity of the state during the entire period of its sovereign development has been under constant threat and certain politicians in the international community, although theoretically, dismember the republic, determining the “masters” of its parts. Security from a standard of being has turned into an unattainable value in people’s hearts and minds, and this is confirmed by everyday life.

To determine the essence of security in the Kyrgyz Republic as a theoretical concept it would be worthwhile to cite the words from a statement made by Yakushi Akashi at a UN conference:

“We need a broader and all-embracing concept of security, which includes not only military security as such, but also problems of economic prosperity, and ecological and even cultural security.”¹

Speaking of security in Kyrgyzstan we mean *systemic* security manifested in all spheres of development. In this sense it would be more acceptable to use the term *positive security* meaning the ability of the state and society “to reveal and eliminate traditional sources of conflicts and channel their efforts to averting all threats to stability and security.”² From the end of the 1990s the concept of positive (all-round) security includes such generally recognized elements as humanitarian, political, military, economic, ecological and information forms of security.

All basic internal and external factors of security related to the state as a whole are expressed in the concept of *national security*. For Kyrgyzstan it is the ability of the state to ensure territorial integrity, preservation and protection of national interests, political, economic,

civilian security, stability of living conditions, and anticipation of threats and challenges. The concept of national security endorsed by the President of Kyrgyzstan contains the generally recognized norms and standards with an emphasis on national interests and external and internal threats. However, its theoretical component is somewhat isolated from reality. During the past decade the main threat to Kyrgyzstan as a state has been permanent *revolutions* violating the main component of security, that is, stability of life, guaranteed calm and quiet, and belief in the future. This is why the first aspect of security – humanitarian – is the most pressing. Two radical changes in the life of a state during a period of five years is too much for any country, not to speak of a small republic entangled in endless contradictions and political conflicts and living through a permanent economic crisis. Internal threats to security are stronger and more dangerous than external ones, and, accordingly, to secure stability as the foundation of the vital activity is the task to be fulfilled by the state, which has not only to declare the concepts of national security, but should also implement them, which it has failed to do properly for the past decade, and can hardly cope with it at present. Kyrgyz citizens themselves do not hold guarantees of stable life of much account, which is manifested in their constant migration to neighboring and far-off countries.

The humanitarian aspect of security is actualized as a consequence of the revolutions taking place in the republic, whereas the dominant factor of the destruction of security in Kyrgyzstan is the *political* factor. The constant crisis of power and conflicts between its representatives result in domestic political instability and, as a consequence, the emergence of threats to economic, cultural, demographic, humanitarian, and the entire national security.

The two decades since Kyrgyzstan's has gained sovereignty have been a history of endless conflicts within the political elite. Unfortunately, the political security of the republic suffers and depends on individual political figures and clans. From the beginning of the sovereign history of our state it was Askar Akayev who, as the first president of the Kyrgyz Republic, has introduced and supported the negative tradition of political leadership which has led to the notorious upheavals and coups.

Political cataclysms are manifested with especial force in the period of elections to the main legislative body of power (Zhogorku Kenesh), thus reflecting the actualization of the phenomenon of *tribalism* in the political sphere. Tribal features of political consciousness proved stable and strong enough, which contributed to their inclusion in modern politics. The present-day political process is full of tribalism which passes into vividly expressed regionalism.

In this context it would be necessary to emphasize the deeply original features of *political consciousness* and *public memory* which predetermine the non-standard character of historical, political and socio-cultural life. The specificity of political consciousness and public memory is manifested in that power had historically been regarded as something sacral in Central Asia (particularly among the Kyrgyzs). After gaining sovereignty it has increased, which was partly a reaction to the bans and restrictions in the epoch of socialism, and during the transition period a new wave of "democratic sacralization" of power came into being. Public memory includes ethnic memory, just as political consciousness retains traits of generic consciousness, which inevitably leads to tribalism. Uniform political culture is absent, and the process of coexistence of traditional political culture with modern political thinking is observed.

It is common knowledge that the elite as the bearer of innovative ideas and organizer of practical actions should become the initiator of important social transformations. It is the elite that initiates cardinal changes in social development, political system and socio-cultural innovations. What do we have in our republic in this respect? Neither the elite nor the counter-elite which emerged in the first years of sovereignty could bear the brunt of responsibility and raise high the symbols of independence during the period of independence with dignity. To be honest we should admit that there is no *really national elite* which was able to take upon itself the burden of people's aspirations and carry it with responsibility and dignity. Our elite changes after every elections to Zhogorku Kenesh and sinks again into unending conflicts. The level of political culture of many representatives of the elite is catastrophically low. It is sad and funny to hear their speeches full of banal slogans. The popular masses heed and take up their slogans only during the days of "revolutions," when they really inspire them to militant actions. But in everyday life full of ordinary cares and concerns slogans cannot influence people, inasmuch as they have long lost trust in the powers that be.

Another aspect of security, military, is closely connected with the political factor, and it shows its instability at present, setting various political forces against one another. *Military* security is a priority for any state, all the more so for a small republic, which does not have a sufficient potential for protecting its territorial integrity. For the second decade already this aspect reflects the clash of interests of Russia and the United States, when the subject of discussion was the granting of military bases or the presence of military contingent. This problem, which remained unresolved since the time of President A. Akayev, has exacerbated during K. Bakiyev's presidency. Kyrgyzstan proved unable

to evolve a well-substantiated tactics of interaction, aggravating now one now another course of interstate relations.

The inability or unwillingness of the elite to determine strategic priorities for ensuring national security is one of the most serious difficulties. Today this problem is actualized with greater force, inasmuch as it is not possible to have a cake and eat it simultaneously. Kyrgyzstan now has to determine its strategic orientations. Besides, according to certain analysts, as far as the positions of regional security in the 21st century are concerned, Kyrgyzstan will face the potential threat of religious extremism and inevitable border conflicts with neighboring states. Among other things, it may touch on disputable water and land problems and territorial claims caused by unresolved state border issues, interethnic problems, national-territorial settlement of the population, etc.³ In this sense, according to a CSTO agreement, the Russian base in Kant where a Russian military unit is deployed, is a long-term element of the system of ensuring external security in the conditions when Kyrgyzstan's armed forces as the main component of the system of military security and, consequently, the system itself, do not answer the requirements of the defense needs of the country and are unable to guarantee its security.⁴ At the present stage a radical reform of the military security system on new principles is necessary.

Another important aspect of security is the *socio-economic* one, reflecting the interaction of economic and social being. The economy of Kyrgyzstan is in a state of permanent crisis. Migration and poverty are the most difficult and contradictory problems which largely increase social tension in society. From this point of view, the most pressing problem in terms of the country's survival is the need for the urgent creation of the foundation, principles and spheres of its economic and political security, as well as the development of economic diplomacy for tackling questions connected with economic development and

economic security.⁵ However, all this is not properly developed in the republic, there is no culture of promoting the economic interests of Kyrgyzstan abroad, and the cultural level of work with donor organizations is extremely low. Economic security is reflected in the position of the middle class which should be the foundation of the stability of economic life. Although the republican authorities undertake certain attempts to ease the tax burden on the small and medium-sized business, one cannot say that there are favorable conditions for its development in the country. Economic security is systemic by itself, inasmuch as it has internal and external sources, however, strategy should be uniform. Such strategy is absent in Kyrgyzstan, accordingly, the problems of economic security are far from solution.

Ecological security is a special aspect of security, and it presupposes inclusion of the state in the general course of globalization. Ecological programs in the republic are practically ineffective. True, water problems are posed from time to time (uniquely pure water is Kyrgyzstan's national wealth; it supplies it to the entire region), but these questions of strategic character are not connected with the survival of the republic and therefore they are not dealt with permanently.

One of the elements of traditional nomadic culture, which is a source of Kyrgyz culture, has always been ecological thinking, as it were: the Kyrgyz nomad has always lived and thought in complete harmony with the surrounding world, which is the main specific feature of nomadic culture and its distinction from settled one.⁶

The formation of positive security in Kyrgyzstan should be of systemic nature, both in theory and practice. It should be based on *national interests*, and its slogans should have a profound strategic nature. It is necessary for the elite to form new thinking proceeding

from the ideas of integrity of society and stability of development. In this respect the *ideology* of a state acquires great importance, unfortunately, such ideology has not been evolved in Kyrgyzstan over the two decades of sovereignty. Our republic should have comprehensive strategic programs of the development of all spheres of life – economic, political, social and cultural. All this should be concentrated in state ideology.

It is necessary to realize that without well-thought-out ideology the future of Kyrgyzstan is quite unstable. In this sense civil identity is quite important, especially taking into account the poly-ethnic character of our society. So far we have not overcome the *crisis of identity* in our country, which is a consequence of the crisis of state development. Without developing the phenomenon of *civic identity* there should be no talk of a possibility of cohesion of the people around any idea.

The absence of well-pronounced civic identity makes it possible to manage the feelings of various ethnic groups, especially in the period of social and ethnic tension. Consolidation of society is not possible without civic identity. Patriotism is a major component of civic identity, inasmuch as it expresses man's unity with society and the state.

Information security has acquired special importance recently. External sources sometimes play an essential role in the formation and propaganda of a negative image, an example of which is provided by numerous articles and other material in the mass and electronic media. It was the case of many countries in the days of the Kyrgyz revolutions. In this sense Kyrgyzstan invariably loses information wars and inevitably finds itself in unfavorable position.

Finally, it can be said that Kyrgyzstan needs a renovated strategy of positive security which is capable to reveal the sources of conflicts and to forestall threats.

Notes

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STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND IRAN

The Russian state, recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union over two decades ago, needs reliable partners, and the Islamic Republic of Iran could be one of them. For today, the need to develop strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran is determined by a number of important factors.

The history of diplomatic relations between the two states dates back to 1562. The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the priority areas of cooperation for the Russian Federation in the East. This is a country with a growing population (79 million in 2013), the majority of which are young people.

Iran, being the world center of Shi'ism and having a huge impact on Muslims, practicing Shia Islam, is interested in restricting separatist movements, both within the country, and across the Eurasian region, including the Russian Federation. Located between the Caucasus and the Indian Ocean in south-west Asia, washed by the Caspian Sea in the north and the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman in the south, the country is a strategic platform that allows to control the situation in the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Caspian Sea basin.

Struggle for Regional Leadership

Iran is a southern neighbor of Russia, sharing the waters of the Caspian Sea with it. For today the struggle for energy resources of the Caspian basin comes to the fore on the international agenda, not only in the region but also globally. 61 percent of world oil reserves and about 40 percent of world gas reserves are in the territory of the Middle East. The legal status of the Caspian Sea is under discussion for many years. It is not only the countries that border on the Caspian Sea are interested in it. The Western countries that are dependent on eastern energy resources pursue a policy of penetration in the Caspian region through their Eastern partners, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan. Third countries constantly try to join the process of dividing the oil fields in the region, the United States declared the Caspian Sea a “zone of its vital interests” in 1997.

Relations between Russia and Iran are of particular importance and increase the need for cooperation of all five littoral states (Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). Russia and Iran hold similar view that interference of a “third force” in resolving the Caspian issue runs counter to their strategic interests. The essence of the Russian-Iranian position is to prevent external actors in the

affairs of the Caspian region, creating a comfortable environment for discussion of the legal status of the Caspian Sea only in the format of an agreement between the littoral states. Russia and Iran have jointly declared that they will not accept any agreement on the issue concluded in another format. Not only Western countries, but also the neighboring states, whose interests include both the routes of transportation of Caspian resources and the strengthening of their influence in the region can be regarded “third countries”. Turkey can serve as an example of a “third country”, which is one of the main opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the struggle for regional influence over the years. The Iranian leadership is very sensitive about Turkey's commitment to a secular form of government in Muslim countries. In addition, the interests of these countries are contrary to a number of issues at this stage, for example with regard to Egypt.

On the one hand, differences in religious preferences, political and economic development models, rivalry for influence in the Middle East and, finally, the Western orientation of Turkish policy, are the reasons for cooling the Iranian-Turkish relations. Thus, the policy of Turkey, which is a stronghold of NATO in the Caspian region, promotes rapprochement between Russia and Iran.

On the other hand, Turkey is an important actor in the region and can become a partner of Russia and Iran in containing conflicts and establishing security in the South Caucasus, and, in the future, in the entire Middle East. Prevention of major wars in the region can and should be the goal of this alliance. It should be emphasized once again that neither Russia nor Iran is interested in expanding the presence of foreign actors in the region, and that the positions of these countries largely coincide with respect to regional security.

Priorities for Cooperation with Russia

Today there are positive prospects for trade and economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. On December 13, 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding on long-term trade, economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation was signed by the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the seventh session of the Permanent Russian-Iranian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation in Moscow. A special place in a document is taken by the energy sector, as both countries have large reserves of oil and gas, and they can play together an important role in fixing the price of oil products on the world market. On July 14, 2010, the “road map” of Iranian-Russian cooperation in the field of energy in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors was signed in Moscow by the Ministry of Petroleum of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. It should also be noted that on December 13, 2007, the Parties signed an agreement on cooperation in the sphere of tourism. At the same time the legal base of Russian-Iranian cooperation is expanding. On December 11, 2007, the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of standardization and metrology was signed between the Russian Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology and the Iranian Institute of Standards and Industrial Research.

At present energy cooperation is the most active and promising areas of bilateral economic relations. In 1967, Iran launched a nuclear program with the help of the United States; Germany and France have joined their collaboration later. However, the construction of the nuclear power plant was suspended in 1980. The new government of Iran has abandoned the NPP construction program after the Islamic

Revolution of 1979. However, the Iranian authorities have returned to the program a few years later, when the situation in the country stabilized. Negotiations on cooperation on the peaceful atom have begun between the Iran and the Soviet Union before the collapse of the latter. The first agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and an agreement on the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran were signed between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of the Russian Federation in 1992. The city of Bushehr was chosen as the place for Russian nuclear scientists' work, because there was an unfinished nuclear power plant started by the Germans. In 1998 the construction work was transferred to the company "Atomstroieksport", and the "Bushehr" NPP was commissioned in September 2011.

The Bushehr nuclear power plant is the largest joint project of Iran and Russia for today and there is a prospect of continued cooperation. At present negotiations are underway for an agreement on the construction of new units for "Bushehr". In addition to the above-mentioned aspects of cooperation between Russia and Iran, there are such promising areas as the construction of oil refinery complexes, the development of gas fields in Iran, cooperation in the engineering industry, as well as cooperation in the development of innovative technologies and medicine in Iran. The positions of Iran and Russia are also similar in the fight against the growing drug trafficking, considering that the main threat in the region is the flow of drugs from Afghanistan, as well as religious extremism. On December 16, 1997, June 29, 1999 and August 10, 2005, the parties signed a number of documents on the fight against drugs, in particular, the Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to combat illicit drug trafficking and psychotropic substances.

In addition, there were paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Final Declaration, signed by the heads of the Caspian states in Tehran, October 16, 2007, which were devoted to the problem of combating drug production and trafficking. Under the agreements, Russia and Iran will cooperate in the exchange of information on combating this evil, operational-search activities in this area, exchange of experience, as well as exchange of legislative and legal acts, training of specialists, etc.

Problems and Prospects of Cooperation

However, there are certain difficulties in the way of cooperation between Russia and Iran. The first difficulty is the economic sanctions, imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Today, Iran is a country in economic isolation. The authorities have launched an anti-American propaganda campaign after the fall of the Shah's regime in 1979. The United States, along with other major powers (including the U.S.S.R.) were declared hostile regimes with wrong and illegal models of social development. In 1995 the United States introduced the first and quite serious sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Transnational companies were forbidden to invest into the development of oil resources of Iran over \$20 million. Penalties were envisaged for companies which violated the terms of sanctions, including denial of assistance from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, denial of export licenses, ban on the issuance of loans or credits from financial institutions of the United States in excess of \$1 million over a 12-month period, etc. Iran has suspended its nuclear program for several decades under the pressure of sanctions. However, in 2005, the nuclear rhetoric sounded again in connection with the coming to power of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran's position has become tougher in negotiations with the United States and the EU on the nuclear issue, as

well as on suspension of uranium enrichment, previously agreed with the UK, Germany and France.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with some members of the international community, has published certain information about the development of Iran's nuclear program, which could be used for the production of nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran proclaimed the peaceful nature of the program. The UN Security Council imposed four packages of sanctions from 2006 to 2010 due to the threat of nuclear proliferation in Iran, which set certain limits on that country, including a ban on import of Iranian oil, export of a wide range of products from high-tech equipment to medicines, and financial and other transactions with Iran's banks. Iran's foreign assets valued at \$4.2 billion have been frozen. Despite the sanctions, Iran has remained Russia's partner in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

These sanctions have had an impact on the implementation of the major “Anaran” joint project. Problems began in 2007 when the Russian “Lukoil” Company, participating in the development of this oil field (where its share was 20%, while the share of the Norwegian Statoil Company – 80%), informed about the difficulties, arising from imposition of sanctions against Iran. In 2010, the Russian company withdrew from the project, but in 2014, the company representatives announced that “Lukoil” is ready to work on the project independently, after the lifting of sanctions. In 2013, with the beginning of the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, Iran's nuclear issue was put on the agenda of international negotiations again, as a result of active steps of the leadership of Russia and Iran striving to resolve the problem. In November 2013, representatives of six powers (Russia, U.S.A., UK, France, Germany and China) and Iran made progress in the negotiations on the nuclear issue. The contracting parties have concluded a number

of agreements on temporary restriction of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for a partial suspension of the sanctions, including the unfreezing of Iranian assets in foreign banks. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, proposed a plan to resolve the situation step by step.

Although the representatives of the United States declared that the lifting of the sanctions should be temporary and have a retroactive effect, the Six in cooperation with Iran can continue the process of negotiations on this issue. The gradual lifting of the sanctions can result in the coming of international corporations on the Iranian market and, as a result, growing competition for Russian companies. A detailed study of the Iranian economy would facilitate the adjustment of the situation in the interest of Russian investors and manufacturers, while continuing the negotiations on the nuclear issue.

There are contradictions in the positions of Russia and Iran on the division of the Caspian Sea. Each party had the right to 50 percent of the Caspian Sea surface in accordance with agreements between the USSR and Iran signed in 1921 and 1940. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the existing status quo. It became obvious that there is the need for a new legal regime of the Caspian Sea, and its working out would require a long period of time.

To date, Russia proposes the following: determination of the boundaries of the territorial waters of 12 or 24 miles, "co-ownership" of the rest of the water area, partition of the Caspian seabed, joint use of the water surface. Iran offers: sharing the waters of the territorial sea of at least 12 nautical miles, exclusive economic zone of 35 miles, commonly used water area, and equitable sharing of the area to 20 percent for each country. Despite the existing differences, the negotiations on the legal status of the sea continue and a solution

to the problem lies in the area of interests of Russia and Iran, as well as other coastal states.

There have been certain differences in military-technical cooperation between Russia and Iran in recent years. In 2007, Russia and Iran signed a contract worth about \$800 million, providing for the delivery of five S-300pmu-1 divisions to that country. However, the ordered equipment has not been transferred to Iran. On June 9, 2010, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution prohibiting the supply of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, warships, attack helicopters, missiles or missile systems to Iran. On June 22, 2010, The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree, introducing an embargo on the transfer of S-300 missiles, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters and ships to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In turn, Iran filed a lawsuit for \$4 billion to the International Court of Arbitration in Geneva against the Russian company “Rosoboronexport” in connection with the revocation of the contract by the latter. To date, the Iranian side does not give up the lawsuit, but at the same time does not exclude such a possibility, if the parties reach an optimal agreement.

The question of trust is a stumbling block in relations between Moscow and Tehran. There is a large proportion of the population of Iran having negative feelings about Russia and Russians. In turn, Russians, especially young people, do not even have a general idea about the current state of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its people. Studying the mentality of the two peoples, especially doing business in Russia and Iran, expanding mutual cultural relations, and paying greater attention to work of cultural representatives of each country could promote the formation of strategic partnerships.

Summing up, it should be noted that the existing problems are not antagonistic and unsolvable in bilateral relations. On the contrary,

awareness and recognition of the problems help to focus attention on their resolution, which will contribute to the development of cooperation between the two countries. Confidence in positive prospects for cooperation rests on a solid foundation. Russia and Iran have similar systems of mental values:

- Tradition as opposed to modernity and negative effects of globalization;
- Community as opposed to individualism;
- State and political organization of society as opposed to the domination of supranational (transnational) structures;
- Striving for the unconditional preservation of identity as opposed to the “melting pot” and multiculturalism.

The Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a news conference on December 19, 2013, that Iran was one of the priorities among Russian partners in the region, a neighbor of Russia, and the development of relations with Iran in all spheres was the principal choice of Russia.

Thus, the long history of bilateral relations, the geographical position of the two neighboring countries, similar positions on many key policy issues, mutual interest in increasing trade relations – all this substantiates the inevitability and necessity of the development of Russian-Iranian relations and broad, long-term cooperation.

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**THE PROBLEM OF MULTICULTURALISM AND
CONFLICT POTENTIAL OF THE DIASPORA**

People of different cultures have different views on the world. The only condition for the peaceful coexistence of different peoples with different cultures is a community of interests in the broad sense of the word, a certain connecting factor. Europe speaks about the failure of the policy of multiculturalism. D. Medvedev presents Russia of the future as a country of maximal tolerance. What choice will be made: rejection or acceptance of the principle of multiculturalism?

It is necessary to distinguish between the processes of cultural interaction at a global level and at a local one. The objective historical process of globalization, that is, internationalization of the productive forces and need for consumption, leads to a synthesized planetary culture (infinitely distant goal). In fact, multiculturalism will exist on the planet while there are ethnic arrays. The greater the powerful potential of disintegration and the greater increase in the number of conflicts and their aggravation on the basis of financial, economic, corporate, ethno-national and religious clashes, the greater the opposition to globalization and the greater awareness of the community of interests of the international community. The reason is a sharp discrepancy between the development rate of the elements of the “triad” of society – the productive forces, and production relations and social consciousness – on a global scale. The pace of change in social relations, especially in public mind, is not commensurate with the rates of the technological revolution in the globalization era. It takes time to overcome the inertia of the existing relations and consciousness, especially in the East. Otherwise, the world will remain divided,

unequal and full of conflicts, although it is becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent.

The process of cultural integration also takes place in countries with multi-ethnic population, but significantly faster, due to the territorial limitations of the state, a relatively small population compared to the global population, and awareness of the existence of common interests of the peoples in these countries. Especially in the so-called ideological states that have arisen on the basis of ideological constructs (Communist U.S.S.R., Zionist Israel, and Muslim Pakistan). Cultures of ethnic minorities are powerfully influenced by the culture of the dominant ethnic group in a multi-ethnic country, and, preserving their ethnic identity, they tend to lose elements of their ethnic specificity which complicate their existence in a multi-ethnic environment. Closeness of ethno-cultural groups constrains integration processes in the nation-states, giving rise to concerns in Europe in connection with the growth of the abnormal number of immigrants.

I will dare make some comments about the conflict potential of diasporas, or closed national and social formations.

My book “The Mentality of the Diaspora” was published ten years ago. I wanted to understand how people felt in emigration, on what principles The Diaspora mentality was formed. Even then it was obvious that the co-existence of the Diaspora and its host society was fraught with conflict. The Review of “International Migration: A Global Challenge” (Mentality 7) was published in Washington in 1996. There are no less than 15 million migrants in Europe today. The Diaspora has become a part of the host society, regarding itself as a natural, even necessary, element, although there are many shades in their relationships: from good-neighborly to ill-concealed antagonism. There is the division in “friend and foe”. The Diaspora has its own

organization, sphere of services (doctors, lawyers, clerics, merchants), spiritual superstructure (traditions, historical memory, and culture). Although relationships between immigrants and the host society is based on mutual interest, their internal interests do not always coincide. Their goals are the same: self-preservation, but the goal of the host society is the preservation of stability and identity, and the Diaspora's goal is the matter of life and death. The potential of the conflict – complication of relations between the parties – is enclosed in a conflict of interest. Immigrants are not a problem for the recipient society, because they are few in number, represent an amorphous group of individuals, and are in a process of structuring the Diaspora, while it transforms into a social organism with the growing number of its members. At this stage, the host society forces the Diaspora to serve its interests, leaving immigrants a living space that is not occupied by original inhabitants.

Society is usually tolerant to immigrants until they become a cause of social tension. A growth in the number of immigrants (legal or illegal) creates difficulties for recipient countries, which are connected with the problems of social adaptation and discrimination on ethnic grounds and manifestations of racial prejudice. The demographic and confessional structure, and partly, cultural climate of the West, have been changed under the influence of the Diaspora. The Diaspora is increasingly a social and political actor in the struggle for privileges, for the right of cultural and religious identity in order to strengthen its position in the country of residence. This is unacceptable to society and exacerbates social tensions. Suffice it to recall the outrages committed by marginal North African youth in France in 2005, suffering from unemployment, and the problems that arose in the late 80s in connection with the prohibition of wearing the traditional Muslim headscarf by female students.

Conflicts associated with immigrants cause serious concern in the West. There is much talk about the threat of the Islamization of Europe, about the failure of the policy of assimilation and multiculturalism – the free development of culture in immigration.

The Diaspora is considered to be a part of the ethnic group, living outside its country of origin. These are people who leave their native country in search for a better life, or for political reasons. The Diaspora is a foreign element, a genetically alien group of people for the recipient country. Relations between them have many shades: from good neighborliness to latent antagonism.

Immigrants have made an invaluable contribution to the development of the North American economy and the restoration of the West European economy after World War II. Foreign workers accounted for about ten percent of the active population of Western Europe on the threshold of the third millennium. They have become an integral part of the host society by showing the local people to see them as a natural and necessary element. The number of legal and illegal immigrants, mainly from Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing rapidly in the Euro-Atlantic world from the 1960s.

At the first stage of the immigrant history, certain mistrust prevailed in the host society and immigrant-outsiders could only rely on their own strength in the struggle for survival. They were under protection of a collective in a structured community-enclave, a custodian of community interests in the Diaspora.

The degree of conflict in the “immigrant-native” relationship depends both on the nature of the Diaspora, as well as on political and social climate in the host country. Generally, the harder the conditions of life for immigrants, the more important for them to have a Diaspora as a social structure that can help them, and the closer its cohesion,

sometimes approaching self-imposed isolation. An inferiority complex, a sense of alienation develops among immigrants, complicating the process of adaptation. Conversely, the more favorable is the environment, the less important is the support of the Diaspora, the closer is its communion with the native population, and the easier is integration.

Immigration policy of recipient countries is a variable quantity. The high degree of tolerance of other religions and peoples, which the West boasts, is reduced as soon as there is no urgent need for manpower and there are problems with the provision of social guarantees for immigrants. Attempts to integrate them either by assimilation or as part of the policy of multiculturalism fail in an atmosphere of xenophobia and malevolence. This applies primarily to people from Asian and African countries that make up the vast majority of immigrants in Europe, and a significant section of the disadvantaged social bottom. An immigrant is “twice alien” if he is African or Asian. According to sociological surveys, published in 1997, xenophobia is common among thirty-four percent of the population in Germany, 55 percent of the population in Belgium, 38 percent of the population in France, and 32 percent of the population in England². Territorial and cross-border movement of people has become a mass phenomenon, the global information space has been formed that promoted politicization of public consciousness in the developing world. Experience of nation-states unable to solve vital problems, a contrast between the living conditions of the “golden billion” and the peoples of Asia and Africa, the democratization of education, the expansion of Western culture – all this led to the emancipation of the consciousness of Asia and Africa. It seems that their inferiority complex has been replaced by the awareness of their worthiness. Civil, cultural, ethnic and religious

identities become a form of awareness of self-worth for them. They want to live by their own rules.

Globalization does not change the basic characteristics of life of diasporas. Coexistence of immigrants and the host society is still based on mutual interest. However, they are not actively seeking integration into the society of the country of residence in the mainstream of assimilation, and the policy of multiculturalism has not led to the gradual disappearance of the Diaspora. Immigrant youth of the second and third generations are increasingly demonstrating commitment to and interest in culture and life in their historical homeland. The Diaspora has insistently sought to participate in public and political life of the recipient country.

A special feature of immigration in Europe is predominance of immigrants from Muslim countries – up to 10 percent. Western Europe is the natural center of attraction for immigrants from its former colonies in the Middle East, Africa, India, as well as Southeast Asia for Chinese and the United States for Latinos. The integration process is associated with considerable difficulties, since emigration faces hardly compatible socio-cultural traditions of the West and the East. Egyptians adapt to the cultural environment of any Arab country and enter into its society quite easily, as compared with representatives of another culture. All necessary mechanisms exist in the mentality of an Egyptian, which are capable to respond adequately to the changes in living conditions. And vice versa: the greater the distance, the harder it is to adapt to the new conditions of life. This is especially true of Muslims.

Adherence to Islam has become the main feature of the overwhelming majority of migrants from Muslim countries for the local population. They are all Muslims first of all, and only then Turks, Arabs, Pakistanis or Afghans. Islam has become a way of life for

believers, religious community is above any community for them. This is the uniqueness of Islam. Muslims regard any insult as an attack on their faith, and insulting their sanctities is considered a challenge to the entire Muslim community.

Insofar as Islam represents and legitimates socially accepted concepts of good and evil, this religion has always been a powerful factor in the manipulation of public consciousness. Islam offers a model to overcome socio-economic and spiritual crises, defining social and political behavior of believers. Immigrants painfully react to the Western political diktat in their country of origin and to the hegemony of the financial, economic and cultural media, and that steps up the processes of Islamization and re-Islamization of public life in Muslim countries.

The influence of Islamists is growing among the Muslim diaspora in the West. Islamism is a global theocentric project chosen by Muslims for the idea of salvation of mankind from secularism, nationalism and globalization. Islamists believe that all troubles come as a consequence of non-compliance with the commandments of the Koran, the expansion of Western consumer and materialistic civilization that threatens Muslim spiritual values, the advancement of materialistic ideologies and Western morality, the Western principle of separating politics from religion, and pro-Western orientation of the rulers of certain Muslim countries.

Simple and accessible formulation of the essence of Islam contributes to the successful promotion of ordinary Muslims. Its essence is that the Sharia is God-established law of social life; everything that does not comply with the Sharia, is the deviation from the true path, is evil that must be destroyed in the name of goodness and justice on earth. Islamist rhetoric meets with understanding on the part of the protesting Muslim population.

The more people lose faith in the possibility to achieve justice, as they understand it, the more conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims, the greater the influence of radical Islamists.

Islamism generated by the crisis situation in the Middle East in the latter half of the twentieth century and a combination of economic and political factors with the specifics of Islam, is consonant with protest sentiments of both educated and uneducated Muslims, townspeople and villagers, intellectuals and lower social strata, people of the right and left, anti-Westerners and moderate people acting only against western expansionism, and also religious extremists.

The great danger of radical Islamism waging a holy war for the revival of the Islamic Caliphate and world domination of the Sharia law, consists precisely of the fact, that a one-sixth of humanity professes Islam. Islamists try to raise the protest level of Muslims to the contradiction between Muslim and Christian civilizations.

Islamist activities led to a sharp increase in anti-Islamic sentiment in connection with the growing influence of Muslims in the Euro-Atlantic world. Public opinion in the Western countries, for the most part, believes that extremism and terrorism are inherent in Islam. The West is worried that European culture can be absorbed by the culture of Muslims. Tolerance of Europeans seems to be waning.

Nationalists of all sorts call for the protection of Europe from Islamization, and their appeals find positive response on the part of the broad public.

Thus, coexistence and mutual understanding between the Diaspora and the host society is the norm today. However, the growing immigrant communities increasingly demand that Western society consider more seriously and pay greater attention to the specifics

of their world perception and cultural features, all that creates conflicts and intractable problems.

Notes

¹ Voprosy istorii [Questions of History] 1998, № 9. p. 72

² Novaia Gazeta 29.09.2010

*“Strany Vostika: Sotsialno-politicheskie, sotsialno-ekonomicheskie, etnokonfessionalnye i Sotsiokulturnye problemy v kontekste globalizatsii”,
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