

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENTIFIC
INFORMATION
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

**RUSSIA
AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2013 – 7 (253)**

**Science-information bulletin
The Bulletin was founded in 1992**

**Moscow
2013**

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Information in Social Sciences
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)

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CONTENTS

Y. Boiko, E. Sadykova. Provinces of Special Importance	4
D. Mulyukova. Formation and Development of Regional Political Myths in Modern Russia.....	11
Indira Kadimova. Specific Features of Political Modernization in the Republic of Dagestan	18
Alim Temirbulatov. Geopolitical Factors of Influence of the Caspian Region in Assessments of U.S. Experts	25
Georgi Rudov. Central Asia in Strategic Concepts of Russia.....	32
Valentin Bogatyrev. The Least of All Evils	39
Ekaterina Borisova, Sergei Panarin. Security Contradictions on the Example of Water and Energy Problems of Central Asia	45
Aziz Niyazi. The Development of Uzbekistan in 2012 and Plans for 2013.....	53

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PROVINCES OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

In the present period of global importance Russia is facing major tasks connected with modernization processes. The need to work out new mechanisms of implementing effective economic reforms, the problem of widespread terrorism, criminalization of various spheres of public life, the stepping up of migration processes, etc. require the constant improvement of state management at the federal and regional levels. The new conditions of the advancement of states predetermine the need to correlate national interests with universal and regional tendencies of the development of the world community.

Russia is the biggest Eurasian power having the greatest number of bordering countries on land. Among its maritime neighbors are such countries as the United States and Japan, Turkey and Iran. As a result of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. fifteen newly-formed states have emerged almost simultaneously. In most of the 83 legal parts of the Russian Federation (RF) the administrative borders coincide with the state borders passing along seas, land and rivers. Some parts of the Russian Federation have inherited the “old” borders of the Soviet period. These include the Astrakhan, Kaliningrad and Leningrad

regions, the Krasnodar territory, and the republics of Altai and Dagestan. The political, economic and social transformations going on in Russia after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. have undoubtedly exerted a profound influence on the formation of new federative relations in Russia. The transition process in the development of Russian statehood in the new conditions has passed unevenly and was accompanied with a host of difficulties. Along with the tasks of the political and economic transformation of the country, the problem of the change and improvement of relations between the federal center and the regions, with a view to creating a stable democratic state, was especially urgent. The well-known Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin wrote that “federation is only possible where the people (or peoples) have learnt the art of reaching agreement or a compromise... Bent to discord, respect of one’s own personal view and insistence on one’s own opinion, as well as vanity, conceit, arbitrariness, etc. are unacceptable to federation.” Definitely, the events of the initial period of the formation of independent Russia have confirmed the thoughts of this outstanding philosopher.

After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the separatist forces in individual regions have stepped up their activities in an attempt to follow suit the example of the former Union republics of the U.S.S.R., that is, proclaim their sovereignty, thus contributing to centrifugal tendencies. At that time the question of the new principles of building the Russian state became quite urgent. Its solution could only be successful with due account of the multinational and multiconfessional composition of the state (about 175 ethnic groups and peoples). An unstable political situation was aggravated by socio-economic problems in the conditions of a transition state.

The Strategy of national security of the Russian Federation up to 2020 points out that “Russia has overcome the aftermath of the

systemic political and socio-economic crisis at the end of the 20th century: it prevented the downfall of the level and quality of the living standards of the Russian citizens,, withstood the onslaught of nationalism, separatism and international terrorism, stopped the discredit campaign aimed against the constitutional system, preserved sovereignty and territorial integrity, restored the possibility of increasing its competitiveness, and protecting its national interests as a key subject of the multipolar international relations.

The problems of internal regionalization have a great importance in these processes. The tasks of modernizing the Russian social system cannot be solved successfully without due account of this factor. In the new conditions of world development the role of internal regions for the safe existence and functioning of the state becomes ever more significant. Transfer to a stable development of the Russian Federation as a whole is only possible along with ensuring a stable and secure progress of all regions. This is a must for the preservation and functioning of a country as an entity. Russia continues to go through all-round reforms, and the new political, economic, social and cultural realities require the further clarification and improvement of the system of mutual relations between the parts of the Federation. The unique position of Russia in the Eurasian area needs to evolve its own geostrategic model as the quintessence of different national, cultural and confessional interests and values. Above all, the influence of the geographical specificities of Russian territories situated at the joint of the civilizations of the West and the East should always be taken into account. At the cultural-civilization level Russia borders, as it were, on the Buddhist, Islamic and West European cultural systems. Some peoples and regions are drawn, in one degree or another, to the European system of values, others – to the values of Oriental civilizations. The borders of the Russian Federation with China in the

Far East and with Finland and Norway in the North-West are cultural and political frontiers. In the Caucasus state borders touch on countries related to different cultural systems.

The post-Soviet area has become one of the serious seats of instability at the present development stage of international relations. The growth of ethno-nationalistic and ethno-separatist sentiments and tendencies, ethnic and territorial conflicts, greater activity of the extremist forces, organized crime, etc. create serious problems in the sphere of ensuring security not only in the post-Soviet area, but also beyond its borders. The effectiveness of the measures to oppose these negative trends is lowered by the problems of international-legal nature coming from a whole number of states, and shortcomings of the border infrastructure. Among the border regions which have been subjected to considerable foreign influence during their entire history, the North Caucasian region and the Far Eastern regions should be singled out, which lie far from the Center of the Federation and are quite close to states of another, Oriental civilization. A special place is taken by Kaliningrad region in the North-West of the Russian Federation. The geopolitical situation of the North Caucasian republics at the crossroads of civilizations creates a complex system of their interaction with the Islamic and Christian worlds, the states of the South Caucasus and the Russian regions bordering on the North Caucasus. This factor exerts a profound influence on the conflictogenic nature of the entire region. Researchers of the problem turn their attention to the active migration processes characteristic of the region, including constant inflow and outflow of people from the central regions of Russia. Growing emigration from the North Caucasian region as a result of wars and revolutions in the 19th and the 20th centuries led to the formation of numerous and influential diasporas of Cherkessians (Adygs), Chechens

and other ethnic groups of the North Caucasus in several countries of the Middle East and in Turkey.

The difficult problems of the North Caucasus had emerged back in Soviet times due to resettlement of entire peoples, revision and changes of borders, and uneven distribution of industries. The socio-economic and ethnopolitical processes, which began in the republics of the former U.S.S.R. in the late-1980s – early 1990s considerably increased social tension in the North Caucasus and led to interethnic conflicts. The most vivid and tragic were the “Chechen crisis” and the Ossetian-Ingush conflicts of 1992. From the early 1990s the North Caucasus has been the most troublesome region of Russia in which conflicts flared up virtually one after another. At present the criminogenic situation in the region still persists, various gangs make armed raids against law-enforcement agencies and units, army and police groups, and various objects in border districts,

In determining approaches to solution of the above-mentioned problems we should proceed from the following basic factors which considerably complicate the implementation of the uniform federal strategy in the region: the low level of socio-economic development; multi-ethnicity (more than 40 indigenous peoples and ethnic groups); policonfessionality (Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism); overpopulation (the most densely populated region of Russia with a great shortage of low-lying lands); low employment of the population; complex demographic situation (uneven settlement, migration processes, refugee problems); territorial disputes between people inhabiting the region; problems of separatism, extremism and criminality, etc. In examining the main factors which have an impact on stability in the North Caucasian region, it is necessary to take into account the potential of outside interference supporting the extremist forces and using interethnic and interconfessional contradictions.

The territory of the Russian Far East has an important place in the geopolitical vectors of the Russian Federation. Parts of that region have different areas, natural resources, socio-economic development level, number of the population, etc. Borders with foreign countries of the region determine the specificity of its national composition. For example, about 40,000 Koreans live on the territory of the region. It is also necessary to mention the problems of the southern border districts of the Far Eastern Federal region connected with labor and illegal migration from China.

Ethnocultural specific features are largely determined by the centers of Buddhism in Buryatia and Tyva, as well as the districts of the Federation inhabited by Altai, Tuvin, Khakas, Shorians, and Buryats, which stretch along the Russian border with Kazakhstan, Mongolia and China. In the northern districts of the Far Eastern region small indigenous ethnic groups of the North with their traditional economic and cultural traditions and customs inhabit very large territories. With due account of the geopolitical conditions of the border regions under review a question arises about possible threats to the strategic interests of the Russian Federation in the Far East. The Asia-Pacific region, part of which is taken by the Far Eastern region of Russia, is an important center of the world economy. Integration in the economic area of this important international structure is very important for the balanced territorial development of the regions of the Far East and a direction of international cooperation of Russia. A great role in this process is given to the development of the economic relations of Russia with border countries on the bilateral basis, and also within the framework of international regional organizations.

World experience shows that one of the reasons for the formation of new ethnic groups can be prolonged isolation of part of an ethnos from the basic ethnic mass. There are many different causes of

this isolation, among them a change in the geopolitical situation and state borders, migration processes, etc. All this is characteristic of Kaliningrad region beginning from 1990, when it became detached from the main territory of Russia due to a change in its geopolitical situation. Kaliningrad region is the only part of the Russian Federation completely isolated from the rest of the country's territory by land borders of foreign countries – Poland and Lithuania and international waters. Among the ethnic groups inhabiting the border territories are Polish and Lithuanian, which exert a profound influence on the development of the region, especially after its entry in international contacts. The special geopolitical position of this region of the Federation plays a major role in ensuring the national interests of Russian in the Baltic area and in Europe as a whole. Among the most important aspects are protecting Russian sovereignty on this territory, turning it into a key Russian region for the development of cooperation with the Baltic countries, and the rapid progress of Russia's economic ties with other states. This region, having broad opportunities for economic cooperation and humanitarian, scientific and information exchanges can contribute to the establishment of greater trust and mutual understanding between the Baltic republics and Russia. The progress of Kaliningrad region is closely connected with Russia's involvement in strategic partnership with the countries of the European Union.

Cooperation within the framework of the economic and strategic interests of the Baltic countries can create a firm basis for regional and European security, where Kaliningrad region occupies a special place due to its specific geopolitical position.

The above-mentioned examples of certain parts of the Russian Federation show that the factor of the geo-civilization model of Russia plays an important role in examining the problems of strengthening

national and state unity. The assessment of the role of Russia in inter-civilizational cooperation is impossible without examination of the problems of interethnic and interconfessional dialogue in Russia. A study of the role of geopolitical development factors of parts of the Russian Federation in the conditions of globalization and regionalization processes makes it possible to form an integral and systemic idea about the specific features of the influence of modern challenges and threats to Russia and possible approaches to evolving measures to overcome the political and economic asymmetry of its parts.

Internal political stability of Russia largely depends on drawing closer the interests of the peoples inhabiting it, creating conditions for their all-round cooperation, and implementing well-thought-out nationalities and regional policy. A comprehensive approach to tackling these tasks should form the basis of domestic policy of the state ensuring its progress as a multinational and democratic federative state.

“Mir i politika.”, Moscow, 2012, No 12, pp. 130–134.

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**FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL
POLITICAL MYTHS IN MODERN RUSSIA
(On the example of the Republic of Tatarstan)**

In the early 1990s the people of Russia came across not only with changes in the institutionalized sphere, but also the need to revise radically the values and standards which dominated their life for many years. In the political sphere there was the change of communist ideology to new socio-political myths answering the requirements of post-Soviet society. *Perestroika* began with the myths (“it’s impossible

to live the old way”), was carried on accompanied with the myths (“there is no other way”), and finished under the chord (“market will regulate everything”). The formation of political mythology in the latest history of Russia proceeded at two levels: federal and regional. Local myths were created in answer to the crisis of identity: the leadership of the newly-emerged parts of the Russian Federation had to legitimize its power ideologically. It was easier for the parts formed on the national principle, inasmuch as by that time they had already had certain experience in the creation of their own statehood, and their population had already realized their national identity. In other regions and territories similar processes were not so smooth, sometimes they were accompanied with many difficulties, and uniqueness of one or another region was based on the specific features of its geographical position, historical development, stability of administrative-territorial division, etc.

This article examines the Republic of Tatarstan from the point of view of the formation and distribution of regional political myths on its territory. In connection with the specific features of the political regime which took shape in Tatarstan back in the 1990s and had certain features of authoritarianism, and also due to the fact that the republican elite had in its possession all material and information resources, the region remains the place where all these myths are created and distributed by the local ruling group. From the point of view of mythologizing the political area, the Republic of Tatarstan is of special interest in terms of creating and distributing these myths. First, there are unique relations between the republic and the Federal Center in the sphere of legislation, imposition of taxes, and institutional construction. In many respects this uniqueness contributed to the formation of the present-day federative structure of Russia with its inherent asymmetry and contractual nature. Second, in contrast to many other national

republics within the Russian Federation, the rulers of the Republic of Tatarstan undertook an attempt to create “on top” an official ideology called for helping to form a new regional identity.

In the 1990s, when in the conditions of a total social crisis the development of the political consciousness of the absolute majority of the people of Russia was unable to follow the rapidly changing events, people demanded the maximally simple and understandable explanation of the current processes, which led to the actualization of traditional myths like the “golden age,” “our own – alien,” etc.). The ideal picture of reality given by a political myth is received by the popular masses much better than the actual reality full of cares, concerns and problems.

The researcher V. Achkasova singles out the following main components of regional mythologies which, in our view, were represented in the political life of Tatarstan in the 1990s.

The *historical component* presupposes laying emphasis on public attention toward some or other symbolic periods of local history. Thus, in the 1990s the republican leadership, in its campaign for sovereignty, was striving to single out the “golden age” of independent statehood associated in the consciousness of the ruling elite with the epoch of the Bulgar Kingdom, the Golden Horde and Kazan Khanate.

Missionary activity as an element of local mythology makes it possible to single out the region from a dozen of other administrative-territorial units and emphasize its importance for the entire country. After signing the treaty “On limitation of subjects and competence and mutual delegation of powers between the bodies of the state government of the Russian Federation and those of the Republic of Tatarstan” in 1994, the political elite of the republic began to create an image of a trail-blazer and the leader in the emergence of Russian federalism, and pass its experience for some ideal which should serve as an example for other parts of the Russian Federation, as well as the

Federal Center in particular, in resolving the conflict with the Chechen Republic.

The *geopolitical component* forms the foreign policy of the region. An important element of the foreign political activity of the Republic of Tatarstan is the spreading and popularization of the ideology of Euro-Islam which is a combination of the ideas of reformist Islam, which is closer in spirit to western civilization. This concept is out to protect the image of the republic from labeling it as a region on whose territory the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism are spreading, and thereby to increase its investment attraction. T. Akulov, Director of foreign relations department under the President of Tatarstan, has said the following at a meeting of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: “We believe that modern Tatarstan has succeeded to create a community and religious theory which could be an effective link in Russia’s relations with the Muslim world, and the Muslim world with western traditions.” In other words, the regional elite once again emphasized the important role of the republic in the implementation of Russia’s foreign-policy strategy.

Utopian project-making lends a purposeful character to regional mythopoetry, mobilizing the local community for reaching one or another image of the future. Here it would be worthwhile to mention the myth about national sovereignty as the panacea for all problems, which became widespread throughout Tatarstan in the 1990s. The relations with the Federal Center have always exerted a profound influence on all political processes going on in the republic. Up to the early 1990s Tatarstan was an autonomous republic within the U.S.S.R. and had no legal privileges which the Union republics enjoyed. In the conditions of democratization of political and public life, which began in Tatarstan, many people from among the local population began to demand that the status of the republic be raised and its rights

broadened. The political elite, feeling that these demands might increase its power, unfolded a broad and noisy propaganda campaign.

The image of an enemy and the image of a hero. The regional mythological schemes explain failures of reforms and unpopular political decisions by interference of the “main culprit causing all woes” – the Federal Center. In this context the ruling elite of Tatarstan began to implement its own policy of a soft entering into market from 1992, in contrast to the Russian “shock therapy,” thus assuming the role of the “protector of its fellow-citizens from the shock therapy and total uncertainty which reigned supreme in the entire country.” As to the image of the hero, it was the myth about M. Shaimiyev as the best leader of the republic which was being spread from year to year among the people of Tatarstan.

Regional political myths directly depend on the character of the federative relations which have taken shape in the country. The construction of the “vertical of power,” which was going on in the 2000th lent a specific character to the formation process of new political myths in various regions of Russia. Some analysts began to talk of disappearance of regional myths from the political scene. In our view, this conclusion is rather premature. The federative relations in present-day Russia have more than once been subjected to radical changes in the past two decades, this is why there is a possibility of reviving the practice of direct elections of the heads of regions in the foreseeable future, which was pointed out by the former President D. Medvedev at one of his news conferences. Returning to direct elections will put on the agenda the problem of the formation of national identity policy. Consequently, one can expect revival of the demand for regional political myths.

The reforms of the 2000th have transformed the character of the functioning of regional political myths. Now their main aim is not the

legitimacy of the power of governors and the creation of an image of the enemy in the person of the Federal Center, but the formation of a favorable social background in the republic in order to pursue a maximally advantageous policy, get financial donations from Moscow, and draw foreign investments, while creating an image of maximal loyalty to the Federal Center. In the conditions when national and regional policy are confined exclusively to economic development, local mythology becomes more rational and aimed at reaching economic result. If contradictions and differences arise between the Federal Center and certain regions in the political sphere, in the economic sphere the regions position themselves as part of the great Russian area. It is due to the assistance of the Federal Center to concrete regions reaching economic achievements. Thus, the range of the recipients of regional political myths becomes broader, and it is joined by foreign partners, transnational corporations and world banks.

In the 2000th, in view of the changed development course of federative relations, the main tasks of regional political myths also changed to a certain extent. The No1 task for the local elite was legitimacy of power not for the republican population, but for the Federal Center because of direct dependence on it. For one, along with the change of the political leader of the republic, the notorious heroic myth idealizing the first President of Tatarstan was put into the background. He was replaced not by “a politician, but by an economic manager,” in the words of M. Shaimiyev himself. In his first address to the State Council of the republic the new President R. Minnikhanov did not touch purely political problems, including those of the republican relations with the Federal Center. He said unequivocally that Tatarstan is a part of the Russian Federation, just as any other republic and it does not claim any special position. He hinted that he needed political support of the Federal Center and the President of Russia personally

and gave it to understand that loyalty brings financial and other bonuses. According to this tendency, in the evolution of the national-territorial structure of the country the idea of sovereignty emphasizing the interests of mainly the titular nation was not so clearly expressed in the discourse of the political elite of Tatarstan as before. Despite the significance of the ethnic problem for the basic subjects of local policy, official propaganda in Tatarstan is now actively upholding the idea of the multi-ethnic composition of the republican population.

Nevertheless, while emphasizing their status as an equal part of the Russian Federation, regions are not always satisfied with their relations with the Federal Center. For example, the elite of Tatarstan regarded unjust certain actions of the Federal Center in the nationalities sphere, which demanded revision of some premises in the new version of the Constitution of Tatarstan aimed at lowering the status of the republic and leveling its certain national specific features.

An analysis of the transformation of some subjects of regional political myths of Tatarstan in the 2000th makes it possible to conclude, among other things, that the change of the vectors of the regional development of political myths can provide new knowledge about political processes in the regions, and also to reveal the most significant values for the local elite, understand their strategies, as well as trends and phenomena in the political and ideological life of parts of the Russian Federation.

“Ucheniye zapiski Tatarskogo Universiteta “Gumanitarniye Nauk”, Kazan, 2012, vol. 154, book 1, pp. 240–244.

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SPECIFIC FEATURES OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN

Among the aims of political modernization in Dagestan mention should be made of the following: the creation of new political institutions for solving the constantly growing range of social and economic problems in the republic; the change of political orientations of the elite and leaders of the republic to an open struggle; the formation of a rationally-minded bureaucracy.

The main aim of political modernization in Dagestan is the possibility to make a step from the lowest stage of democracy on to a higher one, and transform the partially democratic republic into the genuinely democratic.

A specific feature of the modern development stage of Dagestan society is the presence of deep-going processes showing crisis phenomena in the economic, social and ideological spheres.

The general reason for these crisis phenomena is the state of Dagestani society typical of its transition period, namely, the contradiction between the new universal standards and old traditional values, the coexistence of new democratic political institutions with old ones, and the growing discontent of the population. In view of this the ruling elite is trying to adapt itself to the new conditions and specific features of the emerging situation. It is possible to single out five basic crises (identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, distribution) accompanying the process of political modernization in the Republic of Dagestan.

The identity crisis is connected with the problem of political and national identification of the social subject (individual, group, social section). In the conditions of political identification in Dagestan we can conditionally single out three basic types of the identity crisis. The first type is characterized by demands for national or territorial self-determination observed in present-day Dagestan on the example of conflicts in Khasavyurt, Novolak and other districts of the republic.

The second type is characterized by the social differentiation of Dagestani society, with sharp socio-class differences preventing unity. The modernization of the socio-economic system of society has led to the qualitative change of the social status of various groups of the population. The number of the marginal elements of society has grown noticeably. As a result, people, having lost their former social status, do not realize their interests, and do not have clear-cut ideas about the new rules of a political game. An example of it is a radical return to religious foundations. And this gives rise, in some cases, to aggressive manifestations. The conflict between political power and society is expressed especially sharply in the consciousness of young people who, in search of a place in society, join destructive religious sects, such as Salafite (Muslim) or the White Brotherhood, Jehovah's Brotherhood (Christian).

The third type is characterized by a conflict between ethnic and sub-national origin.

One of the most typical manifestations of the identity crisis in the Republic of Dagestan is growing ethno-nationalism. The destruction of the former social ties increases the role of national origin as an important channel of social identification. The intensification of nationalistic tendencies and sentiments is also connected with overcoming the inferiority complex in the marginal sections of society. Such sentiments are used by politicians for drawing the popular masses

to their side. An example of this is putting forward candidates for elections at various levels by ethnic origin.

The overcoming of the identity crisis is possible with the help of charismatic political leaders capable to unite an ethno-national or territorial community, and also by helping people in their search for the feeling of identity.

The legitimacy crisis in Dagestan is conditioned by the following factors. First, far from all main groups of interests of Dagestani society have access to the sphere of adopting political decisions. Second, the status of the basic traditional institutions of Dagestani society is subjected to a threat in the process of political modernization.

Among the characteristic features of the legitimacy crisis in the Republic of Dagestan are the following: absence of accord in society concerning political power, and recognition of its decisions by Dagestani people; excessive competition in the struggle for power; political passivity of the main sections of Dagestani society who do not pay enough attention to the activity of the powers that be; extremely limited possibilities of the ruling elite of Dagestan to enhance its political prestige.

One can single out the following ways to overcome the crisis of legitimacy: first, it could be done by demonstrating the efficiency of the ruling regime, and second, by drawing the opposition to one's side.

The crisis of participation is conditioned by the increase in the number of groups of interests claiming access to the process of adopting decisions in society. This inevitably exacerbates rivalry in the struggle for political power. At the same time, as we have already noted, not all groups of interests are represented in the transition political system of Dagestani society. Besides, the ruling elite of the republic does not show interest in inclusion of the social groups claiming power in the political process. As a result, radicalization of

demands on the part of the opposition groups is taking place, which, naturally, does not contribute to political stability. In this case, the actions of the ruling elite with regard to the political opposition are manifested in recognition of legitimacy of its existence, but in the conditions of a permanent conflict.

Thus, an important condition of overcoming the crisis of participation in Dagestan is the inclusion of all groups claiming power in the political life of society. The successful implementation of political modernization largely depends on the ability of the political system of transition society to integrate the demands of the opposition groups of interests.

The two last crises – penetration and distribution – form the crisis of the state government in the Republic of Dagestan. The crisis of penetration is manifested in the lower ability of state management to implement its directives in various spheres of public life. The innovations initiated by the Federal Center are implemented in a way unfit for the political elite. Along with the realization of decisions their meaning and purpose are distorted, which is due to the growing influence of local social structures striving to isolate themselves from outside interference. Besides, the population is oriented to the regional standards and customs, but not to the Federal Center. In this connection the overcoming of the crisis of penetration can be tied with finding a reasonable compromise between the Federal Center and the Republic of Dagestan.

The crisis of distribution in Dagestan is expressed in inability of the ruling elite to ensure the growth of material welfare acceptable to society, and the proper distribution of wealth allowing society to avoid excessive social differentiation and guaranteeing accessibility to the basic social benefits.

The overcoming of the crisis of distribution in Dagestan is possible only if certain conditions are fulfilled. One of them is that distribution should be implemented with due account of the interests of the poorer section of the population.

The specificity of the situation in Dagestan is determined by the fact that the realization of the key tasks of modernization proceeds along with tackling a whole range of problems, namely, the change of the political system, the absence of economic foundations, and the amorphous character of democratic institutions which renders difficult the formation process of a stable political system. The republic has chosen the road of rapid and radical modernization; the ruling elite is oriented to the liberal type of market, which is rather alien to the social reality and traditions of Dagestan. The ruling elite of the republic is copying the modernization policy carried on by the Federal Center without due account of the socio-political situation in the region.

The assessment of the socio-political consequences of the transformations carried on in Dagestan is causing different reaction in society. Sharp differentiation can be seen in both the socio-economic and political spheres. The situation is aggravated by the fact that there are no powerful counterbalances to this trend, which could guarantee the gradual character of transfer to a socially-oriented market economy and the formation of a democratic political system. Inasmuch as there is not one of the “three consensuses” ensuring civic peace in Dagestan, achievement of a real social compromise seems rather doubtful.

On the whole, present-day Dagestan presents itself as a region internally split. An acute political struggle is developing around the principal questions of social structure: the constitutional process, relations with the Federal Center, the role and place of Dagestan in Russia, etc. Difficulties in the implementation of transformation are

enhanced by the absence of a powerful political force on a republic-wide scale, capable to ensure stability and accord in society.

The aim of modernization in Dagestan is to ensure successful progress for all Dagestani people, which will only be possible in a well-developed and unified Dagestan. It is precisely an effective state that creates conditions for motivation for highly-productive labor, ensures the protection and security of all citizens and adequately solves all problems facing the country.

In the conditions of the asymmetrical form of territorial structure fixed at the constitutional level, the problem of ensuring proper representation of peoples and national minorities of the Republic of Dagestan in the bodies of state power and local self-government acquires special significance.

In accordance with Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan of 2003, Dagestan is a uniform democratic, law-abiding state within the Russian Federation, which expresses the will and interests of the entire multinational people of Dagestan.

According to Article 6 of the republican Constitution, in the Republic of Dagestan the rights of all peoples and national minorities living on its territory are guaranteed in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal legislation and generally-recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties. The Republic of Dagestan recognizes and respects the national-cultural and historical originality of its peoples and creates conditions for the preservation and development of their cultural and historical traditions. Each of the ethnic groups is guaranteed the equal right to protect its vital interests on the constitutional basis.

At present it appears that in forming the republican parliament representation of the republican ethnic groups will be tackled and observed by the institutions of civic society, primarily, political parties.

As a result of the last elections to the National Assembly (parliament) of the republic adequate national and geographic representation was ensured. Each municipal and city district and all fourteen indigenous small peoples of the republic were duly represented in the parliament of the present convocation.

It should be specially emphasized that the proportionate election system in the republic has been effected with due account of the present development stage of Russian statehood and it should ultimately contribute to the formation of a single all-Russia political area, which is very important for a country with such vast territory and different development levels of its regions.

However, regulation of representation of ethnic groups and national minorities at the federal level in the legislative body of state power of a part of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Dagestan at the present stage is still timely. Article 69 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees the rights of indigenous small peoples in accordance with the generally recognized principles and standards of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation.

To achieve greater involvement of Dagestani people in the modernization process of the republic it would be advisable, in our view, to do the following:

To provide citizens with fuller, more truthful and timely information regularly about the activity of local self-government bodies;

To organize public hearings, discussions and reports of the activity of the bodies of state power and local self-government;

To ensure the implementation of the principle of the division of state power and the formation of the government on a party basis.

“Vestnik Rossiiskoi natsii”, Moscow, 2012, N 4–5, pp. 23–242.

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OF THE CASPIAN REGION IN ASSESSMENTS
OF U.S. EXPERTS**

An analysis of the contradictory range of views and examinations of American scholars and analysts on the geopolitical significance of the Caspian region and an assessment of its influence on the political and geo-economic interests of the leading world powers make it possible to reveal a whole complex of factors. Many investigations of Russian and American geopolitical interests are viewed in the light of the relations between the countries of the Caspian region and the entire world.

The Resource Factor

In 1995 the American Oil Institute published data according to which the states of the Caspian region possess two-thirds of all known world oil resources (about 659 billion barrels). This assessment was an obvious exaggeration. On April 30, 1997 *The Wall Street Journal* published data about the supposed reserves of oil in the Caspian region, which were tentatively estimated at 178 billion barrels. It also gave a characteristic of the complex relief of the Caspian Sea bottom, distances from the place of extraction to the shore, production costs, content of admixtures, etc., and pointed out that expenses on the development and extraction of these oil resources would be very high.

According to many sources, including official ones, the resource potential of the Caspian Sea is estimated at 200 billion barrels. Some analysts cite much lower figures, such as 30 to 40 billion barrels, others give the figure of 60 billion barrels (including gas). J. Camp estimates oil and gas reserves of the Caspian basin at 200 billion barrels of oil

and 279 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Such estimates, regardless of their accuracy, mislead many scientists and researchers, which does not contribute to regional stability and growth of regional welfare.

Some scientists, for example Van der Leeuw, note that evaluation of the resources of the Caspian region depends a great deal on the quality of oil, and methods of its extraction, refining and transportation. According to American experts, the cost of oil extraction in Canadian regions is about \$30 per barrel, on the Arabian Peninsula -- \$1 per barrel. The cost of the extraction of one barrel of Caspian oil will be between \$1 and \$7.

Position and Jurisdiction of the Caspian Basin

The legal status of the Caspian Sea continues to be one of the most debatable problems in both Russian and American sources.

Turkmenistan, as one of the countries extracting and transporting gas, pursues a cautious policy: it supplies gas to northern Iran and from there imports oil in comparable volumes, which contributes to lowering transportation expenses of each side.

Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan continue heated political discussions on the problem of their common border along the Caspian Sea. Iran and Azerbaijan are in dispute concerning the right to prospect for oil and assess to the reserves of the sea. It is clear that without a legal regime it will be impossible to manage the exploitation of the resources.

In the view of certain researchers in the United States, Russia retains the right to prospect for the resources of the Caspian Sea unilaterally, although this contradicts the tendencies accepted in the world. Such situation will continue until the problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea is resolved.

The proposals evolved by the Russian Federation on the legal regulation of the status of the Caspian Sea shelf, as well as the political and legal decisions concerning the common zone of the use of the Caspian Sea shelf have been characterized by the U.S. Department of State as contrary to the interests of the United States in the region. The U.S.A. considers it necessary to evolve a mechanism of blocking any one-sided development and take into account the interests of competing states.

According to the view of L. Johnson, the agreement signed by Russia and Kazakhstan in 1998, under which the sea bottom should be divided into national sectors, can now promote the development of resources in the national zones. Turkmenistan was against the Kazakh-Russian agreement on the grounds that it was not reached through multilateral negotiations of all interested parties. And in the view of Julia Nanay, director of the Petroleum Finance Company Ltd., the principle suggested by the agreement placed each country in the position of a hostage. That is, the problem of the legal status of these zones should be solved without delay, although it will not be the final solution of the disputed problems of the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

Market Factors

Among crucial problems are international accessibility of competing energy resources, the expected increase of energy consumption, and the projected value of energy resources. All this is of prime geopolitical importance for the development of countries.

One factor, which should be regarded indisputable, is the growing demand for energy. The International Energy Agency in Paris forecasts the growth of the world demand for oil within two percent during the next twenty years. According to the estimates of the U.S. Department of Energy, consumption of energy resources will double by

2030, and increase fourfold by the end of the 21st century. Uncertainty with regard to the reserves of oil and gas and the price level contributes to the diversification of threats and risks in the context of the strategic analysis of geopolitical and geo-economic stability of the Caspian Basin countries.

Transport Factor

In the view of American analysts, the transportation cost of oil and gas is a risky variable hidden among complex geopolitical realities. The option of risk is maintained by the difficult character of state's participation in the structure of property, the financing of projects, material corporative incentives, tax holdings, and law enforcement and security. The three new states on the Caspian shore, in contrast to the leading countries-exporters of oil and gas, which have no access to the sea, can export their oil only by transit through neighboring countries.

The existing pipelines of the Soviet epoch do not answer the market conditions of the newly-independent states. As it has been noted, Russia uses its pipelines in order to control its neighbors by closing or restricting oil and gas flows when it thinks fit. Widely applying the mechanisms of customs duties and tariffs, Russia is using access to pipelines as a lever for receiving its share of benefits in joint projects.

Many pipelines become obsolete and create problems of environmental protection, and new pipelines become more costly for new states due to Russian monopoly.

American analysts note that the Russian side actively uses the instruments of tariff policy and access to the existing pipelines by monopoly control for reducing, retarding and changing (through restrictions) the export of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Materials of the "France Press" news agency cite an

example of the conflict situation with Azerbaijan in which the Russian side had to compete with the alternative pipeline project along with a high cost of oil transportation. Thus, oil transportation from the Caspian port of Baku (Azerbaijan) to the Black Sea port of Supsa (Georgia) costs \$0.43 per barrel, whereas the cost of oil transportation from Baku to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea via the Baku – Novorossiysk pipeline costs \$2.15 per barrel.

The United States advocates sanctions against the growing export of oil from Iran and has an extra proposal from the Main Export Pipeline Company for oil transportation from the port of Baku to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. The U.S administration is against the Iranian route from considerations of political security, and therefore it supports the Baku – Supsa route as an alternative. This variant is not so much an economic project, but rather a political one and is in line with the U.S. position on the question of ensuring political risks and ecological security.

U.S. official bodies regard the Baku – Ceyhan pipeline as the main export oil pipeline proceeding from political considerations, including the security factor. They note that the United States is not against the existing pipelines from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to the Russian ports on the Black Sea, but is against Russia's monopoly in this sphere. At present the pipeline from Azerbaijan to Novorossiysk competes with two pipelines to Supsa (Georgia): the existing one Baku – Supsa is under repairs, and another, parallel, can be extended to Ceyhan (Turkey) and, consequently, become part of an important export pipeline.

The United States comes out against the Iranian route which is actively supported by Turkmenistan, and instead it supports the project of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Baku, which seems to be a rather doubtful project in the conditions of the elaboration

of the “Blue Flow” pipeline from Russia to Turkey on the Black Sea bottom.

Numerous pipeline projects with due account of geopolitical realities and national interests of all interested parties are widely represented on the site of the energy department of the European parliament.

Ecological Problems

Ecological problems in oil and gas transportation are quite important, and are widely discussed during the elaboration of various projects with due account of different groups of interests. They contribute to an increase of risks connected with infrastructural projects and possible routes. U.S. analysts cite an example of Turkey which expresses concern over the ecological consequences of the transportation of Caspian oil via the Bosphorus. The Russian authorities have officially voiced their position on the need to observe the right of free passage in accordance with the Montreux agreement of 1936 (the share of Russia in transit trade through the Turkish straits amounts to 25 percent), and accused Turkey of political bias on account of the environmental problem.

According to the estimates of the American administration, which supports arguments of the Turkish side, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium will add four supertankers to the daily traffic through the Bosphorus, whose length is 19 miles and width – 672 meters in the narrowest stretch. The Bosphorus cuts the city of Istanbul with a population of 12 million, who are quite familiar with the terrible consequences of serious mishaps.

The Russian government and American oil companies nevertheless express concern over the ecological situation in Turkey,

particularly concerning the Bosphorus, inasmuch as the growing volume of oil export will lead to the growing pressure on the Bosphorus Strait.

Such factors as religion, traditional economics and consumption level, and ethnic self-identification are also important components, in the view of American experts, exerting influence on the geopolitics of the Caspian Basin countries. These factors retain their timeliness for both Russia and Turkey where secular statehood have come across the problem of radical Islamism and nationalism, and also for Iran where the supporters of M. Khatami challenge the 20-year-long domination of the ayatollas.

The above-mentioned factors are also significant to the new countries of the Caspian region where growing state and national construction has confronted the factors of the Soviet past, and the problems of religion and ethnic origin, which play significant roles in the identity of each country of the Caspian region.

Judging by official statements, U.S. policy is aimed at the all-round development of the pipeline network for transporting the oil of the Caspian Basin, which, in the view of American experts, will help the region reach a more independent position (freeing it from Russia's monopoly control), guarantee free supply of the Caspian oil resources to world markets (by the rapid development of the East-West transport corridor), and ensure energy security to the United States and its allies.

The aims pursued by the United States include the creation of a pipeline which would be independent from competition markets of the Central Asian countries (Russia and Iran) and contribute to the prosperity and sovereignty of the CIS countries in the Caucasian region and Central Asia, affirmation of their political stability (and ultimately, democracy), thereby increasing the commercial effectiveness of the U.S. projects in the region preserving the environment (the Bosphorus is not an acceptable export route for the planned volume of oil export

from the Caspian region), resolving regional conflicts and creating effective regulation of interstate relations, along with rendering economic and humanitarian aid.

“Vlast”, Moscow, 2013, No 1, pp. 170–173.

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**CENTRAL ASIA IN STRATEGIC
CONCEPTS OF RUSSIA**

Central Asia is a region rich in natural resources, occupying an advantageous geostrategic position in the center of Eurasia and facing a complex tangle of economic, social, ethnoconfessional and political problems. At present it finds itself in the center of the struggle for global leadership between the leading world powers.

The position of Russia fixed in its basic foreign-policy documents lies in the “development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS countries.” Russia is ready to build friendly relations with each state of Central Asia on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, respect and due consideration of each other’s interests, as well as develop relations of strategic partnership with countries expressing readiness for it.

Our country wishes not only to expand cooperation with Central Asian states in the economic and humanitarian spheres, but also to improve the system of ensuring mutual security, including joint opposition to common challenges and threats, above all, international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, transnational criminal activity, and illegal migration. In connection with a dangerous situation which has emerged in the region, the primary task facing it is to prevent destabilization of the situation and neutralize the threat of terror and

drug production and trafficking. Russia calls on its Central Asian neighbors to work together on the further realization of the potential of the CIS as a regional organization for a multilateral political dialogue and the mechanism of multilateral cooperation with priorities in the sphere of economics, humanitarian interaction, and the struggle against the traditional and new challenges and threats.

The new system of international relations (after the events of September 11, 2001), with account of the military operations of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan and Iraq, the possibility of their direct presence in the region did not reduce military threats and possible conflicts, but only changed their form. The situation in Central Asia develops so rapidly that it is necessary to make corrections to any variants. Suffice it to recall the events of 2005 (we mean the overthrow of President A. Akayev of Kyrgyzstan), and also in 2010 when a sanguinary drama took place as a result of the resignation of President K. Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan, which led to numerous victims, especially in the south of the republic. One cannot forget many casualties during the Andizhan clashes in Uzbekistan in 2005. It can be assumed that local conflicts are quite possible on the territory of Central Asian republics, which may turn into armed clashes in the struggle for land, and water and energy resources. Such densely populated region as the Ferghana Valley where the interests of four (out of five) republics of the region are closely intertwined (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) presents a great potential danger. One should not exclude the active drawing of Russia in these processes, but not only in the capacity of an arbiter, but also as a supplier of material and manpower resources.

The formation processes of statehood in the countries of Central Asia and international cooperation are directly connected with the continuing geopolitical struggle for influence in the region and the

aftermath of the world economic crisis, as well as the historical past with its errors in national-territorial demarcation committed during the Soviet period.

The national borders, which were called “administrative” prior to the 1990s, and which were established voluntarily and changed several times during the existence of the U.S.S.R., showed a great ethno-confessional variety of newly-independent states by the time of the disintegration of the country. For example, according to official data, representatives of the titular nations comprise 56 percent in Kazakhstan, 64 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 79.9 percent in Tajikistan. In Uzbekistan the share of Uzbeks is 80 percent, and the share of Turkmen in Turkmenistan is 77 percent. However, the specificity of this region is connected with the presence of ethno-confessional segments living compactly on the territory of these republics, which, in some cases, just as the titular nations, are autochthonous, and in other cases are mixed with diasporas of another culture and another origin. For instance, the share of Russians living mainly in the northern districts of Kazakhstan comprises 30 percent, in Kyrgyzstan – 12.5 percent, Turkmenistan – four percent, and Uzbekistan – 5.5 percent. Uzbeks account for 14 to 20 percent of the population of Kyrgyzstan, and in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan their share is from five to 15.3 percent. These are the shares of the biggest diasporas, to say nothing of Ukrainians, Belarusians, Uighurs, Tatars, and representatives of other peoples and nationalities. So, the presence on the CIS territory of national segments from neighboring states living compactly remains one of the most serious problems in the development of regional cooperation.

However, this objective circumstance should not be viewed as the only obstacle to interstate cooperation and integration tendencies. The results of almost twenty years of regional cooperation and

integration of Central Asian countries whose main aim is to restore the broken economic ties, and speed up economic reforms and integration in the world economy leave much to be desired.

As is known, in 1992 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan set up an interstate organization – the Central Asian Regional Cooperation. In 1994 a treaty was signed on the creation of a uniform economic area between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and in 1995 the Program of the economic integration of these countries up to 2000 began to be implemented. In 1998 this structure was defined as the “Central Asian Economic Community”, and in February 2002, at a meeting of the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation was officially set up. However, the 10-year-long search for integration models did not bring any serious results in the development of the region. More than two hundred agreements were signed during this period, but many of them remained on paper only.

The Central Asian countries still do not have a clear vision of how the water resources should be used for mutual benefit. Besides, there is no timely exchange of information between them, which has a negative influence on the struggle against drug trafficking, which becomes the main evil which is very difficult to suppress. The inadequate level of cooperation between these countries has induced them to adopt a decision on their integration in the EurAsian Economic Cooperation Organization at the summit in St. Petersburg on October 7, 2005.

From that time on the following stages in the economic cooperation between the Central Asian countries can be singled out:

First, the Customs Union was set up in July 2010 and the uniform system of transport tariffs was adopted. Secondly, a free-trade zone was created. And lastly, the task of organizing the Eurasian

Common Market has all chances for successful implementation, inasmuch as there is a stable tendency toward the intensification of cooperation between the states of this Community in such major spheres as regional security, efficient use of the water-and-energy resources, the creation of the regional transport infrastructure, and trade-economic and humanitarian-cultural relations.

Certain integration initiatives for strengthening ties between the Central Asian countries should also be remembered. For example, in 2005 President N. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan proposed to set up the “Union of Central Asian States.” This proposal was repeated in 2007. So far it has not received support from other countries of the region. In turn, President I. Karimov of Uzbekistan put forward a proposal in April 2008 to create a free-trade zone between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the President of Kyrgyzstan proposed to set up a bilateral alliance between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. However, as long as all these proposals have a declarative character and depend on the political ambitions of the countries’ leaders, the question remains open and undecided.

It should be borne in mind that the integration tendencies and moods of the ruling elites of the countries of the region often appear and develop separately from Moscow’s desires and are, to a certain degree, a consequence of the activity of the Euro-Atlantic bodies, as well as of Beijing, and are ultimately aimed at tearing Central Asia away from Russia. To this long-term strategy should be added the real military presence of NATO and the activated mechanism of integrating Central Asian countries in the European Union. For instance, the project of expansion of Europe after the implementation of the “neighborhood” program in Georgia and the South Caucasus has emerged in Central Asian countries, too. At the same time, one can presume that NATO and the European Union are hardly ready to

assume full responsibility for protecting security in this unstable region. This is why attention should be devoted to such regional organization as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). By now the total area of the SCO member-states amounts to about 30 million square kilometers, which takes three-fifths of Eurasian area, and the population – more than 1.5 billion, that is one quarter of the entire global population. After Iran, India and Pakistan have received the observer status at the SCO summit in Tashkent in 2005, the geographic, demographic, economic and political weight of this organization has increased considerably. From the point of view of the development of international cooperation the SCO is important and promising not only as an organization “to fight the threats of a new generation” (I. Karimov), but also as an organization ensuring economic interaction, cooperation in the sphere of transport and communications, and in the field of culture and science. The overwhelming number of experts and analysts regard the SCO as the most successful organization in Eurasia.

During the years of independence the Central Asian countries have implemented a number of major integration projects. For instance, in 1996 the Tejen – Serakhs – Meshkhed – Bender – Abbas railway line was commissioned, which connected the railway system of the countries of the region with the Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf. The construction of the Tashkent – Andizhan – Osh, Sarytash – Irkeshtam motor roads, and also the autobahn through Kazakhstan with an outlet to China, the Turkmenistan – Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan – China gas pipeline has contributed to the intensification of economic cooperation not only between Central Asian countries, but also between Central Asia and China. In other words, there is a host of problems connected with the integration of the Central Asian countries. We shall now dwell on some of the pre-crisis indices.

For example, the main partners of Uzbekistan are Ukraine, Russia and China. Among the Central Asian countries, it is only Kazakhstan that is actively cooperating with Uzbekistan, in whose export its share comprises 7.26 percent, and in import – 4.8 percent. Turkmenistan has no serious economic relations with the states of the region. Its main partners are Ukraine, Turkey, China and Russia. Tajikistan has economic contacts with Uzbekistan (export – 7.92 percent, import – 4.78 percent) and Kazakhstan – 8.92 percent of import. Despite certain difficulties, plans of commercial export of electric energy from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan become gradually implemented. Kyrgyzstan is actively cooperating only with Kazakhstan (export – 12.4 percent, import – 5.9 percent) and Uzbekistan (export – 15.72 percent).

During the years of independence economic cooperation of the Central Asian countries with one another has been declining steadily, ceding place to China, Turkey and Iran. Russia is still an important participant in the economic sphere.

It is hard to predict what new challenges to regional or global security can emerge in Central Asia and around it. It is not yet known what twists and turns we can expect in the domestic and foreign policy of the countries of the region, even in a short-term prospect (for example in determining their new key allies). It is not quite clear how other big non-regional powers will behave in the present and future conditions.

In our view, diversity of approaches to the determination of Central Asian policy on the part of western states can be explained with due account of the ambiguity of the very structure of relations in the region, as well as the policy conducted by all five Central Asian countries and their elites.

In these conditions the possibility of creating an alliance of Central Asian states seems rather problematic. Nevertheless, integration is possible, even necessary. It could be hoped that the removal of all customs barriers within the framework of the tripartite alliance – Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus might serve as an effective impetus for other Central Asian states. The meeting of the heads of government of the eight CIS members in St. Petersburg in November 2011 worked out their integration plans. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine held their own views on the principal questions and did not sign certain documents.

It can be forecast that if closer economic cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is not established, serious practical steps should be taken for the reliable presence of Russia in the region.

With the present alignment of forces and the present leaders of these countries it would be difficult to imagine the possibility of mutual concessions, and consequently, there are hardly any prospects for the creation of a firm alliance of Central Asian states on the basis of active integration processes.

*“Rossiya i mirovoi politichesky protsess”,
Moscow, 2012, pp. 66–71.*

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THE LEAST OF ALL EVILS

Despite ten years of Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the country still has little experience of relations with it. If not for regular meetings of officials

and certain technical and personnel assistance (its volume cannot be compared with the aid rendered by NATO countries), the ties with CSTO are distinguished by two main aspects.

Not Relations with Russia, but Attitude to Russia

One of the aspects is connected with the Russian airbase in the town of Kant, some twenty kilometers from Bishkek. It appeared in 2003 as a simple answer to the setting up of a base of the anti-terror coalition in the “Manas” airport. Whereas the need for the latter was quite concrete, namely, transporting forces and cargoes, and refueling the aircraft operating in Afghanistan, the Russian base was created as an aviation component of the Central Asian grouping of the CSTO forces. However, several Russian airplanes which have landed in Kant do not allow us to talk of the presence of any regional aviation group. It was clear to all that the Russian airbase was set up in reply to the creation of the base of the anti-terror coalition. By that time there have been no Russian men and officers on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, except a couple of objects of the Russian defense infrastructure, and Manas became a good pretext for returning to the country.

The Kyrgyz national security concept, which was pursued by the then President of the republic Askar Akayev was oriented to a many-vector character and “umbrella cover” of ensuring security, and it allowed the country to have several bases of different military blocs on its territory. By that time Kyrgyzstan was not only a member of CSTO, but it also actively interacted with NATO within the framework of the “Partnership for Peace” program. Moreover, there were many supporters of closer interaction with and even entry in NATO. For one, this idea was actively advocated by the outstanding Kyrgyz writer Chinghiz Aitmatov who was the republic’s Ambassador to the Benelux

countries at the time. These views could be explained not only by American and European assistance in the strengthening of the country's defense potential, but also by Moscow's neglect with regard to the former Soviet republic during the first post-Soviet decade. Orientation to rapprochement with the West obviously dominated at the time. This was why the decision to agree on the deployment of the Russian base in Kant as a component of the Central Asian grouping of the CSTO forces was adopted by Bishkek due to its orientation to a many-vector policy.

Another aspect is more important. During its membership in CSTO Kyrgyzstan has asked for assistance only once. It was in June 2010 when the interethnic conflict in the south of the republic carried away hundreds of lives every day. The answer to the plea of the head of the provisional government of Kyrgyzstan Rosa Otunbayeva given by the then President of Russia D. Medvedev at the Tashkent summit of SCO, some 300 kilometers from the place of the tragedy, boiled down to outright refusal, because, as he pointed out, such actions were not envisaged either by the Charter of the organization or any other agreements.

Today the General Secretary of CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha says that the organization actively participated in neutralizing the conflict. However, people in Kyrgyzstan remember quite well that it took a very long time just to make a list of what should and could be done by CSTO and the first aid to arrive to the country. Besides, all of it arrived long after the conflict was put down by Bishkek itself. These events have confirmed the views of the Kyrgyz authorities and public that they cannot expect any assistance from CSTO, and that the organization is unable to ensure the country's security.

There are two reasons why Kyrgyzstan remains in the organization. The first is that any other force is even less trustworthy. Due to a number of reasons Kyrgyzstan's relations with its neighbors

can hardly be called friendly or secure. Not to speak of Uzbekistan, the border with which is practically closed, and relations with which are on the brink of a conflict. Even Kazakhstan with which the then president Bakiyev signed a treaty on alliance constantly undertakes actions spoiling the atmosphere between the two countries. The border question with Tajikistan and the use of border pasture lands and water reserves also aggravate bilateral relations between the two neighbors. However, Kyrgyz-Chinese relations are the most stable and secure. But the age-old stereotypes do not allow Kyrgyzstan to regard its great neighbor as a guarantor of security. Despite the constantly proclaimed and pursued policy of non-interference and respect of Kyrgyzstan's sovereignty, the fear of a threat emanating from China is constantly present. And there can hardly be any official or army officer in Kyrgyzstan who could rely on Beijing in terms of ensuring military security. Although the assistance from the great neighbor, including one for strengthening Kyrgyzstan's defense potential, is gladly accepted.

There are many more people who believe that the country's security can be better ensured by NATO. Several political parties hold similar views, and should they come to power, many changes would have been possible. The attitude to the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the need to participate in it is rather cool, especially among young people, who have received education in Turkey, Europe or the United States. However, along with an improvement and expansion of Kyrgyz-Russian relations the number of supporters of pro-Western orientation decreases. All the more so since the negative attitude to the United States and NATO is actively promoted by the Islamic circles. There is a widespread opinion about the danger for the country stemming from the existence of the American base on its territory which may well be a target of possible attacks by Islamists.

But the main force keeping Kyrgyzstan within CSTO is not so much its relations with Russia as its attitude to Russia. Despite the almost total oblivion by Moscow during the first post-Soviet decade and the sobering pragmatism of the present Russian leadership, the overwhelming part of the country's population has very warm feelings for Russia. True, there are few people who would wish the presence of the Russian military personnel, just as any other foreign military personnel, for that matter, in the country, but everybody realizes that it is the Russian army which will be the first to come to defend Kyrgyzstan if need be. This circumstance is the key reason why Kyrgyzstan is still a member of CSTO.

Not to Scare, but Help

We should not accept the stereotype that the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan would lead to serious negative consequences for Central Asia.

First, nobody talks of the complete withdrawal, and there will be enough resources and mechanisms from the outside to control the situation in Afghanistan even if state power changes there. American experts and diplomats do not conceal the fact that participation in the Afghan affairs will continue for an indefinite period, although in different forms.

Secondly, the subject of the export of Islamic terrorism will no longer be the determining one for the Central Asian countries, but the problem of control over the northern territories, including the one of their status. This is not only an internal Afghan problem, but a problem of the relations of Central Asian states between themselves. We see that the situation in Afghanistan engenders serious, even dangerous consequences outside its territory, including in Central Asia.

We do not wish to discuss ghost stories actively circulated in the Russian mass media and quasi-expert community concerning American intentions to destabilize the situation in Central Asia as one of the reasons for staying in the region and not allowing Russia to be there. There are more weighty grounds and reasons to believe that the United States will agree with China on this score, which does not wish destabilization in Central Asia. Russia is not a welcome guest in Central Asia for the United States and this is why the latter may delegate regional leadership to Beijing.

Lastly, there is a well-founded suspicion that certain experts and analysts, by intimidating the public with post-Afghan consequences, are trying to conceal other purposes, which are closer geographically to Russia. We mean military-political control over Central Asia at the geopolitical level, and also as a means to gain competitive advantages in access to natural and other resources.

In any case, new realities and possibilities for CSTO arising in connection with the forthcoming withdrawal of the forces of the anti-terrorist coalition from Afghanistan, and also the position of Uzbekistan which suspended its membership in CSTO, will be determined by the position and actions of the organization itself, and above all, of Moscow.

Progress in the questions of the existence of the Russian military base and Russian participation in the development of the energy potential of Kyrgyzstan, and writing-off its state debt, changes Kyrgyzstan's attitude to CSTO and creates prospects for its participation in the work of this military-political organization at a new level. Few people understood why the country needs the Russian military base on its territory with almost complete absence of Russian investments in the country and its stubborn unwillingness to write off Kyrgyzstan's debt to Russia, paltry yet very heavy for the country as it

is. Hence, the reaction of the Kyrgyz side – its attempts to raise the cost for the deployment of the base, demands for compensation for conflicts with representatives of the Russian special forces, and some other recent actions of Bishkek. Now there is a sort of comeback of Russian friendly relations with Kyrgyzstan.

The decision of the Russian leadership to transfer arms, hardware and equipment to Kyrgyzstan worth of \$1.1 billion is a step in this direction. Its army really needs to be rearmed. Everything made in this sphere up to now was due to NATO. Large deliveries of Russian arms and military equipment to Kyrgyzstan will make the country's army almost entirely dependent on Russia. Besides, it will entail the need to train Kyrgyz military officers only with the help of Russia. Thus, CSTO will have an indisputable advantage in the competition of military standards inasmuch as it mainly works in the Russian format.

Will this choice be attractive for Bishkek, will it receive from Russia second-grade stuff what Russia itself does not need any longer – these questions are to be answered some time later.

*“Rossiya v globalnoi politike”, Moscow,
Vol. 10, No 6, November–December, 2012.*

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**SECURITY CONTRADICTIONS ON THE EXAMPLE
OF WATER AND ENERGY PROBLEMS
OF CENTRAL ASIA**

Water and energy produced by the fuel-and-energy complex (an important branch of the economy of any country) are a life-giving force

due to which security is ensured and consolidated in various forms – from the very simple physical survival of man to the opportunity open to him to engage in many types of activity, rest and recreation. Accordingly, the presence of these basic conditions of human life in the necessary quantity and of acceptable quality is assessed very positively. On the contrary, their poor quality, shortage or complete absence are regarded a serious threat. As is known, security has many aspects and levels, and the water and energy problems can threaten several of them simultaneously: physical, ecological, sanitary-epidemiological, food, military, etc. The impact of each of these problems on security can have consequences at all levels – individual and group, local and regional, national and global. When they merge in **one block**, one can see not only a multitude of threats created by them, but also a possibility of the emergence of contradictions and new aspects fraught with still greater danger.

It would seem that water and energy as guarantors of security should not enter into contradiction inasmuch as water itself can be a powerful source of energy. But it is the multi-functionality of water that explains the growing demand for it. The bigger the arid zone the greater the need for water. Central Asia consists of five states formed in place of the Union republics of the former U.S.S.R.: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. On the example of the Central Asian region one can clearly see the growing security conflicts at the resource and political level.

I

The essence of the water-and-energy problems of Central Asia lies in the fact that the purposes for which water is used in the region differ from one country to another. Besides, due to the general shortage of water for all the Central Asian countries enter into contradictions.

The latter is due to the different priorities of water consumption, because some countries need water mainly for agriculture, while others use it for energy generation. But differences between countries on the problem of how this precious resource should be used immediately take them to the level of national security. The states and their leaders take upon themselves responsibility for access of their citizens to such vital resources as water and energy. This is why any obstacle on the way to this access is regarded as a threat to national security.

The countries of the region can be divided into two groups by the specific features of their situation in the basin of the two main rivers of Central Asia – the Amudarya and Syrdarya. The first group includes the states situated in the upper reaches of these rivers: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The second group includes the states situated in the lower reaches of these rivers: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The countries of the first group have virtually unlimited water resources, but suffer from a shortage of hydrocarbon and hydro resources. The countries of the second group, on the contrary, have big hydrocarbon resources, but very limited water resources. The first actively use water for hydro energy generation, the second ones need water mainly for agriculture.

In actual fact, the problem does not boil down to some exclusively necessary choice between hydro-energetics and agriculture. The point is the volumes of the use and distribution of water resources between the upper reaches and lower reaches with due account of seasonal cycles. However, if this problem is viewed from the positions of security, to be more exact, national security, there is an open contradiction: the food security of the states of the lower reaches against the energy security of the states of the upper reaches. The main problem lies in that the hydro-energetics consumes more water during the cold period, that is, in autumn and winter, and agriculture – during

the vegetation period, that is, in spring and summer. It means that when Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan urgently need water, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan try to save it: they store it in their water reservoirs and use for energy generation during autumn and winter periods.

The states of the upper reaches, having enough water, suffer from an acute shortage of electric energy during the autumn and winter period. Tajikistan has a quota on the use of electric power in autumn and winter, in some regions of the republic electric power is supplied to dwelling houses only for several hours daily. In Kyrgyzstan there are constant failures of electric energy supply at winter time. The situation could be improved either by agreement with the neighboring countries which have enough energy resources on supply of energy at acceptable prices on a permanent basis, or by creation of their own energy-generating capacities without dependence on the good will of the neighbors. Naturally, the second variant is more preferable. Practically, it would mean that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should increase the capacity of their old hydropower plants and build new ones. But following this logic, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan should be against this scheme, and they already express their objections.

At the same time, demanding that the upper reaches states should sacrifice the priorities of their water consumption, the lower reaches countries, especially Uzbekistan, are not ready to guarantee Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan uninterrupted and sufficient supplies of hydrocarbons at reasonable prices, although an agreement on the subject was signed in 1998. We mean the Agreement between the governments of Kazakhstan, the government of Kyrgyzstan and the government of Uzbekistan on using the water-and-energy resources of the Syrdarya basin signed in Bishkek on March 17, 1998. It was valid for five years,

but in later years it was not possible to revive it: nobody wanted to take responsibility for actions in accordance with it. Besides, the agreement had an essential shortcoming: it did not envisage any responsibility of the parties to it, or compensation for any damage or violations of its conditions by any party. For example, Uzbekistan ceased to purchase electric energy in summer in 2004, which was generated by Kyrgyz hydropower plants. Besides, it raised the price of gas for the countries of the upper reaches. In 2005 the price of gas for Kyrgyzstan was \$44 per one thousand cubic meters, in 2006 it was raised to \$55, in 2007 – to \$100, in 2008 – to \$145, and in 2009 – to \$240. Prices could change every three months: in early 2011 gas for Kyrgyzstan cost \$223 and by the end of the year it jumped to \$305.

This is just one example of how the countries of the region were unable to agree with one another on mutually acceptable conditions. Such examples are many and varied in the relations between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, or between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which were no less conflictogenic than those between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

II

If water had been used only for tackling the problems of food security, there would not have been such sharp contradictions between the countries of the region. Water would have always been enough at any time. However, there would have been another controversial problem, one of the priority methods of water consumption. This includes the problem of the minimization of losses of water in its use and purification after use. This is a very timely problem today because it has a direct impact on the quality of life in the Central Asian region and hence, touches on the level of personal security.

The water crisis in Central Asia today is conditioned by three basic factors: the rapid growth of the population, climate changes, and pollution of the environment. The first two factors can be regarded potential, to a certain extent, whereas pollution of the environment has become a really grave threat.

Generally speaking, it is the ecological component of the water-and-energy problem that has become so urgent and decisive today. Indeed, the entire world is heading for the ecological collapse in the sphere of water consumption at a frightening speed. Water security, including the presence of enough drinking water and water for hygienic purposes, and also the possibility to prevent floods, mudslides, and other calamities in which water is the main force of destruction, becomes a *sine qua non* of global security. Rivers all over the world have suffered so much from human activity that normal water consumption of almost five billion people and the prospect of survival of thousands of water species of plants and animals are now under constant threat.

The Central Asian region presents a very motley picture from this point of view. The most ecologically secured country is Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand, it boasts a varied nature rich in water sources, and on the other, there are few harmful industries polluting the environment. As to other countries of the Central Asian region, we see a great variety of all and sundry ecological problems there. For example, in many mountain or foothill districts of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the upper layer of soil is exhausted or destroyed, this is why nothing can grow there. Such mountains and foothills are the constant sources of floods and mudslides. Such mountains and foothills are unable to preserve moisture, and on plains crisscrossed by big and small canals water evaporates at a great speed. As a result, average air temperature grows which, along with global warming, contributes to a

more rapid thawing of glaciers in the mountain systems of Central Asia. From 1957 to 2000, that is, during the past 43 years, water reserves in the Pamirs-Alai glaciers decreased by more than 25 percent. This, in turn, negatively influences the water balance of the region.

The problem of the Aral Sea should not be forgotten either, because it has a direct bearing on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. During the period between 1960 and 2004 the water surface area of the Aral Sea dwindled by almost 70 percent, and the water level dropped by about 20 meters. Water salinity increased considerably, biological variety decreased, and the economic and social living conditions of the population sharply deteriorated. Besides, from the dried-up bottom of the Aral Sea more than one million tons of salt and sand are swept away by wind and water and placed on an area of 400,000 square kilometers. This kills crops and has a very negative effect of the health of local people.

These and other problems put to doubt the suitability of large territories for human life and become threats to security at all levels, from individual to regional. Thus, the entire Central Asian region with its dust storms, thawing of glaciers, and “necrosis” of formerly living water makes a “tragic contribution” to the worsening of the ecological situation on the planet. It is sad that water for the region is not only a source of life, but also a force of destruction.

III

The absence of strictly observed and smoothly functioning agreements between the Central Asian countries on the problems of mutually advantageous, interconnected and ecologically safe use of the water-and-energy resources leads to a new potential threat – armed conflicts because of water. The aspects of water-and-energy and military security are a natural part of the concept of national security.

Such position does not help solution of problems and removal of threats, inasmuch as most of these and other questions are examined within the framework of the confrontation of states on the problem of the use of water. And it is hard to find a mutually acceptable solution in the situation of confrontation. The latter could be removed by a common security concept, in which the driving motive for a wide range of subjects could be the general concern for the survival of each man, and not only national, but also regional and global security. Superiority of national security over any other security – human, regional or global – turns the former into a threat in terms of its own aspects (economic, transport, social) and also in terms of security at any other level.

The main stumbling block here is the question of sovereignty. Solution of the problem of the joint use of transborder rivers requires delegating part of national sovereignty to some supra-national body. Or at least refusal from short-term one-sided benefits bringing harm to other parties. However, we now observe a different picture, where the interests of national security become absolute in contrast to and to the detriment of security at other levels. This turns national sovereignty into the most precious value, whereas part of it could well be sacrificed in the interests of all.

“Bezopasnost kak tsennost i norma: opyt raznykh epokh i kultur”, St. Petersburg, 2012, pp. 268–276.

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**THE DEVELOPMENT OF UZBEKISTAN IN 2012
AND PLANS FOR 2013**

In 2012 Uzbekistan was one of the first country in the CIS which reported its successes in socio-economic development for the year and announced the key plans for the year 2013.

Economy. In the past year the country's GDP increased by 8.2 percent. The volume of industrial production grew by 7.7 percent, in agriculture – by 7 percent, the volume of retail goods turnover – by 13.9 percent. The country's export grew by 11.6 percent. What's important: the share of non-raw material positions and manufactured goods in the structure of export exceeds 70 percent. A positive balance of commodity turnover amounts to \$1.12 billion. Inflation was about 7 percent. This level is one of the lowest in the CIS. The budget was fulfilled with a profit of 0.4 percent of the GDP. The budget revenue grew along with the lowering of taxes on small businesses and entrepreneurship.

By January 1, 2013 the size of the aggregate foreign debt of Uzbekistan did not exceed 16 percent of the GDP, which was considered by international standards as “less than moderate.” Investments in basic assets amounted to almost 23 percent of the GDP. \$11.7 billion were drawn in the country's economy, which was more than in 2011 by 14 percent. In 2012 the aggregate capital of the bank system increased by 24.3 percent, and in the past two years – almost twofold. The sufficiency level of capital amounts to 24 percent, which is three times more than the generally accepted international standards. The liquidity of the bank system by the results of 2012 exceeds 65 percent, which is twice as much as the required minimal level.

Last year the construction of 205 big investment projects was completed. Among the major ones are a steam-and-gas unit at the Navoi thermal power plant with a capacity of 500 MW, the second stage of a truck plant built jointly with the German “MAN” Company, the first stage of a plant producing liquefied gas and condensate.

The project of the commissioning of the second stage of the Dehkanabad mineral fertilizer plant is underway. Construction began of a unique gas-and-chemical complex at the Surgil deposit worth of over \$25 billion. Large-scale high-tech projects were under construction within the framework of free industrial-economic zones “Navoi” and “Angren.” Large-scale construction and modernization of motor roads and railway lines continued in the republic. For one, high-speed service between Tashkent, Samarkand and Bokhara proceeded apace. Telecommunication projects were also implemented. Fiber-optic communication lines and transfer to digital TV continued to develop. The latter now covers 42 percent of the country’s population.

More than three million tons of raw cotton, 7.5 million tons of grain and over 11 million tons of fruit and vegetables were gathered.

Social development. In 2012 a greater part of the budget (59.2 percent) was earmarked for the social sphere. About one million jobs were opened, 62 percent of them in rural districts. Small businesses and private entrepreneurship gave jobs to about 485,000 people. The population’s incomes grew by 17.5 percent, and the minimal wage – by 26.5 percent. On the whole, real incomes increased by 8.6 times over as compared to 2000. The income level ratio of eight was registered between 10 percent of the wealthiest and poorest sections of the population.

The problems of the development and reforms of the sphere of education continued to be in the center of attention. With the beginning

of this scholastic year the country has switched to complete 12-year compulsory school education.

As to the sphere of health protection, the Uzbek model has been recommended by the UN as the best regional program for the East European and Baltic countries, as well as for the CIS. The construction and reconstruction of 154 medical institutions have been completed by this time. Much attention is devoted to the development of sport, especially among children. Last year 108 big sports objects were commissioned, including a big sports arena, the most up-to-date in Central Asia. At present about 1.6 million children from six to 15 years of age go in for sports regularly.

Special mention should be made of the so-called “problem regions,” that is, the most backward and suffering from the exacerbation of socio-ecological crises connected with the growing population and increasing shortage of water and land resources and jobs.

Another crucial subject is the still existing radical and extremist organizations of religious and separatist nature.

By the results of 2012 the volume of the regional GDP of Andizhan region increased by 8.4 percent as compared with 2011. Last year 2,290 subjects of small business and private entrepreneurship were opened there. The share of representatives of this sphere in the regional product comprised 57.4 percent. More than 79,000 new jobs were opened. Small businesses account for 75 percent of them. Over 42,600 graduates from industrial trade colleges received jobs. The growth of the regional GDP of Namangan region comprised 10 percent last year. More than 75,000 new jobs were opened in the region, 81.6 percent of them – in rural districts. The share of industry in the regional GDP reached 9.8 percent, and the share of small business – 79 percent. The

volume of export of manufactured goods produced by regional enterprises increased by 9.6 percent, 53.2 percent more than in 2011.

The volume of the GDP of Ferghana region increased by 6.3 percent last year. Ninety industrial projects were commissioned worth of 122 billion sum, and the region received \$82 million of investments. More than 700 new dwelling houses were built and 92,430 new jobs were opened.

The volume of the GDP of the Karakalpakstan Republic grew by 12.7 percent in 2012. Industrial output increased by 8.7 percent, production of consumer goods – by 10.6 percent, construction work – by 19.5 percent, agricultural produce – by 13.2 percent, trade and services to the population – 12.7 percent. The sum of investments in 2012 comprised 1.145 trillion sum. The volume of export was \$11.8 million, which was by 18.8 percent more than planned.

As we have already mentioned, last year the construction of a gas-and-chemical complex at the Surgil deposit began. After commissioning this big enterprise will produce 400,000 tons of polyethylene, and 100,000 tons of polypropylene a year, and there will be 5,000 new jobs. Last year the enterprises of “Nukus Samsung” producing vacuum cleaners, as well as “Orient technology” leather plants and “Asia Silk” cocoon processing factories were commissioned. Six big light industry enterprises were modernized to a sum of \$65.5 million. In accordance with the republican employment program more than 48,000 new jobs were opened in 2012. Four hundreds new dwelling houses and infrastructural objects were built in rural districts.

Plans for 2013. The most important spheres and priorities of the economic development program of Uzbekistan in 2013 are as follows:

Preservation of high growth rates, macroeconomic stability and greater competitiveness of the economy. Economic growth rate should be no less than eight percent, primarily at the expense of increase of

industrial output – by 8.4 percent, agriculture – by six percent, investments in basic assets – by 11 percent, the sphere of services – by 16 percent.

Acceleration and expansion of modernization, technical and technological innovations, and diversification of production. The state investment program envisages the implementation of over 370 strategically important projects. \$13 billion will be drawn for the purpose. Almost three-quarters of investments will be channeled to new construction, reconstruction and modernization of production.

The creation of new jobs and greater employment of the population. It is planned to open more than 970,000 new jobs. Special attention will be devoted to the development of small businesses and private entrepreneurship, and the sphere of services, which will provide about 500,000 new jobs.

Materials of briefing at the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Moscow (January 2012), publications of “Turkiston-press” Agency, and information resource <http://www.gazeta.uz/>.

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№ 77.99.6.953.П.5008.8.99 от 23.08.1999 г.
Подписано к печати 31/V-2013 г. Формат 60x84/16
Бум. офсетная № 1. Печать офсетная. Свободная цена
Усл. печ. л. 3,75 Уч.-изд. л. 3,4
Тираж 300 экз. Заказ № 116

**Институт научной информации
по общественным наукам РАН,
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Москва, В-418, ГСП-7, 117997**

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**E-mail: ani-2000@list.ru
(по вопросам распространения изданий)**

Отпечатано в ИНИОН РАН
Нахимовский пр-кт, д. 51/21
Москва В-418, ГСП-7, 117997
042(02)9

