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SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE GEOPOLITICAL PICTURE OF THE MODERN WORLD

The present development stage of civilization is characterized by the constant emergence of new trends and phenomena. One can fully agree with the words of Sergei Lavrov, Minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, that “the problem of determining the present stage of world development is one of the most fundamental questions in the international relations of our day.”

At the same time the world processes of our epoch have definite geopolitical determinants. This is why the perception of the present-day processes cannot be full enough without understanding the *geopolitical picture of the world*. Indeed, it is the system of scientific knowledge of the geopolitical structure of the world which has taken shape to date. This picture cannot be characterized fully enough due to a shortage of time and space. At the same time it is possible to make note of the basic components – phenomena, processes and problems as its elements.

First of all, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the generalized characteristic and initial point of the perception of the changes going on in the world is globalization, the formation of information society and the problems connected with these processes.

Among the most important characteristics of these processes are the growing spatial and time generality and their interdependence. The deepening and expanding of globalization is a contradictory process, inasmuch as increasing financial-economic and political interdependence is taking place along with the economic and political processes slipping from under the control of national states. Due to this, and also to some other reasons, the confrontation between a state as an institution created on a definite territory and transnational structures becomes the main contradiction of the present epoch. As is known, transnational structures have their own value orientations.

The following features can be singled out as the most important characteristics of our epoch.

1. The high dynamics of socio-economic and political processes, suddenness and ineffective predictability of events of a political, economic and military nature, including those of a global scope.

2. The events and processes taking place in a separate state (and within the framework of a local cultural medium) can rapidly acquire a global character. Practically any event provoked or organized by interested subjects can transform into an event of worldwide significance. An armed conflict, initially limited to the boundaries of any one country, can become regional or even global.

3. Political changes and technical innovations touched on the broadest popular masses.

4. The interconnection and interdependence of the various spheres of society's life result in that a transformation of one of them leads to significant consequences for others.

The reverse side of globalization and information society is the possibility for practically unlimited access of people to any information, including one which used to be restricted previously. Thereby all can have access to technologies, including the most destructive ones.

The consequences of the explosive development of the means of mass information and communication are well known to all.

The wide use of the results of the development of science presents serious challenges to humanity. Russian scientists assert that now man has the possibility to change his natural properties and interfere with his genetic nature. Longevity and the state of health become increasingly dependent on financial possibilities. In these conditions it can so happen that the world's population will become divided into two non-crossing branches.

The challenge, which is understood by very few people, is the absence of an adequate theory of the development of human society and instruments for forecasting the future.

The modern epoch is also characterized by the unequal development of the world against the backdrop of the selfish desire of a comparatively small number of advanced countries and transnational structures to ensure their own prosperity, disregarding others.

The exhaustion of natural resources, primarily, hydrocarbons, is one of the determining factors of world development. In case of the expansion and growth, in one way or another, of the so-called golden billion at the expense of other rapidly developing economies of a number of countries (for instance, China, India, Russia, Brazil, Iran), it would practically be impossible to satisfy the growing requirements on the basis of natural resources existing in the world.

Having broad opportunities the advanced countries are striving to preserve the existing economic inequality, which is now coming out as a new form of colonialism. As soon as new deposits of fuel-and-energy resources are found in any region of the planet, political stability is undermined, radical and extremist organizations step up their activity, and a change of “undemocratic regime” takes place there... Besides, a

military infrastructure of the United States is developed near a given state, and military force is used at the concluding stage.

The struggle for fresh water resources increases, which has been noted by President Putin in one of his articles written on the eve of the last presidential elections.

The global demographic crisis, which has regional and ethnic specific features, also contributes to the uneven world development. As is known, birth rate in the developed countries, above all, in West European ones, is on decline steadily, whereas the population in the Third World countries is rapidly growing. These processes inevitably increase demographic unbalance between the regions of the planet.

Evidently, uneven development is a basis for conflicts between advanced countries and practically the rest of the world. It would be quite appropriate to remember Samuel Huntington's views on the implacable contradiction between the interests of the West (the "Westerners") and the remaining nations (the "Non-Westerners")."

Experience shows that the subjects which oppose states, peoples and civilizations, have their own strategies and actively resort to geopolitical operations with a view to strengthening their might, establishing a new world order and ensuring free access to the natural resources of the world. Such situation does not, and cannot, suit ethno-cultural civilizations, including Russia.

A distinguishing feature of our time is a considerable lowering of the level of manageability of socio-political processes at the global and intrastate levels.

This process can be observed especially clearly:

- a) in the change of the role of traditional international institutions in regulating global processes;
- b) in the wider practice of "color revolutions";
- c) in the emergence of the so-called failing states.

We should note that in the present conditions the risks and threats to national and international security acquire an ever greater and more comprehensive character, which makes it difficult to forecast them.

This comprehensive character can be seen in the simultaneous aggregate influence of several factors and their various combinations. We mean intrastate and regional crises and conflicts, anatomy of states, struggle for natural resources, terrorism, organized crime, slave trade, illegal arms trade, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, mass migration (primarily, illegal migration), smuggling operations, money laundering, ethnic and religious radicalism and extremism, drug production and trafficking, etc.

Predictability becomes still more difficult because in most cases there are no borders and any territorial bounds for the emergence of risks and threats due to which they are easily spreading beyond the boundaries of any country and acquire regional or international character. As a result, threats to security can emerge at any time in any place of the world and can be directed against any state or persons.

It should be noted that a number of structures of extremist and terrorist nature are ably using the situation. As is known, many important infrastructures in modern advanced countries are very vulnerable.

In the present conditions, in contrast to previous historical periods, non-state and non-governmental actors become full-fledged participants in geopolitical processes. The global subjects of world politics, economics and culture are formed on the basis of coordinating the activities of a multitude of participants.

Among the consequences of the existing situation one can single out the following:

Violation of the traditional balance of forces and stability on the global scale, which were connected with the establishment of the Westphalian system of international relations and the results of World War II. The present standards of international relations and the existing international institutions are a reflection of the status quo of that period;

Possession of weapons was one of the conditions for the emergence of many new non-state and non-governmental geopolitical subjects which received an opportunity to present their conditions to the traditional subjects;

Abolition of the monopoly of national states and their coalitions on military force and weapons of mass destruction. This gave rise to “demonopolized violence”, according to the American futurologist E. Toffler.

Apparently, the modern epoch is transitory, and after it another development stage of the world will begin. Adaptation to a new situation demands considerable efforts on the part of all participants in geopolitical processes.

First of all, we will come across a weaker management of world processes and a further growth of chaotic elements in them in the near future.

Then the role of external factors in the internal development of individual states will be growing and along with it the real possibilities of a state in the implementation of its sovereign rights and fulfillment of obligations will diminish.

Finally, the demands to the quality of state management at a national and international level will also grow.

In these conditions the geopolitical subjects will have to evolve adequate mechanisms and instruments to react to these challenges. Simultaneously, the states, peoples and civilizations should avail

themselves of the opportunity to become the subjects capable to assume global responsibility.

The position of Russia on these issues and its strategy should become clear-cut and known to the international community.

The geopolitical picture of the world and the place of Russia in it are outlined but briefly in this article. Many important characteristics need to be more thoroughly described.

Report at an academic conference called “Russia in the Geopolitical Structure of the World in the 21st century” held at the Moscow State Linguistic University on October 18, 2012.

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THE ROLE OF INFORMATION POLICY

IN DERADICALIZATION OF DAGESTAN SOCIETY

The modern world is manifested in a multitude of ethno-political conflicts demanding, in each individual case, the creation of effective means to overcome them. Russia entered this century with the heavy burden of sharp contradictions and problems. One of them is terrorism disguised by radical and religious motives, which is ripe in some of the North Caucasian republics. After the well-known events in the Chechen republic, the wave of extremism and terrorism has swept over Dagestan, one of the most religious North Caucasian republics, which is inhabited by more than 30 basic nationalities.

Dagestan continues to remain an object of subversive desires of various international organizations, which are trying to realize their long-term plans to wrest first Dagestan and then the entire North Caucasian region from Russia. The state and development trends of the

socio-political situation in Dagestan are determined, as previously, by the existing threats on the part of illegal armed units of religious extremists. A serious threat to the security and stability of the Republic of Dagestan is presented by radicalized movements which commit acts of terror spearheaded against officials and employees of law-enforcement agencies. Urgent and effective measures are necessary to deprive these movements and organizations of internal and external support, reduce their social base, disclose and suppress the centers of financial and ideological backing, isolate them and bring to trial their heads and active members. A solution of this extremely difficult task can be achieved by the implementation of political, economic, social, military-technical, ideological, information, and other measures. The mass media take an important place in this work as a major means of ideological and information opposition to extremism. This is why an analysis of the role of the mass media in their interaction with the bodies of state power in combating extremism and terrorism is quite timely. A priority direction in the examination of these processes is the study of counter-terrorist activity in the North Caucasus, a region where there is the real threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. Among other things, there is the need for examining the activity of government bodies in their struggle against extremism, the work of the mass media, as well as the information activity of certain radical groups in Dagestan. Manipulation of public opinion by information interference in the formation of social priorities and disorientation of public consciousness plays a no small role in the radicalization process of the population. For the first time in history man has acquired the technical possibility to create information technologies, which have turned from the simple systems of processing and transmitting information into the mechanisms of constant and comprehensive control over and transformation of his consciousness. The modern mass

media are subordinated to many demands, sometimes quite contradictory, coming from society as a whole, or their direct users, as well as economic partners and sponsors.

The mass media have long since been nicknamed the “fourth power,” which shows that their ability to influence, even rule, popular masses has been universally recognized. The information activity of the mass media enables society adequately comprehend and assess political developments, prestige of power bodies and statesmen, and their own role in political processes. The most widespread instruments of the mass media are the press, TV, radio, the Internet, and ads. The mass media influence society and each person, generating definite emotions, which often serve as incentives for actions. For example, there is definite public view supported by society with regard to such global human problems as the need to avert ecological disasters, thermonuclear and biological wars, etc. In this instance, public opinion has been formed by regular and thorough discussions of these subjects in various types of the mass media, with participation of experts at various levels. The mass media today are the powerful factor of influence on the psychological state of people. Along with the family, school and university, the mass communication system is the most important channel of transmitting and receiving information about society and events taking place in it. This is why the mass media can play the role of an organizer uniting and consolidating society, as enlightener, and at the same time they can disunite and disorganize the community of men. The mass media should contribute to creating favorable situation for searching and choosing solutions to the most complicated social problems and acquainting people with diverse constructive points of view and concepts of our further development. However, as regards the most pressing social problems, such as

extremism, corruption, drug addiction, etc. the mass media should adhere to a definite political and ideological position.

We should dwell, in brief, on the notion of “political communication” and its derivative – “information policy,” whose inalienable part is the mass media. Political communication is the conceptual aspect of the interaction of subjects by way of exchanging information in the process of the struggle for power or during the already established rule. The uninterrupted process of exchange of information takes place between individuals and between the rulers and the ruled with a view to reaching accord. The more intensive the exchange of information, the more intensive political processes. Information policy is a component part of the political and ideological activity of the forces interested in it, which has the aim of bringing positive views concerning political and ideological tasks to the popular masses, winning more supporters, and spreading negative information about the opponents. In other words, the information weapon is used in order to conceal the true intentions and plans concerning the subjects of socio-legal relations against whom it is to be applied. In most cases information policy of the radically-oriented underground is directed not to realizing political or religious rights and freedoms, but to scoring economic benefits.

The ideological position of the radicals in recruiting young men is mainly based on repudiation of the secular law, the absolute necessity to observe the Sharia laws, and the interpretation of the work of the law-enforcement agencies and power bodies from anti-social and Islamic positions. Blind faith in Allah relieves the individual from the need to observe patriarchal traditions and many “formalities,” that is, secular laws. Thus, man becomes subordinated to the highest religious sanction for self-determination within the framework of new forms of social solidarity. The ideological basis of religious radicals is very

stable and firmly opposed to counteraction. The ideological component in the process of the information activity of radical ideologists in Dagestan is an important reason for the local population's sympathies toward the radical Islamists and also for young people's desire to join the ranks of militants. The radical elements are engaged in an active ideological work among the local population, including Islamic propaganda and intimidation of common people. This is why the fight against religious extremism should not be waged only by adopting harsh legal and forcible measures.

The Concept of opposition to terrorism endorsed by the former President of Russia D. Medvedev on October 5, 2009, contains premises dealing with information activity, and reasons and conditions for the emergence and spreading of terrorism in the Russian Federation. Among them are inadequate control over propagation of the ideas of radicalism, propaganda of violence and cruelty, the absence of a single anti-terrorist information area and measures at the international and national levels, and popularization of the ideas of terrorism and extremism through the information and telecommunication Internet network, and the mass media. Besides, the subjects of terrorist activity are interested in broad description of their activity in the mass media with a view to getting broader public reaction. The Concept notes the need for creating a system of opposition to the ideology of terrorism. This system should contain a complex of measures to step up the activity of the bodies of power and law-enforcement agencies in ideological opposition to terrorist activity. Extremism and separatism should be condemned by the whole of society. In his first address to the deputies to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan, its President Magomedshah Magomedov stated that Dagestan society did not properly condemn terrorism and extremism, and noted that the bodies of executive power worked formally in this sphere.

Terrorist acts intimidate the population on a mass scale. Each action of extremists has a deeply negative effect on the state of society which reacts in accordance with information received from the mass media. Responsibility for the acts of terror in the Moscow Metro and the Dagestani city of Kizlyar was taken by Doku Umarov, one of the leaders and ideologists of the North Caucasian criminal underground, allegedly deployed on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The President of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov expressed the view that Doku Umarov took responsibility for the monstrous acts in the Moscow Metro in order “to provoke bad feelings toward and persecution of inhabitants of the North Caucasian region and make innocent people victimized by law-enforcement agencies join militant fighters.” Indeed, after finding the criminals who perpetrated the terrorist acts in the Moscow Metro and publishing a host of reports and articles in the mass media and the Internet, anti-Caucasian, and especially anti-Dagestani sentiments were on a rise in Russian society. The mass media, willy-nilly, have kindled a fire of undisguised aggression, interethnic and inter-religious tension and discord toward representatives of the Muslim regions of Russia (mainly people of North Caucasian origin), thus proclaiming one of the main world religions the sources of evil, identifying religious fundamentalism with extremism. Fundamental Islam calls for return to the basic dogmas of religion, but does not preach assassinations or any illegal actions. The attempts to present Islam as the religion of aggression and a source of danger to the world community will only lead to the exacerbation of inter-confessional contradictions in poly-confessional and poly-ethnic regions of the country. Thus, in the context of the absence of a centralized ideological doctrine of opposition to radicalism, the role of the mass media as a powerful instrument to combat religious extremism becomes ever more important.

The mass media play the role of a factor widely used by the interested parties for the formation of the necessary public opinion concerning current events, and also separate social groups, particularly, those in the law-enforcement agencies in Dagestan and elsewhere in the country.

As a result of an analysis of various publications in the mass media and the Internet, works by independent authors and informal contacts one can draw a conclusion that a high percent of the population regards the radicals as a certain instrument of the struggle against the arbitrariness of government officials and corruption, and even view them as defenders of people unlawfully and unjustly persecuted by law-enforcement agencies. Salafite ideology used by the radicals with its emphasis on the socio-political activity of the individual serves as an effective means for mobilizing people to the struggle against injustice and lawlessness. This is a vivid result of active ideological propaganda of definite social and religious values among the population with a view to gaining more supporters and sympathizers. The situation in the republic acquiring ever greater political and social instability for a long time has been one of the determining factors of this state of affairs. The radically-minded underground has been in existence in the republic since the mid-1990s, and it is very actively propagating definite ideological values among different social sections of the population. The danger of this activity has been underestimated by the republican authorities, which does not have a clear-cut policy to oppose it. As a result, the situation in the republic is far from satisfactory. Accordingly, the stabilization process of the situation will take a long time, inasmuch as in people's consciousness, particularly of those born in the 1990s, firm notions have entrenched themselves that secular laws can be violated in order to please religion. The improvement of the situation in the republic and

solution of the problem of religious extremism cannot take place without proper information accompaniment to forcible measures. In this process specific features of local mentality should be taken into account. It is necessary to appeal to customs and traditions of Dagestani society, which have taken shape over many years, and include in the process traditional religious organizations (Councils of Muftis, Muslim spiritual boards, etc.), which use basic religious and ethical values and oppose anti-social actions of dangerous character under the guise of religion.

At the Congress of Dagestani people held in Makhachkala on December 15, 2010, Abbas Kebedov, member of the Presidential Council, called in his speech for the mobilization of all people's forces to tackle the important problems facing the republic, and for consolidation of power and the people. He said that "Islam influences all processes going on in the republic and the region as a whole. And it gradually becomes the main factor influencing the development of all civil and public relations. Unfortunately, today Islamic concepts work for separatism and extremism, not in the interests of the people and stability in Dagestan. It is evident that without the ideological potential of Islam in the life of the republic it is impossible to carry on pacification of militant young people. Regrettably, the republican bodies of state power regard the Sharia laws as an attribute of Islamic separatism. They deny any possibility of using them in the interests of the state, although the Sharia laws have enormous potential and can be used as a basis for appeasement of a definite part of Muslims within the framework of the Constitution. The republican authorities should not separate Islam from politics, but should direct its political activity to the channel answering the interests of Dagestan. This is why it is necessary to find and put forward definite orientation points for our young people. The problem is that there is no adequate ideological platform in the

republic which could serve as the basis for our people's unity. It is impermissible to have Islam as a factor of destabilization in Dagestan. Unfortunately, destabilization is a reality in our republic and favorable ground for the intrigues of those who are interested in the weakening of Russia through Dagestan and the Caucasus as a whole. The Islamic factor is a bait for those who are seeking a weak link in Russia with a view to discrediting and weakening Russia.” Nevertheless, the introduction of the Sharia laws at a legislative level seems inexpedient, inasmuch as in the conditions of a democratic state and constitutional freedoms there are no obstacles for following religious dogmas and standards at a public level.

At the same time it can safely be said that with the high level of corruption in government bodies, a great shortage of jobs, low level of economic progress, and the absence of positive development of the region as a whole, and without the guaranteed fulfillment by the state of all social obligations it assumed, the local population will hardly support the position of the federal and republican authorities on ideological control in the sphere of combating radicalism. One of the most important tasks of the state is the creation of such political and social conditions of society's life under which the local population will voluntarily stop rendering support to and showing sympathies for the extremists. However, it would be impossible to talk of the restoration of the economy and creation of new jobs in a politically unstable region without elimination of radicalism within society and in the hearts and minds of people. The formation of public opinion is based on the fundamental principles of morality and, unquestionably, observance of religious norms in the family and everyday life. Accordingly, the choice of socially useful direction and trends is, primarily, the consequence of social upbringing and education. On this basis, the upbringing and education of the young generation in the spirit of

tolerance, law-obedience and the subsequent formation of positive stable social views are the primary task of the family, society and the state.

In the activity of the bodies of the federal and regional authorities today we can see futile attempts to oppose the radical elements at the ideological front, and thus the only effective means of fighting extremism is counter-terrorist operations to neutralize the illegal armed units in the North Caucasus. The standard scheme of actions of the special forces (cordon-and-search in a district of storming, blocking of address, talks with militants, and their neutralization in case of refusal to surrender) has also a demonstrative character with a view to bringing a moral-psychological pressure to bear on the members of criminal armed groups. But confining to tactical military activity alone shows the absence of other methods of influence aimed at stabilization of the situation in the republic. The exclusion and suppression of the activity of criminal gangs are carried on only by forcible measures, inasmuch as any other (information) activity is outside the competence of law-enforcement agencies. Effective measures have been taken in the military, financial and organizational spheres of struggle against extremism and terrorism, including those with broad international support. But the ideological-theoretical aspect of the phenomenon has not been properly attended to by the Russian authorities, both theoretically and practically. Whereas the firm positions of the radical elements lie not only in their ability to ably use the still unresolved socio-economic, political and ethnic problems, but also in the ideological base oriented to Islamic concepts.

The complete absence of a positive federal development strategy of the region and a single ideological doctrine evolved in accordance with the existing social realities is a weak feature of Russian policy in the North Caucasus. It should be directed against any manifestations of

extremism and unambiguously denounce terrorism. The entire federal program boils down to the simple principle: not to allow any manifestations of terrorism or separatism in the North Caucasus. But the possibilities of the mass media, the Internet, TV, radio, etc. are not used to the full by the authorities for the formation an information-ideological front to fight extremism and terrorism as one of the most crucial problems facing Russian society today. If the federal and regional authorities lose ideological battle against extremists and terrorists, the latter will inevitably become, in the consciousness of the population of the North Caucasian region, brave guerilla units waging a liberation struggle in the name of people and faith. Having allowed the extremists and separatists to intimidate the regional population, state power will lose prestige and trust of the popular masses, which will inevitably lead to undermining the national security of the Russian Federation.

Evidently, the problem of objective information-ideological opposition to radical extremism and terrorism should be tackled comprehensively by a complex of measures, such as the creation of Internet-sites of anti-radical nature, including forums, ads, distribution of pamphlets and journals advertising social values, documentaries, etc. However, it is impermissible to identify extremism with religion. First of all, it is necessary to proceed from the generally accepted principles of law, which should strictly be observed by one and all. The fundamental values in the life of modern civilized society should be broadly propagandized, especially among all sections of the young people. Poly-confessional religious education is especially important in a multinational state. Full-fledged civil culture and mutual understanding are not possible without the establishment of interethnic and interpersonal relations based on tolerance and respect. The basis of successful anti-radical campaign lies not in forcing a principally new

point of view on young people, but in understanding the need for a change in the way of thinking and developing positive interests in our society's life. Analyzing the place and role of the North Caucasian region in world politics and in the political strategy of Russia, it should be regarded as a single whole, irrespective of internal administrative, ethno-national or other boundaries dividing it. Such approach is objectively determined by the presence of close many-century economic, political, cultural, and other ties, similar historical destinies, forms and standards of behavior, and features of mentality. The North Caucasus is an inalienable part of Russian statehood not only strategically and geopolitically, but also in terms of mutual cultural penetration and the development of good-neighborly relations between peoples. In the process of the struggle against terrorism and the growing radicalization of the population of Dagestan, which is now the main political and administrative problem in this part of the Russian Federation, it is necessary to take into account the world experience in fighting extremism and terrorism and also use the enormous resource potential accumulated over the centuries of peaceful coexistence of our peoples within the single uniform state.

*“Kaspiisky region: Politika, ekonomika, kultura,”
Astrakhan, 2012, No 2, pp. 307–311.*

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Observer (“Moskovskie Novosti”)
TASHKENT GOES, PROBLEMS STAY

The decision of Uzbekistan to suspend membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) gave occasion for another round of discussion on efficiency of this structure. Evidently, it is high time to gain an understanding of the situation of the post-Soviet

space for the third decade after disintegration of the Union State. Apart of accumulated geo-political problems, much is connected with personal relations among leaders of the countries emerged on the territory of the former USSR.

A year ago in time of the official photo session of the participants of the jubilee summit of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation in Astana the president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov changed his place for the place of the president of Kyrgyzstan Rosa Otunbayeva only to avoid being close to the Tajik colleague Emomali Rakhmon. Karimov did not come to the CIS summit in Dushanbe in September 2011, timed to the 20th anniversary of the Community, having ignored a month beforehand the informal summit of CSTO in Astana. Aleksandr Lukashenko, who was the chairman at that time of the Organization, felt more insulted than the host of the meeting Nursultan Nazarbayev. He burst into tirade against Tashkent saying that it is high time to exclude the countries, which do not wish to cooperate fully within the framework of the treaty. The last accident occurred in December at the official summit of CSTO in Moscow. Karimov responded with emotion to the reproaches of Lukashenko and Nazarbayev that he was at variance with almost all partners.

The return to the Kremlin of Vladimir Putin seemed that Islam Karimov had a chance to restore confidential relations at least with Russia to some extent lost for the years of Dmitri Medvedev's presidency. At any rate, such supposition became quite probable following the glorification of Putin on the part of the Uzbek leader during their meeting in Moscow a week after inauguration of the Russian president. "Putin is just the man, who may be the companion for a reconnaissance", Karimov said and recalled his appeal to Putin in 2008 to take part in elections in 2008 for the third term, despite the constitutional limitation. Islam Karimov put his signature to support the

common declaration for commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Treaty for Collective Security and the 10th anniversary of creation of the Organization. In this document the presidents re-affirmed their “adherence to aims and principles of the Treaty of Collective Security, their readiness further to develop and consolidate the multilateral union relations”.

However, two weeks later at the summit of ShOS in Beijing the significant discords again emerged between Uzbekistan and its partners in CSTO, which are members of ShOS (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan). In this case the occasion was the concession for Afghanistan of the status of observer at the Shanghai organization. For the last years, Tashkent expressed its particular point of view and insisted on the bilateral relations with Kabul striving to avoid its active involvement in the orbit of ShOS. Probably, the Uzbek leadership having never felt a sympathy for the Afghan president Hamid Karzai does not favor consolidation of its position owing to closer relations of Kabul with Moscow and, mainly, with Beijing.

Karimov did not venture to veto this decision but mildly shared his dissatisfaction with it. A week further Tashkent informed the Secretariat of CSTO on suspension of its membership. Two weeks later the public declaration was made on this matter.

In Moscow some high officials considered it as a slap in the face, since the ink had hardly dried of Karimov’s signature of the Moscow declaration, where he confirmed his loyalty to the allied relations. Russian diplomats preferred to keep silence: the situation is subject to study. There is no legal norm in the statute documents providing for the unilateral suspension of membership in CSTO. Adilbek Jaksybekov, the minister of defense Of Kazakhstan reminded that according to the order of suspension of participation of a member-state in activities of CSTO organs or its exclusion from the Organization, adopted in Astana

on 18 June 2004, the request of the Uzbek party would be discussed at the session of the Council of collective security in Moscow in December 2012. The decision shall be adopted by consensus.

Some analytics talked about the inevitable disintegration of CSTO as a result of withdrawal of Uzbekistan. Most likely, for the nearest future it will not occur, as the Community of Independent States did not disintegrate. Both structures are rather the images than the actually functioning organizations, and each of them in its way for a certain time will demonstrate the attempts made by Moscow to keep the post-Soviet space within the framework of a historic, mental and economic community. According to a Russian official in charge of relations with the near abroad, there is no alternative to CSTO for consolidation of CIS states round Russia. The countries, which do not want to have anything common with Moscow, will break, like Georgia, institutional ties with CIS and Moscow. Tbilisi defined the possibilities of the principally another format of relations with Russia of a former Soviet outlying region, but, despite radical political discord, economic life of Georgia as usual depends very much on its northern neighbor.

The Georgian way will hardly be acceptable for Uzbekistan. It is worth recalling the fact that several million Uzbek labor migrants earn for the living in Russia and transfer not less than \$ 4 billion (\$ 4.9 billion in 2011) to their households. When in 2011, in time of conflict due to arrest of the Russian airplane and its crew in Tajikistan, Moscow let understand that it would start deportation of Tajik labor migrants from Russia, and Dushanbe went back on its word soon.

V. Putin tried to muffle the scandalous repercussions of the demarche made by Tashkent. In beginning of August speaking in Ulyanovsk with the servicemen of the brigade of VDV paratroopers-members of the emergency forces of CSTO, he qualified it as an “important organization”. V. Putin said that this organization was the

definite guarantor of Russian reciprocal action with partners and allies primarily in the so called post-Soviet space, the mechanism to be efficiently and quickly used in case of emergence of threats, particularly external threats. The accuracy of the formulation used by V. Putin – “definite guarantor” – is a significant detail. Up to present, the reciprocal action within the framework of CSTO was evident only in the course of numerous military maneuvers with participation of Russian detachments. However, it would be difficult to recall of participation in them of Uzbek and more so of Tajik servicemen.

Long ago the open animosity between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan became the talk of town, while formal allied relations of two countries cause painful smiles on both sides of the Uzbek-Tajik boundary. It is difficult to imagine a greater discredit of CSTO itself than dozens of mined parts of this boundary. Recently, Dushanbe officially for the first time recalled “a clumsy assistance of the good neighbor”, when due to it Tajikistan allegedly turned out to be the sole Soviet republic, which after disintegration of the USSR was unable to nationalize its military-technical objects. As was asserted in the computerized data of the Tajik embassy in Moscow, for the beginning of the 1990s this fact augmented the forces of radical Islamists, which started civil war in Tajikistan. But construction of Rogun hydroelectric station in Tajikistan remains the deepest clinch, which worsens relations between Tashkent and Dushanbe. The Uzbek leadership regards it as a threat to its national security, while the Tajik opposite party, on the contrary, considers counteraction of Tashkent to construction of the hydroelectric station as an external threat to sovereignty of Tajikistan.

The same situation exists also on the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where recently an armed incident took place and the border guards of both sides became its victims. The catastrophic level of distrust and inter-ethnic animosity between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz

aggravated as a result of bloody events in June 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan demonstrated the extraordinary vulnerability of the collective security system in Central Asia. Actually, it demonstrated its lack.

Not a very friendly atmosphere exists on the boundary between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In July 2011, the Uzbek border guards for almost two weeks did not inform about 12 Kazakh alpinists, including teenagers, detained in the mountain region in Tyan-Shan. In June of this year the Uzbek authorities refused to go through its territory to Tajikistan a group of servicemen and military equipment of Kazakhstan to take part in military trainings of ShOS “Peaceful Mission – 2012”. Uzbekistan as a member of ShOS did not participate in this venture.

The mentioned facts describe cooperation of Uzbekistan with three member-states of CSTO. Is it possible to expect a reliable and confidential reciprocal action of the forceful structures of four Central Asian member-states of CSTO in case of emergence of external threats? It is a rhetoric question. Instead of the reply it is possible to recall the invitation to Dushanbe last year of a platoon of the Iranian army to take part in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of Tajikistan. Minister of defense Sherali Khairullayev proudly declared at that time about probable arrival in two hours of Iranian brothers in case of need to render assistance to Tajikistan. But due to lack of coordination Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan did not allow delivery of “brothers” via their air space. Americans rendered assistance and ensured the flight of Iranian servicemen through the Afghan air space. It is a rare case of the U.S.A. assistance rendered to Tehran.

In 2006 the author of this text was an eye-witness of the meeting in Sochi of V. Putin and I. Karimov, and after this meeting the president of Uzbekistan declared that the country will return to CSTO. This event was expected. In this way Tashkent thanked Moscow for the support of

the forceful suppression of disturbances in Andijan in May 2005, which resulted in a deep isolation of the Uzbek leadership in the world. One of the high Russian officials noted with bitterness that together with Uzbekistan we would obligatory “drag in CSTO” all its problems in relations with its neighbors. It occurred like that, although Uzbekistan finally did not enter CSTO. Tashkent did not ratify about 15 agreements and protocols concluded within the framework of the Organization.

Nobody would really rely on the readiness of the Uzbek leadership to cooperate closely with allies in CSTO, given the fact that Tashkent had been drawn by force to the Organization. And not a real sensation became the declassified by Wikileaks dispatches of American diplomats with information that in 2009 Islam Karimov in talks with W. Berns, First Deputy State Secretary of the U.S.A. accused Moscow of imperial ambitions and the urge towards creation of “anti-NATO” for the sake of domination in the post-Soviet space. It is even strange that only three years afterwards the Uzbek president decided to get rid of ambiguity of his position among the partners in CSTO.

According to article 3 of CSTO, its aim, in particular, is the protection on the collective basis of independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member-states. Probably, the step taken by Tashkent may honestly give the reply to the question whether there exist at present the conditions for collective actions for ensuring security in the part of the post-Soviet space, which is still ready to regard Russia as a main guarantor. And on the whole, how to interpret the notion security for the member-states of CSTO?

In 2011, N. Bordyuja, General Secretary of CSTO held a round-table of experts and political analysts and proposed to arrange the brainstorm for the search of new ideas to perfect activities of the Organization. The attempt to find out an ideology, which would unite

its member-states on the basis of imitation of liberal values of western democracy for the member-states of NATO, resulted in embarrassing position. They found out with difficulty one such value – stability. This stability is comprehended in the West to be the conservation of the authoritarian regimes, and CSTO was created just to insure it, mentioned T. Parkhalina, the director of the center for European security of the ISISC of the RAS. And nobody questioned the obvious fact: the main threats of instability are just within each of the states and not outside them.

Can in such situation CSTO be useful, since article 5 of its statute prescribes non-interference in the affairs within national jurisdiction of member-states? For the last years, the answer to this question had to be given. The above mentioned Osh events in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 and the short-term military operation of Tajik government forces in the Mountain-Badakhshan autonomous region in July 2012 should be cited. CSTO did not interfere in both events although in June 2010 the question was discussed, since R. Otunbayeva, the head of the provisional government asked for the help. The General Secretary of CSTO N. Bordyuja had to admit that the mechanisms of reaction to the inter-ethnic clashes, like in the south of Kyrgyzstan, did not exist. The working game was arranged to elaborate such mechanisms, and it revealed many practical problems, delicately noted Bordyuja.

In this case these problems were conditioned by the definite veto expressed by the leadership of Uzbekistan relating to interference of CSTO in the Osh events. Tashkent objected to appearance near the Borders of Uzbekistan of Russian servicemen, but just they might compose the main part of peacemaking forces.

It may be mentioned that the position of Uzbekistan was not caused by conjuncture's considerations, but it was quite consecutive.

In 1999, one of the reasons of refusal expressed by Tashkent to sign the protocol on prolongation of its participation in the system of the Treaty of Collective Security were the planned intensions of Moscow to create in Tajikistan a military base with participation of the N 201 motorized infantry division located since the Soviet time there. (At present, they call it the first exit of Uzbekistan from CSTO, although it became an international organization only in 2002.) At that time I. Karimov sincerely told the author about his claims to the Russian leadership and mentioned a propos his dissatisfaction with large deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia (the Uzbek leader did not keep silent his solidarity with Azerbaijan) and his dissent with striving of Russia to keep its military presence in the Trans-Dnestr territory.

The refusal of Tashkent to let forces of CSTO put out the Osh “fire” in 2010 may give evidence of the main and most painful problem, which prevents confidential military cooperation within the framework of the Organization. The authoritarian ruling regimes in countries of Central Asia are not sure that Moscow sending its commandos to render assistance to them will not simultaneously give the opposite orders. One should see the degree of anti-Russian phobia among many representatives of national elites in this region. The fear of allegedly prepared Russian conspiracies is a significant factor of the political atmosphere of these countries.

CSTO did not interfere also in the situation in Tajikistan, when in the end of July of this year the expedition of the government’s detachment of three thousand servicemen made an attempt to liquidate an armed group of opposition located in the Mountain-Badakhshan region. According to N. Bordyuja, this action concerns the internal life of Tajikistan and does not demand interference of collective forces, and the law enforcement structures of Tajikistan are able to solve self-dependently the problems in Mountain-Badakhshstan region.

Bordyuja said it in response to declaration of A. Lukashenko that Tajikistan was a member of the Organization and the appeal of the president should be taken into account. But actually, E. Rakhmon did not ask for assistance. The request could not be made because the Russian ally was under suspicion of Dushanbe. As characteristic evidence of it became the rumors which were afloat that, according to “informed sources”, an attempt was being prepared upon the life of the president of Tajikistan in the course of his trip to the Mountain-Badakhshan region for the festivities related to the 80th anniversary of foundation of the autonomous region in the end of August. According to these “sources”, “Uzbek or Russian traces” were seen in the arrangement of the probable attempt.

It is difficult not agreeing with A. Arbatov, the head of the Center for International Security of the RAS, who said in his interview to “New Izvestia” that CSTO as a military union did not exist and rather signifies the presence of military relations between Russia and other members of CSTO. He stressed that the Organization lacked the main feature, which made it a military union: the common perception of external threats and rules, which determine the military interference in case of internal and trans-border threats. According to Arbatov, CSTO does not resemble a military-political union, although it claims to be such union. The political analyst alluded to the lack of political support of the actions of Russia in the course of the August war in the Caucasus in 2008 by the allies of CSTO. Up to present, none of them recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

And what is more, the August war threatened fairly some capitals of CIS. Their ruling elites felt the resoluteness of Moscow to realize its interests in the post-Soviet space by forceful means. For instance, the leadership of Turkmenistan, which possesses the neutral status and is not a member of CSTO, arranged in the western region of the country,

in the Caspian region the extraordinary exercises. It is quite possible to suppose that it was the demonstration of readiness to take responsive measures, if Moscow would take forceful actions relating to Turkmenistan. A number of economic and humanitarian problems, which complicate Russian-Turkmen relations, are well known, and the attitude of the Russian leadership to them could make Ashghabad become nervous once more.

It seems that suspicion dominates relations among neighbors in “communal apartment” of the former USSR. The disintegration of the Soviet power has not terminated at any rate at the mental level, and the divorce proceedings are going on, although CIS was created just for this sake. At the same time they suspect not only of Moscow, and others are under suspicion of Moscow. The initially declared by Tashkent exit from CSTO raised the certitude of the Russian expert community and the political elite in the intention of Tashkent to remove obstacles for return to the country of the U.S.A. military base, which was ousted from the country in 2005 in response to denouncement by Washington of suppression of disturbances in Andijan. The withdrawal of the allied military contingent from Afghanistan by 2014, the intention of the United States to keep a great part of military equipment in bordering with Afghanistan countries of Central Asia, first of all, in Uzbekistan, provided every reason to make this conclusion.

Having understood it, president Karimov known for political pragmatism (which was qualified by his many partners at best “double-dealing”) decided to play ahead of schedule trying to refute such reproaches. In the beginning of August a project of the conception of foreign policy activities of Uzbekistan was submitted by him to the parliament for its approval. For the first time in the period of more than twenty years this document raised to the level of law the principles of

foreign policy. Having read this law one can see the reason of this action only this time.

The essence of the conception is a theoretical foundation of the exit of Uzbekistan (the final exit, according to Tashkent) out of CSTO. I. Karimov formulated the principles of state neutrality, which his country should confine itself to. However, for some case, probably, this term was omitted in the text, which is as follows: Uzbekistan does not takes part in military-political blocks, has the right for exit from any inter-state formation in case of its transformation in a military-political block, does not provides its territory for location of foreign military bases and objects, takes political, economic and other measures to prevent its involvement in military conflicts and hotbeds of tension in adjacent countries.

Thus, there will be no military bases in Uzbekistan. But it is evident that the law is not retroactive, otherwise what would be done relating to the base of German air-force located in Termez near the Afghanistan border. It had been given initially a less defiant status. In case of need nothing will hinder to do the same relating to any military infrastructure for use of foreigners. The same permanent and mutually satisfying device was resorted since 2009 concerning former military base “Manas” in Kyrgyzstan, called now the international center of Transit Transportation. After its exit from CSTO, Tashkent will not be obliged to coordinate its actions with “sworn allies” like Tajikistan.

The following provisions of the conception are very significant from the point of view of Tashkent: Uzbekistan takes political, economic and other measures for averting its involvement in military conflicts and breeding grounds in adjacent states...the problems of Central Asia should be solved by the states of the region without interference of external forces... integration should not be imposed from outside, it is unacceptable if it infringes upon freedom,

independent and territorial integrity of the country or is dictated by ideological obligations.

Each of these points may easily be illustrated by specific situations, which have taken place in the region and have been grounds for expression of “special opinion” of Uzbekistan actually in each discussion at the summits of CSTO and CIS. One may read here appropriate references to various initiatives of Moscow (integration should not be imposed from outside) and to the opportunity of participation of Russian military forces, including the forces within CSTO, in regional conflicts (problems of Central Asia should be solved without interference of external forces).

At the same time, the system of views of the head of the Uzbek state relating to the place of the country in the world expressed in the form of conception and adopted by legislation is also the non-codified message to Moscow: “If we are not with you, it does not mean that we are against you”. Karimov gave a kind of reply: what for do we need CSTO, let us be on friendly terms and cooperate directly.

The way the question is put reveals the unhealthy problem of relations among member-countries, and if one takes into account that they, with little exception, are the states with authoritarian regimes, it shows the problematic type of relations among the leaders. If the highest echelon of the president of Uzbekistan is excluded from this system of communications, probably, it will increase sustainability of the structure of CSTO. However, there is a “but”: unlike other countries of the Central Asian region, where public discussion on expediency of membership in CSTO is going on, no news on similar discussion in Uzbekistan does exist. It is impossible to make a prognosis about the prevailing position on this question following the approaching change of the ruling elites in Tashkent.

On the other part, the present Uzbek demarche forces to deliberate about a much more general question – the artificial feature of the whole structure of military-political security concentrated round Russia. In essence CSTO at present represents a mechanical connection of three systems of security, each of them based on Russian participation: Central Asian, Southern and Western. Russian military base N 102 in Armenia is a self-evident guarantor of stability in the South Caucasus. But soldiers of Christian Armenia will never turn out to be within the services of CSTO taking part in any forceful actions in Central Asia populated primarily by Muslims. And, vice versa, even in the most audacious suppositions one may imagine that a Kazakh or Kyrgyz special service would be sent to render assistance to Armenians in the Karabakh battle-front to fight against co-religionists from Azerbaijan.

Exactly as well it is very difficult to imagine that fighters from Belarus would take part in military operations in the Caucasus or Central Asia despite agitated reaction of A. Lukashenko to events in these fronts of long distance. The president of Belarus is concerned more about the need to work out the joint peacemaking activities in format United Nations-CSTO, initiated by him last year, when he was the Chairman of CSTO. In its turn, the Central Asian and Armenian allies of Minsk in CSTO have not become uneasy because of discovered holes in the sky protected by Belarus air-defense in the western boundaries of the Organization as a result of the flight of a Swedish light aircraft, which penetrated into the territory of collective security and threw about toys-plush bears. From their point of view, this was the problem of Moscow, which has the common air defense with Minsk and not CSTO.

The ending of the prolonged parting of Tashkent with CSTO poses more acutely the question of autonomous functioning of each of

three composing organizations. This problem is the most urgent for Central Asia: the time is quite short before the exit of NATO contingent from Afghanistan, and it is high time for the staff officers of the allied countries to work out finally the plans of specific actions in case of escalation of tension in the region. The Uzbek Fronde will not hinder them any more, and one may express thanks to Tashkent for it. But if they fail in talks and if the agreement is not be concluded, it will not be possible to make Uzbekistan answer for it.

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**CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGION
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) on the eve of XXI century attracted greater attention of the world economic and political centers. The summit of five states of the region, held in Tashkent in January 1993, introduced the term “Central Asia” in political usage. Beforehand, this territory was named “Middle Asia and Kazakhstan” in national publications. However, from the point of view of the geographic science, Central Asia is a bigger region, which besides Middle Asia and Kazakhstan includes also Mongolia and the western part of China; UNESCO holds this point of view. As the members of the Central Asian-Caspian region it is possible to regard also Azerbaijan and bordering territories of Russia near Kazakhstan – from Astrakhan region in the west and up to Altai krai in the east This trend is conditioned as follows: by the rising competition among big regional and global powers striving for getting

influence in the region; by numerous trans-border threats and challenges coming from it; by the discovered deposits of hydrocarbons. The future of the region is uncertain. It depends both on external reasons, and on political stability, and on the rate of internal integration.

The significance of Central Asia (CA) in world economy is determined by its natural resources. For international players the agenda in the political sphere includes the threats, coming from CA, such as export of instability, terrorism, religious extremism, narcotics traffic, migration etc. The contemporary struggle of external forces in CA assumes the forms of competition of various integration projects supported by some or other non-regional forces. The struggle for directions of transport communications, particularly of pipelines, turns out to become a significant part and parcel of these projects.

Each international region is characterized by some or other structure of formal and informal institutions. The first ones are international law, statutes and decisions of United Nations and other international organizations, bilateral and multilateral treaties. The second ones may be regarded as identity, cultural-civilization's norms and systems of values of the region, traditions of reciprocal action, worked out for the period of historic development.

As far as the post-Soviet space is concerned, a group of western and some Russian researchers think that it is in the process of disintegration and that its member-states are "drawn" to other international regions, which, from the point of view of Dmitri Trenin, a known political analyst of the Moscow Carnegie Center, possess greater chances for keeping stability and inter-regional cooperation than the leading integrator CIS – Russia.

The higher is the rate of institutionalization of international relations in any region, the more significant is the role of formal and informal institutions. The contemporary West Europe may be used as

an example. For the 1990s the idea of mutually beneficial cooperation came forward there. Against the background of consequences of disintegration of the USSR, there functioned with efficiency in UE also the multilateral structures, which tried to replace by certain parameters the functions of separate states. Owing to the minimal transaction expenses of reciprocal action of the countries of this region, this process became attractive also for the East European countries striving for minimization of expenses for the transitional period also by means of the West European assistance.

Economic and political characteristic of Central Asian region (CAR)

The political situation in the states of the region is fraught with internal instability. The shaped authoritarian political regimes are based on domination of personality of the president, who uses (in various proportions in different countries) for consolidation of his power's different patronage-clientele networks and forceful structures. The periods of the leader's change represent the significant challenges for such systems. The mere age factor shows a possibility of the perspective president's change for the period of five-seven years in two biggest countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The consecutive struggle for power may cause significant destabilization in the region as a whole.

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as the bordering states in Fergana valley are subject to important internal political threats connected with activities of religious-extremist and terrorist groups.

From the economic point of view, the raw resources economies of the region are very weak and depend on conjuncture changes in the world markets. For the Soviet period, the Central Asian republics were separated from the outside world by “iron curtain” and were connected

primarily with other former Soviet republics. The extent of their internal economic cooperation was rather high: the inter-republican trade made up from 57% to 78% of the GNP. The traditional diversity and many-vector external economic interests of the region was restored for a rather fast period after disintegration of the USSR. The weakening of trade ties within the region was another external economic indication. It was caused, first, by the fact that all of them produced various kinds of raw resources (often identical) and, consequently, were in need of markets of industrialized developed countries. Second, the efficient internal regional integration of the region's states does not exist, and there is no needed institutional basis of reciprocal trade, since no state in the region is ready to forgo shortsighted interests for the sake of its creation. For instance, the share of other countries of Central Asia in the external trade turnover of Kazakhstan, having the largest economic capacity in the region, did not surpass 3% (with illegal trade and smuggling, including narcotics traffic, – 5 or 6%).

The crisis of developing markets in 1997–1998, enlarged by Russian default in August 1998, led to the customs war among members of the integration structure “Central-Asian Economic Community”. Uzbekistan periodically terminated shipment of gas to Kyrgyzstan, while Kazakhstan switched off international telephone connections in Uzbekistan. The trains coming from Tajikistan were subject to robbery at the points of crossing the Uzbek boundary. The weakness of regional economic connections is the characteristic of the region's countries. The hierarchy of the main trade and investment partners is subject to constant changes. The table below shows the main external economic partners of the states of Central Asia for the mid-term of the decade.

Table 1

**Main external-economic partners of countries
in Central Asian region for the years of 2004–2006**

Country	Place / share in trade		Import (%)
Kazakhstan	Share of five main partners		63
	1		Russia – 96.4
	2		China – 19.3
	3		Germany – 7.4
	4		
	5		
Kyrgyzstan	Share of five main partners		69.9
	1		Russia – 38.1
	2		China – 14.4
	3		Kazakh – 11.7
	4		USA – 11.7
	5		
Tajikistan	Share of five main partners	87.3	62.2
	1	Netherl. – 40.7	Russia – 24.6
	2	Turkey – 31.7	Kazakh – 10.8
	3	Iran – 5.4	Uzbek – 10.2
	4	Uzbek – 4.8	China – 8.6
	5	Russia – 4.7	Azerb – 8
Uzbekistan	Share of five main partners	59.2	68
	1	Russia – 23.7	Russia – 27.6
	2	Poland – 11.6	S. Korea – 15.1
	3	China – 10.4	China – 10.3
	4	Turkey – 7.6	Germany – 7.8
	5	Kazakh – 5.9	Kazakh. – 7.2
Turkmenistan	Share of five main partners	69.4	52.5
	1	Ukraine – 47.7	UAE – 15.5
	2	Iran – 16.4	Turkey – 11.1
	3	Azerb – 5.3	Ukraine – 9.1
	4		Russia – 9
	5		Germany – 7.8

The complex de-modernization in a number of spheres in various correlations was characteristic for the period since 1991. It was displayed as follows: decrease of the share of city population (de-urbanization) and of industrial production relating to agricultural

produce and/or the final product within industrial production, rapid fall of level of living and standards of education and health care, outflow of labor resources. The states of CAR actually do not use the potential of economic cooperation created for the Soviet times. In particular, the structure of resources distribution in the region might organize an efficient exchange of hydro-energy produced by downstream flows of upper reaches of the rivers of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in exchange for the hydrocarbons, oil and gas produced by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan located in the low reaches of the rivers.

The significant discords preclude optimization of electric energy production in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and irrigation of cultivated fields in Uzbekistan, as well as alleviation of ecological problems of the Aral Sea. Uzbekistan hinders construction of new hydro-stations on the territory of its northern neighbors, ensures for them discharge of water in the periods of maximum consumption of electric energy justifying it by the need to maintain the water balance in the region.

The tension around and within CAR is being intensified by the fact that the territories with big deposits of hydrocarbons cause discords among neighbors. The most essential conflict is the dispute between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan relating to the deposits in the Caspian Sea. Iran also presents its claims for the same sector of the sea. The Central Asian states to a large extent depend on external investors, new technologies of mining natural resources, development of pipeline systems. The geopolitical competition of external players for regional resources and the discords among them create obstacles for economic development and even create uncertainty in the directions of export flows of the region in the short term perspective. The U.S.A. prevents transportation of oil and gas from Iran to Europe. As a result, only European companies under “swap” agreements with Iran are able to use this route. The positions taken by Iran and Russia prevent construction

of the pipeline via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. Up to the present time, this route is used by tankers bringing oil from Kazakhstan, for instance, via the modernized port Aktau. The going on conflict in Afghanistan as well as discords between India and Pakistan block completely construction of gas pipeline from Turkmenistan along the southern route.

Main vectors of CAR foreign policy. Chances and reality

The first vector – Russia and its strategic partners in the post-Soviet space (Belarus, Armenia). Orientation of CAR to the Central Eurasia – macro-region, and unity with CA is conditioned historically. Integration was forced by Soviet modernization. At present, Russia takes active steps for the sake of re-integration of the post-Soviet space and carries out activities within the framework of the organizations, such as EvrAzES, ODKB and ShOS, playing the role of the guarantor of military stability in the region. It is the most significant trade partner of CA and annually imports a big labor force from the region. At the same time, “post-imperial ideology” is based on the respectful attitude to the role of Russia and the USSR, Russian culture and Russian language in modernization of the region. In its liberal modernization variant this ideology actually does not differ from the pro-Western choice. For the period of XVIII–XX centuries Russia was the historic mediator, specific though, in the process of mastering by Central Asia of western culture and technologies. A very significant synthesis of cultures of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples took place in the social-cultural field of the region. The nationalist and extremist feelings, the lack of Russian strategy in transformation and development of the historic potential prevent development in this direction. Should CAR select Russia with consequent consolidation of

anti-western trends, the rise of competition between Russia and China, on the one hand, and western countries, on the other hand, will be inevitable. At any rate, all pro-Russian ideologies in CA have “weak points”. They propose for the region the orientation to the space, which has not sufficiently recovered from consequences of the crisis, connected with disintegration of the USSR, and therefore creates the feelings of disillusionment in Russia in the minds of elites of CA. At the same time, Russia keeps under its control oil and gas transport systems of the region, possesses the key factors of control over profits gained thanks to hydrocarbons by Turkmenistan and to a lesser extent by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The hydrocarbons were mainly shipped from these countries to the markets of CIS countries, which were unable to pay the world prices. And the Russian oil and gas were “liberated” for export to Europe.

The second vector of the region’s foreign policy orientation is the U.S.A. and the EU, i.e. the western world. The influence of western culture and identity on the region in the past time was not big and was realized via Russian influence. The migration waves from Eastern Europe for the XIX and the first half of the XX centuries, including German re-settlers to Central Asia, promoted this process. At present, the cultural influence of the West grows rapidly thanks to inclusion of Central Asia in globalization processes. For the period following disintegration of the USSR the economic influence of the EU was growing steadily in the region. The member states of the EU occupied the principal positions in trade with Central Asia, in financial-investment activities in the region and in rendering assistance in many other forms. The cooperation with the U.S.A. after disintegration of the USSR was concentrated mainly in the military-political sphere within the framework of NATO program “Partnership for Peace” and reached its apogee for the period of anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan since

2001. It should be mentioned that it would have been impossible without agreement of the Russian leadership to provide for air forces of the coalition the air corridors. Washington does not have direct chances for maintenance and strengthening of its influence in the region, despite cooperation in the military sphere and the consequent creation of military base in Atyrau. The non-state subjects supported by military power of the U.S.A., such as transnational corporations (TNC), play important role in CA. Probably, just the American oil lobby played an essential role in the rise of the U.S.A. interest paid to Central Asia since the middle of the 1990s. In particular, it was displayed by risen activities of western oil companies in the Caspian region after signing in 2004 of “Contract of the Age” with Azerbaijan, by projects for laying new pipelines routes (Trans-Caspian and Trans-Afghan).

The peak of the big lobby campaign arranged by American oil TNC in this direction was in 1997. Its aim was as follows: to make Administration of Clinton carry out its policy in Central Asia more efficiently in the interests of American oil companies. Just in 1997 the Caspian region was proclaimed as a zone of the U.S.A. “national interests”. For the period of the 1990s the expert community also paid greater interest to the Caspian region. In this connection, the activities of “Heritage” Foundation, Institute for Central Asia at John Hopkins University and others should be mentioned. The expert community as well as TNC has essential influence on formulation and working out of political priorities of western countries in Central Asia. These perspectives attracted attention also of British business – the British Petroleum (BP), which became one of the main initiators of political advancement of the western countries to this region of the post-Soviet space. The West and the U.S.A. as its leader comes forward as a complicated and multi-lever construction, where the main interests in the main are coordinated but certain differences in opinions and

priorities are not excluded. For instance, just the U.S.A. blocks cooperation of European energy companies with Iran in the Caspian region.

However, the American interest in the region was becoming less as the prognosticated estimations of oil deposits were diminished. The American and British energy companies, having raised the interest in prospected regional reserves of hydrocarbons, later initiated the significant re-appraisal of sizes of the Caspian reserves. Some Russian experts think that the correlation between reasons and consequences was different in this case: the evaluation of the extracted reserves was set too high for the political objectives.

After disintegration of the USSR the leaders of Central Asia proclaimed their readiness to support the western global project with its priority of individual rights over society, the competitive political system with free elections as the only legitimate form of political governance, free internal market as well as the priority of the above principles relating to the national legislation of the states. However, the specific social-political systems of Central Asia adapt with difficulty to these principles. Individualism contradicts the traditional clannish system. The competitive democracy raises political chances of Islamic radicals (like in Uzbekistan) and may provoke civil conflict (the war in Tajikistan). The market economy gets on with difficulties with the political systems based on the authoritarian governance. The priority of international law comes up against “nationalism” of young nations. The countries of CAR can not paying attention to alter-global criticism, which stresses the fact that globalization in its contemporary form preserves the division of the world into “global billion” and the exploited periphery with inevitable inclusion of the region.

The other variant of pro-western choice is being supposed by the course to economic and political integration with the West Europe and

the U.S.A. Since 1991, all countries of Central Asia, particularly political elites of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, cooperate with NATO, the U.S.A. and the EU. It is worth mentioning that one may see a higher support of the pro-Russian ideological views. It is connected with historical role of Russia in modernization and westernization of the region.

The aims of the Central-Asian policy of the European Union in terms of hierarchy became often subordinate to the Russian policy of EU. Even the projects of “alternative transportation” being the main subject of discords with Russia were often used as an instrument of pressure on it. For instance, European policy of “energy diversification” in relation to CA partially is the response to disinclination of Russia to follow the principles of the European Energy Charter. From the formal point of view, by the middle of 2006 Russia was the gainer in political struggle for CA against the U.S.A. from the middle of 1990s. Four out of five Central-Asian states simultaneously became members of the integration projects supported by Russia (CIS, EvrAzES, ODKB and ShOS).

The other essential vector of probable development is China and the Asian-Pacific region. The Asianism (or Pan-Asianism) is a rather intricate complex of ideologies spread at present in the Asian-Pacific Region (APR) and India. The unity of these peoples was formed owing to the gigantic trade zone connecting all countries of the region (subject to influence of the Chinese culture – Confucianism, Indian Buddhism and Hinduism as well as Islam). The ideology was born after the victory of Japan over Russia in war of 1905–1907. In the course of the Second World War, Japanese committed many crimes having raised animosity of other Asian peoples against themselves. Nevertheless, the economic boom in Japan after the war gradually alleviated their attitude and contributed to the emergence of Asianism,

which side by side with anti-colonial and anti-post-colonial feelings included perception of social-economic modernization based on the traditional values and structures in the trade-investment reciprocal action with the West. In the APR there appeared an attractive (for many non-western societies) development's model correlating successful development of market economy with preservation of national social-political institutions. Following Japan there appeared new Asian "tigers": Singapore, Hong-Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. After reforms of Dan the process of rapid economic growth started in China. At present, many experts talk about transfer of the center of world economy from the North-Atlantic to the Asian-Pacific region. The authoritarian, semi-authoritarian or Communist regimes prevail there. The region lacks "democracies". At the same time, they are very young (South Korea and Taiwan), while other countries are characterized by specific "Asian" peculiarities, for instance, domination of one party in Japan.

The adoption of "Asian" identity might solve many problems of development of CAR. In particular, it will eliminate dilemma "Islam or development". The people of Malaysia profess Islam and are included in the group of successfully developing peoples of the Pacific Basin. However, some foreign and internal policy impediments are unavoidable on this way. CA may "be included" in APR only via and by support of China, and this circumstance disseminates in the region the fear to be controlled by the eastern neighbor and be subject to the Chinese influence. From the point of view of internal policy, the APR membership demands a high economic dynamics and limitation of the surveillance of the state over economy. The elements of control may be left but not in the present form, when the power gives the chance for control over private property.

At the level of declarations, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the beginning of 1990s expressed their sympathies to the “Chinese way”. Actually, the political elites of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan failed to ensure economic openness according to the APR model and fast inflow of foreign investments.

At present, Kazakhstan approaches to ideology of Asianism for two reasons. On one hand, thanks to successful use of natural resources it is the sole country in the region, which demonstrated high tempos of economic growth. At present, programs of industrial and post-industrial development of the country are subject to preparation. On the other hand, Kazakhstan gradually moves from European images of democracy. It is proved by prolongation of the powers of the president, who rules the country since 1990 and by the domination in the parliament of the pro-presidential party “Nur Otan”.

The fourth probable vector of development of the region is the Islamic world. The supporters of this paradigm of CAR development find out the basis of their position in history. Today, Islam is perceived by many people as the component of culture and identity. The Central-Asian countries see connections with the Islamic world also in economic contacts. To some extent, the Islamic choice may be regarded as an alternative to the western liberal model. Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Persian Gulf display a particular interest in consolidation of Islamic positions in CA. At the same time, they come forward as adversaries to preservation in the region of the Russian-Soviet cultural tradition. The conservative circles of some Muslim countries do not support westernization and all the more “Asianization” of CAR.

However, even in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where before 1917 the positions of Islam were more powerful, the Soviet heritage and adherence to secularism of the ruling elites prevent full acceptance of

ideologies spread in Islamic countries. Besides, within the Islamic world itself, for instance, in OIC, they failed to arrange efficient reciprocal action even for the key problems of policy and international relations, such as the Arabic-Israeli conflict or relations with the West. As far as the Islamic Bank of Development is concerned, it does not play a significant role in the integration processes.

In 1985, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey established the inter-government Organization of Economic Cooperation (OEC). After disintegration of the USSR five Central-Asian countries and Azerbaijan entered this organization and made an attempt to restore cultural and economic unity of the Eastern Islamic world. The member-states of OEC differ greatly in terms of level and tempo of economic development and economic power. The objective economic reasons preventing integration are supplemented by political discords. The more intensive economic ties have been shaped between OEC countries and industrially developed countries, which purchase their natural resources. The idea of probable change of geo-political orientation of CA has shaped in the countries of Islamic tradition. This idea is based on the routes of oil and gas transportation to the southern directions. In this case the following conflict of interests becomes unavoidable: on one side, with Russia, which evidently prefers the northern routes of transportation, and, on the other side, with APR, first of all, with China, which prefers the profitable orientation to the east.

However, within the “Islamic community” there is no unity relating to geography of laying the energy routes from CA. Pakistan is interested in shipment of oil and gas from Central Asia in the south-eastern direction in order to get a part of raw resources (primarily Turkmen gas) and to become simultaneously a transit country for energy and goods flows to the shore of the Indian Ocean. As a rival of

Pakistan there comes forward Iran, which needs a part of Kazakh gas and Turkmen gas to cover the energy deficit in the northern part of the Islamic Republic for the sake of shipment of its own hydrocarbons to Europe and Turkey. For political reasons the Turkish-Iranian cooperation in this sphere has been blocked, and the project of Trans-Caspian oil pipeline comes forward. With support from the West, they tried to start implementation of the project within the framework of TRACEKA – “Great Silk Route” program. However, thanks to agreements between Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed in 2007 the implementation of this project is not foreseen in the near future. This circumstance allows make the conclusion that “the Islamic world” has a weak influence on contemporary political processes in Central Asia and on its development in the sphere of energy.

For the beginning of the new millennium, the foreign policy priorities of the Central Asian countries and their adherence to various models of development started to shape.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan go on the way of synthesis of different ideologies: liberal-European, liberal-Islamic and modernist. They take into account the objective specifics of the region, which prevent it to resemble completely countries of Europe or Asia. At the same time, the combination of modernization with local traditions corresponds to the spirit of “Asianism”.

The isolationist trend gained in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the role of the state and the presidential power is particularly strong. The attempts to imitate it under conditions of contemporary Tajikistan did not give good results, and Tajikistan, being a strategic partner of Russia, remained in its foreign policy preferences within the framework of many-vector policy.

Thus, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in terms of ideology equally are close to all four probable vectors of development,

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are rather far from them. It is clear, if one compares the foreign policy courses of two groups of countries. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan readily participate in all possible integration structures both in CIS and outside this organization. On the contrary, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan avoid participation in any regional and international organizations. Turkmenistan, citing its status of a neutral state, officially recognized by United Nations, some years ago declared the termination of its membership of CIS, remaining in this international community of post-Soviet states only as an associated member. Uzbekistan, formally keeping its membership in CIS and ODKB, avoids participation in most activities of these organizations. Tajikistan due to its complicated economic and political situation, nearness to the zone of the Afghan conflict threatening security of this Central Asian republic, has to balance among various regional and non-regional players and has not finally defined the priority vector of its foreign policy.

Table 2 demonstrates the foreign policy priorities of the countries in the region of Central Asia for the second half of the former decade. Starting from these circumstances, it is possible to come to the following conclusions:

- 1) the foreign policy interests and priorities of the countries of Central Asia are not determined both in terms of the choice of interests and priorities of the Central Asian countries and in terms of definition of the region of the world chosen for their orientation;
- 2) these priorities and interests are unstable and subject to conjuncture changes.

Rendering justice to the above said, it should be said that the geopolitical uncertainty was characteristic for CA for the whole period of existence of the region, which historically was “the crossroad” connecting civilizations of distant territories of Eurasia. This process

was going on in ancient times and in Mid-Ages primarily in the form of ethnic migrations from Central Asia in many directions. As a result, CA turned out to be connected by ethnic ties practically with all regions of Eurasia. At the same time, the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods were marked in the region by the outflow of able-bodied population to Russia, which promoted consolidation of ties of peoples of Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

Table 2

**Foreign policy interests and priorities
of the countries of Central Asia for 2007–2008**

Country	Spheres of interests and partners	Foreign policy interests and priorities	Foreign policy type
1	2	3	4
Kazakhstan	Economic sphere: Russia, China, U.S.A., EU. Military-political sphere: Russia, China, U.S.A.	1. Many-vector policy. 2. Common integration projects with Russia. 3. Common investment projects with China. 4. Cooperation with American and European oil and gas and other raw resources companies. 5. Military cooperation with NATO and U.S.A.(construction of navy base in Atyrau).	Open foreign policy. Integration course.
Uzbekistan	Economic sphere: Russia, China, APR countries. Military-political sphere: Russia and China.	1. Friction with U.S.A. and EU. Game based on their geopolitical competition in the region with Russia and China. 2. Interest in external investments, particularly from APR, China and Russia. 3. Interest in China and Russia as countries with minimum claims for human rights observance and democratic standards. 4. Military NATO base (Germany) in Termez.	Elements of isolationism. The course for development of bilateral relations.

1	2	3	4
Kyrgyzstan	Economic sphere: EU, Russia, China, U.S.A., Kazakhstan. Military-political sphere: Russia, China, U.S.A.	1. Many-vector policy. 2. Interest in investments of all possible external partners. 3. Big migration flows to Kazakhstan and Russia. 4. Military bases of NATO (U.S.A.) and Russia.	Open foreign policy. The course for integration.
Tajikistan	Economic sphere: EU, Russia, China, U.S.A., Kazakhstan, Iran. Military-political sphere: Russia, China, EU, U.S.A.	1. Interest in investments of all possible external partners. 2. Big migration flows to Kazakhstan and Russia. 3. Military bases of Russia, NATO (France), information on informal interest of India in a military base in Aini.	Moderate course for integration. Combination of elements of open and private foreign policy.
Turkmenistan	Economic sphere: Russia, EU, U.S.A., China, Ukraine, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Turkey. Military-political sphere – the neutral status officially recognized by UN.	1. Dependence in gas export on the Russian infrastructure 2. Many-vector policy in export of gas. 3. Search for alternative routes of gas export. Main potential partners: China, EU and U.S.A., Turkey, India, Pakistan, Iran.	Rigid isolationism. The course for development of bilateral relations.

Permanently, CA was subject to political influence of various external forces connected with the Islamic world, China, Russia, India and West Europe and had itself a rather great influence on them. The complex of the above mentioned factors lead to the conclusion that the vagueness of the development model and differences in selection of external partners of the region were inevitable. At present, there are equal reasons either to accept or to turn down any of the above described “external” political orientations. The ruling political elites in the states of Central Asia are afraid that acceptance of any of these vectors may undermine their positions and at the same time also stability of the states. Therefore for the present powers of Central Asia the most advantageous variant is such model of political development

and vague ideology, which would not impose significant obligations and would not threaten political processes directed “from above”.

Therefore some experts defined the situation shaped in the CA countries and their foreign policy’s choice to be “the suspended neutrality”. As its variant one may regard the doctrine of “Eurasianism” interpreted as “orientation” simultaneously to Russia, the European Union, the U.S.A. and China. The other foreign policy ideologies are close to it, such as “many-vector policy” and policy of “open doors” in Tajikistan, the conception of “diplomacy of Silk Route” and regional zone free from nuclear weapons in Kyrgyzstan. The neutrality of Turkmenistan is a special case, while Uzbekistan pursuing the policy of “free hands and unions” actually is guided by ideas of “potential neutralism” in the process of carrying out its foreign policy.

The CA states try to avoid extremes in their foreign policy. On one side, they stay at a distance from Russia and images of “parts of former USSR”, and, on the other side, they succeed to avoid temptation to proclaim them to be “a part of the West”. However, it would be a mistake to regard the foreign policy of the Central Asian states as “neutrality”. Such policy has nothing in common with the classical neutrality of Switzerland and Sweden or with neutrality of ACEAN states. It is dictated by internal and external threats (instability in Fergana valley, closeness of CAR to restless Afghanistan and Chinese Sinkiang).

The lack in CA as a whole of a clear oriented model of development makes this region closer to Africa to the south of Sahara, where there exists the same situation of indefinite civilization’s choice. Therefore in the long-term perspective the adoption of such course may lead the CA states to the same results – transformation into failed states. One other foreign policy trend should be mentioned. Today, the CAR states actively urged towards involvement there of external forces,

which would make them solve complex problems of survival and development. In this respect Russian expert E. Yatsenko truly notes that the main interest of the CA states is as follows: acceptance of the proposal solving the whole complex of existing problems (economic and civilization's problems). In its time adherence to the Soviet Union supposed just such decision: protection from eternal threats and suppression of extremism, access to technologies and infrastructure, integration in the united and international economic ties, guarantees of observance of interests of local elites, humanitarian development. Today, the national leadership of Central Asia looks for a new variant of complex decision, which is different comparing with the times of the USSR. On the one side, the Central Asian states need an external partner, which may solve the complex of regional problems, as it was done by the Union's "center", when the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were union republics in the USSR. On the other side, due to the complex of external and internal political reasons the new independent CA states are not ready to make the choice in favor of any world and regional partner.

In the situation of domination in Central Asia of centrifugal forces there appears its construction as an international region by means of external forces. At the same time, each of them strives for formation of the region according to its own interests, i.e. primarily to establish in it such institutions, which would promote the long-term involvement of CA in the sphere of influence of the corresponding power. Since different countries involved in reciprocal action represent various regions with different orders, they urge towards "inclusion" of CA in the corresponding part of the world promoting washing out regional identity in Central Asian states. At the same time, the paradox is as follows: the keeping unity of the region is achieved not as a result of centripetal forces but owing to the balance of centrifugal forces.

At present, Central Asia exists as a separate international-political region because the external forces with diverse directions prevent each other to dissolve this region in other adjacent regions of the world.

Thus, the analysis of various aspects of regional and international reciprocal action shows: the CA states are close sooner to the pole of minimum institutionalization. They try to avoid excessive obligations and do not follow rigidly any values and principles generally accepted by international practice. All this is fraught with significant consequences for development of paradigm of international reciprocal action in this region of the world.

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