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**ISLAMIC FACTOR IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA'S
PROCESSES OF IDENTIFICATION**

The dialogue of cultures is necessary for Russia, first of all, for solving its domestic problems. The people of Russia have to acquire a new collective identity in place of the former and they lost collective identity known as “Soviet people”. This is a difficult task, because various ethnic groups in today’s Russian Federation strive for their own self-identification, for autonomy, or even for complete sovereignty.

The influence of religion in the identification processes not only affects the “main” religion of Russia. It is equally perceptible (sometimes even to a greater degree) among other religions, and primarily in Islam, the second most widespread religion in Russia after Orthodox Christianity.

Who am “I”, and who are “we”? Wherein resides our difference from others, the difference in which we believe, which we value, and towards which we strive? Having unexpectedly ceased to be the “Soviet people,” Russian citizens have turned to these questions now that they have discovered the illusory and deceptive nature of much of what they were once taught and forced to believe. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the destruction of the socialist system gave rise not only to a

broad interest in self-identification, but also to perception of its vital importance for each individual and for society as a whole.

In the hierarchy of factors of self-identification, ethnic affiliation is especially significant. Surveys conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology in 1999 showed that in answer to the question "About whom would you say 'This is us'?", the overwhelming majority of respondents identified themselves with ethnic communities rather than with their regions or the broader Russian Federation. At the same time, these ethnic identities are to a great extent defined by religion, which may be the central characteristic of culture writ large.

The precise number of the followers of Islam in Russia is still unknown. Figures ranging from 12 to 50 million have been cited. If one considers all peoples with traditionally Islamic culture as Muslims, then the higher figure may be justified. However, sociological surveys show that among the Tatars and Bashkirs (two of the most numerous traditionally Muslim peoples), only 45–46 percent claim to be believers and of these only about 11–12 percent observe rituals.

In studying the influence of Islam on identification, one must take into account the doctrinal differences between the two world religions, as well as the difference between the ethnogenesis of the Muslim peoples of Russia and the Russian ethnos instantiated by the state over hundreds of years.

From the very beginning, Islam viewed the state as a religious community. The group of believers that arose in the seventh century at Medina viewed their *umma* as an organization transcending kinship and tribe, and its creation was the first stage on the path towards establishing a state. In this we find one of the key differences distinguishing Islam from Christianity. Unlike Islam, the emergence of Christianity within the confines of already existing states engendered the independence of the church and its separation from secular power.

The close, often seemingly unbreakable connection between the Russian Orthodox Church and the prerevolutionary Russian state (which some religiously oriented leaders would like to see restored even today) was not at its core doctrinally justified. It appeared as a continuation and a further development of Russia's inherited Byzantine tradition, that is, as a consequence of history, not of religious doctrine. In Islam, by contrast, the identification of religion with the state occurred from the beginning, and so was fundamental.

Mohammed was not only a prophet, a messenger of God, but also organized the unification of diverse Arab tribes into the *umma*, which soon formed a state: the Caliphate.

The legal foundation of the Muslim state was the *Sharia*, or the law of God. Gazali, one of the most authoritative Muslim theologians, asserted that *Sharia* is the foundation, and the government is its defender. If something has no foundation, it can be destroyed and lost. Modern Islamic fundamentalists tirelessly stress this particular feature of Islam. According to Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, "Islam rejects the idea of conflict between the spiritual and the secular that is characteristic of the West... The Christian idea of 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's' is absent, because everything belongs to the all-powerful Allah".

Turning this principle of the faith-based community into an absolute has allowed Islam over the course of history to justify the consolidation of ethnically diverse groups within the boundaries of one empire. Therefore, nationalism as an ideology seems irreconcilable with Islam, because nationalism asserts national unity as the foundation of statehood and sees religious communities at the same level as linguistic, economic, territorial, cultural and other communities. From the point of view of Islamic doctrine, nationalism is *asabiyya*, group

solidarity, and is comparable to the exclusive loyalty to one's tribe characteristics of early Arab society. According to the tradition (*sunna*), Prophet Mohammed proclaimed that "the man who turns to *asabiyya* does not belong to our community".

Just as *asabiyya* had led to inter-tribal conflicts in the past, later Muslim leaders viewed nationalism (manifested as the interests of a particular nation) as a cause of wars in which one nation would attempt to enslave another. They regarded it as an egotistical, immoral, and materialistic philosophy, giving rise to colonialism. "Both in spirit and in general, Islam and nationalism oppose each other", stated Abul Ala Maududi, the founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic fundamentalist organization Jamaat-i-Islami. "The ultimate goal of Islam is a world government in which racial and national prejudices will be eliminated; all of humanity will be joined into one cultural and political system..."

"Anti-nationalism" received its most logical expression in the ideology and movement of pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism arose at the end of the 19th century, and was associated with Djamal at-Din al-Afghani, who believed that nationalistic ideas prevented Muslims from uniting against their common enemy (colonialism). Afghani challenged this national solidarity with religious one. He and his supporters viewed Islam as a unified ideological platform, capable of uniting the Muslims in battle against the colonial yoke and imparting faith in the possibility of revival.

The idea of Islam's incompatibility with nationalistic ideology was especially popular at the early stages of the national liberation movement, before the peoples of the Muslim world had dared oppose their colonial rulers. The rise of the local bourgeoisie, as well as the strengthening of nationalistic feelings in the former colonies and semi-colonies, led to a gradual turn from pan-Islamism (although in a

transformed state it continues to exist even today). Characterizing the atmosphere that had developed by the 1930s, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote: “The old pan-Islamic ideal has ceased to have any meaning; there was no Caliphate, and every Islamic country, Turkey most of all, was intensely nationalist, caring little for other Islamic peoples. Nationalism was in fact the dominant force in Asia, as elsewhere”.

Most strikingly, Islamic ideologues had shifted from one extreme to the other, moving from the complete negation of the idea of “nation” to identifying it with the religious community. The most revealing example in this regard was the formation of Pakistan. A concept of “Muslim nationalism”, operating on the assumption that two nations – the Hindoo and the Muslim – existed in India, served as the justification for creating Pakistan.

Russian Muslims present numerous examples of such fluctuating relationships between Islam and nationalism, varying with historical conditions and concrete socio-political situations. But before examining one of these examples, associated with the Tatars, we will note a few general characteristics of the self-identification processes among Russian Muslims in comparison with those typical of Orthodox Russians.

At the individual level, Russians’ self-identification includes an Orthodox component because of the need “to find oneself” in the spiritual vacuum created by the destruction of the political and ideological systems founded on communist ideals. Russians turned to Orthodox Christianity hoping to find the meaning of life and moral reference points. At the collective level, the Russian appeal to Orthodoxy came about through a tortuous search for a “national idea” that could serve as the basis of unity, inspiration, and mobilization in solving problems of state reorganization.

At the individual level, the motivations of Russian Muslims in turning to their traditional faith correspond to those of Orthodox Russians. However, for Russian Muslims' identification at the collective and ethnic level is even more significant. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens and other Russian Muslims, as well as other ethnic minorities living in cohesive groups, were able to declare themselves *nations*; that is, not only cultural, but also political communities. Ethnic groups developed their ideas about statehood and sovereignty in connection with their historical past and status within the Russian Federation (as well as in the Russian Empire and the U.S.S.R.).

The most numerous Muslim people of Russia and the most developed in many respects, are the Tatars. The issue of national identification moved to the center of Tatar social discourse around the second half of the 19th century, which historians characterize as the start of the Tatar ethno-nation's first formative stage. The second stage (from 1905–1907 until the 1920s) witnessed the establishment of the so-called “political” Tatar nation. At that time, three basic ideological directions appeared: Islamism, Turkism, and Tatarism.

Islamic ideologists assert that identification with Muslim faith is a priority for Tatar self-identification. For them the Tatars are a “Muslim nation”. They argue their position by citing the history of the Tatars, who come from Volga Bulgaria, a state formed by the Turkic Bulgars in the seventh century near present-day Kazan. The Bulgars converted to Islam in 922.

Tatar identification with the “Turkish nation”, prominent among the Tatar bourgeoisie and among some of the intelligentsia, is meant to separate the Tatars from Muslim peoples more broadly and to emphasize their unique place among them. It is also connected with the rise of movements promoting the unification of Russia's Turkic

peoples, begun by the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinsky. A few ideologists of Turkism (for example Yusif Akchur) have expressed solidarity with pan-Turkism defined as the unification of all Turkic peoples under Turkish leadership. Others (F. Karimi, I. Validi, Kh. Maksudi) argue that the Tatars themselves must unite the Turkic peoples.

The prominent theologian Shigabutdin Marjani played a major role in developing the concept of a “Tatar nation” (Tatarism). He was the first Tatar to address the question of his people’s ethnic origin. Marjani insisted on the Bulgar heritage of the Tatars and believed that they should consider not religion but ethnicity as their defining characteristic. “A few (of our tribesmen)”, he wrote, “declare that we are not Tatars but Muslims... Poor souls!.. If you are not a Tatar, and not an Arab, a Tajik, or a Nogai, and not a Chinese, a Russian, a Frenchman, a Prussian, and not a German, then who are you?”

Kaium Nasiri then formulated a detailed concept of the “Tatar nation” in his *Short Tatar Grammar Explained in Examples* (Kazan, 1860). Nasiri established four basic components of Tatar identity: origins (“a people of the Turkish tribe”), common territory (“Tatars living in Siberia, Orenburg, Kazan, and other districts on the right bank of the Volga and in the Astrakhan district”), culture (“their own literature”), and the language (“we usually call the Tatar dialect spoken by the Turkish tribe, the Tatar language”).

The relative importance of religion in Tatar self-identification has changed over the course of history, between complete domination and a minimal level. Although in modern Tatarstan one can observe the rebirth of Islamism and Tatarism (and Turkism to a certain extent), a new approach has now appeared: “Tatarstanism”. The political elite, in its attempt to gain as much “sovereignty” (independence from the federal center) as possible, must take into account both the ethnic

composition of Tatarstan (according to the 1989 census, the Republic's population was 48 percent Tatar and 43 percent Russian) and Tatarstan's geographic position in the middle of the Russian Federation (making it practically impossible to secede). Wishing to avoid ethnic conflicts, preserve political stability, and simultaneously achieve the maximal independence possible in negotiations with Moscow, the leaders of the Republic proclaimed Tatarstan's sovereignty on August 30, 1990, "in the name of a multinational people", asserting "the inalienable right of the Tatar nation and all peoples of the Republic to self-determination".

But two years later, in the Constitution of the Tatar Republic adopted on November 6, 1992, Kazan had already changed the notion of the "Tatar nation" to that of "the people of Tatarstan". This concept put forward by Rafael Khakimov, the political adviser to the Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev (now the director of the Institute of History of the Tatar Academy of Sciences), views the people of Tatarstan as a nation. Khakimov sees Tatarstan's situation as analogous to Switzerland's: a poly-ethnic nation consisting of ethnic groups possessing equal rights. Just as in Switzerland, Tatarstan forms a "poly-ethnic, poly-cultural society operating on the principle of territorial (not ethnic) sovereignty".

Although Tatarstanism has support at the official level, its critics cite public opinion data in the Republic to assert that the "idea of Tatarstanism" has no future, and is merely an ideology promoted by the Republic's ruling party to justify Tatarstan's economic and cultural independence. While not without foundation, judging Tatarstanism's future in this way seems premature. At least two scenarios are possible.

First, the most numerous ethnic group (the Tatars) may aspire to the status of a nation in Tatarstan. Of course, this would complicate

Tatarstan's inter-ethnic relations and, more important, its relations with the federal center, because this option would present the possibility of a subsequent demand for full national self-determination.

But another variant is also possible: the political elite may succeed in convincing the public that a poly-ethnic nation is preferable, especially considering the distribution of power and resources at the republican and federal levels. That which the Norwegian anthropologist T. Eriksen described might come to pass: the nation arises "from the moment when a group of influential people decides that it has to be. In most cases the nation begins as a phenomenon that is given birth to by the elite. Nevertheless, in order to become an effective political instrument this idea must take root at the level of the broad masses".

Because if its limited independence from the broader Russian situation, the ultimate choice of Tatarstan will depend upon developments in identification processes in other regions. Other republics also have politically pragmatic local elites (and sometimes common-sense public attitudes) interested in solving social problems by constructing a new type of identity to unite ethnic groups sharing single territories, freeing them from inter-ethnic conflicts that would harm everybody involved. A case in point is Dagestan.

Dagestan has 102 ethnic groups, with no one group titular or predominant. Five ethnic groups collectively dominate (Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezghins, and Russians), together comprising two-thirds of the population. The Republic has several religions as well, although Islam is the traditional faith of the overwhelming majority of the population (over 90 percent). Most Dagestani Muslims are adherents of Sufism (a mystical trend of Islam) and various *tariqats* (Sufi fraternal orders). Clan relations remain influential in the region, as do the norms

and mores of *adat* (common law), which are most deeply rooted among mountain dwellers.

After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the beginning of reforms, the situation in Dagestan has become extremely complicated. A rising level of tension in inter-ethnic relations was due to the economic recession (driving many people to the edge of poverty) and the rivalry for domination over political institutions and the distribution of state property became very acute.

All kinds of ethno-religious conflicts arose in the republic. They were aggravated by virtual battles between different national groups for living space in their historical lands, territorial conflicts arising because ethnic communities' physical locations did not always coincide with political administrative borders, and conflicts sparked by socio-economic and geopolitical factors.

The authorities of Dagestan saw a way out of the developing situation in the "introduction of practical means and methods of de-ethnization". Such path would ultimately lead to the formation of "Dagestani identity" similar to that of the "Tatarstan nation" in that both concepts promote general republican identity. However, there is a substantial difference between them. The poly-ethnic character of the "Tatarstan nation" is intended to minimize the importance of religious affiliation in the identity of Tatarstan's citizens. In Dagestan, in contrast, this de-ethnization is accompanied by an increasing emphasis on religious identity. Islam unites Dagestani citizens rather than separates them as in Tatarstan.

Islam has historically supported the unity of Dagestan, with the particular features of the Islamic doctrine playing a significant role in the process. Beginning with Prophet Mohammed and his associates, the followers of Islam first politically unified the Arab family groups and tribes, and then representatives of diverse races and ethnic groups.

Although according to official data, only 20 to 25 percent of Dagestani residents are practicing Muslims (those who observe all rules and rites required of Muslims), a significantly greater number identifies itself with Islam and is favorably disposed to political coexistence with other clans and ethnic groups. Dagestani citizens' preferences for Sufism support these beliefs because in contrast to Sunni and Shia religious leaders, Sufis view secular life, including politics, with indifference. For example, the *tariqat* of Kadiriyya, established in the North Caucasus in the 1860s by Kunta-kazi Kaziyeu, acknowledged any political power as lawful (including the Russian tsars), believing that politics affects only external life and thus has no importance for the spiritual life of the Sufi. (It is true that in the 19th century an anti-Russian opposition formed the politically involved *tariqat* of Nakshbandiyya, but this was ultimately connected with the idiosyncratic personality and ambitions of the Nakshbandiyya imam Shamil.

In the early 1990s, Dagestani political analysts took stock of Islam's integrating power and gave the "renaissance" of Islam a green light: the number of mosques grew considerably (from 27 in 1985 to 1,600 in 2001), Muslim educational institutions expanded (there are now 17 Muslim institutions of higher learning with 44 branches in Dagestan, as well as 132 Muslim secondary schools (*madrasah*) and 245 elementary *madrasahs* studying the Koran, and religious literature became widely distributed. However, the calculations and plans of the Dagestani authorities were thwarted by the unforeseen penetration of Islamic fundamentalism (most often called Wahhabism) into Dagestani life. This fundamentalism is distinguished by aggressive interference in politics and rejection of the separation of Islam from the state. It is also characterized by the idealization of early Islam; by irreconcilability with other viewpoints, new information and reforms; by intolerance and

antagonism toward non-Muslims; and by the use of violent, even armed methods to accomplish its goals. Fundamentalism's appearance in Dagestani politics was facilitated both by internal and external factors, most notably, by the events in neighboring Chechnya.

Islamic fundamentalist ideologues believe in the complete identification of national or ethnic identity with religion. From this belief comes the name of one of the most influential Dagestani fundamentalist movements – “Islamic Nation.” This name testifies to its intent to replace the present Dagestani system of national integration with a system based on Sharia, presented as a unified doctrine capable of “destroying *in vivo* the seeds of discord and mutual hatred”.

The fundamentalists throw an open challenge both to secular power and to the Sufi *tariqats* (indeed, Dagestani Islam is commonly called *tariqatism*). Recognizing the mutual threat to their power and spiritual influence, the state and *tariqatism* have now allied to prevent the influx of fundamentalists. The Sufi orders, through their leaders (who even in 1998 were still in direct opposition to the government), have in practice united with the government on the common platform of anti-fundamentalism. In September 1999 a law was adopted “On Banning Wahhabism and Other Extremist Activities in the Republic of Dagestan”. This law designated *tariqatism* as the single legal and historically rooted form of Islam in Dagestan, which in practice represented official government recognition. The *tariqatists* answered in 2001 by creating an all-Russia political party, the “Islamic Party of Russia” (on the basis of the Sufi-oriented movement “Nur”), which is loyal not only to the Republic, but to the federal government as well.

Comparison of religious influence on the evolution of Russian and Muslim identities in the Russian Federation truly demonstrates that nations are “neither natural nor primordial, but the result of hard constitutive intellectual and political work of elites and the masses”.

It is still too early to predict the ultimate results of these developments in Russia. Only one thing is clear: in our time, societal or collective endeavors do not convey authentic religious meanings. Religious identifications beyond the individual level are encouraged more for pragmatic political reasons than to impart the spiritual ideals inherent in religious teachings.

A search for identity inevitably results in division and separation. Just because of that it is said that an “era of identity” is full of sound and fury (see: Zygmunt Bauman, *The Individualized Society*). The Other starts to be looked as an alien, even as an enemy. There are quite explicable reasons for that. In fact, separation leads to a revision of borders, to a redistribution of lands, fertile plots, natural resources, water resources, access to sea ways, etc. It results in reshuffle of property and political power. The opposing business groups and political parties use a wide arsenal of means to achieve success. Manipulation with cultural, especially religious differences becomes in their hands the most dangerous destructive weapon. Dogmatic interpretation of religious teachings, justification of one’s own deeds by God’s will, recollection (often far from adequate) of religious fights of the past – all the above-said constitutes the powerful weapon for mass agitation under which people lose control over their words and deeds.

The intellectuals – historians and philosophers, poets and writers, film producers and journalists – play especially significant role in molding confrontation with the Other. People believe in their words more than in political propaganda, trusting them as educated and unselfish persons. Just because of that the responsibility of the intellectuals is of such great importance. There is no other way to put an end to destructiveness and enmity than to redirect the processes of identification to the path of reasonable, well-balanced and constructive cultural dialogue.

Only a dialogue of cultures is capable to put an end to distrust, hostility and hatred by transforming the acquisition of identity into reasonable, well-balanced and constructive venture.

*“Miroviye religii v kontekste sovremennoi kultury: noviye perspektivy dialoga i vzaimoponimaniya”,
St. Petersburg, pp. 36–42.*

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**ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL SECURITY AS SEEN
IN INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC
OF BASHKORTOSTAN**

The unity, state integrity and efficiency of the functioning and development of the Russian Federation are determined by the natural-climatic, socio-economic, political and cultural factors of domestic and external character. One of the major parameters determining the country's territorial unity and security is regional processes.

In the present conditions it is the region that is the optimal unit within whose framework the process of adopting crucial decisions on the problem of ensuring security should take place. Today, a national state which earlier used to be the monopoly provider of security is forced to give over a considerable amount of its functions to other political actors. The shift of the center of gravity from the federal level to regional and local ones is not only a reaction of society to the globalization processes, but also a natural scientifically and practically-based process of drawing the political system of power closer to man. A tendency of centralization of management and adoption of decisions is observed in big states, like the Russian Federation. In the conditions of emergency situations when the life of people is at stake, the complex

of timely adequate measures is urgently necessary, which can be ensured, in our view, primarily at the regional level.

Another factor calling for the necessity to transfer the system opposing the threats to security of individuals and social groups from the federal to regional level is the differentiation of population centers and, accordingly, the sources and scope of threats.

Due to the above-said, an analysis of regional security and the factors and threats destabilizing a given region and hampering its normal development seems especially important. We examine it as one of the priority spheres of state policy.

But it is important not to overreact. If each region acts independently, a danger emerges of incoordination and disintegration of the system. This is why a balance between the federal and regional levels of security is necessary.

The author's observations, an analysis of publications in the mass media and the study of scientific literature on problems of regional security made it possible to single out the most tangible groups of regional threats to security:

- ecological threats;
- economic threats;
- political threats;
- social threats touching on problems of the interaction of representatives of different social groups and communities.

It should be noted that at present threats of an economic, political and social character disturb residents of regions more often than those of the capital or major big cities. The main reason for this lies in their socio-psychological consequences, which can fluctuate between the state of frustration and fear and the degradation (destruction) of the social organism.

Ethnic and confessional problems (societal group) occupy a special place among the above-mentioned threats due to the fact that the poly-ethnic and poly-confessional structure of the Russian Federation can quickly turn into a conflict potential due to the interest and actions of certain forces, and is used for the destabilization of the situation in various Russian regions and in the entire country.

It should be borne in mind that nationalist threats come not only from radically-minded organizations, but also from the so-called common nationalism and xenophobia, which are manifested especially vividly in the youth medium and which are added to the special features of the socialization process of the individual in the present conditions.

Ethnic and confessional problems come to the fore in the Republic of Bashkortostan inhabited by people of more than 130 nationalities from time to time.

Among the most painful issues are:

The broadening of the sphere of using the Bashkir language (introduction of special requirements concerning the knowledge of the national language by the President of the Republic of Bashkortostan, the use of the Bashkir language at state government bodies, local government bodies, introduction of the compulsory study of the Bashkir language at general educational institutions, etc.);

Reliability of statistical record of national affiliation of republican residents. On this issue the public association of the Tatars living in Bashkortostan has repeatedly addressed residents of the republic and sent a letter to President D. Medvedev of the Russian Federation, in which they expressed doubts concerning the data of the population census in the Republic of Bashkortostan.

Justifiability of establishing days-off during the Muslim holidays Uraza-bairam and Kurban-bairam. We believe that the above-mentioned issues are artificially exaggerated and politicized. There are

certain people and organizations interested in fanning inter-ethnic and inter-confessional discord. By provoking ethnic conflicts they try to mislead society and distract its attention from the heart of the matter, that is, solution of urgent problems. The task of the system of ensuring regional security lies in carrying on propaganda and socio-psychological actions aimed at preventing destructive actions.

We fully agree with the President of the Republic of Bashkortostan R. Khamitov, who maintains that “the Republic is one of the good examples of friendly, good-neighborly relations between people of different nationalities”. Inter-ethnic marriages, which become ever more frequent in Bashkortostan and the region, are the most vivid confirmation of this.

The problem of inter-ethnic relations as not a priority one for the Republic. At the same time its leadership realizes the significance of tolerant relations between representatives of different ethnic and confessional communities. It was not accidental that the year 2011 was proclaimed the Year of Greater Inter-ethnic Accord in Bashkortostan.

“Rossiya i eyo regiony v poiske grazhdanskogo edinstva i mezhnatsionalnogo soglasiya”, Ufa, 2011.

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**FORMATION OF NATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
OF INDIVIDUAL IN POLY-ETHNIC REGION
OF TATARSTAN**

National self-consciousness of a person is one of the basic concepts analyzed by sociologists in the investigation process of interethnic relations. National self-consciousness has a complex structure. The ethnic sociologist L. Drobizheva includes in the structure

of national self-consciousness such concepts as the feeling of belonging to an ethnic group (ethnic identity), “images” and “ethnic interests”. M. Mnatsakanyan maintains that it is necessary to take into account the fact that the structure of national self-consciousness has not only a horizontal, but also a fundamental – vertical sociological snapshot. In this sense, he maintains, one can talk of deep-rooted foundations of national self-consciousness: psychological, cultural and historical.

However, researchers also note that the growth of national self-consciousness can proceed along the path of cohesion of members of an ethnic community, and also along the road of ignoring the interests of other peoples. Three negative forms of the manifestation of national “I” are singled out: ethnic limitedness, narrow-mindedness (unwillingness to agree to contacts outside the borders of one’s ethnos), ethnic egoism (striving for privileges and benefits for one’s own ethnos at the expense of other peoples), and ethnic phobia (direct hostility toward other peoples).

National self-consciousness of an individual included in a concrete ethnic community, is formed in the process of socialization. The result of this process largely depends on the ethno-cultural medium in which the socialization of a person takes place. The Republic of Tatarstan is part of the multinational Volga-Ural region which is distinguished by cultural diversity. Three ethnic strata have formed here in the course of more than a millennium: the Ugro-Finnic peoples (Mordovian, Mari, Udmurt); Turkish peoples (Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash), and Slav peoples (Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians).

R. Abdrakhmanov and E. Mavrina note that immediately after the conquest of the Kazan Khanate by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, two basic negative trends took shape in Tatar society, which continued to exist even to this day, namely, that “the Russians are colonialists” and “the Russians are enemies of Muslims”. In the latter

half of the 18th century, when Catherine the Great ruled Russia, the legitimized institution of Muslim clergy and permission to build and open mosques somewhat neutralized the second trend. In later years, along with the development of commodity-money relations the first trend largely lost its negative connotation, inasmuch as the requirements of the emerging class of the Tatar bourgeoisie were not limited too greatly by the Russian state.

The greatest tension in the history of Tatarstan – during the 1990s – was caused by a sharp upsurge of nationalism, both political and cultural, which could not but cause a definite strain in the relations between the peoples inhabiting the Republic. According to numerous researchers, despite differences in culture, the language and religion, and certain contradictions between the indigenous peoples during definite historical periods, these relations were mainly of a friendly character, and tension and conflicts were a result of erroneous nationalities policy of the official authorities. In these conditions the formation of the national self-consciousness of the peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan took place.

In the course of studying inter-ethnic relations in the Republic of Tatarstan in 2007 we carried out a surveillance poll among residents of Kazan on the subject of inter-ethnic relations in our Republic, using the method of semi-formalized interview going deep to the roots of the matter. We studied such components of the national self-consciousness of Tatars and Russians – the two main peoples living in the Republic – as ethnic identity, autostereotypes, and ethnic interests. We asked 36 persons representing three main age groups, Tatars and Russians, as well as men and women who were taken in equal number.

In order to find a place for ethnic identity among other identities we asked our respondents about the importance of perception of their belonging to their people and also asked to name the most important

identities for them. We offered a list containing nine identities: citizen of the world, inhabitant of Eurasia, Russian, citizen of Tatarstan, Tatar (Russian), Muslim (Orthodox Christian, other), member of a professional team, mother (father, son, daughter), wife (husband, girl, boy) and gave them an opportunity to name their variant. But nobody availed of it.

The predominant opinion of our respondents was the importance of perception of their closeness to their fellow-compatriots, irrespective of nationality, and negative answers were given by some Tatars and Russians. The range of opinion concerning the place of ethnic identity among other identities was quite wide among both Russians and Tatars, however, there were certain differences. Not a single Russian respondent put his or her ethnic identity to first place, but it was at fourth or fifth place. The Russian respondents considered more important their belonging to family, religious identity, civic identity (belonging to Russia), belonging to the entire world, belonging to professional team, etc.

Among the Tatar respondents there were people who put their ethnic identity at first place, and some respondents did not mention it at all among the identities important for them. On the whole, there is a tendency of Tatars placing their ethnic identity at first, second and third places. These respondents considered their civic identity (belonging to Russia and Tatarstan), as well as religious identity, belonging to the entire world, and belonging to their family also important.

In analyzing the autostereotypes of Russians and Tatars it was revealed that not all respondents have them, and among those having autostereotypes there are more people who form their perceptions and views on the basis of moral and communicative qualities, but there are also those who prefer to assess specific features of the way of life and work habits of representatives of the two people – Russian and Tatar.

As to assessments of visage, the respondents of both Tatar and Russian nationalities unanimously state that during many long years of living side by side people have mixed with each other to such an extent that it is very difficult, if at all possible, to find any noticeable distinctions in the appearance of Tatars and Russians. Positive and negative autostereotypes are also characteristic of respondents of both nationalities, which make it possible to speak of an adequate and critical assessment of their people by representatives of both nationalities.

The following autostereotypes have been revealed among the Tatar respondents. Tatars are more decent, reserved, peaceable, industrious, hospitable, and communicative; Tatar women are patient and tolerant, and they can forgive. The Russian respondents had the following autostereotypes: they are easier to get on with, they have closer relations between themselves, they are peaceable, more careless and less disciplined.

In analyzing the importance of ethnic interests for the respondents we also tried to reveal the presence or absence of ethnic egoism among them, that is, striving for getting privileges for their people at the expense of other peoples.

We have found that ethnic egoism was rather more characteristic of Russians than Tatars. In general, ethnic egoism was manifested in a weak form in all age groups and among respondents of both sexes, but among certain young male respondents of Russian nationality ethnic egoism was stronger and there was greater discontent with inadequate satisfaction of their ethnic interests. It is interesting that these respondents came across the negative attitude to them on the part of Tatars, and they assert that sometimes they come across national discrimination in Tatarstan. The Tatar respondents expressed ethnic egoism in a weak form, which was revealed among representatives of

all age groups, men and women in equal numbers. A strong form of ethnic egoism was not found.

Our investigation made it possible to draw a conclusion that relations between the Russians and Tatars are friendly or neutral, but not at all conflicting. Thus it can be assumed that in the Republic of Tatarstan the national self-consciousness of both Tatars and Russians has been formed in the conditions of friendly, goof-neighborly relations, and despite a negative influence of erroneous nationalities policy and certain cases of negative experience they have been based on mutual tolerance.

*“Kazanskaya Nauka”,
Kazan, 2010, No 10, pp. 350–352.*

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TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL GANGS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

In analyzing organized crime in the North Caucasus it is important to take into account the presence of a definite number of organized crime groups, their characteristic features and connections between them, as well as the means of establishing these connections and agreed-on terrorist activities. In view of this it would be expedient to examine the system of organization and operation of criminal gangs and the place of the “Imarata Kavkaz” organization in this system. The North Caucasian region, where more than 76 percent of all terrorist acts registered in the Russian Federation occurred in 2010, continues to remain the main source of the terrorist threats to the Russian Federation’s security. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation

has established that the activity of the above-mentioned organization threatens Russia's territorial integrity. Its strategic aim is to separate the North Caucasus from the Russian Federation and set up an independent Sharia state in the region, which presupposes the violent overthrow of the constitutional system of the country and the abolition of the Russian legislation in the territory.

It should be noted that the Russian special services do not have precise and sufficient information about the structure of this organization. Nevertheless, a certain picture can be formed on the basis of the records of criminal cases, court trials, bills of indictment, and other sources. Indeed, in the course of investigation of the activities of some leaders and members of illegal armed units closely connected with the "Imarat Kavkaz", it was established that in October 2007 Doku Umarov announced the formation of this organization operating in the South and North Caucasian regions inhabited predominantly by the Muslim population. Doku Umarov has published on his sites a number of "decrees," including one on the introduction of the Sharia rule on the entire territory of the organization and on its administrative-territorial structure, which included Dagestan, Chechnya, Ossetia, and other parts of the North Caucasus. The activities of the organized criminal groups, which are members of the "Imarat Kavkaz", are aimed at the destruction of the constitutional system, the federative structure of the state, legal power, municipal bodies, etc.

Having organized a large-scale criminal activity, the Wahhabi militants have decided to tackle two tasks simultaneously. First, these militants used the form of collective association sacred for each Muslim – 'jamaat'. Secondly, they ensured cohesion of their supporters on the principles of strict subordination to the leader, or amir. Hence, the formation of "horizontal ties" between the leaders of the underground criminal gangs in various Caucasian republics. Today they closely

interact with religious, public and human rights organizations, and the mass media, and set up their own information resources. Especially important is the fact that they have their supporters and accessories at law-enforcement agencies, bodies of executive and representative power, and also among religious leaders. It can safely be said that the “Imarat Kavkaz” has emerged and is functioning as a criminal association coordinating and directing groups of criminals, armed units, and extremist organizations. Coordination of terrorist activity is effected on a larger territory, including other regions, which “are occupied by infidels and where devout Muslims wage a just struggle against them”.

As we see, modern terrorism in Russia is a complex organized structure. Its ideological cover only disguises the real figures and ultimate aims. Among the sources of personnel, material, financial and other resources of terrorist activity are modern corporative structures fulfilling big concrete terrorist orders connected with the redistribution of financial flows and power in the economic and political spheres. Terrorist activity directly depends on financial flows from abroad, and also those from “internal sources.” Some of the leaders of the criminal gangs of Dagestan had records of their incomes and expenditures, which fell into the hands of the law-enforcement agencies after their death in fighting with the federal troops. The militants have extorted money from rich Dagestani entrepreneurs by threats and blackmail, and also received considerable means from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. For instance, the “commander of the Dagestani front” Shamil Magomedov had dozens of millions of rubles to spend on criminal and terrorist operations.

The growing scope of the criminal activity of the illegal armed units of militants and changes in its forms, means and methods are their reply to the stepped-up actions of the law-enforcement agencies in

order to suppress the resistance of the criminal rebels. Armed bandits intensify their activity, killing more and more employees of the law-enforcement system in the region. According to available information, the stepped-up activity of armed gangs in the North Caucasus is constantly supported and financed from abroad by international terrorist and religious-extremist organizations, and also from domestic sources. The underground criminal gangs in the North Caucasian region are constantly helped by people of North Caucasian origin living in foreign countries. These ethnic groups collect money to render humanitarian assistance to their fellow-compatriots of the same origin. Apart from that, criminal gang leaders quite frequently turn to domestic sources of financing, taking under control criminal businesses – drug trafficking, kidnapping, racket, prostitution, etc., and also blackmailing corrupt government officials.

It is only natural that one of the key elements in the system of measures opposing terrorism is putting an end to its financing. Work is underway to cut off both outside and inside sources of financing terrorist, extremist and criminal activity, including the illegal sales of arms and explosives and drug trafficking.

In this connection the position of the Criminal Investigation department of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and the General Prosecutor's Office with regard to the terrorist activity of the "Imarat Kavkaz" organization and the groups included in it and acting independently is quite correct. An analysis of circumstances of the perpetration of criminal acts shows that they have been thoroughly prepared and well-coordinated and had the aim of dealing maximal damage to people and property. Terrorist groups are well-organized, well-armed and strictly disciplined. The "Imarat Kavkaz" organization is a free association of semi-autonomous gangs, and these free associations and gangs present a difficult problem for the law-

enforcement system, inasmuch as it is difficult to identify them, collect information about them and fight them. The point is that what seems to be the only organized criminal gang operating in a given locality or town is in actual fact a small cell of a criminal structure or structures operating in the entire North Caucasian region or even in the whole of the Russian Federation, which can include a great number of free voluntary participants or groupings. Even if one or another cell is liquidated, this may not touch the whole structure, which has a great many such cells replacing one another.

At present, investigation continues concerning big acts of terror in the republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, particularly, in Vladikavkaz where 19 people were killed and about 200 people wounded, and 46 vehicles were damaged, to say nothing of other property.

In investigating and combating terrorist and other criminal acts it is necessary to take into account the results of the analysis of the struggle against organized crime in the North Caucasian region, which show that illegal armed units, terrorism and extremism are the phenomena of secondary order if related to highly-organized economic and political crimes in the North Caucasian republics.

Secondly, terrorist acts and economic crimes in the North Caucasian region are closely connected with one another and with corruption, which has directly been helping separatists and international terrorists and extremists for quite a long time.

Thirdly, it is necessary to organize an effective operational-investigation work in the sphere of combating corruption.

Fourthly, strong operational measures should be taken in the spheres of corruption. Stricter control should be exercised over persons suspected of economic and other similar crimes. This work should be

carried on at a high professional level and with strict observance of the constitutional rights of citizens.

*“Terrorism i ekstremizm v Rossii i stranakh ATR:
pravovoye regulirovaniye i protivodeistviye”,
Moscow, 2010, pp. 48–60.*

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**RESTORATION OF MONARCHIES
IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE?**

More than 60 out of 193 states of the world are the presidential republics. Therefore the study of the legal, political-economic and other consequences of functioning of this state order has become quite urgent.

The biggest abuse of the presidential powers is the attempt to transform the temporary election post into the permanent post and the republic – into the monarchy. Many heads of the presidential republics wish to have power permanently because of the benefits connected with the uncontrolled power. The legal basis of such abuses is the multitude of the presidential powers, holding in one office of functions of the Head of the state, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and many others. The presidents have the multitude of powers and use them for their personal aims. The presidential republic is marked by forms of absolute power of the president, by transformation of him into the sole institution of the state power, notes V.E. Chirkin.

The evil of the lust for power is the biggest evil of the mankind, wrote Chingiz Aitmatov in his great work “Block”. Using K. Marx words in the preface of “Capital” one may say that the person aspiring for getting permanent and uncontrolled power may commit any crime.

There are many such examples in history of presidential republics. For the XX century the individual dictators were a common phenomenon in Latin America: F. Duvalier dynasty, which tortured the people of Haiti for 29 years, R. Trujillo regime in Dominican Republic existed for 31 year, A. Stroessner regime in Paraguay – for 34 years, Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua – for 43 years, Castro dynasty in Cuba – for more than 50 years. The longer one and the same person occupied the power post – the level of living of the people was lower. The people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, where Kim dynasty has ruled for more than 70 years, are well aware of it.

The process of installation of monarchies (the personal uncontrolled power transferred by succession or designation) was going in full swing in the republics of the former USSR, where the leaders chose the presidential republic as a system of the state. There are examples of transfer of high power to direct or designated successors transforming democratic regimes into “elected” monarchies”, academician O.T. Bogomolov notes.

At the same time, the size of powers of the president is comparable with the powers of an eastern despotic monarch. But the way of legitimization of the power and the constitutional status of the head of the state formally are different: he is considered to be the president elected by the people and has civil liability.

The system of elected monarchy contains some evident advantages for the personal power: it is easier to maintain tranquility and stability, full liberty for the cult, monopoly, legal voluntarism and corruption. This system is characterized by ignorance of democratic norms, purely formal division of branches of power, complete absence of any deterrents and counter balances and as a result of it – the unlimited power of the president and his team. Its main shortcoming consists in the fact that this system does not work for the benefit of all

citizens and it inevitably leads the country to depression; the fall of respect to the president inevitably results in degradation of the state power, while the full power in this system means the complete personal irresponsibility.

It is worth giving examples of “elected” monarchy in the post-Soviet space.

Azerbaijan for 20 years has been the presidential republic. Four presidents have occupied the highest post in the country. Ayaz Mutalibov and Abulfaz Elchibey stayed at power for one year each. Unlike them, Geidar Aliyev is the only president out of the presidents in the CIS, who was able to work for two full terms and to ensure transfer of his power to his son. Just in his time this system degraded to the primitive “elected” monarchy. Levon Melik-Shakhnazaryan, a known political analyst in the Trans-Caucasus commented the situation in the state as follows: the next president after Ilkham will be his wife Mekhriban, followed further by Geidar Aliyev junior. All is being done for this in Azerbaijan.

Kazakhstan. The first constitution of independent Kazakhstan was adopted on 28 January 1993. The constitution approved the people’s sovereignty, independence of the state, principle of division of powers, recognition of the Kazakh language as a state language, recognition of the president to be the head of the state, recognition of the Supreme Court, of the Constitutional Court and of the High Arbitration Court and others. The president and the majority of deputies of the parliament thought about welfare of the people, about the future of the country, and therefore the basis of the constitution of 1993 was the model of the parliamentary republic, where main political powers were possessed by the collective organs: the parliament, the government and the parties. But in autumn of 1993 there was adopted in Russia the new constitution; according to this constitution, all main

powers of the executive, legislative and judicial powers were transferred to the president. The president designates the government, the military command starting from the commander of a detachment, designates all diplomats, he proposes the candidatures of judges and of the Prosecutor General. As a result, the political division of powers was substituted for functional division. The presidential circle proposed to N.A. Nazarbayev to rewrite the constitution of Kazakhstan taking as an example the constitution of Russia. And the president could not ignore this proposal.

On 30 August 1995, the people's referendum adopted the constitution, which is in force, and Kazakhstan became a presidential republic. The model of the Russian constitution was the basis of the constitution of Kazakhstan. According to it, the president shall be elected by the people for 5 years. The president shall be a citizen of Kazakhstan by birth and not younger than 35 and not older than 65 years, freely speak the state (Kazakh) language and shall reside in Kazakhstan for not less than 15 years. One and the same person cannot hold the office of president for more than two terms running. The election of the president shall be recognized, if over 50% of voters took part in the election.

On 7 October 1998, the people's referendum made the essential amendments in the constitution of Kazakhstan: the term of powers of the president was enlarged from 5 to 7 years, the limitation of term of office of one and the same person was abrogated, the minimum age of the president was enlarged to 40 years, the obligatory participation of over 50% of voters in the presidential election was repealed, the restriction of maximum age of the president was repealed (i.e. the interests of the first person were considered to be more significant than the interests of the country), simultaneously the analogous limitation for all state officials in Kazakhstan was repealed. In 2007, some

significant amendments were made in the constitution redistributing the powers of the parliament for the benefit of the president. In 2011, the president got the right to arrange the anticipatory presidential election.

As a result, the coup d'état took place in Kazakhstan, which passed the way from the parliamentary to the super-presidential republic. The situation is not yet characterized by the power transfer by succession, but the cult of the first president N.A. Nazarbayev, who has been the leader of the country since 22 June 1989, has been created. His status and powers are defined not only by the constitution but also by a separate constitutional law. According to this law, the first president has full, unconditional and permanent immunity for all his actions taken in time of his office. He has the life long status of a state man, the right to address the people of Kazakhstan; he has protection, communication, transport, state ensuring of his activities as well as his personal property of the office apartment and the country cottage with state service. He has the right for medical and sanatorium service, pension and insurance. The state order and the state prize have been established in the honor of the first president, as well as his personal library and archive.

Nevertheless, the option of elected monarchy is possible. Ermuhamet Ertysbayev, a presidential advisor for political affairs on 25 July 2011 declared that the President's son in law Timur Kulibayev might become a probable successor of Nazarbayev, who was at that time 71 years old. In case of emergency, connected with a sudden departure of the head of the state, just Kulibayev may continue the strategic course of the president, said Ertysbayev. The talks about emergency related to a sudden departure of the president were resumed often in July 2011 after the surgical treatment to Nazarbayev.

If for the next years N.A. Nazarbayev does not leave his post due to health or other significant reasons, Kazakhstan will be threatened with the following troubles: a full stagnation of state service, the lack of replacements, the further flourishing of corruption, the vacuum in training young and perspective cadres of leaders at all levels, the vacuum of new ideas, the technological backwardness and the “time of troubles” with the threatening reshuffle of temporary leaders and political instability.

Kyrgyzstan. For fifteen years (1990–2005) Kyrgyzstan was headed by academician Askar Akayev. For this period of time the country became a domain of the president and his family. His wife Mairam Akayeva sold administrative posts. The elder son Aidar was an advisor to the finance minister, while his wife Saikal was a TV official. Adil Toigonbayev, a citizen of Kazakhstan, the husband of the president’s elder daughter Bermet, kept under his control all profitable branches of the republican economy: alcohol sector (AO “Kyrgyzalco” and the Kara-Baltin alcohol plant, the Kant cement-corrugated asbestos board enterprise, cable TV and newspaper “Vecherny Bishkek”.

After the “tulip” revolution the new leader of the republic K. Bakiyev came forward as a frenzied prosecutor of the Akayev family and considered the impoverishment of the people of Kyrgyzstan and all other misfortunes to be the result of activities of “the family business” of the Akayevs. He assured that “new Kyrgyzstan” would not tolerate such development. However, actually only the clannish overthrow occurred. It was resulted in the capture of the family business of the Akayevs by the Bakiev family, wrote analyst Akyl Stamov in internet “Gazetta KG”. Marat Bakiyev occupied the post of Mairam Akaev and Aidar Akayev, and it should be said that this son of President Bakiyev obtained the monopoly for selling administrative posts. The president’s brother Adyl Bakiyev was designated to the post

of the trade representative of Kyrgyzstan in China. The most unpretentious brother of the president – Janybek Bakiyev was the chief of the department of transport militia. One of the brothers became the head of the state protection and kept under his control all secret services of the country.

The new president took all measures to hold his power for ever. In 2007 there was created his personal pro-presidential party “Ak Jol”, which got the great majority in the parliament. As a result, the parliament was an obedient addition to the administration of the president. In autumn 2007 the new constitution (analogous to the Russian constitution) was adopted. The main aim of the new constitution was the installation of the unconditional superiority over all other branches of power, concluded the European constitutional commission. According to this law, the president was the main actor and arbiter of the political system. Given the absence of legal limitations of the president’s power, the opposition had little chances to be heard. The forceful and not peaceful change of power may be the consequence. Under the slogans of optimization of the system of state governance K. Bakiyev concentrated the power in his hands, to the mind of political analyst E. Baisalov. It is not worth speaking about the super-presidential republic, since the quasi-monarchial system of governance existed. The question is that the democracy served as a cloak for construction of a khan-monarchic system. There appeared a perspective of transfer of power from father to son by succession.

On 7 April 2010 the forceful change of power actually occurred: K. Bakiyev was overthrown in the course of the other revolution. On 27 June of the same year the referendum took place in Kyrgyzstan and adopted a new constitution, which approved the parliamentary-presidential form of governance analogous to the governance in France.

Tajikistan. Since 1992 Emomali Rakhmonov ruled at a stretch in the country. Since 1998 Emomali Rakhmonov started to get rid of former supporters and influential representatives of the opposition. In 2003 the former head of the ministry of internal affairs of Tajikistan Jakub Salimov was detained in Moscow, extradited to Tajikistan and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment with strict regime. In December 2004 in Moscow there was arrested the leader of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan Makhmadruzi Iskandarov. In May 2005 he turned out to be arrested by the secret service of Tajikistan and was sentenced to 23 years of imprisonment.

In 2003 Rakhmonov arranged the referendum on amendments to the constitution of the country, and since 2006, according to these amendments, he may occupy the presidential post for two additional terms of 7 years each. At the same time, the limitation for the president's age was repealed, and all preconditions were created for the lifelong rule of E. Rakhmonov in Tajikistan. By the time of the next election in 2013 the purged political climate of Tajikistan would be artificially prepared for the crushing victory of only one person – the present president, political analyst A. Kurtov said.

Turkmenistan. After getting independence Saparmurat Niyazov installed to power his circle, former cadres of the Central Committee of the Republican Communist Party, and he consolidated his power. For the second part of the 1990s he started to get rid of his former circle and designated to administrative posts the unqualified but obedient people. As a result, the highest centralized power headed by Niyazov was created. His megalomania was proved by unprecedented facts: for 16 years of being in power he decorated himself with 22 medals, including seven Golden Medals “Hero of Turkmenistan” (L.I. Breznev should envy!), and with 16 orders. He was fond of getting international prizes from any organization: UN International Academy of Digital

Information; Golden Medal of P. Kapitsa Academy “To the Author of Scientific Discovery”; Golden Medal of the Foundation 200 years Anniversary of A.S. Pushkin; Medal of Peter I Russian Academy of Natural Sciences; Golden Medal of the International Epizootic Bureau; Golden Medal of the World Organization of Intellectual Property; Golden Medal “For Special Contribution of Aviation Development” of the Inter-state Aviation Committee; Leo Tolstoi Golden Medal.

In December 1999 the sitting of the Council of Elders Khalk Maslakhaty and All-National Movement “Galkynysh” as the All-Turkmen Forum took the historic decision and gave to the first president of the republic the right of the permanent head of the state. The eccentric president of Turkmenistan, “the father of all Turkmen” Niyazov died at the age of 66 years. This person called a day of week by his name and another day by name of his mother.

Uzbekistan. The permanent president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov has ruled the country for 22 years, having replaced on 23 June 1989 at the post of the first secretary of CC of the Republican Communist Party Rafic Nishanov. Many Uzbek representatives of the opposition and foreign experts question legitimacy of Islam Karimov staying in power as the head of Uzbekistan: Karimov extended the presidential powers twice by means of people’s election and twice by means of national referendum. It should be noted that the existing constitution of Uzbekistan does not foresee extension of the presidential power by means of referendum. According to the logic of opponents of Karimov, his presidential powers were terminated in 2005.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that Uzbekistan in 2010 resembled Romania of Nicolas Chauseshku of the example in 1989. All goods, which may bring foreign currency, are exported, and the interests of the local population are not taken into account. The growing dissatisfaction of the people is supposed to be suppressed by forceful

action and intensified state propaganda. Uzbekistan is a closed country, where there is no opposition, freedom of press, independent court, while normal work of journalists for the sake of evaluation of the regime's political perspectives is actually impossible.

* * *

Thus, the formally democratic regimes in most presidential republics in the post-Soviet space have transformed into “elected” monarchies, as a rule, without real election. For the sake of comparison: in Latin America out of 20 presidential republics two of them – Venezuela and Cuba – are marked by existence of “elected” monarchy. Only Africa has approximately the same share of “elected” monarchies. However, the mutinies against “elected” monarchs in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Tunis and Syria show that their share in Africa will diminish greatly there.

The presidents invent almost identical explanations in order to justify somehow their anti-democratic and permanent being in power.

1. I deserve it because before the crisis of 2008 our country was developing with certainty. First, some of the presidential republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) for the period from 2000 to 2008 were marked by the tempos of development, which exceeded the world average rates. But all of them were developing by means of rise of the world prices for oil and gas. Nevertheless, these countries in terms of tempos of development were far behind “Asian Tigers” (Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea), where the additional stimulus to development was the passage to the elected and superseded power. Second, what about others, do they not deserve it?

2. I have to finish the started reforms with the logical outcome. But, first, any national leader is doomed to carry out reforms, and it is quite possible that other leaders would have realized more efficient

reforms, for instance, the change for real democracy; second, the logical result of a prolonged leadership of the same person is clearly seen by example of Cuba, Northern Korea, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Tunis and most African countries, which more and more lag behind democratic countries in terms of economic development.

In the republics of the former USSR, where the ruling elite choose the state order in the form of parliamentary republic, not a single phenomenon of lifelong governance existed. In Estonia for 20 years (from 1990) three presidents replaced each other, while Leonart Mery was elected twice (in 1992 and 1997). In Latvia from 1991 to 2011 four presidents were elected, while F. Friberg was elected twice (in 1999 and 2003). In Lithuania from 1991 to 2009 four presidents replaced each other, while Valdas Adamkus was elected twice (in 1993 and 2004), and neither of them could think about the lifelong term of presidential office. Therefore the Baltic republics, which lack oil, gas and other significant resources, are characterized by greater rates of development than the presidential republics with vast natural resources.

Summing up, it should be said that the greater powers has the head of the state, the greater is dependence of the law enforcement bodies on the head of the state, the less influential is the opposition, the easier are the chances obtained by the president to change the elected power for the lifelong power. The heads of the most presidential republics in the post-Soviet space (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (up to 2010), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) used this advantageous chance. Using big presidential powers they transformed the elected and replaced power into the permanent self-nominated power. At the same time, the republic of Azerbaijan has transformed into a classical monarchy: the son inherited the powers of the father.

The review of constitutions, reduction of powers of the head of the state and transfer of powers to collective organs with greater intellectual potential (parliament, government), as it was done in Kyrgyzstan, – this is the main way to prevent installation of monarchies, which doom economies of “elected monarchies” to non-competitiveness, the state – to instability and “time of troubles”, the peoples – to poverty and destitution.

“Svobodnaya mysl”, M., 2011, N 10, pp. 35–45.

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**THE CONTEMPORARY ROLE OF ISLAM
IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SPACE
OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC**

The rebirth of Islam and its greater activity in the political sphere nowadays may be considered as a natural reaction to the profound crisis in political, social, spiritual-moral and economic spheres endured by the countries of Central Asia at the present time. It is determined also by the external factors – globalization, changes in the geopolitical balance, modernization etc. Re-Islamization goes on in parallel (or is attended by) ethnic mobilization, and this factor means that the direct or indirect attempt has been taken to stimulate it at the official level for the sake of formation and consolidation of the national statehood and identity.

However, the following question remains an item on the agenda: how is it possible to realize in practice, since even if in the historic period Islam was not the main consolidation factor in the Fergana valley; the national, tribal, clannish, political and economic components first of all determined the process of consolidation.

The existence of different levels of identification of Muslims related to regional and national belonging means also the following: in ideological terms the separate groups of the Muslim community of Kyrgyzstan represent a rather motley picture. The below part of the study is devoted to discussion of the main ideological directions of development of various groups or communities (jamaats) in the Fergana valley of Kyrgyzstan as well as their different views on implementation of Islamic doctrine.

The specific feature of the ideological picture of Kyrgyzstan, i.e. the rapid rise of religious self-consciousness of the population, was clearly shown by the results of the sociological research of the author in summer of 2005 in two southern regions of the country (Osh and Jalal-Abad regions), two northern regions (Chui and Issyk-Kul regions) and in the city of Bishkek. The great majority of respondents (81.7%) answered that they believe in Allah (81.7% of them have higher education). A rather great part of them (25.75%) observes fully religious laws and permanently observe Muslim rites. More than half of the respondents (51.7%) answered that they observe the religious rites not always, while 64.45% of the respondents said that they have Koran at home.

To the author's view, the following ideological aspects of development of the Muslim community contain the complex of Islamic values: All-Islamic moral, law, religious-cultural specifics, including national traditions and rites of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and other nationalities living in the countries, which in terms of historical past remain in close and permanent reciprocal action.

It seems that by characterizing the Muslim community of Kyrgyzstan in terms of its ideology it is significant to find out which ideas of development of Islam and of realization of Islamic doctrine as a whole in Central Asia have been disseminated to a larger extent in the

Muslim environment of the country. The question arises as well: the ethnic belonging of any Muslim has any reciprocal ties with his susceptibility to some ideology based on Islam?

At present, the Muslim community of Kyrgyzstan every year becomes more subject to the political process. On the wave of further democratic reforms, which led to adoption of the new constitution of the country in 2007 and to forming of the parliament according to the party lists, different parties do involve non-secular Muslims in political life of the republic.

Actually, the Muslim resource of Kyrgyzstan represents potentially an influential force, which, however, does not fully take actively actions in its interests jointly with various political parties or non-governmental organizations. In other words, Kyrgyzstan stands on the threshold of real struggle waged by different political forces for bringing the Muslim resource to their side. A particular interest attracts the practical question: is it possible to use for the political purposes the Muslim community as a united political force under conditions of its multinational composition, of tribal and clannish differences. According to the data of 2001, the national composition of Kyrgyzstan, taking into account the peoples professing Islam, was as follows: Kyrgyz – 3225 thousand people, Uzbeks – 683 thousand people, Tatars – 45 thousand people, Dungans – 51 thousand people, Uighurs – 46 thousand people, Kazakhs – 42 thousand people, Tajiks – 43 thousand people, Turks – 33 thousand people, Azerbaijanis – 14 thousand people.

Correspondingly, the above presented data it is evident that, from the point of view of political object, two groups in the Muslim community (Kyrgyz and Uzbeks) attract special attention, while representatives of other nationalities, due to their small number, can not be a significant factor in the aggravating political struggle for the

“Muslim resource”. At least, the significance of other nationalities in political struggle is much less comparative with two main ethnic groups.

It is also not excluded that due to the recent rise of Kyrgyz nationalism “the Islamic alliance” of representatives of non-title nations, for instance, Uzbeks, Uighurs, Dungans, Tajiks etc., may emerge. The quantity of these nationalities may exceed one million.

For the long period, the following expertise prevailed: the Kyrgyz thanks to the nomadic way of life in the past time and under conditions of atheist Soviet rule are not susceptible to Islam. Actually, “traditional” (“every day”) Islam, disseminated within the Kyrgyz population of the country, was always marked by queer and strange forms by means of mixture shaman perceptions and concept of Islamic monotheism. Evidently, this fact resulted in the ingrained meaning that Kyrgyz in mass are less religious than other, mainly settled peoples of Central Asia.

The distinct features of Islam in the epoch of rapid development of information technologies and the general trends of development of Islam for the post-Soviet period should be taken into account. For the period of independent development of Kyrgyzstan, Islam significantly consolidated its positions in the environment of Kyrgyz, which became an important result of openness of Central Asia to external influence and “rebirth” of Islam. Islam gradually extended the horizons of its influence on the system of social relations. Islam gradually more and more becomes the norm of “customary law”.

However, it should be noted that Islam still is unable to perform one of the significant functions in society of Kyrgyzstan – the activities directed to integration. The capacity of Islam as an instrument of society’s integration has not been realized both at the all-national and the internal-national levels, if the matter concerns the title nation of

Kyrgyzstan. The tribal system of Kyrgyz society and, consequently, the specifics of internal-national identification of the Kyrgyz to a large extension prevent achievement of this objective. In this context, the experts and scientists of Kyrgyzstan started the research for working out theoretic model of relations between the state and Islam and of the boundaries of the secular order.

The main problem consists in mechanisms of such reciprocal relations: either it is the extension of state relations to Islam, including Kyrgyz national elements, or it is the process in order to de-ideologize the power, which occupies the position of neutrality. The tribal division acquires a special significance in case of distribution of power functions and representation in the organs of state governance.

The higher level of identification of the Kyrgyz is fixed by the line of geographic division of the country to the North and the South. At the present time, it represents a much more important factor in policy of the country comparing with the local tribal division within both the northern and the southern clans. In the point of fact, the attempts of many years to overcome the tribal structure of Kyrgyz society resulted in the change for the regional principal of division and representation in the power structures. This factor always had impact on the change of groups in the power structures, which was realized according to a private line for governance of the country. It should also be noted that the question of self-identification directly depends on the age, social status and education of respondents. At the same time, the theological education or average training in this field is not a key factor for determining the nature of the given views.

The poll arranged in 2008 among students originated from the regions at the age from 18 to 25 years getting education in secular higher education institutions in Bishkek and Osh showed that the majority of respondents did not observe religious rites. At the same

time, there exists the trend of the rise of religiousness among representatives of the students (from 25% to 30% of students in secular higher education institutions), who visit mosques not regularly but attend all Friday prayers. It is worth comparing the results of the poll among young people in 2003, which showed that from 8% to 10% of students of secular higher education institutions attended Friday prayers, one may see the geometrical growth of attendants by the youth of Friday Mohammedan prayers. At the same time, over 52.76% of young people are “nonreligious” and 62.8% of young people identify themselves primarily as Muslims and only later as Kyrgyz by nationality. It shows that the youth besides cultural identification looks for political and ideological basis in Islam (although over half of respondents said that Islam was only religion (55.53%), while 32.66% of respondents considered Islam as a religion and at the same time as ideology and politics).

Thus, the stereotype of perfunctory “religiousness” of Kyrgyz, in contrast to Uzbek, is being broken gradually. The spiritual vacuum, corruption and, as a result, the fall of authority of secular state institutions lead to the situation, when the youth today considers Islam as a value’s orientation, a certain political-ideological system and not simply a tradition. Of significance is the fact that the contemporary youth remains at the initial stages of the process of ideological transformation from the traditional-national perception of Islam (Kyrgyz means Muslim) to adherence to general Islamic values, religious orientation to identification, which means augmentation of a chance of emergence in the perspective of the protesting ideological-political position.

Most (68%) of respondents-students from 20 to 23 years, mainly representatives of the rural youth from regions, positively value the participation of higher state officials in religious rituals of believers.

It may be considered that in total 66.9% of respondents admit that the believers have the right to establish political parties. At the same time, of significance is the fact that against the background of ideological “uniformity” of secular political parties of the KR, in the future the youth may consider as an alternative in the form of a new political force, exactly “the secular party with pro-Islamic rhetoric”. Today, most respondents coming from regions (64.6%) consider that Islam and democracy represent the mutually compatible phenomena in certain circumstances. It gives the chance to speak about both positive perception of democracy, its rights and freedoms and about the traditional perception of Islam. At the same time, 51.1% of respondents see the future of Kyrgyzstan in the mixed form of secular system with the deciding role of Islamic values like, for instance, in Malaysia and Turkey. At the same time, 14.32% of respondents see Kyrgyzstan as a purely Islamic state like, for instance, Iran. One should become lost in thought by the fact that 1.26% of the respondents from rural districts consider Kyrgyzstan as a democratic country with the western model of development like, for instance, the USA.

In point of fact, we may see the formation of a strict Islamic level of identification and exit of thinking outside the national framework. However, it should be admitted that these trends only started to grow in the milieu of Muslims, and this category of people represents even if gradually growing but still a minority of the Kyrgyz part of the Muslim community in the republic.

In contrast to the above mentioned, we see that the main mass of the population at the age from 30 to 64 years intend to identify itself within the framework of nationally oriented Islam. Undoubtedly, it leads to separation of the Muslim community of the republic from other nationalities professing Islam in Kyrgyzstan.

At the present time, the urgent problem of Muslim Kyrgyz remains as an engrained factor in the consciousness, namely – the regional and tribal division. The emergence of regional tension, of distrust or alienation within the Kyrgyz part of the Muslim community was not marked by open and evident features. And what is more, it is not discussed by the press. However, the unofficial regional division in the process of distribution of powers within organizations and institutions in the religious sphere is a direct consequences and a partial reflection of the situation emerged in society for the years of independence.

The monopoly of the southern regional group in the religious sphere is the established tradition since the power of Soviet time. In its turn, this actual situation resulted in emergence of the situation when actually in all regions of the country, except the Talass region, the heads of Muslim communities originated from the southern region, particularly, from the Osh and the Batken regions.

Actually, this circumstance to a large extent shows the essence of the main regional contradictions between the South and the North within the Kyrgyz part of the Muslim community. They always were characterized not so much by theological as by traditional distinctions.

The first group of contradictions relates to a different perception of traditional Islam, which characterizes mainly the rites and culture of daily life of the layman in Kyrgyzstan. The imams of the mosques nominated to the northern regions of the country brought with them the cultural specifics of the South, the stereotypes and psychology of religious thinking which were not understood by Muslims of the north.

For instance, in the south rather under the influence of the settled way of living of other peoples, the views, which had nothing in common with Islam, became deep-rooted. As an example one may cite as follows: women shall not visit mosques; imam has a special status of

“holy man” in society and a lot of other distinctions, which are not fully supported in the north of the country with due account of the period of the Soviet power and traditions inherent in nomadic societies.

The other feature of the so called “southern Islam” is the open commercialization of the rite’s services. One of the clearest examples may be such phenomenon as davran spread in the south of the republic. Most likely, Davran has its origin in the Tajik language and is the term of late Sufi Islam. The Arabic root day’p, i.e. turn or queue is its basis. In traditional “southern” Islam davran means calculation of missed Mohammed prayers. Since the time of attaining one’s majority and till funeral prayer it is transferred to the material basis in kind of foods (grain) paid only once and transformed further to money.

The imams in the south have their own theological interpretation of this phenomenon doubtful from the point of view of Islam and not justified by any religious sources. It should be stressed that the term davran and the mentioned practice related to the missed prayers do not exist in Islam. From the theological point of view, this local perverted and dangerous misinterpretation of religious principles causes the deterioration of material wellbeing of the deceased person’s family.

At the same time, this phenomenon has been widely spread in the south of the country. Some families have to sell cattle and houses in order “to pay off” for the deceased person. The attempts to introduce davran in the north caused dissatisfaction, and imams of the mosques had to repudiate this practice. But in any case, it had a negative impact on the relations between the community and its head. However, some paid services were practiced by imams in lesser cases than in the south.

The education and training of cadres remain a not less important problem. At present, the other reason of discord in the milieu of Muslim Kyrgyz in the south is a result of many years “monopoly of the south” in the spiritual sphere and the subsequent unjust proportion for

the northern students sent for studies to the main universities of the Muslim world by the Spiritual Department of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan.

Thus, the factor of regional belonging has a very great impact on the Kyrgyz part of the Muslim community, and this purely internal and unpublicized phenomenon, nevertheless, represents a significant problem for society and for the state, from the point of view of social-public stability.

The other significant factor, which contributed to the lack of conflicts on the basis of regional division, was the fact that the religious self-consciousness of the population in the north of the country was much lower than in the south. The thesis may be put forward that “the rebirth” of Islam in the south of the country created the situation when Muslims could more freely and, probably, with greater ardor than beforehand to observe the rites of Islam. In other words, the formerly not so openly observed religious rites later became the daily practice of the majority of the population. But further this practice did not modernize the religious thinking but consolidated the traditional (daily) form of Islam.

The situation in the north of the country differed from the situation in southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. It was a tradition that in the north the level of the secular education of Kyrgyz was always higher. Since the Soviet time, in the process of break of the traditional way of life of the nomadic population, the Kyrgyz population was actively attracted to getting the special and the higher education. Evidently, the majority of the population in the rural districts, like in the south, respected the priorities, determined by traditional types of economic and private business activities. Like in the south of the republic, “the rebirth” of Islam resulted in consolidation of its traditional-ritual role in public relations. Further, as the rise of religious self-consciousness of the population was going on, the attitude of the

population to Islam was gradually acquiring the features of its thoughtful study and attempted use in daily life not only as a religious tradition.

The external influence of the Muslim world, including establishment of various institutions, education and enlightening Islamic centers, played a significant role in this respect. For the last 16 years, the main result of these activities was as follows: the education level of an ordinary Muslim rose greatly promoting a more conscious approach to Islam. Every year understanding of Islam gradually leaves the framework of its traditional-ritual content.

The process of spread of Islam in the northern regions of the republic goes on and gradually exerts influence on the representation of people coming from the north in the local kaziyats, mosques and the administration of mufti. To all appearance, “monopoly” in the spiritual sphere of the representatives of the south will gradually diminish, although the post of the head of mufti office will be kept as usual by the representative of the south. It is determined by the circumstance that for the years of traditional control in this sphere the spiritual leaders of communities and education institutions to a rather great extent are “stuck” in terms of further development of Islamic thinking and limited themselves with ritual and daily aspects of interpretation of Shariah. The long-term concentration of power within the framework of one regional group has led the rivalry for the post of the head of muftiyat. Some spiritual leaders in the north comprehend it clearly. The designation of local residents to the post of imams is the first indication of significant changes in the spiritual sphere of Kyrgyzstan.

The control exerted by southern representatives in this sphere has led to violation of the main principles of selection of the head of Muslim community, recognized one of imams in the Chuy region. He said that a desperate struggle was going on in the muftiyat and the

government for the right to be the mufti, while the main decisive factor of its outcome was not the knowledge and personal qualities of the person but money. Evidently, the regionalization of spiritual sphere is a negative phenomenon in the Kyrgyz part of Muslim community. But it is a natural process, which is caused by the rise of religiousness in the population and which is determined by the remaining problem of regional division for North-South. However, exactly Islam remains the main mechanism of consolidation under conditions of multinational characteristic of Muslim community of Kyrgyzstan.

A numerous national group in the Muslim community of the country consists of representatives of the Uzbek people. Traditionally, Uzbeks were more religious than Kyrgyz and kept to a larger extent the religious-ritual part of Islam as an important element of daily life and identity even in the period of the Soviet power. Further, religiousness of the Uzbek population became the basis of the stereotype in society – “Uzbeks are marked by greater religiousness than Kyrgyz”.

However, in Soviet time the level of religiousness of Uzbeks was characterized rather by the traditional-ritual part of Islam, which formed an integral part of their culture. For the period of “rebirth” of Islam it resulted in public demonstration of Islamic rites in daily life and in increase of the number of mosques.

The “rebirth” of Islam was marked to a greater extent by another distinction: the development of “national” Islam in the country, which implied unofficial closeness of national Muslim communities. From the objective point of view, it is a natural phenomenon, since in the places of compact settlement of other Muslim peoples usually there existed mosques called by the names of nationality of believers, who attended them – Uzbek, Uighur or Dungan.

This division by national indication was always a specific feature of the religious sphere of Kyrgyzstan, and it is kept alive till present. In

the long-term perspective, it is a great problem for the state, since the question of integration of society of Kyrgyzstan is raised inevitably for the sake of solving the problem of integration of society of Kyrgyzstan for achievement of internal political tasks or, in other words, for creation of the integrated society corresponding to the interests of the state.

With due account of the total number of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan and the places of its compact settlement near the historic Motherland, the problem of integration of Uzbeks in the common structure of society of Kyrgyzstan seems very urgent. However, the probable solving of this problem should not be based on the principles of pressure or rigid restrictions. In this case, the principle of involvement in social and political life of the country should be applied, and a stage to it may be fixed at the community level taking into account religiousness of Uzbeks.

In reality, the identity of Uzbeks consists of two components: first, nationality, second, religious belonging. Ethnicity occupies the first place, since in consciousness it is identical with religious belonging.

In point of fact, we speak about realization of the principle of Islamic unity based not on the state level, taking into account its secular character, but on the level of Muslim community of Kyrgyzstan. The need of elimination of national barriers in the Muslim environment is evident, but it demands great efforts, which should be supported by practical steps both on the part of muftiyat and on the part of other official organs of the state. It concerns not only Uzbek ethnos but also other nationalities – Uighurs, Dungans etc.

We see that elaboration of the principle of representation in the power by national quotas, like in the USSR, at present is impossible primarily due to specifics of Kyrgyz mentality. One of the first steps in

this direction may be involvement of Uzbeks and other nationalities to the work of muftiyat and its organs. It will promote the internal community integration, the attainment of higher status of Muslim community as an influential factor in social relations and, consequently, consolidation of the authority of muftiyat as an organ contributing to harmonization of inter-national relations. We come to the conclusion that under conditions of secular power in Kyrgyzstan the state is unable to interfere directly in the religious sphere and to assume the functions of the regulator of relations within one confessional unity. At the same time, it is an objective factor that at present the state lacks the needed means for working out and carrying out the national policy owing to absence of the means and of any national ideology promoting integration of society.

The question is that the ideology based on common human principles and deprived of religion might suite Kyrgyz, since one part of them and non-Muslim peoples share atheist views. It is impossible to find out an alternative to the Muslim way of development and the system of Islamic values for the Muslim part of the population, i.e. Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Uighurs, Dungans and others. Any ideology, which ignores this specific feature, is doomed to tearing away particularly by the people with strong Muslim tradition and by the Kyrgyz, who accepted Islam. And adoption of any ideology based on Islam will violate the norms of the constitution.

The full realization of integrating function of Islam seems to be possible only within the framework of Muslim community of Kyrgyzstan. And what is more, Islam contains the legal norms of regulation of relations in community, which not always are applicable under conditions of the secular state. Just greater role of Muslim community in social relations will promote solving inter-national

problems and, consequently, will make its contribution to the stable development of the country.

At present, the simplified division of Islam to traditional, moderate or radical type of it is widely spread in contemporary political science relating to analysis of processes in Islamic world. But, undoubtedly, we comprehend that Islam as a system of common human moral-ethical values and social-political principles is the integral and undivided system. In other words, the different types of Islam do not exist. Islam is one entity, but its perception and evaluation of its role in a given society for certain historic periods are different.

At present, the collisions among various groups of ulam (scientists) take place in the Muslim community of Kyrgyzstan as a result of the restoration and politicization of Islam. Using plain words, the conflict occurs between two types of religious thinking: the traditional for Central Asia acceptance of Hanifites mazhab and maturidit akida; Salafit, often political thinking brought from other countries of the Muslim world and further acquired sustainable forms and content not without external intrusion. The emergence of two “types” of Islam within the framework of one state is not a new phenomenon. For the first time it was noticed in the countries of the Near and Middle East. The reasons of appearance of the parallel Islam in this region lie in discrepancy with the official power in the political sphere, when policy of the state differs from the existing principles of religion. At the same time, if the traditional type of religious thinking often means the conservative approach in the perception of the definite mazhab and akida, the views introduced from outside represent by themselves a very mixed picture – from fundamental-conservative type to modern and radical types of religious thought.

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**APPRAISAL OF LABOR POTENTIAL OF
UZBEKISTAN IN TERMS OF MIGRATION
PERSPECTIVES**

Uzbekistan is an active participant of international labor markets. According to studies, most migrants of the republic are employed within the limits of the CIS. The constant and rising demand for labor force in host countries, mainly in Russia, promotes this process thanks to the lack of language barriers, the entry regime without visas etc. At present the migration flows to Kazakhstan grow mainly to the construction industry and agriculture.

The scales of labor migration grow for the last years. The globalization of world processes strengthens openness of the countries and their integration in the world community. It is the cause of not only movement of natural resources, capital, financial and material resources but also of labor force. The accelerated formation of world labor markets is going on mainly by means of labor migration of the population. Under the contemporary conditions, labor migration becomes an integral part of the world labor market and world economy. In point of fact, labor migration with due account of its scales becomes at present a significant segment in labor market both in host and in home countries creating a specific segment of external employment of the population.

The world financial crisis had a rather great impact also on the labor migration of the population of Uzbekistan. In particular, the migration to Russia, as formerly and now the main migration partner

was reduced to some extent. It is proved, first, in 2008 – by the return of some labor migrants in time of the usual season of most active working activities, in 2009 – by a reduction of the whole number of labor migrants, second, by reduction of the amount of money transfer (for the first quarter of 2009, for instance by 37%). However, according to experts, the reduction of labor migration is a temporary phenomenon. According to Russian sources and appraisals of local experts, even under conditions of the world financial crisis the labor migration from Uzbekistan as a whole keeps its usual size.

For a long time there continued to exist the regime of the extended reproduction of the population and, accordingly, the rapid rise of labor resources. According to the Soviet methodology, Uzbekistan was considered to be a region with excessive labor power and was a significant source for the organized export and redistribution of labor force in the country. Actually, the annual increase in labor capacity was rather high (2–3%), which ensured the rapid rise of labor resources and at the same time created problems of job placement and ensuring employment of the population. To some extent such situation has existed up to the present time, since the main mass of labor resources was formed for the period of extended reproduction and rapid rise of the population. As a matter of fact, the increase of the amount of the republican labor resources was going on up to 2008 on the basis of high birth rate for the Soviet period.

On the boundary of centuries the size of labor resources was growing annually by 360–390 thousand people (3.0–3.1%). For these years, the demographic pressure on the labor market was felt particularly evident, which created some problems in ensuring employment of people under conditions of supply-demand of labor force. In spite of a rather high annual increase of jobs, the tension in labor market remains. The extension of the employment sphere takes

place mainly in the sphere of small business and individual entrepreneurship, which in other countries is characterized by inadequate stability of jobs probably creating a non-sustainable employment and a potential risk of unemployment.

According to the world practice, the admissible-critical level of unemployment is usually considered to be the size of 10% of economically active population (Economic security, 1998). According to the estimates (with methodology of ILO), the actual level of unemployment in Uzbekistan is appraised as 5.3–5% (by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the population of Uzbekistan in 2007). It is lower than in most states on the territory of CIS. However, with due account of the rapid rise of labor resources and a vast mass of the youth annually fulfilling labor market, it is possible to consider as a rather high indication the current level of unemployment in Uzbekistan. The job placement problems, in particular, in small cities and rural districts create pre-conditions for the search of work outside permanent residence.

At the same time, a rather low level of work remuneration in some republican industries has a great impact on formation of labor migration flows. Thus, the high level of provision with work places and the potential threat of unemployment call for the intention of people to look for jobs and wages outside the borders of the republic.

The labor migration is of great significance for Uzbekistan. It diminishes the demographic pressure on the local labor markets particularly in densely populated regions and, as a matter of fact, is the alternative to unemployment. Thousands of people having left for other countries to get jobs to a certain measure alleviated the tension in labor market of Uzbekistan. The labor migration is also a significant source of currency coming to the country. According to the National Bank of Uzbekistan, the size of currency remittances to the republic is rising

constantly: from \$ 225 million in 2002 to \$ 3 billion in 2008. The money remittances of labor migrants have a significant share in the whole amount of currency transfers. According to the World Bank, the annual currency transfers of labor migrants of Uzbekistan in 2006 estimated almost \$ 1 billion (World Economic..., 2006), in 2009, by experts view, these transfers exceeded \$ 2 billion. Actually, the currency remittances of labor migrants are much greater than the sums fixed in the official sources, since in parallel with international and national financial systems and banking structures some informal channels are used for this sake. In aggregate, the money transfers of labor migrants ensure about 10% of the GNP of the republic.

At the same time, the excessive growth of labor migrations has negative consequences. The labor market of Uzbekistan as a result of external labor migration forfeits the most mobile and capable population. Despite the measures taken by the state for extension of organized export of labor force, a rather great part of emigrants from Uzbekistan in host countries are employed on an unorganized basis and lack the needed social protection either on the part of their state or of the host state.

The labor migrants, members of these flows, are used mainly by employers not according to their professions and special skills, losing their professional knowledge and qualification often irretrievably. It should be taken into account that the labor migration goes on against the background of the general migration outflow from the republic. As a whole, it creates problems related to the qualified workers, and these problems may aggravate in the perspective. The exit from the republic of a great number of mobile qualified workers engenders certain problems for the national labor market: the deficit of specialists, the provision the enterprises of the real sector and the sphere of services with qualified cadres. The negative social-demographic consequences

of labor migration are not less significant: deterioration of the participants' health, complication of family relations and inadequate attention to education of children.

As a whole, the external labor migration weakens the national labor market and to some extent contributes to worsening of the demographic situation in Uzbekistan.

The formation of quantity and structure of labor resources at present time is subject to a great impact of the essential reduction of birth rate, which occurred and subsequently increased for the 1990s and the beginning of the new century. As a result, for the period of 1991–2004 the general and the total coefficients of the birth rate reduced by 1.7–1.8 times. At the same time, the reduction of birth rate in rural districts with more than one half of labor resources was going on more rapidly than in cities.

The reduction of birth rate had for the republic rather significant positive social-demographic consequences. It promotes improvement of health of mother and child. The demographic pressure on the able-bodied population decreases. According to some estimates, for the period of independent development of the republic, taking into account 1000 able-bodied persons, the general demographic burden decreased from 1038 to 652 persons, i.e. by 383 persons of disabled ages, including the burden of children – from 878 to 530 persons, i.e. by 348 persons. The age structure of the population changed a lot: the proportion of able to work contingents rose from 49.1% in 1991 to 60.1% in 2009. Simultaneously, the proportion of children and teenagers aged up to 16 years reduced considerably from 43.1% in 1991 to 33.0% at the present time.

The demographic echo of the reduced birth rate will be felt in formation of the labor market in Uzbekistan for the nearest years. In 7–8 years, the growth of labor resources will become slower to a

rather great extent and the parameters of generations change will differ in the republic. If at present the ratio between the people, who are approaching to the able to work ages, makes 3.6: 1, while by the year of 2020 it may reduce to 1.7:1, which demonstrates the slowing of growth of the labor capacity. It inevitably has influence on the scale of labor migration. In the nearest future the republic will not have great reserves for export of labor force.

At the same time, a significant improvement of social-economic situation in the republic will promote the processes of external labor migration. As economic growth will accelerate the needs of economy will rise in attracting new masses of able to work population. As the world experience shows, the analogous with Uzbekistan changes in the age structure of the population open a kind of “demographic window” of economic chances. Given the lesser number of dependents comparing with the able to work people of certain age, the countries get a chance to make additional investments, which may contribute to the accelerated economic growth and to the rise of level of living of the population. In Uzbekistan the main pre-conditions of this process are as follows: acceleration of the economic growth, structural reforms in economy, improvement of investment climate; all these measures bring results in case of a significant reduction of the tempos of the population growth. For the last years economic development of the republic took the lead over the population growth; and the GNP, the size and per head indications of industrial production and agriculture grew by accelerated tempos. The going on positive processes of economic development will be accompanied by the rise of incomes of people, which shall objectively weaken the factors of labor migration.

Thus, the labor migration of the population from Uzbekistan may reduce significantly owing to the impact of economic and social-

demographic factors, including many factors with the prolonged influence. The contemporary rise of labor migration of the population of Uzbekistan seems to be a relatively temporary phenomenon conditioned by the specifics of transformation period. As an example, one may cite experience of Italy, Turkey and Kazakhstan, as well as other countries, which recently were active exporters of labor force to the international labor markets but further themselves became the host countries. Uzbekistan also may present an example of the change of the situation in the labor market; and rather significant pre-conditions exist for this phenomenon.

Lately, the scientific literature is marked by citing of the notion “population’s economy”. Probably, it is expedient to put into the scientific circulation also the term “labor economy”, which may be urgent not only for the countries with the lack of labor resources but also for the countries marked by rapid rise of labor resources. Under conditions of growth of size of labor migration, it is significant to keep the national labor capacity in terms of quantity and quality. The achievement of more efficient international cooperation may promote realization of these aims. It is necessary to extend organizational-legal cooperation of Uzbekistan with Russia and other countries. At the present stage, both home and host countries should work out the strategies of changing the job placement of citizens abroad for the civilization process. They may be based on perfection of the legislative-legal basis and may foresee elaboration of new approaches to the organized labor migration.

*“Migratsionny most mezhdu Tsentralnoi Aziei i Rossiei:
Rol migrantov v modernizatsii, innovatsionnom razvitii
ekonomiki stran, posylayushchikh i primayushchikh
migrantov”, M., 2011, pp. 337–341*

INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS FACTOR ON THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA*

At present the Russian Federation is inhabited by people of more than one hundred nationalities. The specific feature of the situation is that one people – Russian – account for 81 percent of the entire population, and all other peoples comprise only 19 percent. During the post-Soviet period a religious infrastructure, quite impressive in its size, has spontaneously formed in the country. And today its confessional structure can be regarded stable enough.

One of the authors of the above-mentioned book, D. Kotelenko, writes: “The tumultuous growth of religious organizations in post-Soviet Russia ended in 2004–2006. At present the total number of these organizations (registered and unregistered) exceeds five thousand. The main confessions (by the number of believers and religious organizations) in the south of Russia are Orthodox Christianity, Islam and five main neo-Protestant confessions (Evangelical Christians, Baptists, Pentecostalists, Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses).

“The Orthodox Christian and Islamic belts differ considerably in the degree of consolidation and intensity, as well as frequency and content of religious manifestations. The territories of the traditional distribution of Islam are distinguished by a high number and density of religious organizations. The leaders in this sphere are Dagestan (especially its mountain districts) and Karachay-Cherchessia (Karachay districts). The Orthodox Christian belt lags behind considerably (especially in Dagestan). Chechnya and Ingushetia can be regarded as super-religious Islamic centers”.

* G. Matishov, D. Kotelenko, V. Avksentyev. YUNZ RAN Publishers. Religious factor and security problems in the South of Russia. Rostov-on-Don, 2010.

In this author's view, there will be no changes in the ethno-confessional borders in the south of Russia in the near future because the borders of traditional confessions have been firmly established. During the past eighteen years Islam has not advanced any further, although there have been certain possibilities for it. Besides, it is not known whether any further advancement of Islam will meet resistance (and how strong it will be) in the Orthodox Christian territories. Thus, the borders of "Islamic" regions of the North Caucasus remain closed to religious interventions.

Geographically dispersed migration to rural districts has its limits, in contrast to migration to cities (the capacity of the former is connected with the extensive character of agricultural production which aggravates rivalry for resources). Certain "advancement" of Islam was connected primarily with the "development" of new territories.

A period of the stabilization and consolidation of the state and society has begun, and a period of spiritual quests and experiments has ended. Neo-Protestant confessions have exhausted possibilities for a considerable rise in the number of their adherents in the south of Russia.

As a social subsystem of society religion is intertwined with other components of the social system and is always, to one degree or another, a factor of a definite state or change of this system. Its turning into a real factor of concrete social processes, including in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations, takes place by religion fulfilling definite social functions.

Religious manifestations are multiform, which is determined by a complex, ambiguous character of its inner structure and great variety of its components and ties. During many centuries religion has formed man's attitude to the world, nature and entire human life. The turning of people en masse to spiritual values of national cultures (Christianity,

Islam, Buddhism, etc.), which has begun in the past decades, is inalienably connected with a search for and formulation of the laws of moral-ethical behavior in society. As part of the social organism, religion also experiences the influence of the increasing global processes. This is why it is necessary to use its traditional values in determining and shaping man's relations with the modern poly-cultural medium.

During the past few years interest in the Islamic problem has considerably grown all over the world, including our country. It can be explained by large-scale processes going on in the modern Moslem world. The developments of a global character taking place in several countries of the Middle East have led to the emergence of the contradictions which are very dangerous for the entire world. Islam is playing a major role in resolving them on a regional scale, and also exerts considerable influence on the world geopolitical picture.

The ethno-confessional relations in the south of Russia in the 1990s were fraught with dangerous conflicts. Relations between certain peoples of the Russian Federation had a complex contradictory character. The religious factor exerts, as a rule, long-term influence on society and its political systems, which cannot be properly assessed at a given moment.

The collectively-written monograph by scholars at the Southern research center of the Russian Academy of Sciences headed by Academician G. Matishov, examines in a comprehensive manner the role and significance of the religious factor on the southern borders of Russia and its influence on this country's security. The work reveals the main development trends of religious communities in the south of Russia, analyzes the impact of the religious factor on socio-political processes going on in the North Caucasus and in the whole of Russia

and gives recommendations to the bodies of power concerning the key problems of ethno-confessional situation.

This monograph has been written within the framework of the program of fundamental research supervised by the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences entitled “Spatial Development of the Russian Federation: Interdisciplinary Synthesis,” subprogram No 12 entitled “Problems of Socio-economic and Ethno-political Development of the Southern Macroregion”, and the project entitled “The Functioning and Development of Religious Communities in the South of Russia” (2009–2010). Among the authors of the monograph mentioned are well-known and authoritative Russian scholars and experts.

In their view, most works examining the present ethno-confessional situation in the south of Russia concentrate on studying individual problems of religious life, regions or confessions. The work under review is one of the first attempts to analyze in a comprehensive manner the religious situation in this macroregion.

The approach used by the authors of the work includes spatial and systemic analysis of the situation and conflicts and takes up four volumes of the “Atlas of Socio-political Problems, Threats and Risks in the South of Russia,” which was published by the Southern research center of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It should be noted that the monograph includes data about religious organizations submitted by local government authorities, their analytical material, archives, the mass media, etc.

One cannot but agree with the authors’ view that the continuing segmentation of the political systems of advanced countries is largely determined by the fact that national-political self-identification is pushed to the background by ethnic-religious group identities. The latter contradict one another, and the consensus reached is too fragile,

which reduces the stability of democratic systems and threatens their very existence.

During the 1990s, confessional identity was one of the many factors which prevented the disintegration of Russian society and the state, which was in the process of transformation. However, today it is evident that a firm foundation of national identity cannot be formed on this basis. Religion, even in its most peaceable manifestations, divides people of different confessions. Apparently, power is well aware of the danger of the confessional heterogeneity of the country and is trying to overcome it by lowering the significance of religion in public life.

Russia's cultural variety is a sum total of ethnic and confessional identities of more than one hundred peoples inhabiting the country. The phenomenon of modern Russian self-consciousness has emerged on the basis of inter-ethnic, inter-confessional and inter-cultural contacts and actions over many centuries. We examine ethnic and religious identities as the basic values which exerted the decisive influence on the formation and development of the all-Russia cultural and civilization tradition. At present the formation process is going on in Russia to create a common national identity, and attempts are made at a state level to form a single common national identity by different means. In our view, these attempts are not always successful because the ideas offered at a state level for the formation of common identity come across serious obstacles.

One of the serious reasons for such situation is, in our view, socio-cultural polarization and intolerance, as a consequence of this. Being a direct consequence of inability to reconcile these or other ethnic, socio-cultural and confessional differences, intolerance has now become the biggest obstacle on the way of forming common national Russian identity. Such trend is typical not only of Russia. A radical modernization of all social relations within a very short historical

period inevitably leads to the aggravation of a host of problems – political, economic, cultural, socio-psychological, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional. In the present conditions the center of attention shifts to the sphere of the interaction of various socio-economic, political and socio-cultural tendencies, which determine the parameters of relations between man and nature, the state and society, power and the individual, etc.

The first step on the way of solving the problem of socio-cultural demarcation, as the authors of the work believe, should be a thorough analysis of the current situation. An attempt of such analysis is presented in the first chapter of the work – “Unmanaged Religious Renaissance and Problem of Socio-cultural Demarcation.” The socio-cultural area of society and its region can be characterized as a multitude of the subjects of culture and sociality, which are stably connected with a definite territory, have an impact on its objects and interact among themselves. Their interaction forms socio-cultural fields in which the center and periphery, knots and diffusive sponginess, horizontal and vertical structures develop, and the population’s mobility on a given territory goes on between them. Certain results of interaction represent the visual layer of the socio-cultural landscape on which the population’s identity emerges with these or other parts of the socio-cultural area. The intensity of identity depends on socio-cultural trends in the area, closeness, or distance of its subjects, and the character and speed of communications between them. The symbolic, subject and institutionalized areas of the region are closely intertwined.

In the authors’ view, the mapping or visualization of the problem largely facilitates its comprehension and, ultimately, a search for an acceptable solution. The book under review contains the mapping of the results of religious renaissance in post-Soviet Russia which, as

the authors believe, allowed them to reveal the bottlenecks and problematic points calling for greater attention. The distribution of religious organizations in cities and districts of various parts of the Russian Federation situated in the Southern federal area (within the boundaries of 2010) was analyzed. More than 5,200 religious organizations functioned in 299 municipalities, 3,500 of them were registered properly.

An analysis of the distribution of religious organizations on the territory of Dagestan is of special interest. As the book notes, the high level of religiousness is characteristic of societies with traditional culture. “Perhaps, it is not accidental that Dagestan has now the same number of mosques as in the early 20th century. Compared with the same period, “Russian” regions have, on average, five times less the per capita number of religious organizations. The level of religiousness (at least what concerns the per capita number of mosques) can be compared with that in other countries of the Islamic world. For example, 70-million-strong Turkey demonstrates similar figures (80,000 mosques), whereas in Russia with its population of 141 million there are about 30,000 religious organizations.

The changes in the ethno-confessional landscape of the south of Russia in the post-Soviet period are characterized by the authors as the expansion of the zone of Islam at the expense of the traditional territories of distribution of Orthodox Christianity and Buddhism. These changes are especially noticeable in rural districts, where the number of Muslims is constantly growing and that of Orthodox Christians and Buddhists is diminishing. Such situation is fraught with conflicts, which, indeed, flare up from time to time.

The second chapter of the book is called “Terrorism and Islamic Values in the North Caucasus”. The authors discuss possible scenarios of the development of the military-political situation in the North

Caucasus in connection with the real threat of terrorism and religious-political extremism in the region. In recent years the leaders of separatists have changed their strategy and ideology. The major factor now is the activity of the consolidated terrorist underground based on the ideology of radical Islam. Until recently the complex of the socio-political and economic problems of the Southern macroregion was regarded by experts and scholars as the main threat to security and the principal obstacle to stable development, and the activity of the terrorist underground was viewed as just one of the challenges to the stability and security of the state and society. Mistrust toward the present authorities displayed by a considerable part of the population and the concentration of protest energy in society tend to increase the activity of the terrorist underground. In the view of the authors, there is a risk of the Islamization of the North Caucasian region on the Afghan pattern.

One cannot but agree with the opinion of the authors of the monograph that Islamic resurrection is a spontaneous process, despite the desire of quite a few regional and foreign actors to step up and use it in their interests. Nevertheless, a considerable role in the development of negative phenomena has been played by certain actions of the federal authorities themselves, who relied on support of traditional Islam as a counter-balance to radical Islam. Unexpected consequences will always accompany the adopted decisions when there is no long-term strategy and the authorities' reaction depends only on the immediate situation.

Many experts and scholars during the post-Soviet period oriented the authorities to supporting traditional Islam. The idea has actively been supported by the Islamic clergy in the North Caucasian republics at the regional and federal levels. This resulted in strengthening the influence of the Islamic way of life and Islamic values on the life of

North Caucasian societies. Religious propaganda aimed at influencing young people first and foremost and drawing them to the foundations of faith and Islamic culture at the same time formed a musty, dogmatic type of thinking and authoritarian-conservative, traditionalist patterns of social behavior.

Undoubtedly, the regional authorities hoped that support on the part of traditional Islamic figures would prolong their stay in power. And their behavior copied that of the federal authorities who flirted with religious leaders with a view to preserving their positions. As a result of this erroneous, inconsiderate policy and ungoverned propaganda of traditionalist values, religious ideology has taken an important place in society, having thus created favorable ideological conditions for spreading religious extremism along with separatist tendencies in the North Caucasian region. Supporting the practically uncontrolled process of the revival of traditional Islam, the authorities failed to take into account the fact that the ability to awaken and support and the ability to manage and control religious revival are two different things.

We should also note that the book under review contains objective conclusions and well-founded criticism. “The process of religious revival was left to take its own course. The local authorities thus hoped to win the sympathies of the population and bolster up their positions. However, the ideas of self-organization and self-regulation of the religious sphere have not justified themselves, ‘The genie was let out of the bottle. And the situation slipped out of control. An absurd situation emerged: the republican and local authorities sanction the stepping up of religious propaganda by traditionalist structures to combat spreading radical ideas. How is it possible to fight Islamic radicalism with the help of factual Islamization?’”

The authors thoroughly analyze the reasons for the Islamization of young people in the North Caucasus. In the post-Soviet period they were left to their own devices, in contrast to Soviet times when the state had taken upon itself the care and concern for the growing generations and channeled their energy to socially useful work. As a result, a whole generation of young people has emerged whose world outlook was entirely based on religion. The overwhelming number of participants in the present-day terrorist underground in the North Caucasus is young men from fifteen to twenty. They are distinguished in their ideology from the generation of men from 25 to 30, who have more secular and moderate views. The Islamists are dangerous because they have a concrete aim, namely, the Islamic political project, that is, seizure of political power. These ideas become a real weapon, especially when society has no clear-cut ideological priorities shared by most people. A result of Islamic revival in the North Caucasus has been the emergence of an entire generation fostered in the traditions of radical Islam.

The authors of the book note that in recent years we have come across only the first results of Islamic revival in the south of Russia. An original mechanism of cultural inertia has begun to operate, and prolonged efforts will be necessary to cope with the existing situation. One of the most crucial tasks is that of establishing secular values in the sphere of education, politics, the way of life and the mass media. Cultural factors, in contrast to socio-economic ones, can exert a more profound influence on society's life and determine its progress for a long time to come.

The third chapter of the work under review is devoted to the study of various network religious communities in the region. They are traditionally considered as Protestant, however, this is a qualitatively new phenomenon denoted as neo-Protestantism uniting Baptists, Evangelical

Christians, Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostalists, and others. It should be noted that numerous western confessions are represented in districts of "color revolutions", on territories of a great geopolitical and geostrategic significance, and in regions which are objects of the foreign forces' claims.

Neo-Protestant missionaries carried on a large-scale activity all over the world prior to 1991, except the countries of the Islamic world and the U.S.S.R., but after its disintegration they now have a new vast area for activity. In today's Russia the total share of these confessions in relation to the overall number of religious organizations reaches 25–40 percent, and the number of believers runs into hundreds of thousands.

Russians and Ukrainians predominate among neo-Protestants in Russia today. However, one cannot assert that other peoples in the south of Russia are spiritually immune to any versions of neo-Protestantism. Among Evangelical Christians, Pentecostalists, Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses there are Adygs, Armenians, Jews, Germans, Kalmyks, Koreans, Ossetians, Lezghins, and representatives of other nationalities. Thus, neo-Protestants are a considerable part of the confessional landscape of the south of Russia.

The authors make a well-founded conclusion that the religious factor will continue to exert profound influence on the socio-political situation in the south of Russia, including the North Caucasus. They cite a wide range of possible negative consequences of this influence, among which are demarcation, lower loyalty, growth of violence and terrorism, and return to archaic more and morals.

A proper, well-thought-out policy of the federal authorities could be a factor putting to order religious renaissance, without restricting religious freedom. It should only protect the values of secular society and the state.

In conclusion we should add that this book is intended not only for specialists, managers and political and public figures, but also for a broad range of ordinary readers.

*G. Yusupova, D. Sc. (Philosophy), Regional Center
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