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WE ARE 20

MESSAGE OF GREETING FROM ACADEMICIAN Y. PIVOVAROV, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

I congratulate the editorial team of “Russia and the Moslem World” bulletin on the 20th anniversary of its first issue coming off the press.

From the very first days of its existence the bulletin has always been in great demand as one of the most popular publications among the scholarly and general public. The range of its readers is constantly broadening.

I’d like this jubilee to be the start of new interesting projects which will be realized on the bulletin’s pages. It is difficult to be a trail-blazer, but it’s still more difficult to remain always in the lead. I’m sure that your best and most interesting publications lie ahead.

I wish “Russia and the Moslem World” bulletin to remain an interesting, timely and authoritative publication as it has always been. I also wish new creative achievements to its editorial team.

**MESSAGE OF GREETING FROM CORRESPONDING
MEMBER OF RAS V. NAUMKIN, DIRECTOR OF THE
INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES RAS**

I congratulate the editorial board of “Russia and the Moslem World” bulletin on the 20th anniversary of its existence. For two decades already this joint publication of the Institute for Scientific Information in Social Sciences and the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS has been rendering invaluable assistance to Russian scholars of the Orient. Today, when there are dozens of publications devoted to Oriental subjects, “Russia and the Moslem World” bulletin serves as a guide-book for many scholars in their work.

During the past twenty years the bulletin published numerous articles by different authors, including from other countries, records of various conferences and symposiums, interviews given by leading Russian scholars of the Orient, as well as officials of government bodies responsible for shaping domestic and foreign policy.

I wish the editorial team of the bulletin further successes.

**MESSAGE OF GREETING FROM THE HEAD
OF THE CENTER OF STUDIES OF CENTRAL ASIA
AND THE CAUCASUS AT THE INSTITUTE
OF ORIENTAL STUDIES RAS A. ALIKBEROV**

On behalf of the employees of the Center of Studies of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Ural and Volga Area at the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS I congratulate the indefatigable creative team of “Russia and the Moslem World” bulletin on its 20th birthday. This jubilee for your monthly periodical is an example of staunchness, devotion to science and daily painstaking work. We deeply respect Albert Belsky, the “founding father” of this successful “offspring.” We wish him and all editors and employees working on this publication health, happiness and success in their noble undertaking.

**“RUSSIA AND THE MOSLEM WORLD”
BULLETIN IS TWENTY YEARS OLD**

Twenty years have passed since the appearance of the first issue of “Russia and the Moslem World” bulletin. It has been published every month in Russian and English. The Institute for Scientific Information in Social Sciences RAS and the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS are its founders and sponsors. The volume and circulation of this bulletin have always been on an increase. This shows that it has found a worthy place among academic publications and permanent readers.

Our bulletin has traversed a long and arduous path. From its very inception it ran against serious difficulties among which were attempts to block its publication under the far-fetched pretext that the problems of Russia’s relations with the Moslem world have nothing to do with

the academic sphere. This theoretical near-sightedness has existed for quite some time. However, today such arguments do not exist any longer. The relations with the Islamic world have now acquired a global meaning. We can state with satisfaction that more than two hundred issues of our bulletin form the information base for studying one of the most urgent and important problems of our time.

Among the basic principles of our bulletin we can name political, cultural and informative significance of its articles, commentaries, interviews, etc., reflecting various points of view (sometimes diametrically opposed) on one or another problem, and also a maximally full reflection of Islamic subjects. We pay special attention to developments in the “hot spots of the planet.” The latest events show the profound destabilization of the situation in the regions of Islamic influence – North African and Middle Eastern countries. These processes can have far-reaching negative consequences for the entire world. Our bulletin often gives forecasts concerning various processes going on in the modern world.

“Russia and the Moslem World” bulletin informs readers about all regions with the Moslem population. Naturally, pride of place is given to the problems and situations existing in the Russian Federation where Muslims live, and relations with the newly-independent states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Russia’s interaction with numerous Moslem countries and communities is also analyzed. The bulletin systematically publishes various reference materials and touches on religious and philosophical problems of Islam.

Such broad range of Islamic subjects is of interest to many readers, including research associates of academic institutes, teachers and students of higher educational establishments, political and public figures, officials of foreign embassies, and other bodies. The copies of the English edition of the bulletin are delivered every month not only to

subscribers, but also to foreign libraries and institutes with the purpose of exchanging them for foreign publications collected at the library of the Institute for Scientific Information in Social Sciences RAS.

The editorial team of the bulletin has always appreciated support and assistance on the part of the Director of the Institute for Scientific Information in Social Sciences RAS, Academician Y. Pivovarov. He has always noted the innovative character of the bulletin and its great popularity with readers. His interest in and attention to the bulletin enables its editors to look into the future with optimism.

Words of gratitude should also be said to members of the editorial team: V. Schensnovich, O. Bibikova (IOS RAS), and R. Vasilchenko, who helps a great deal to the work of the editorial board. The latter is especially grateful to M. Shneiderman, deputy head of the information technologies group; V. Gusev, head of the Publishing Center, and A. Gorodtsov, director of the print-shop, who take care of the smooth monthly publication of the bulletin. And, of course, words of thanks should be said to all who work directly on each issue of the bulletin: type-setters, proof-readers, technical editors, etc.

We shall do our best to satisfy the versatile interests of our readers as fully as possible.

Deputy Director of the Institute
for Scientific Information in Social Sciences RAS,
editorial director of the bulletin

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**PREVENTION AND NEUTRALIZATION OF FOREIGN
THREATS TO POLITICAL STABILITY OF RUSSIA**

Analyzing the problem of preventing and neutralizing foreign threats to political stability, which, in our view, include possibilities of forcible interference of individual states in Russia's internal affairs, we agree with the view of analysts who do not see serious dangers in this sphere today. At present favorable situation in foreign economic activity continues to exist for Russia, because the world oil and natural gas prices are still at a sufficiently high level for the economic and energy security of the country. The existing level of the defense capability of Russia serves as a definite guarantee from the country's involvement in regional and large-scale wars.

However, one should always remember that the present world political system is characterized by the existence of several knots of contradictions between the biggest states – centers of power, which concern our country. These include the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, which are engaged in confrontation, without resorting to military force, for the status of the world leader, then contradictions between the United States and the leading European countries – Germany and France, as well as

conflicts of these states with individual countries – producers of hydrocarbon raw materials. Meanwhile, Russia itself tends to balancing between various participants in conflicts, depending on the concrete situation. For example, the Russian Federation supports western powers in their opposition to the production of weapons of mass destruction in Iran. At the same time, it has economic interests in the sphere of nuclear energy production, which determines cooperation with that country.

One of the yardsticks measuring interstate confrontation is rivalry between the advanced and developing countries for access to energy resources and control over their transportation. L. Ivashov discloses the essence of this rivalry and confrontation as follows: “The main objects of global contradictions are the key regions of the world, strategic communications and planetary resources. In the view of American strategists, control over these objects guarantees the U.S.A. the status of the world power No 1. This is stated quite clearly in the Strategy of national security of the United States. The American elite includes the Balkans, the Greater Middle East, the Caucasian -- Black Sea – Caspian Sea basin and Afghanistan in the key regions of the world.

“Strategic communications are, above all, the transportation routes of hydrocarbon raw materials, and other trade routes. The United States already controls the Ormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Malacca straits through which China imports 80 percent of oil. Rivalry for control over the Northern sea route will unfold in the future. And, of course, the Panama and Suez canals and Gibraltar are also the objects of rivalry.

“The basic planetary reserves include the already prospected and developed deposits of hydrocarbons and deposits to be worked in undeveloped regions. Among the latter are the Arctic, which is believed to contain about a quarter of all hydrocarbons of the planet,

Afghanistan, which is rich in uranium-235, natural gas, copper, and other ores, precious stones and metals, etc., and Antarctica.”

In the present conditions Russia, as a country possessing considerable deposits of fuel and energy raw materials and claiming control over their transit, can also become an object of military pressure. On the one hand, Russia is the world’s second nuclear power, whose strategic nuclear forces, despite large-scale curtailment, retain the possibility of containment at a global and regional level. On the other hand, certain initiatives of the United States and NATO member-states capable to lead to the violation of strategic stability at a global and regional level, cause quite justified concern of the Russian political and military leadership. We have in mind the construction plans of the anti-missile defense systems in Europe and East Asia by the United States and its allies. This entails militarization of outer space, the elaboration of the concepts of waging “cyberwars” at the information theater of war, the formation of the quick-reaction forces and the forces of “rapid global strike,” etc.

The data destabilizing the military-political situation in the world and certain initiatives of some countries can be connected with the strategy of “passive predetermination” and make it possible to step up considerably the rates of carrying on the operations of the armed forces acting in the form of strategic military networks.

The acceleration effect in the character of warfare is admitted by many experts. Some of them, examining the new form of military operations – netwars, have come to the conclusion about the emergence of the possibility of reanimating the “*blitzkrieg* of a new generation.” Previously, there were definite boundaries beyond which there was no interaction in the operations of the separate offensive groups of forces. However, new information technologies have considerably widened these boundaries. The entire information about the state of affairs is

now accessible to all active participants in an armed struggle. Interaction is now organized not by joining separate groups of forces at decisive spots, but by uniting their fire power and information capabilities. This made it possible to overcome the spatial, time and information gap between the forces and management bodies for the first time in the history of military art. New information technologies ensure firm leadership and constant interaction of tactical groupings of forces deployed at a considerable distance from one another, which can now maintain constant communication and coordinate their actions in joint operations. This circumstance changes the character of modern military operations: all management processes and combat activities themselves become more dynamic and fruitful, and tactical and operational pauses, which could be used by the enemy to its advantage, disappear.

Operations acquire a new essence which presupposes swift and resolute maneuvers not only on the flanks, but also in the deep rear of the enemy. As shown by the results of investigations, such actions can be carried on in the form of central net operations of tactical groupings commanded from a single strategic center and acting simultaneously on individual key elements of the system of state and military management, and units of the “retaliation forces” over the entire enemy territory. The main aim of central net operations is to seize the strategic initiative from the very first minutes of war and transfer military operations into the strategic depth of the defending forces, thus depriving the enemy of not only strategic, but also tactical deployment of groupings of its armed forces.

The concept of net-centric military operations is realized in the plans of the military construction of NATO member-countries: the creation of the quick-reaction forces of the alliance, joint rapid-reaction forces of France, Britain and the European Union, and the

reconstruction of the infrastructure of the planning system of the Pentagon to switch over to the “10 – 30 – 30” concept. Its essence is that “after receiving a corresponding order the U.S. armed forces should be transferred to any place in the world within 10 days and begin military operations. During the next 30 days the U.S. forces should defeat the forces of the enemy and deprive it of the possibility to resume organized resistance in the foreseeable future. Within the next 30 days the U.S. forces should carry out redeployment and get ready for new combat assignments and transfer to another region of the planet.

The new forms of using the strategic offensive forces of the United States are elaborated in the Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, Prompt Global Strike and Global Strike Solutions. In other words, it is the elaboration of technological variants for fighting the network of rogue states, non-state players and terrorists possessing the weapon of mass destruction. The global strike is planned as a coordinated massive destruction within a very short time – from several seconds to several days – of communication systems, combat management and reconnaissance, as well as the most battle-worthy enemy forces carried out at the initial stage of a military operation to create conditions for subsequent resolute actions of the grouping of the U.S. armed forces in order to achieve final tactical and strategic aims. It is supposed that as a result of a global strike with the use of non-nuclear ballistic and hypersonic cruise missiles accompanied with operations of radio-electronic and psychological warfare, the enemy should be deprived of the possibility to control the situation and resist.

The realization of this concept and corresponding program is in full swing: research in the field of hypersonic weapon and outer space-based weapon proceeds without a hitch, the Global-strike Command in charge of the U.S. strategic non-nuclear forces has been set up. Speaking of the consequences of the implementation of this program

and the possible practical use of the “prompt global strike,” in military actions, experts come to the conclusion about the destabilizing role of this concept in maintaining strategic nuclear balance between the U.S.A. and the Russian Federation and a reduction of their arms race. The realization of the “prompt global strike” poses great risks to the defense of Russia, inasmuch as it increases the American potential of preventive non-nuclear strike which can be dealt not only at terrorists and rogue states.

Thus, the accelerated rate of conducting military operations is conditioned by the well-known factor, namely, the development of information and organizational technologies, and management and communication systems thanks to which the time for deploying networks and the speed of fulfilling the tasks posed to them and carrying out corresponding operations have improved considerably. The essence of destabilizing initiatives makes it possible to suppose that their implementation could create, under certain conditions, the effect of strategic passive predetermination. These circumstances pose before researchers the major problem of elaborating a system of measures to neutralize this effect.

Well-known military experts believe that the realization of a complex of measures and actions aimed at nuclear containment will ward off destabilizing initiatives. It is the strategic nuclear forces of definite quantitative and qualitative parameters, in the conditions of the limited character of Russia’s economic possibilities, that will be able to neutralize the new types of offensive weapons, anti-missile defense systems, etc.

Undoubtedly, the factor of the strategic nuclear forces is a major guarantee of the protection of the sovereignty and political stability of Russia. Indeed, the containment forces parry destabilizing initiatives and protect Russia from military-political pressure and a disarming

blow. The preparation of the latter can be disclosed by military intelligence of the Russian Federation by several visible signs: for example, reconnaissance space apparatus and unmanned aircraft flying over the country's territory, increased number of submarines in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Japan, etc.

The resource of a greater part of the nuclear forces of the country has been calculated for the nearest decades, but they will have to be renovated the sooner the better. Taking into account the fact that the struggle for control over and access to fuel-and-energy resources, above all oil, will be the ground for interstate conflicts, the existing forces of containment make it possible to postpone aggression against the Russian Federation for several decades.

In this connection, in our view, strategic nuclear containment should become part of a broader system of measures to ward off and neutralize outside threats to the political stability of Russia, including non-military or indirect military actions.

In the conditions of international peace it would be expedient to continue a foreign-policy course aimed at drawing centers of force in cooperation with Russia. This course envisages the establishment of good-neighborly relations with all countries of the world, above all those which border on the Russian Federation. To achieve this aim it would be reasonable and desirable to turn "enemies" into "competitors," "competitors" into "neutrals," "neutrals" into "partners," and "partners" into "allies."

It would be expedient for Russia to strengthen the relations of strategic partnership with France and Germany as the political and economic nucleus of the European Union, develop the already existing advantageous ties of asymmetrical interdependence in the sphere of energy security, step up popular diplomacy and thereby lower the possibility of these countries' participation in anti-Russian actions. As

to the new members of the North Atlantic Alliance, the Russian Federation could undertake measures for the further development of trade-economic partnership, drawing Poland, Romania and Bulgaria in cooperation in the export of Russian energy resources. Similar course could be taken with regard to Japan.

Russia's participation in the international organizations of collective security and economic cooperation could contribute to the lowering of outside threats to political stability in the southern direction in the form of the activity of the network structures of Islamic fundamentalism. We have in mind the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, and others. Russia could rely on the already created collective rapid reaction forces of the CSTO, the Anti-terrorist Center of the CIS, the Unified system of anti-aircraft defense under formation, and the joint system of radiation, chemical and biological protection of the CSTO from terrorist attacks. The significance of the SCO potential for the security of Russia is also connected with the possibility of uniting efforts with China and Central Asian states for neutralization the movements of radical Islam and separatist nationalistic organizations of Central Asia, which undermine internal political stability in certain regions of the Russian Federation.

The development of allied relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, the drawing closer of their military doctrines, regular joint military exercises and actions to combat ethnic separatism lower the danger of a conflict between the two countries.

Mutually advantageous cooperation between Russia and the United States can be implemented in the sphere of military security, the American national anti-missile defense system, struggle against terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their

delivery means, interaction within the framework of the World Trade Organization, in energy, joint space projects, and other spheres.

During transfer from peaceful interaction to the latent phase and the phase of the exacerbation of relations in interstate confrontation the main efforts of the Russian leadership, diplomacy and the armed forces should be concentrated on the preservation and strengthening of the potential of nuclear containment. This would make it possible to keep the leading powers of the world from a direct clash with the Russian Federation.

In the periods of the aggravation of interstate relations and open confrontation Russia could resort to forming coalitions and direct containment of its opponents. The open indicators of these periods are: the formation of aggressive military-political alliances, information-psychological, diplomatic, economic and forcible pressure on the subject of systemic opposition, destabilization of the situation and change of the ruling elites in allied countries, and near-border local armed conflicts.

In this case the use of methods of forming coalitions would ensure prevention of outside threats to political stability by the implementation of measures and actions aimed at changing the international balance of forces and exclusion of the situation of passive predetermination. The forms of containment can be used for tactical prevention of outside threats in the form of the demonstration of one's own military possibilities "to close vulnerability vents" and impact on the centers of gravity of the opposing states and their military networks. Among the "centers of gravity" are space satellite systems the damage to which can considerably weaken the possibilities of individual states to wage "netwars," turning groupings of the armed forces into a set of "platforms" (vehicles and flying machines for military purposes).

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MOSLEM COMMUNITY OF RUSSIA UNDER INFLUENCE OF MIGRATION PROCESSES (On the example of Samara Region)

The population of Samara Region, just as the population of other parts of the Volga area, is characterized by ethno-cultural and confessional variety, which has taken shape over the centuries. Despite a rather complex history of Islam in the Ural-Volga area, it can now be stated that the Moslem population of the region adheres to deeply-rooted Sunna Islamic traditions. Within the framework of these traditions their bearers have evolved effective mechanisms of interaction with other, non-Islamic people of the region and they are tolerant members of the regional community characterized by the different ethno-confessional features.

In the conditions of modern Russia with the mass drive for religious identity, the stepped-up activity of religious organizations and the development of cooperation of state and religious institutions, adherence to traditional Islam are of especial significance for the Moslem community and for Russian society as a whole. Despite numerous innovations imported from Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, it is precisely traditional Islam that provides the psychological and social foundation for the individual choice of religious identity. The adherence of most Muslims of the region to traditional Islamic practices explains their aversion to religious-political extremism.

At present the territory of Samara Region is inhabited by representatives of more than 130 nationalities. Among the traditional residents are Russians (83.6%), Bashkirs, Jews, Kazakhs, Mordovians,

Germans, Poles, Tatars, Chuvash, and Ukrainians. At the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century the population of the region was augmented by the arrival of Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Kyrgyz, Koreans, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and representatives of the North Caucasian and other peoples. They came to settle for good or as labor migrants, and we determine them as “new migrants.”

Most “new migrants” are “ethnic Muslims.” According to the All-Russia population census of 2002, the number of “ethnic Muslims” living in the region was about 182,000 (5.6%). Among them are Tatars, Bashkirs and Kazakhs who account for over 150,000 people.

During the period between 2002 and 2010 Samara Region attracted many migrants. The number of newly-arrived immigrants from the Transcaucasus and Central Asia wishing to receive Russian citizenship was growing right up to 2009. For example, no less than 10,000 Azerbaijanis became Russian citizens living in Samara Region.

Interviews with the leaders of national-cultural organizations and Muslim clergy show that people from Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (it is they who form the bulk of labor migrants and immigrants) are active believers.

There are more than 400 officially registered religious organizations in the region representing 23 confessions. The Muslim community has 86 officially registered mahallya-parishes and two madrasahs (“Nur” at the Samara Cathedral Mosque, and “Gali” in the village of Alkino, Pokhivistnev district).

The year 1989 was the turning point for the Islamic religious organizations in the region. Parishes began to be officially registered one after another and mosques were opening. The regional Spiritual Board of Muslims of Samara Region was set up in 1994, which was first headed by Imam A. Mingachev and then the Mufti of the Samara Cathedral Mosque V. Yarullin.

In the opinion of most representatives of the clergy, secular authorities and Tatar national-cultural figures, V. Yarullin succeeded in setting up a uniform and authoritative managerial structure. Until recently, all registered parishes and the Samara Spiritual Board were subordinated to the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and the CIS European countries headed by Mufti T. Tajuddin. At present there are two small parishes in the city of Togliatti whose leaders regard themselves loyal supporters of R. Gainuddin and the Council of Muftis of Russia. But the regional umma does not recognize these organizations, regarding one of their leaders impostor deprived of the title of imam. Besides, he has serious legal problems facing him. A mahallya-parish subordinated to the Kazan mufti was registered in Samara in 2010.

With the growing number of migrants the traditional Muslim community of the region now includes Shia Muslims from Azerbaijan and Shia Ismaili Muslims from Tajikistan. Among the Tajiks living in Samara Region and temporary labor migrants from Tajikistan there are followers of the biggest Ismaili Muslim community headed by Aga Khan IV. Donations of the “Aga Khan Foundation” help maintain a Sunday school and organize various religious functions. In 2010 a preacher (Hajji-Nabi) from Tajikistan settled in a village in the region, and Tajiks from Samara and other places in the region come to him for Friday prayers. This parish has not been registered and Hajji-Nabi himself failed to get a place at any mosque. The leaders of the Tajik national-cultural organization “Paiwand” (“Unity”) consider his activity schismatic.

At present, representatives of the Muslim peoples of the Ural-Volga area and people from the Caucasus and Central Asia come to any mosque for prayers together. Although there are certain differences in prayer ceremonies between Tatars, Bashkirs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, on the one

hand, and Chechens, Ingushis and Daghestanis, on the other, no discontent is ever expressed by anyone.

According to information from the chairman of the board of the “League of Azerbaijanis of Samara Region” Sh. Kerimov, Shia Muslims from Azerbaijan attend prayers at Tatar mosques and do not feel any discomfort.

From the mid-1990s the number of Muslims representing non-traditional peoples in the Ural-Volga area has been growing steadily. However, the leading position in the Muslim umma is held, as before, by Tatars. They also form the overwhelming majority of the Muslim clergy. In some mosques newly-arrived Muslims account for a greater part of those offering prayers, they include people from the North Caucasus, Central Asia and Azerbaijan. In recent years traditional bilingual service (Arabic and Tatar) at urban mosques gave way to trilingual (Arabic, Tatar, Russian).

Mosque has a special significance for temporary labor migrants. Some of them came to the region independently and have no addresses of their fellow-compatriots, so they turn to mosques for information and material assistance. These migrants are few and far between, but they should be taken care of. The Spiritual Board closely cooperates with the national-cultural organizations representing the interests of “ethnic Muslims,” and this is why employees at mosques know contact telephones and addresses of national clubs and group heads. For Muslim immigrants and temporary labor migrants mosque is a “place of their Motherland,” where they can have physical and spiritual rest, and also get in touch with their fellow-compatriots.

In the view of one of Samara experts, the increase in the number of Muslims in the region due to people from Central Asia, the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan is beneficial for the local Muslim community. Muslims from those parts “restore the image of Muslim as a man

leading a virtuous life without alcohol. True, the local clergy are slightly worried over the stricter mentality of people from the North Caucasus and the harsher Hanafi variant of Islam of Central Asian Muslims. But it is only natural that ethnic specific features influence Islamic traditions.

Three years ago, while assessing the situation in the Muslim community of Samara Region, the Imam of the Cathedral Mosque emphasized the fact that there were no “real Wahhabi Muslims” and extremists. However, recently representatives of the Muslim public express growing apprehension over increasing Salafi Islam tendencies in neighboring Tatarstan and their possible penetration in Samara Region. The main source of the spreading of Salafi Islam lies, in the view of our experts, in the system of modern Islamic education in Egypt, the Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

In 2004–2005 the Muslim public and clergy unanimously denounced the attempt of the supporters of the Party of Islamic revival (“Hizb ut-Tahrir”) to unfold broad propaganda activity in Samara Region. Now one can state with confidence that supporters of “Hizb ut-Tahrir” and “Tablig-i Jamaat,” and other radical organizations have no backing in the regional Muslim umma. However, these organizations using the idea of radical Islam to achieve social justice or as a means to overcome personal ideological-psychological frustrations can become attractive for a certain part of Russian Muslims, especially, young people.

Despite the fact that more and more changes have been taking place in the Muslim community, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Samara Region can safely characterize the situation there as calm and quiet. The secular authorities hold similar views.

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Moscow, 2011, No 4–5, pp. 224–241.*

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**THE NATURE OF POLITICAL REGIMES OF NATIONAL
REPUBLICS OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS**

One of the key factors negatively influencing the situation in the North Caucasus is the complex and unresolved character of socio-economic problems. The forms and methods of the implementation of economic transformations in most national republics have an essential impact on the life of their people. The privatization of state property has been carried out with gross violations of the law and under control and in favor of representatives of the party-economic and *nomenklatura* groupings, as well as criminal and semi-criminal communities. The actual monopolization of property, which formerly belonged to the state, has been carried out by representatives of certain ethnic groups. This brought about sharp social differentiation, and the emergence of poor and rich nationalities and national groups.

The “shadow” (or black-market) economy has been playing a considerable role in the North Caucasus. It has always been distinguished by a very high level of corruption, especially among highly-placed government officials, from Soviet times. During the present period it became an effective system of the redistribution of finances.

The desire to explain all failures and evils in the North Caucasus – high criminality, frequent conflicts and acts of terror by poverty, unemployment and other purely economic and social factors is not always correct. Of course, favorable socio-economic conditions, material well-being and higher living standards are the *sine qua non* for social and political stability. But as world and Russian experience shows, this is really the necessary, but definitely inadequate, condition.

One can name many countries, and also regions of Russia, for that matter, which are poorer than the North Caucasus, but the situation there is not poisoned by frequent conflicts, crime and terrorism as much as in the North Caucasian republics.

One of the key reasons for the situation existing in the national republics of the North Caucasus should be sought in the nature of their political regimes. Naturally, the region as part of the Russian Federation could not stay aside from the radical transformations going on in the country during the time of reforms. Democratic constitutions were adopted, the principles of the market economy introduced, and the division of power into three branches – legislative, executive and legal was carried out.

Despite all this, it cannot be said that the political elite of the national republics have finally eliminated all “birthmarks” of the Soviet system and certain specific features inherent in the mentality of the peoples of the region, which hamper the formation process of the values, institutions and relations of civil society and political democracy.

Unfortunately, the basic institutions, principles and standards of political democracy and law-abiding state fixed in the constitutions of these national republics have not been able to play the role they should in democratic society. Quite frequently, the division of power into three branches – legislative, executive and legal has a formal character, inasmuch as in reality they are suppressed by the will and whims of the heads of republics.

In the post-Soviet area, particularly in the national republics of the Russian Federation, the modernization of political regimes began with the legitimization of the election procedure of legislative assemblies and heads of administration. However, the absence of a politically educated electorate and the presence of election candidates

having no rudiments of parliamentary activity (and is still worse, having only Soviet experience of command-administrative work) led to the situation when power in most national republics remained in the hands of the former communist elite. Due to this and some other factors connected with it, the constitutional political and state institutions could be called democratic only formally.

True, it can safely be said that in the modern world any form of state structure cannot exist in a pure form. The well-known American political analyst R. Dahl was right in saying that all political regimes existing in the world can be placed between the two poles – autocracy and democracy. If applied to national republics, the problem is not whether these or other regimes are democratic, but to what pole they gravitate and in what direction they develop. In this connection it is not accidental that in determining democratic or semi-democratic regimes that have emerged during the past two or three decades in the post-Soviet area and in a number of developing countries the term “new democracies” has been used to describe regimes combining specific features, which distinguish them from the traditional models of the political system which entrenched itself in western countries. According to the autocracy – democracy scale, most national republics in the Russian Federation are nearer to the first pole. It can safely be said that not a single national republic in its development has reached the “democratic shore.” Having achieved definite results, they are still in the process of transformation, and democracy as such seems something ideal and far away.

One of the specific features of the political culture of the North Caucasian peoples, just as the entire Caucasus, is their adherence to group, kinship, and collectivist standards and values. Most of them are distinguished by ethnic and professional corporative feelings, high degree of personalization of politics, authoritarianism, and a great role

of traditional values. This is why there is nothing surprising that the political regimes of the North Caucasian republics are of a hybrid character, intricately combining certain elements of the Soviet type, and modern variants of authoritarianism and democracy.

The ethnonational factor also plays a major role and quite often breeds conflicts. The point is that in the national republics of the Russian Federation in most cases representatives of the so-called title nation, or title ethnos, take the highest state posts, leaving less important ones to national minorities. As a result, new elitist groups have come into being on the ethnic basis, which monopolized the levers of power for the promotion and realization of their own economic and political interests.

Such situation breeds contradictions and conflicts between clans and groupings which often bear an ethnic character. This phenomenon can be defined as the process of ethnopolitical mobilization whose result is the politicization of the ethnic component of the North Caucasian area, which threatens the social and political stability of society and the territorial integrity of the state. An impression is created that a definite part of powerful elites in certain national republics is directly interested in maintaining socio-political instability, which they can control, and this enables them to receive greater means from the budget of the Federal Center.

Experience shows that the “forcible” component in the south of Russia is one of the major instruments of political struggle. Both the opposition and the official authorities do not always know how to use the political means of struggle. The authorities more often try to get rid of the opposition with the help of the stick, and more rarely with the help of the carrot. Many oppositionists became loyal to the ruling regimes after receiving lucrative posts. A factor causing great concern is the growing tendency to the actual merger of mafia-clan groupings

with government bodies, penetration of organized crime in state power, and turning the region into a seat of political terrorism. According to the available data, trans-Caucasian criminal groupings have entrenched themselves in some of the North Caucasian republics – Chechnya, Ingushetia, Northern Ossetia and Daghestan. Underground production of and trade in oil products, valuable fish and caviar, alcohol, etc., as well as illegal gambling, are thriving there.

One of the manifestations of the deep crisis of power in the region is a very high level of corruption of the local ruling elites and their staggering professional incompetence. Corruption and practically open trade in high posts have become quite ordinary phenomena and ceased to cause a negative reaction and censure in society. For instance, it would be well-nigh impossible to get a job at a government body or in the police department without a bribe amounting to \$1,000 at a minimum.

Corruption has corroded the educational system through and through, which cannot but evoke deep concern. Places at higher educational establishments have long become objects of buy-and-sell. Cases are not rare when good marks at exams can be got for a definite sum. The mass media are not averse to selling their space or time for publication or broadcast of specially designed or ordered material. All this creates additional problems in the way of reaching socio-political stability in the region.

It should be admitted that the federal authorities in the North Caucasus are not able to combine effectively enough the interests of the Federal Center and those of the local authorities. This is shown by the fact that the present North Caucasian elites demonstrate exceptional abilities in staging political intrigues at local and federal levels, as well as distributing the financial means coming from the Federal Center.

An impression is created that the federal authorities either do not wield power in the region properly enough, or prefer to close their eyes to and neglect or ignore the inability and corrupt practices of the local authorities. This can be explained by the fact that the policy of the Federal Center toward the national republics of the North Caucasus is dominated by the trend to support the regional clan groupings formally loyal to Moscow. Naturally, the republican authorities “repay their debt” by giving all-out support to people put forward by the federal authorities for regional elections. This is expressed, among other things, by the fact that at the all-Russia presidential and parliamentary elections the local authorities provide the candidates from the ruling party with the overwhelming number of votes. Such policy of reliance on the ruling groupings and clans forces Moscow to pardon or ignore the abuse of the regional elites loyal to it. Besides, reliable data are available that many North Caucasian criminal groupings and clans are secretly given cover from Moscow.

However, the price of such “comfort” is too high. In recent years the leadership of Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Karachay-Cerchessia and Dagestan have demonstrated their inability to undertake resolute actions or simply control the situation in their own republics. They are unable to oppose effectively the terrorist and criminal groupings active in their republics. From this point of view an especially important role is played by the absence of the proper legitimization of the ruling elites. It can even be said that they do not have any moral-psychological legitimization.

In this context it should be admitted with regret that the administrative reforms of the 2000, which could possibly be regarded justified from the point of view of restoring the vertical of power, have not given the expected results conformably to the North Caucasian realities so far. The heart of the matter is that the reforms have not

solved a number of problems determining the character and the main aspects of the development of the region. True, in recent years important changes have taken place in the leadership of a number of national republics. But on the whole, this rotation has been made within the framework of the already existing mechanism of the formation and functioning of the system of power, which has already demonstrated its “lameness.”

It should also be taken into account that the institution of donations to the parts of the Federation from the federal budget which has, perhaps, played a positive role previously, has now gone out of date and needs serious revision. Direct donations of federal means to the local budget lead to a colossal growth of corruption, which has by itself become a great factor of instability. Paradoxical as it might seem, but certain representatives of the ruling upper crust of individual republics are simply not interested in overcoming their financial weakness. This aspect is especially important in the light of the fact that all republics of the North Caucasus, without exception, receive financial donations from the Federal Center. It is indicative that one of the most depressive parts of the Russian Federation – the Republic of Dagestan – was a donor-region before the 1990s. (!) At present, the distribution of the federal financial means has become a rather lucrative business for the local ruling elites. The very system of the budget financing of North Caucasus is so non-transparent that it gives serious grounds to believe that corruption in the region begins in the very center of Moscow. In the view of the chairman of the Anti-corruption Committee of the North Caucasus S. Umarov, the existing situation in the region is a direct consequence of the model of ensuring loyalty of the North Caucasian elites formed by the Federal Center in the early 1990s. Their loyalty and neutralization of separatist tendencies is for the leadership of the national republics a guarantee of the absence of

any control over their spending of the budget means and their domestic policy in the republics. In turn, the impunity of republican officials in their relations with the Federal Center brings corruption at the local level to fantastic dimensions. The “trade in posts” has acquired such scope that every second official or employee of the law-enforcement agency should, first of all, think of how to compensate the money paid for the job. Apparently, the representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasian Federal district, Alexander Khloponin, was unable to establish control over the flows of the federal financial means due to the strong resistance of the regional leaders. In any case, one can hardly say, judging by the real state of affairs in the region, that any tangible progress has been reached in any spheres of life in the North Caucasus under his guidance. As to donations, they should be discontinued in their present form, and part of them should be used for raising pensions and salaries, and also curtailing, or even lifting taxes on small businesses, at least for a definite period of time. This would, naturally, contribute to increasing the purchasing power of the population, thus providing an incentive to the regional economy.

Taking into account the above-said, one should not ignore another reality. The knot of unresolved problems facing the region is so big and complex that both the federal and republican authorities are almost always tempted to postpone their solution fearing to aggravate the situation still more. There is the real threat that the dismantling or attempts to revise or restructure the ethnoclan system of power will inevitably entail a difficult and, perhaps, even bloody repartition of power and property. In other words, the republics will find themselves in a vicious circle from which there is no worthy way out so far.

If the present tendencies are projected to the future, it will hardly be possible to regard the state of affairs as something having already passed the point of no return, inasmuch as the basic conflict-breeding

factors characteristic of the region during the recent two decades still retain their significance. Touching on the question of the possibilities and prospects of separatism and the formation of new state entities outside Russia, or contrary to its will, it should be noted that at present there are no significant horizontal or vertical economic, social, political or other ties between the national republics of the North Caucasus. Each republic is closely and unbreakably connected with Russia, but not together, not as some uniform economic, political, cultural or other area, but each one individually. Political life is kept itself close at the level of parts of the federation, with insufficient development of supra- and sub-regional levels. This conditions the existence of considerable difficulties for their integration, which, in turn, adds significance to the elaboration of scientifically substantiated development projects of ties in the political, economic and cultural spheres between the republics and regions of the North Caucasus, overcoming the closed character of political and socio-economic life of individual regions-parts of the federation and creation of a complex system of containment and counter-balances.

Nevertheless, the process of political modernization in the Caucasus – in the national republics of the North Caucasus and the newly-independent states of the South Caucasus – should not be assessed in a simple, “black-and-white” light. As is known, the key condition for the success of social and economic reforms is political stability making it possible to reform society without serious collisions. As to national republics, what strikes the eye is the weak social base of systemic political parties and movements, the weakness and absence of structure of the middle sections of society, the absence of united and influential opposition capable to serve as the real counter-balance to official power, etc. The opposition, as a rule, has been pushed back to marginal positions and is deprived of opportunities to participate in

political life. As it has been noted, this can be explained by the specific features of the political culture of the Caucasian peoples.

It should also be taken into account that the formation and institutionalization of democratic values, establishments and relations is a very complex and difficult process requiring a long period of time – sometimes even several generations. This process can proceed with backward movement, and periods of rapid progress can be replaced with stages of retardation, which are characterized by the accumulation of quantitative changes which can ultimately lead to qualitative ones. Besides, as the experience of the post-Soviet countries shows, such features of democracy as universal electoral right, parliamentarianism, etc. are unable to lead always to the desired results and cannot resolve all problems facing society. Here we observe, on the one hand, attempts to adapt the structures of the Soviet authoritarian system to new conditions, and on the other, the trends of the formation and establishment of new ideas and approaches, institutions, mechanisms and relations.

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ISLAMIC FACTOR IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS

Religious challenges to power can be regarded as attempts to dispute the monopoly of the state in the distribution of basic values in society. The main manifestations of the Islamic factor which influence the socio-political situation in the South of Russia can conditionally be determined as follows: 1) the problem of socio-cultural dissociation between peoples and confessions; 2) aggravation of the existing and

emergence of new contradictions among the North Caucasian Muslims; 3) the problem of terrorism under Islamic slogans.

Dissociation between peoples and confessions is one of the direct threats to the unity and stability of Russia. The tumultuous revival of traditional confessions (among other factors) contributed to noticeable shifts in North Caucasian societies. The explosive character of the growth in the number of religious organizations, religious onslaught against the secular principles of Russian power and society and the spreading of a corresponding way of life contributed to the backward movement of North Caucasian societies, rendered management of North Caucasian republics more difficult, and undermined the normal functioning of the political and legal standards of the Russian Federation on their territory.

Many experts and scholars in the post-Soviet period recommended that state power give support to traditional Islam as a counter-balance to radical Islam. This idea was also supported by the Islamic clergy of the North Caucasian republics. Moslem priests with the help of the authorities gained access to the sources of influence, and this brought about an increase of the influence of the Islamic mores and morals and Islamic values on the life of North Caucasian societies. The regional authorities expected that support of the traditional Islamic religious and public figures would prolong their stay in power. However, as a result of the careless and haphazard propaganda of traditionalist values society became extremely susceptible to radical religious ideas.

Islam has not become a consolidating force in the North Caucasus. On the contrary, it turned into an arena in which a multitude of conflicts began to unfold between various ethnic projects in the sphere of “traditional” Islam; between young and old Muslims; between sheikhs (Daghestan); between the Islamist terrorist underground and the

rest of Muslims; between Islamists of different trends, etc. Naturally, such situation does not contribute to social peace.

The terrorist underground operating under Islamic slogans is the most urgent problem for the North Caucasus. The “Imarat Caucasus” can be described by using its own ideological rhetoric and also by analyzing its pragmatic aims. Possibly, the coordinators of the Islamic movement pursue positive aims, but the underground has quite earthly aims of its own. For several years already it has been in a state of “normal” functioning rather than in a state of development. This is shown by preponderance of private aims, insignificant inflow of new people, a relatively stable number of the underground members, and the seasonal character of terrorist activity and its relatively limited geography.

The pragmatic motivation and limited character of influence of radical Islamic ideology is also shown by 1) joining by most fighters of the former armed units of unrecognized Ichkeria the legal armed units of the present Chechen Republic; 2) the limited character of their terrorist activity beyond the boundaries of the North Caucasus; 3) the forcible collection of tribute from local businesses, which antagonize common people.

The network structure is not only a strong, but also the most vulnerable side of Imarat. The networks of trust are ramified interpersonal ties within whose framework it is possible to get valuable, important and long-term resources and take measures against alien subjects. Trade diasporas, kinship clans, religious sects, clandestine societies of revolutionaries are parts of networks of trust. The isolation of these networks prevented their members from taking part in collective democratic undertakings. Democratic participation can deal a shattering blow at the clandestine networks of trust. The struggle

against corruption, effective social policy and honest elections are the basic elements of combating Islamic extremism.

The “Imarat Caucasus” enjoys support of a rather limited section of the population because the main part the local residents do not share the ideological premises of radicals. They represent another edition of fascism. The ideology of Imarat, which is a branch of “al Qaeda” has little in common with the left Islamists of the 1960s. The bandits have to prove the need for jihad and the absence of alternative means (except violence) to the population for improving its life.

It is difficult to say whether Imarat deteriorates and finally turns into a typical mafia-like stricture, losing its political capital completely. Evidently, its patrons and coordinators realize the scarcity of their resources and do all they can to preserve the benefits they have gained (collection of tax, forcible influence, specific status). Besides, religious rhetoric has little in common with their aims. Meanwhile, the strengthening of the positions of religion in North Caucasian societies at the present stage will contribute to rather than prevent the activity of the terrorist underground which is using the sentiments of believers in its interests.

On the whole, in recent years we have come across the first results of Islamic revival in the South of Russia: the mechanism of cultural inertia has begun to operate, and prolonged efforts will be needed to overcome the existing situation. A corresponding policy of the federal authorities aimed at protecting and strengthening the secular principles of our society and the state could be a factor which would restrict and put straight Islamic revival.

“Fundamentalniye problemy prostranstvennogo razvitiya Yuga Rossii: Mezhdistsiplinarny sintez,” 2010, pp. 157–159.

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THE POST-SOVIET PATH OF AZERBAIJAN

The countries of the South Caucasus have shared a common fate. After gaining independence Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have suffered from wars, ethnic conflicts, break-up of previous communications and ties, and the disintegration of state structures. However, rather equal starting positions and almost similar foreign-policy conditions gave different results. We shall look at one of these states – Azerbaijan.

After several years of tossing, Azerbaijan has practically returned to the “patron-client” system of networks, which existed in Soviet time, as the foundation of the political regime. The inflow of petrodollars makes it possible to ignore the losses engendered by this system and suppress potential conflicts within the ruling elite, because the wealth to be divided between its members constantly grows, although rather slowly.

It is indicative that differences between these three South Caucasian countries do not seem to depend on the degree of their democratization. But it should be admitted that public criticism of the authorities of Azerbaijan may be fraught with very unpleasant consequences for the critic. The country has not gained much experience of the legitimate change of power as a result of elections, and this is why there are no visible signs of democracy there.

The course of political transformations in Azerbaijan can be described as follows, if it is regarded as a result of the four factors given below: they are:

The place of the country in the international and regional division of labor;

The result of confrontation for control over state institutions between the different groupings inside the ruling elite;

The role of “people with arms” in the political system;

The degree of the dependence of the state on the resources it takes from the population.

Azerbaijan has never been a most developed part of the former Soviet Union. In the Soviet epoch it was quite well industrialized and by the time of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the structure of the GDP of Azerbaijan was dominated by industry. According to the data of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, by the end of the Soviet epoch the engineering industry of Azerbaijan satisfied up to 80 percent of all requirements for the equipment of the country’s oil industry.

The degradation of the Soviet Union and the wars and conflicts accompanying it, as well as the break-up of the traditional transport communications and the economic crisis have resulted in Azerbaijan’s deindustrialization. By the mid-1990s the share of industry in the structure of the republic’s GDP diminished by 50 percent (from 60 to 30 percent). It should be added that the collapse of the Soviet system of trade restrictions has also led to a sharp reduction of the export potential of Azerbaijani agriculture – its products have lost their exclusive position on the markets of Russia and other post-Soviet states. Thus, the country’s economic advantages created by its people have largely ceased to exist, only natural ones remained.

The only way to achieve rapid rates of economic growth for Azerbaijan and increase its state budget was to expand the extraction of oil and gas and increase their export. At a certain time, the export of fuel and energy to world markets along new routes and in cooperation with major western companies was regarded as a panacea, which was supposed to ensure Azerbaijan an economic upsurge, greater state

sovereignty (due to an end of the influence of Russia) and foreign political advantages in its conflict with Armenia.

The growing world prices of oil, an increase of hydrocarbon production (in 2000–2010 oil extraction in Azerbaijan grew from 14 to 50.4 million tons) and the increased export of oil, oil products and gas to other countries have ensured the country an economic boom. According to the World Bank estimates, in 2006 the growth of the GDP in Azerbaijan amounted to 34.5 percent, and in 2007 – 25 percent. Further on the rates of its growth have diminished, however, as compared with its regional neighbors and most countries of the world, for that matter, Azerbaijan suffered from the global economic crisis much less. In 2008–2010 the average annual growth rates of its GDP reached 8.4 percent, with the average annual world rates 1.2 percent.

However, the economic success brought about by oil was followed by the firmly established status of the single-branch structure of the economy. In 2005 the extraction of hydrocarbons gave about 40 percent of Azerbaijan’s GDP, and in 2008 this figure increased to 60 percent. The growth rates of the “non-oil” industry in the country have been much lower than the growth rates of the economy as a whole.

The influx of the petrodollars makes it possible to maintain the outward attributes of affluence, like high-rise buildings under construction and enormous defense expenditures compared with those of its neighbors. However, Azerbaijan still remains a comparatively poor country. The per capita GDP is \$10.2 thousand (according to the IMF data for September 2011), which is almost double the figure of the neighboring Armenia and Georgia (approximately \$5.4 thousand each), but lower than Kazakhstan (13.0) or Russia (16.7).

Indicative in this respect is a subjective attitude to this boom of representatives of the Azerbaijani population. According to the poll of the *Puls-R* (Baku) sociological service, the number of the

respondents who assess the situation of their families by saying “We can hardly make both ends meet” dropped from 50.8 percent in 2006 to 49 percent in 2010. “Acute need” experienced 10.1 percent and 9.1 percent respectively against the background of the vast state programs to combat poverty. The share of those who do not suffer from material difficulties (they are referred to as the “middle class”) increased from 28.0 percent to 32.5 percent respectively. In other words, the rapid economic growth has not led to any noticeable shifts in the social structure of the population.

The latter circumstance largely explains the stable character of the political order in Azerbaijan. The social groups which were the driving force of changes at the end of the Soviet epoch have disappeared along with the economic structure which created them. Hydrocarbon growth concerned only the elites and the section of the middle class dependent on them. On the whole, society remained as it was during the 1990s, that is, it consists of the poor masses, a narrow section of the rich elite and a small middle class servicing its interests. There are no big groups whose interests would need expression and accommodation, and this narrows down the social conditions for political competition.

The hydrocarbon boom has another consequence. The extraction and export of oil and gas dominate in the national economy due to the absence of other large-scale and important branches of it. Outside the boundary of the hydrocarbon sector economic growth is concentrated in construction and on the real estate market, the latter bearing a speculative character (just like the pre-crisis Moscow market of real estate when flats in the Russian capital were regarded as an investment instrument). In Azerbaijan there are comparatively few industrial enterprises turning out finished goods, and the high rate of the national currency objectively contributes to the growth of import.

The political regime of Azerbaijan imposes restrictions on active policy in the sphere of diversification of the economy. Despite its harshness, it is still suffering from a whole number of “birth traumas” of the post-Soviet statehood, that is, the influence of the autonomous centers of power in the form of various *nomenclatura* groups, weakness of institutions, corruption, etc.

The prolonged stability of the personnel composition of the higher echelons of power in Azerbaijan shows that the process of transferring power from father to son in 2003 took place in the conditions of the preservation of the bureaucratic clans staying in power. Some of them – those who threw an open challenge to President Ilkham Aliyev – were suppressed. But the very principles of power remained unchanged.

Although an experienced analyst from another country might well think that the political reality in Azerbaijan could be likened to that in the Middle Eastern oil monarchies, it would be incorrect to make conclusions about the authoritarian character of the regime in Baku. Politics is not based on diktat from the single center, but rather on an intricate polycentric balance of interests. The Azerbaijani political regime is distinguished by such specific feature as the actually atomized resource of forces. Apart from the army, there are about seven ministries and departments in the country which have their own armed units – ministry for the interior, border-guard service, ministry of national security, ministry of justice, state service of protection and defense, and ministry for emergency situations. These structures of force are part of the sphere of interests of some or other influential bureaucratic groupings, maintaining the balance of power within the elite.

The future of Azerbaijan’s political regime, probably, depends on how the ruling groupings will react to the slowing down and then a stop of hydrocarbon growth. An answer should be sought within a short

space of time. In recent years the authorities, apparently, retarded the extraction of oil quite consciously, keeping it at a level not exceeding 50–55 million tons a year. The purpose of this policy was to prolong the peak of mining for as long as possible. According to certain forecasts of five years ago, the peak (71 million tons) should have been reached in 2010, after which there would have been a slump going up to the level of mining at 20 million tons by 2020 (the Republic of Tatarstan extracts about the same amount of oil). The policy of “lowering the peak,” as Baku believes, will make it possible to keep the present level of extraction until 2020. According to other estimates, the lowering will begin after 2015. Further on, economic transformation will be bolstered up by any financial resources comparable to the present ones. Besides, they will have to be implemented in a more difficult socio-political situation.

The strategies of diversification which are now discussed in Azerbaijan, are not convincing enough. First, the point is to turn the state-owned oil company *SOCAR* into a transnational player having a production and resource base abroad and selling not only oil as such, but licenses for its mining. However, *SOCAR* may not have enough resources for implementing such strategy. The acquisition of a production base abroad will require either big investments, which will have to be withdrawn from the country, or merger with a major foreign player on the oil market, which will be fraught with the danger of the loss of control by Azerbaijan over the joint venture. As to licenses for oil mining, *SOGAR*, despite a century-old experience of Azerbaijani oil workers, will hardly be able to compete with world leaders of the oil industry.

Secondly, in the context of the diversification of the economy the usual of weakly developed countries and regions – tourism and agriculture – are discussed. There have been no precedents in the world when countries succeeded in overcoming poverty on the basis of these

branches. A vivid case in point is Greece which has proclaimed at one time: “Tourism is our industry.” Besides, Azerbaijan will have to compete with Turkey in these spheres, which is quite disadvantageous for the former. A natural market for the Azerbaijani tourist service is Iran, but Azerbaijan is poorly prepared for developing cheap tourism (too high prices, too expensive hotels). Another aspect of diversification is oil refinery; in recent years the country has achieved considerable success in this branch.

The implementation of a harsher and more purposeful economic policy aimed at fighting corruption, the development of its own industries, import substitution, and more effective protection of the right of investors are fraught with the opposition on the part of the groups of the bourgeoisie which may lose their benefits, and that will undermine the intra-elite consensus in Azerbaijan.

Theoretically, the president can overcome his position of the “first among the equals” by two methods. First, by forming a broad public and political coalition with the view to eliminating the old elites – a kind of a “rose revolution from above.” This method is very risky: a liberalization of the regime can destabilize the country before such coalition is formed. The emergence of such coalition will also be hampered by the weakness of political institutions. Besides, such method presupposes an increase of populist elements in the policy of the president, whereas the reserve of populism in Azerbaijan has almost completely been exhausted.

Another method will be a notable achievement in foreign policy, which will make him the indisputable leader in the Azerbaijani elite. It can be assumed that Aliyev’s harsh position on the Karabakh issue can be explained by striving for such success.

The Islamization of Azerbaijan at the present moment is hardly possible; the country remains largely secular. According to *Puls-R*

sociological pole, the number of people who consider themselves deeply religious and observe all religious orders and rites is negligible. In 2006 there were 15.8 percent such people among those polled, whereas in 2010 – only 9.5 percent. The same is true of those adhering to Islamic values: 14.5 percent in 2007 and 10.7 percent in 2010. Apparently, the authorities succeeded in arresting the trend toward Islamization which was observed in the mid-2000s. There are three reasons for this. First, the Islamic radicals were forcibly suppressed by the authorities and, contrary, to the situation in the Russian North Caucasus, these measures were not countered by human rights organizations. Secondly, the noticeable economic growth in the past four years has reduced the number of opponents to the regime and consequently, radical ideology was not too popular. And thirdly, the authorities agreed to make certain concessions to “systemic” or moderate Islamic leaders (for example, Sheikh-ul-Islam Allahshukyur Pashazade) who wanted to play a more active and influential role in political and public life.

At the same time a number of Azerbaijani experts admit that in case of the weakening of the ruling group, the country may move not to democratization, but to Islamization. Despite a relatively small number of the confirmed adherents of political Islam, they are distinguished by high mobilization and cohesion, in contrast to other political forces. One of the Baku experts believes that with the share of Islamists at 10 percent, they can receive up to 30 percent of votes at free elections. One of the potential resources of Islamists can be a spontaneous protest movement of the grass roots on the basis of local conflicts provoked by the attempts of the authorities to infringe the economic rights of citizens.

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THE SPECIFICS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES IN CENTRAL ASIA

Many authors of western political thinking from Aristotle to Cicero quite definitely opposed free institutions of Europe to the despotic power of rulers in East. This tradition was kept also for the time of the Middle Ages. Since the XIV century at least, the notion of “despotism” was identified with the states in the East. For the epoch of Renaissance, the conception of the eastern despotic state was worked out; in the social and political terms it was the alternative to the free state of the West (Machiavelli and others). In 1748 Montesquieu created his famous work “On the Spirit of Laws”, where he united the political institutions of the East in a global notion of despotism. Montesquieu regards the eastern despotism as a global alternative to the free society. Leaving aside the detailed argumentation pro et contra, one may see the whole period of historiography of the countries in the East. It is significant that this view is contested, for instance by G. Anketil-Duperon, who proposed the following three arguments refuting the conclusions of Montesquieu:

the absolute despotism does not exist in the East, since the power is attained by a legal way (proved, for instance, by ceremonies analogous to western crowning of the person ascending the throne);

the existence of universal laws in the East is quite evident (they cover both the sovereign and the subjects);

the private property exists (its owners use it as anon-alienable property).

The author supports these convincing arguments by his experience accumulated as a result of difficult eastern journeys to

counterbalance Montesquieu, who based his views on materials of F. Bernuieu journey.

The disputes on the nature of the political power and state in the East go on up to present. The “third wave” of democratization originated in the south of Europe covered its central and eastern part and reached the countries of Central Asia, where it aggravated with a new force. Central Asia after Russia is the biggest bloc of the post-Soviet space. It occupies the connecting position between the western and the eastern parts of Eurasia and the interim position between the developed North and the developing South. This region is one of the richest regions of the world in terms of deposits of natural resources. The position in the space and the natural riches make Central Asia a significant theater of the world political game.

The peculiarities of political processes in Central Asia to a large extent are conditioned by specifics of the social order and its institutional basis – by relations between the power and the property. In view of many scholars of the Orient, sociologists and political scientists, the social order of eastern society has its specific features, which crate fundamental differences between western and eastern societies. In particular, according to the conception “power-property”, proposed by L.S. Vasiliyev, the state (in the name of its head) is accepted as a bearer of the social-political and economic power at the same time. The system of power-property was dominant always. It assumed different forms, including Soviet-socialist form. But its essence remained the same: the private property is subordinated to the power and is powerless confronting arbitrary rule of the authorities.

In this system the state seems to be a total and powerful entity in relation to a human being as a subject in life. The system power-property determines the policy of the state leaders in the East. The rulers always urged towards ideological support of the situation

characterized by dominance of social-economic and political power given the lack of social structures able to withstand it and liquidating any chance for a human being to make his choice among competing social forces. Such model of the social order was presented as a fixed norm and was justified by many ways (which was the function of ideology).

The eastern state is characterized by the combination of the state sector of economy with the state apparatus, which provides for the state a chance to have a rigid impact on processes of reciprocal action of economic subjects as one of them. The state has a chance to solve various conflicts for its benefit and its further consolidation. This state of order was formed on the perception of firmness of social structures, which was not only supposed by a mode of production but also advanced as an unchanged principle of social-cultural orientation of the human being. Following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 for the process of consolidation of independent Central-Asian states the problem of strategy of modernization of economic and political systems became the principal problem for their leaders.

The contemporary states of Central Asia are still at the stage of transition. This transitory position of Central-Asian states may be characterized as a post-Communism having in mind as a main argument the “Soviet” origin of the region’s states. But it is necessary to make the reservation that actually post-Communism concerns more Russia than Central Asia. Most countries of the region have “syndrome of the suddenly acquired independence”, according to Imanaliyev, the president of the Institute of Public Policy. According to him, it showed its worth as follows:

the excessive personification of the chosen way of development with further formation of the regime of personal (or family-clannish) power (leadership) characterized by different elements from despotism

to soft authoritarian rule. It should be stated that the leader coming to power was not always and in all respects to blame for it;

the formation of the model of economic development with components of Soviet (sometimes more rigid) system of management; the mosaic incorporation of market mechanisms, partial return to natural economy (primarily in the rural sector); the illegal privatization and personal control of the leader over the most profitable branches of economy; the fragmentary integration in the world economic ties etc.;

the low level of political and legal culture (what is more significant in Central-Asian countries: law or family relations, law or a telephone call?); the lack of balance of relations in the triad “man-society-state”. The civil society as a phenomenon does not exist in some states of Central Asia. The systemic notions and cycles, such as political and social regulation of power transfer and of separation of power, do not function in the region’s states;

the dehumanization and sometimes destruction of social relations is displayed in the crisis of family institution, in the fall of level of education and health care, in the growth of the gap between city and rural regions, in mass migration and in criminalization of political, economic and public life in some countries of Central Asia;

the unpredictable and not always responsible foreign policy, which is carried out with constant discourses;

the lack of national systems of values and stable developing elites, which started to emerge.

In this connection, one of the most important problems existed in the Central-Asian states is the problem of constructing self-identification models and at the same time of finding out identity in the environmental space, according to M. Imanaliyev. There were several hypothetical ways of development in the region’s countries:

a) the western way – open economy, political pluralism, developed “civil society”;

b) the Turkish way – a rather liberal but oriented to separation between secular and Muslim functions of the state; c) the Iranian way – a Muslim-theocratic and anti-western;

c) the Chinese way – with keeping of a rigid political regime oriented to reforms under the state’s control.

As it is known at present, not one of these options of development was realized in a pure way by the region’s countries. However, as a result of the reforms carried out in five states of the region some mixed strategies of modernization are executed: the strategy of partial liberalization with the support on energy resources with elements of authoritarian rule (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan); the authoritarian types of modernization with keeping full state control and use of natural energy resource (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan); the peripheral old type of modernization with elements of economic liberalization (Tajikistan).

For a long time, the civilization’s union of the peoples of Central Asia was regarded as a general part in most scientific works and political appraisals. Actually, all contemporary leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, in particular for the time of regional summits, underline the common nature of history and languages, the origin of traditions, culture and economics. The main trend responding to the spirit of present time by numerous authors is considered to be the integration, including Central Asia. And what is more, the definition itself of Central Asia recently actually by all leaders of the states in Central Asia is called to be “the bridge between the West and the East”. And this place should indicate a chance for universal acceptance of achievements of both parts of the world.

A decade ago, history of Central (formerly Middle) Asia was regarded as an inherent part of history of the USSR. At present, the conclusion has been perceived that there are adequate justifications to consider Central Asia as a type of local civilization. And what is more, a group of Kyrgyz scientists has made the conclusion that Central Asia shall be considered to a larger extent to be a part of the East but has been able to work out its own civilization's space. The authors regard that the Central-Asian civilization includes two components – civilizations of nomads and settled farmers. At the same time, the Central-Asian region comes forward as a part of Islamic civilization. This recognition is characteristic for the present state of political processes in the region. The recognition of particulars represents a significant part of national self-appraisal and self-identification.

Central Asia was always a complicated and contradictory region. Probably, therefore the present appraisals of history and perspectives of the region are very different. Some of them are presented in the form of mythic perceptions or are far from actual knowledge. For instance, K. Pleshakov writes: “It is curious that Central Asia is a vacuum of centralism. The space used to be united (by Chingizkhan, Tamerlan, Alexander II or Stalin) is separated to five state entities. In Soviet time, the boundaries between them sometimes were fixed by means of the ruler (for instance, between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to the west of the Aral). Four of them are Turkic people. Economies of Central Asia are marked by one-crop system. The cherished hopes for “better life” are based exclusively on the export (to the West) of natural resources, mainly oil and gas, as well as gold, narcotics, copper and other items. In scientific words, the proto-imperial space was formed in Central Asia. To put it bluntly, the region is ready to be united by the certain leader of hegemony.

The approximately analogous approach is shared by some contemporary political analysts, who are specialized in situations in new independent states. The political conjuncture defined the attitude to the states of Central Asia as the system of “N-stans” characterized by common economic, political and social foundations and the united civilization’s origin as well as the almost identical political regimes and economic policy. Given this basis, the events in Uzbekistan become easily subjects to extrapolation in Kazakhstan, while the regime in Turkmenistan does not differ at all from the Tajik and Kyrgyz regimes. For ten years, a lot of stock phrases were formed, which do not explain the real processes. R. Abazov writes about it: “We as analysts of the Soviet system consider in the same way the processes in the former Soviet Union and in Central Asia, in particular. But the realities not always corresponded to the ideological constructions applied for explanation of them”.

The adherence to the prepared schemes often leads researchers to unfounded conclusions and meanings, which are reflected in description by western analysts of the situation in Central Asia. As a result of mixture of myths with theoretical artificial schemes, a new image of Central Asia is being formed as a group of countries approaching authoritarian rule and totalitarian regime with different speed. The distinctive features of the new myth about these countries and peoples are the assertions about maladjustment to market relations, deep roots of religious fundamentalism, stagnation of economic life and excessive adherence to patriarchal relations and constant struggle among various clannish groups. This approach causes objection primarily of the experts with a long experience of studies of peoples and states in Central Asia. Naturally, many problems exist. Like all new states, the Central-Asian countries are subject to corruption and are marked by the struggle of elites for redistribution of property, while

society has a small impact on state decisions , the middle class is small and the interests of social groups are not reflected in the parliament and the party system. The sickness is common, while the experience of its treatment differs in various countries.

A thorough study of the region leads to understanding of existence of civilization's limits. The search for peculiar, honest and individual features is not something special, and this is a world trend. The detailed and deep study of history free from ideological dictate reveals the tendency to study of civilizations, cultures and sub-cultures, which results not so much in the search of the common feature as of differences among them. And what is more, the tendency to the search for identity leads to the review of former appraisals and to separation of local civilizations.

After disintegration of the USSR a long transitional period started and continued to the start of the XXI century in all states of Central Asia, according to A. Ulunyan, a senior researcher of the IGH of RUS. At present, it is impossible to speak about the unity of the states in Central Asia having in mind the formed model of state governance. They may be divided conditionally in two groups: Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The level of the totalitarian rule in the existing political regime is the criterion for definition of the group. Although Kyrgyzstan is nearer to democratic foundations than other countries of the region, all of them are characterized by the complete control over the legislative power. At the same time, the lower chamber of the parliament is elected in the second group.

The forms of governance in all countries of the regions resemble each other and differ only in the level of the features of totalitarian regime, mentions A. Vlasov, the deputy director of IAC of M.V. Lomonosov University. The analysis of the situation in

Kazakhstan, marked by rapid economic growth, shows that economic reforms are not accompanied by political reforms. All countries of the region took the choice in favor of ethnic nationalism as a state ideology. The form of governance constructed by the states of Central Asia conditionally may be named as “governed democracy” or “façade democracy”. The leadership exerts main efforts to keep the position of ruling elites. The opposition is virtual being integrated in the existing structures, and tactfully catches the power’s feelings. Therefore the inevitable crisis of power in countries of Central Asia discussed a lot by Russian experts will hardly take place. The construction of “governed democracy” represents the most probable scenario of development of the region’s countries. Some force major circumstances (for instance, aggravation of the Islamic factor) may cause a great aggravation of discords within the ruling elites resulting in the outcome which would be not easy to predict. Kyrgyzstan is marked by very great instability, and it represents the only exception in the region. Probably, it would be necessary to start construction in this country from naught.

The following conclusion may be made. The political institutions and processes in Central Asia are characterized by their historical and social-cultural specifics. Many analytical schemes created by western political science as usual are not justified by empirical research. The processes of democratization and modernization of the political system in practice assume a characteristic, which differs from theoretical description. The Russian political science has to do a lot to describe adequately the going on processes in the region. It is necessary to overcome to a great extent some false stereotypes and perceptions on the Central-Asian states as eastern despotic entities unable for development of democracy. The similar perceptions and appraisals in essence repeat the assertions often repeated in western political

research, which describes the political processes in Russia in traditions of American Soviet research.

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TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE “POLITICAL ISLAM” IN TAJIKISTAN

To the author’s mind, in the course of discussion about “political Islam” it is worthless to come back to the known disputes on the terminology and to consider acceptance or non-acceptance of the use of this category. The personal experience shows that in the course of practical definition of this notion’s boundaries we face great theoretical and methodological problems. Besides, these problems have some practical aspect. In this connection, the author during discussions on “political Islam” in Tajikistan often asked his colleagues the rhetoric question: does “non-political Islam” exist in Tajikistan?

As a researcher of the Islamic environment in Tajikistan for a long time the author may definitely make the conclusion: it is impossible to see “non-political Islam” in Tajikistan. Thus, the logical conclusion will be as follows: all groups and strata of Islamic clergy in Tajikistan actually take part in politics and have a definitely formulated political position. And only the form and specifics of their participation in politics are different.

In this connection, the main types of political activities of the clergy in Tajikistan should be mentioned.

The dependent political participation is characteristic for the so called “official clergy”. The institution of official clergy is the organic

part of political regimes and one of the most important instruments in realization of state policy in the religious field in post-Soviet Central Asia. In this way the official Islamic clergy directly takes part in politics and what is more is a political instrument of power. This situation existed in Soviet time and continues to exist in post-Soviet Central Asia.

The direct independent participation in politics as a form of political activities was chosen by the Islamic clergy and by activists, who realize their participation in politics by creation of political structures, such as the Party of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan (PIRT) etc.

The negative or “neutral” political participation as a form of activities is mainly characteristic for Sufi Islamic clergy, which formulates its political position as neutral or “non-participation in politics”. Occupying such position, they have a great impact on the characteristic and direction of political processes in society. At the same time, this position of the most significant stratum of the Islamic clergy holds in check thousands of believers from joining active political activities, particularly the groups of Islamic activists. Therefore there exist unofficial and sometimes secret contacts of the authorities with the Sufi clergy, the contacts, which are based on the principles of observation of mutual interests and reciprocal action to render services.

Thus, in the post-Soviet space Islam is completely permeated by politics and “non-political Islam” does not exist there. Even in case, when religion avoids any expression to politics and to the authorities, the authorities themselves express their attitude to religion, and religion will definitely insist to determine its position to construct on this basis its relations with the authorities.

Speaking about evolution of political culture of “political Islam” in Tajikistan, one may mention only evolution of political culture of the representatives of one of positions in Tajik Islam. In this case one should speak about the Islamic activists, who occupy the position of independent and organized participation in politics by means of creation of political structures and organizations. The PIRT is the main representative of such Islamic political position in Tajikistan. Therefore evolution of political culture of this position of political Islam in Tajikistan is shown below by the example of evolution of political culture and behavior of PIRT.

Primarily, it is significant to recall the position of PIRT at the time, when it came to the political arena. It was a group of young people, who expressed their rigid ideological-political theses and openly radical political behavior, expressing radical principles and methods of carrying out political struggle. Comparing the initial political culture of PIRT with its present position it is possible to see the radical evolution not only of its political behavior but also of many principal political positions. Although on the face of it PIRT seems to be an ideological force, the author’s analysis shows that maybe the principal difference of PIRT from not only Islamic but also from secular political groups in Tajikistan is contained in its pragmatic characteristic. In this connection it is possible to say that for the period of independence no political force in Tajikistan did transform itself to such extent as PIRT.

The study of activities of PIRT shows that its ideas and political positions were in constant dynamic change. It is possible to show this dynamics by transformation of the party’s positions on a number of principal ideological and political issues. As a first example one may mention the gradual departure of the leadership of PIRT from its original reformation position relating to traditions and rites. For the end

of the 1980s, instructed by the ideas of “reformation” the young activists of PIRT entered in rigid confrontation with the traditional clergy. As a result, the latter blocked access of PIRT to the religious environment proclaiming its adepts as “wahhabies”. It cost PIRT a pretty penny. For the beginning of the 1990s, S.A. Nury, the leader of the party clearly understood fatal consequences of this position and started to correct the relations with the traditional clergy. After his return from emigration in 1997 one of the main priorities of PIRT was rapprochement with the traditional clergy.

A significant demonstration of evolution of PIRT political position may be considered transformation of the party’s approaches to the form and characteristic of the state. For the second half of the 1990s S.A. Nury changed his views on the issue of “Islamic state”. For the first half of the 1990s this term had a definite meaning in his rhetoric, while in the end of the 1990s he used exclusively the term “Muslim society”. This was a great change and a significant re-interpretation of the meaning of Islamic state. A number of factors contributed to the change of S.A. Nury position on this principal issue. For the years spent in emigration S.A. Nury got acquainted with the approach of traditional Islam to politics and power. For this period of time he directly studied the experience, mostly bitter experience of some Islamic countries in this direction. His clearer perception of actual geopolitical realities of the world and the region was formed for this period. All this experience helped him to comprehend the internal situation in the country, including the population’s attitude to this idea. Finally, he clearly comprehended political and legal consequences of this idea for the activities of PIRT.

What is the difference between these two conceptions? In principle, the difference is significant. The theory of creation of “Islamic state”, used by a contemporary Islamic movement to furnish

itself with, concentrates attention to the problem of power. The crux of the problem is as follows: the movement of society to Islam is foreseen through the change of the political system. This conception has a conflicting characteristic, since the primary importance is assigned to the struggle for power. In contrast to this position, S.A. Nury in his conception of “Muslim society” assigns the primary importance not to the problem of power but stresses significance of such civil and cultural-valuable aspects as ensuring religious rights. It is significant that they are part and parcel of general civil rights, including determination of the recognition of place and role of Islam in national culture, respect to Islamic norms and values. These aims, in essence, do not contradict either Constitution or laws of the Republic of Tajikistan.

This conception, on the one side, keeps the Islamic essence of PIRT, which is the foundation of the religious political party. On the other side, it keeps its legitimacy within the framework of the Constitution of RT. To the author’s mind, the change of “Islamic state” for “Muslim society” was for Nury the only possible option. The aim consisted in keeping simultaneously both Islamic and legitimate characteristic of the party under conditions of the secular state. This decision is principal and at the same time pragmatic.

Precisely speaking, Nury had a natural approach to solving this problem. It differs from an artificial-politicized and journalist minded understanding. He came nearer to the Islamic conception of society. On the face of it, he came to such unusual conclusion that at the present stage exactly the secular state may ensure the conditions for conversion people to faith, since the normal legal secular state ensures all religious rights of citizens. “Muslim society” in this understanding is existence of certain frameworks of people’s behavior in their personal life and in relations with other people according to canons of Islam. There is no need for it either in the change of the constitutional order or in

organization of illegal political activities. This is the essence of the final position of S.A. Nury on this issue. Proceeding from all this deliberation he supported the secular type of the state.

What is the meaning of this position for society? Such conception eliminates the power problem from “the first point of agenda” and consequently alleviates tension in the secular-Islamic relations within the framework of political space. The problem changes the conflicting form of the direct struggle for power for the form of mutual action of values in social-cultural environment and simultaneously in the legal sphere. This is an absolutely normal process in democratic society.

This evolution may be seen in position of PIRT relating to some other issues. For the last month of his life S.A. Nury as the leader of PIRT accumulated his life and political experience. He made some final conclusions on the problem of political struggle and power. For instance, he made PIRT subject to severe criticism. He mentioned that the party faced many problems and that it should make improvements in formation of cadres and make amendments in its programs. He made the conclusion that PIRT was not ready at all for the national governing. In this connection, two directives were formulated: first, to exert all efforts for consolidation of the party itself, for training of cadres, for working out programs; second, to forbear flatly from attempts to come to power. S.A. Nury considered that under present conditions and taking into account the position of the party the PIRT coming to power would be an irresponsible act and absolute madness, which might become “a tragic outcome”. He exhorted that coming to power was senseless until the party had the minimum of “100 Khitmmatzods” (i.e. a sufficient quantity of strong men like Mukhammadsharif Khimmatzoda, the present spiritual leader of PIRT),

until the party would be assured that in case of victory “the country would transform into Japan”.

Thus, the main political will left by S.A. Nury to his followers was the direction that the party should never claim for power without needed intellectual training, without adequate cadres and corresponding programs for national development. It seems that it was one of the most significant and principal conclusions of his political life.

At present, evolution of political positions and political behavior of PIRT is going on. For the last year of his life, S.A. Nury spoke about the needed transformations, which should cover the party’s structure, its programs and priorities. M. Kabiri, the present leader of the party proclaimed continuation of the reforms’ course, but his chances are more limited than those of S.A. Nury. It seems that for some time he postponed a part of reforms, including renovation of PIRT structure and its cadre’s component. At the same time, he initiated some changes in the contents of tactic and strategy of PIRT. For instance, he started his course by thesis “confidence” explained as a series of practical steps aimed at consolidation of internal confidence in PIRT as well as mutual confidence in Islamic clergy, political elite and international community. After S.A. Nury death PIRT actually was in need of restoration of this confidence, since this loss deprived the party of a significant part of contacts and trust.

As another essential change in tactic of PIRT may be mentioned the idea of the turn in its direction of the people and the youth. Judging by declarations of M. Kabiri, the party came to the conclusion that at the present stage its priority is not participation or victory in elections but intimacy with the people and formation of the young generation comprising its followers. The party should not wait for the elections, and its successes should not be appraised by the results of its participation in elections. As a whole, at the present stage the

participation in elections as a main aim and principal form of the party's activities have been put to the background.

But how there may exist and develop the political party without participation in elections? It seems that the similar step is connected with a psychological matter: the participation of PIRT in the parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005 did not result in great success. Although the leaders of PIRT consider that actually they received much more votes than their opponents, the party's participation each time stressed its real capacity and, being significant, real conditions of carrying out the elections. The endless repetition of this statement will increase pessimistic feelings among members of PIRT. As a result, a part of its members may "deactivize" or simply leave the political arena, since they gradually lose faith in expediency of political activities under such conditions.

* * *

The experience accumulated in Tajikistan relating to legalization of activities of the political party with religious characteristic shows that this choice is the most rational way to insure stability in Muslim societies with secular regime of governance. The legal activities of Islamic political forces will lead to a deep evolution of their essence, structure and methods of carrying out political activities as a whole as well as to transformation of their political culture.

Carrying out their activities on the legal political arena and within rigid framework of law, these forces gradually go on through the process of thorough socialization and modernization, share feelings of responsibility for stability and development of society in the country. Adapting to political culture of society, they pass to moderate creative positions and become a natural part of the legal political space. This transformation will result in decrease of religious and political

extremism in society. Legalization is a channel of their socialization, modernization and nationalization. And quite different logic exists in periphery and underground.

Thus, legalization of religious political activities in Tajikistan acquired the sustainable stability in this direction. This assertion is not a theoretical conclusion of the researcher, since by this time for ten years this mechanism functioned in practice. And, as they say, “factor of instability” finally has transformed into the element of stability. This is one of the most important lessons of the Tajik peaceful process.

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CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT’S TRENDS OF TURKMENISTAN

Turkmenistan with the territory of 0.49 million sq km occupies the 51st place in the world. The population of the country numbers 4.9 million people, and in this respect Turkmenistan occupies the 115th place in the world. The amount of the gross domestic product produced in Turkmenistan in terms of parity of purchasing power accounted for \$ 33.4 billion, and Turkmenistan occupied the 94th place in the world by this index (its share in the world GNP made 0.05%). At the same time, the size of Turkmen GNP estimated by method of atlas of the World Bank made about \$ 10.5 billion in 2006, and by this indicator Turkmenistan occupied the 91st place in the world (its share in the world GNP accounted for 0.02%). For the period from 1996 to 2006 the economic growth of Turkmenistan made 13.3% in terms of average annual increase, and Turkmenistan occupied the 4th place in the world

by the tempo of economic growth. Turkmenistan is the sole country in CIS without external debt.

Turkmenistan is an industrial-agrarian country. About 40% of economically active population consists of industrial workers, while 30.8% of able bodied people are occupied in agriculture and about 30% in the sphere of services.

The Institute for Strategic Planning and Economic Development of Turkmenistan has worked out the national strategy for economic revival and reformation for the period up to 2030. Its main aim consists in determination of the priority directions of social-economic development of the country under conditions of intensification of integration processes and globalization of world economy, as well as elaboration of efficient mechanisms for their realization. The national strategy consists of three blocks: the state plan of social-economic development of the country for 2009–2010 years, the state program of social-economic development for 2011–2015 years and the general strategy of social-economic development for the period up to the year of 2030.

In order to alleviate the influence of the world crisis on economy of the country in 2009 the cabinet of ministers of Turkmenistan adopted the decision on creation of the stabilization fund to provide the resource base of augmentation of the state budget. This source of financing will let reduce to some extent the influence of the fuel-energy sector and will level the impact of external factors. The means of the fund will be directed to implementation of the most important social programs and further development of the innovation component of the country. The investment of some assets of the stabilization fund in highly profitable long-term holdings of enterprises is a significant strategically thoughtful step promoting formation of a peculiar insurance fund of the country oriented to the needs of future generations.

The main and the most significant branch in the industrial structure of Turkmenistan is the oil and gas industry. According to the data of the state concern “Turkmengeologiya”, 38 oil fields, 82 gas-condensate and 153 gas deposits, including 142 land and 11 shelf deposits, were discovered in Turkmenistan.

Turkmenistan exports oil and oil products in almost all directions. The deliveries in western direction are provided through Makhachkala, Novorossiisk and Baku-Batumi to the countries of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean basin. The shipment in the south-eastern direction is made to Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The northern direction ensures export via Astrakhan-Kerch to the North-Western Europe, while the southern direction is arranged to the port of Neka (Iran) and further to the Persian Gulf and some countries of the South-Eastern Asia. The export deliveries of oil and oil products are arranged mainly by sea. The oil and oil products are realized in the national market by companies “Argomar Oil Ltd”, “Middle East Petrol Farm”, “Com Petrol”, “BP Oil International”, “British Petroleum”, “Itochu”, “Vitol”, “Petronas” etc.

In 2010, the gas production in Turkmenistan increased by 16.5%. “Turkmengas” uses gas pipelines ensuring shipment of gas from the eastern and the western regions of Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. The export of natural gas from Turkmenistan is executed in two directions. The northern direction is arranged via the territory of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation by the system of gas pipelines Turkmenistan (Derya-lyk) – Europe and Turkmenistan “Garabogaz) – Europe. In the southern direction the deliveries are carried out to Iran by gas pipeline Korpeje (Turkmenistan) – Kurt-Kui (Iran). In December 2009, the gas pipeline Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–China was commissioned, which arranged deliveries of big volumes of Turkmen natural gas. In

January 2010 the gas pipeline Iran–Seraks–Khangeran was commissioned.

The capacity of functioning power stations is able to produce about 16 billion kWh of electric energy per year, according to the ministry of energy and industry of Turkmenistan. The export supply of electric energy to Iran and Turkey is made by the line Balkanabat–Gonbad (Iran)–Khoi-Bashkale (Turkey). Turkmenistan also delivers electric energy to Afghanistan. The electric lines of 22 kV Imamnazar (Turkmenistan)–Andkhoy (Afghanistan) – Shibirgan and Serkhetabat (Turkmenistan) – Turgundi (Afghanistan) are used for electric energy deliveries.

The chemical industry of Turkmenistan consists of mountain-chemical enterprises, the plants of general chemistry and oil-technical industry. In 2010 the chemical industrial production in Turkmenistan rose by 15.2% comparing with 2009. The mountain-chemical industry develops on the basis of local chemical resources: mineral salt, native sulphur, iodine and bromine.

Turkmenistan is the only state among CIS member-states, where within the framework of implementation of the social program the free deliveries to the population of gas, electricity and water are provided. Within the general sum of money expenses of households in Turkmenistan the share of housing and communal services makes only 0.1% and these expenses are the lowest in the world.

In 2010 Turkmenistan demonstrated one of the highest rates of growth in plant growing, which is the basis of the agrarian complex of the country. The size of farm cotton production rose by 33.1% comparing with 2009, while this result was achieved by introduction of efficient methods of production with due account of soil and climate conditions. The association of joint stock cattle production of

Turkmenistan implements investment programs for development of livestock farming complexes and agricultural firms by 2012.

In 2010 the amount of investments in fixed capital grew by 14.1% comparing with 2009, while the budgetary means, foreign investments and other financial inputs ensured the basis of this growth. For the 2009, some actions were taken for active realization of the geo-economic component of foreign policy of Turkmenistan. In 2009 Turkmenistan maintained trade relations with 104 countries of the world comparing with 96 trade-partners in 2008. The first four places in the whole external trade turnover of Turkmenistan were occupied by Russia (30.3%), Iran (18.7%), Turkey (12.4%) and China (9%).

According to the data of the state committee on statistics of Turkmenistan, in 2010 the external trade turnover of Turkmenistan made \$ 17.9 billion, having reduced by 2.4% comparing with the previous year. The export of Turkmenistan rose by 3.8% and made \$ 9.7 billion, while the import decreased by 8.8% and accounted for \$ 8.2 billion. In 2010, Turkmenistan had trade relations with 106 countries of the world. Russia, which formerly occupied the first place among biggest trade partners of Turkmenistan by this year, occupied the second place after Iran. The share of Iran in the trade turnover of Turkmenistan in 2010 made 21.7%, the share of Russia was 18%, the share of Turkey – 16.3%, the share of China – 10.7%.

In 2010 the amount of Russian-Turkmen trade reduced by 12.7% comparing with 2009, which was caused by decrease of Russian export by 23.5% primarily in the main export groups. The size of deliveries of metals and metallic products was reduced by 53.4%, of machines, equipment and transport means – by 28.5%. These trade groups represent about 60% in the size of the Russian export. At the same time, import from Turkmenistan increased comparing with the year of 2009 by 3.3 times, first of all, thanks to the raised deliveries of chemical

products by 4.5 times, of textile production – by 2 times, which in sum made 81.4% of the amount of Turkmen import to Russia.

At present, according to the data of the Turkmen party, in Turkmenistan 138 subjects of economic activities with participation of Russian capital jointly with Russian and Turkmen experts implement more than 120 projects in different sectors of Turkmen economy. Presently, the biggest Russian-Turkmen investment project is represented by development of the block N 21 of the oil field in the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea, under the treaty of production share signed on 13 September 2009 by company “NGK ITERA” and the state agency for management and utilization of hydrocarbon attached to the President of Turkmenistan. For implementation of this project company “NGK ITERA” arranged cooperation with Russian company “Zarubezhneft”.

It is significant that the national external economic policy was formed in Turkmenistan and the organizational-institutional basis of external economic ties was created. The national program “Strategy of Economic, Political and Cultural Development of Turkmenistan for the Period up to 2020” defines the purposeful objectives of the external trade policy of Turkmenistan. At the same time, the national program up to 2020 aims at a rather great growth of the living level and entry of Turkmenistan in the group of economically developed countries of the world with high indexes of human development. The strategy of economic development of Turkmenistan regards as its primary significance the external trade development. The new Customs Code of Turkmenistan was adopted in 2010. Creating favorable conditions for reciprocal trade Turkmenistan concluded agreements in the sphere of trade-economic relations with 27 states. The share of these countries in the total amount of the external trade turnover accounted for 85%. The imported and exported products in the external trade of Turkmenistan

are subject to obligatory certification, which is executed by the organs of the Gosstandart of Turkmenistan.

Turkmenistan is the first country of the world community possessing the neutrality recognized by United Nations. The policy of Turkmenistan's neutrality makes it possible consequently and purposefully to put into life the large scale reforms in the oil and gas industry, in construction, chemical, energy, agricultural and other branches of economy as well as in the social sphere.

Summing up, it is necessary to say that the national economy of Turkmenistan dynamically developed for twenty years since creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, in 2010 due to global economic crisis the external trade turnover and export of the country was reduced mainly as a result of smaller amounts of trade with the CIS member-states. In 2011 Turkmenistan took steps for correction of this situation, which will promote extension of geo-economic partnership with the countries of the Commonwealth.

“Perspektivy razvitiya ekonomicheskogo potentsiala Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv”, M., 2011, pp. 242–250.

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KYRGYZSTAN: IN SEARCH OF ITS OWN WAY OF DEVELOPMENT

Kyrgyzstan was one of the first states in Central Asia taking the way of democratic reforms and market transformations, which conditioned its high authority and positive image on the international arena and consequently support on the part of democratic countries. For the first years of independence the main institutions of democratic statehood and multi-structural economy were formed in the republic,

the macro-economic stabilization was achieved and the growth of gross national product was going on. The social and inter-national consent was maintained in the country.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that for the last years the trends to authoritarian rule and concentration of political power by a small circle (to the detriment of legislative and judicial organs of power), the attempts were made to exclude political parties, civil society and social associations from political life of the country.

It resulted in significant faults in public consciousness. The problems of social and issues of world outlook were aggravated due to systemic corruption in all state institutions, unjust distribution of economic benefits and financial flows and careless utilization of foreign assistance. Owing to all this the meaning of the international community about Kyrgyzstan as a country going on the way of democracy changed to the negative side.

For the last years, the key problems caused by unstable economy, large scale unemployment and degraded legal system, chronic failures in municipal services, energy and infrastructure and other sectors lacked adequate attention for a long unacceptable period of time. The number of tragic events in spring 2010 demonstrated the legal vulnerability and inefficiency of the existed system of state governance. The accumulated conflicting potential was displayed by the events in spring 2010 and was solved in principal by the change of the republic's leadership and of the constitutional order.

However, for the last years the public-political processes fixed negative tendencies in life of Kyrgyzstan. The clannish order in politics and economy bringing corruption transformed the elite groups in small corporate societies separated from the population of the country. The clannish-political groups of the republic concentrated in the struggle for power and resources utilizing public feelings and resentment as an

instrument of realization of their aims; and they actually were not concerned about either strategic planning or problems of economic development. A great part of economically active population periodically left the country, primarily to Russia and Kazakhstan, which partially alleviated the tension. The share of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan leaving their country achieved 45% of able bodied population. It makes 1 million people of 5 million people, living in the country.

The world financial crisis had an impact on labor migration from Middle Asia and reduced it. The mass unemployment, social exposure and unfairness, periodic rise of prices for communal services together with the growing stratification in Kyrgyz society became the stimulus for the growth of radical feelings in the country.

The constitutional reform carried out in autumn of 2010 changed the presidential-parliamentarian republic in the parliamentarian-presidential republic. Under conditions of period failures of the legal system and of the increasing nihilism in society, the recently adopted legal acts and documents may be questioned any time, and it occurs in the Kyrgyz Republic. New emerging opposition forces (not always consisting of supporters of the former regime), before and after parliamentary elections, will strive for disavowing legitimacy of a number of decisions taken by the new powers. The wave of nationalization covering some important national objects of economy was the start of the redistribution of property, and in this connection the level of opposition among the competing clans became higher.

The political processes in Kyrgyzstan were marked by regeneration of the role and influence of clannish groups on the regional, local and tribal basis intensified for the period of K. Bakiyev governance. As was shown by the recent events, the resources of the clannish groups (power, financial, tribal, local etc. resources) and the

struggle for them are the deciding factors in actual politics of contemporary Kyrgyzstan. For instance, one of the factors in the Kyrgyz clannish-political structure is determined by geographic separation for the northern (Chu, Talas, Naryn and Issyk-Kul) and southern (Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken) clans, which partially coincide with historic division of Kyrgyz tribes into the left (sol-kanat) and the right (on-kanat) wings and ichkiliks (internal) tribes. The big and influential tribes of the north are as follows: sarybagysh, bugu, solto, kushchu, sayak, saruu, kytai and others. The largest southern tribes are – ichkiliks, the largest tribe otuz-uul, which is divided into the influential tribal groups – munduz, adygene and others.

Under the conditions of existence of inefficient institutions and rules, which are constantly ignored by leading political forces, the clannish-political structures as well as their mobility and adaptability demonstrated their relative vitality. This resource was widely used both by Bakiyev clan and by the competing groups.

The rapid degradation of legal mechanisms led to enforcement of archaic forms of mobilization and political activities. The public declarations of many politicians using democratic rhetoric are meant for mass media. At the same time, the real mechanism moving the political process in the country is within the closed clannish scheme of distribution of power and other resources. The mass-scale poverty, unemployment, the reduced economic capacity and the limited resources of the government promoted conservation of the clannish structure.

The peculiar feature of the situation was displayed in participation in conflicts in 2010 of criminal structures connected evidently with opposing clans. The south of Kyrgyzstan, Osh and Jalal-Abad are primarily the key points in the mass-scale smuggled trade of Chinese products and the large-scale narcotics traffic from Afghanistan.

The change of power in April provoked a new stage of struggle for control over profitable spheres of trade, services and other economic assets, contributed to the re-distribution of property among competing clans.

The above described situation in Kyrgyzstan means that its future is indeterminate. The storms of two revolutions still blow in the country. Under such conditions it is very difficult to foresee further development of the Kyrgyz Republic, which occupies a significant geopolitical and geo-economic position as a connecting bridge between the West and the East, as well as between the North and the South. In terms of its political and social-economic parameters Kyrgyzstan is still at the transitional stage of its development; it is included in the group of developing countries; it is the country without exit to sea.

Kyrgyzstan is one of the possible natural testing areas (training centers) for studies of the state of people, technique and constructions in extreme mountainous conditions. Kyrgyzstan is an international ecological donor: springs of pure drinking water, biological diversity, a low level of emission of hotbed gas. The glacial stocks of 13 years water flows represent the capital, which is much more precious than the riches of raw resources.

The research organization Population Reference Bureau has made the prognosis of the population growth in Kyrgyzstan up to 8.3 million people by 2050. The tempos of natural growth of population do not have evident impact on either GNP, either level of inflation, either correlation of marriages and divorces, either coefficient of the share of the youth with higher education, or migration. All this makes it possible to characterize this social phenomenon as a demographic “explosion” following certain slump for the middle of the 1990s and to evaluate it as a strategic resource of the country’s development. For the first part of the 1990s a great outflow of the population started: people

emigrated voluntarily for reasons of ethnic belonging and for economic considerations.

All these resettlements resulted in the change of permanent place of living. The recent trend is connected with provisional migration. It is caused exclusively by economic reasons. These migration flows represent an important factor of regional cooperation. The total number of migrants from Kyrgyzstan makes 10% of the whole labor force. The excess of the labor force, related to a high level of birth rate in the countries of Central Asia results in creation of a great reserve of labor force, which is ready to fill in the niches of labor markets in Russia and Kazakhstan.

The existence of such great part of labor force, situated abroad, has numerous economic, social and human consequences for Kyrgyzstan. According to different estimations, the sum of foreign money remittance may make from \$ 120 million to \$ 300 million, i.e. more than inflow of direct foreign investments. The money transfers represent one of the main reasons of reduction of poverty for the recent years, some experts consider.

The national interests in the field of economy assumed as its basis predict the overcoming of the crisis, the sustainable growth to ensure integration in the world and regional economy at the acceptable conditions as well as the balanced decision of social-economic tasks. The promotion of formation of efficient economics by attraction of foreign investments, integration of Kyrgyzstan in the world and regional economic space, as well as ensuring economic security represent the most significant directions of external economic policy.

Kyrgyzstan depends on the IMF and the World Bank, where the U.S.A. plays the leading role. The interests of Russia and China limit the American influence in the region. The promotion of democracy and liberal economics remains a priority in relations of Kazakhstan with the

U.S.A. and EU. In perspective the prospects are seen for maintained relations with the United Europe, in particular with Germany. The corridor “Europe-Asia” makes Europe and China being interested in sovereignty and development of the countries in Central Asia. The biggest donor of Kyrgyzstan is Japan. Japan and Germany are the biggest stock-owners of the Asian Bank of Development. The grants of the Asian Bank of Development and of the World Bank received by Kyrgyzstan were made mainly by Japan.

For the middle period perspective, the CIS countries will as usual account for 50% of trade partners of Kyrgyzstan. In its relations with Uzbekistan the lack of water resources will be used in the same way by Kyrgyzstan as it uses the dependence of the country on gas. Kyrgyzstan is needed by Kazakhstan due to the lack of water and electric energy in its southern regions. The southern regions of Kyrgyzstan are in need of cheap labor force and oil products coming from Tajikistan. The railway route through Afghanistan may open the exit to the Indian Ocean for the countries of Central Asia.

Kyrgyzstan lacks the needed amount of goods at the regional and world level – of oil, metals and grain (like in Kazakhstan) and of gas, cotton and gold (like in Uzbekistan). The neighboring countries produce more agricultural goods. But the natural resources of the country make it possible to produce ecologically pure products and medicines being in popular demand in the world market. Kyrgyzstan may become a knot of electric energy communications and may orient itself to the export of electric energy taking into account the rising demand of it. Kyrgyzstan has the borders with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the friendly states being close to it in terms of culture, history, ethnic origin and confessions. Kyrgyzstan actively participates in integration processes of different format involving other countries of Central Asia.

It is possible to mention the following unfavorable factors: the situation within the continental region, the lack of direct exit to world communications, the weak infrastructure of transport and communications, the distance from the centers of economic and political influence.

The neighborhood of Kyrgyzstan with China creates favorable conditions for development of trade-economic cooperation with this country, which also is a member of the World Trade Organization, for diversification and modernization of transport infrastructure and overcoming national isolation. Thus, considering probable losses and advantages of realization of some or other strategy it is possible to conclude as follows: under conditions of the multi-polar world the integrity of territory keeps the significance of basic factor for Kyrgyzstan as a competent object of international law and sovereign state with legitimate government and unitary form of state order. The meaning of this factor is characterized by the evident trend to growth in case of unification of Eurasian space thanks to regional projects – railway, large electric stations and communications on the basis of information technologies.

The above made analysis showed that the way of development for Kyrgyzstan would be possible within the framework of five basic scenarios.

1. The first scenario consists in the multi-vector policy carried out for a long time. This course has more perspectives, since it allows maintenance of the balance of forces in the region making concessions to some or other forces, while determined defense of national interests in the long-term perspective is possible only by adequate application of international lawful aspects of cooperation; however, weak economics, small military forces and small population pre-condition relatively not great capacity for carrying out actually independent foreign and

economic policy. The strategy of multi-vector policy implies movement to a balanced and consistent multi-vector foreign policy of the state. As a whole, it is a rather successful strategy for the situation, when neither of the leading centers of the world and the region feels that it possesses the adequate force to advance to the position of unconditional dominance.

The situation of the definite subjection of governance emerges in the country itself. At the same time, weakening of the state power in the region's countries, as is shown by the example of Kyrgyzstan, may be used by external forces to make attempts for changing the geopolitical configuration of the region. Therefore a rather successful strategy of national development on the basis of flexible course is fraught with a danger of fast loss of sustainability due to weakness of the state governance, in particular under conditions of aggravation of struggle of external forces for influence in the region. Probably, this is the worst strategy from the point of view of ensuring stability, since the external forces start to feel that the geopolitical space is not occupied and this sense provokes their active attempts to change the situation for their advantage. The complexity of execution of this strategy is the need of virtuosity in carrying out foreign policy, which is a complicated task for a small country with limited resources.

2. The second scenario means the entry in the sphere of influence of Kazakhstan or Russia and the growing political and economic dependence on Kazakhstan (or Russia). In principle, this is the option of giving full powers in the choice of strategic way of development to the state, which is close ethnically and mentally and possessing greater primarily economic might. In pure form this scenario is also difficult to realize, since although Kazakhstan (Russia) has much greater capacity than Kyrgyzstan, however, other "global players" are not interested in this dependence. The realization of this scenario actually means that the

optional way of development of Kyrgyzstan will be chosen by Astana (Moscow) in correlation of four other scenarios. The strategy “Entry in the sphere of influence of Kazakhstan (Russia)” is accompanied, on the one side, with the partial loss of sovereignty, a possible territorial division, but, on the other side, it is accompanied with the rise of level of living of the majority of the population of the country thanks to the real economic growth. At the same time, the scheme of delegation of powers in selection of a strategic way to though much mightier but still comparable state in terms of its capacity seems to be not completely justified.

3. “Eurasian integration” is one of the most acceptable scenarios for Kyrgyzstan, since potentially it allows Kyrgyzstan, side by side with other states of Central Asia, to become a systemic creating entity of the great geopolitical association, like small European states, which are able to achieve success thanks to their membership in EU in order to raise their significance and influence on the international arena. However, the chances of Kyrgyzstan for development according to this scenario are reduced by a relative progress in construction of valuable integration structures of EEP, EvrAzES and SHOS. The only trump card of Kyrgyzstan in this process is its key position at the crossroads from China to Europe and from Russia to Asia and India. The aim of strategy called “European Integration” will be economic and military-political integration of the post-Soviet space. By 2020, the united economic and defense space of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may be formed. The priority regions of integration cooperation for Kazakhstan are described below:

the creation will be completed of the regional water-energy consortium characterized by transfer to it of key elements of infrastructure. Each country will have its share. The consortium makes it possible to predict estimates of economic, social and ecological

effects of the existing system of water regulation and energy production. It represents a rational justification of the choice of working regime profitable for each country. Kyrgyzstan should receive a part of incomes of the irrigated agriculture of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and cover a part of profits received by irrigated agricultural farms of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and should compensate a part of damage caused by submerged area in the low stream of Syr-Darya river; in their turn, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan should receive their part of incomes of energy production in Naryn cascade. The estimation of the size of expenses and benefits is a very complicated political and technical task, but nevertheless it should be accomplished;

the mechanisms of economic cooperation, including trade, investments, transit, development of infrastructure should be created on the basis of obligatory observation of all rules and sanctions for their violation. Such mechanisms might be based on the rules of the WTO;

the cooperation in the sphere of security protecting the region's countries from threats of terrorism, extremism and organized criminality should be arranged;

“Eurasian integration” represents the most attractive scenario both for Kyrgyzstan and Russia, since the high level of foreign policy achievements will be realized not thanks to national limited resources but as a result of impact of the common might of Eurasian Union.

4. “Entry in the sphere of influence of China” is a very probable scenario with due account of growing economic might of China and its geographic nearness. The main danger in the course of realization of this scenario is connected with the threat of ethnic and cultural dissolution. At the same time, there exists the risk of copying the Chinese scheme of extensive development (utilization of the schemes of industrial development ignoring ecological norms and being based on low paid labor), which may lead to the loss of competitive

advantages of Kyrgyzstan as a unique bio-sphere zone and to preservation or even aggravation of social instability in the country. In pure form this scenario may be realized with great difficulties, since other “global players” are not interested in such dependence.

5. “Euro-Atlantic option” with its seemed attractive entry in the sphere of influence of the most developed states of the world is fraught with rather great threats, since development of economically weak states in the system of open liberal economy, as a rule, fixes economic periphery. At the same time, the land situation of Kyrgyzstan aggravates its dependence on its neighbors, since the main transport routes connecting Kazakhstan with the external world are laid through their territories. The urge of Kyrgyzstan towards playing the role of the big transit knot may also be realized against the background of friendly relations with great powers of the region. Under these conditions, the formation of strategy of national development on the bases of Euro-Atlantic orientation seems to be short-sited from the point of view of the key geopolitical factors of development of Kyrgyzstan. “Euro-Atlantic option” as a strategy is hopeless for Kyrgyzstan due to its location within the continent. The radical option of search for independence of continental neighbors in practice means transformation of the country in a colony of the third, distant power. Georgia represents the most spectacular example in the space of CIS. However, in Kyrgyzstan this scenario is more difficult for its implementation due to its geopolitical position.

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Thus, for the midterm period the interests of Kyrgyzstan will consist in protection of its constitutional system, sovereignty and territorial integrity, ensuring social-political stability and economic development. The adequately determined national interests let chose the

justified (from the point of view of development's objectives, existing resources and chances) strategic perspective of the state's development. The due account of local peculiarities facilitates definition and the best use of social-cultural features of the state and society needed for their reformation. The international experience allows Kyrgyzstan successfully to integrate itself in the world system with full comprehension of universal and generally accepted "code" and, in its turn, in the atmosphere of being comprehended. A significant element of implementation of this program becomes the creation of the modern state adapted to realities of globalization and being able to carry out the program of long-term reforms.

The other scenarios of economic development are characterized by the trend to reduction of specific meanings of the factor, which in practice means the aggravation of division to the north and the south, the fragmentary development, i.e. the lack of the united economic space of the country. For the midterm perspective, the small size of the country will be a sign of backwardness.

"Vnutripoliticheskoe i sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Kyrgyzstana", M., 2011, pp. 245–256.

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THE AFGHAN CONFLICT AND CENTRAL ASIA

The region of Central Asia is connected with Afghanistan in terms of ethnic origin, history, politics and economics. For the last quarter of century after the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979 the political destinies of the Central Asian countries and this country were to some extent reciprocally connected and depended.

At present, Afghanistan represents one of many factors, which threaten sustainable development of the countries in the Central Asian region. The existing military-political situation in the state shows that the conflict is still far away from the final solution and as usual continues to create tension in the region, represents a real threat to stability and security of Central Asia and the whole world community. The events in Afghanistan have a significant impact also on the regional system of international relations. Before disintegration of the Soviet Union the republics of Central Asia lacked the independent course of foreign policy, including policy relating to Afghanistan. It was reduced to cultural conflicts and a small size of economic cooperation.

The countries of Central Asia, having attained independence in 1991, worked out their own course of foreign policy. At the first stage (1991–1996) after the fall of the pro-Soviet regime of President Najibullah and the seizure of power by mujaheds they carried out policy of self-isolation from the Afghan events. For the first half of the 1990s, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan established consulates in the north of the country in the city of Mazari-Sharif. After coming to power of talibs in 1996, Central Asian countries had to define a new course in relation to Afghanistan. The meeting of the leaders of the CIS countries in Central Asia (except Turkmenistan) was held on 4 October in Almaty, and the Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin represented Russia. The participants of the summit disapproved activities of movement “Taliban” and took the decision not to recognize officially the extremist regime.

However, under conditions of military successes of talibs the policy of isolation gradually was changed for attempts to establish contacts with the regime of talibs. Turkmenistan occupied a separate position carrying out the policy of neutrality under conditions of

military antagonism between talibs and the Northern Alliance. Seeking to find out the peaceful way of solving the conflict, in 1998 the group “6+2” (neighbors of Afghanistan plus Russia and the U.S.A.) was established under the aegis of the UN General Secretary’s representative L. Brahimi, who tried to play the role of negotiator between the conflicting parties. However, the repeated attempts to start negotiations failed.

For the end of the 1990s the informal coalition of regional states was formed consisting from Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India, which came forward in support of the Northern Alliance headed by its leader, legendary hero of Afghanistan Akhmad Shakh Masud. The Alliance received material, political and military assistance. A new situation was shaped in the region following the defeat of the regime of talibs in 2001. The countries of Central Asia started to establish diplomatic relations with new Afghanistan headed by the president H. Karzai. The multilateral cooperation was started among them, primarily in the sphere of deliveries of energy resources (oil products and electric energy) to Afghanistan.

At the same time, the events in Afghanistan have a significant impact on political processes in Central Asia. As a whole, it is possible to underline four main spheres of this negative influence: 1) political instability (Islamic extremism and terrorism); 2) narcotics traffic; 3) corruption; 4) external (extra-regional) factors.

The going on military conflict in Afghanistan as usual represents the main threat to security of Central Asia. The West, represented in Afghanistan by the forces of the international anti-terrorist coalition, starts to understand that the military way to liquidation of Islamic extremism and terrorism in the region leads to the deadlock. Besides, as dynamics of developments of events in Afghanistan relating to the struggle against talibs and their allies show, the planned increase

of the number of American troops owing to additional 20–30 thousand servicemen withdrawn from Iraq would hardly radically change the military-political situation in the country and will cause a new splash of activities of enemies of H. Karzai regime and its western allies.

Carrying out their struggle against H. Karzai regime, Afghan talibs actively cooperate with the close-in-spirit radical groups and organizations, in particular with Al-Qaeda, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan headed by G. Khekmatiar, the radical Islamic group headed by J. Kakkani. They maintain close cooperation with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU), having established contacts with it long since the end of the 1990s. D. Namangani, the former leader of IDU in the period of 1998–2000, occupied the post of deputy commander of talibs and was in charge of military operations of talibs in the north of Afghanistan. In 2001 he was killed in the course of military clashes. A rather large number of IDU fighters headed by their spiritual and military leader T. Yuldash take part at present as members of groups of fighters of talibs and Al-Qaeda.

At the same time, Afghan talibs do not represent a direct threat to the countries of Central Asia. It is the more so, as their ally IDU remains underground and is marginalized to a great extent. However, the danger of dissemination of ideology of Islamic fundamentalism and correctly speaking “Jihadism” coming from Afghan extremists still remains. It should be said that the more so, as the favorable conditions exist for dissemination of it in the region. The special danger represents in this context Fergana valley, where a great potential has been accumulated for troubles and mass dissatisfaction on the religious basis.

The trans-border connections between talibs/Al-Qaeda and Jihadists of Central Asia are nourished by Afghan narcotics traffic. The prolonged and multilateral struggle against production and spread of

narcotics in Afghanistan does not bring results up to present. The production of opium in Afghanistan continues to grow and makes 90% of heroine consumed in the world. And what is more, for the last years, given the highest harvests, its offers in the world markets by far exceeded the demand, which accounts for 4 thousand tons. In Afghanistan 3.3 million people (14.3% of the population) are engaged in production of narcotics. The cost of illegal export makes \$ 3.4 billion, which account for one third of the Afghan gross national product (\$ 11.5 billion).

Almost total amount of the produced narcotics is illegally exported by three flows abroad: to Iran and further to Europe (34%), to Pakistan and further to India and Europe (about 40%), to Central Asia and further to Russia and Europe (21%). As a result, Russia turns out to be the biggest aim of Afghan narcotics (more than 3 million people consume them). In the countries of Western Europe from 90% to 95% of the consumed heroine comes from Afghanistan.

To all appearances, the territory of Central Asia is part and parcel of the control executed by Afghan narcotics mafia, which naturally takes actions in close cooperation with local narcotics groups. The prevailing part of narcotics shipped by Afghan narcotics groups is delivered by the northern route through the territory of Tajikistan. Further narcotics are sent to Kyrgyzstan to Osh (by Khorog route), further to Bishkek and by railway or by air are shipped to the territory of Russia. Naturally, a part of narcotics remain in the republics of Central Asia.

The main danger of Afghan narcotics business consists in the following fact: it is not interested in keeping regional stability. The huge profits received by illegal narcotics traffic support the forces, which have destructive impact on the states in the region and outside it. Narcotics destruct the traditional spiritual and moral values and norms as well as the state system, raising the level of corruption

and criminality of power. The profits accumulated by narcotics illegal traffic will always nourish various radical and terrorist organizations.

As is shown by events in Afghanistan, narcotics business is closely connected with underground activities of talibs and other enemies of the regime of Kabul. Talibs promote production of narcotics in Afghanistan, provide Afghan peasants with money and seeds and ensure their security and protect them from abusive actions of local authorities. The Afghan narcotics represent one of the main financial sources of the destructive activities carried out by the enemies of the government. According to NATO, from 40% to 60% of incomes received by talibs are formed by illegal narcotics traffic. However, the dealers of narcotics trade regard these estimations as understated. Talibs impose the tax (10% of the crop) for the peasants producing poppy. In their turn, narcotic barons deliver extremists with arms, money and recruited bandits in exchange for protection of narcotics routes, poppy harvest and members of their groups. As a result, narcotics barons and their criminal business flourish under conditions of the lack of security and of sustainable state governance in the regions controlled by talibs. Many representatives of local and central authorities are connected with narcotics traffic and get big dividends. The corruption connected with narcotics traffic is a quite evident feature of local and provincial authorities.

For the last years the corruption in Afghanistan acquired the total dimension and is nourished by activities of criminal structures and groups connected with talibs. The highest rate of corruption characterizes the functioning of law enforcement bodies, first of all the organs of internal affairs. For instance, the post of the chief of police in the narcotics producing province is estimated in Afghanistan as \$ 150 thousand. The police officers quite often not only “cover” the narcotics business but directly participate in it.

An interesting detailed description of corruption at different levels of political hierarchy is presented in the report of American researchers B.R. Rubin and J. Sherman on the struggle against narcotics in Afghanistan, published in 2008 by New York University. The small traders visiting a village have to pay the police or bandits. The policeman, in his turn, has “to unfasten” a part of it to his commander, who makes payment to the ministry of internal affairs. If he wants to occupy the post of the chief of police in the district of the narcotics producing province, he should make payment to a deputy of the parliament or any other important official in order to be presented to the needed official in Kabul. This official correspondingly should give the bribe (“political contribution”) for getting the post, which is connected with the chance to get big money. In order to have a laboratory for transformation of opium into heroin it is necessary to pay those, who keep under control the local territory (an influential local authority or an official or talibs). To bring to Afghanistan the chemicals for heroine production one should pay the body guards often in two sides of the border or a group of armed people to cover the crossing of the border. The illegal narcotics traffic needs an access to the airport or to the border guards’ point, which are controlled consequently by national air company “Ariana” and by border guards. Both get a lot of money owing to the illegal narcotics traffic. Much money should be paid for the services of guides and expensive assistance of packing specialists, who utilize packages for legal export. Finally, high officials of military and political structures also claim for their share in profits, although the higher is the level of the official, the less evident is his connection with the original source of narcotics business.

In Afghanistan we see the trend to merging of narcotics business, corruption and political extremism – the phenomenon acquiring the trans-border characteristic. A clear example of close reciprocal action

of corrupted officials involved in narcotic business with talibs may be proved by functioning of arms market on the Tajik-Afghan border. It is located on an island of the bordering river Pyandzh. The actually legal exchange of arms for narcotics is made there. The police from both sides protect the trade operations. The corresponding official structures of both states cover these actions. The arms are delivered to the market by Russian mafia groups, while heroine is brought from southern provinces of Afghanistan, primarily from Gilmend province, which produces 40% of Afghan narcotics. The change of narcotics for arms is in charge of Afghan narcotics dealers, who share their profits with the local police and officials. The proposed arms for sale include sniper rifles, Kalashnikov automatic rifles, grenade launchers and explosives. The arms bought at the market are further sold to talibs in the south of Afghanistan. At the market one kg of heroine of high quality costs 600 Pound Sterling, the automatic rifle AK costs 50 Pound Sterling, while in the south and the east under conditions of military actions the price is much higher.

The narcotics business flourishes in the corrupted environment, supports terrorism and corrupts state and other structures on the territory of adjacent countries, first of all in Central Asia.

Finally, one other channel of the Afghan conflict on the situation as a whole and security in Central Asia should be considered as an external, extra-regional factor. The question is the military presence of the U.S.A. and NATO both in Afghanistan itself and in countries of Central Asia. The presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan has a dissimilar effect for the region's countries. On the one side, the U.S.A. and NATO, according to the declared by them objectives, conduct the armed struggle against Islamic extremists and terrorists presented there by talibs and Al-Qaeda fighters and render assistance to Afghanistan

for restoration of economy. From this point of view, the political leadership of Russia gives support to NATO actions.

However, the prolonged military presence of the Alliance in Afghanistan did not result in liquidation of Islamic extremism and terrorism in the country. And what is more, as far as the number of foreign forces in Afghanistan rises, the scales of the armed struggle of talibs against H. Karzai government and its western allies grow. The number of victims of the civil population increases as a result of military actions. Thus, the presence of NATO forces did not become a stabilizing factor in Afghanistan. At the same time, the U.S.A. apart from the officially declared aims in the country carry out its policy for its own geopolitical, economic and military-strategic objectives. Washington created on the Afghan territory a network of military bases, which are supposed to be used for deterrence of Iran, Russia and China. Having signed in 2005 the agreement on strategic partnership with Afghanistan, the U.S.A. urges towards consolidation of these bases for itself on the permanent basis.

And what is more, after the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 the U.S.A. succeeded to strengthen its position directly in countries of Central Asia. Having got privately “all right” from Moscow, which declared its support of international anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan, Washington located its forces in military bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for the rear ensuring military operations of Pentagon. However, side by side with realization of the declared aim, the U.S.A. pursues other objectives within the framework of “protection of national interests”: to ensure access of American business to the fuel-energy resources of Central Asia, to create the situation of “protection of energy interests” of American oil corporations in the Caspian region, to open markets of Central Asia for American investments, goods and services and to stimulate structural economic reforms.

Having consolidated its positions in economic terms in Central Asia, Washington tries to have its direct influence on the type of internal development of the region's states and to direct it in the needed channel. As a result of its activities, actually of its interference in their internal affairs became actions of provoking "a tulip revolution" in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. The role of the U.S.A. in events in Andijan in 2005 is known as well. The attempt of Washington to initiate an international investigation of these events in order to exert pressure on the government of Uzbekistan resulted in a rapid aggravation of American-Uzbek relations. Tashkent refused to give the U.S.A. the right of keeping its forces in military base Karshi-Khanabad. The countries-members of ShOS at the summit, held in 2005, formulated their demand to the U.S.A. and other NATO members to define their final terms of their military presence in the bases of Central Asia.

The policy of the U.S.A. is directed also to weakening and in perspective to excluding Russia from Central Asia and to occupying the key geopolitical positions ensuring the complete control over the access to the main world deposits of hydrocarbon resources, as well as to further isolation of Russia. However, for the recent period of time, Moscow consolidated its positions in the region both on the basis of bilateral relations with the region's states and within the framework of regional organizations (ODKB and ShOS). Concerned with such development of events, Washington advanced a new international initiative. The question is the project of "Great Central Asia" proposed in 2006 by the Institute for Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus at J. Hopkins University in Washington. The main aim of the project is as follows: to connect Central Asia and Afghanistan in a united military-strategic and geopolitical entity and further to unite Great Central Asia with the so-called "Great Near East" under control of the West. The other aim of the project consists in isolation of this enlarged region and

its withdrawal from influence of other great powers – Russia and China. At the same time, according to the intention of the project’s authors, NATO should come forward as one of the main instruments of implementation of this American strategy. This project is summoned to transform Afghanistan and the region as a whole into a safe zone of security for sovereign states developing in the channel of efficient market economy, based on secular and open systems of state governance, and maintaining positive relations with Washington.

However, after some years of the project’s elaboration it is becoming clear that the idea of creation of Great Central Asia as a component of American foreign policy conception is called up for becoming a new geopolitical and geo-strategic reality. The project’s authors intend to place Afghanistan with all its threats and problems in the center of a new geographic entity and by means of it to have influence on the processes of political, economic and military development of the whole region. It is easy to see here the long-term strategic interests of the U.S.A. aimed at creation of certain artificial structure, which may become an obstacle on the way of extension of cooperation of the region’s states with Russia and China. And the rather evident contours of the U.S.A. urge towards establishment of control over extraction and transportation of hydrocarbons from Central Asia is seen again in this project

Thus, the U.S.A., having appeared in 2001 in Afghanistan as a “liberator”, “peace maker” and “standard-bearer of democracy”, transformed in the region in the biggest foreign policy player, claiming for dominant positions and striving for imposing on peoples of Central Asia the model of social development, which suits Washington.

*“Rossiysko-turetski dialog po problemam
Tsentralnoi Azii I Kavkaza: Istoriya i sovremennost”*,
M., 2010, pp. 239–248.

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