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President of the Russian Council  
for International Affairs, Minister  
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Federation in 1998–2004

**WHAT KIND OF DIPLOMACY RUSSIA  
NEEDS IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY**

The past two decades in the development of the system of international relations was a period of great expectations and great disappointments, revolutionary shifts and desperate attempts to preserve the status quo, historic transformations and tragic mistakes. It is rather difficult to speak of this period also because of the fact that the process of fundamental restructuring of the world system, which began in the mid-1980s, still continues: apparently, we are in the middle of the prolonged historical cycle of changes. Many transformation tendencies are still ripening, and the result of their impact will only be seen in several decades.

However, it can safely be said today that the process of changes proved to be not only long, but also quite painful. This concerns not only those who lost in the Cold war, but also those who regard themselves to be the winner. This was largely due to the fact that the collapse of the old system took place very rapidly, almost instantaneously. Nobody had any “prepared variants,” or any well-

thought-out strategy. Everybody had to “improvise,” relying not so much on the experience of older colleagues or teachers, but on their own intuition and imagination. Sometimes this was successful, sometimes not. This is why it would not be just to assess the activities of political figures of the past two decades from the positions of today. Sometimes, they were simply unable to predict the consequences of their decisions.

Nevertheless, an objective and unbiased analysis of events, successes and errors is necessary, at least for being able to move ahead more confidently and avoid repetition of previous mistakes.

### **Trap for Winners**

Today it seems quite evident that twenty years ago western countries, primarily the United States, yielded to triumphant sentiments and became prisoners of illusions about “the end of history,” “the unipolar world,” and the universal character of liberal values. This prevented them from assessing the scope of the still unresolved tasks soberly, and gave rise to illusions that the stabilization of the international system would take place almost automatically, without strained efforts, great political and material investments, and without compromises with old enemies and new opponents. This cost them dearly: they not only had to face international crises and long-term foreign-policy problems, but also lost historic opportunities.

Speaking about the United States, that country had real chances to become the universally recognized leader of the world community at least twice, but missed them. The first time it was in 1989 – 1991 when the world communist system and the Soviet Union disintegrated. The prestige of the United States was very high at the time; the world public expected new ideas, strategic vision and long-term leadership in the rebuilding of the entire system of international relations. Instead of it

Washington demonstrated a desire to use the favorable situation to the maximum in order to gain immediate tactical advantages. The illusion of the unipolar world proved to be too tempting. The United States took the road of forcing its own interests on other countries, thus the opportune moment for global restructuring was missed.

Another historical chance appeared in 2001, when, after the terrorist acts in New York and Washington, a real opportunity emerged to create a broad coalition to fight international terrorism. Moreover, there was an opportunity to begin a serious discussion of the reform of world security as a whole, the fundamental problems of international law, the restructuring of the UN bodies, etc. The level of sympathy for the United States and solidarity with the American people was very high at the time. However, Washington took the road of unilateral actions and quickly lost the credit of trust which could be used for making systemic changes in world politics. The result was blind alleys in regional conflicts, the inflated U.S. military budget with the subsequent budget deficits and accompanying economic problems, and also the explosion of anti-American sentiments all over the world. Tactical diplomatic victories were quickly replaced with strategic defeats.

### **From the Course of the 1990s to “Putin’s Turn’**

What about Russia? Looking back we have to admit that we too had illusions and made foreign-policy blunders. Perhaps, our main illusion in the 1990s was a romantic picture of the world after the Cold war. We thought at the time that a place for new Russia in the changed world system had already been reserved and that our partners would easily understand our present difficulties and help us resolve them and find answers to difficult questions. We hoped that somebody would do our job for us only because Russia had put an end to the Cold war

unilaterally and renounced a considerable portion of the Soviet heritage. But we considerably underestimated the harshness, even cruelty, of modern politics and exaggerated our partners' readiness for strategic vision and comprehensive solutions. Insight has come about much later and proved rather painful.

It has now become fashionable to criticize the Russian policy of the 1990s, interpreting it as a chain of unilateral concessions to the West, surrender of positions, unmotivated break-off of relations with traditional allies, and a sharp drop in the professional level of Russian diplomacy. Such criticism is unjust. Of course, there were drawbacks, even blunders, especially in the first half of the 1990s. But one should not forget the conditions in which our policy was evolved and implemented at the time.

Russian statehood was just taking shape, the material base of foreign policy practically did not exist, one political crisis followed another, and the country's economy was in a state close to collapse. In these conditions, the working out and implementation of a long-term foreign-policy strategy was well-nigh impossible. Sometimes our diplomats displayed wonders of inventiveness in tackling tactical problems. In the conditions of the catastrophic shortage of resources they minimized inevitable international losses which accompanied the fundamental internal transformation of Russia.

There is much talk in the West about "Putin's turn" in Russian foreign policy, opposing Putin's pragmatism to the romantic trends of the preceding period. However, it should be remembered that the first years of Putin's staying in power (the years between 2000 and 2003) were marked by the clear-cut "integrationist" course. It was at that time that resolute attempts were made to raise our relations with the European Union to a higher level. Russia agreed with the American military presence in Central Asia, the Russia – NATO Council was set

up for supporting the anti-Taliban operation in Afghanistan, and certain progress was achieved in the relations with the World Trade Organization.

Of course, Russian foreign policy ten years ago was also multiple-vector one. We were striving to develop relations with our eastern neighbors actively. Noticeable progress was achieved in the Chinese direction, our dialogue with India became more fruitful, and we began to look closer at resolving the sensitive territorial question with Japan. There could be no other way for such country as Russia: any “exclusive” geographical direction in policy was impossible for us because our interests were too varied and our involvement in the affairs of various regions of the world was too deep.

Yet, it would not be an exaggeration to say that in the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the western direction was a priority. Moscow demonstrated time and again its readiness for serious political investments. I’d like to emphasize that Russia has not made a single step or undertaken any international initiative, which could be interpreted by our western partners as unfriendly or harming their legitimate interests.

And what did we get in reply to our striving for strategic partnership with the West? NATO continued to expand, despite Moscow’s insistent objections and despite the obvious ambiguity of the strategy of its expansion from the military point of view. The United States has unilaterally withdrawn from the Soviet-American anti-missile defense treaty, thus undermining the system of strategic balance which existed between Moscow and Washington over several decades. The beginning of the military operation of the United States and its allies in Iraq has put to doubt the principle of the supremacy of law in world politics. The West has made active attempts to penetrate politically the CIS territory and weaken the positions of Russia there.



Naturally, our western colleagues asserted, and continue to assert, that NATO expansion, the operation in Iraq, the U.S. withdrawal from the IBM treaty, and penetration in the post-Soviet area were not aimed against Russia and did not harm its “genuine” interests. One can argue about this contention, but the important thing is that Russian concern, irrespective of whether it was founded or not, has invariably been ignored. The West did not wish to hear us at all.

All this could not but cause deep disappointment. This was why “Putin’s turn” clearly expressed in his well-known “Munich speech” was inevitable. Our western partners are largely responsible for it. The very logic of development at the beginning of the century has brought Russian political figures to the inauspicious conclusion that in this world of ours it is only force which is respected. Nobody guarantees Russia anything and therefore it should be tough and resolute in protecting its interests. The turn was based on understanding that Russia had passed the peak of its maximal weakness, that its resource base for active foreign policy was growing, and, consequently, Moscow could and should talk with the West in the language of an equal partner.

Judging by many things, such stand of Russia was unexpected by its western partners, who regarded this as a violation of the unwritten “rules of the game,” which had never been agreed on formally. We were accused of all mortal sins possible – from intending to hammer together a worldwide coalition of anti-western regimes down to striving to recreate the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the West began to defer to Moscow’s point of view, and Russian support was no longer taken for granted.

Perhaps, historians will continue to argue whether “Putin’s turn” raised or decreased the effectiveness of our foreign policy. One could also argue whether it was fit for the obtaining situation or was too

strong and excessive. However, both supporters and critics of that “turn” would definitely agree on one thing, namely, that it is important now not to repeat the American mistakes of the recent past. This means that we should not feel euphoria caused by the growing possibilities of Russian foreign policy, should avoid temptations of one-sidedness, should not use harsh rhetoric, or place all hopes on our comparative advantages – be they in military force or energy resources.

American experience should also teach us that opportunism and leadership are incompatible. It is not possible to claim leadership in world politics and at the same time use opportunist approaches to concrete problems and situations. Opportunism is a weapon of the weak who would use every opportunity to gain marginal advantages to bolster up their positions. Only strong states are able to be the leaders, which can sacrifice transitory interests for the sake of solving strategic tasks, including those of a systemic character which go beyond the framework of the nearest and direct national interests. During the greater part of the past two decades Russia was sometimes forced to resort to opportunism due to the lack of proper resources. However, exceptions should not become rules.

Of course, the surrounding world is more cynical, selfish and harsh than we thought it to be twenty years ago, but such notions as “international law,” “world public opinion,” “political reputation,” “balance of interests,” etc. are not simply propaganda ruses disguising selfish interests of the leading powers. They are real and important parameters of modern life. A policy based exclusively on cold-blooded cynicism and national selfishness is far from the most effective instrument, as demonstrated by American experience.

## **New Measure of Force**

During the past two decades the world has become more interdependent, so to say. The integration processes in the world economy, science, culture and in its social and political development have become more rapid. Not a single country, even the strongest and self-sufficient, is able to tackle all problems alone. Isolationism leads to an impasse, it dooms to stagnation, lagging behind and inevitable downfall. Effective inclusion in the global economic, political, technological, social and other processes requires the ability to use numerous instruments of foreign policy, and we should master them.

The fundamental problem of the next two decades is whether Russia will learn how to use instruments which are called *soft power* in political science. Realistically assessing the dynamics of world development, we have to admit that the possibilities of Russia to use the traditional instruments of foreign policy, such as military or economic might, will diminish. This is due not to the growing weakness of the country, but simply because many other players in world politics will increase their military-technical, economic and demographic potentials by accelerated rates. For the first time in several centuries the continental neighbors of Russia in Eurasia (primarily China and India) are more dynamic and successful than Russia. This means that the relative weakness of the material base of foreign policy will have to be compensated by the growth of its other, “non-material” aspects.

The possibilities of the economic development of Russia based on the use of its natural resources will gradually decrease. Hence, the task of radical diversification of its economic base comes to the fore – the development of scientific knowledge and introduction of innovative technologies, incentives to small businesses, etc. Without creating a new, “clever” economy we shall lose positions with every decade, every year, even if the world prices of energy and raw material

resources remain high. The economy of the future will not be based on raw materials. Similarly, the foreign policy of the future will not be based on a limited number of military or energy instruments.

Naturally, fuel and energy resources and military force will play their definite role in the future world. But we should realize that their significance in international relations will diminish as time goes by. It is exceptionally important for Russia to use the present, relatively favorable geopolitical situation for diversifying our instruments beyond the framework of military force and fuel and energy resources.

The states possessing greater resource base can afford to use “linear” and traditional foreign-policy strategies. Russia has no such possibilities, and will not have in the foreseeable future.

Within the next few years Russian foreign policy, just as our economy, should become “more clever,” that is, it should not mainly be based on the military-technical and fuel-and-energy potential inherited from the past. It is not enough to preserve the international positions of Russia, all the more so, to strengthen them in the modern world.

I shall emphasize once again that transfer to a “clever” foreign policy does not confine to the *improvement of the mechanism* of adopting and implementing decisions. Apart from thorough preparation of our initiatives, better interdepartmental coordination of foreign policy, and inclusion of institutions of civil society in realization of foreign-policy projects, we should also use various models of state-private partnerships in foreign policy, etc.

Foreign-policy course and its essence should not only be confined to *greater flexibility* and *greater operational efficiency* of adopting decisions. In my view, *we should radically renovate and enlarge the set of foreign-policy instruments*, which Moscow is capable to use in international relations. Our political leadership should use the maximally broad set of instruments and possibilities possessed by our

country and our society, including, of course, non-material ones, which have often been ignored or underestimated by traditional diplomacy of the past.

So far we do not well understand and are not able to control the leading trends of the world politics of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, such as the broader use of new communication technologies, sharp increase of migration flows, globalization of education and science, unprecedented growth of the activity of public diplomacy, inevitable climatic changes, etc. So far these trends are viewed in Russia as a challenge to our security and our interests, and also as threats to be protected from by all means.

Psychologically, the desire of many political figures, officials and diplomats to isolate themselves from the new trends of world politics is quite understandable. These trends do not correspond to the traditional logic of political games, it is difficult to predict them and still more difficult to use; their consequences cannot be predicted either. But isolating ourselves from the new, we not only ignore problems, but also miss opportunities, which can be quite promising for the next few decades. And problems will not disappear, notwithstanding our attempts to ignore them.

Russia, just as any other country of the modern world, will not be able to isolate itself from the changes taking place around it. It is only active participation in globalization processes that will be able to ensure the implementation of our national interests. And a “clever” foreign policy can be the decisive trump card compensating for the relative shortage of material resources. The significance of “non-material” components will apparently be growing in the world processes and in human life in general.

To illustrate this I shall cite just one example from everyday life. The *iPad* and *iPhone* communication devices so popular in the world

now are assembled in China by Chinese companies. However, no people but specialists know the names of these assembly plants or those of their managers, but everybody knows the Californian *Apple* Company and its late head S. Jobs. It's because it was S. Jobs and the *Apple* that have invented and developed the concept of electronic communicators of the new generation and put forward the revolutionary idea which has changed the attitude to the Internet of tens of millions of people in the most diverse countries. And it is just that the *Apple* Company, but not the Chinese contractors that have come to first place in the world in the level of capitalization. The idea, but not a standard material resource proved to be the decisive economic advantage in competitive struggle. Similarly, it will be the idea, but not a material resource that will become the determining political advantage of a state in the globalized world.

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Russia's transfer to the level of a new, "clever" policy will open broad vistas for its international influence and integration prospects in the new world system taking shape now.

Take, for example, two global markets – the arms market and the market of educational services. The export of arms has always been an instrument of traditional diplomacy, and the export of educational services is a relatively new phenomenon. These two markets are comparable in size, although the latter is developing faster than the former. Russia is well represented at the arms market, but its position at the market of education is quite modest. It's only natural, because the export of arms is a business of state importance for Russia, and numerous ministries and departments work for it, multi-billion subsidies are granted and entire federal programs are evolved for the purpose. Meanwhile, the export of educational services is not a priority.

Political and financial resources of the state are not earmarked for it, real interdepartmental coordination is practically absent, and individual universities implement their institutionalized programs of export of education services frequently competing with one another.

This situation should not be acceptable from the point of view of a “clever” policy. The export of educational services will be a very effective instrument and it has greater prospects than the world market of arms. This means that more attention and more material means should be given to the promotion of Russian educational services in the world, which should be turned into one of the priority tasks.

Similar strategic approach is necessary to other key spheres of world politics – from the use of the Internet to regulation of international migration. Russia should launch a foreign-policy offensive at a maximally broad front.

A “clever” foreign policy is only beginning to take shape. It is now not an integral project, but a scattered set of innovative ideas, but they will transform the international system sooner or later.

At present Russia has at least one tactical advantage as compared with other leading players. We are now at the beginning of a new political cycle and this is why we can have the benefits of medium-term planning – for at least six years ahead. Most countries do not have such advantage – their current political cycles are shorter and closer to completion. Why shouldn't Russia try to become a leader in the forthcoming intellectual breakthrough?

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**Y. Amelina,**

Political analyst

## **THE FEDERAL “WAHHABI LOBBY” AND THE “STOCKHOLM SYNDROME” OF INTELLECTUALS**

Islamism<sup>1</sup> is one of the most serious threats to the social order and state structure of the Russian Federation. It has been the main driving force of the unlawful armed units operating in the North Caucasus for the past five to seven years. These units motivated by the ideas of political Islam have also moved to the Volga area (Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), which can be explained by spreading the ideas of jihad to this region.

The reasoning of certain experts to the effect that the struggle against the Islamists has allegedly been lost does not hold water because, to say the truth, it has not yet begun in Russia. One of the reasons for this is the existence of the “Wahhabi lobby” in the North Caucasus and in the Volga area, whose activity is, perhaps, even more dangerous than extremism.

The “Wahhabi (Islamist) lobby” in Russia is acting in several directions, helping realize the interests of the Islamic circles, which have not switched over to armed struggle against the Russian state so far, and also the armed Islamist underground.

The “Wahhabi lobby” spreads the atmosphere of apathy and hopelessness and the defeatist ideas that it will not be possible to

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<sup>1</sup> Islamism, according to Alexander Ignatenko, D. Sc. (Philosophy), is an ideology and practical activity oriented to creating such conditions in which all social, economic, ethnic and other problems and contradictions of any society or state where Muslims live, and also those between states, will exclusively be resolved on the basis of the Islamic standards contained in the Shariah law on the basis of the Koran and Sunna. In other words, it is the realization of the project for creating political conditions for the implementation of the Islamic (Shariah) standards of social life in all spheres of human activity. This is why Islamism is also named political Islam, or politicized Islam.



oppose Islamist influence in North Caucasian society and go ahead with secular development. The “Wahhabi lobby” pursues similar aims at the federal level, adding to them paralyzing fear which the Russian man of the street should feel at hearing the words “Islamism” and “Caucasus.”

The activity of the “Wahhabi lobby” merits serious attention, inasmuch as it is directed against Russian state interests and Russian statehood. Regrettably, a number of Russian experts, journalists and public figures help this activity, although they cannot be regarded ideological supporters of Islamism. Besides, there is also a financial motive in their work.

The “Wahhabi lobby” began to take shape several years ago, and by now it is a well-organized and strictly governed uniform media and expert mechanism. Here are a few examples of the activity of the “Wahhabi lobby.”

The reaction of Russian society to explosions in the Moscow Metro on March 29, 2010, was the most indicative. Judging by writings and sayings of many journalists and political analysts, many people were not ready to dissociate themselves from the terrorists. Pro-Islamist experts tried to vindicate, at least partly, the perpetrators of the terrorist acts, and maximally shade over the religious component of the act, explaining terrorism exclusively by socio-economic reasons. Failure to understand the true sources of terrorism in the foreseeable future can worsen the position of Muslims in Russia and enhance the negative tendencies of mistrust and confrontation between the various sections of Russian society.

Ruslan Kurbanov, a senior research associate at the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote, among other things, that the explosions in the Moscow Underground was a well-thought-out provocation to fan the anti-Caucasian and anti-Islamic hysteria and phobia and give a new impetus to the destruction processes

in the Russian social, cultural and political media and separate the Caucasus from Russia.

His reaction to the terrorist act at the Moscow “Domodedovo” airport on January 24, 2011, was quite similar.

The essence of the views of Ruslan Kurbanov and his fellow-experts was eloquently expressed in one of his appearances at the Russia.ru TV channel recently. Speaking about the reasons for the much greater activity of militants in the North Caucasus last year and the mass departure of young men to mountain districts, he claims that “it is not socio-economic problems, corruption or mass unemployment. *“Young Muslims join the ranks of militants because they are unable to find in the modern world and present-day Russia an opportunity to realize themselves as true Muslims following the precepts of their religion.”* They are prevented to materialize their desires by “corrupt regional authorities, law-enforcement agencies, and obsolete clergy.”

Ruslan Kurbanov notes that the Caucasian Muslim community is in a state of tumultuous revival and “if the seething social energy of these young people has no outlet to a reasonable constructive channel, they will find a way out through blood and violence by joining the ranks of armed units.” It is logical to make a conclusion that, in Kurbanov’s view, an alternative to this will be the inclusion of Islamic fundamentalists in state and public bodies, that is, the actual “surrender” of the secular Russian state to the militant adepts of medieval religious values.

There are quite a few respectable persons thinking in the same vein. For example, Denga Khalidov, vice president of the Academy of geopolitical problems and cochairman of the Russian Congress of the Caucasian peoples, suggests that the Sharia legal procedures be restored and implemented on a par with official courts (“let two legal systems coexist, for this does not violate the principles of the Russian

Federation”). In his view, “the state and law-enforcement agencies should take a neutral position in the intra- and interconfessional conflicts and try to integrate the leaders of the Muslim public opposition in social and state projects.”

Denga Khalidov also expressed the view of Ruslan Kurbanov, namely, *to include fundamentalist Muslim ideas in Russian political and social practice and present Islamism as an equal, although rather exotic, political-religious current*. This project is extremely dangerous and should be resolutely opposed, inasmuch as it is realized not only in the media sphere, but also in the sphere of real politics.

Ruslan Kurbanov has signed an official statement of the working group of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation on the development of public dialogue and institutions of civil society in the Caucasus. This document noted that “the main aim of terrorism is not murdering innocent people, but fanning hatred and xenophobia in our society.” It is necessary to realize that “victory over terrorism will not be possible without deep-going socio-economic and civil transformations in the Caucasus and the entire country,” the statement says.

Without mentioning Islamic fundamentalism as a phenomenon, members of the Public Chamber working group reduce the problem to “social injustice, low living standards, a great gap between the rich and the poor, closure of schools, and degradation of the health-protection and educational systems in mountain and rural districts,” which, in the authors’ view, “lead to growing protest sentiments among young people, which are used by all and sundry radicals and extremists.”

Thus, the authors of the statement try to explain terrorism by socio-economic problems, completely brushing aside the religious factor. The head of the working group Maxim Shevchenko, commenting on the terrorist acts in the Moscow Metro, said that their

sponsors and organizers had no relation to the “Taliban,” Afghanistan, etc., and that “financing and fanning ethnic hatred and enmity in the Caucasus come primarily from the United States, Britain and Israel. This is why we should not lay responsibility for the acts of terror on Caucasian society or Muslims.” According to Maxim Shevchenko, “the criminals who perpetrated these acts, without suspecting it, were themselves hostages of the forces staying very far from Islam and the Caucasus.” He also says that “the general background of radicalism and the readiness of Caucasian young people to accept it are a consequence of the monstrous socio-economic degradation and a deep gap between the rich and the poor, which exist in the Caucasus.” Maxim Shevchenko believes that the Caucasus “is being marginalized and driven into a ghetto. Naturally, it opposes it and fights back.” In Shevchenko’s view, “terrorism in the North Caucasus is directly connected with the developments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in general, in the Middle East invaded by the armed forces of the West, which are trampling upon the dignity of the local population. It is precisely these forces that are to blame for terrorism. They have brought blood, ruin and horror to the regions inhabited by the Muslims, where the radicals were sufficiently marginalized.”

Maxim Shevchenko justifies the head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov who has time and again proclaimed priority of the Sharia law over secular laws and the need to introduce polygamy. He turns to the idea of establishing a dialogue with the Wahhabites and tries to instill it in public consciousness. He says: “I hope that a normal dialogue will be established with the Muslim communities whose members do not violate law and order, but simply want to live their own way.” As he explains his ideas, it becomes clear that he has in mind precisely Islamists, including those accused of grave crimes, namely, the acts of terror in Nalchik in October 2005. Maxim Shevchenko asserts that “a

great many people are opposed to the authorities (that is, the Islamist underground) due to inability to realize their social desires and aspirations. They have been driven to mountains and forests by corruption and arbitrariness and outrages on the part of the authorities... *People should be guaranteed their rights within the framework of their faith.* Naturally, they should stay within the framework of the law, just as all other citizens.” Besides, as Maxim Shevchenko insists, these people “should be included in social processes and public life.”

Quite a few examples could be cited of our public figures expressing similar views.

Now a few words about the so-called Stockholm syndrome. Arguing about the reasons for a series of terrorist acts in the North Caucasus near Mt. Elbrus where a tourist bus was fired at by militants (three people were killed) and a wire-rope way blasted on February 20, 2011, the observer of the *Moscow News* Ivan Sukhov wrote that there were two answers to the question “who benefits from a war on a mountain resort.” The first answer is as follows: “It is advantageous to state security officials and army generals who will retain and strengthen their influence in the North Caucasus if Kabardino-Balkaria becomes a constant seat of instability, but they will lose it if it becomes a mountain-ski resort, inasmuch as nobody from among the above-mentioned officials and generals has been invited to sponsor the organization of a resort. It is also to the advantage of those “who wish to discredit the present Caucasian strategy of the Kremlin, promising investments and jobs, instead of reprisals.”

These fantastic versions were actively supported by other well-known journalists specialized in the “Caucasian subject.” In the course of discussions of Sukhov’s article, views were expressed, according to which the acts of terror in Kabardino-Balkaria had been perpetrated by

“the Wahhabites who had not been allowed to take part in profitable business,” or poor local residents (in the view of liberals, the socio-economic component should necessarily be present in every version). A simple thought about the activity of the Islamist underground in the republic was disproved by the arguments like the one that “the murder of tourists is not part of the tactics of the underground.” It was also claimed that the very existence and activity of “clandestine militants” was only possible due to the sympathies of the local population who should not be persecuted as accomplices of crimes, but should only be persuaded, and that in helping Islamists people are guided by non-religious motives, inasmuch as “no religion vindicates murderers.”

This discussion shows how deep Russian society, even the part of it which is better informed about the real situation in the North Caucasus than rank-and-file citizens, is influenced by the so-called Stockholm syndrome. Some experts also demonstrate such views. For example, the head of the monitoring group studying the youth medium in Daghestan and expert of the Center of Islamic studies of the North Caucasus Ruslan Gereyev insistently calls for a dialogue with the Wahhabites. In his words, “the values of the secular state in the Caucasus have always been rejected. The point is how to combine the secular and the Shariah. It is necessary to evolve their symbiosis.” And further on: “If the population wants to live in accordance with the Shariah law, there can be only one approach, in my view – a combination of the Muslim code with the Constitution.” It looks likely that the expert has come to terms with the idea of turning Daghestan into a Shariah state and is unable to oppose this negative phenomenon.

The defeatist ideas have long since penetrated the minds of not only representatives of the mass media, but also those of the authorities. The Minister for nationalities politics of Daghestan Bekmurza Bekmurzayev also believes that “supporters of the opposition in the

religious sphere should be persuaded to modify their views, although,” he admits, “it is difficult, because they are full of hatred and cannot overcome it.” He informed the media that while on a mission abroad he had met representatives of terrorist organizations which now turned into national and religious movements. And they were less hostile than our people. Referring to the Shariah law, Bekmurzayev says that reconciliation between the warring parties should be the determining factor, but he does not mention the conditions on which it should take place.

The presence of the “Wahhabi lobby” is the indisputable fact. The measures suggested by the lobbyists, namely, negotiations with the Islamists, their integration in the bodies of power, the mass media and other public institutions, should resolutely be rejected. It is necessary to understand quite clearly that the ultimate aim of the Wahhabites and their supporters is the construction of an Islamic state on the territory of Russia based exclusively on Islamist ideology in its extremely radical form.

Inasmuch as Islamist ideology is religious, the measures of a socio-economic character offered by the state (more jobs, curtailment of unemployment among young people, etc.) will not bring the desired result. It is only another religious ideology that could oppose Islamist ideology. It could be a national idea uniting the entire society in opposing radical elements, however, at present there is no such idea. The formation and proclamation of an alternative, all-embracing ideology is a task of primary importance, but it is impossible under the concept of liberalism and “general human values” adopted in Russia. Apart from that, there have been no concrete proposals on the subject so far.

It is necessary to put up strong opposition to the “Wahhabi lobby” in the mass media and the entire field of information. At present

the information and analytical resources of the supporters of traditional Islam are much weaker than those of the Islamists. It should also be noted that the traditionalists, in contrast to the fundamentalists, are not engaged in propaganda in social networks popular with young people. It should be stated quite clearly and unequivocally that the secular character of the Russian state is not a matter for discussion, just as the subjects of introducing the Shariah law, polygamy and the rule of Islam in Russia or in any of its regions. These subjects are anti-constitutional. The Administrative Code and the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation should regulate all discussions of these matters. The atmosphere of intolerance should be created around the Islamists and the “Wahhabi lobby,” otherwise they will be victorious and their victory may be followed by dire consequences.

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## **INSTITUTIONALIZED DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN**

The experience of the development of the institutions of power in the Republic of Tatarstan is important for understanding the forms of consolidation of a higher political status and the correlation of the trends of centralization and decentralization of power in Russia.

Regional power has certain specific features. It is a subsystem of general state power which promotes the introduction of innovations. Regional power also expresses the interests of local society, smoothes down directives and signals coming from the Federal Center, and



supports its own autonomy. Regional power maintains the balance of political interests and takes into account the requirements of the local community for political decisions. Thus, the legitimate character of regional power for the local population and state power is ensured.

The impetus to the institutionalized variety of the systems of power in the republics of the former U.S.S.R. began in the summer of 1990. Former autonomous republics and autonomous regions of the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic raised their status to national-state parts of the Federation. A number of republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tyva, Yakutia, Chuvashia) claimed supremacy of their power and legislation in relation to the federal ones. A separatist regime has established itself in Chechnya, which threatened the integrity and security of the Russian state and assumed an ethnocratic character.

The choice of the level of claims presented by the republican elites, and methods and institutionalized forms of the realization of their interests depended on the volume of the resources of influence and on interethnic relations in each region. Tatarstan has become one of the initiators of non-violent “sovereignization” and a reference point for importing political institutions by other republics.

The higher status of the bodies of power and their structure uncontrolled by the Federal Center was sealed by Tatarstan’s legislation in 1990–1993. The trend of “confederalization” began to be seen during the preparation of the “Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic,” which was preceded by heated debates. After compromises agreed on at the end of August 1990 the Declaration was adopted by the republican Supreme Soviet, which determined the development vector of the institutions of power and created conditions for “confederalization.”

After the failure of the attempt at coup d’etat in August 1991, the political process in Tatarstan destabilized. A parliamentary crisis

emerged by the end of 1991. In 1992 the Milli Majlis was set up in the republic as an organ representing the interests of the Tatar people and having the right to form alternative bodies of power. It began to claim the functions of parliament; on June 19–21, 1992 a World congress of Tatars was held in Kazan initiated by Tatarstan's President M. Shaimiyev. The Congress was supposed to become not only the priority form of ethnic consolidation, but also an institution to adopt decisions of administrative power.

In the conditions of ethnopolitical mobilization Tatarstan's elite preferred the legal methods of the institutionalization of power. A referendum on the status of the Republic of Tatarstan was held on March 21, 1992. Having gained support of 61.4 percent of voters, the confederative draft became legal. The republic refused to sign the Federative treaty of March 31, 1992, in contrast to other regions of Russia. The Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan of November 6, 1992, fixed the key premise characterizing "confederalization": "The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law associated with the Russian Federation – Russia on the basis of the Treaty of mutual legislative delegation of powers and competence."

Meanwhile, the establishment of strong presidential power in the Russian Federation after the crisis of September 21 – October 4, 1993 and the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on December 12, 1993, have increased the resources of central power. The regional ruling elite did not have to support radical ethnic movements, and it took a course to a compromise with the Federal Center. The economic crisis that followed proved the unproductive character of the republic's isolation. This was why transfer began to federalism, though decentralized at first. The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan "On Delineation of Competence and Mutual Legislative Delegation of Powers between Bodies of State Power of the

Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan” was signed on February 15, 1994. The treaty had a compromise character and gave the Republic of Tatarstan a higher asymmetrical status. For example, the land, its subsoil and all property were recognized as public domain of the multinational people of Tatarstan.

Tatarstan was granted the right to enter into international relations, establish ties with foreign states and conclude treaties and agreements with them.

Beginning from the autumn of 1999 the political conditions of federative construction in Russia changed radically. The treaty on delineation of authority was replaced with the restoration of the uniform system of power and coordination of the regional legislation with the federal one. Due to political conditions asymmetry changed into a new centralized scheme, that is, the “Center – regions” system. The integration of republics in the uniform political area of the Russian Federation was a lawful expression of a model of symmetrical constitutional federalism. At the same time the political elite of Tatarstan continues to protect, although cautiously, a special status of the republic. For instance, in July 2007 the State Duma of the Russian Federation endorsed the “Treaty on Delineation of Subjects and Authority between Bodies of State Power of the Russian Federation and Bodies of State Power of the Republic of Tatarstan.”

The institutional organization of power in Tatarstan has certain specific features. According to its Constitution, the President of the Republic is not included in any branch of power, either legislative or executive. Under Article 89 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic of Tatarstan is “the head of state and the supreme official functionary of the Republic of Tatarstan.” He is not included in the system of executive bodies, but is the head of executive power. Article 94 of the Constitution says that the President “heads the system of the

executive bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan.” He determines domestic policy and spheres of foreign activity of Tatarstan. The federal law does not envisage the office of prime minister and establishes that the supreme official functionary of the part of the Russian Federation is the head of the higher executive body of power of the part of the Federation. But the offices of the President and the head of government in Tatarstan are separated.

The President of the Republic of Tatarstan has dominating positions in both legislative and executive branches of power. The President has a strong support of a majority of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan – the “United Russia” faction. The system of parliamentary control over the President and the executive power bodies is rather weak. The cabinet of ministers is responsible to the President. The government is answerable to the State Council on certain questions. There have been no attempts to sack the government on the initiative of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan.

Tatarstan’s President is elected by the population by direct elections (not always alternative), which is fully in line with his political role. But beginning from 2005 it was the President of the Russian Federation who submits the candidacy of the supreme official functionary for endorsement by the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan. The repeal of direct elections of the President of Tatarstan and participation of the President of the Russian Federation in appointing the head of the republic have lowered the level of the autonomy of power in Tatarstan, just as the resignation of M. Shaimiyev in 2009. The new President of Tatarstan, R. Minnikhanov, does not have a high personal prestige and he supports the initiatives of the Federal Center more actively.

And so, the main stages of the institutionalized development of political power in Tatarstan are sovereignization (“confederalization”)

in 1990 – 1994, decentralized federalism of 1995 – 2000, and unitary federalism. The organization of the institutions of power in Tatarstan has certain specific features. One of them is the dominance of presidential elements among the elements of a parliamentary system in the conditions of federal interference in the mutual relations of the branches of power in the republic. This form of the organization of power could be termed “over-presidential.” It is characterized by imbalance of the branches of power, weak counter-balance, very strong power of the President of the republic, and the growing interference of the federal institutions of power. The political institutionalization of the bodies of power in the Republic of Tatarstan confirms the important role of the domination of executive power in the system of the division of power.

*“Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta,”  
Volgograd, 2011, series 4, No 2, pp. 184–186.*

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## **THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN MODERN BASHKORTOSTAN**

In the mid-1990s a number of independent spiritual boards of Muslims appeared in the Russian Federation due to the stepping up of national, religious and political processes. Among them the spiritual boards of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Bashkortostan, which were not accountable to the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia. The Republic of Bashkortostan is a unique phenomenon, inasmuch as there are two spiritual boards working simultaneously on its territory: The Muslims living in the northern and north-western parts

of the republic are under the jurisdiction of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, whereas those living in the central and southern districts are subordinated to the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan. Of the 413 Muslim parishes registered in the 1990s, 149 communities were supervised by the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, and 264 – by the republican board. The Muslim population of the Republic of Bashkortostan is equally represented by the Tatar and Bashkir ethnoses. Bashkir national organizations initiated the setting up of the republican spiritual board, whereas the Tatar population preferred to be under the jurisdiction of the Central Board of Muslims of Russia.

Of the nine Muslim religious educational establishments now working in Bashkortostan three are subordinated to the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan. They include the Maryam Sultanova madrasah, the “Galiya” madrasah, and the madrasah in the city of Sterlitamak. In turn, five educational establishments (one of them of higher learning) are accountable to the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia. They include the Russian Islamic University in Ufa, the madrasah attached to “Lyalya-Tyulpan” mosque in Ufa, the female madrasah “Hakimiya” in Ufa, the “Fatikha” madrasah in the village of Tuimazy, the “Nur ul-Islam” madrasah in the town of Oktyabrsk, and the female madrasah in the village of Kandry.

Muslim educational establishments under the republican spiritual board have only two stages of education: primary courses at mosques, and madrasah giving secondary special education.

Then term of study at the Maryam Sultanova madrasah under the republican spiritual board lasts for five years, and its graduates receive the title of imam-khatyb. Its curriculum also includes non-religious subjects, such as informatics, the Bashkir language, history, philosophy and the Arab language. Among the religious disciplines the rules of

fulfilling religious duties and rites, Muslim upbringing of children, the study and interpretation of the Koran, the rules of its reading, the life story of Prophet Mohammed, and the recital of the Koran. Arabic is taught very thoroughly at this madrasah, inasmuch as there are highly-skilled teachers of the language from the al-Azkhar University with which the madrasah has special relations on the basis of an agreement. At present there are 18 students at the madrasah. Among the five teachers four have studied in Egypt and in Bokhara.

The madrasah is facing problems with the enrolment of full-time students. Young men from poor families enroll in the madrasah, which provides them with board and lodging free of charge.

The “Galiya” madrasah under the republican spiritual board of Muslims has evening and correspondence courses. It trains imams working in rural districts, who have no secondary religious education. At present there are 74 men studying at the madrasah at day’s and correspondence courses. Many students have come from Siberia, Barnaul, Ekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk.

The madrasah in the city of Sterlitamak is organized and works on the same basis, and there are from twenty to thirty students at its day’s branch.

Another situation is at the educational establishments under the jurisdiction of the Central Spiritual Board of Moslems of Russia. Their system of education has three stages – primary, secondary and higher. The term of education at the secondary-stage madrasah lasts two years. After graduation good students can enroll in the Russian Islamic University. Compared with the educational establishments under the republican spiritual board, the number of students at the madrasahs of the Central Russian spiritual board is much greater.

The madrasah attached to the “Lyalya-Tylpan” mosque provides secondary education by correspondence. Its student body numbers

about three hundred men. The Russian Islamic University has 150 full-time students, and 600 students at the evening and corresponding departments. The women's "Khakimiya" madrasah was opened in 2007 and thirty girls enrolled in it at the very beginning. The Russian Islamic University plans to open its affiliations in Orenburg, Ulyanovsk, Samara, Penza, Noyabrsk, Aleyev, and other places with large Muslim communities.

The madrasahs providing a secondary special education work on the basis of generally accepted curricula and standards. Special attention is paid to the study of Arabic, inasmuch as the next stage of education at the Russian Islamic University includes quite a few subjects requiring sources in the Arabic language ("Zubdat" by al-Buhari, "Tarikh" by at-Tabari, and others).

At the Russian Islamic University under the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia the theological standard consists of a whole complex of secular and religious disciplines. The former include political studies, history, sociology, psychology, Turkic languages -- Old Tatar and Bashkir, and the Russian language, informatics, philosophy, economics, law, ethnology, mathematics, natural science, history of culture, and, of course, sports. The latter include the rules of the recital of the Koran, Muslim law and its foundations, commentaries to the Koran, the rules of reading sermons, Islamic upbringing and education of children, etc. The full-time course of the University trains theologians and teachers, and the correspondence department prepares theologians and historians. In addition to the theological and pedagogical department it is planned to open a department of economics and management. Thus, the educational establishments under the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia develop more rapidly than the madrasahs attached to the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan.



It should be emphasized that all educational departments and centers have now come to understanding the need for uniting the Islamic bodies in order to eliminate rivalry and confrontation between the two supervising centers of Muslim affairs in Bashkortostan.

As to the material support rendered by the government of Russia to the Muslim educational system in Bashkortostan, it covers three educational institutions: the Maryam Sultanova madrasah and the “Galiya” madrasah, as well as the Russian Islamic University under the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, which receives government financial aid through the Bashkir State Pedagogical University.

Besides, within the framework of the Russian government project of training skilled specialists in various fields studying the history and culture of Islam, a special subject of legal studies was introduced at the Bashkir State Pedagogical University in 2008. Ten students enrolled in the University through the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan for thorough studies of the history and culture of Islam.

*“Izucheniye prepodavaniya Islama v Evrazii,” Moscow, 2010, pp. 110–115.*

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**PROSPECTS OF REFORMING  
THE NATIONAL-TERRITORIAL  
STRUCTURE OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS**

The main problem facing the peoples of the North Caucasus, just as those in the entire post-Soviet area, is the loss of spiritual, ideological and political orientation. The awakening of national self-

consciousness is, above all, a result of profound changes in the world outlook and state of mind of the peoples who need new and more perfect forms of social and economic self-organization, and also a specific reaction to the infringement of their national interests. In this connection we deem it necessary to dwell on a very important matter. All and sundry ethno-national and national-cultural, as well as religious-fundamentalist movements are often depicted as retrograde phenomena engendered by taking the laws of socio-historical development for survivals of old backward epochs, etc., etc. In reality, they are a reaction to modern realities and are their products. As B.J. Stinger justly noted, ethnic identity is not illusory self-consciousness; it is an important connecting force of community, a powerful basic element of identification and personal self-identification of any human being.

This explains the revival of the peoples' striving all over the world for independence or autonomy in any form within the framework of the states they live in. This tendency is characteristic of Europe, too. For example, Belgium has to face time and time again the Flemish and Walloon separatism. The same is true of France, which comes across the national movements of the Bretons and Basques, Britain facing the national movements of Scotsmen and Welshmen, Spain with its Basques and Catalans, etc. The unity of Canada is periodically challenged by French-speaking Quebec claiming independence. This is despite the obvious facts connected with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and especially the U.S.S.R. In the modern world the idea of the implementation of the right to create an exclusively mononational state increasingly acquires the character of anachronism. The number of nationally homogeneous states is now few and far between. Most countries are now multinational. Besides, there

are peoples numbering tens of millions who have no statehood of their own.

Therefore it is not accidental that although quite a few international legal documents include special articles envisaging the right to free development of ethnic communities and peoples, they do not encourage separatism and dismemberment of states by the national principle. These documents emphasize the impermissible character of using references to the principle of self-determination for undermining the unity of a state or national unity.

Coercive forms and means of territorial-state refashioning of a multinational state, as a rule, hardly lead to a satisfactory solution of the nationality problem. Solution of problems by non-legal means and methods gives birth to new and more serious problems. Besides, in the modern world with about eight thousand languages, the limit of the planet's division into the growing number of independent national states cannot be endless.

Experience of the past three to four decades has shown that in most cases attempts of any ethnos to create its own mononational state by force have always brought about tragic consequences for that nation. This experience shows that to arrange a harmonious and rational life of peoples it is necessary to use various political, legal, diplomatic and socio-economic means and methods worked out and tested by the world practice, which would give an opportunity to resolve the most controversial problems.

As we have mentioned, Russia is a pluralistic complex society consisting of many ethno-national, linguistic, cultural, confessional and other communities or groups. Each one of these communities or groups has not only interests coinciding with the interests of others, but also interests of its own, contradicting, even conflicting with them. In other words, common interest and common will in Russia as a unified state is

formed from many sources, the main ones being ethno-national communities. The violation of the rights and interests of any one of them, let alone several, can undermine the basis of the common interest and common will, which can become a time bomb placed under the edifice of united Russia. Any ethno-national community subjected to national discrimination will fight for its rights, and a result of this fight will be interethnic discord which will enhance disintegration tendencies.

It is quite natural that the Russian Federation, while regulating the legal status of national minorities and indigenous small peoples, has assumed obligations strictly to follow the principles and standards formulated in international legal documents, which guarantee observance of human rights – personal security, inviolability of property, freedom of speech, etc., which are closely connected with the status of a nation and its life pattern and development way.

If the rights of nations and peoples are connected with concrete territorial boundaries, what is to be done with representatives of the title nation of one or another republic living beyond the boundaries of that republic? It should be borne in mind that millions of representatives of ethno-national groups live in Russia, but beyond the boundaries of their national republics. For instance, more than two-thirds of Tatars (even more) live beyond the boundaries of Tatarstan. Two-thirds of Mordovians also live outside their republic. In the Republic of Bashkortostan the Bashkirs hold third place after Russians and Tatars. Big groups of people from the Caucasus have been scattered on the territory of the former U.S.S.R., a greater part of them having settled in the South of Russia.

Under the circumstances it is evident that any attempts to build a state around just one nationality and form statehood on a monoethnic basis have no reasonable foundations. They are not legitimate in our

day when broad processes of people moving from one place to another and a medley of races are taking place.

The specific features of the formation and evolution of Russian statehood requires special understanding of the sovereignty and self-determination of those peoples and republics which have for many generations, even centuries, lived together within the framework of this statehood. The point is that the state has always played the decisive role in Russia in turning the diverse conglomerate of regions and peoples, cultures and religions into a uniform political, administrative, socio-cultural and economic area. This required purposeful administrative regulation, including a wide range of measures, such as reorganization of economic pattern, drawing of all people in the uniform cultural and information area, and a uniform state and socio-cultural organism. This is why it is not always correct to compare the position of national minorities in some European countries, for example Holland, Germany, France and others, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other.

In many European countries it is the problem of migrants, in the main. Whereas in Russia more than 95 percent of its Muslim population are autochthonous, or indigenous. The same can be said about the Finno-Ugrian people, let alone the Paleo-Asiatic peoples. This factor radically changes the essence of the problem and the character of the demands of minorities. For instance, in Germany the Turkish communities settled there cannot raise such question. The situation is completely different in Russia.

By the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union the social, economic and political structures, and the very way of life and the system of values, and orientations of most inhabitants of Russia, for that matter, had undergone profound changes. Various multiform ties integrally penetrating the economic, socio-cultural, educational, political and other spheres have entrenched themselves in the country's

life. As a result, the situation of all national-territorial state units has changed, just as the very way of life of the people and their mentality. It is natural therefore that the traditional categories and concepts of national sovereignty, etc. should now be regarded in a different context.

Any political entity can be preserved for quite some time either with the help of coercion or by way of unity of interests and will of all its segments to live in peace and accord. This task was successfully achieved during the period of totalitarian power, when social, economic and other problems were resolved by strict orders. This is no longer possible in the present conditions. The North Caucasus is a pluralistic community consisting of many ethno-national groups, cultures confessions, languages, etc. Each one of these communities has not only interests coinciding with those of other segments, but also its own specific interests contradicting to or conflicting with them.

This is why the nationalities question for most republics of the North Caucasus is of key importance and not a single serious economic, political or social problem can be tackled properly without its solution.

Our special literature has time and again written about the lack of prospects in changing the political map of Russia on the basis of the ethno-national principle and attempting to create purely ethnic state units on the basis of politicized ethnicity or ethno-nationalism. A question arises as to what independent sovereign national state can emerge in Daghestan – Lezghin, Avar, Kumyk, Darghin, etc. Similarly in Kabardino-Balkaria – Kabardian, Balkar, Russian?... Or in Karachay-Circassia – Karachay, Circassian, Russian, or another?... And so on, so forth. Evidently, nationalism of each type will inevitably provide an impetus to nationalism among other peoples *ad infinitum*. There is another important aspect which should not be disregarded. The point is that in forming the state-administrative structure of the U.S.S.R. state borders were often established disregarding ethnoses in

many instances. This is why it is quite clear that any attempt now to establish state borders on the purely national principle can have unpredictable tragic consequences because in the present conditions border lines will have to be drawn disregarding the history, traditions and vital interests of many peoples.

In this connection the preservation of national autonomous units within the boundaries of the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories, namely, Karachay-Cerkessia and Adygea, cannot be assessed positively, because these small republics are now a source of additional problems in the North Caucasus. Numerous projects have come into being, proposing to reform, in one way or another, the federative structure of the republics of the North Caucasus. Moreover, these ideas have become part of the political context of the South of Russia.

In this connection mention should be made of absurd projects of reunification of kindred peoples living in different national republics by their unification within new mono-ethnic republics. For example, some people suggest to unite the artificially divided peoples and territories “for their ethnical rebirth and more successful development of Russian federalism.” For this purpose it will be necessary, first, to form the “Adygea Republic” with several autonomous districts. Secondly, the Karachay-Balkarian Republic with several autonomous districts. It would be possible to form other national-state units, just like the ethnic reunification of the Vainakh people (Chechens and Ingush), Ossetians, Lezghins, Nogais, and others.

However, these projects are objectively unfounded, inasmuch as there are no serious territorial, economic and other ties between the parts of the country suggested for unification. Besides, the implementation of such projects would lead to increasing the drawbacks of the national-state construction of the Soviet period. One cannot but agree with Academician V. Tishkov who says that “the

attempts to restore historical justice lead to new injustice with regard to the present population. Such problems should be resolved along the road of mutual cooperation, free travel and settlement, the development of economic and humanitarian ties, and respect of the individual and collective rights of citizens.”

Quite often a whole number of small nationalities, such as Tsakhurs, Aguls, Andiis, and others are faced with the more pressing problems than their representation at regional and federal bodies of state power, namely, those of material well-being, which should be tackled together with their neighbors.

It should be admitted that the formation of national autonomous units as independent parts of the state-territorial structure of the U.S.S.R. indeed played a definite positive role for their economic, social and cultural development. However, by the end of the Soviet period it became evident that the administrative-territorial division of the country and individual regions lagged behind the main trends of the socio-economic and political development of the country as a whole and the rest of the world. In the present conditions the principle of administrative-territorial division, which came into being many decades ago, has become outdated and worked only due to historical tradition, or to be more exact, inertia. Moreover, it became one of the factors preventing the complete overcoming of conflicts in the region and the establishment of unity, stability and security of the state. This is why it is necessary to search for new forms and ways of transferring from national-territorial to territorial-administrative federation.

As world experience shows, poly-ethnicity does not always envisage the national-territorial principle of state structure. The United States and some other countries are a case in point, for they have been built, either exclusively or predominantly, on the administrative-territorial principle. As shown by the U.S.S.R., the national-territorial



federation is connected with the emergence of the phenomenon of the title ethnos or title people, which is nonsensical in relation to the North Caucasus with its virtually Babylonian medley of races. This phenomenon prevents the actual legitimation of regional political elites on the ethnical basis. And this leads, at least in an actual form, to the hierarchical status of the peoples of the region, their division into “equal” and “more equal.”

At present the North Caucasian republics present an example of communities in which different segments in the form of ethno-national communities partly coincide and intersect, in other words, we have a combination of territorial and extra-territorial segments. From this point of view, one of the specific features of the North Caucasus is that it is a mixture of peoples, districts, teams and families. This has led to the emergence of a whole range of new problems, and it is practically impossible to examine and solve the problem of one nationality outside its connection with other peoples, all the more so at the expense of other peoples.

Besides, this principle does not resolve the nationalities problem, but only pushes it to the background, and in many cases even complicates the problem of ensuring unity and territorial integrity of the federative state. Moreover, contradictions connected with it breed conflicts. This was confirmed by the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. One of the latest examples is provided by Belgium which has turned from a unitary state into federation during the past decades, and an acute political struggle has been going on there for the past years between the Flemish and Walloon people, with the former coming out for turning the country into confederation or even for complete secession and creation of an independent state, and the latter advocating the preservation of the federation.

Evidently, federation based on the administrative-territorial principle suggests a simpler and more optimal system of territorial structure based on due account of resource, economic, production, geographical, demographic and other factors. There is no doubt that federalism tinted with ethnic shades inherited by the Russian Federation considerably weakens the country's unity. As shown by historical experience, nationalism can come out as a factor mobilizing peoples for the fight for their independence and a source of creative passion. But in many cases it is a sort of an original cover for other interests and motives, for instance, the striving for taking part in dividing material resources, winning power and prestige, overcoming psychological and ideological barriers, etc.

It should be noted that the right of each people to self-determination contradicts the principle of the territorial integrity of a state. This aspect is of major importance for a multinational country, inasmuch as the effectiveness of measures to block possible separatist tendencies aimed against integration largely depends on it. As to Russia, it is a constitutional federation, which excludes the possibility of any part of it to withdraw from the federation.

Without denying the right to self-determination as the expression of the sovereignty of a nation, international law, nevertheless, limits its realization by the requirement to preserve the territorial integrity of a state.

In this connection the decree of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No 10-P of July 31, 1995, is of special importance, inasmuch as it emphasizes that the aim of preserving the integrity of the Russian state is in accord with the generally recognized international principles of the people's right to self-determination. This is why the constitutional principle of "self-determination of peoples" in the

Russian conditions means that it can only be realized within the bounds of the Russian state.

One of the most negative consequences of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. was the outburst of centrifugal tendencies and processes aimed against integration over the entire post-Soviet area, which led to disunity and separatism of the peoples living on its territory. The Caucasus became the arena of bitter interethnic and inter-confessional armed conflicts.

The example of several former Soviet Union republics is quite indicative in this respect. Having become independent, they are now ruled by ethnocratic regimes based on disregard of the interests of non-title nations. The idea of sovereignty, “having gripped the minds of the popular masses,” has virtually become a means of ascending to the peak of supreme power for certain political figures. However, the genuine national ideas have not been realized and were sacrificed to political interests.

All this goes to show that it is necessary to discard foggy and simplified interpretations of the idea of national sovereignty and self-determination of peoples and bring them in line with modern realities.

There is no doubt that contradictions between the ethno-national and territorial models of a state will persist for a long time to come in the Russian Federation as a whole and in its national republics particularly, they will be felt in their policy in the economic and social spheres and also in the sphere of interethnic relations.

It is evident that the North Caucasian peoples will have to pass through a long transition period, when the national and territorial models will have to adjust to each other and evolve new forms of the inner organization of the Russian state. This means that asymmetrical character of the Russian Federation will be preserved during this period, and the territories and regions will begin to become equal in

their status to national republics gradually. The slow transition to the territorial-administrative principle is possible by leveling the economic, social and political rights of all part of the Russian Federation, which should be combined with ensuring the almost equal living standards throughout the entire territory of the country.

It can be asserted that the main conflicts in the North Caucasus have emerged and are developing mainly due to interethnic contradictions. In addition, other conflict-generating factors emerge: the economic interests of the conflicting parties and third countries, struggle around the problem of sovereinization of the self-proclaimed state formations and their relations with the outer world, etc. The successful regulation of problems in the sphere of ethno-national relations influences the investment climate, the proper use of natural and other resources of the North Caucasus, and also the migration processes and the socio-psychological atmosphere in the region. It goes without saying that the disruption and collapse of the economic and political infrastructure and social ties are concomitants of prolonged ethnic and confessional conflicts.

In order to resolve the problem of the optimal state and political organization of the North Caucasus it is necessary to work out and implement such nationalities policy which would be based on the dual strategy of ensuring and observing the rights of all peoples and providing all-round assistance to factors and trends ensuring their solidarity and unity within the bounds of the Russian Federation. This policy will only become effective if it is based on recognition of the existence of many peoples historically developed and now living in the North Caucasus with their national languages, cultures, traditions and specific interests. It is also necessary to recognize the importance of preserving the unity of the country as a complex multinational community with a view to reforming and democratizing the economy,

the social and political spheres and interethnic relations. The conservation and enlargement of the old structures and the system of dividing power and its benefits between different clans, which regarded state power as their inalienable property, will be a path fraught with negative consequences for the prospects and viability of the country.

*“Prioritety natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii na Severnom Kavkaze,” Moscow, 2011, pp. 167–183.*

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**CENTRAL-ASIAN REPUBLICS: DESTABILIZING FACTORS IN RELATIONS AMONG THEM AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION IN THE REGION**

The situation in Central Asia remains rather complicated in terms of ensuring regional stability and security. As the president of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev admitted, Central Asia is one of the regions with potential conflicts. In the perspective, conflicts may arise both in the region and in adjacent territories relating to water and rich national resources. The territorial and other related inter-state contradictions emerged after disintegration of the USSR. Although the leadership of new sovereign states in the sphere of territorial demarcation took decisions according to the boundaries determined in time of the Soviet Union, the old inter-communal tensions relating to the belonging of some or other territories reminded of themselves.

**The relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan** as the biggest regional states did not avoid the territorial contradictions, which demanded the delimitation of boundaries between them. At present, the issue as a whole has been settled, which decreased tension in their mutual relations. However, the actual absence of border protection of

these territories, where administrative control exists only in some places, creates conditions for the illegal migration of the population. By the way, this situation to some extent suits Uzbekistan. It not only alleviates its acute demographic and social problems at the expense of southern regions of Kazakhstan but also promotes the outflow to these regions of the people dissatisfied with internal policy of Tashkent. Naturally, all this causes dissatisfaction of Astana.

The ethnic-demographic factor is also significant in this situation. A rather great number of ethnic Uzbeks live in the border regions of Kazakhstan. The same situation exists in Uzbekistan. Astana is particularly concerned about existence in the south of Kazakhstan of 370 thousand members of the Uzbek Diaspora probably becoming a basis for dissatisfaction roused by Islamists. Although at present it is not an active “actor” on the political scene of Kazakhstan, it has a great potential for its impact on the social, economic and political situation in the south of the state. One may mention in this context the events in Kyrgyzstan in 2005.

The Kazakh Diaspora in Uzbekistan is the biggest one in the space of CIS. It accounts for 1 million people, according to official data, and makes 1.5 million people according to the data of demographers of Kazakhstan and to the estimates of representatives of the Diaspora. The representatives of the Diaspora live in compact settlements in border districts near the territory of Kazakhstan. For the period of consolidation of state sovereignty of Uzbekistan the representatives of the Diaspora, like other national minorities in Uzbekistan, were subject to certain pressure, while Kazakh schools and special chairs in higher education institutions were closed, while broadcast from Kazakhstan was stopped. Almost all members of the Diaspora, who occupied high official posts, had to resign. Naturally, it

caused an outflow of Kazakhs to their historic Motherland, making the unofficial number of 180 thousand people.

At present, the return of Kazakhs home from Uzbekistan is important for Kazakhstan in two respects. The problem is as follows: their main part (90%) selects for the settlement the complicated in social-economic terms regions in the south and the south-east of the country marked by surplus labor force. The situation is aggravated by the flow of illegal Uzbek labor migrants. According to the Uzbek official data, 700 thousand labor migrants are present in CIS countries, while their unofficial number makes 3 million people (including season workers). They strive for arranging settlement in southern regions of Kazakhstan.

The above mentioned factors create tension in labor markets of both states. Uzbeks demonstrate better adaptation to their activities in the most profitable economic spheres. As a result, the Kazakh population in southern regions of Kazakhstan becomes “the economic minority”. Thus, the mentioned and the other realities of inter-ethnic relations between Kazakhs and Uzbeks are able to transform the tension in the economic sphere into a potential of political instability.

The relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are marked by a number of problems also in the sphere of water-energy, gas and transport complexes of the region. There remain the contradictions related to the excess of the agreed limits of water intake from the river Syr Darya during the vegetation period, which is related to river stream pollution. The shortage of water in the southern regions of both countries will remain an urgent problem for the long time accompanied by regular season aggravations.

The other problem is the dependence of Kazakhstan on deliveries of Uzbek gas, while Astana strives for reducing them by means of development of gas deposit Amangeldy. Although the gas produced by

Amangeldy deposit is unable to be sufficient even for the south of Kazakhstan, the development of this deposit consolidates the position of Kazakhstan in the course of the talks with Uzbekistan, if the latter tries to raise the gas price. However, up to present, Astana has not succeeded to remove completely the pressure on the part of Tashkent.

On the contrary, Kazakhstan uses its favorable position in the transport situation, and it has caused problems. The inadequate railway policy (mainly, tariffs conditions) pursued by the Kazakh party promoted activities of Uzbek transportation companies, which looked for alternative directions of the freights.

The existence of these unsolved problems and the lack of evident wish of both parties to overcome them hinder development of integration processes in these spheres of economy of both states. Besides, one of significant factors able in the perspective to have a negative influence on the bilateral relations of these states may become the rise of a shadow sector in their economic ties: trade, finance and currency. In this case the economic component of bilateral reciprocal action also contains a real basis for aggravation of conflict potential.

**The relations between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan** are characterized by lesser tension than relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, there are some unsolved (mainly economic) problems, and they are cited below. The Kyrgyz party in its time made a proposal to solve urgently the problem of freight transit via the territory of Kazakhstan, as well as simplification of customs procedure, the access to the market of Kazakhstan of electric energy from Kyrgyzstan and the liquidation of season limitations of export of oil fuel and diesel fuel from Kazakhstan. The conditions of tariffs for beneficial transit and of customs duties were directly connected with the decisions by the Kyrgyz party of the issues relating to creation of a joint venture for rational utilization of the resources of Naryn-Syr



Darya cascade of water basins and for transferal to Kazakhstan as its property of some boarding houses on the shore of Issyk-Kul. However, the Kyrgyz party did not fulfill in good time these agreements, which prevented ratification by the parties of the agreement on friendship between two states. The actions taken by Bishkek provoked Astana to reduce deliveries of energy resources and of wheat motivating this decision by shortage of food for internal needs of the country. At the same time, the leadership of Kazakhstan repeatedly declared that the Kyrgyz party executed the non-agreed intake of natural gas allotted for the south of Kazakhstan and that the existed debt caused by its deliveries was reduced. The Kyrgyz party, in its turn, with some justification considered that the state, unlike its neighbors, deprived of deposits of oil and gas has the right to use in inter-state relations its trump card – the water resources. Further, the way of utilizing it needs explanation. But one should say that the agreement of 1998 on free deliveries of fuel in exchange of water and electric energy constantly fails out of step. The parties feel that they have the right to violate the obligations each time, if they consider that their interests have been infringed.

Thus, although the contradictions between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are concentrated in the economic sphere, the parties fail to find out the efficient exit from the created situation.

**The relations of Uzbekistan with Tajikistan** are also characterized by essential problems. The territorial contradictions are the most complicated long-term problems. The settlement of ethnic Tajik and Uzbek groups actually by 50% does not correspond to the boundaries of their states. In this respect, the most complicated is the situation of Leninabad region in North Tajikistan, which as a part of Fergana valley is cut off from the rest territory of the country by two mountain ridges. It is necessary to take into account that the Tajik

people consider Uzbek cities Bukhara and Samarkand as the nidi of their culture. All this creates the reason for numerous both inter-ethnic and inter-state contradictions. The problem of struggle against terrorism is also another significant problem in relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In particular, Tashkent constantly upbraids Dushanbe for the lack of activities aimed at liquidation of bases of fighters of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan on the territory of Tajikistan.

At the same time, the inter-state relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are marked by economic difficulties. The reliable governance and utilization of hydro-resources is very significant for Dushanbe. The main interests of Tajikistan are connected with compensation of the losses, which emerge due to the working regime favorable for adjacent republics; and the leadership of the country therefore regards that this problem should be solved on a par with due account of the meanings of all interested parties. However, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as the biggest consumers of water resources in Central Asia drag out solution of this problem. One should take into account that since the time of installation of border guard posts and customs points on the Tajik-Uzbek boundary the Uzbek party gives the priority right for passage through its points to ethnic Uzbeks. Given a big amount of transportation flows of goods by private channels, it hinders other citizens of Tajikistan to travel normally to the neighboring territory. As a result, Tajik merchants are ousted from the border trade, while the position of Uzbek ethnic groups in Tajikistan consolidates in terms of economic advantage. This circumstance becomes a mighty means of Uzbekistan's influence on the internal political and economic situation in Tajikistan.

**The Kyrgyz-Tajik relations** are characterized by existence of some problems. Neither republic of Central Asia, except Kyrgyzstan, has such queer boundaries and various foreign enclaves on its territory.

In addition to the mentioned Uzbek enclaves, there are two Tajik rural settlements of 60 thousand people on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Dushanbe several times proposed to make an exchange of territories, but Bishkek avoids settlement of this issue. As a result, the enclaves become more isolated from Tajikistan. Isolation engenders the sense of alienation, which, according to political analysts, prepares the ground for dissemination of Islamic radical ideas, since the lack of legislative act on these matters, recognized by the parties, is the basis for emergence of conflicts threatening stability in the bordering regions and shakes faith in the authorities' ability for local governance.

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Summing up the above said, it is possible to make the remark that the main contradictions among the states of Central Asia are caused by the following:

- the territorial discords;
- the unfinished processes of boundaries delimitation;
- the problems relating to delivery of energy and raw resources as well as water management;
- the existence of enclaves and compact settlements of non-indigenous nationalities;
- the failure of regulation of trans-border trade and utilization of adjacent territories in combination of unrealized migration of the population, including transit freight transportation;
- the inadequate coordination of efforts exerted in the struggle against extremism and trans-border criminality.

Under conditions existed in time of the USSR, such contradictions were alleviated by Moscow. At present, it is not always possible by the format of bilateral relations, while international organizations, including CIS, EvrAzES and ShOS were not interested

enough to settle these contradictions, particularly in the circumstances of intensification of activities of local extremists and international terrorist organizations. The coming change of generations of the political leadership in most states of Central Asia also contributes to the lack of determination of the perspectives of the situation's development in the region. The course of this development may make corrections both in bilateral and in multilateral formats of relations among them. Therefore the security's ensuring in Central Asia remains one of the most complicated and important problems of the region's states and of other countries connected with them by common interests.

*“Mirovye derzhavy v Tcentralnoy Azii”*,  
M., 2011, pp. 91–100.

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**The REASONS OF DOWNFALL “SHORT CYCLES”  
AND OF RENEWAL OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES  
IN KYRGYZSTAN**

The Kyrgyz usually like to talk about their democratic traditions and of “nomadic democracy”. F. Kulov said: “Even in ancient time the people elected their khan, and if the people did not like him, he was replaced. In this sense the Kyrgyz had the genetic and historic memory”. A. Akayev mentioned: “In essence the way of life of the Kyrgyz supposed the democratic organization... Our democracy came down from Tien Shan Mountains”. K. Bakiyev uttered: “The Kyrgyz always governed the state by means of people's democracy. A thousand years ago our people lived under conditions of people's democracy.

The Kyrgyz did not ever allow dictatorship and usurpation of power...” It is possible to cite dozens of such meanings.

Actually, unlike Uzbeks and Russians, Kyrgyz never had despotic statehood. Strictly speaking, they lacked the shaped statehood, and their tribes were governed by the tribal aristocracy (“manaps” in the north and “Beks” in the south) and by the pre-state tribal institutions (people’s assemblies, kurultais), which were divided to clans and families. These tribes had some common Kyrgyz identity and were connected with each other by the idea of origin from common ancestors and by complicated (semi-real and half-mythical) genealogical relations, but they lacked power institutions, constantly seized cattle and pastures from each other and sometimes waged mutual bloody wars for a long time. For the XIX century khan Ormon, (a monument to him was erected in Bishkek) was elected by the common kurultai of the tribes but failed to establish his dynasty. Unlike the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz lacked any structure above the tribes and the aristocracy of sultans – Chingizids.

The historic memory prevents the attempts of creation in Kyrgyzstan of authoritarian systems. The authoritarian power confronts difficulties in finding its basis in history of the country, since the Kyrgyz do not accept it as a natural and traditional form of power. On the contrary, the contemporary national-democratic ideology bases itself on the memory of “nomadic democracy” and presents it as a proto-image of modern democracy (as it is seen in the above citations). The Kyrgyz anti-authoritarian movements naturally appeal to the ideologically reconstructed and embellished past time, they regard authoritarian rule as an antinational order and accused Bakiyev of the attempts to restore the rule of Kokand khanate, which oppressed the Kyrgyz.

The tribal system is not only the past, which has an impact on historic memory and the determined directions of acceptance. To a large extent it is the present time.

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The passage from the contemporary model of demographic reproduction took place in Kyrgyzstan only for the 1980s and later rather fast (despite superfluous post-Soviet archaic development) after the declaration of sovereignty. For the period of 1969–1970, the index of birthrate of Kyrgyz women attained the level of 7.7 for one woman (5.9 – in cities and 8.1 – in rural districts), while most babies survived under the conditions created by the Soviet power. Therefore the type of Bakiyev family (seven brothers and two sisters) is quite normal for the present Kyrgyz generation. (For instance, Otunbayeva has eight brothers and sisters, prominent politician A. Mamadurov – seven, M. Akayeva – three sisters and two brothers). Leaving aside cultural and “valuable” factors, such families by their size engender “the central attention” of individuals to family affairs, since even minimum participation in life of sisters and brothers demands much time and efforts, particularly in difficult moments.

The question is not only the size of families but also the cultural and “ideological” value and consolidation of family ties. The Kyrgyz joke says: “If you marry a Kyrgyz woman you marry all her relatives”. Since each Kyrgyz theoretically should know his ancestors up to the seventh generation, while many actually know them, the family ties become more extensive kin and tribal relations. Any Kyrgyz biography or autobiography with obligation contains the genealogical and tribal belonging.

The Soviet modernization and Soviet policy directed to eradication in Kyrgyzstan of kinship and tribe’s relations and of loyalty

(to a large extent, continuation of the tsarist power's policy) failed to liquidate them. These ties play a significant role up to present, while for the post-Soviet epoch, under conditions of permanent crisis when people are in need of support, given the general trend to rebirth of old national traditions, these ties even strengthen. The tribal kurultai was restored. As another example of this archaic displays is restoration in Akayev time of court of aksakals as well as the semi-official practice of polygamy among representatives of the elite, and in Bakiyev time a proposal was expressed to legalize this practice. It is characteristic that Bakiyev parted to exile not with his official Russian wife but with his second (or even the third) hidden Kyrgyz wife with her children. Otunbayeva mentioned that polygamy became fashionable after new elite's coming to power. The mono-national homogenous Kyrgyz society returned to its past: recognized polygamy, the abduction of the bride by custom, obligation to pay wedding ransom, getting married to sisters of dead wives etc. The big, successful and relatively united family (like Bakiyev family) may appeal to kins, tribal and regional loyalty by use of wives' relatives and of friends and clients connections and may mobilize a colossal support.

The connections and loyalties limit the authoritative power, since each Kyrgyz always may rely on support of "his people", and the authorities confront not atomized individuals, like in Russia, but rather big and rallied communities. It is possible to ignore individuals, but it is impossible not to reckon with clans. "The clans represent a real political power, which could not suit our former ...leaders, who were accustomed to exercise complete sway over the people", once uttered the head of an influential southern family Bekmamat Osmonov.

The clannish and tribal aspect is present in the Kyrgyz political life. The system of majority districts strengthened the clannish type of elections: it was senseless for any candidate to participate in elections

in the alien district of another tribe, particularly in rural districts. “According to this principle each candidate to a deputy seeks to be elected only in the place of his origin and of the origin of his tribe. Each summer and probably each spring every candidate explores his genealogy”, Otunbayeva spoke about the parliamentary elections in 2005.

The clannish struggle whimsically is interwoven with ideological-party struggle: if the party ideologies may be amorphous, the distinctions among them and the devotion to them is doubtful, the support of prominent figures as the party leaders given by “their people” is definite and natural. The people, who supported Kulov and Beknazarov in Akayev time or Isakov or Beknazarov in time of Bakiyev, came forward not for their political ideas but instinctively rendered assistance to the offended “their people”. The members of the Kemin tribe kept their devotion to the Akayev family and their deputy Aidar Akayev after the revolution of 2005, and they greeted Bermet as a princess, who visited them. And Bakiyev was supported both in 2005 and in 2010 by his relatives and other people in Jelalabad.

Naturally, the “tribal” aspect was presented in Kyrgyz revolutions. Bakiyev with typical for him simple-mindedness showed in his book in public the role of his clan in victory of revolution in the south in 2005: “B. Asanov, A. Beknazarov, J. Jenbekov, Jusup, Janush, Kanybek, Adyl, Marat Bakiev and many other revolutionaries made a great contribution to the victory”. The strong tribal and regional connections weaken the power not only by the fact that they force to reckon with them, but also by the impact of this pressure, which imparts to it itself a specific clannish characteristic.

The presidents strive somehow for keeping clannish balance in making designations (the Soviet local and also Moscow power reckoned with it) but finally always violated it. Transformation of



power into its clannish model goes on naturally in itself even without particular patronage of “the own people” on the part of the president, since the accelerated carriers of his relatives do not demand his interference (the presidential circle itself understands that the president appreciates the situation when his nearest and dearest people are appreciated and promoted), and therefore, irrespective of any sphere or post occupied by one of his brothers or nephews, leaving aside his children, he becomes the non-formal “curator” of this sphere.

The presidents can not cease to protect their “own people”, since they like their nearest and are “normal Kyrgyz” and are subject to colossal psychological pressure on the part of their “own people”. Besides, they see that in time of difficulties they may lean only on their “own people” and designate them to the “key” posts, where personal devotion is of particular need. Bakiyev talked a lot till the end of his rule about the struggle against clannish power, and he hardly strived for making his rule a clannish power, but he could not be indifferent to his brothers and children, he appreciated their qualities and he therefore charged them with governance of financial and security service authorities.

The power becomes limited due to the need to keep balance, but violation of balance and support given to “the own people” also weaken the power for the following reasons: first, the ruler has relations not with traditional patriarchal families marked by unconditional subjugation to the elder but with families characterized by contemporary relations among relatives, when it is difficult to construct “a vertical power”, second, the support of the relatives and people of the same clan hinders perception of the power as “national entity” and causes protests of other clans; it was not accidental that both Kyrgyz revolutions took place after a great number of the presidential relatives came to power. In time of rule of Akayev and Bakiyev their

closest relatives were not afraid of them and took personal actions, conflicting with each other (in time of Akayev, his son Aidar and his son-in-law Adil had “difficult” mutual relations and seemed to wage struggle for the property; the time of Bakiyev was marked by the conflict of generations between “the uncles” with old “views” and modern “boundless nephews”), which sent contradicted signals to the bureaucracy. The similar conflicts took place also in the families of Nazarbayev, Aliyev and Rakhmonov.

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The limited clannish loyalty in certain situations may be replaced by wider loyalty. The rivalry within smaller groups may step aside in case of rivalry among bigger groups, if they belong to them. The individual comes forward as a representative of his family, which may struggle for the influence against other families, but he advances as a member of the clan in relation to the people of other clans, as a representative of the tribe in relation to representatives of other tribes, finally, he comes forward as a representative of the south against the northerner.

The division of the Kyrgyz to the southerners and northerners is the contemporary form of ancient tribal division to the group of tribes “of the right wing”, living in the north, and the “left wing” living in the south jointly with the separate group of tribes Ichkilik. Further, the ancient division acquired a cultural and sub-ethnic characteristic. The differences between more Islamized and earlier becoming settled agriculture tribes in the South (the South was part of the Kokand khanate and was subject to a strong Uzbek influence) and the nomadic and pre-Islamic culture and later more Russified and urbanized and becoming more cultured and wealthier North (analogous with division of Ukraine to west and east) are of great significance for Kyrgyzstan. In

Soviet time, Moscow, probably, taking into account the division of Kyrgyzstan into two main regions, established the order of alternation between southerners and northerners for designation of the first secretaries of the Central Committee. For the post-Soviet period, such alternation was achieved in a revolutionary way.

It is significant to avoid exaggeration and description of Kyrgyz revolutions simply as skirmishes between southern and northern tribes (as it is impossible to consider the Kyrgyz parties as a mere camouflage of clannish groups). Kulov is a northerner, who conflicted with northerner Akayev and was imprisoned by him. Beknazarov and Tekebayev are the southerners, who struggled against Bakiyev regime. But the regional factor plays its significant role. In both revolutions a big role was played by concentrated in Bishkek intellectuals, subject to European influence, of different tribes. But the massive support given to the revolutionary movements in 2005 and in 2010 was even opposite. In the revolution of 2005, which overthrew the rule of northerner Akayev, the protest of intellectuals in the capital was supported by southerners, who felt themselves having been deprived, who not only liquidated the power of Akayev authorities but also sent columns of autobuses under the slogan “Bishkek Stand Firm!” rendering assistance to Bishkek opposition groups. But in 2010 the revolution got the main mass support in the north against governance of southerner Bakiyev, who, on the contrary, had to flee to his native village Teit and tried to mobilize his forces in the south.

Much stronger the clannish and regional connections are, naturally, weaker become the all-national ties. In the past, the constantly alien to each other tribes came forward as a union only in time of conflicts against “the aliens” or against an aggression of foreigners or, vice versa, they united in military actions against these foreigners. At present, the national consciousness to a large extent is

displayed in “a savage” form of opposition to “aliens”, when in the deeply divided society for a certain period emerges the sense of blood unity. It was characteristic that the first demand proclaimed in 1990 by the students’ youth was the demand not to provide Armenian refugees with housing in Frunze. The mass political crises both in 1990 and in 2010 were accompanied by notorious Uzbek massacres with greater number of victims than caused by the Kyrgyz revolutions themselves and by local massacres of small nationalities – Dungans and Kurds. The internal separation of the Kyrgyz , the moral and physical weakness of the state as well as these massacres – are all inter-connected events.

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The lack of national authoritarian tradition and strong tribal and regional connections in Kyrgyzstan facilitate resistance to authoritarian rule. The Kyrgyz do not have special piety to their rulers and the authorities and are not afraid of them to a large extent. They think nothing of arranging meetings and of carrying out semi-meetings-semi-conferences called traditionally by the term “kurultai”, they stop up roads, organize “marches to Bishkek” etc. The Kyrgyz revolutions represent the outcome of this attitude to the power.

Although at present any protest and any riot in terms of ideology are formed as a struggle for democracy, the Kyrgyz love of freedom and inimical attitude to the authoritarian rule have rather “pre-historic” and “pre-national” roots and are far away from democracy, which is formed as a result of the long-term state’s and law’s development. The real democratic consensus is being gradually shaped in the political elite, while big masses and crowds participating in revolutions lack the principal support of democracy and opposition to authoritarian rule. Theoretically they might be ready to have an authoritarian rule. According to a poll arranged in 2000, the majority of the population

(81%) considers that “the steadfast man should install the order in the country”. But any own particular authoritarian power causes a protest. It lacks the needed respect and does not engender the needed fear. The authoritarian rule is not so much turned down in principle but it simply “fails to turn out”.

The Kyrgyz with difficulties subjugate to the authoritarian power. But they submit to legislation even to a lesser extent. The total Kyrgyz corruption is a kind of the seamy side of the Kyrgyz “tribal free thinking”, the dominance of family and tribal values over the formal value of law. (It is a shame to fail to arrange designation of “your own person” to a profitable post or to help him to avoid judicial proceedings; it is a shame to leave him without assistance in hard time.) The land seizures for housing construction constantly occur in Kyrgyzstan. The riots and disturbances in Kyrgyzstan represent the natural consequence of the elections: if the failed candidate is unable to come to agreement with the election committee or the court, he may arrange a demonstration of his relatives to protest against the result of the election, he may give some money to unemployed people and beggars in order to organize riots. “Up to present, the ties of relatives and the tribal connections are very strong, and any candidate is able to ensure participation of two thousand his relatives in the protest demonstration”, considers Bernet Akayeva. It is easier for Kyrgyz to arrange a revolution than to conduct free and honest elections, which still have never taken place in independent Kyrgyzstan.

If the society is not ready to submit to the authoritarian rule and easily comes forward against it, but if simultaneously it lacks strong psychological and cultural preconditions for the legal democratic state, inevitably we see in Kyrgyzstan the cycles of weak and non-sustainable quasi-democracies, replaced by weak and non-sustainable authoritarian regimes, later overthrown by revolutions, which start a new cycle. As it

is shown by examples of many countries of “the third world”, it is very difficult to get out of the similar cycles, and it is much more difficult to do it than to liquidate a certain authoritarian regime.

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Any authoritarian stabilization (in Kyrgyzstan or any other country) in essence may be only a temporary phenomenon, and the later destabilization will become an inevitable payment for it. But the relative and temporary authoritarian stability, like in neighboring countries, where up to certain time such phenomenon makes it possible for society to accumulate forces and to develop till the moment of the regime’s final collapse, such stability does not turn out in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan has passed already through two different forms of authoritarian regimes (softer and harder), and its harder form turned out to be weaker and shorter than the softer form. Actually, still another attempt to create the authoritarian presidential system would result in a new revolution and continuation of the cycles ruining society. But since the authoritarian regime “does not turn out” and does not produce even relative stability, the exit out of Kyrgyz cycles may be found out only on the way of establishment of democracy.

The establishment of democracy in various countries confronts different problems, and the problems in Kyrgyzstan to a large extent do not resemble them in other countries, for instance, Russia. The main objective tasks in Kyrgyzstan on the way to democracy are as follows: placing the tribal and local loyalty to the joint level of democracy and lawful order (the liquidation of these ties and loyalties is impossible and not needed, since in a milder and civilized form these ties may even provide the needed stability and sustainability for the party system), to move the Kyrgyz free thinking to the lawful democratic channel, i.e. to transform the Kyrgyz cycles of revolutions, chaos, authoritarian

regimes and new revolutions into the cycle of elections and democratic rotation of power. In principle, it is possible to fulfill this task, as it was done in other countries, for instance, in India, where the cultural level of the population is lower than in Kyrgyzstan and the original internal separation of the population is not less, and where relatively sustainable democratic systems were established. The colossal difficulties are connected with fulfillment of this task.

The leadership of Kyrgyzstan sees the need to achieve this task and the difficulties related to its achievement. The sad experience of the post-Soviet history in Kyrgyzstan and of the revolution in 2005, which had no clear aims and plans, except the overthrow of Akayev and an abstract strive for democracy, and which was reduced to the change of one bad regime for the worse regime, had its effect for the leadership and, evidently, for the most conscientious part of society in Kyrgyzstan. As early as in 2006 Otunbayeva said: “We want to get not only the mere change of power. We want to change the political paradigm! We are in need of the change of the whole algorithm of power... We will prove that a democratic country may exist even in Central Asia”. The present Kyrgyz leaders – Otunbayeva, Tekebayev, Atambayev, Beknazarov and Sariyev – are the people, who accumulated a great personal political experience of participation in political life since the time of reconstruction, participation in power activities, experience related to persecutions, arrests, attempts and of two revolutions. We will not be able to find out politicians with such experience in other post-Soviet countries. And their devotion to democracy is deeper and more apprehended than superfluous, imitated and “lighthearted” democracy on the eve of the 1990s. The establishment of democracy is as the justification of their life and of history of Kyrgyzstan. It is the question of national self-assertion and of national pride.

The serious nature of democracy proclaimed by revolutionaries in 2010 was proved by the proposal of “the revolutionary junta” to designate as the prime-minister and “the president for the provisional period” (to the end of 2011 and without the right to participate in the presidential elections) of R. Otunbayeva as an evidently non-authoritarian, non-clannish and uncorrupted figure and only one woman among revolutionary leaders. But the most significant matter is the wish of the new power to lay its principles into the basis of the state order. The idea of the parliamentary republic periodically was advanced by Kyrgyz opposition leaders-democrats since the time of Akayev. But after the experience of authoritarian degeneration and after fall of two presidential republics it acquired a rather defined form of consensus. The text of the draft of the new constitution was prepared rather fast without discussions on the basis of the proposed principles.

According to the new constitution (Tekebayev was his main author), Kyrgyzstan becomes a parliamentary republic with the president obtaining minimum powers, who is elected for five years and who has no right to be elected for the second term. The president does not possess the right for immunity and may be deprived of this post, and proceedings may be instituted against the president “on the basis of the prosecution of the president accused of the crime supported by the conclusion of the General Attorney”. The elections will be held only on the basis of party lists, which will weaken the role of local clannish interests. The barrier of 5% has been installed for election of the party members in the parliament for five years, and no party is allowed to obtain monopoly, the constitutional majority, in the parliament: more than 65 votes out of 120, irrespective of the percentage of votes received at the elections. (Such norm does not exist anywhere in the world, and it is the achievement of the Kyrgyz legislative creation emerged on the basis of the experience accumulated after elections to



the parliament in Bakiyev time and, probably, of the experience of other post-Soviet countries.) The government shall be formed by the majority of the parliament's deputies. The constitution is the original and considered, not imitative document, which emerged as a result of comprehension of the national experience and which puts a significant barrier to authoritarian feeble efforts.

But if the new leadership has become better prepared for construction of real democracy than the victors of 2005, it has confronted greater challenges. The two consecutive revolutions finally have shaken loose the vertical state and respect for power. After the suppressed first wave of chaos and wild outburst of pillage the events in the south, which surpassed the massacre of Osh in 1990; and coming from the underground the supporters of Bakiyev headed by his brothers and nephews evidently provoked this massacre trying to wreck the constitutional referendum. Hundreds of assassinated and thousands of wounded people were the victims of weakness of Kyrgyz state and Kyrgyz anarchic free will. The cessation of pillages, liquidation of chaos becomes the main task, which objectively pushes to the background all other tasks, including the tasks of democratic construction. The colossal chaos is a good ground for a new authoritarian rule, which may be accepted by society as a salvation, which actually will signify the continuation of Kyrgyz cycles and will not solve the problem but will postpone its solution.

*“Kyrgyz tsykly”, M., 2011, pp. 64–78.*

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**TAJIK MIGRATION: HISTORY, CONSEQUENCES  
AND LESSONS**

In time of the Soviet Union the following meaning was spread: Tajiks are slow to start and do not leave their place of origin, the youth leans to parents, while parents stick to traditions of the generations. For the 1970s–1980s it was a very hard work to send the youth to all-Union shock Komsomol construction sites. The title nation with rare exception left the republic for work, leaving aside women altogether. The real historic cause of this situation did exist.

For the XX century the Tajik people endured three stages of migration, emigration and re-emigration. Given the number of refugees, labor migrants, political migrants, forced migrants, victims caused by repressions and the people killed, wounded and mutilated in time of the Great Patriotic War, a great number of victims in the years of the senseless civil war, – it should be said that in these circumstances not each state could survive and not all people could exist as a nation. For the last century, the Tajik people every period of 5-10 years tempted its fate. At present, Tajiks live in various parts of the globe: in Asia, Africa, Europe and America. The number of Tajiks living in other states surpasses by seven times the number of Tajiks in the Republic of Tajikistan, in view of the professor Mansur Babakhanov. It is possible to say that the XX century will be marked as a century of forced migration in history of the Tajiks people. This is the question of a special study. It was very difficult for the small nation to survive, and not every people could be able with dignity to find the way forward from this complicated situation. Each of these stages left its mark in life of every Tajik family.

The first stage of migration started in the period of history after the October revolution in 1917, for the years of struggle against basmatschs, which was marked by gross violations and which caused mass emigration of the population from the republic. Due to unjustified persecution poor peasants jointly with rich peasants left abroad creating difficult situation in the republic, leaving only 5% of the population in many border villages. At the same time, basmatschs plundered the country and only for the period of 1924-1925 forced the people to collect 3 million gold coins for the family of Amir living in Afghanistan. Several hundred thousand people died in the course of the civil war after the October revolution. Only in East Bukhara as a result of military actions 4418 persons were killed, 3835 people were wounded and 2409 houses were demolished and burnt. Only 5 kishlaks and only 450 (13%) out of 3500 households were left. For this period the emigration of Tajiks was directly caused by the activities of the Soviet state. The number of forced migrants exceeded by several times the official data, according to professor Mansur Babakhanov. In 1936 the number of refugees left for Afghanistan attained 120 thousand families and 600 thousand people. Most probably, these numbers were approximate. For that period the statistical data could not be considered quite correct. Regretfully, mainly historic materials relating to Afghanistan were studied by historians. Up to the present time, historians lack the full information on the forced migration of Tajiks to Pakistan, China, India, Turkey, Iran and countries of Europe.

For the short historic period, particularly before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (1941) the Tajik people endured the most complicated stage of forced migration. The fear of “read Bolshevism” forced Tajiks to leave the Motherland, and for the 1930s the repressions resulted in liquidation of the pick of the nation. Many people left the country, while a large part of the population was deported to Siberia.

Thus, the conclusions cited below may be made. The population of the Tajik ASSR accounted for 747 222 people. Approximately every third resident had to emigrate. Before the Great Patriotic War, for a short historic period, the situation was stabilized. A great number of refugees returned home from Afghanistan and started their new life. Like all peoples of the Soviet Union, the Tajiks made their contribution to the defeat of fascism, and 260 thousand people were mobilized and went to the front, hundred thousand people worked at industrial enterprises of Ural. More than 70 thousand people, who went to the front from Tajikistan, fell on the field of battle for the happy life. The Great Patriotic War actually caused the hardest distress for residents of Tajikistan in its history. The victims, the economic losses, the new orientation of industries, demolitions and chaos, migration processes and other negative consequences may be cited for a long time. A lot of different and contradictory information on this terrible time becomes evident also at present.

The second stage of migration for the XX century was called by historians inter alia as “the century of refuges”. After establishment of sovereign states in the XIX century the notions separation and hatred acquired a new quality: “erroneous faith”, “incorrect” ideology, “wrong” nationality – those, who are “not ours”, should take to flight following their noses, if they succeed. The century of ethnic purges started.

The civil war in Tajikistan started just because of daily issues and grew into the civil war. After disintegration of the Soviet Union the only republic, marked by the start of the civil war, was Tajikistan; the civil war lasted for five years and left the worst traces of hardship in history of the Tajik people. For the years of the civil war over 100 hundred thousand people were killed, 600 thousand refugees left the country, over one million forced migrants appeared in the country, the

whole damage surpassed \$ 7 billion, and over 300 thousand Russian speaking citizens, including scientists, qualified workers, professors, teachers, doctors left the republic. Hundreds of women remained without husbands and homes. The war not only resulted in the misfortune and suffering of residents of the country, but it also caused a vast loss in economy of Tajikistan. The government of Tajikistan and international organizations took all needed actions to bring refugees back to the Motherland. Every fourth resident of the republic became a forced migrant or a labor migrant.

The third stage of migration of the population of Tajikistan started after the civil war. The number of labor migrants from Tajikistan is estimated by the figure from 750 thousand people to 1.5 million people, according to the preliminary data. The total number of Tajik labor migrants living abroad is unknown. For evident reasons, illegal labor migrants are not registered by the official statistics, and therefore the experts have to make some approximate evaluation of the situation. The state structures and the international organizations present different estimations of the number of labor migrants.

Actually, one member of every Tajik family is the labor migrant. For the last 15-20 years Tajikistan has become the country, which depends of the foreign money remittances, which resemble narcotics. The experts should study the perspectives of development of migration situation and the future of Tajik migrants both in Russia and in other countries. The Tajik authorities should make conclusions and work out the strategy for the next decades in connection with the changes of migration policy carried out by the European countries.

Thus, what conclusions may be made on the basis of the tragic forced migration in history of the Tajik people? In terms of cruelty, human and material losses the XX century has no equal period in many-century history of the Tajik people. Probably, it is determined by

a number of the mutually connected factors. These factors differ in character and meaning. Therefore the overestimation of some of them and underestimation of other factors is not admissible.

### **The Seven Lessons of the Tajik Migration are as Follows**

1. The most significant lesson consists in the conclusion that the policy in pure form does not exist. It is viable only, if in organic unity it takes into account the whole complex of factors ensuring security of the country and of the nation: political-diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational and last but not the least defense factors. The state officials, irrespective of their functions should use the mechanism of reverse connections with labor migrants by means of Internet and social networks for the study of migration situation both in the country and outside its borders. Those, who themselves endured migration and came back, should be occupied with problems of migrants. In the nearest future, Internet and social networks will transform into a real force, which is exactly the reverse channel of communication and which should be used.

2. The second lesson, first of all, concerns the activities of strategic ministries and offices, meanings of experts, conclusions of scientists, more precisely, their ability to foresee the coming changes of the political and economic situation in the country and abroad. Both in the past and at present, the might of the state was not utilized in full measure. The lessons should be taken for the present time. Hence, the important conclusion for the present time is as follows: by attainment of the character of the situation it is impossible to proceed from “modern” ideological directives, old stereotypes and abstract principles, and it is significant to comprehend the essence of the going on processes. One should draw attention of the compatriots in order to ensure the

situation, when they observe and do not violate laws of the host country and understand that observance of law is advantageous, interesting and displays the level of culture. The common task is to educate respect to observance of Russian laws.

3. The third lesson consists in organization of strategic governance of migration processes. It should be based on the knowledge of the going on events. However, glancing back to the past, one has to be surprised that for all these years not a single textbook on the migration issues has been published, that no large scale sociological studies have been made (the research arranged with the support of international organizations does not tell on the actual situation). As a result, the migration processes represent a spontaneous movement governed by nobody.

4. The fourth lesson concerns the need of the study of the labor market in Tajikistan and abroad. It gives the answer to the question about the need in qualified cadres and on the way of training them. On the basis of the responded information the following decisions should be taken: creation of the infrastructure of the state regulation of labor market, including the complex of organizations and offices; working out proposals for raising mobility of labor resources; determination of directions for territorial movement of labor resources; creation of the Russian labor exchange in Dushanbe and regional centers of Tajikistan; rendering assistance to Tajik citizens in getting employment connected with their departure to another country by invitation of Russian and other foreign companies.

5. The fifth lesson relates to formation of the system of vocational training of the youth, which is a significant stabilizing factor in the social sphere. It is needed to restore the professional-technical schools, and for this sake the expedient action should be taken to adopt the state program of support given to vocational training schools (VTS).

It will be necessary to create joint VTS with participation of Russian employers and simultaneously arrange the practice of sending for training and doing practical work at the enterprises in Russia. The main aim of the vocational training system is raising the level of competitiveness and professional mobility of citizens in labor market and in the market of professional services ensuring guaranteed employment. The employment services for arrangement of vocational training should be guided by the needs of both the unemployed people and of foreign employers.

6. The sixth lesson relates to the application of scientific approach to the study of migration processes. The scientific governance of migration is of great significance. The collected data, irrespective of their negative substance, should be objectively analyzed, summed up and worked out, separating actual data from fictitious information, and this data should be given to the leadership taking decisions in the migration sphere. The thorough analysis of the situation and skillful application of the conclusions based on this analysis are the must for ensuring efficiency of the taken decisions and actions.

7. The human losses of Tajikistan for the mentioned years force to think that the actions and the policy based on the ideological slogans actually turn out to result in big number of victims. The contemporary appeals contain more hidden elements of demagogy and speculation than genuine care for people.

First, the Tajik should themselves critically evaluate their own past experience. In this respect, it is necessary to cultivate and to educate exactingness to the utmost.

Second, it is necessary to size up that the preservation of people shall be achieved not by abstract wishes and appeals.

The new generation of leaders should critically give a meaning to the past experience and utilize it with creativeness. At least, the present



leaders should with equal success achieve the tasks of the country as the older generation succeeded to do it. Any public and political figure is obliged to take into account the existing meanings.

The migration services as well as the Tajik Diaspora abroad, primarily in Russia, should keep in the focus of their attention the problem of migrants' security as well as the problem of preventive measures against criminality and unlawful actions of migrants. Every migrant should know his rights and liabilities. The main question is not the laws but the observance and application of these laws both by the officials, who are charged with application of the laws, and by Tajik citizens.

*“Mezhdunarodnaya migratsiya naseleniya na post-Sovetskom prostranstve: Dvadtsat let udach, oshibok, nadezhd”, M., 2011, pp. 161–169.*

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**THE ACTIVITIES OF WESTERN  
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS  
IN CENTRAL ASIA**

At the present stage the international relations are subject to dramatic changes marked by decrease of the state power's role, while the impact of international norms and institutions rises. As a result, as a decisive factor becomes subjection to international decisions and ensuring of their implementation. They become the building materials in the system of global governance, and therefore the list of spheres of activities in need of cooperation with non-governmental organizations and civil society has greatly enlarged. The need of efficient management is growing. But the West as a whole in the field of

governance of world processes pursues rather its own vested interests in order to derive its benefit by all means. It utilizes actively all resources of the contemporary world: mass media, technologies and military equipment. The main aim is the unrestrained consumption of resources of less developed countries. And this aim is demonstrated by western ideological views on “golden billion”, “democratization of society” and “westernization”. It is done for the sake of consolidation of western values.

At present, Central Asia is the object of intent observation by the world powers. The secret struggle for the spheres of influence in this region was going on since the declaration of independence by the republics of Central Asia. These republics (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) attract attention to themselves by the mere fact that their statehood has not yet formed completely: namely, feeble legal and political systems, lack of stability in all spheres of life, outbreaks of inter-ethnic and political conflicts. All these factors make Central Asia a region very susceptible to the external impact.

The periodic tulip revolutions only reinforce the position of Islamic radical groups as well as of non-governmental organizations of the U.S.A., Germany and China, which carry out their activities allegedly directed to democratization of society. Actually, these organizations pursue only one objective, which is as follows: to destabilize society, to shake loose the political situation in the country in the interests of the usurper striving for expansion in CA. The “colored revolutions” are regarded as outbreaks of people’s hatred against the corrupted and negligent authorities, which achieved success thanks to the split in the ruling elite, including the secret service, as a part of the plot prepared and directed by the U.S.A. At the best, these actions were taken with the aim of reducing the influence of Russia on

its neighbors and, vice versa, with the aim of strengthening influence of the U.S.A. on them, according to the meaning of the Russian party. At the worst, it was the dress rehearsal of revolution's export directly to Russia. In 2004, V.Putin accused the West of the support given to terrorists in order to weaken and to dismember Russia.

The military presence of Russia in CA has been reduced. At present, it is limited with the military base in Tajikistan, a small air base in Kyrgyzstan and some military objects in Kazakhstan. Russia makes attempts to keep CA as a sphere of its influence, but the U.S.A. more actively takes roots in this region. Turkmenistan as a neutral state represents the exclusion and comes forward against any NGOs in its region. In September 2010, local non-governmental organizations were closed.

The activities of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan may be appraised and evaluated by the unstable situation in the country. The most known of them is Freedom House – the non-governmental organization with the headquarters in Washington (U.S.A.). Its budget by 66-80% is financed by the government of the U.S.A. In March 2005 this NGO gave financial support to Bakiyev in the amount of \$ 2 million in the course of parliamentary elections, which resulted in a revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and Bakiyev replaced Akayev at the presidential post. Further Bakiyev had to repeat the destiny of Akayev: on 17 March 2010 the kurultai (people's assembly) demanded resignation of Bakiyev, who responded with the arrest of the opposition. Nevertheless, he had to flee to Belarus. Following R.Otunbayeva coming to power the U.S.A. started to arrange pressure on the provisional government, and due to American activities the situation aggravated in Bishkek. In June 2010 the youth went to the streets of Bishkek, and the specially trained women and elderly people, knowing what and where to talk, joined

them. The patriotic feelings often transformed into emotions, and as a result of inspired mass protests the crowd ceased to be controlled.

Freedom House conducts research and arranges polls among residents of Kyrgyzstan to comprehend substance of ideas and feelings, which should be used to provoke maximum emotions of the people in street crowds and to make them destruct themselves and the country. F. Crowley said that the U.S. had liabilities relating to Kyrgyzstan and wanted to render assistance to this country, particularly in formation of its new government. The dangerous substance of events in Kyrgyzstan is evident, since they may result in the change of the situation in Central Asia as a whole and lead to the replacement of elites in all Central Asian republics of the CIS and in Afghanistan.

These events cause concern of China as well. The outcome of these events determines the answer to the question about probable strike of the U.S.A. against Iran. But the outcome of these events is mostly dangerous for Russia. There is only one option: to establish control over activities of international organizations and simultaneously to arrange honest elections at all levels of power, to form the legitimate power, which will enjoy confidence of the population.

In Uzbekistan the activities of human rights organization Freedom House was forbidden by decision of court. The authorities of the country accuse this organization of violation of the legislation. It was pointed out, in particular, that human rights activists do not submit the detailed information on the carried out work, do not present the lists of their partners and documents relating to the expenditure of financial means. All this signifies violation of law on non-governmental and non-commercial organizations. In this respect, the policy of Uzbekistan relating to NGOs resembles the analogous policy of Turkmenistan. The existence of NGOs is not promoted in both republics. An official occupying a high in Uzbekistan spoke about it: "The NGOs have

transformed into a significant force”. As far back as in 2003, the state was concerned about it. Already at that time the first plans of neutralization of NGOs activities were worked out. But it was necessary to do it in such way, which would not present Uzbekistan as a country, where NGOs were persecuted by the state. A number of government decisions were adopted for the sake of putting hindrances to their activities.

At present, this policy is successfully carried out in Uzbekistan. The NGOs were in such strained circumstances, when they had to violate the existing legislation. Now it is possible to intimidate them slightly, and they will themselves take decision on cessation of their activities. And there will be no judicial proceedings, no complaints and claims on the part of the international community. If you break law, you will be closed. Probably, the sole European NGO, which existed without any obstacles for thirteen years, was the office of Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The thorough training of officials of the state, parliamentarian, judicial and law enforcement bodies was the pledge of guaranteed success. The training itself more often is arranged in democratic European states, and Uzbek officials appreciate such trips abroad.

The Freedom House still exists in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan and continues to criticize local authorities, guiding the republics to new revolutions. Despite this situation, the authorities of Tajikistan regard various NGOs with favor. Over 3.5 thousand various NGOs carry out their activities on the territory of Tajikistan. A senior advisor to the president of Tajikistan described their activities as follows: “It is good, when many people in all regions of the country get employment and are engaged in solving problems. They look for financial means with assistance rendered by international organizations, which have their offices in our country. The state and the government are interested very

much in raising efficiency of activities of the NGOs in the country”. The authorities by their activities show that they are not interested in the future of the country but only pursue their vested aims. The payments for services provided for western foundations and NGOs represent a significant addition to the salaries not only of representatives of the non-governmental sector but also of officials at all levels, as well as interpreters, office-cleaners, guards, drivers and cooks.

But the organizations disliked by the Tajik government still exist. They are mainly German NGOs. The court of Sino Dushanb district by its decision suspended the activities of German social organization “Mission “Alliance”, which had carried out its activities in Tajikistan for more than ten years. In 2008, the ministry of justice initiated the judicial proceedings aimed at cessation of activities of international charitable organization “ORA International”, which had to stop its activities. The ministry of justice based its decision on the results of the planned review of NGOs activities and the revealed violations by them of legislation of Tajikistan. The two offices of international organizations were closed: International Foundation of Election Systems (IFES) and National Institute of Democracy (NDI), which were involved in activities in the sphere of development of democracy. The ministry of justice initiated the judicial proceedings relating to the representation of American social organization “Adra International”, which illegally propagated Christian faith on the territory of Tajikistan. The judicial proceedings were started against German organization “Caritas”, since its activities exceeds the limits of its statute and legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan.

At present, about 5000 NGOs carry out their activities in Kazakhstan in all significant social spheres. Representatives of civil society express their concern about expansion of China. Ermurat Bapi,

the editor of newspaper “Public Position” initiated discussion on illegal entry of Chinese migrants to the republic. He expressed the view that the uncontrolled consolidation of Chinese influence threatened national security of Kazakhstan. In his view, the local population comprehended that foreigners considered themselves to be the hosts of the country.

The examples of economic expansion of China are evident: 80% of the state debt of Tajikistan was paid by the financial means borrowed from China. It might be a coincidence, but in 2011 the parliament of Tajikistan ratified the protocol on demarcation of the state border with China, which received about one thousand sq. km of the Tajik territory. The local experts are afraid of the Chinese appetite and think that it will only grow. In these circumstances, Kazakhstan turns out to be placed between various centers of force, experiencing rising difficulties for making evolutions. The consolidation of China dictates the need to make the final decision: for or against the emerging super-power. If Kazakhstan (and Middle Asia jointly with it) makes its choice for the benefit of China, Kazakhstan and other countries will inevitably enter the sphere of attraction of the gigantic super-power, which threatens with the loss first of economic and further of political sovereignty. If Kazakhstan and Middle Asia choose the anti-Chinese option, they should select the guarantor of their sovereignty preservation.

The choice is not great. It is either Russia, or the West as: a) the United States, b) the European Union, c) the U.S.A. and the EU together.

The integration of Middle Asia at this stage may not be executed in the interests of the region’s states. It may be either pro-Chinese or pro-American. But the first option does not promote preservation of sovereignty, while the second option does not contribute to keeping stability, since the opponents to American presence will inevitably “rock the boat”. There are variants of actual integration with Russia,

and lately the Russian party made hints about it. However, only Kazakhstan and not the whole region may really be integrated with Russia. The question is only as follows: has Russia enough might to do it?

*“Sovremennye problemy mezhdunarodnyh otnosheniy i mirovoy politiki: Materially mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsii”, M., 2011, pp. 223–228.*



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