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**RECONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL (PLANETARY)  
DEMOCRACY: CIVILIZATIONAL  
CONSEQUENCES**

**1. The Phenomenon of “Global”  
(Planetary) Democracy”**

The phenomenon of planetary democracy emerges as a consequence of defeat of Fascism in the course of the Second World War and the following disintegration of the colonial system. The victorious war of the united forces of the allies – the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the Great Britain against Fascism owing to logic of counteraction against racism and Nazi dictatorship attached universal meaning to the principles of democracy. It had a great impact on the whole spiritual situation after the war. The ideas of priority of civilizational value of equality of rights of the peoples, their freedom and independence became the catalyst, which resulted in the accelerated collapse of colonial empires.

The emerged global trend could not help influencing the characteristic of shaping international organizations. The question is, evidently, the Organization of United Nations. In essence the Organization of United Nations became a peculiar democratic world inter-governmental center with versatile and simultaneously rather

efficient powers of solving emerging problems of inter-state relations by mutual concessions, of preservation of peace and security of the peoples.

The global opposition of the two world systems formed as a policy and conception after the known speech of W. Churchill in Fulton started to carry on in the form of peaceful competition and “cold war”. The “cold war” periodically put the world on the verge of nuclear catastrophe. The Caribbean crisis was a kind of its paroxysm. The comprehension of a real threat of annihilation of the mankind changed social psychology: it became evident that the way to “victory” of one or other social system was laid through “hot war” with the use of all destructive means. Such “victory” turned out to be equal to the total defeat of humanity.

The mere seemed search for a compromise, for a “middle way” between capitalism and socialism could not give any real outcome. And the parties lacked adequate intellectual and moral-political forces for the actual compromise. As a result, the “cold war” disappeared only as a result of “perestroika”, the unilateral retreat from civilizational positions of socialism, the renunciation of “the final aim”, which determined the strategy of policy and life of the Soviet Union.

As a result, the Soviet Union disintegrated. Side by side with its disintegration took place a radical change of the whole international situation, which determined stability of post-war global democracy as a co-existence and relatively coordinated peaceful reciprocal action of appeared and appearing sovereign states becoming the real foundation of liability and lively activities of the Organizations of United Nations. The documents worked out and adopted by the Organization of the United Nations determined the democratic status of the states, which received equal right of vote at the General Assembly of UN, irrespective of their territorial size, economic and military might, as

well as the human rights becoming the guidance in the struggle against all forms of discrimination for reasons of racial, social, national, ethnic and gender distinctions. At the same time, there was realized the policy aimed at preservation of cultural destiny, spiritual property of peoples of the world. The UNESCO programs made as a property of the whole world the vast cultural riches developed outside the original regions. The world culture as an organic mutual action and mutual enrichment of local civilizations' cultures forming the global entity started to transform into reality.

The rising sense of cultural dignity, the growth of spiritual influence of various cultural centers, of civilizational self-consciousness and self-determination started to shape a global social-psychological trend. The radical change of political forces' balance connected with disintegration of the Soviet Union created real chances for a new global order. This process was promoted by aggravation of contradictions connected both with the trends to intensification of global economic and military-political inequality and with the aggravating problems of ecology, energy, resources, as well as food and demographic crisis. The advantageous situation appears for the alliance of the western countries: they may restore their dominant imperial role in the contemporary world. It seems that, given the present military and economic might of the West, nothing may hinder attainment of this aim.

However, the international organizations, such as the Organization of United Nations, the Security Council of United Nations, UNESCO, based on equal representation of sovereign states, carry out their activities. The right of sovereign states, fixed in the UN documents, for determination of the strategy of their development and for non-interference in their internal affairs, makes it possible to counteract against aspirations for establishing international relations

with imperial one-sided influence. On the other side, some politicians regard establishment in these organizations of a new one-sided influence not only as a vital need but also as inevitability.

The organizations of this type should either change their strategic orientations or disappear from the sphere of global political game. The West can not admit such trend of world events' development, when it would be dependent in terms of energy and resources on the countries, which not long ago were colonies or were in the situation of fundamental political dependence.

The situation of equal bilateral position and more so the situation of one-sided dependence is regarded by the countries of the West as completely unacceptable, since in this case not only the foreign policy but also the internal political situation of the western countries might radically change: they will cease to be the civilization's orientation, the sole center of global attraction with all related consequences. The following question is quite logical: is the idea of restoration of global imperial relations not absurd under conditions, when western countries constantly consolidate the principles of democracy as "a political sacral cow" with unquestionable status.

The restoration of imperial global relations is possible, if this process is given a form of "reconstruction" of global democracy aimed at liberation of the world from despotic regimes and consolidation of models of western democracy all over the world. The global dream will be targeted in the following way: it is sufficient merely to wish and to express the will, and it would be possible to live like Americans or West Europeans. The perception is being spread that a new world order may be born. The aspiration for a probable new world order is spread in this way. But the natural consequence of formation of this order becomes the change of the formula of global democracy. Just the change of this formula may be presented as a grand project, as a wave

of the future to enter comfortably this future or, on the contrary, to be “washed away” from historic arena.

The emergence of such dilemma is a peculiar form of efficient psychological dictate: either you agree to the new global rules of game or you will be “dropped” from it. The destiny of local civilizations should be determined exactly by this game. One can not help seeing that the sovereignty of the states appeared in the post-colonial era became a kind of charter of immunity of civilizational specificity, which in its turn became the spiritual basis of protection of state sovereignty of the countries liberated from colonial dependence.

At present, the task seems to be as follows: to present the global democratic process of taking decisions not as a system of common participation of actually existing sovereign states with equal rights but as adoption in the world by “the league of elite” of the best principles of life, which are known for these states and are used as guided directions. Just they personify “true democracy”. Evidently, the following question arises: what is “the league of elite” and how does it intend to establish “true democracy” in the world?

## **2. Autocratic democracy**

It is evident that the notion “true democracy” includes separation of the whole space of democracy. It supposes existence of “inferior” states in terms of democracy. Global democracy as a sum of sovereign states should be subject to a kind of “revision”. It means that the sense of “the league of elite” in relation to the system of international relations consists in its limitation functions. Not all states may be included in the group of “elite”.

But in which way from the point of view of conception and political reality may be interpreted the limitation functions relating to the historic legal international system of sovereign member-states of the



Organization of United Nations? This sense may be interpreted, if world democracy “is made nearer” with the forms of international organizations including the power dominant in the world as a shaping reality of the consolidated economic, political and military might. Similar situation is seen in the principles and mechanisms of activities of the organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organizations, leaving aside the military organization NATO. But is it possible publicly to proclaim formation of a new international order reducing the sphere of activities of the system of global democracy and covering the actually existing sovereign states? How to correlate it with the principles of life and activities of the Organization of United Nations?

It seems to be possible, if you admit “coexistence” of various types of democracy. It seems that priority of such admittance belongs to John McCain, a candidate of the Republican Party to the presidential post. It took place in the U.S. in the course of presidential election campaign of 2008. In the course of the campaign John McCain advanced the idea of World League of Democracies, which did not repudiate existence of the United Nations Organization but existed side by side with it and allegedly rendering assistance to it for efficient solving of global problems. As a Republican Party candidate to the presidential post John McCain proclaimed as democratic allies of the U.S. the soldiers of Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain and Turkey, as well as the forces of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines and South Korea. But since these forces are not engaged in systematic work for realization of diplomatic and economic strategy, NATO should fill in this gap by forming partnership with grand democracies in Asia and in the world. McCain asserted that the U.S. should go further and combine democratic nations in one common organization: in the World League of Democracies,

which would not resemble the doomed W. Wilson plan of creating universal League of Nations. According to him, the League of Democracies would be the league of selected organizations and its objective should be formulated as follows: to be “the unique server of freedom” but not a universal organization.

Thus, side by side with the “inadequately efficient” Organization of United Nations, which resembles due to its universality the “doomed” to failure League of Nations, the efficient Union of democracies with identical thinking should appear. In its time, side by side with the League of Nations and more precisely instead of it, there emerged limiting unions of states, which used electoral political and geometric terminology, and it resulted finally in the global catastrophe of the Second World War. The question arises: is the World League of Democracies, if not a “triangular”, a “multangular”, i.e. again a “geometric figure”, which actually creates limiting barriers between itself and the other world?

How to interpret the sense incorporated in the notion of “the World League of Democracies”? If the universal, in its essence, United Nations Organization is impossible to be regarded as an efficient global democracy, the functions of global democracy should be given to a new “non-universal” international organization. This is the hidden “logic” of deliberations of John McCain (“Foreign Affairs”, November/December 2007, p. 26).

It is evident that the comprehended repudiation of universality is not totally democratic, more precisely – not democratic at all – step. Democracy means combination of differences. If the World League of Democracies selects civilizational and political adepts in order to unite them, it looks like a world plot of the movement in the direction of the totalitarian union. The specific shadow of civilizational diversity of the contemporary world is placed on it to justify this movement. It seems to

be “relict”, not corresponding to the flow of the stream of the historic future. Certainly, it is possible to be engaged in abstract deliberation about noble aims of the League of Democracies – about alleviation of hardships, the struggle against AIDS, counteraction against ecological crisis, ensuring free access to markets for those, who consolidate economic and political freedom. But if the nearest democratic allies of the U.S. are the soldiers of various countries, if partnership with the grand democracies forms NATO, we get the formula of collective global dictatorship drawing the boundary of freedom only for itself. It is not a global democracy but a form of power ignoring a fundamental principle of democracy – the principle of freedom of civilization’s subjects. The reduction of the civilization’s space of freedom by freedom for one person means that it is not freedom in exact meaning of the word.

The other fundamental principle of democracy is equal representation in the organs of power. The global democracy demands recognition of reality of equal rights of civilization subjects in the international bodies of governance, if they claim for creation global structure as a form of universality. Another question emerges in this connection: is global democracy consistent with individual leadership of one power? This question has both the legal conceptual aspect and the aspect of actual policy. If the world leadership of one power is established in terms of conception, this consolidation contains the claim for the individual adoption of practical decisions with global meaning.

Is any constitutional limitation of individual global leadership possible? The world society is not aware of it. This fact creates a critical situation for principles of democracy. The present international military actions demonstrate that reality of individual decisions on military actions of international significance may be attributed to American foreign policy. For instance, the Administration of George

Bush alone took decisions on the beginning of military actions in Iraq without any sanction of the Organization of United Nations, without common consent of American allies. But this action concerned the key problems of international security and not only in the region of the Near East. The individual leading function is not subject to discussion and adoption by the international community. It is proclaimed and is agreed by it.

The mechanisms of “capture” of the leading functions are most actively discussed in the course of election campaigns. At the same time, it becomes clear that the global leading functions do not get sanctions by the voters, and this circumstance engenders significant negative political consequences. For instance, Hillary Clinton testified to the fact that the Administration of George Bush put the American people before the false option: force against diplomacy, unilateralism against multilateralism, hard power against soft power. In other words, Bush proposed to use the U.S. might for realization of political will by his individual choice.

Hillary Clinton, unlike Bush, considers that there is time for individual use of force and there is time for multilateral diplomacy. The foreign policy of the U.S. in certain situations should be guided by priority of multilateralism using unilateralism in the case, when it is absolutely necessary to defend security of the country or to prevent a probable tragedy. Hillary Clinton proceeds from the supposition that the world still appeals to the U.S. for leadership, that the American leadership is wished by the world and that American friends are everywhere in the world and want to unite with the nation, which by its values, leadership and force inspired the world in the past (“Foreign Affairs”, pp. 4–5). It is sufficient to recall the American war in Viet-Nam to question the assertion that the American force was a source of inspiration for the whole world. But one may forget about it today.

Hillary Clinton correctly considers that soldiers do not respond to all questions. Sometimes it is better simply to keep a big baton than use it. However, to keep a big baton over the world without corresponding ideological veil means to engender an unwanted global resonance. For instance, this situation was created, when it became finally clear that the pretext for military intervention to Iraq turned out to be false. Thus, the world leadership as a justification of individual decisions on the basis of false arguments and arbitral aspiration creates the unfavorable atmosphere for realization of foreign policy decisions. The collective participation is needed to create an alleged legitimacy of the unprovoked aggression. To ensure collective participation in not a good action it is necessary either to have or to create “sufficient justification”. Since the Administration of George Bush made a mistake, it was necessary to bring back the situation to the original position. Hillary Clinton considers that it was necessary to withdraw American forces from Iraq. She thinks that this step will restore the trust of the world to the American leadership. America should become again a great country basing not only on the military force, on the size and wealth of the nation but also on the American idea. What idea makes people be Americans? One of the last American ambassadors in Russia considered that it is the support given to democracy and human rights not only in America itself but all over the world. In this sense the government of the U.S. may judge any country. Citing Hillary Clinton, the ambassador asserted that this feature of Americans is incorporated in the genetic code of DNA, and that Americans and Russians often have different opinions on this sphere of problems.

Due to the fact that the idea of democracy and human rights is within DNA of Americans, nobody may judge them: it is impossible to judge the Nature, since the Nature can not be different.

Why the leadership of one great power is identified by the whole world as the spread of democracy? Did Rome in its time of the republic, which conquered the world, spread democracy? In reality, the republic executed the imperial governance over other peoples and states. Finally, it itself transformed in the empire.

The appropriate question emerges: is global democracy possible to exist, if one superpower has established its leadership in the world? The global leadership of one superpower transforms into a kind of fig-leaf the democratic procedures in all countries, which become satellites but not equal in rights partners of the superpower. The superpower starts to create a global military structure, which should serve as “the sufficient basis” for understanding by all other countries of their second-rate place in the global world, where it would be better for them to obey voluntarily than to revolt and to kneel before the prevailing greater might. This situation resembles the phenomenon of autocracy in the global extent, of autocracy arrayed in the democratic cloth.

### **3. Cosmopolitan democracy**

It is possible to say that practical realization of the idea of the World League of Democracies leads to formation of “autocratic democracy”. The autocratic democracy is internally contradictory and, naturally, can not help confronting critical attitude to it both on the part of internal and external political forces. The strategic aim of the successful reconstruction of global democracy demands creation of an attractive image of “true” democracy, in any case, a more attractive than the autocratic democracy. In this way there appears the idea of an alternative to the autocratic democracy repudiating absolute individual leadership. The essence of this alternative is in the equality of all participants in the league of democracies fixed by unanimous adoption of decisions within the league.

The historic experience shows that in order to ensure such collective nature it is necessary to acquire organic economic reciprocal action making it possible to form common market, to ensure free movement of goods, services, labor force, to carry out common customs policy and to introduce the united visa regime and one common currency. The collegial democracy should strive for recognition by the population of various countries of their common values. It should keep traditions of high culture. All this taken together may transform it in “the beacon”, which throws light upon not only local but also global ways and routes of civilization’s evolution. For keeping the status of the global beacon collegial democracy should open its boundaries for representatives of various ethnoses providing them with a chance to prove by their experience the high civilizational status of the collegial democracy.

What international entity in the contemporary world may actually claim for the status of such global beacon? Naturally, it is the European Union, which possesses its own parliament and its government – the European Commission. At present, they start to analyze the activities of the European Union from the point of view of contemporary international policy. The democratic mechanisms of work of the European Union, where the individual power of the leader is not recognized, may be regarded as a specific counterpoint to the American model of the World League of Democracies. At the same time, the European Union is, evidently, the model restricting the model of global democracy. Not all but selected by certain indexes countries are invited to take part in activities and life of the European Union.

Thus, both American model and the model of the European Union restrict the circle, where the principles of “true” democracy are realized. A peculiar “gray zone” emerges outside this circle, and the principles and laws of democracy are not spread there. The American

and the European models coincide in this respect. This coincidence finds its evident expression in organization and strategy of NATO.

At present, NATO arranges military operations far away from its borders actually in the whole world. At the same time, for these operations there are selected the regions, which can not deliver the equivalent responsive blow against the member-states of NATO. The American foreign policy is aimed at creation in various regions of the world of such structures, which guarantee primarily the U.S. territory to avoid a responsive blow. The creation of such structures will allow extension essentially of the borders of “gray zone” outside the territory subject to functioning of principles and laws of its own democracy. The following question arises: is it possible to make some academic appraisal of the political trends directed to “reconstruction” of global democracy formed after the Second World War, the defeat of Fascism and collapse of colonial empires? It is evident that the academic discussions on these problems represent not only a theoretical but also a lively practical interest.

In this connection of certain interest is the theoretical dialogue between David Held, a professor of political science of London School of Economy and Political Science, the author of publications “Democracy and Global Order” (1995), “Model of Democracy” (3d ed., 2006) and Heikki Patomaki, a professor of international relations of Helsinki University, the author books “Democratizing Globalization” (2003) and “Probable World: Democratic Transformation of Global Institutions” (2004, in cooperation with Teivo Teivanen).

Heikki Patomaki notes the characteristic feature of industrial developed countries of America and West Europe. They positioned themselves as national sovereign states (nation-states). If it is the attribute of the democratic feature of the state, the spread of democracy should be considered as an establishment of all states in the world as



nation-states. But somehow the countries freed from colonialism had to be engaged in the long and consistent struggle for getting the status of nation-states equal in all respects to the participants of international procedures of taking decisions. It should be mentioned that these restrictions were valid particularly in relation to the Soviet Union and further the Russian Federation. It is enough to recall the procedure of abrogation of Jackson-Vanik amendment or “history” of Russia joining the WTO. The key to the explanation of such situations is in the hidden non-acceptance of the conception of equality of the subjects of global international policy. This problem appeared immediately after creation of the Organization of the United Nations.

The first discussions on the character of planetary democracy were marked by a hope that the principles of planetary democracy might be and should be universal and equal for all. However, for the years of “cold war” the opposite interpretation of principles of democracy was formed. Consequently the discussion on the character of universal planetary democracy died out.

Heikki Patomaki considers that the theme of common planetary democracy emerged again for the 1970s, when “the third world” advanced the demand of a new international economic order. The United Nations declared that all states had equal legal rights and as equal members of the international community have the right to participate fully and efficiently in the international process of adoption of decisions on the world economic, financial and monetary problems. The demand of the state sovereignty in the process of decolonization created the legal platform for the struggle against imperial governance and exploitation endured by the majority of the mankind outside the boundaries of the countries representing the key regions of the world economy. It was not accidental that the democratic aspirations in the world were articulated in terms of inter-governmental relations.

Heikki Patomaki considers as well that it was the time of flourishing of the state sovereignty and of the first common exit of “the third world” countries out of the governance of industrial capitalism and European empires. The natural question is as follows: was it possible to regard the shaping wave of global democracy as an insurmountable wave of the future? Or is the faith in full equality and indestructibility of sovereignties of new national states a reversible process?

The shaping global social-psychological situation seemed to open a wide way for the final consolidation of universal principles of democracy for all. Actually, the processes of globalization and termination of “the cold war” presented the theme of universality of planetary democracy in its new aspects. There were no evident political hindrances in order to reduce planetary democracy to “a common denominator”. Under the influence of the policy of reconstruction, the system of international relations was marked by asymmetric processes. The organization of Warsaw Treaty was dissolved, the defensive structures of the Soviet Union were disassembled, and the USSR disintegrated. In parallel with this process, the military might of the U.S. and of NATO was growing.

At the same time, the cherished hopes for the final planetary victory of universality of democratic principles turn into a dangerous illusion. The question is that the slogan of establishment all over the world of the principles of true democracy might be utilized as a battering-ram to violate state sovereignty of the states receiving independence after the Second World War and disintegration of the colonial system.

The new situation created conditions, when under the banner of consolidation of democracy it was possible to start realization of geopolitical aims. But was it possible to attach to this process an

outward appearance of the planetary march of democracy? It is characteristic that for these years a radical change of correlation of forces took place on the world arena, and the system of “cosmopolitan democracy” was advanced. David Held developed this theory in his article “Democracy, State – Nation and Global System” (1991) and further in the book “Democracy and Global Order” (1995).

Heikki Patomäki regards that as a result of it the significant revelations were made. It turned out that just creation of the European Union may be presented as a result of overcoming of Nazism and dilemmas of inter-state relations by means of integration. It means that not the collapse of the colonial system and formation of sovereign states, not global democracy represent a productive response to the historic experience of the XX century, but exactly the European Union did it. But in reality, did the creation of the European Union mean that it presented a chance to liquidate aggressive actions among the member-states of the Union? But did it signify the emergence of a chance to put aggressive actions outside the Union? Will the block of NATO become a device of such use of this outside move? How may one apprehend the sense of “cosmopolitan democracy” in the context of these questions? Is it possible to regard that theory of “cosmopolitan democracy” has universal meaning and may be used relating to non-European states? It turns out to be quite possible but only as a moral justification of the dictate of the rules of internal structure for the states, which, as it occurs, may not be regarded as valuable nation-states. But are there also democratic principles, which in hands of the European Union may claim for the global status?

David Held considers that there are eight all-embracing principles of “cosmopolitan democracy”, which let assert that “cosmopolitan democracy” may call for the global status. They are as follows: equal for all value and dignity; active participation in

democratic actions; individual responsibility for taken decisions and accounting; achievement of agreement; collective decisions by means of procedure of voting; inclusion of all and support of the majority; prevention of significant damage for taking decisions to settle practical issues; preservation of integrity of society. At the same time, rationality of cosmopolitan principles depends on recognition of two fundamental metaprinciples or organizing notions: the cultural-historic metaprinciple of autonomy and the philosophic metaprinciple of impartiality.

These principles, undoubtedly, are good and universal in their abstract universality. But why are they realized only within the space of the Union? Do bombardments of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya correspond to the principle of non-admittance of a significant damage? Is it possible to speak about inclusion of all in case of execution of Saddam Hussein and of massacre of Muammar Qaddafi? Where is here a collectively taken decision by means of voting procedure? Where is responsibility of Jorge Bush for taking the decision on military intervention to Iraq on the basis of the evidently false justification? What kind of preservation of society's integrity may be discussed, if the military forces of NATO supported only one side in the civil war in Libya?

Thus, the following question remains not responded: are eight democratic orientations of behavior and two metaprinciples the orientations of internal application within the boundaries of "cosmopolitan democracy" of the European Union or are they applied in the great number of sovereign states emerged after the Second World War? If these orientations are set aside for the closed European area, the "cosmopolitan democracy" may acquire imperial qualities.

The imperial qualities potentially include probability to repudiate the principle of taking unanimous decisions. This trend appears in the situation of economic crisis, when its burden is accepted in a different

way in various member-states of the European Union. The need of change of unanimous taking decisions for the principle of qualified majority decision appears in this situation, probably, further by simple majority. If the simple majority is unable to ensure an agreed decision, the way to dictatorship of the federal government or the way to disintegration of the Union is quite possible.

But what sense is in principle to arrange the struggle against dictatorships in other countries? Or is it only the pretext for achievement of the geopolitical aims? What theoretical appraisal should be made of military invasions of the military forces of the U.S. and of the block NATO to different countries of the world? Partially, this appraisal is determined by the consequences of military operations. What is the result of it?

The wave of terrorism grew in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Libya, in the country, which got freedom from Muammar Qaddafi, as the true ideas of life they proclaimed not the principles of “cosmopolitan democracy”, but the Shariah dogmas. In Egypt, as a result of democratic voting, Muslim Brothers and Salafits came to power. The fundamental conceptual problem appears: why the principles of democracy born by the western political tradition and accepted as an example of absolutely universal strangely start “to skid” in civilizational sands of the Near East and North Africa?

The above question equally concerns both the truths of American Fathers and the theoreticians of “cosmopolitan democracy”.

#### **4. Philosophic dilemmas**

It is a common secret that the U.S. as a rule comes forward as an initiator of military interventions for the sake of establishment of democracy everywhere in the world. It sees in it its leading role. At the same time, in the context of emerging military-political and economic

consequences of reconstruction of global democracy confronted by the U.S., the following question arises: do the presidents of the U.S. have the founding strategy (grand strategy)?

Daniel Drezner, a professor of international policy in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Taft University, notes that as a result of military intervention to Libya there emerged acute debates on probability of existence of Obama strategic doctrine. The chorus of foreign policy observers started to complain on the supposed strategic incompetence of the U.S. Administration.

Daniel Drezner cited the meaning of an observer of newspaper Washington Post, who considered that the lack of a Grand Strategy or strategies was the feature of the American Administration. The analogous point of view is shared by other political analysts, who considered that the key reason of misfortunes of America were adoption after the war of the incorrect strategy. The “National Magazine” asserted that actually Obama doctrine is in general absence of any doctrine.

Daniel Drezner disagreed with these points of view and stressed two aspects of Grand Strategy of Obama Administration. First of all, this is the restoration of positions of America by reduction of its involvement in foreign operations and by replacement of its burden on its global partners. Second, it is establishment of influence of American ideals and interests in the world by means of counter blows in case of challenges on the part of other states. These political points could hardly be characterized as “founding strategy”. They rather characterized tactic of foreign policy of Obama Administration.

The problem of global political strategy is connected with the true interpretation of the way based on the truth of political constants, the universalities, which explain the direction of political actions and the moral pathos of state leaders. They are the original philosophic

truths, which are moral and legal justification of specific political actions. Obama used these universalities as an original pre-condition of his policy.

B. Obama made the following remark about his decision to start intervention in Libya: repudiation American responsibility as responsibility of the leader, more significantly our responsibility for our brothers – human beings under such circumstances might mean a treachery to us themselves ...The people striving for freedom far and wide will make their friend of the United States (“Foreign Affairs”, July-August 2011, p. 66). Evidently, B. Obama was basing himself on human identity as an urge towards freedom. In other words, he considers as his friend only the “others”, who demonstrated their political identity with American identity. If it is human identity, all those, who lack such political identity, may not be considered as a part of the mankind. This philosophy, which explains America’s military-political actions, represents the spiritual basis of its leadership in the contemporary world, including use of military force.

The point of view expressed by Hillary Clinton is quite characteristic. As a State Secretary she asserted that by means of the correct balance of civil and military force the U.S. would be able to advance its interests and values, to direct and to support other nations for solving global problems. And she added that the U.S. might enhance its importance up to the challenges of the XXI century and to stand the test of American global leadership (“Foreign Affairs”, November/December 2010, p. 24).

These assertions are marked by the conviction in the exact knowledge and in personal possession of the truth of human being and of the truth of civilization’s life. This truth is directed to all, and everybody urges towards its realization.

This perception is supported by the evident common original principles of western democracy. They may be defined in the deliberation of the essence of cosmopolitan democracy. But how should one explain its universality, i.e. its allegiance to any civilization's conditions and any historic circumstances? If we assume that the contemporary principles of western democracy – the principles of freedom, electoral formation of ruling powers, impartiality of judicial decisions etc. – are the principles of wisdom, while wisdom is universal, in this case the man as a Homo Sapiens irrespective of his ethnic, racial and civilizational peculiarity should accept these principles as an absolute truth.

If from this point of view, one considers metaprinciple of autonomy (MPA, by interpretation of David Held), the democratic culture in western perception establishes conception of the individual as a citizen, who from the beginning is free and equal and in these roles is understandable for others. This is the identity of human being. Thus, the specific western perception of true essence of human being is established as a criterion of universality.

However, the eastern tradition as a criterion of universality considers the spiritual perfection achieved as a result of the long process. Owing to this circumstance, the individuals can not be identical in terms of their real qualities; they are different, since they occupy different stages of spiritual development.

If we accept the western perception of human identity as a constant in general, we should consider the main part of the people's history as a deviation from the truth: actually, slavery, serfdom and forced exploitation turn out to be outside the true history. In this sense, the eastern tradition legitimizing inequality of individuals may be regarded as a philosophic apology of history.



The following question may be asked: what should be the foundation of pure reason in the process of comprehension of truth – the abstract identity of human being in general or the experience of real history? In this case, we confront another paradox. Thinking of the West traditionally is regarded as a dynamic and lively antipode to any inertness, while consciousness of the East is considered to be conservative and “stagnant”. However, in the process of interpretation of the internal world of human being the East traditionally sticks to the position excluding constant perception of qualities of “the man in general”. If you recognize the constant spiritual characteristic of “the man in general”, you should regard him as a member of the profane mass of people, who mechanically repeat the ritual forms of behavior. There exist for this mass of people only such rules of “free game”, which brings results within the established limits. Those, who work out these rules, always turn out to be “more equal” than the equality of rest of the people. But what should be done with inequality of individuals? May we in real life ignore this inequality? If all of us are equal, why should we exert our efforts and spend time for the search of the best and of the most dignified option? But the essence of democracy consists in the election procedures. It occurs that democracy itself is based on the internal contradiction. At the same time, the following logical question arises: did the western tradition always consider the metaprinciple of autonomy (i.e. the urge towards freedom) as a starting point of construction of true society?

The sole answer to this question may be negative. Let us mention as an example the principles of life of the Pythagorean union. It was characterized by the determined and stable order including all aspects of life, submission of thinking to principles of the dominant doctrine, rigid discipline and rating of the society’s members. It is known that the Pythagoreans considered each other as equal to blessed Gods and

thought little of others. These representatives of blessed Gods were greedy for power and wanted to be the pastors of peoples. This example resembles something from the modern life's experience.

Certainly, it is possible to contest it and to mention the fact that the Pythagoreans were persecuted and exiled from Great Greece. But it did not mean that these principles used by the Pythagorean Union were eradicated. These principles are still alive. The Pythagorean principles are used by Vatican. Why B. Obama did not order to subject Vatican to bombardment? Probably, because the American Administration considers itself, like Vatican, to be equal to blessed Gods, wants to be the pastor of the peoples and thinks little of others. It means the actual repudiation of identity of the human being in general as equal and free. But in this case one should recognize that metaprinciple of autonomy is not universal even as applied to society of the West. The legitimate moral and legal justifications for utilization of military force against societies living in the other way and on other foundations disappear in this case. The evident question is as follows in this respect: what attitude should be taken in relation to founding strategy of life in countries of the East?

From the positions of historic cultures of the East, the perception of identity and mutual "perspicuity" of individuals as equal and free citizens from their births – is the original and the greatest delusion. The man from the beginning passes as a human being the stages of consolidation and self-formation as well as learning his essence. The individuals are not equal in this process. They can not be equal, since even the highest stage of self-formation can not be taken for the final truth. Meantime, the achievement of the truth proceeds for the whole life of the person or even for the period of his many lives.

The initial equality of identity of all and of everyone is the legal postulate of western thinking, but it does not concern the actual non-

identity of people. May we ignore as false the laws, which form the basis of traditional life of civilizations in the East? Did John McCain, Barak Obama and Hillary Clinton respond to this question put by them themselves? It is difficult to say. But their political positions evidently lack any reflection concerning civilization's peculiarities of peoples in the contemporary world. Just therefore their universality in principle is not different from universality of George Bush, who gave birth to a threat of transforming occupied Iraq into "a black hole" of American economy.

The historic experience demonstrates that the rules of public game may be different. They are formed on the basis of civilizational traditions. Who should define what tradition is better? For instance, in Great Britain the priority of the right of succession of the royal power belonged to men. However, in 2011 the equal rights of men and women in succession of the royal power were recognized. The new tradition was adopted. But why is it better than the old one? Who should take the final decision on this question? What opinion would express the citizen of Great Britain, if only the Japanese monarchy would make the true decision on this matter? The appropriation of the exclusive right for establishment of the public game's rules is not democratic in essence.

Just therefore it remains not clear how the U.S. under the banner of democracy intend to lead other nations to solve global problems? How the XXI century will be able to terminate the test of the American global leadership of democracy, if in the beginning of this century there emerged the internal contradiction between the conception of autocratic democracy based on the leadership of one superpower and the principles of cosmopolitan democracy excluding individual governance? What democracy is true? Or does the sole true democracy not exist at all? But can the epistemological basis exist for the individual global leadership in the contemporary world?

If this basis does not exist, it will be a strategic mistake to ignore the civilizational diversity bringing its specific truths. These truths are formed for the historic period making the unity of the people's qualities as a civilization's subject and of the circumstances of life. It is possible to make a certain analogy of perceiving by the people of their civilization's truth and of the individual's process of perceiving the truth of his being. The man, who with definite perception passes certain stages of his self-perfection, starts to comprehend that the achievement of complete perfection is not merely a long process but in essence ad infinitum.

The constant determination attached to the man by the Fathers-Founders in its literal meaning may become a source of misfortunes in strategic thinking. David Held had to recognize that metaprinciple of autonomy was better protected within the context of citizenship, i.e. the reduced context, where autonomy is conditioned by the characteristic of civil society emerged in the epoch of modern. And it means that it has historic limitations. Those, who are unable to participate and take actions in life of this society, are in need of protection. Hence, the principles of "cosmopolitan democracy" may efficiently function only within one community with fixed boundaries.

However, David Held considers that the principles of "cosmopolitan democracy" may be regarded as universal, if it is admitted that all people adhere to the idea of equal individual freedom and should have the sense of joy as a result of equal freedom. But how one may determine the adherence of all people to the state of equal freedom, if you take into account the people of the past and of the future, whom you can not already or can not yet put the question? Nobody has yet questioned all people living at present in the world about this matter.

The hypothesis that each person would like to be engaged in his own business without mediators and undesired interference seems to be true. However, it is not clear whether there exist age, gender and profession distinctions in the definition of rights and liabilities of people in family, industrial, social and political cultures. It is difficult without explanation of the aspects of the problem to formulate clearly the definition of universal meaning of metaprinciple of autonomy and of “cosmopolitan democracy” at the same time.

The review of universality of the proposed principles seems to be consisted in “thinking from the point of view of others”. The conceptualization is needed from the impartial moral point of view, which makes it possible to evaluate and to correct individual forms of practical thinking. The arbitration court should occupy impartial position. But such arbitration court may function only in case, if among its members there are no representatives of individual groups and countries, which possess their own ideological positions and interests. The judicial proceedings of the contemporary international courts clearly demonstrate that this situation is probable only in exceptional cases. As a rule, the particular private interest of dominant political alliances is realized in the principles, which acquired universal sense.

However, David Held considers that mataprinciple of impartialist Reasoning (MPIR) opens the way for moral perspective, which may serve as the device to concentrate our thoughts and our actions in the direction of inter-subjective value of common good comprehension. And this is the way of utilization of principles, norms and rules, which may give a reasonable command for achievement of common consent. However, as it seems, philosophic dilemmas contain impossibility of voluntary agreement of all participants. If “common consent” is understood as an establishment of dominant influence in the world of autocratic or cosmopolitan democracy, we will confront a new era of

resistance and struggle for preservation or restoration of planetary democracy.

## **5. Is it possible to keep planetary democracy?**

If from the philosophic point of view there are no justifications for reconstruction of planetary democracy, it means that its main motive has been mediated by economic and political interests. From the point of view of social realities, preservation of planetary democracy is primarily a problem of economic influence. If the U.S. and the West Europe raise their economic superiority in the world, the global positions of autocratic and cosmopolitan democracy will consolidate. At the same time, the process of civilization's unification and erosion of social ground of civilization's diversity will go on.

The situation of total advance of consumers' society ensuring the universal process of production and consumption of goods for global markets creates the needed conditions of constant growth of profits of transnational corporations, which covered the whole world by their industrial, communicative and informational connections.

The consolidation of global function of the transnational subject creates the requirement of universal culture opposing historically shaped unique cultures, which form the basic foundations of moral, esthetic and philosophic perceptions and consequently images of life. At the same time, of great significance becomes the issue of the place and functions of local civilizations in the context of globalization processes and trends of emergence of the universal civilization's subject. Does globalization means a start of the transition period in direction to the world order, which pushes out the system of sovereign states with equal rights and local civilizations? Is it possible to consider transnational corporations as a social-economic basis of universal subject with the right of repudiation of truth of life of sovereign states

and local civilizations? This kind of law recognized by the international community does not exist. The lack of the legal and moral justifications of such law demands its appropriation by the way of raising and consolidating the military might, which not only by action but also by its capacity should neutralize any self-dependent oppositional force. The elaboration of strategy for creation of military-technical infrastructure corresponding to the demands of solving this problem is needed to attain this aim. What is necessary to do to make this process psychologically acceptable? It may be made acceptable in the following case: if you “put down” the system of existing human relations to the level of mutual action of biological species.

When the united natural essence of inter-ethnic and inter-racial relations is taken out to the surface of civilization’s life and is presented as **the priority**, there emerges the perception that only “culture of survival” corresponds to this essence. This “culture” makes utilization of force as a natural and “legitimized” act, since the common norms of human relations worked out by civilization’s history become exhausted. The priority of force for solving global problems in terms of this “culture” starts to be identified with the real but not an illusionary mechanism of attainment of civilization’s truth.

The well-known aphorism “The Force is not in God but in Truth” is turned head over heels: “God is not in Truth but in Force”. This perception starts to have influence on the characteristic of international relations, on appraisals of aggressive and destructive actions, on appearance of deliberate disinformation for interpretation of events, on the judgements awarded by international courts. The unilateralism of world policy is being formed step by step. In this context they strive not for true impartiality in settlement of international disputes but for imitation of impartiality, which becomes a kind of rule in international life.

In order to imitate impartiality it is necessary to exclude from international discourse the real dialogue between sovereign subjects coming to agreement as a result of the dialogue. In this case, there is no need of the voluntary agreement. The prevailed force makes everybody “be agreed” with the real or potential victor. Victory is a success, and the success is evidence of truth. It means that the victor is the carrier of truth.

The most powerful party in the contemporary world becomes the sole and permanent proprietor of “truth”. This “logic” puts in brackets a chance to express your own actual truth to the carriers of local civilizations’ values. But the real truth does not disappear and waits for a chance of its emergence. The analogous situation shapes in the relations between autocratic and cosmopolitan democracies. Both democracies orient themselves to its own model as an entity with universal sense. The establishment of this sense by all accessible means is regarded as a noble moral and lawful objective defining the global function of the elites. But who selects them? In essence, they select themselves for accomplishment of the global mission.

David Held is convinced that combination of metaprinciples of impartial thinking and autonomy creates epistemological justification of common agreement on the basis of cosmopolitan thinking. However, such combination is in evident contradiction with the original basis of the idea of the “World League of Democracies”, which emerges as a reaction to absence of common agreement and to impossibility of its attainment in principle. The World League of Democracies is summoned to make as universal the aims and objectives of the exclusive group of countries but not of all civilization’s subjects.

The chance to combine provisions of the World League of Democracies with cosmopolitan democracy emerges in this vocation. Their mission may be fulfilled in two practical forms: in the form of



direct pressure with the use of military forces; or in the form of persuasion with the task to incorporate “truth” in profane consciousness of “non-consecrated” as an evidence of the fact that it is more profitable to recognize this “truth” than to refuse to do it. David Held considers that the dialogue with other civilizations is possible so far as they declare about their intention to fulfill certain conditions, namely – to respect autonomy of each individual, moral dignity of all, to recognize preservation of agreement and public democratic life.

But is democracy able to stand autonomy of each person and moral dignity of all, if, for instance, a person starts to defend positions of racism and political practice of terrorism, if diapason of autonomy of persons may start from Franklin Delano Roosevelt and terminates with Al Capone? Is it possible to make terms for other civilizations, if you yourself are unable to observe them? It is possible only in the case, if your own position is regarded as exclusive and not subject to discussion. If we raise the demand to respect autonomy of each individual, all the more the principles of democracy should demand respect of autonomy of every civilizational subject represented in the form of sovereign state. Global democracy emerged exactly on this basis of principle.

The various civilizations’ manifestations of global democracy started to be accepted as authentic in the situation emerged after the Second World War. Does in real life exists an ideal model with not local but universal meaning, which makes it possible to define the recognized authentic civilization’s manifestations? Is it possible to create the scale as a means for integral conclusion about “authenticity” or “non-authenticity” of the order of life in some or other country? In its historic time, this problem appeared permanently. Both the East and the West, each in its way, defined the signs of “unfaithful” and waged “Holy War” against them. We, on the basis of enlightened positions,

see the lack of objectivity of bloody victims of religious wars in the past history. But will the democratic world start a new “Holy War”? Such questions are inevitable, if civilization’s authenticity is considered outside the sense of democracy, while its spread in global extension is qualified as an absolute and priority task and aim of contemporary civilization. But do we need a mechanism “to jam” the voices, which, according to the carriers of “true” democracy do not coincide with the demands of the established “ideal model”? Authenticity of other voices should not be mixed with the nature and meaning of democracy, David Held considers (“Problems of Global Democracy: A Dialogue // Theory, Culture and Society”. Vol. 23. Number 5. September 2006, p. 119). It means that the strategy of democracy as an international policy definitely gives rise to dictate. If you recognize this thesis to be true, you should agree with justification of a non-provoked aggression against sovereign states and consequently with destruction of the principle foundations of the Organization of United Nations.

In this case, the Organization of United Nations may be kept as an artifact of the past epoch. This is the epoch of dominant sovereign states and diversity of civilizations on this ground. The diversity of civilizations dictates the need of impartiality in the attitude to the position of the other party. And in this case truth can not be considered as an attribute of only one form of civilization’s identity.

The response to this question anticipates the destiny of local civilizations: may they be considered as “valuable” or they are marked by “inferiority”, which dooms them to disappearance in the structure of new democracy?

Local civilization in “skimmed” appearance contains in its tradition the many-centuries truth of its being. What is our attitude to this truth from the specific “highness” of our civilizational situation? We have our own history and our own traditions, and we know our

truth of being. If this truth of our being is within our tradition, what should be our attitude to other civilizations' voices? Should we adapt them to the common civilizational chorus or "jam" them as a display of dissonance to our perfect civilization's "solo". To respond to this question it is necessary to make clear the gnosiological situation giving birth to replacement of truth by its surrogate of force.

It seems that Heikki Patomaki made a step in this direction. He considers that the issue of truth or a more general problem of value of any assertion may not be solved only on the basis of identity of the speaker or the writer. Rather, we should strive for such impartiality as it is possible in the course of various trans-cultural global dialogues, he thinks (*Ibidem*, p. 119).

From the ontological point of view, we start a dialogue as the shaped, complicated and mutually connected systems and possess ability to be engaged in trans-cultural discussion and teaching, which was arranged by our geo-historic experience. Colonialism showed us, what can mean a priory the consolidation of superiority of western perception and western political theories, Heikki Patomaki asserts.

The meta-theoretical form of fundamentalism emerges, and it becomes the basis of security's comprehension. This basis defies discussion. In the outcome, the core of political morality's beliefs constitutes a closed system. Can the carrier of this system regard himself a carrier of impartiality? For this sake, he forms in himself "the other I", an immaterial creature, who may be involved in a persuading dialogue. Here, "the other I" closes eyes to failures in argumentation and cites his reasons, which allow to avoid a real dialogue with a particular someone and to violate universal moral norms in relation to this opponent.

Imitation of impartiality lets keep both semblance of honesty and moral pathos in standing up for incorrect positions. The split emerges

between the world of impartiality of universal morality and the real world of bio-political determinants in the form of moral abstractions and legal categories. How one should estimate this split? Is it a sign of erosion of consciousness and absence of moral hardships in execution of egoistic decisions of global policy? Or is it, as Heikki Patomaki thinks, a sign of “unhappy consciousness”, which is incapable to solve moral problems of real life? Evidently, the answer to these questions is in specifics of individual morality hidden from strangers’ glances.

It may be said from the social point of view, that the absence of balance of forces promotes formation of a closed system of political morality, where reality of truth is ignored in moral position of the definite other party. The original moral justification of “impartiality” in use of forceful action becomes “cultural violence”, imposition on civilizational diversity of the contemporary world of sketchiness of “selected” and “non-selected”, of “ours” and “strangers”. Such “cultural violence” is accepted as a spiritual justification of use of military force for “correction” of “untrue” way of life and behavior” of representatives of other civilizations. As a result, from the point of view of culture and from the ethical point of view, the closed systems of political morality may include the right of forceful action. Just therefore Heikki Patomaki as a European expressed his protest against Euro-centrism in the model of “cosmopolitan democracy”. He considers that this model is a formula and, finally, the real potential for global democratic wars as a display of imperialism.

It is difficult not to agree with it. The former models of Euro-centrism as a justification of imperialist policy have run counter realities of contemporary global life.

The conception of autocratic and cosmopolitan democracy “forcing out” the principles of global democracy does not propose positive solving of problems, which confront the mankind. The way of

economic and political pressure and usage of armed force brings the civilization's progress to a deadlock leaving behind civilization's debris and growing waves of terrorism. It is not by accident that the mankind confronts ecologic, energy, resource, food, demographic and climatic problems, which find their solving in other ways, on the basis of common principles of sovereign states' international life, as well as by formation of wider social movements advancing demand of the environment's protection, life-saving of fauna and flora, reduction of industrial mechanisms' negative impact on the planetary climate.

The more significant role in forming social climate is plaid by the international reciprocal action of representatives of the scientific community, the arrangement of representative international conferences elaborating scientifically justified practical recommendations for determination of efficient approaches to solving urgent problems of the mankind. The question is creation of the needed conditions for preservation life on the planet Earth. The combination of the states' efforts becomes the rule for overcoming the consequences of technical and natural catastrophes.

There appears a deeper comprehension of the fact that the correct use of civilization's diversity is not an obstacle but the means of discovering probable non-standard decisions in arising non-standard situations. The globalization's processes demand teaching to listen to each other. The global subject becomes a pluralistic entity by its character. For instance, the subject keeping under its control the situation in the river Amazon delta becomes the global subject, since normal functioning of "the lungs" depends on preservation of forests in the river Amazon delta. But in the contemporary mutually connected world such global subjects emerge everywhere, in all key regions of the Earth. The contemporary situation objectively gives rise to new demands of arrangement of the world economic and trade regime,

financial reforms creating favorable conditions for establishment of new types of technology directed to the spread of pure industries, economical utilization of natural resources. It should become a real strategic aim of industrial and agricultural production as well as the change of its incentives and meaning of economic policy.

The political strategies are subject to changes. It is evident that solving contemporary problems is impossible without formation of the global political movement comprising both civil representatives and representatives of sovereign states.

Heikki Patomaki clearly sees the formation of new demands of civilizational evolution of the contemporary world and comes forward for cultivation of democratic pluralism, which by means of its new directions will consolidate the foundation of the reform in various spheres, including the sphere of politics. This strategy is comprehended in public processional notions but not in a closed model. These reforms may be accomplished by a peaceful and democratic way despite resistance of some superpowers, transnational corporations and financial institutions.

These gaining strength tendencies of the contemporary civilizations' evolution do not correspond to the purposes of autocratic and cosmopolitan democracy. By means of information technologies and secret services these purposes were given an idealized image decorated like a balloon showing to the mankind the way to the paradise. However, the balloon's cover was punctured, and it is difficult to patch up the appeared "holes".

The use of tortures, bombardment of peaceful settlements resulted in a lot of human victims, arrangement of leaders of sovereign states, provoking internal civil wars and even taking part in it on one side – all these events spoil the image, which in its time won the heart of adepts of "new democracy" of the newest western model. The lacked

balloon burst due to significant punctures and started to lose its original splendor. The idol of adepts' dream perishes in various countries. They suffer and, probably, cry, although not so loudly as fanatics in North Korea mourn over death of Kim Jong-il. It seems that they do it not less sincerely. It is possible to hope that it will become a process with sobering effect on them and will lead to spiritual self-cleaning, which will let comprehend that the present global civilizational subject is not a decorated figure of Goliath holding "big baton", but the unity of diversity of sovereign state and civil subjects covering inter-ethnic and inter-racial, inter-personal, language and spiritual spheres of civilizations' life. The problem of governance of contemporary trends of global development, of putting them in order and directing in the positive creative channel resembles a shaping and developing chorus of the orchestra, where each instrument with its specificity performs its melody, which merges with all other instruments and lets forming an actual harmony of heroic symphony of global self-governance of the countries and peoples of the contemporary world.

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**ARABIC REVOLUTIONS AS A FACTOR  
OF INFLUENCE ON INTERNAL RUSSIAN POLICY**

Spring in 2011 suddenly was marked by the events, which were not foreseen even by well versed political analysts. Some countries of the North Africa from Tunis to Libya turned out to be rapidly

destabilized by a wave of people's protests against the ruling political regimes with actual inherited-dynastic character, despite republican (presidential) system of governance. The ordinary democratic wave, in words of S. Huntington, with the speed of political tsunami covered the Islamic world putting a number of uneasy problems before analysts. The first of them is as follows: how to incorporate these events in logic of the third wave of democratic transit starting in the middle of the 1970s? Do we confront the fourth democratic wave or sub-wave within the framework of the united transformation process? Or is this unexpected wave of its own Arabic origin and its own unique nature? The last question corresponds to the version expressed by specialists (primarily, by S. Huntington) yet in the beginning of 1990s about the failure of the democratic process to overcome Islamic bastions for reason of full lack of convergence of valuable foundations of Islamic and western civilizations. Nevertheless, the demonstrators on the square Tahrir in Cairo, like in other capital's squares of Arabic states, raised demands of freedom of speech, meetings, justice in distribution of incomes, political representation et., which may be evaluated as democratic demands. In other words, the democratic winds reached the boundaries of the Islamic world as well.

The following question is quite logical: what are the reasons of these processes? To all appearance, we see a complex of reasons, which conditioned a cumulative effect being pernicious for authoritarian rulers of this region.

A special attention should be paid to the institutional context of developing processes, exactly the character of the political regime. The situation in the discussed countries more often than in others is defined as "decaying semi-authoritarian regime" by American researchers. In the beginning of the 2000s they included in this group of countries Egypt and Azerbaijan (the prognoses for the latter mention analogous



events in the near future). The mere fact of being in power for the period of 30–40 years and firm intention to give it to the successors testifies to the limitless self-confidence of the ruling leaders, which together with the unbelievable personal enrichment led to the explosion of people's dissatisfaction.

At the same time, side by side with the political factor, there exist also other remote causes of emerged macro-conflicts, for instance, economic factors. For the last half of century, particularly for the last two-three decades, the Arabs endured the on-going crisis, which exists today. There are multi-planned causes of this crisis: war against Israel, increasing influence of religious extremists, rising social injustice, particularly against background of corruption of many power structures and their intention to suppress a different trend of thought, as well as the growing gap between the rich and the poor. The tempos of economic development of most of 22 member-countries of the League of Arabic States significantly slowed and turned out to be the lowest on the planet. Actually, one third of the population in the Arabic East is illiterate and almost the same part of it lives having daily income of \$ 2. The backwardness of the Arabic world is especially evident against the background of economic successes of East and South-East Asia, which started from almost equal positions but left Arabs far behind. And this situation occurred, despite the fact that the Near East possesses almost two thirds of the energy-bearers' resources, while the self-cost of extraction of the black gold is actually by an order of magnitude greater than, for instance, in Russia.

The situational causes, including grave social problems occurred due to the world financial-economic crisis, primarily unemployment, which aggravated the position of not only the poorest strata of the population but also of the safe middle class – banks' employees, state officials etc. These hardships were particularly painfully met by the

youth, which instantly confronted disappearance of chances for professional carrier, rising mobility etc. Not accidentally, just the youth (“Face-book youth”, by definition of some observers) became the main driving force of protest movements.

It should be said that the demographic factor, i.e. the growing share of young people in the social structure of the population attracted attention of researchers. The changes in the demographic balance of the population are regarded as a factor of not only internal but also international policy. The augmentation of one group gives rise to the political, economic and social pressure upon other groups and causes the counteraction. And what is more important, this circumstance engenders military pressure on the demographically less dynamic groups. For instance, for the 1970s, in Sri-Lanka the peak of Sinhalese nationalist mutiny and of Tamils uprising in the end of the 1980s coincided exactly with the years, when “the wave of the youth” including people from fifteen to twenty years exceeded the share of 20% in the total number of the group. Actually, all Sinhalese guerillas were less than 24 years old, and “Tigers of Tamil”, as was reported, were unique in this kind, since they were supported in essence by an army of children comprising boys and girls at the age started from eleven years. The Tigers waged “the war of adolescents”, as marked English magazine “Economist”. In an analogous way conflicts and even wars marked by the gap between different ethnic groups were supported by a great difference in growth of the population. For the 1980s, Chechnya was one of the most densely populated territories of Russia, since the number of Chechens was increased by 26%. The high birth rate in the republic resulted in emergence of re-settlers and fighters. And not any exclusion represented the complicated and dramatic processes resulted in the inter-civilizations’ wars in former Yugoslavia. They were marked by many causes and stating points.

However, it was quite probable that the most significant factor was the change of demographic situation in Kosovo. By the 1980s, about 50% of Albanians were young people at the age less than twenty years. The changed demographic balance led to the situation, when Albanians proclaimed the demand of raising the status of Kosovo to the status of Yugoslavian republic. The ethnic expansion of one group led to ethnic purges on the part of the other group. Thus, the changes in demographic balances and “peaks of the youth” in twenty and greater percent were “responsible” for inter-civilizations’ conflicts in the end of the XX century.

The role of the moral factor seems to be also rather significant. The essential role was plaid by channel “Wiki-Leaks”, which publicized the facts of corruption of the ruling circles, of huge riches accumulated by the ruling dynasties. This kind of information explosion shook the consciousness of millions of people. Together with economic problems caused by the global financial crisis the exposing publications made their contribution to formation of common dissatisfaction and mass protest mobilization.

At present, three main forces come forward to the proscenium of Arabic policy. First of all, it is the youth supported, as a rule, by secular opposition parties, as well as by the armed forces and Islamists, which by the level of influence in society and in case of actually free democratic elections are capable to collect not less than the third of votes, according to various estimates. The young educated people will never reconcile with the role of extras – mere observers of political processes, and they raise the demand of ensuring their actual participation in the political process and in the governance of the state. The particular ways of these revolutionary transformations will differ and to a great extension will depend on practical correlation of forces, the skill in bringing forward the slogans responding to the spirit of the

moment and the needs of people and the ability present convincing arguments, some specialists think. The Arabic world will never be the same as in the old days, and the tempos of reforms will only accumulate the force, considers Director of the Center for Partnership of Civilizations of the MSIIR(U) of the MFA of the RF V. Popov.

The identification of these events represents a significant problem. What was it: social revolutions, political revolutions, youth revolutions (by composition of participants) or subversive actions inspired from abroad in relation to legitimate governments? The publications in the national literature appeared soon after the analyzed events may contain also recent quite conspiratorial versions of them.

However, national experts, scholars of the Orient hold other, academic views and appraisals. In particular, V. Naumkin, the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS thinks that the events in Arabic countries almost by 100% have the social but not the religious implication. For instance, in Tunis the Islamist movement is very weak, and no religious impact was marked there. To his mind, it was the revolution of the youth characterized by the term “Face-book youth”. Another matter is that the clergy and Islamic organizations might support this movement inter alia in their sermons. In Egypt “Muslim Brothers” took part in this movement. But neither the slogans pronounced by participants, nor the composition of the movement let make conclusion that Islamists plaid the key role in it. In Libya the events were connected with internal inter-tribal relations, with the loss of popularity of Qaddafi regime, leaving aside the social disease, such as unemployment, which deteriorated position of 30% of the population. At present, therefore the discussion on the Islamic threat is absolute unconstructive and unfruitful.

According to G. Mirsky, a senior researcher in the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the RAS, it was a real

social revolution, since the movement of great masses of people against the ruling regime was caused by their dissatisfaction with a great gap between the elite and society, corruption, arbitrary actions and rude behavior of the police, the lack of freedom of speech.

R. Silantyev, a scholar of Islam, the Deputy Chairman of the Expert Council for State Religious Expertise at the Ministry of Justice also considers that the events in Arabic countries were characterized by the mixed composition: Islamists may use the social protest of the people for their own aims, and it is not clear, what will be the outcome of it. According to E. Bazhanov, the Deputy Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the MFA of Russia, the opposition was nourished primarily by the aggravation in Muslim states of social evils: property stratification, corruption, poverty, unemployment and criminality. It was provoked as well by policy of the U.S. – assistance rendered to Israel, military invasion to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The experts by common consent expressed the view that Islamization of the region is possible but is not a sole option of development in the region. The experience of revolution in Iran in 1978 gave rise of the perception that any mass opposition movement in Muslim countries is possible only under the banner of fundamentalist Islam. And what is more, democratization of the state under these conditions is equal to Islamization. A recent justification of this tactic's rightness seemed to justify the results of general elections in Gaza, which showed the victory of fundamentalists of Hamas, said A. Umnov, senior researcher of IMEMO RAS.

However, these assertions ignore rather essential peculiarities of Shiite Muslims teaching dominant in Iran and Sunni trend dominant in almost all countries of the Arabic East. The Shiite fundamentalist clergy of Iran was able to unite under its leadership the people's movement against the existing power. In Sunni countries the clergy is

unable to do it not only due to certain local conditions but also in principle. At the same time, as thinks A. Umnov, the extremist wing of fundamentalists, becoming disillusioned in “parliamentarian” means of struggle, may again try “to waken the people” by terrorist acts. Other experts share this prognosis.

What do these processes mean for Russia?

In the end of February 2011, the president D. Medvedev at the meeting with members of the National Anti-terrorist Committee in Vladikavkaz supposed that the revolutions in Arabic countries would have “direct impact” on the situation in Russia but “this scenario would not work”. The solution of the terrorist problem, according to the president, depends on the development of the North Caucasian region and “the maxim support of Russian Islam”. Some days later, the prime-minister V. Putin at the press-conference in Brussels said that despite the reassuring theses that coming to power and growth of influence of radical groups in the countries of the North Africa was hardly probable, these events excited concern. First prime-minister of the Russian government I. Shuvalov at the press-conference “Russia and the World: in Search for Innovation Strategy” made the prognostication that Arabic countries would endure dismal life in future and would soon learn what happened after revolutions.

These views show that the Russian ruling elite attentively keeps an eye on the Arabic East and thinks about probable preventive measures to exclude in Russia something of the kind. The question is to what extent of adequacy and thorough evaluation the elites comprehend the reasons of political troubles in the North Africa and the Near East. At present, the evident attempts are seen to overestimate the role of Islamists in the events in the Near East, some experts point out. According to V. Naumkin, it would be a counter-productive meaning to

regard foreign Islamist circles to be responsible for what is going in the North Caucasus.

At the same time, in Russia there exist the structured factors, which gave rise to the protest wave, and the Russian authorities should take them into account. For instance, there are the same social reasons of dissatisfaction: poverty, enormous social stratification, the lack of valuable social guarantees, the dominant influence of bureaucracy, which deprives the youth of prospects to make carrier etc. And the corresponding moral factor is as follows: the enormous social injustice, the defiant lavishness exposed to other people, the impunity of criminal groups enjoying protection of law enforcement bodies etc. The mere fact that for the years of the financial crisis, despite the world trend, Russia became the leader in terms of the number of dollar billionaires speaks for itself.

Of particular significance are political reasons, for instance, stagnation of the ruling elite accompanied by the large scaled corruption and direct theft. For the last years, the tendency to blocking the channels of the ascending vertical mobility becomes more distinct, which demonstrates the urge of the ruling class towards the objective to “capsulize” political regime, to deny inflow of new young energetic people, who do not belong to the system, regarded A. Solovyev. The institutions of civil society, which in developed democratic countries come forward as a kind of insurance net in case of force-major circumstances, are very weak and are unable to play this role. Besides, the authorities regard them as rivals and create all possible obstacles for their activities.

However, nobody has yet liquidated the law of change in the political sphere, and “the zero years” of stability are gradually replaced by the years of political dynamics nourished, inter alia, by the political campaigns of 2011 and 2012. The political mobilization of the Russian

youth, which may occur instantly, and the events in the Manezh square in Moscow in December 2011 had an impact on the Russian authorities, who were downright frightened just by the fact itself of a mass protest mobilization.

One should not forget that Muslims also live in Russia. Over 90% of Muslims are not well aware of what is going on in Arabic countries and do not intend to struggle against “the unfaithful”, G. Mirsky regards. In the majority of the regions with Muslim population, primarily in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, Muslims maintain quite normal relations with Russians. And if they have some reasons for dissatisfaction, it does not mean that they are ready to arrange uprising against “Russian supremacy”.

However, there exist a small but very vigorous stratum of Islamists not only in the North Caucasus, known as wahhabies, but also in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. For the last time it became evident that a number of religious representatives, having got education in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, came back and started to sermonize rather radical ideas. If Islamists gain a victory in Arabic countries and if the Arabic world is grabbed by the wave of Islamization, this situation will be presented by propaganda of Islamists as a defeat of the West and a triumph of Al-Qaida, which will give a push to development of Islamism in Russia.

It is needed to take into account the existence of solidarity of Muslims. Muslims in many parts of the world are upset by events in Palestine and express their indignation with the fact that the Holy Places are located within the territory of the Jewish state, feel wars keenly, when Muslim forces come forward, on the one side, and the western, American forces, on the other side. The united Muslim state – from Morocco to Indonesia – will never exist, but the feeling that it is necessary to be able to stand up for at least some part of Muslims will



disseminate wider. This is a significant problem particularly in case, if anti-Islamic nationalist feelings grow on the other side. The great rise of hostile attitude to Islam by Russians would be an ideal option for terrorists.

Thus, the impact of events in distant Arabic countries on the world and regional political processes is felt rather evidently. At present, the zone of political risk is much wider than the Arabic world, and Russia is not the exclusion.

*“Vlast i obshchestvo: Vzaimodeystvie i conflicty”. Voronezh, 2011, pp. 302–308.*

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### **DEPOLITICIZATION OF ISLAM AS THE BASIS OF STABILIZATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS**

One of the key factors capable seriously to destabilize the political process in the North Caucasus is Islamism, or political Islam, which emerged in the region during the past two decades and which has objective and subjective reasons, as well as internal and external political sources.

As we see it, the most effective struggle with radical Islamism, and hence, the stabilization of the ethnopolitical process in the North Caucasus can only be carried on within the framework of the strategy of the depoliticization of Islam. The conditions of depoliticization in the North Caucasus are as follows: first, to search for effective means to resolve the problems causing the politicization of Islam in its radical variant at the level of other social subsystems (economic, legal, religious, etc.); secondly, to alleviate the timeliness and high social significance of the problems causing the politicization of Islam in the

North Caucasus and their return to the purely religious sphere; thirdly, to block the possibilities of using political technologies aimed at artificial politicization of Islam in the North Caucasus by domestic and foreign actors which take part in transferring the pressing problems from religious to political sphere.

Among the main trends ensuring prevention of religious-political violence are political-legal, administrative-coercive, socio-economic, and religious-ideological. Measures in the first three trends of the depoliticization of Islam have been taken in recent years and first results can already be seen, but, unfortunately, there are no changes in the religious-political sphere. However, it is precisely this sphere that is the crucial one in the fight against the extreme forms of religious-political activity. This is conditioned, first, by the very nature of Islamism due to which its political practice is founded on the ideological basis. Secondly, there is an acute spiritual and ideological crisis in the region, which in itself is one of the reasons for the politicization and radicalization of religion. What then should be done to ensure security in the religious-ideological sphere?

The spiritual-ideological trend in resolving the problem of the politicization of Islam and stabilization of the political process in the North Caucasus should proceed, first of all, from the need to ensure spiritual security in North-Caucasian society and, secondly, from importance of the speedy choice of the ideological development vector of the state, reflecting the complex social specificity of the region and allowing the coordinate all state, public and personal interests.

Despite the fact that the problems of spiritual security have become acute quite a long time ago, professional interest in them has appeared only in recent years. Nevertheless, there is no commonly accepted interpretation of spiritual security as yet. Most researchers tend to agree that it is one of the crucial elements of national and

civilizational security included in all their types and at all levels. This is connected with the exclusive universality of the spiritual sphere of society, which incorporates ethical and religious communities, social, political and legal institutions, political parties, corporations, families, etc. – the fundamental ideas concerning social standards, values, social orders, ideals, interaction and contacts of people, social communities, and also material bearers of cultural values.

Dealing with the problem of security, including spiritual security, researchers and scholars, as a rule, concentrate attention on protection from definite threats which is represented by methodologically effective and widely used categories allowing us to describe thoroughly enough what sphere should be protected from whom and how. From the general theoretical positions the concept of “danger” or “threat” is characterized by a condition under which a possibility emerges to inflict damage on a system (society, the state, civilization), and also a negative, mostly abstract, impact on it is fixed. Danger is transformed into threat just as abstract impact becomes real. This is why the concept “threat” reflects the greater degree of reality which can have a negative impact on the system, and is determined as a sign of direct danger of inflicting damage.

Among the real threats to spiritual security in the North Caucasus are:

Devaluation of spiritual values, propaganda of mass culture based on the cult of violence, on spiritual and cultural values contradicting the values generally accepted in Russian society;

Demographic and cultural-religious expansion of neighboring states to the territory of a given country and region;

Increased dependence of the spiritual, economic and political spheres of social life on foreign information structures;

Lower spiritual, moral and creative potential of the population of a country and region;

Religious-political extremism and terrorism, nationalism and ethnic separatism;

Greater activity of transborder organized criminal groupings and foreign terrorist organizations;

Manipulation of information (misinformation, defamation, failure to report information or its distortion).

As we see, most threats to spiritual security in the North Caucasus are of an information character. The Concept of national security of the Russian Federation connects the increasing threats to the country's national security in the information sphere with the "elaboration by some states of concepts of information wars," which envisage the creation of means of dangerous impact on the information sphere of Russia.

Information war boils down to purposeful instruction of the enemy about how to destroy its own defense system. The task of using the information weapon consists of helping the enemy to direct the means at his disposal, including technical means, against himself, using his "genetic" knowledge for the self-destruction of the system. Information war is aimed not at annihilating manpower, but at undermining the aims, views and the world outlook of the population and destroying society as such. This is why a system struck by information weapon is guided in its behavior not so much by its own interests as by alien commands. The greater orientation of behavior to alien commands the deeper information defeat.

What we have just said is related to the impact of Islamism on North-Caucasian society, especially its young section, inasmuch as it is precisely its consciousness that is susceptible to such influence most of all. In this connection the question of ensuring religious security, which

is one of the key elements of spiritual security of Russia in the North Caucasus, is especially urgent.

The importance of this problem became evident in 1996, when the State Duma of the Russian Federation in its address “To the President of the Russian Federation on dangerous consequences of the influence of certain religious organizations on the health of society, the family and citizens of Russia” proposed that “religious security should be regarded as one on a par with military, political, economic, ecological and social security.” The problem remains as crucial as before, which is largely due to the fact of the presence of the principle formulated in part 2, Article 14 of the Constitutions of the Russian Federation proclaiming equality of religious associations formed by citizens.

It becomes evident that the existing legislation does not take into account the fact that different confessions have different, often contradictory, views on law, statehood, power, morality, etc. For example, the first persons who drew attention of the authorities and public to the danger connected with spreading the ideological practices of the neo-Wahhabi movement were figures of the official Islamic clergy of Daghestan. Their first statements on the matter made in 1994–1995 and addressed to the supreme leadership of the republic contained serious accusations of the Wahhabi movement and demanded to ban it. However, it should be noted that the regional ruling elite in that period underestimated the danger connected with the possible negative consequences of the politicization of the Islamic movement, which had a serious influence on the position of Moslem traditionalists. As a result, there are from two to 10 percent neo-Wahhabi believers among all Russian Muslims (that is, from 300 to 1,500 people). The greater part of them is in the North Caucasian republics of Chechnya,

Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cerkessia, and Stavropol Territory.

Taking into account the connection of religious organizations with the political system of a state on whose territory they operate, foreign missionaries, directly or indirectly, act as messengers of a state whose interests they represent. In a geopolitical plane, missionary activity can be considered as ideological expansion against certain Russian regions. As V. Kalinin, an expert on religious affairs, writes: "...The authorities and society do not devote due attention to the very serious problem of missionary activity in Russia by foreign religious organizations in a geopolitical aspect. Meanwhile, the activity of this type at present and in the future poses a serious threat to the country's security, integrity and the normal functioning of state and government bodies. A considerable part of the missionary activity of foreign religious organizations poses a grave threat to the country's national interests."

An active "ideological struggle" has unfolded in the religious sphere of public consciousness. Russian spiritual leaders more often use such words in their articles, speeches and TV and radio broadcasts as "destructive religious organizations," "totalitarian sects," "spiritual aggression," "brainwashing," etc. The problem of protecting its spiritual sphere has become quite acute for Russian society today. Russia should wage a struggle for the hearts and minds of young people of the new generation, which is crucial for peace and security in the North Caucasus.

Such concern is easily understandable, for a wide spectrum of non-traditional faiths which has appeared in recent years gives a person an opportunity to choose faith. However, this choice largely depends not so much on its foundations, traditional character and value for Russian statehood, its significance in Russian history and popularity

among the population, as on its outward attractiveness, its orientation to concrete sections of the population, skill of preachers in their sermons and ability to make it more attractive.

Thus, spiritual security of the North Caucasus, and Russia as a whole, for that matter, is among the most unrealized public requirements. On the one hand, it is connected with the fact that spiritual security *per se* does not hold any special place in the system of national security and there is no exact definition of its specific functions in public life. On the other hand, the problem of ensuring spiritual security boils down exclusively to defense against definite dangers and threats, which does not allow us to take into account the inner state of this system determined by the interaction of its elements (subjects), which, in turn, should ensure the normal functioning of this system, as well as the functioning and development of society as a whole, irrespective of the presence/absence of these or other threats. In other words, it is necessary to create such system of spiritual security which would be directed not only to protection “from,” but also would take into account the need to create a system of security “for”: socio-cultural welfare of the individual,.. defense of the values of one’s way of life,.. the sphere of intellectual contacts, and the inner world of man.” Everyday life and practice show that it is very difficult to realize the character of dangers and threats and evolve a reliable and effective mechanism to oppose them, even if they have been clearly and legally defined.

In view of this, spiritual security should be regarded as a specific component of national security included in all its aspects and representing the state of person, society and power and ensuring their normal interaction and functioning, and also the creative civilizational progress of the existing religious way of life. On the other hand, this is the process of the preservation and positive change of ideas, ideals,

values, standards and traditions prevailing in society and shared by the masses of people and structures of power with an aim of social reproduction guaranteeing the stability of the vector, continuity and dynamics of social development.

A no less important aspect in overcoming the spiritual-ideological crisis and capable to oppose the politicization of Islam is the speedy choice of the ideological development vector of Russia. It is crucial because political Islam is an ideological challenge which should be answered ideologically and theologically in order to offer and substantiate the peaceful practice of political relations. In order to oust Islamic radicalism from human consciousness, people should be offered a no less powerful ideological alternative. Nationalism has already tried to throw a challenge to Islamism, but lost. Communist ideology has not recovered after the shock caused by the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the world socialist system, and it cannot be regarded as a real alternative. Liberal democratic ideology, which the Russian authorities tried to turn into the foundation of their policy, is alien, even hostile, to most Muslims, especially in rural districts.

It becomes evident that the ideological answer to Islamism should be formulated in religious terms. As we see it, the most effective and real project capable to rally poly-ethnic and multiconfessional Russian society in the North Caucasus and actively oppose the aggression of Islamists would be the Eurasian (neo-Eurasian) concept. Despite the fact that this is a religious ideology founded on the basis of Orthodox Christianity, it has time and again confirmed its consolidating ability.

A positive element of this ideology is the desire to establish allied relations between Islam and Orthodox Christianity and preserve the unity of Russia as a unique cultural and political entity. The Eurasian concept is approved by quite a few Muslim and non-Muslim



religious and political figures. Among them were Ahmat Kadyrov and A. Panarin.

It should be borne in mind that different political forces can interpret “Eurasian concept” differently. Naturally, it should be modified and revised by Muslim thinkers on the basis of Muslim values.

To conclude, it should be said that the politicization of Islam in the North Caucasus will continue to increase and become stronger and hence, it will continue to determine the character and dynamics of political life. It should be admitted that the existing situation in the North Caucasus seriously threatens the national security of Russia and requires new approaches with due account of the socio-economic and spiritual-ideological character of the problem. A struggle against religious-political extremism and terrorism is also a struggle against the further politicization and radicalization of Islam and it is a must for the stabilization of ethno-political life in the North Caucasus.

*“Mir cherez yazyk, obrazovaniye i kulturu: Rossiya – Kavkaz – Mirovoye soobshchestvo,” Pyatigorsk, 2011, pp. 105–113.*

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## **AZERBAIJAN IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

The “march-past of sovereignties,” which took place in the late 1980s – early 1990s in Russia resulted in the complete remake of the geographical and political map of Eurasia, on which new independent states appeared that took up an independent development path in the international arena proceeding from their own interests and requirements. Each state was striving to establish multifarious, multi-

vector ties, sometimes contradicting their previous historical and ideological foreign-policy course, or, to be more exact, the course pursued by the government of the former federal state. This concerns not only global relations, but also regional integration.

It was such processes that began in the 1990s, and continue to this day, in the South Caucasus, particularly, in Azerbaijan, which started to tackle the problems of its integration in the world community practically from scratch. The national interests of a newly-independent republic were now based on new laws, presupposing orientation to outside forces. The latter were represented by regional and world powers, primarily Russia and the United States, as well as Turkey. Apart from them, other republics of the South Caucasus and the Middle East, namely, Armenia, Georgia and Iran, due to their historical and ethno-confessional closeness, have also become an inalienable part of Azerbaijan's political development. However, taking into account the role and place of these countries in the priority direction of the national foreign-policy strategies of the United States and Russia, and also the degree of their influence in the region, their relations with Azerbaijan should be viewed in the context of precisely Russian and American regional and global interests. Thus Azerbaijan has been, and remains, an arena of the rivalry of stronger and more influential powers.

It so happened that the internal and foreign political situation around Azerbaijan has largely been determined by the events in Nagorno-Karabakh since 1988. Prolonged differences between Armenia and Azerbaijan around the territory have led to a conflict between the two nations which turned into a full-scale war and thus considerably aggravated the relations between the three Trans-Caucasian republics and their close neighbors. As a result, a situation has emerged in which the bilateral ties of Azerbaijan with its neighbors were largely determined by the latter's attitude to this conflict.

The prolonged military hostilities on the territory of Azerbaijan formally ended on May 12, 1994, when the Bishkek agreement went into force, which brought about ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the conflict has not been resolved and lives on in a frozen state: the two neighboring states have no diplomatic relations, there is no cooperation between them, and one self-proclaimed republic, which is not recognized by any country, exists between them. From a legal point of view, the situation is as follows: Armenia has occupied up to 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory, and there is no way out of it, inasmuch as the interests and demands of both sides are diametrically opposed. There is the view that the conflict in itself is not so important, but it is a reflection of more complex problems touching on the interests of Russia, the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Turkish Republic, which are interested not so much in resolving the Karabakh conflict as in reaching their own aims.

It should be said that Azerbaijan holds an important place among its neighbors which it has taken as a result of the foreign-policy activity of the political elites and their ideologies that have proclaimed diametrically opposite priorities and orientations, which could ultimately be reduced to two global directions – northern and western. Of course, the “surrounding medium” of Azerbaijan should not be confined to the exclusive bounds of Russia and the United States, the role of other important geostrategic actors should also be considered, primarily Turkey and Iran.

In the first half of the 1990s the foreign-policy course of the young republic was rather uneven and unstable. The first president of independent Azerbaijan, A. Mutalibov, paid much attention to international activity: contacts were established with the close neighbors, Iran and Turkey (the latter was the first country to officially recognize Azerbaijan's independence on November 9, 1991), the

Russian Federation, the United States, and many European countries. Azerbaijan has become member of the CIS, OIS, OSCE, and other international organizations. Baku has begun negotiations with representatives of foreign oil companies for the development of oil deposits on the Caspian continental shelf. This diplomatic activity pursued concrete aims, namely, to strengthen the country's international position and emphasize its importance on the local scene, and also to influence the world public with a view to favorably resolving the Karabakh conflict.

However, the domestic political situation in the country was far from stable, and soon another leader, with a harsher ideology, has come to power. A. Elchibei adhered to nationalist views and emphasized the historically strong ties between the Azerbaijani and Turkish peoples. His foreign-policy course considerably differed from that of his predecessor. Having proclaimed Turkey a strategic ally of Azerbaijan and the United States and NATO partners in the struggle against the "communist empire" and Iran, which were considered enemies, Elchibei and his team have taken an openly anti-Russian and anti-Iranian position. The new Azerbaijani leadership was striving to discontinue all political, military and economic relations with Russia. Elchibei demanded that Russia immediately withdraw all Russian troops from the territory of Azerbaijan and refused from maintaining any ties with the CIS countries. Being an ardent follower of Ataturk, Elchibei believed that complete orientation to Turkey would be a beneficial development model for Azerbaijan. It should be noted that Turkey was not against such developments. In August 1992 the first bilateral agreements on cooperation in military training were signed in Ankara. Apart from that, Turkey expressed unreserved support to Azerbaijan, especially in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and in all linguistic and ethnic ties. In 1992 Turkey severed all economic ties with

Armenia and a year later completely closed the Turkish-Armenian border.

Apart from a sharp deterioration of Azerbaijan's relations with Russia, the policy of the Azerbaijani leadership has led to a considerable worsening of its relations with Iran. Repeated statements of the leaders of the Azerbaijani political elite about the "need" to annex Southern Azerbaijan and join it to Northern were received in Tehran as provocative propaganda of separatism and encroachment of Iran's territorial integrity. Besides, in the conditions of a noticeable increase of Turkish influence in Azerbaijan, and especially more intensive interference of western states in its financial-economic sphere, Iranians began to be driven out of all spheres of life of the republic. Moreover, after the introduction of transport-economic blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan in 1992, a small section of the land border with the Islamic Republic of Iran remained the only outlet for Armenia's access to the outer world.

As a result, pan-Turkism as a reaction to the previous Russian influence and everything connected with it, has contributed to Azerbaijan's increasing isolation in the region. Evidently, such one-sided nationalist course could hardly exist for a long time. And so, a new president took power in Azerbaijan in 1993, Geidar Aliyev, who succeeded in achieving internal stabilization in the country and even continuity of his political course, which is now pursued by his son Ilkham Aliyev.

With Geidar Aliyev coming to power, the country's foreign policy has radically changed and ceased to be narrowly-oriented. G. Aliyev exerted no small effort to developing cooperation of his country with as many states as possible.

Among the first foreign-policy acts of the new president were a number of measures to improve his country's relations with Russia.

However, the No 1 problem was, as before, solution of the armed conflict with Armenia. In this connection Baku took part in various negotiations and meetings initiated by Russia and other countries. The Azerbaijani leadership hoped to get support from Russia on the Karabakh questions and end the war on worthy terms. However, peaceful initiatives of the new president during the first months of his staying in power brought no results. The passivity of the Russian leadership in rendering assistance to the new leadership of Azerbaijan was one of the reasons for “transfer of Baku on to the line of drawing closer to the West.” A certain worsening of bilateral relations took place in 1994 after the beginning of the military operations in Chechnya, when Russia actually closed the border with Azerbaijan and stopped all transport communications, suspecting that it helped the Chechen militants.

After President G. Aliyev’s official visit to Ankara in 1994, Azerbaijan has pursued the course of strategic cooperation with Turkey. Military-political cooperation took pride of place, because Baku regarded Turkey as a “mediator in its rapprochement with Washington and NATO.” The president of Azerbaijan did not agree to the Russian military presence in his country, rejected the offer for jointly guarding state borders, and then curtailed military cooperation with Russia.

We should note that 1994 was a decisive year in Azerbaijan’s destiny. On September 20, 1994, the “oil strategy” worked out by President G. Aliyev, scored a major success: the so-called contract of the century was signed with a consortium of foreign companies for the development of the oil deposits of the Caspian Sea. This event was the turning point in Azerbaijan’s relations with the outer world. The country proclaimed itself as an active actor in regional and global relations.

In subsequent years this pro-Turkish and pro-western position of Azerbaijan headed by Geidar Aliyev has strengthened and was continued later by his son, President Ilkham Aliyev.

In view of the fact that integration in the EuroAtlantic bodies is one of the priorities in Azerbaijan's foreign policy, an important place in the present policy of the country is cooperation with Turkey. The latter is a major regional partner of Azerbaijan in the economic and energy spheres. Several pipelines pass through Turkish territory supplying Europe with Azerbaijani oil and gas. A ramified network of pipelines on its territory can turn Turkey into a major transit state which would give it political and economic levers for greater influence in the South Caucasus, as compared to Russia and Iran.

It is very important for Azerbaijan that Turkey fully supports it in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, also insisting on the territorial integrity of the country.

Moreover, Turkey claims the role of the regional guarantor of security, putting forward initiatives and taking steps for the creation of a collective security system in the Caucasus within the framework of "the five" regional states (Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). In 2000 the president of Turkey put forward the idea of the "Caucasian Stability Pact," which would be open for signing by the countries of the South Caucasus, its neighbors and all OSCE countries. However, the pact was not signed at the time due to the position of Armenia, which declared that first the Turkish-Armenian relations should have been normalized; Russia adhered to a similar position. After the "five-day war" in 2008, Turkey proposed the creation of the Caucasian platform of stability and security. However, the future of this project remains rather dim, inasmuch as cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia and Georgia is not possible.

Another achievement of the Aliyevs was that the political course they pursued contributed to the development and improvement of the relations with another neighbor of Azerbaijan – Iran. The present-day relations between the two countries develop intensively enough, but there are still certain problems which somewhat complicate them. First of all, Iran is worried over the close cooperation of Azerbaijan with NATO and a possibility of deployment of American military bases and U.S. military contingents on its territory.

Another problem is the absence of the proper regulation of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which concerns not only Iran and Azerbaijan, but also all countries of the Caspian region. The relations between the two countries have also been aggravated by the fact that Iran does not take part in transporting hydrocarbon raw materials and commodities, because it is outside the bounds of the existing Caucasian transport and energy systems.

However, despite these contradictions and problems the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have begun to improve in recent years. Iran's anxiety over the possible deployment of American military bases in Azerbaijan and a threat of a military attack by the U.S.A. has forced its leadership to step up its contacts with Azerbaijan. In February 2007 the Minister of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan E. Mamedyarov stated that the question of using his country for possible American military strikes against Iran "was not even discussed." Since 2002 Iran, jointly with India and Russia, has participated in a major alternative transport project called "North – South," in which Azerbaijan also takes part.

Despite Iran's close cooperation with Armenia developing since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Iran declares its support of Azerbaijan's position and calls for its territorial integrity and the liberation of the territories occupied by Armenia.



Cooperation between the two countries develops not only in the energy sphere, but also in other fields. The Treaty “On principles of Relations of Friendship and Cooperation” has been in force since 2002, high-level meetings are regular, and the two countries have good prospects for closer cooperation.

And so, Iran and Turkey are the two countries which have exerted a strong influence on the development and foreign policy of Azerbaijan for a long time. Although the relations between the peoples and governments of these countries have not always been good-neighborly, Turkey and Iran have always regarded the Trans-Caucasian states as the zone of their interests. In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century it became evident that the closest relations exist between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the latter has achieved what she was dreaming of for a long time, namely, the closest interaction with the kindred Azerbaijani people. As to Iran, the development of Azerbaijan’s relations with it was influenced by Iran’s political isolation on the part of the United States. Despite this, Azerbaijan, striving as it does to develop cooperation in several foreign-policy directions in order not to draw too much attention on its evidently pro-American course, has consolidated its interaction with Iran in the past few years. However, Azerbaijan’s desire to develop evenly its cooperation with all countries of the region can be regarded as somewhat declarative, inasmuch as the degree of the U.S. involvement into its policy is rather high. And if a close, even fraternal, Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation is quite natural and well substantiated, because Turkey is a partner of the U.S.A. and NATO and an active participant in the distribution of the Caspian energy resources and transport arteries of the region, for its part Iran, on the contrary, is a hostile state for the United States and does not take part in transporting hydrocarbon raw materials and commodities.

Speaking of the degree of Azerbaijan's cooperation with its southern neighbors – Turkey and Iran – it should be noted that the historical closeness of the destinies of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian peoples within the framework of the single South Caucasian region should have presupposed their strong regional cooperation and integration, which would help the region to become a major actor of the world economic and political system. However, the existence of acute unresolved problems of both domestic and interstate character has prevented the strengthening of their cooperation.

The Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership are unable to find points of contact for any civilized solution of the conflict within the framework of international law and, consequently, for a stable political dialogue. Both countries search for allies (more influential and weighty in the region and the world) for resolving the situation in their favor. Azerbaijan intensively develops cooperation with the United States and NATO in the hope to create a counterbalance to the open support and current influence of Russia in Armenia. In its turn, Armenia, while accepting the priority character of its relations with Russia, is striving to speed up political integration with it. Besides, Iran is a historical ally and partner of Armenia in the region. In the conditions of a considerable isolation of both states, their cooperation is quite natural. This can well be seen in the development of the transport and energy infrastructure.

As to Georgia, it has succeeded to create a solid legal basis in its relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Russian Federation, the United States and the leading western countries in a short time after gaining independence. Its relations with Azerbaijan became closer as both countries acquired an ever greater importance in the energy policy of the West. Georgian territory is quite convenient for transporting Caspian energy resources. As to the military sphere, the two countries

have similar interests in close cooperation with NATO, and they regard Turkey as a “guide” for their joining the alliance.

During the long period in the history of the people inhabiting modern Azerbaijan there has not been a strong and influential state. On the contrary, the neighboring stronger states, politically and economically, exerted a great influence on it. However, Azerbaijan, after gaining the coveted independence in the early 1990s, has not done much to overcome historical injustice and restore or acquire a high status, and began to rely on the authority of the neighboring states, having entrusted them with its foreign political development. The determining factor in the selection of a partner was ethnic, confessional, linguistic and cultural proximity, as well as the degree of political and economic stability.

Thus, it was Turkey which became the leader in partnership relations with Azerbaijan. That country is an attractive medium for political, military and economic contacts.

Iran is also a country close to Azerbaijan, however, the latter’s cooperation with it is not as versatile and intensive as with Turkey.

Azerbaijan’s relations with Georgia have reached a very high level. Certain aspects which united these countries in the past continue to draw them closer together at present and form a stable and reliable foundation for a productive dialogue.

Armenia is considered a hostile state by Azerbaijan. Although its inclusion in the uniform economic system of the region would have been advantageous to many countries of Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Asia, the two sides do not even see any possibility of rapprochement.

A conclusion suggests itself that the countries which have solid positions in Azerbaijan and are able to influence the course of events are Russia and the United States. Each of them pursues its own

interests. However, the most tangible impact on Azerbaijan is now exerted by the most influential states of the region – Turkey and Iran.

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**TRANSFORMATION OF ETHNO-CONFESSIONAL  
STRUCTURE OF NEWLY-INDEPENDENT  
STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA**

The transformation of the ethno-confessional structure of the population takes place under the impact of three factors: natural surplus determined by the birthrate-death rate ratio, migration flows, and assimilation processes. Inasmuch as the latter occurs, as a rule, during a long historical period and it is difficult to determine it quantitatively, the main factors of the transformation of the ethno-confessional structure of the newly-independent nations of Central Asia in the 1990s – the middle of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are the natural and migration movements of the population.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are referred to Central Asia. The peoples living on the territory of Central Asia since its inclusion in the Russian Empire are regarded as indigenous population, and non-indigenous population includes settlers of the pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods from other, predominantly European regions of the country. And they are called the “European population” in the article.

In the conditions of a profound economic crisis and an unstable socio-political situation which accompanied the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., the natural growth rates of the population of the former Union

republics have slowed down noticeably. In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, in particular, the slowing down of demographic increase took place in the 1970s. In the period of the demographic “explosion” in 1959 – the 1970s the population surplus reached 42.6%, in 1970–1979 – 22.6%, and in 1979–1989 – 22.9%, whereas in 1991–2000 the figure was only 9.3%, that is, more than two times less. By 2000 the number of the population of the region reached 55.2 million, by 2008 – 60.6 million, and its share in the CIS population in 1991–2005 grew from 18 to 21.6%.

At the same time the demographic development trends of the Central Asian states in the post-Soviet period were differently oriented. In 1990 – 1999 the average annual population surplus in Kyrgyzstan was 0.8%, Tajikistan – 1.8%, and Uzbekistan – 2%. On the contrary, the number of the population of Kazakhstan in the 1990s decreased annually by 0.6% , which was a consequence of the mass emigration of non-indigenous ethnoses and a sharp reduction of natural surplus. As a result, the numerical strength of Kazakhstan’s population dwindled by 9.1% (or 1.5 million) by 2000, whereas the population of Kyrgyzstan increased by 11.4% (0.5 million), Tajikistan – by 15.1% (0.8 million), and Uzbekistan – by 18.9% (3.9 million).

In 2000–2008 there was a small population surplus in Kazakhstan (0.8 million), as a result of which the total loss of the population decreased to 4.3%. In all, the population of Central Asia continued to grow rapidly, having increased by 18.2% in Kyrgyzstan, 32% in Uzbekistan, 36.8% in Turkmenistan, and 37.7% in Tajikistan.

On the whole, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan where more than 70% of the regional population live, are the indisputable demographic leaders of Central Asia. However, these indices are not too spectacular against the backdrop of the neighboring states of the Middle East. The leading states of the region – Turkey (72.9 million) and Iran

(69.5 million) not only exceed Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but entire Central Asia in the number of population.

In recent years the term “Greater Middle East” has become current. It was introduced in journalistic and scientific parlance by the administration of President George Bush, Jr. The Greater Middle East includes Turkey, the Trans-Caucasian states, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the North African countries dominated by Islam. After the disturbances of 2010/2011 in the Arab world Washington’s political rhetoric now uses the term “New Middle East.”

The decrease of demographic growth rates in the sovereign states of Central Asia was caused by a reduction in the natural surplus of the population. In 1991–1999 the general birthrate coefficient in Kyrgyzstan decreased by 1.3 times, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – 1.5, in Turkmenistan – 1.8, and in Tajikistan – 2.1 times. Despite a reduction of death rate in the republics of Central Asia connected with a younger age structure and its slight growth in Kazakhstan, the natural population surplus in Kyrgyzstan decreased by 1.5 times (from 21.6 to 14.6 per 1,000 population), Uzbekistan – 1.7 (from 28.3 to 17), Turkmenistan – by 1.9 (from 25.4 to 13.1), Tajikistan – by 2.3 (from 32.8 to 14.4), and Kazakhstan – three times (from 13.4 to 4.4).

The coefficient of the natural surplus of the population of Tajikistan increased from 14.4 to 22 in 1999 – 2008, Kazakhstan – from 4.4 to 11, Turkmenistan – from 13.1 to 18.0, Kyrgyzstan – from 14.6 to 17, and Uzbekistan remained at the same level (17 per 1,000 population). By 2008 the lowest natural population surplus was in Kazakhstan and the highest in Tajikistan.

The economic crisis and a drop in the population’s living standards were the main reason for the prolonged drop in birthrate. In 1988–1998 the average number of children born by a woman during her reproductive years decreased in Kazakhstan from 3.1 to 2, in

Kyrgyzstan – from 4 to 2.8, in Uzbekistan – from 4.3 to 2.8, in Turkmenistan – from 4.6 to 2.9, and in Tajikistan – from 5.3 to 3.4. By the end of the 1990s birthrate in Kazakhstan ensured only a simple reproduction, and in other countries of Central Asia – extended reproduction of the population.

Despite a reduction in the average size of the family, most of them had many children. In 1993 forty-five percent of all families in Kyrgyzstan and about 60% in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan consisted of five and more members. According to the population census of 2000, in Tajikistan 10.8 % of all households had ten and more people.

The families of the indigenous people in Central Asia are characterized by many children. According to the data for 1995, birthrate among Tajiks was 29.8, Uzbeks – 30.3, and Russians – 6.2, and death rate – 5.3, 5.4 and 16 per thousand, respectively. That is, birthrate among Russians was 4.8 lower and mortality three times higher than among the indigenous ethnoses.

The emigration of the non-indigenous people from Central Asian countries has begun long before the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. The outflow of representatives of the European population in Kazakhstan, for example, was first registered in 1968 and in other Central Asian republics it began in the 1970s. By that time the consequences of the demographic “explosion” among the indigenous people began to be felt. One of them was the growing tension on the labor market. Another sphere of tension was certain clashes of interests of the indigenous and non-indigenous people in the party-government apparatus, the systems of education, health service, and culture and art, where responsible and prestigious posts were taken more and more frequently by representatives of the indigenous (title) ethnoses. As a result, the migration flow of the European population was replaced by its outflow.

The post-Soviet migrations were based on a whole range of factors which determined their character and intensity during different periods. Among the objective factors were political ones (the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the turning of administrative borders between republics into state borders, which forced the non-indigenous people to determine their citizenship and choose the country of residence), social ones (non-inclusion of non-indigenous ethnoses in the system of informal social ties), and economic ones (considerable reduction of employment in industrial branches). As to the subjective factors, there were ethnic ones (growth of nationalist sentiments among the indigenous population), confessional ones (the growing influence of Islam), and cultural ones (the narrowing down of the Russian cultural, information and educational sphere).

In a concrete historical situation these factors turned into reasons determining the dynamics of migrations in one or another country. According to a selective surveillance in 1991, emigration from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was caused mainly by the exacerbation of interethnic relations, which accounted for 40.6, 32.7 and 27.3 percent of all reasons for emigration, respectively. In Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which had gone through interethnic conflicts, the criminal situation, which usually accompanied inner political instability, was among the major reasons for emigration.

By the mid-1990s, when the situation in Central Asia became somewhat stabilized, the economic problems came to the fore among the main reasons for emigration. A poll among Russians living in cities in Kazakhstan carried out in 1994 revealed that the unstable economic situation was the main reason for their departure. Ethnic discrimination in employment and promotion at places of work took third place among the reasons for emigration from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, according to an expert surveillance carried out in 1999.



The emigration of the population from Central Asian countries continued to grow until the mid-1990s and began to slow down in the latter half of the decade. On the one hand, it was due to the numerical reduction of the non-indigenous people, and on the other, a relative stabilization of the political and economic situation. However, there were periodic increases of the migration outflow of the population caused by the aggravation of the internal political situation, which was observed in the region in the latter half of the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000<sup>th</sup>.

An absolute majority of migrants from Central Asia moved to Russia. By 2000 Russia accounted for 93.2% of all migrants from Kazakhstan, 84.2% from Kyrgyzstan, 76.9% from Uzbekistan, 71.7% from Tajikistan and 67.5% from Turkmenistan.

In all, migration of the population from Central Asia to Russia throughout the period from 1991 to 2008 amounted to 3,535,500 people, 50% were from Kazakhstan, 24% from Uzbekistan, 11% from Kyrgyzstan, 10.8% from Tajikistan and 4.3% from Turkmenistan.

In 1991–1999 the population of the Russian Federation increased, due to migration from Central Asian countries, by three million Russians, 243,000 Ukrainians and 30,400 Byelorussians. As a result, migration processes have become the main factors which have radically changed the ethno-confessional structure of the Central Asian states.

### **Changes of Ethno-confessional Structure**

In each Central Asian country the transformation of the ethno-confessional structure was determined by a specific combination of migration and demographic factors.

**In Kazakhstan** among these factors were mass migration of “non-indigenous” ethnoses, which comprised more than half of its

population by the late-1980s, and the low natural population surplus of Kazakhs themselves. In 1989 – 1999 the population of Kazakhstan decreased by 7.7% due to emigration, the number of Russians living there dropped by 26.1%, and the number of Kazakhs increased by 22.9%. As a result, the share of Russians diminished from 37.4 to 30%, and that of Kazakhs increased from 40.1 to 53.4%. They became, for the first time from 1926, the ethnic majority on the territory of the republic.

Curtailment of the Russian population and increase of the title population of Kazakhstan continued in subsequent years. By 2007 the number of Russians in the republic decreased to 3.9 million (by 34% as compared to 1989), and Kazakhs grew to 9.3 million (by 16.8%).

Apart from Russians, curtailment of the population concerned other non-indigenous ethnoses of Kazakhstan. By the end of the 1990s the number of Ukrainians and Byelorussians decreased by almost two-thirds.

The indices of the natural surplus of the indigenous ethnoses remained high. The number of Dungans increased by 23.3%, Uighurs by 15.9%, Uzbeks by 12%. In all, the indigenous population of Kazakhstan grew by 22%, and its share from 44 to 59.8%.

Similarly, the correlation of ethnic groups historically embracing Christianity and Islam has also changed. In 1989 there were 7, 640,600 Muslims and 8, 258,400 Christians living on the territory of Kazakhstan (47.3% and 51 %, respectively). By the end of the 1990s these main ethno-confessional groups changed places. According to the 1999 population census, there were 9,077,800 Muslims and 5,593,200 Christians in the country (60.7% and 37.5%, respectively). On the eve of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. Christians predominated among the inhabitants of Kazakhstan, which was unique

in Central Asia, whereas ten years later Muslims comprised a majority in the republic's population.

Among the specific features of the ethno-demographic development of Kyrgyzstan were the higher rates of increase of the indigenous and curtailment of the non-indigenous population. In 1989–1999 the number of the population in the republic grew from 4.3 to 4.8 million (by 13.3%). The number of Kyrgyz increased by 40.3% (from 2.2 to 3.1 million), and Russians dwindled by 34.2% (from 917,000 to 603,000). Among the biggest ethnoses of Kyrgyzstan, the number of Russians decreased and they held third place and Uzbeks second place in 1999. According to the data of the Russian foreign ministry, there were 470,000 Russians (about 9%) by January 1, 2007, a decrease by 22% compared to 1999, or 50% compared to 1989.

The numerical strength of other non-indigenous peoples decreased more rapidly than that of the Russians. For example, the number of Jews dropped by four times (from 5,600 to 1,600).

All indigenous ethnoses demonstrated considerable growth, but not as great as that of the Kyrgyz. The total number of the indigenous ethnoses of Kyrgyzstan increased from 2.92 to 3.98 million people, and the non-indigenous ones decreased from 1.33 million to 846,000.

One of the consequences of a sharp drop in the number of people of non-indigenous nationalities was a considerable increase of Muslims and decrease of Christians. During the period between 1989 and 1999 the share of Christians in Kyrgyzstan decreased from 26.7 % to 14%, or almost twice, and Muslims grew from 71% to 84%. Thus, the population of the republic became more monoconfessional.

On the whole, the increase of the indigenous and decrease of non-indigenous population in Kyrgyzstan proceeded more rapidly than in Kazakhstan, which was conditioned by a greater socio-economic crisis. The place of Russians in the southern districts of the republic

was taken by Uzbeks, as a result interethnic contradictions became much sharper, which led to the bloody conflict in Osh in 1990.

In **Tajikistan** which had lived through the bloodiest and bitterest civil war in the post-Soviet area the migration flow of the non-indigenous population assumed the character of an avalanche in the early 1990s. As a result, the Republic of Tajikistan has become one of the most mono-ethnic and monoconfessional states of the CIS. In 1989–2000 its population increased by 20.3% and reached 6.1 million.

Non-indigenous ethnoses have left Tajikistan almost completely, their share having dropped from 12% to 1.7%.

In the post-Soviet period Muslims have become almost the single confessional group of the republic. In 1989–2000 their share grew from 89.5% to 98.5%, and the share of Christians decreased from 9.6% to 1.2%. Thus, the population of Tajikistan is now almost 100 percent Moslem.

The transformation of the ethnoconfessional structure of Uzbekistan proceeded more smoothly. The emigration of non-indigenous people did not have a mass character, which was due to a relatively more stable political and economic situation. Despite a rapid growth of the numerical strength of the title ethnoses at the turn of the century, there was a rather big European population which played a no small role in the country's socio-economic progress.

During the period between 1989 and 1999 the population of Uzbekistan grew from 19.8 million to 24.1 million, or by 22%. This was due to the demographic dynamics of the two most numerous ethnoses – Uzbek and Russian, which comprised about 80 percent of all inhabitants of the country. By 1999 the number of Uzbeks increased by 32.5% (from 14.1 to 18.7 million) and that of Russians decreased by 26.9% (from 1.6 to 1.2 million). By the data of the foreign ministry of the Russian Federation, there were about one million Russians living in

the republic, or about four percent of its population, by the end of 2002. Among the non-indigenous people the number of Germans and Jews decreased the most noticeably (by 4.5 times). By the end of the 1990s the share of most of them did not exceed one percent. This was largely due to emigration.

The confessional homogeneity of the population in Uzbekistan has grown to a greater degree than in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, where there is a big non-Moslem population, but it was not as great as in Tajikistan. In the period between 1989 and 1999 the number of Muslims grew by 29%, and that of Christians decreased by 28%. As a result the share of Muslims increased from 86.4 to 91.5%, and that of Christians decreased from 9.6 to 5.8%.

On the whole, the rates of the depopulation of the non-indigenous ethnoses in Uzbekistan were lower than in most of its neighbors in Central Asia, which could be explained by a more stable political and economic situation in the republic.

**Turkmenistan** is the most complex country as far as the ethno-demographic processes going there are concerned. This is largely connected with the problem of demographic statistics after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.

According to the data of the population census of 1995, the increase of the indigenous population and decrease of the non-indigenous population proceeded rapidly, just as in other Central Asian countries. The total number of the republican population increased by 26% during the period between 1989 and 1995, and the number of Turkmen grew by 34.1%.

If the data of the 1995 population census are really true, the growth rates of Turkmenistan's population in 1991–1994 increased almost twice, as compared to the 1989–1991 period (from 2.5 to 4.65%), which showed almost unprecedented demographic

“explosion.” Russians occupied considerable place in the ethnic structure of Turkmenistan’s population, but their share decreased from 9.5 to 6.7%. The share of other non-indigenous people was less than one percent by the mid-1990s. On the whole, the numerical strength of the non-indigenous population of Turkmenistan decreased from 474,000 to 429,000, that is, by 9.6%, and its share dwindled from 13.5 to 9.7%.

Proceeding from these incomplete data, the number of Russians in Turkmenistan can be estimated at about 110,000. Thus, during the six years from the 1995 census up to 2001, the number of Russians decreased by 2.5–3 times, which could be compared to their emigration from Tajikistan during the civil war there.

The number of Turkmen has increased considerably, especially against the backdrop of other ethnoses. According to official figures, their number in 1989–2001 grew from 2.5 to five million, or twice as many, which exceeds all real possibilities of demographic growth.

On the whole, by the beginning of the 200<sup>th</sup> Turkmenistan became one of the most mono-ethnic and monoconfessional states of the region. The title ethnos (Turkmen) accounted for more than three-quarters Muslims, that is, more than nine-tenths of all inhabitants of the republic. And by the number of ethnic Russians Turkmenistan took the last but one place in Central Asia (Tajikistan is the last).

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During the first fifteen years after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the change in the ethnoconfessional structure of the sovereign states of Central Asia was characterized by the absolute and relative numerical strength of the indigenous ethnoses and a reduction of that of the non-indigenous ones. The growth rates of the title population were, as a rule, higher than those of other ethnoses, and the number of

Russians decreased slower than that of other groups of the non-indigenous population.

The reduction of the Russian population in the countries of the region proceeded unevenly. The total number of Russians in Central Asia during the period between 1989 and 2000 decreased by about 29%, in all, in Kazakhstan by 26.1% and in Uzbekistan by 26.9%, in Kyrgyzstan by 34.2%, in Turkmenistan by almost three times and in Tajikistan by 5.7 times, that is, much more rapidly than for the region as a whole. The rates of reduction of the numerical strength of the European population were higher in countries with a more difficult political and socio-economic situation and lower where it was more stable.

However, the emigration of Russians from Central Asia, although on a mass scale, has not assumed the character of total flight, except in Tajikistan. More than half of the Russian population living on the territory of the Central Asian countries by the time of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., stayed where they were so far. After Ukraine, where there are about 11 million ethnic Russians, Central Asia is a demographic reservoir of the Russian population living abroad second in importance (about five million), most of which live in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The surplus rates of the title ethnoses also differed considerably. The number of Kazakhs has increased by 22.9%, Uzbeks – by 32.5%, Turkmen – by 34.1%, Kyrgyz – by 40.3%, and Tajiks – by 54.4%. That is, the numerical strength of the Central Asian ethnoses grew 1.4–2.4 times faster in the south of Central Asia than in the north (in Kazakhstan), which resulted in the further increase of the agrarian population in the south. In all, the share of the indigenous population of Central Asia increased from 69.6% to 81.2%, and non-indigenous population decreased from 28.6% to 17.3%, or by 1.7 times.

Simultaneously with the reduction of the European population the rapid demographic growth of the most numerous people of the region – Uzbek – was observed. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the Uzbek became the second biggest ethnoses in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, having outpaced the Russian. At the turn of the century there were 370,700 Uzbeks in Kazakhstan, 635,000 in Kyrgyzstan, about 400,000 in Turkmenistan, and 936,700 in Tajikistan. It should be said that the real figure of Uzbeks living in border districts was much higher.

Summing up the results of the ethnodemographic development of the sovereign states of Central Asia it should be said that their population has become much more mono-ethnic and monoconfessional. By the middle of the first decade of this century the title ethnoses accounted for more than half the population of Kazakhstan, two-thirds of the population of Kyrgyzstan, and more than three-quarters of the population of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The share of Muslims was still higher: more than 60% of the inhabitants of Kazakhstan, 80% in Kyrgyzstan, and 90% in other states of Central Asia. Due to a reduction of the share of the European population the ethnoconfessional image of the region has acquired more “Asian” and Muslim features, which now looks more like the neighboring countries of the Middle East.

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**INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL ASIA:  
RUSSIAN AND TURKISH DRAFTS –  
RIVALRY OR COOPERATION?**

In November 2011 the leaders of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov, Azerbaijan, Ilkham Aliyev, and Turkey, Abdulla Gyul met for the first time in the city of Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk). Apart from everything else, this was the first Turkmen-Azerbaijani meeting for many years inasmuch as after the memorable attempt on the life of Turkmenbashi on November 25, 2002, (Azerbaijan was accused of implication in the crime) all relations between Ashkhabad and Baku were broken. They are restored only now, after the death of the “Great Serdar” (one of the official names of Niyazov-Turkmenbashi). In January 2010 the work of the bilateral commission on economic cooperation was resumed and talks were held on determining the median line on the Caspian Sea. In March 2008 Turkmenistan appointed its ambassador to Azerbaijan. Recently, the two sides have resolved the problem of repayment of Azerbaijan’s debt for Turkmenian gas, and also reached a certain progress in negotiations on the problem of dividing the Caspian Sea and disputed oil and gas deposits.

Much more interesting was the fact that the head of another state, Turkey, was also present at the meeting, as well as the subject of the discussions held there. According to information of Turkmenistan’s foreign ministry, the heads of the three states, apart from mutual trade relations, discussed the problems of cooperation in the sphere of energy.

The author of this article has already written about the energy integration of Russia with some friendly states of the region populated by predominantly nomadic cattle-breeding people – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In 1996 the project of Russia's participation in hydropower construction projects in Kyrgyzstan (Kambar-Atinsky cascade of hydropower plants) began to be examined and now it is about to be implemented, after Kyrgyzstan resolved its electricity supply problems, as well as those of deliveries of Kyrgyz electric energy to Siberia in exchange for oil and gas. Perhaps, this will be the first step toward Russian–Kazakh–Kyrgyz integration within the framework of the Eurasian project.

A reservation should be made here. Most Russians take Central Asia as a single whole, although the region consists of three different parts: Eurasian or cattle-breeding steppe (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) gravitating toward Russia, the Central Asian part proper (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and certain regions of neighboring states gravitating toward them), and Turkmenian, or cattle-breeding and desert land.

Just like Russia forms a single Eurasian entity with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Azerbaijan are a single civilizational whole with Turkmenistan. The title peoples of these three states belong to the same subgroup of the Turkic languages – Oguz, which is only natural, inasmuch as they all are descendants of the Oguz, or Turk – Seljuks who mixed with the settled Iranian and Near Asian populations who took up their culture and gave them their language. About that time some local tribes settled in Eurasian steppes and, having reached the boundaries of Rus, after several decades of confrontation, established allied relations with it, having laid the foundation of Eurasian unity.

It is indicative that the per capita GDP in the countries of the two integration groups is comparable: Russia – \$15,000, Turkey – \$12,000, Kazakhstan – \$11,000.

If the plan succeeds, then along with the Eurasian integration project, another, the Pan-Turkic one will begin to be implemented in the Central Asian region. However, its energy foundation will not be electricity supplies, as in the case of the Eurasian one, but oil and gas supplies via an oil pipeline laid out on the bottom of the Caspian Sea. True, in the joint Russian-Kyrgyz project oil and gas supplies were also touched on, and in the Pan-Turkic project electric energy problems will also be dealt with. A contract will be signed with the Turkish company “Lotus Proje Akaryakit Enerji Madencilik Telekomunikasyon Insaat Sanayi Taahhut ve Ticaret A.S.” for the construction of a new gas-turbine electric power plant with a capacity of 254 mWt in Ashkhabad.

But let us go back to the project of an oil pipeline via the Caspian Sea and dwell on its prospects for Russia.

At first glance, this variant does not promise anything beneficial to Russia. Turkey is a NATO member, and Russia has always disliked the idea of a Trans-Caspian oil pipeline as a continuation of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline bypassing its territory.

However, Turkey could become a friend and ally of Russia due to several reasons. NATO membership as such does not mean too much. For instance, France and Germany, being NATO members, were against the war of the United States in Iraq more resolutely than Russia, and last spring almost all “old” European members of NATO blocked the admittance of Ukraine and Georgia to this organization.

Incidentally, the war in Iraq could not improve the American-Turkish relations, because the United States created an actually independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, which was an inspiring

example for the Kurds living in Turkey who have been waging an armed struggle for independence for many years.

Besides, the United States fears (not without foundation) that Turkey, in realizing its Pan-Turkic plans (including in Central Asia) will break loose from its control. This was why the United States did not insist on Turkey sending its troop contingents to Afghanistan, although, it would seem, Turkey is a NATO member second in strength as the armed forces are concerned, which have great experience in waging military operations in mountain regions (especially against the Kurds), and, what is no less important, the Afghan population would treat Turks as Muslims much better than Europeans or Americans.

A question arises whether Turkey would not find itself under control of other forces, if it succeeds in breaking loose from under U.S. control, for instance, Islamic radicals... Without doubt, the latter are much worse than the United States. If the Islamists have stepped up their activity in recent years even in Turkey with its many-year adherence to secularism since the time of Ataturk, one may expect that the Islamists had much better chances for success in much less westernized Azerbaijan and especially in Turkmenistan.

In general, Russia and Turkey need each other, including for gaining more advantageous positions in their relations with the West, inasmuch as it is evident that the latter intends to keep Turkey at the “threshold” of Europe, without treating it as a full-fledged member of the European community. At the same time, I would not emphasize the anti-western trend of the Russian-Turkish alliance; Russia and NATO, Russia and the European Union, Russia and the United States still need each other in the geopolitical aspects, too.

Thus, it is in Russia’s interests that Turkey should implement its Pan-Turkic projects, remaining a NATO member and maintaining friendly relations with our country (and with our Eurasian partners

within the framework of the Central Asian region). The influence of Russia and the United States in Turkey would balance mutual relations and prevent threats of Islamic radicalism.

Recently, another factor emerged which makes Russian-Turkish cooperation desirable, particularly in Central Asia. It is quite possible that with the coming of a new administration to the White House the troops of the U.S. and its allies will withdraw from Afghanistan. One can regard their military presence in that country as one pleases, but, undoubtedly, the NATO forces restrain the onslaught of the Islamic radicals – Talibs and their like, which otherwise could have been directed to the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan. One should remember the events in the region some two or three years ago, prior to the occupation of Afghanistan by NATO countries. For instance, Kyrgyzstan was twice (in August 1999 and August 2000) invaded by Talib military groups in the vicinity of Batken, and it was only the occupation of Afghanistan by NATO troops on September 11, 2001, that prevented large-scale military operations of that kind in Kyrgyzstan..

In this sense Pan-Turkic cooperation would be quite reasonable and useful for keeping the Islamists at bay. This is a real situation, especially taking into account the fact that Turkmen, Azerbaijanis, let alone Turks, are less prone to succumb to Islamist propaganda and are better prepared to oppose the Islamists' schemes than Uzbeks.

At the same time, the interests of the Eurasian and Turkish Pan-Turkic projects do not clash anywhere, even if Turkey would suddenly have thought of striving for political integration, following energy integration. Of course, this is in case of Russia renouncing its claims to the entire post-Soviet area, and Turkey – to all Turkic peoples, confining to those already mentioned. If these conditions are observed, Russia and Turkey will not be rivals, and in this context the concept of

“Pan-Turkism” acquires a positive tint. Economic aspects are a more complex matter; for instance, Turkey’s economic influence is very great today in the north-west of Kyrgyzstan (Talas Region), but after all, Russia, too could be present there economically if she so wishes. In general, Russian-Turkish cooperation has good prospects in the future.

Another reason for greater cooperation, but not rivalry, between Russia, Turkey and their Eurasian and Pan-Turkic customers in Central Asia has emerged in recent years. I mean a great flow of migrant workers to Russia, which has long become a subject of heated discussions in the Russian mass media and public circles. However, in view of the present economic and financial crisis in the country and the world a new aspect of this problem has emerged.

In connection with the crisis in Russia and freezing a number of major projects, a reduction of the number of migrant workers from Central Asia has taken place, a majority of them being Uzbeks and Tajiks who are strongly influenced by Islamic radicals. Kyrgyz and Kazakhs are more Eurasian and closer to Russians, besides, they are less “Islamized” and more inclined to “Europeization.” Whereas Uzbeks and Tajiks represent much more “Islamized” East.

The fate of the migrant workers who lost their jobs is far from happy. Some of them stay in Russia and search for new jobs, others leave for home or for other countries. According to the latest data, about 30,000 more migrant workers leave Russia than arrive in it every month.

But quite a few remain in Russia, or return to it failing to find jobs in their native countries or abroad. The quotas for migrants have been increased to four million people, but the Russian public comes out against this decision. There are different people among the new arrivals from Central Asia: some of them are supporters of Islamist radicals. For example, militants from the “Islamic Jamaat” or “Khizb at-Tahrir” are

active in the Volga area preparing terrorist acts. And what will happen when thousands upon thousands of Islamic militants are “left without jobs” in Afghanistan and Iraq?

In the light of what has been said one should keep in mind that Turkmenistan is the only country in the Central Asian region from which there is no constant flow of migrant workers. And Turkish building workers, who are active on construction sites in Russia, are not striving to remain here for good. Thus Turkey and Turkmenistan are the natural allies of Russia in its opposition to “free flows from the South to the North.”

*“Rossiisko-Turetsky dialog po problemam Tsentralnoi  
Azii i Kavkaza: Istoriya i sovremennost,  
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