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**A NEW WORLD ORDER?: DIALOGUE,
INTEGRATION AND UNDERSTANDING**

1. Some New Questions.

While the general consensus is that the post-Cold War order has been characterized by US hegemony and unipolarity, there is little consensus on:

- the new contours of the *in statu nascendi*, post-crisis, new international order: the increase or decreased of the level of competitiveness/cooperation in the years to come;

- the implications that this has had on international order and

- the effects on the stability of the new system (whether or not we will see a positive correlation between multi-polarity and stability) and, lastly

- whether the new system will require a different IR “logic” (corresponding to the new conditions of a multiplicity of economic and political and culturally distinct centers which may create a logic of “non-linearity” where the effects of IR actions would not be proportional to their causes, thus creating large amount of fluctuations and uncertainty).

Indeed, many have argued that US hegemony has been detrimental to international order and have been advocating a return to

a multipolar system. Such new system – obviously – will have more independent actors that will have to form new alliances and coalitions. Multipolarity might imply a healthy degree of balancing and lead to new coalitions that in turn might create some constraints on nations' international behavior. On the other hand having Russia (along few other countries such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey perhaps South Africa) play leading roles in an increasingly multilateral world may cause uncertainty and raise obstacles to cooperation as the former relations among these countries will under major changes and leaders of these countries will be thrust into new roles on the international stage.

What is certain that a more complex geopolitics is returning to the center stage in the international relations. Most probably we will see new initiatives for greater regional cooperation/integration by which smaller countries will try to achieve greater strength or security or market standing. New lines of alliances may be created beyond religious, ethnic or cultural solidarities or to reinforce them.

If we are indeed moving in the direction of a multilateral/multi-layer order there are a number of questions and issues to consider in better understanding the possible future.

Security and Stability.

First, what are the international security implications of a return to multi-polarity? Proponents of unipolarity fear the power struggles that will ensue if the United States loses its preeminent position and is unable and unwilling to underwrite global security. A key question to consider is what happens when states like Germany and Japan become responsible for their own security. While this lead to arms racing, nuclear proliferation and the potential for greater crises and conflicts? Uni-polar optimists argue that multipolar systems are prone to great power wars as evidenced by World War I and II. They argue further

that multipolarity would see a return of balance of power politics which increases the possibility of conflict on both a limited and more extensive scale. Multipolarity would also change the alliance dynamics that have characterized international politics for the last twenty or so years and it is impossible to predict the nature of future alliances formation (e.g. Russia-Iran, China-Russia).

Obviously proponents of multilaterality/multipolarity disagree with some of these dire scenarios and argue that unipolarity has given the United States the opportunity to expand and wage war. A return to balance of power politics and equilibrium in the international system world, proponents argue, contribute to international order. Multipolarity, especially a multipolar system of nuclear states, would instill more cautious foreign policies and might even result in greater respect for state sovereignty (as states will be less a free agents). States that are roughly equal in terms of power do not typically fight each other. A return to multipolarity does not necessarily entail the rise of revisionist powers but might create new alliances and coalitions.

Stability within new system is another key question – that is whether or not is to be expected – as the system moves away from unipolarity toward multi-polarity, the frequency and intensity of war should be diminish; so far there is no empirical evidence to prove such proposition.

Cross-Cultural Harmonization or Conflict?

The end of U.S. dominance in the global economy comes soon after the abandonment of the “Washington consensus” on free markets and light government as a universal guide to economic development. The success of China and the 1997-98 economic crisis in liberal Asian states had already called into question all Western models of economics and political order as a route to prosperity.

However, it is unclear what new models will emerge for political and economic growth and whether they will be regionally differentiated or globally accepted. Will the “Chinese model” of a strong state, authoritarian politics and profit-led growth spread to Africa and Latin America? Will an Islamic model based on Koranic law and economic regulation prevail in all Muslim countries or in any? Will different regional models lead to a new “cold war” of competition among different models of political and economic organization? Will new regional trade blocs based on culture or region (the EU, OAS, AU, ASEAN) create the new pattern of IR? Or will broader principles based on human rights, democracy and the U.N. charter and other international agreements provide a basis for harmonious cooperation of different nations and regions?

Economy

What will be the economic implications as US dominance erodes and the international system comes to be characterized by a number of great powers? One scenario suggests that nothing would change. All states have benefited from the liberal economic system that the US helped to build after World War II and would continue to follow the basic rules and norms associated with globalization. It is in the interest of Russia, China, Brazil and other powers that US decline is not too steep because the American market will continue to be the engine of economic growth. On the other hand, US decline and the rise of new great powers could result in economic chaos such was the case during the interwar period when a liberal hegemon did not exist. A loss in confidence of the US dollar could contribute to an even greater financial crisis than what we have just witnessed. There is also no guarantee that key institutions such as the World Bank, International

Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization would be able to function without the dominant role of the United States.

In any event the basic mechanisms of the global economy will undergo a rapid change. During the period of US dominance, Europe, Japan and America were the major consuming economies and the developing and developed economies focused their production on meeting the demands of these markets. Labor and raw materials from throughout the world were drawn to low-capital intensive economies to produce for consumption in the capital-intensive economies. In the coming multi-polar world the large developing countries (Mexico, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, India and China) are becoming more capital intensive and are becoming major consumer markets – indeed their consumption is growing more rapidly than that of the rich nations. What will be the shape of the international economy and what rules for currency, capital, investment and trade will prevail as consumption in the developing countries becomes the main driver of global growth, production in all countries becomes more focused on those markets and the relative financial leverage of America and Europe greatly diminishes?

Leadership and Global Governance

Finally, the issue of leadership or the lack of leadership needs to be considered as we ponder the transition to a multi-polar system. There are a number of challenging issues – climate change, human rights, terrorism, energy, poverty, failed states – facing the global community. It is unclear now or if they can be dealt with in the absence of a leading state. While there has been a good deal of displeasure with the United States there is some truth to the point that if the US does not take the lead on an issue nobody else will either.

It will be important for a single state or group of states to take the lead in dealing with global problems. This will be difficult considering the vastly different political systems, ideologies and beliefs of the top-tiered states in the international system. If this is not possible then again dealing with problems on a regional basis might have to suffice. But it's unclear if regional solutions are sufficient to address the problems and issues facing to the globe.

Conclusion

We suggest that Russia will play an important role in the new international system but her role will depend on sound policies and alliances. At the same time the future of Russia is closely connected with the future of the modern world system as it seeks to move from its current heavy dependence on exporting natural resources to acquire capital to becoming a more capital-intensive, knowledge-based, high-value producer, with broader links to the global economy. Trade – however – will be only one variable in setting Russia's global position; more important will be the innovativeness of the social socio-economic system and institutional strength. The quality of “politics” played by the elite (and quality of the elite itself) will also be important factor.

For all these reasons we think that a more systematic approach to analyzing the future of the international system will serve well the intellectual community.

*“Dialog tsivilizatsii I postkrizisny mir”,
M., 2010, p. 17–20.*

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**A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE ISLAM IDENTITY
IN RUSSIA (IT'S EXEMPLIFIED IN PERM TERRITORY)**

There is a concrete contradiction in the Moslem consciousness concerning the Islamic-regional ratio – in doctrine context the Islamic identity is realized at the transnational level and mustn't have regional perspectives. On the other hand, a religion as the essential of mentality reacts inevitably to occurring changes in the society. The Islam history demonstrates a possibility for such adaptation of the doctrine norms to concrete regional conditions in dependence of confessional, ethnic, geographic and even socio-political constituent. The bright examples of such regionalization at the national and sub-national level are such brands as “euro-Islam” (in the Russian (R. Khakimov) and the western interpretation (B. Tibi)), the “Turkish Islam” (M. Aidin), “the Russian Islam” (S. Gradirovsky) being continued at the state level.

In order to estimate a role of a regional component in the Moslem consciousness it's necessary to analyze the processes at a low, local level which can be revealed by means of a subject perspective of the Islamic identity. At the same time a religious identity is understood as a psychological category and component of a social person identity and becomes apparent in consciousness of its belonging to a concrete confessional community. The empiric background of studies were the results of inquires (2002, 2007–2008) and interviews (2007–2008, 2010) by the author in Perm territory during the last 8 years. A model of the state-Islamic mutual relations in the given region can be characterized as mutually distanced itself where the local Islamic leaders aren't very active. Many non-Moslem regions can be

characterized in the same way what allows having a concrete universality of the conclusions for the given group of the regions.

Islam as a marker of identity for a concrete part of the Russian population becomes noticeably apparent in 1990-ss when so-called “reviving” processes began becoming more active. In 2002 76,7% of the interrogated Tatars and Bashkirs declared about their religiousness in Perm territory. These data demonstrate one of the peculiarities of a religious consciousness including the Islamic one: namely, seemingly lost values can be quickly regenerated: “It (belief), belonging to the faithful, to Islam was probably genetically included by upbringing”. The phenomenon being observed can be explained from the point of view of the minority psychology and a latency of the religious ideas during the soviet period. Even non-practicing Moslems categorically confirm in response to a question on a possibility to change religion: “I am the Moslem and I’ll be and die as the Moslem but I shall not get the other religion”.

For the faithful themselves “to be the Moslem” means to observe moral principles, customs, feel a participation in the common past history (foreshortened of ethnic history), correspond to appearance and concrete character traits and psychology. At the same time the Islamic identity is watered down very much among the faithful but a level of knowledge in the Islamic religious doctrine leaves much to be desired. Only 37,9% of the interrogated know the basic provisions of a belief.

The ethnic factor is very important in self-identification of the faithful as usual:” Though we consider ourselves as the Moslems-Tatars but we didn’t know three words which began with a letter “m” – mullah, the Moslem and a mosque”.

The Islamic identity like any other one isn’t a static phenomenon and in its turn it can be changed. A transformation of the religious norms and behavioral models in consciousness of the faithful is very

noticeable in the sphere of family, gender and inter-confessional relations. According to the imam of one of the villages "... we have one dinner without alcohol then I say good-bye and go away and they probably drink alcohol. Our population and the youth take a great interest in alcohol but there is no job there; this is very bad. The people prefer alcohol than religion now".

The Moslem identity of the interrogated isn't always aimed at a prescribed religious practice performing, with the rules and rituals some respondents aren't familiar with though they stress their undoubted importance and authority." In fact I consider myself to be a believer but may be not as enough as it had to be, i.e. to observe all the Islamic norms. I don't observe because of my health but I always believe in my soul". Non-observance of ritual norms is subjectively grounded and it proves a flexibility of progressive processes in their consciousness. Only 35,7% of the respondents regularly observe a prescribed fivefold prayer. 36,5% of the Moslems (31% in Russia) do it periodically. The rest faithful (25%) don't pray so it's fair to speak about their nominal but not real religiousness.

At the same time one shouldn't underestimate the importance of the Islamic factor: 87,7% of the respondents stressed a religion importance in their life in 2007. But the importance of emotional-religious experience comes into the picture; a religious practice is secularized and a number of practicing customs is decreased.

The terms influencing on the Islamic identity actualization in consciousness of some citizens in each concrete case are different: it's necessary to take into consideration socialization peculiarities, subjective life circumstances of the faithful, their theoretical foundations, psychological comfort of living in any or that region and etc. However, one can name a general term – a religious surroundings (wife and husband, relatives, friends). A family institute is as before an

important channel of translation, support and transfer of the Islamic values.

A religiousness actualization is also promoted by the external factor – a religious minority status with all the ensuing consequences: discussions about the Islam essence in mass media, its compatibility with the democratic systems, about its “militant character” bring inevitably to self-identification strengthening in the Moslem environment.

Besides the conditions promoting a religious consciousness becoming active one can name the main reasons of the respondents to experience religion – it’s spiritual Odyssey and psychological motivation of a person. A religion fulfils identity and compensatory functions. The Islamic identity includes many socially possible practices.

One practically meets the examples of individual actualization of the regional Islamic identity (the “Perm Moslems”) among the informers nowhere. As the analysis of Internet-publications and mass media shows it’s produced either by the leaders of the Moslem communities or the regional mass media confirming once more a possibility to form a regional religious identity in dependence of the goals and situational context.

According to data of the inquires the considerable part of the respondents-Moslems (34,4%) have the problems on their identity structuring. The rest part identify itself within the framework of Russia: either at a level of a parish (19,4%) or at a level of oblast (14%) or a state (11,3%). Only 21% of the Moslems understand a world. However, all the faithful see their future only with Russia:” I am the Russian for myself. Russia is my homeland of own will of Lord in the Highest. We don’t choose our homeland and epoch. Allah should know better... Any Moslem must defend its homeland”.

The Islamic identity of the respondents is realized in poly-confessional social medium. The respondents used to feel themselves as a part of a complex world having many identity and cultural models what is a guarantee for free performance of their religious convictions. The faithful overcome doubled challenge: in a cultural field within the framework of ethno-confessional minority and in the modern regional society where they try to find their own place. At the same time the Moslem being and the present aren't contra theses. But the Islam regional field can't suggest them attractive perspectives for self-realization. The respondents feel themselves like living in two worlds as minimum allowing a partial holding of the different socio-cultural standards and value systems. Balancing between the different cultural demands the respondents review their subjective attitude towards the cultural models. Social practices of the past generations don't quite correspond to the modern professional and religious demands and so the faithful develop their own strategies to overcome a challenge and also for the account of the externals of a religion decrease.

The Moslems having taken a participation in the inquiry had a negative experience many times with respect to their otherness:" When we began only putting headscarf one named us as Krishna worshippers". However, the respondents don't share radical moods and coercive methods to solve problems.

The greater part of the Moslems lives and builds plans relatively future in poly-confessional society. It doesn't allow considering Islam and carriers of the Islamic identity in the Russian poly-confessional regions as a threat for the existing system. On the other hand, one can't deny that owing to heterogeneity of the Moslem umma the extremist forces can hide under the Islamic identity.

A problem on specifics of the Islamic identity in some regions is directly associated with a problem of the regional-doctrine Islam ratio. Taking into account a historical process of the Islamic and the national culture interpenetration it's more correct to speak not about the regional kinds of Islam ("the Russian", the "Turkish" and etc.) but about the regional forms of its being. A religious consciousness of the Moslems of Perm land is subjected to transformation processes. We observe a religious tradition washing out without losing its importance. The Islamic identity of the informers is closely interwoven with the positive Russian identity. A process of the faithful consciousness regionalization is more noticeable in the ethnic field and it can't but influence on its confessional constituent. At the same time a weakness of a regional aspect of the Islamic identity doesn't mean impossibility for its forming for the concrete socio-political goals.

"Identichnost' kak predmet politicheskogo analiza", M., p. 252–256.

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THE NORTH CAUCASUS:

FROM SEPARATISM TO THE RADICAL ISLAM

At the present one can observe a protracted ethno-political crisis on the Northern Caucasus suppressing a region development to a great extent and making it very exposed. Many problems were defined as early as during the soviet period (people resettlement, border redrawing and unequal distribution of production) but their considerable part was actualized during "transition period" (setback in production having achieved 90% in some republics, "division of labor" being ethnically established, mass unemployment). As a result a democratization and

liberalization being not economically backed began developing in interethnic and inter-confessional conflicts and contradictions; the most striking were “Chechen crisis” and Ossetino-Ingush conflict in 1992.

Today a gross regional product on the Northern Caucasus in terms of per head is considerably lower in comparison throughout Russia. So, in Kabardino-Balkaria on the eve of terrorist attack in Nal’chik on 13 October 2005 a level of unemployment was estimated in 27% of economically active population (the age of one in three an unemployed person was 16–19 years!) So, the republics of the Northern Caucasus belong to a group of either underprovided or poor regions. At the same time a role of shadow economy is great as nowhere in Russia.

According to the experts almost one in three people is somehow occupied in the sphere of shadow economy but in the North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan these indexes are 80% in comparison with the Russian ones -20-25%. One can’t but mention a corruption eroding all the levels of regional authorities. So, the inquiry in 2008 showed that 77% of the respondents in Nal’chik personally faced with corruption in the different social institutions and in the area of life; 75% are sure that the corruption scopes in the republic won’t be either changed in near future or will increased. It’s natural that the different extremist forces made the most of such vulnerability in the sphere of economic security. At the beginning of 1990-ss the separatists and the ethno-nationalists brought forward drafts secession not only from Russia but also from the republics where the representatives of any or that ethnic group were included (for example, a draft to establish Lezgistan on the lands occupied by the Lezghins, in Azerbaijan and in Dagestan). Only in 1991 one proclaimed 5 republics in Karachai – Cherkess also including two Cossacks. In Kabardino-Balkaria in 1991-1992 there was the intensive process to separate the republic according to the ethnic principle (with referendum organization and “land

surveying”). The Confederation of the highlands people of the Caucasus was also in action with the idea of “common Caucasus home” without a participation of the Russian “architectures”.

But the brightest example of ethno-separatism was Chechnya having existed beyond a legal and socio-political area of Russia during six years. However, even this conflict wasn’t purely ethno-political. So, there were also the followers in the Supreme Board of the republic disbanded by J. Dudaev on 6 September 1991 to keep Checheno-Ingushetia as the part of Russia but a confrontation between Moscow and Grozny was only one conflict among a great number (in particular, between Grozny and Nadterechny district where Dudaev wanted to assign his prefect; between the republican authorities and a city hall of Chechnya’s capital; between secular nationalists and religious radicals; between the followers of Sufi Islam and salafites and etc.). All of them used a force against each other. It happened at the background of numerous Chechen community existence outside the republic within the Russian Federation and an active ethnic business but the most part of the Chechens prefer going to Russia but not far abroad even during the military operations.

The height of the ethnic nationalism fame fell on the first half of 1990-ss. It’s explained by that, firstly, any above-ethnic formation disintegration is accompanied by and worsened by “roots” search, a new identity finding; secondly, the North Caucasian republics as a part of the Russian Federation were included in the USSR during 70 years, on one hand pursuing a policy of a state atheism but on the other hand, promoting a legal institutionalization of ethnicity. So, the Islamic “radicals” appeared at the beginning of 1990-ss on the North Caucasus strived to combine a religious rhetoric with ethno-nationalism. However, then ethno-nationalism (also ethno-separatism) lost its popularity as ethno-nationalism (also separatism) is fraught with

conflicts because of ethnic mixed characters of the North Caucasus. Ethno-nationalism couldn't solve some urgent problems of ethnic elites (in particular, hopes for a territorial rehabilitation) and they having forgotten their promises given to "their people" began privatizing power and property. The failed state experiment "Ichkeriya" also influenced greatly on a popularity decrease of the ethnic nationalism. In de facto Chechnya didn't manage to establish a state being comparable at least with Abkhazia or Nagorny Karabakh. Moreover, "free Ichkeriya" was so aggressive towards the neighbors that Russia was the less evil for them in comparison with it. So, today one can state that ethno-nationalism under conditions of the North Caucasus was historically defeated, may be temporary especially with a wrong policy of a federal center.

So, today the radical protest movements against a federal or a republican power use not ethno-nationalist (or separatist) but the Islamic language (as the hopes for that the West will prefer a continuation of "the evil empire" disintegration weren't realized and the eyes of the yesterday's nationalists turned on the East). So, if there wasn't anti-westernism in the slogans of "ichkeriitsev" then D. Umarov named not only Russia but also the western world as an enemy of "true Moslems" and proclaimed the Caucasian Emirate instead of "the Republic of Ichkeriya" abolished by him. "Chechnya's freedom" yielded to the slogans of "the Islamic solidarity".

As a result there formed a radical-Islamist environment on the North Caucasus in the middle of 1990-ss where a project of so-called "pure Islam" was formed for a region. Its ideologists made the best use of their psychological methods of influence (appeal to unsuccessful strata of the youth having no possibilities for career development and qualitative education). Such propaganda finds a support, first of all, among the youth, in circumstances of mass unemployment. There was

no clear strategy of a social, economic and political development of the North Caucasus. As a result, a radical Islam distribution began not only in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia but also in the republics where population religiousness was traditionally lower having resulted in tragic events in Nal'chik, 13 October 2005. At the same time it would be a great mistake to consider all protest movement on the North Caucasus as Islamist. There is also a secular opposition in the republics and its criticism is directed against the republican authorities to a greater degree. These people are very different by a political descent and convictions united by rejection of regional authorities but in Dagestan they are activists of some All-Russian parties. They are also present today though their force and power were seriously weakened in 2007–2008.

One can't ignore "opposition within apparat" in all the region subjects having no public slogans and open debates but one can't underestimate its role in personnel policy and in making administrative decisions. So, today there is not ethno-separatism on the North Caucasus but the radical Islam is a main challenge for a state security and society. This political trend is characterized with such vices of federal and regional authorities as nepotism, corruption, closure, inaptitude and unwillingness to dialogue with opponents.

Together with the above-mentioned problems there emerged external threats for security in the South of Russia – not only the traditional strategic rival attention of Russia in the region is attracted to the North Caucasus (first of all, of Turkey and Iran) but also of the international terrorist organizations and religious-extremist movements. Therefore, many threats and challenges for a threat on the North Caucasus (conflicts, social explosions, migration and etc.) can destabilize a situation when unfavorable development of events all over

Russia and distribute its negative influence beyond the bounds of a region. However, this situation isn't unconvertible.

Today a regional and national policy of Russia must be different where the following principles are:

1. Admitting a prolonged ethno-political crisis as a system-forming element of regional socio-political processes by both federal and regional authorities;

2. A main criterion to make decisions effectively must be their destabilizing influence on ethno-political sphere;

3. A refusal from attempts to solve a situation rapidly and readiness for a long and laborious task to overcome it;

4. A work with reasons but not with consequences; transition from reactive to preventive and projective policy in ethno-political sphere;

5. A retreat from "overture" with ethno-political elites; ethno-political elite responsibility increasing for a state of affairs in the subjects of the Russian Federation;

6. A reasonable denouncement of nationalism, chauvinism, political extremism and separatism by mass media and bodies of power.

*"Fundamental'nye problemy prostranstvennogo
razvitiya Yuga Rossii: Mezhdistsiplinarny
sintez", 2010, p. 98–101.*

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**THE REPUBLICS OF THE CENTRAL ASIA:
THE FOREIGN POLICY IN MANY VECTORS
AND GEOPOLITICAL UNCERTAINTY**

Since disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the Central Asia as an international region with five independent states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) exists as a specific regional sub-system of international relations. Nevertheless, this region is characterized by a high geopolitical uncertainty in terms of regional identity, definition of borders and international institutions of the corresponding regional sub-system. This uncertainty is one of the most significant characteristics of “New Great Game”, i.e. the geopolitical rivalry of the key world actors for the influence in the region after disintegration of the USSR.

For the Soviet period, the Central Asian republics politically and economically were separated from the external world by “the iron curtain” and were mainly connected with other republics of the USSR. After its disintegration the traditional diversity and many-vector foreign policy external economic interests of the region’s states restored rather quickly. Both Turkic and Iranian by origin, nomadic or settled peoples living for many centuries along a key transportation artery of the world got acquainted to the many-vector foreign orientations. The process of restoration of old cultural, historic, religious and commercial ties started in the end of Gorbachev reconstruction. As a result at present, the interests of the Central Asian states are dispersed not only in various countries-partners but also among key regions of the world.

The foreign policy interests and priorities of the countries of the Central Asia since the year of 2006

Country	Interests spheres and partners	Foreign policy interests and priorities	Type of foreign policy
1	2	3	4
Kazakhstan	Economic sphere: Russia, China, post-Soviet states, USA, EU. Foreign policy sphere: Russia, China, USA	1. Many-vector policy. 2. Common integration projects with Russia. 3. Common investment projects with China. 4. Cooperation with American and European oil and gas and other big resource companies. 5. Military cooperation with NATO and USA (construction of naval base in Atyrau).	Open foreign policy. Powerful stress on integration.
Uzbekistan	Economic sphere: Russia, China, ATR countries. Military-political sphere: Russia and China.	1. Tension with USA and EU on democratization. Play based on their geopolitical rivalry with Russia and China. 2. Interest in foreign investments from ATR, China and Russia particular. 3. Interest in China and Russia as countries with minimal demands to human rights and democratic standards. 4. NATO military base (Germany) in Termez.	Isolationism elements. Stress on bilateral relations.
Kyrgyzstan	Economic sphere: EU, Russia, China, USA, Kazakhstan. Military-political sphere: Russia, China, USA.	1. Many vector policy. 2. Interest in investments of all probable external partners. 3. Big migration flows to Kazakhstan and Russia. 4. Military bases of NATO (USA) and Russia.	Open foreign policy. Strong stress on integration.
Tajikistan	Economic sphere: EU, Russia, China, USA, Kazakhstan, Iran. Military-political sphere: Russia, China, EU, USA	1. Interest in investments of all probable external partners. 2. Big migration flows to Russia and Kazakhstan. 3. Military bases of Russia, NATO (France), interest of India in military base in Aini.	Moderate stress on integration. Combination of elements of closed and open foreign policy.

1	2	3	4
Turkmenistan	Economic sphere: Russia, EU, USA, China, Ukraine, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Turkey. Military-political sphere – officially recognized by UN neutral status	1. Dependence on Russian infrastructure in gas export. 2. Many vector gas export policy. 3. Search for alternative routes of gas export. Main interested parties: China, EU, USA, Turkey, India, Pakistan and Iran. 4. Use by USA of the base Mary-2 for cargo delivery to Afghanistan.	Isolationism. The stress on Bilateral relations.

It is significant to stress the following trends

All Central Asian countries carry out the many-vector policy oriented to cooperation with the greatest number of partners. Hence, emerges the need of membership in numerous international organizations representing various regions of the world. In terms of foreign policy type the CA countries are divided into two definite groups. One group consists of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. They are open for integration in all possible directions and take part in activities of various international organizations and always support extension of integration within their framework (although they do not always comply with the corresponding limitations).

The other group consists of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. They prefer not to transfer the authority of national states to multinational international organizations and prefer bilateral relations in spite of membership in these organizations. For the last period of Turkmenbashi rule, Turkmenistan preferred a definite isolationist policy. Due to its official neutral status Ashghabad did not participate in the Central Asian integration projects and did not take part in many regional structures supported by non-regional powers, such as Organization of Collective Security (ODKB) or Shanghai Organization of Cooperation

(ShOS). Tajikistan stands between these two groups of the states, although for the last years tends to the second model.

In different spheres (economy, politics) there exist different key partners of the CA countries. However, it is impossible to determine the dominant external partner in one of these countries. Their influence is always balanced, and this fact makes it possible for the CA leaders to use for their benefit the contradictions of external forces. For instance, Uzbekistan after Andijan events in its relations with China and Russia used their contradictions with the USA. Turkmenistan urges towards “organization” of the biggest possible competition among potential buyers of its gas.

The permanent rapid change of hierarchy of external partners takes place. Uzbekistan after Andijan events changed its orientation from the USA to mutual actions with Russia and China. For the last years, this country again took its interest to cooperation with the West. Tajikistan for the period of consolidation of E. Rakhmon regime increased the many-vector trend of its policy and reduced “the share” of Russian influence. The positions of external forces in Turkmenistan depend directly on the main directions of gas export. Therefore completion of the gas pipeline to China will result in rapid rise of its influence in the nearest future. In Kyrgyzstan during consolidation of K. Bakiyev power the military-political influence of Russia and China increased, while influence of the West decreased. The further conflict with Russia connected with closure of the American military base in Manas airport resulted in Bakiyev regime fall.

In total, the above described foreign policy interests and priorities of the Central Asian countries (a) are not determined in terms of choice of the key partners and the region of the world for orientation; (b) are very unstable in time (i.e. are not determined in terms of temporal measurement).

The indetermination grows also due to the fact that the CA states are very interested in involvement in the region of various external forces, which would make them achieve complex tasks of survival and internal development. The main interest of the CA countries is the receipt of the proposal, which solves the whole complex of existing problems – from economic to civilization problems. In its time, the belonging to the Soviet Union supposed just this solution: protection from external threats and suppression of extremism, access to technologies and infrastructure, integration in union and international economic ties, guaranties of interests of local elites and humanitarian development. At present, the national leadership of the Central Asia is in search of a new variant of the complex solution, which differs from the time of the USSR, notes E. Yatsenko as the President of Foundation “Heritage of Eurasia”.

The paradox is as follows: being in need of an external partner, which, like Russia in Soviet times did it, could solve complex problems, the Central Asian countries are not ready to make the choice in favor of one key partner, i.e. to adopt the one-vector policy. Therefore they try to attract as many as possible different forces.

The many-vector foreign policy of the Central Asian countries consists in their readiness to cooperate with any partners (Russia, the USA, China, the EU countries, Turkey, Islamic states etc.), which express the wish to render assistance in solving regional problems. However, the CA countries, having acquired independence and the power to be in charge of their countries’ national resources, are not yet ready to give “the control package” to some external force. And what is more, they often use cooperation with one big country as an additional argument in favor of attraction of interests of international competitors.

Such policy keeps the geopolitical “vagueness” of the region. The key partners are being looked for by new independent states in all

probable geographic directions. In this case the paradox is as follows: the unity of the region is preserved not due to the centripetal forces but thanks to the balance of the centrifugal forces. The Central Asia exists as a separate international region only because the diverse external forces prevent each other to dissolve it finally in the adjacent regions of the world.

The many-vector foreign policy of new independent states of the Central Asia is not a short-term phenomenon. This phenomenon exists almost twenty years, and given the lack of significant changes in the existing structure of the world policy it will hardly disappear earlier than in time of some decades.

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**KYRGYZSTAN: A LOOK AT THE PRESENT
AND THE FUTURE**

The analysis of the social-political situation in the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) makes it possible to speak about a crisis of the idea of democratic world in the whole Central-Asian region. Since the time of obtaining by Kyrgyzstan of sovereignty and proclamation of the democratic state almost two decades have past, which clearly show “the experience” of democracy’s construction: for the last five years two revolutions took place and the Constitution of the country was changed several times. The intermediate outcome of such results leads to the

logical question: is it worth taking a risk further and will it not be a threat of the complete loss of the statehood?

In Kyrgyzstan the democratic development was theoretically divided to the definite stages each representing certain leap (break-down) in deepening democratic processes. For the first years after obtained sovereignty by the states of the Central Asia (CA) a great popularity was gained by transitivity describing the process of passage to a stable democratic state with the self-supporting structure. The theories of the transitional society were created by western political scientists and sociologists and they supposed application of the western devices for advance of democracy.

For instance, Z. Brzezinski proposed and considered as an example of inculcation of democratic norms and mechanisms in CA (in each country separately) having determined their perspectives as being average, i.e. 50 to 50; however, western sociologists and political scientists applied exclusively western criteria and confronted obstacles in the regional context. For a long time, scientists of Kyrgyzstan discussed one problem – whether the going on in the republic processes correspond to the main criteria of democracy, while the western model was considered as the main example. Finally, following a thorough analysis of these reforms many of them came to the conclusion on impossibility of mechanical application of the existing standards of democracy to the societies of some other type, since it may cause tearing away of the innovations alien to this society. Thus, it turned out that the theory of transition society, which determines the same standards irrespective of regional and cultural-historic peculiarities of the states, should not be considered as universal in any case.

For the first years after obtaining the sovereignty Kyrgyzstan became the advanced country among the CA states building democracy: the republic introduced the national currency and entered

the World Trade Organization (WTO) as one of the first country in the post-Soviet space. It showed that KR in good time reacted to the extension of the market economic system as an important economic characteristic of democratic society. At the same time, against the background of other CA republics tended to a rigid authoritarian power, the existence in KR a relatively independent opposition testified to a political democracy of society in KR.

However, the “democratic feature” of the sovereign KR resulted in two coups d’etat which pushed KR for many years backwards in social-economic terms and which “tiered away” investors and supporters of eastern exotics; and the actually demolished country rapidly loses its statehood. At the same time, there was demolished one of the criteria of efficient state structure – security creating a threat to national independence and sovereignty. What has caused this rapid fall of the democratically intended republic?

The founding factor leading the country to the tragedy and an abyss of conflicts and contradictions is, to the author’s mind, the mechanical transfer of elements of western model of democracy to the totally unfit ground. Due to the peculiar mentality, peculiarities of political consciousness and social memory comprehension of democracy by society in KR was marked by its specificity which in no way coincided with the western type of thinking accepting democratic values as one of the main conditions of society’s existence.

For many centuries, the societies of the peoples of CA, including KR, were characterized by sacramental feature of power marked by worship of elders; the tribal features of political consciousness were rather strong and stable at the level of sub-consciousness, which promoted tribalism in contemporary policy and caused a new wave of “democratic sacramental feature” of power. These traditions were kept despite all attempts of the socialist regime to eradicate them, and they

increased after the country gained its sovereignty. At the same time, not single new political elite was able to become the national elite. Exactly the elites are responsible for carrying out significant historic reforms in society. American sociologists and futurologists O. Tofler and X. Toffler asserted that the notion of “the load of responsibility” was the deciding factor in any understanding of democracy and at the level of the elite it was necessary to form the new relations coming from priority of stability idea and of society unity. A non-standard and different from acceptance and understanding of democracy was characteristic for the people themselves and for the political establishment, while the first often regarded as democracy the all possible means of liberty (in common understanding democracy is only the power of majority, which means a chance and the need to execute the power proceeding from comprehension of the masses; hence, the people’s revolts demonstrating their unorganized but great power); the second created the “democratic” governance of the Central Asian type (particularly, of its Kyrgyz model).

For a long time there existed the meaning that the Kyrgyz as a freedom loving people and in case of need are heroic people. However, the former barbaric revolts in the country, where the rulers betrayed the people and saved by flight contradict this assertion.

Trying to comprehend the objective reasons of the processes going on in Kyrgyzstan it is possible to make the very significant philosophical conclusion: each historic stage of social development dictates its laws. While in the middle of the XX century (the period of relative stability) it was considered that the people themselves put forward the historic personality and the irreplaceable people did not exist, by the end of the XX century-by the beginning of the XXI century many philosophers considered that fortuity occupied the principal place; thus, the notion of historic personality acquires a

special meaning. Just a chance gave to Kyrgyzstan as “a gift” the first president, and continuation of historic traditions and political development of the republic depended on him; exactly he made the foundations of the leadership. The appearance of the second president was not yet a chance; the destinies of both political leaders turned out to be the same to a large extent; however, the “tulip” revolution was added as an event in the second case. Meanwhile, the ordinary “fortuity” resulted in a new state coup d’etat making it possible to speak about the tradition of the exclusively forceful change of power. However, historic knowledge and common sense force to admit that traditions may be and sometimes should be changed to prevent emergence of the famous Hegel’s “evil eternity”.

Kyrgyzstan is on the eve of the third “renovation”, and thoughts about the future of the country are quite natural in this situation; the great historic responsibility has been put on the provisional government, which assumed the task to change in principle the form of the state’s development. In this connection, it is necessary to admit that a limit of the people’s confidence has been used long time ago, and the people will logically express not only doubts and suspiciousness but even certain nihilism. Who is a charismatic leader able to ensure “a leap” to the historic future? Will the people avoid being emerged in abyss of hopelessness due to the internal sense of the provisional government and as a result of installation of the parliamentarian form of governance? It is evident that the next conflict of interests will lead the country to an unknown future; two coups d’etat for five years – this is too much for any country leaving aside the small republic immersed in endless contradictions and the permanent economic crisis and political conflicts.

What should be done to preserve statehood and to ensure a stable development of the state? First, it is necessary to pay a special attention

to the Constitution of KR (which was changed five times for the period of sovereign development); the permanent encroachments on the Principal Law of the country show that it is not a guarantee of security, national independence and development. At present, the sixth and principal change of the Constitution is in the process of making amendments in its text. Will the idea of the parliamentary republic bring escape for Kyrgyzstan? Probably, the idea itself is good; however, it is impossible to realize it in the country with prevailing economic troubles, permanent political conflicts, social explosions and spiritual bankruptcy of the population. At the same time, the success of parliamentarianism to a large extent depends on maturity of the political parties with clearly elaborated development conception and the social basis, as well as on existence of charismatic leaders.

At present, the election race has started in the country; new parties are being formed in haste raising the level of chaos. In this connection, it should be stressed that there exist the political parties, which have functioned for a long time, and it seemed that they would be able to elaborate the variants of exit from the shaped crisis. The members of the provisional government often compare Kyrgyzstan with Great Britain, which, mildly speaking, might be considered as a political shortsightedness: the question is the comparison of the state with the totally different historic ways, leaving aside the level of political consciousness and social memory, the level of economic, social development and culture (primarily, – political culture). This comparison recalls the slogan of transforming KR into Central Asian Switzerland causing a smile up to the present time; unfortunately, in the course of elaboration of the strategy of the state's development we raked around for something.

Having acquired the idea of parliamentarianism, KR in the course of hard time provokes a radical change of the political system. It

is probable that the events in the republic, though, will give a new push to development, since it is known that tragedy possesses a vast cultural creative potential. One more argument in favor of parliamentarianism may be the fact that there were in history of Kyrgyz the events of taking collective decisions to determine the destiny of the nation. In any case, the realization of the idea of parliamentary republic will show whether and to what extent the present elite supports the patriotic senses of saving the Motherland and whether it is capable to solve the most important problems from the point of view of national interests. At present, KR is on the edge of the abyss, and parliamentarianism either finally will liquidate the republic or will cause a break of collective wisdom, will and resoluteness and will keep statehood; the instinct of self-preservation should show the optimal way for development.

The theoretical underlying reason for a possible leap of Kyrgyzstan to the future may be the idea that the archetype of Kyrgyz, namely the mentality of nomads, *inter alia*, is marked by susceptibility to changes; the Kyrgyz rather easily adapt to the changing conditions. The second, not less significant condition for further development of the republic is a sober and objective view on the chance itself to build a democratic state; it is necessary to determine whether this idea is a super-idea for the Kyrgyz. Western liberalism and democracy are acceptable for the West itself having achieved certain positive results, which it “shares” with the whole world; but is it worth copying some other’s experience and will we achieve the same success? To the author’s mind, the practice of elementary copying without taking into account the local cultural-historic traditions is senseless.

In this case, the most attractive approach seems to be the idea of the constructivists, who prefer the principal consideration that the social reality is neither unchangeable nor rationally pre-determined. Reality is

marked by originality in terms of values and culture. The constructivists proceed from the assertion that any rationality possesses its historic peculiar roots; it is created and re-created by activities of the politically significant participants. The interests themselves (consequently, also rationality) have been originated in the social sphere and do not represent the result of intellectual attempts. They are subject primarily to the social study and comprehension. The historic and political perception of the interests is the key for such understanding. Hence, there are three main principles of constructivism: the cultural, the historic and the political determination of social actions.

In any case one should not change reality according to the certain prepared standards in the course of state's construction and termination of certain social action. It is necessary to take into account the cultural-historic factors: the peculiar perception of the world, the system of values existing in society as well as the political consciousness and social memory. One should not forget that in the process of strategic determination of development it is necessary to proceed from the national interests and to stress their priority and not to try to apply mechanically existing conceptions, which dictate the determined strategic behavior; at the same time, one should agree to a certain geopolitical compromise.

One should not forget that in the course of construction of a sovereign state the key role is played by ideology, while Kyrgyzstan failed to elaborate it for two decades. And it is rather difficult to overcome the existing social contradictions without a strategic perspective of further development. For the first years of independence the theory of ideology's harm; many conferences and seminars were held on incorporation of non-ideological consciousness, while the idea of western democracy itself contains a certain cultural-ideological context.

Further, the attempts were taken to create national ideology, but all of them failed. It concerns “Seven Precepts of “Manas” interpreting the spiritual heritage in favor of political aims, the slogan “Kyrgyzstan – Our Common House” incorrectly touching the question of inter-ethnic consent, as well as the idea “Kyrgyzstan – the Country of Human Rights”, which in no way stressed KR in the list of other states, since any state may be called in this way. Thus, at present there is an urgent need to advance an actual national idea able to consolidate the nation, while in principle it should realize the idea of civil identity.

The period of sovereign development in the CIS countries was marked by the crisis of identity, which emerged in Kyrgyzstan in all its forms: civil, national and religious forms. The identity of hierarchy, presented by the West, staggers by numerous small features; this theory, particularly its ideological component, being an interpretation of the notion of national self-consciousness was discussed recently in Kyrgyzstan. It is difficult to speak about probable rallying of the people round any idea without adequate cultivation of the phenomenon of civil identity. Besides, it is also necessary to remember about poly-ethnicity and poly-cultural peculiarity of Kyrgyzstan; there exists the problem of keeping ethnic diversity and ensuring sustainable development of all nationalities on the basis of civil unity. Identity is an individual phenomenon, but it is also the product of reciprocal action: any person becomes a member of some ethnic group and, consequently, a bearer of certain ethnic identity not thanks to his origin (biological or cultural-historical) but owing to the role, which is played by him in social mutual cooperation. Identity is not a virtue but the relation; hence, its openness and volatility.

Is it not senseless artificially to try to create ideology, which further will not be demanded? Probably, it would be wiser to separate it from the process of constructing the world, while in formation of civil

identity to concentrate attention on its continuity. The main role should be devoted to the education system summoned not only to cultivate this idea by all means but also to improve the mechanisms, which have influence on the perception's integrity (a good example may be considered creation in Soviet time of organizations of oktyabryonoks, pioneers and Young Communist Leaguers). At the same time, it is worth recalling Yu. Khabermas theory on the need to accept identity as a project. As he proposed, it is very significant to see identity not only as a notion of the past but as a project; in this way the cultural context is supplemented by the social-political substance. The contradictions between citizenship and national identity may be solved by the theory of "political acculturation" proposed by Yu. Khabermas; the corresponding subjective and objective factors play a significant role in its realization. The subjective factor is expressed in capability and readiness of the person to understand and to accept its position, i.e. to integrate in his new state. The objective factor consists in the state's responsibility for creation of a new political system and in compliance with democratic values as the sole acceptable notion, while priority is given to protection of rights and interests of citizens. In this case, the democratic values should be perceived within the framework of western perception, and the process not based on democratic values will soon be thrown away or will degrade beyond recognition, noted D. Howgland.

In the context of this thesis it is possible to assert that the processes going on in Kyrgyzstan were not based on the democratic values in their western understanding, which resulted in degradation of artificial democracy. The crisis of the state development inevitably raises also the crisis of civil identity displayed both at the civil and cultural levels; it is the consequence of the loss of demand and importance of the human self-determination within the framework of society and culture. This social-cultural situation needs the test by time.

As a response to political and social challenges of the contemporary situation shall be regarded a new civil “state” identity, which resembles public self-consciousness: as high is its level so adequate is it to the global world. The problem of formation of civil society within the framework of independent national state is quite urgent from the point of view of pluralism and dialogue of cultures, since the accent is made on civil and cultural identity as a founding mechanism of self-determination and self-realization of society. The regional identity within the framework of the geopolitical region of CA also plays a rather great role, which at present actualizes and functionalizes; it may significantly promote progressive development of each country. The formation of such Central Asian identity is in great need, since only the region as a whole is able to confront the challenges of contemporary globalization: a single state is unable to do it. From the point of view of geopolitical unity, the situation in Kyrgyzstan can not help bringing troubles to its nearest neighbors; a further aggravation of the crisis situation in KR threatens the region with a loss of integrity and destabilization.

The process of democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan is closely connected with modernization of all spheres of life – economic, political, social and spiritual; since the first years of sovereignty it transformed in westernization, i.e. copying of models of political institutions and systems of values of the West. However, the innovations were unable to “incorporate themselves” in society and caused “the syndrome of alienation”; the conservative-traditional features of the Kyrgyz national character were displayed with the unknown force. It is quite probable that the variant of KR development does not fit the common generally accepted frameworks of democracy’s notion. Consequently, modernization also should acquire its strategy with due account of all nuances of economy and individual

political culture of the people marked rather often by very contradictory displays.

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The analysis of the reasons of the shaped social-political and social-cultural situation in Kyrgyzstan makes it possible to see better the present time but also in a certain way to have a look at the future. One of the most significant steps in the process of elaboration of the strategy of further development of KR is comprehension at the state level of disastrous results of mechanical copying of democratic standards; of great significance is a deep comprehension of the specific cultural-historic context shaped in the republic. At the same time, the perception of the thinking culture plays a significant role; a good accent on cultivation of certain features of mentality is able to bring more sustainable and long-term results, since the human being as the main subject of the state is the criterion of development of any society. This approach is connected with actualization of issues of patriotism, which serves as a tuning fork of unity of the people.

For the last decades, patriotism was considered a very unpopular phenomenon of the post-Soviet period; however, the events in KR showed the reversible situation: patriotism is laid at the level of sub-consciousness of the Kyrgyz people. At present, Kyrgyzstan should use all its chances for a break; it is necessary to decide the question “to be or not to be?” It seems that the sole correct answer to this question since earliest times should become creation of the democratic society based on its specific cultural-historic context.

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TADJIKISTAN – UZBEKISTAN:

THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER RESOURCES

Lately, the relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are marked by a regular peak of tension. The clearest example of it is the detainment at its border over two thousand railway freight cars with goods (fuel, wheat, fertilizers, medicines, technique, equipment etc.) destined for Tajikistan. Although the Uzbek leadership asserts that the detainment of freight cars was caused by technical reasons, it is undoubtedly related to the conflict connected with the renewed construction of Rogun hydroelectric station by Tajikistan. It is proved indirectly by the fact that following the agreement between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in June 2010 during the ShOS summit the freight cars with various cargoes except equipment for Rogun hydroelectric station were allowed to proceed to Tajikistan. The economic losses surpassed \$ 100 million, according to the Tajik party.

Tajikistan is in great need of Rogun GES to become finally a state without any dependence on some other party in terms of energy. For the last 15 years in winter time, the republic experienced lack of energy for its distant regions for 4–6 hours every day. The hydro-energy capacity of Tajikistan (527 billion kwt) has been used only by 3–4%, according to the data presented by the Tajik president at the international conference “Water for Life”, held in Dushanbe in June 2010.

At present, the republic to a large extent depends on its neighbors. Following withdrawal of Uzbekistan from the united energy circle of the Central Asia Tajikistan ceased to get electric energy from Turkmenistan by the power network via the territory of Uzbekistan. As

a result, taking into account the needs of Tajikistan, its energy problems increased greatly. Should Rogun GES be constructed, Tajikistan will be able not only to ensure fulfillment of its own energy tasks but also to sell electric energy by higher tariffs to Afghanistan and Pakistan, leaving aside other factors, which may hinder implementation of this project.

Referring back to the origin of the construction of Rogun GES, it should be mentioned that the project was elaborated by “Gidroproekt” in Tashkent since 1987 in the interests not only of energy of Tajikistan but also of irrigated agricultural lands in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The project was confirmed by the corresponding documents of all countries of the region. It is significant that at that time Uzbekistan was guided by its plans of extension of cotton production and supported the project, while Tajik public circles expressed their protests, since the station’s construction could do harm to ecology of Tajikistan. The construction of Rogun GES was stopped after disintegration of the USSR. In 1993, due to the not terminated construction of water straight through tunnels the built objects of the station were partially damaged. In 1994, the presidents of Russia and Tajikistan signed the agreement of the joint construction of Rogun GES. The Russian company “Russian Aluminum” was chosen for construction in Tajikistan of the big energy-metallurgical complex including GES. However, in 2007 Tajikistan cancelled unilaterally this agreement.

The Tajik representatives assert that the contradictions between the leadership of Tajikistan and “Rusal” appeared after visit of the company’s head (O. Deripaska) to Tashkent and his meeting with the president of Uzbekistan in 2005. Exactly after this meeting the authorities of Tajikistan and “Rusal” top managers disagreed on the type and height of the dam. Tajikistan insisted on rock and earth fill dam with height of 335 m and six aggregates ; “Rusal” and its

consultant – German company “Lahmeyer” drafted the project of the concrete dam with the height not more than 285 m and installation of four turbines with common capacity of 2.4 thousand mvt. Dushanbe rejected this variant, probably, owing to get a greater output of the large-scale project. The Tajik leadership planned to sell electric energy abroad. The principal position of “Rusal” was quite understandable, since under international ecological norms and international law on trans-border water use the construction of the dam with height of 335 m demanded confirmation on the part of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan disagreed with the proposed height of the dam, and therefore the Russian company proposed the construct the dam up to 285 m.

It should be mentioned that the two heights (285 and 335) did not appear by chance. The project of Rogun construction elaborated in 1974 provided for three stages of construction of the dam: the first – 220 m, the second -285 m, the third – 335 m. If Tajikistan succeeds to construct the dam with such parameters, it will be the highest dam in the world.

The differences between Tajikistan and “Rusal” became evident on one more issue – the share of participation in the project. In accordance with its investment “Rusal” wanted to get 70% of stocks of “Rogun” GES. The Tajik leadership also intended to acquire the control package of stocks, having recalled that in Soviet time 804 million Soviet rubles had been invested in this project. As a result the parties disagreed on the project. Later, E. Rakhmon, explaining his position, declared: “We will not let the situation to come when destiny of such significant strategic object for Tajikistan is decided by one private company”. Due to the lack of other significant investors Tajikistan in July 2008 resumed the works to finish the construction by its own budgetary inputs. At present, the whole population is involved in

financing the construction of this strategic GES: since 6 January 2010, the stocks of the hydroelectric station are being realized in the country. Five million stocks and certificates of OAO “Rogun GES” for the sum of 6 billion somoni (\$ 1.3 billion) were issued in the country. “The People’s IPO” is carried out in “the voluntary-obligation way”. At present, Tajikistan is engaged in restoration of the station’s objects, which were built in Soviet time.

The proclamation of People’s IPO by Tajikistan made Uzbekistan take action in order to publicize its position on construction of Rogun GES. Tashkent expressed its resolute objection to resume construction of this hydroelectric station and demanded to arrange a previous international expertise and to present the technically justified written guarantees of the international specialists that the constructed dam would be safe. Uzbekistan refused to accept the arguments of Tajikistan based on the expertise, made in 2006 by German company “Lahmeyer” on the request of Russian company “Rusal”. The agreement signed by “Rusal” and “Lahmeyer” provided for preparation of the feasibility study (TEO) of the GES construction, but not the arrangement of the complete expertise of the project. The company “Lahmeyer” was not engaged in it and was not able to be in charge of ecological and technique-generative safety, since it was not supposed to do it, was published in Uzbek newspaper “Pravda Vostoka” in response to the official letter of the premier of Tajikistan A. Akilov to his Uzbek colleague, who was engaged in polemics concerning Rogun GES. As was stressed by the Uzbek newspaper, Tashkent disagreed with the expertise of the Soviet time, when “independent audit and independent expertise were not practices”.

As the first deputy minister of economy of Uzbekistan G. Saidova mentioned at the International Water Forum, held in Dushanbe, the expertise should guarantee that for centuries the

unchanged amount and regime of water flow would provide normal water consumption by the population in downstream, that the threat of ecology for the region, i.e. the Aral catastrophe and the threat for life and health of millions of people in the low water stream would be avoided. Thus, the disputes concerning this object not only prove the existence of a conflict between the upper and the low reaches of the river in terms of water consumption and the access to the water affecting also the corresponding ecological problems.

Uzbekistan motivates its position first of all by probable catastrophic consequences for the region in case of a probable accident in this object. The Rogun GES is situated in the region of high seismicity along the line of tectonic fracture marked by repeated earthquakes. The dam is located on Ionakhsh tectonic fracture filled with stone salt with seismic danger with force of 9. Referring to the mathematical accounts of Soviet scientists, Saidova said that in case of probable demolishing of Rogun dam the height of the wave from the water basin would account for 240–260 m and will reach Nukus in the north of Uzbekistan with the height of 4–8 m. As a result of this wave there would be demolished six hydroelectric stations, houses and enterprises in the low reaches of the river. According to the official point of view of Tashkent, the old project worked out forty years ago with its technological features does not guarantee the successful outcome of the construction.

The accident in the Sayano-Shushenskaya GES in Russia was used by Uzbekistan as an argument in favor of its position. All functioning hydroelectric stations in the Central Asia were built in Soviet time and need the overhaul repair. It may be proved by the accident in Kairakum GES in January 2009. as a result of this accident due to a hydraulic strike and destruction of the cover of the water passage chamber the basement of one turbine was filled with water.

According to the expertise, the accident was caused by the failure of aggregates due to their long-term exploitation. It would be better to examine the old stations before construction of such big new station.

Uzbekistan is concerned not less about any changes of the amount and regime of usage of water flows in the region, which as a result of construction of new hydroelectric stations might lead to food and ecologic catastrophe. The survival of millions of people in the region with the definite continental desert climate directly depends on existence of drinking and irrigation water particularly in the repeated periods of low water level. Besides, the Uzbek party reminds that the glaciers in Pamir and Tyan-Shan as the main water sources of Amu Darya and Syr Darya reduce their amount every year. According to the official viewpoint of Uzbekistan, the tragedy of Aral was caused by the impact of hydroelectric stations erected in the basin of these two rivers flowing to this sea. The Rogun station will aggravate the situation. Tashkent is also suspicious that Dushanbe might reduce the water used by Uzbekistan by regulation of water flow from the dam of the Rogun station and in this way might dictate its conditions to Tashkent in various disputes.

Tajikistan has its own arguments relating to the above mentioned claims. It proposes to the neighboring country primarily to pay attention to its own problems relating to the damage brought to ecology and to solve the problem of water deficit on its own territory leaving aside Rogun, which corresponds to all ecological problems, to the mind of the Tajik party. And what is more, the Tajik experts assert that Rogun GES will be of benefit to Tajikistan, while all Uzbeks protests are connected with refusal of the Tajik people to depend on Uzbekistan. For instance, the secretary of the Tajik National Committee of the International Commission on Big Dams K.H. Arifov said: “the government of Uzbekistan understands well that Uzbekistan will get

more benefits after construction of Rogun GES, that the Uzbek will get a chance to improve irrigation and to cultivate new lands. However, this declaration is a political act on the part of the leadership of Uzbekistan with the aim to prevent development of Tajikistan". The Tajik party reminded that the report of Tashkent institute "Soyuzgidrokhlopok" in 1990 pointed out that construction of Rogun GES was needed for liquidation of water deficit in the basin of Amu Darya. The same conclusion was made in the report of institute "Tashgidroproekt" in 1993. The water regulation by Rogun water basin will make it possible to ensure 90% of irrigation of 4.6 million hectares of lands in the basin of Amu Darya and additionally to cultivate 480 thousand hectares, including 140 thousand hectares in Turkmenistan and 240 thousand hectares in Uzbekistan, providing greater irrigation of the exploited lands.

According to Dushanbe, there no reasons to be afraid of the water lack and of difficulties for irrigated lands after completion of construction of Rogun GES. Tajikistan uses 12–17% of water flow of Amu Darya. Thanks to the mountainous relief 40–50% of the used water comes back to the river. The water used by turbines of the power station also completely returns to the river. The main losses of water occur just in the lower reaches of the river, where water is used for irrigation. The water used by irrigation comes back as the water of bad quality.

According to the long-term monitoring of Tajik experts, the water and the salt regime of Syr Darya and Amu Darya on the territory of Tajikistan remain at the level of the long-term average indexes. The changes of these regimes occur mainly in the plains.

Uzbekistan receives the greatest part of water in the region, and the greatest part of it is lost just on its territory in its irrigation systems. Only 35% of channels' extent possesses anti-filtration lining and over

15 thousand km of inter-household and main channels (60% of their extent) need reconstruction. At present, the efficiency coefficient of Uzbek irrigation systems makes only 0.64 (with specification 0.7), which results in the loss of not less than 3 billion cubic meters (20-30%) of the supplied water. The water is not lost irretrievably. By means of cascade channels it emerges in the down-stream, but is already the dirty water. In general, Uzbekistan itself comprehends its problems connected with the non-rational use of water and asks for assistance on the part of international financial institutions to solve these problems. The state program of construction and repair of the irrigation system for 2008–2012 has been adopted. The program provides for reclamation of 350 thousand hectares of land, reconstruction of 30 thousand km of collector-drainage network as well as construction of new collectors for removal of ground waters. The projected reconstruction of the drainage system and of the irrigation infrastructure in the delta of Amu Darya is carried out with financial assistance of the World Bank. In 2004, the Asian Bank of Development provided Uzbekistan with the loan of \$ 73.2 to start implementation of the project of the total cost of \$ 112.6 aimed at restoration of irrigation system Amu Zang, including the cascade of water pumps stations in the upper reaches of Amu Darya; in August 2009 the Bank invested \$ 100 million for implementation of the project aimed at improvement of drainage of the lands in Fergana and Zaravshan valleys. In February 2010, the World Bank and the government of Uzbekistan signed the agreement on the credit to Uzbekistan in the amount of \$ 65.5 for rendering assistance to implement the first stage of the project on managing water resources of Fergana valley. The project consists of three main components: improvement of the irrigation system and construction of drainage networks; institutional strengthening and

development of agriculture; management and monitoring of the project and appraisal of its results.

According to experts of Dushanbe, the countries of the low reaches, which use irrationally water resources, are to blame for the problem of Aral. The problem is aggravated by construction there of great water reservoirs in the amount, which 1.5 times surpasses the present size of the Aral Sea, remind the Tajik experts. There is no definite answer to the question – what is to blame for the disaster in the Aral Sea. It is also not clear to what extent Rogun GES will aggravate or ameliorate the situation in the final account. At present, neither united meaning, nor common policy relating to water-energy resources of the Central Asia exist. Each country sees and pursues its own benefit forgetting about the interests of the region and aggravating the situation. Expertise of different parties is also quite different. It is significant that all parties agree about the need of a common position, but nobody takes steps in this direction.

Appealing to the world community for justice the president of Tajikistan E. Rakhmon at the 15th Conference for Change of Climate, held in Copenhagen, for the purpose of ensuring water security in the Central Asia proposed to arrange the complex expertise of the impact of water use system on the ecological situation of the region. But the parties have one-sided views on the problem even in case of asking for assistance to make a complex solution of water-energy problems in the region. For instance, the president of Tajikistan declared that under conditions of demographic explosion and uncontrolled development of new lands as well as of irrational use of water Tajikistan appeals to United Nations and its corresponding structures to arrange a complex expertise of the influence on ecology of the old and inefficient system of water use in the region and of a great number of water reservoirs in the lower reaches of the rivers. According to his point of view it is the

countries of the lower reaches which are to blame for the existing situation.

According to Dushanbe, Rogun does not create any threat to the region. According to Tajik scientists and the analysis of Uzbek “Gidroproekt” made in 2006, the mathematical calculations of the dam of Rogun GES provide the station with guaranteed sustainability in case of an earthquake of 9 marks. The big stone dams with loam kernel are sustainable in case of such natural phenomena, which is proved by exploitation of Nurek GES for 36 years.

At present, the construction of hydroelectric station is guided by “Gidroproekt”, since the general experts in projection from Tashkent refused to take part in it further. The Moscow specialists agreed to work under the following condition: if the technical decisions on construction of the hydroelectric station do not ensure the needed level of safety, “Gidroproekt” has the right to make corrections. Thus, the project elaborated in Soviet time may be optimized, if needed, according to the modern technology.

Tajikistan presented its justification of incorrectness of the claims of the lower reaches’ countries connected with the change of water balance, reduction of the size of water flow and violations of the agreed regimes and the size of water flows for the lower reaches’ countries. The rivers of the Central Asia form every year 115 km of water, and only 15% of it relates to Tajikistan. The amount of the water reservoir of Rogun GES will make 13 billion m of water. But this water will be accumulated almost unnoticed for the irrigated agriculture of the lower reaches’ countries for the period of 8-10 years. In time of low water years this period will be extended. At the same time, the Tajik party asks to take into account that the flow of river Vakhsh, the place of Rogun GES construction, makes only 30% of the water flow of Amu Darya. It means that theoretically in case of maximum conflicting

regime of work of two water reservoirs – Nurek and Rogun – the maximum damage to the lower reaches' countries will not surpass 15% and will be even less in the periods of water accumulation and even less in time of its further rise. It is just a part of the share, which was given to the republic by the special agricultural commission in 1992 and which Tajikistan still lacks.

Water will not be sufficient for all

The main problem in this conflict seems to be connected with the fact that there is not enough water for all. It might have been different, if it were not lost in the old and demolished irrigation networks, if its saltiness did not rise, if the amount of silt did not increase in water reservoirs, if the natural water stream were not disturbed and if water did not vaporize out of vast artificial water reservoirs. It is necessary also to take into account the change of the climate. By means of water the upper reaches and lower reaches countries try to solve their most vital problems: the upper reaches countries – with due account of the lack of hydrocarbons – try to solve their energy problems; the lower reaches countries try to solve the food problems. And all of them need as much water as possible. Therefore each country tries to protect its interests hindering each other to realize their plans and building big storages of this valuable for CA production.

The water reservoirs are built not only by hydroelectric stations in upper reaches countries but also on the territories located near the lower water stream. The project of creating in Karakum desert of a big artificial water lake getting water from Amu Darya is subject to implementation in Turkmenistan. Its planned capacity makes 11 billion cubic meters. Uzbekistan, according to some Tajik data, contrary to the agreement on water delivery to Karakum water reservoir, intends to build a water reservoir in Fergana valley. Kazakhstan has constructed

Koksarai counter regulator in order to prevent the uncontrolled water waves in spring flood.

But the larger size of water is dispersed, the larger quantity of problems emerges related to the lack of water. As a result, the disputes come to the politics and cause inter-state opposition. A certain transnational state control organization might solve the problem. It is significant that the countries of the region see it but actually do not take steps to create it, although they have tried not once to organize an international consortium on water problems. Each country wants to get more and not to reduce itself in anything.

For 1998–2001, the Global Ecological Foundation tried to elaborate both the common water-energy strategy and an individual strategy for each country. Each national strategy was based on its priorities, but by summing them up at the regional level it became clear that the need of water by 1.5 times surpasses the existing water resources. The demand for water rises each year. The opposition among the countries due to disputes for getting water will grow. The disputes relating to Rogun GES represent a clear example of the intensifying struggle for water resources among the countries of the Central Asian region.

“Istoriya i sovremennost”, M., 2011, March, p. 93–106.

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THE CENTRAL ASIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AFGHAN SITUATION

The five former Soviet republics of the Central Asian region (CAR), which for the 1990s were actually in the distant sphere of world

politics, at present turned out to be an object of the highest attention on the part of leading regional and world actors. The changed situation of CAR is determined by several factors.

The countries of this region possess significant fuel-energy resources. They are not so big in terms of the world marks and are not comparable with the reserves of oil and gas in the Persian Gulf. For comparison it should be noted: the oil reserves in the Persian Gulf make 56% of all world reserves, while in the countries of the Central Asia (CA), the exporters of this energy resources (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, which is a part of the Caspian energy network) it accounts for only 3.5%. The deposits of natural gas in the Persian Gulf make 40% of its world reserves, while in CA – only 7%. In spite of this fact the oil and gas resources of CA are considered not only as the alternative to Russian deliveries of hydrocarbons to the world markets but also as an important reserve for the future, which might be used by those actors, which will consolidate their positions in this region. The interest to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) as a transit country for energy routes from the Central to the South Asia remains quite stable by other countries, including Russia. Although the official reason for the American military operation in Afghanistan since 2001 was the fact that al-Qaida, accused of the terrorist act of 11 September found its refuge in the region of Afghanistan controlled by Taliban, there is another version of the event. According to this version, the refusal of talibs to agree to construction of the trans-Afghan gas pipeline was the actual reason of the USA action. This project was supported by American Administration and Californian oil and gas company Unocal, and the plan of intervention to Afghanistan, according to some experts, was elaborated and terminated by the American Administration six months before the events of 11 September.

The second factor, which determines significance of the CA region, is its involvement jointly with Russia in the present and future events going on in Afghanistan. It concerns primarily the transit possible routes of CA, which became very important for the USA/NATO military operation in Afghanistan. In October 2001 the USA started in Afghanistan the military operation named Enduring Freedom. Its official aim is liquidation of Al-Qaeda and Taliban. According to the decision of the first Bonn Conference on Afghanistan (December 2001), the supporting detachments – The International Security Assistance Force-ISAF – were sent to Afghanistan. For the beginning they were under jurisdiction of the United Nations and later since August 2003 – of NATO, which extended its zone of strategic viability. The ISAF represents almost 50 countries: 28 NATO members, the great majority of European states, some states of the Asian-Pacific region, some countries of America and the Near East (NE). In 2010 its military contingent consisted of 120 thousand servicemen. The great role is played by military cargoes deliveries for the intensified activities of NATO forces in 2009–2010, including military transport airplanes. Almost $\frac{3}{4}$ cargoes were delivered via Pakistan; however, since 2009 this route became very dangerous due to the fighters' attacks against transportation columns delivering cargoes needed for the coalition forces. In this connection, the greater attention will be paid to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) for military deliveries via territory of Russia, the Caucasus and CA. At present, 30% of military and civil cargoes are delivered to the coalition forces in Afghanistan by means of this route. The territory of CA is significant also for the planned large-scaled withdrawal from Afghanistan of the foreign military contingent from July 2011 to 2014. It will be realized according to the plan of terminating by stages the military mission in Afghanistan, which was presented by the USA at the NATO summit in

Lisbon (19–2- November 2010). In this connection, the role of CA as a territory for transit of cargoes increased greatly.

The third factor defining significance of the region is determined by its location: the territory of Afghanistan and of CA, in case of restoration of Afghanistan and creation there of conditions for secured development, may become a place for implementation of a number of significant economic projects, including the projects, which are interesting for Russia. In connection with the hidden and evident competition in CA and Afghanistan of certain significance is the meaning expressed by an informed expert and journalist Pepe Escobar, a correspondent of the Hong-Kong internet publication “Asia Times” and the author of book “Obama Does Globalistan” (2009). Escobar asserts that in the space of the Central and South Asia (called by him Pipestan) the going on events will determine the image of not only Eurasia but of the whole planet. In the context of the preceding withdrawal of military forces of the USA and its allies from Afghanistan of significance also for comprehension of the situation in CA seems to be the review of certain preliminary results of the coalition forces presence in Afghanistan.

The principal strategic imperative – liquidation of Al-Qaeda and its supporter Taliban – was realized only partially. Al-Qaeda in the main left Afghanistan, however, its centrally uncontrolled groups left for Pakistan, Yemen and Somali. Some most radical participants of Taliban were liquidated, but the movement itself was not liquidated at all; according to certain information, “the shadow governments” created by Taliban carry out their activities actually in all settlements in Pushtun provinces. Although certain efforts exerted by the West in the sphere of state governance gave some results, the ethnic balance in Karzai government was not achieved, while Afghanistan with its internal conflict represents a state with flourishing shadow economy

and narcotics' business. Finally, unlike Iraq, where the USA and its allies confronted the Shiite-Sunni conflict but were not involved in it directly, in Afghanistan the NATO forces became one of the parties of the civil conflict, which is provoked still more by the foreign presence.

The situation in Pakistan is not calm at all, even leaving aside the presence there of Afghan talibs and of their local cells in this country. The role of Pakistan in Afghan conflict is not so simple. The country turned out actually being involved in the zone of guided conflict within the frameworks of the strategy proclaimed by president Obama, indicated by neologism as "Afgh-Pak". Pakistan, on the one side, seems to be the key ally of the USA; it claims as well for the leading role in the process of regulation of the Afghan problem, and Islamabad strives for solving it in its interests. At the same time, the high army circles and special services of Pakistan continue to regard Taliban and related movements as their basis in a probable conflict with India (particularly, in Punjab) or as a force, which in case of need will allow to resume expansion to Afghanistan. It may be supposed that in perspective the situation in Afghanistan to a large extent will be determined by the choice of one of the probable scenarios after (probably, in the process) of withdrawal from Afghanistan of the military forces of the multinational coalition.

Scenario 1. The pessimistic scenario ("Taliban-2"). It supposes emergence in Afghanistan of civil dissension with participation of Pushtun ethnic-territorial group, on the one side, and the new variant of the Northern Alliance (Tajik-Uzbek-Hazar block), on the other side. The consequences of this conflict will be as follows: dismissal of the functioning government headed by Hamid Karzai, coming to power of irreconcilable talibs and restoration of the situation existed in 1996-2001, when Afghanistan became the refuge for Al-Qaeda and the international terrorist forces under its aegis, which threatened CA,

Russia and the world. Evidently, this situation will be a great challenge for the adjacent countries to Afghanistan and primarily for the CA countries. In particular, the threat of resumed armed actions of the civil war against Afghanistan may take place on the territory of its neighboring countries, namely Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The accompanying risk may become a great flow of refugees from Afghanistan, like in Tajikistan for the period of 1996–1997, as well as great aggravation of the epidemic situation accompanying any war, especially under conditions of the hot climate and deficit of war in the East. Taking into account the inadequate condition of armed forces and the border guards in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the interference of the allies of the Organization of the Treaty on Collective Security (ODKB) and of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation (ShOS) will be needed, resulting in the rise of social and economic tension in all countries-members of these organizations.

Scenario 2. The optimistic scenario (“Peaceful Afghanistan”). Evidently, this scenario is in the interests of the people of Afghanistan and of its adjacent countries, including the CA countries. According to this scenario, there will be developed the so-called Kabul process started in July 2010 at the Conference on Afghan regulation, held in Kabul. The program of national pacification and re-integration will be realized, the system of state governance will be structured, and as a result of it the local authorities will be able self-dependently to keep stability. The coalition government created (according to Iraq’s model) on the basis of the consensus achieved among the main political national forces will represent the main interests of all principal political forces of the country – Pushtun and other ethnic groups. The internal correlation and behavior of the leading political forces will determine to a large extent the situation in Afghanistan. The situation will depend on

the intentions of talibs – do they intend to continue the irreconcilable struggle or are they ready to become the legitimate participants of the political process; will they succeed to come to the agreement with “the North” (Tajiks and Uzbeks) and “the Center” (Hazars) claiming as well for taking part in governance of the state; will the Afghan National Security Forces trained by the USA-NATO instructors be able to prevent the return to Afghanistan of fighters of Al-Qaeda and of “irreconcilables” (members of “Khakkani network” based in Pakistan) and not to make it possible to transform again Afghanistan into “the grey zone” uncontrolled by the international security institutions and being a menace for the world. The development of Afghanistan may adopt a rather peaceful scenario thanks to the following factors: the regional and international situation differs a lot from the situation confronted by the USSR, when its forces were present in Afghanistan, the present situation differs as well from the period preceding talibs coming to power, when the bloody civil war of “all against all others” was going on in Afghanistan. At the same time, the non-Pushtu communities do not represent a consolidated and influential force; at present, the Northern Alliance as the main enemy of Pushtu tribes and talibs does not exist, while disagreements between former sponsors of this military-political structure are caused by their competing interests.

The struggle against terrorism, consequently against Al-Qaeda has transformed today in a global problem; and an extensive international front has shaped against radicalism and terrorism coming forward under religious slogans. It includes not only the USA and European countries but also Russia, China, the countries of the Near East and Middle East and of all Muslims, who themselves suffer from extremism’s displays. As far as the CA secular regimes are concerned, they may with full justification consider themselves as a probable target on the part of their own extremists and their adepts in Afghanistan and

other parts of the Muslim world. It should not be excluded that in future some groups of talibs in the future may become allies in the struggle against international terrorism appealing to Islam. In other words, transformation of Afghanistan in “Asian Somalia” suits only a scarce group of people, and the fact that some groups of fighters gradually come to reconciliation with the official government of Afghanistan demonstrates that ideology of Taliban movement do not correspond to the individual views of its representatives. Nevertheless, the intended in the middle of 2011 withdrawal of American and further other western troops from Afghanistan may cause the significant and long-term consequences for the whole region of CA, Russia, ODKB and ShOS structures.

The risks connected with the proposed withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan result in the restoration in Afghanistan of the situation existed in the country before the foreign invasion in 2001, as well as in intensification of radical Islamists’ activities and of narcotics’ traffic. At the same time, the intensification of activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU) and of other small extremist groups in CA is determined not only by “Afghan factor” (the support given by talibs), but to a large extent it is caused by the significant internal social-economic and political problems in the Central Asian countries. The fear of a probable destabilization, of, as they say in CA, “Afghanization” of the region instigated the actions of the local leaders directed to cooperation with the coalition forces. Of not a small significance for the states of CA is the direct economic advantage from the military objects provided by the USA and NATO and from the transit. Russia went the way of cooperation with the coalition. For instance, on 1 December 2010, the agreement on the so-called “return transit” providing for transport of non-military cargoes came to force; according to this agreement, the non-military cargoes of

the USA and NATO will be transported from Afghanistan via the territory of Russia. But it seems that as a whole Russia is not yet ready to accommodate itself to the new turn in Afghan-Central Asian history. Even such rather troubling event as “revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 did not accelerate elaboration by Russia of the efficient strategy, which would be adequate to the new challenges and would make it possible to defend the rights of ethnic Russians in CA, to create a good barrier against narcotics’ expansion and religious extremism mixed with transnational terrorism. At the same time, this strategy, being applied both in Russia and CA, should be based primarily on the struggle against corruption, since exactly corruption opens the way for expansion of narcotics and for transformation of ordinary economy into narcotics’ economy. It will be hard for Russia without such strategy to count on realization in CA of its national interests in order to ensure its security. To change the situation in the region for its advantage Russia should support its economic resource by the military capacity and economic will, which still is not yet clearly seen in its policy in CA.

However, it is impossible to say that Russia does not do anything at all. The consultations with Afghanistan are going on, and in the nearest future the inter-governmental Russian-Afghan commission on economic cooperation will be created. In 2010, Russia increased essentially its contribution to realize the special anti-narcotics program for Afghanistan jointly with UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Russia is ready to participate in restoration of the infrastructure of Afghanistan, if it will be able to come to an agreement on the financial source for implementation of the corresponding projects. Russia also tries to involve ShOS by means of its “Contact Group ShOS-Afghanistan”, as well as the Organization of the Treaty on Collective Security through the Working Group on Afghanistan under the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Some results were achieved by Russia’s activities

within the framework of “Four” – the non-formal mechanism uniting participants of ShOS (Russia and Tajikistan) as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan as observers of this organization. The first meeting of “Four” was held in July 2009 in Dushanbe, the second meeting took place in Sochi on 18 August 2010, while the heads of the anti-narcotics agencies of the four states met in December 2010. Evidently, these contacts are significant from the point of view of maintaining security and for the sake of giving a new impulse to social-economic development of the regions in the South and Central Asia on the basis of such four-lateral reciprocal action.

Russia expresses its interest also in the energy projects, which will connect CA and Afghanistan. At the meeting of the ninth session of the Council of the Heads of Governments of ShOS on 25 November 2010 in Dushanbe prime-minister of the RF V. Putin and his Pakistani colleague Yusuf Reza Gilani discussed the probable participation of “Gazprom” and of its branches in creation of the trans-Afghan gas pipeline called TAPI (meaning Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India). It creates an intrigue connected with the planned pipeline, taking into account the fact that following the visit of the Russian president in October 2010 to Ashghabad the foreign ministry of Turkmenistan expressed its definite objection against participation of “Gazprom” in project TAPI.

It should be said in all fairness that not all depends on Russia. It seems to be probable that partners of Russia in NATO, primarily the USA and the EU, in spite of all talks about “re-settlement”, are unable to overcome their distrust to Russia. They will not start equally legal and mutually beneficial cooperation either with Russia or ODKB, or ShOS even on such significant for NATO problem as Afghanistan. It is determined to a large extent by ideological considerations and by the strategy, which is so precious for the West. It consists in probable

exclusion of Russia from the key, from the western points of view, post-Soviet republics, prevention of their integration into the associations, where Russia might play a significant role (if Russia actually pursues this objective). NATO does not intend to cooperate in Afghanistan either with Russia or with ShOS or with ODKB; the NATO declaration adopted in Lisbon proves this conclusion, since these structures are not mentioned as regional partners, which, according to NATO, may render constructive assistance to Afghanistan. It is ridiculous that in the declaration on stable partnership, signed by Rasmussen and Karzai in Lisbon, it is stressed that Afghanistan made an input into “maintenance of regional stability”, which seems to be a mockery and contradicts the wise sense as well as existing reality. Many experts express the supposition that definition of Afghanistan as a partner of NATO will lead to a failure of difficult negotiations with talibs conducted by the government headed by Karzai.

At the same time, the military-political “mastering” of CA by the USA/NATO, having received a new stimuli after 2001, hardly responds to Russian interests, if they are connected with presence in this region. Actually, the USA having done nothing specific in terms of responsibility for stability in CA the USA changed there the scheme of security maintenance and became a kind of geopolitical competitor to the security structures of CIS and ShOS. In its turn, “the Northern route” creates pre-conditions for a more extended presence of the USA/NATO in CA, which in case of favorable for the West circumstances will extend further and will objectively consolidate its position in the region, will make CA countries dependent on NATO. This military presence will allow western countries more efficiently keep under control Russia, Iran and China, which is regarded as a main geopolitical competitor of Washington and Brussels in the Eurasian continent. In this way the American-NATO presence in CA under “the

cover” of military operation in Afghanistan has created for Russia a risk of loss its strategic advantage, the gradual ousting of CA with its hydrocarbons from the sphere of Russia’s influence, which is to the detriment of its interests. The eastern, the Asian direction of Russian foreign policy (irrespective of its present actual state) is not less significant than the European trend, primarily from the point of view of perspectives of development of new Russia.

It is possible to make some conclusions from the above said.

Russia for the period of a short “respite”, which coincides with withdrawal of the multinational coalition from Afghanistan, should be ready to assume additional and greatly more complicated obligations for ensuring security in CA. It will need it also for the following: first, to make safe its own development, since Russia will not be able to construct a barrier in direction to CA problems, even if it wishes it. Second, it is necessary to preserve its positions gained in the period of reduction of the tension of American-Russian rivalry, caused by involvement of the USA in solving more urgent problems than the Central Asian problems. With due account of all this circumstances, Moscow should better intensify its “target” military-political and economic cooperation with the region’s countries, install new life in the unused capacity of EvrAzES, ODKB and ShOS, initiate (parallel with the planned and permanent protection of its own interests) cooperation with regional and international forces to oppose the existing and potential challenges and threats.

The second conclusion concerns the perspectives of CA in the near future in connection with the Afghan situation. Even in case of talibs again coming to power, the large-scale war between Afghanistan and the CA republics is not supposed to be unleashed. A collapse in the region will not occur after withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, since just they represent the main factor of political

instability. In a larger context the presence or an absence of foreign troops has not key impact on stability of CA countries, since not the external but the internal factors represent the principal threats and challenges.

The CA countries, like in the previous years, will try to use the multitude of cooperation vectors, provided by their advantageous geographic location. Shuffling the different foreign policy “cards” (Russian, American, Chinese and European), the region’s states will try to get the maximum advantage from the competing geopolitical struggle initiated partially by them. However, in the nearest perspective they will confront the task to keep balance with all international actors under conditions, when relations between the USA and Russia, the European Union and Russia as a whole will ameliorate with simultaneous rapprochement of Russia with China. Nevertheless, in the future CA, in spite of the interest paid to it as a “world store” and an advantageous territory for transit, will remain in the distant zone of globalization.

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otnoshniya”, M., N 5, 2011, p. 3–16.*

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**BIN LADEN – A PHENOMENON
IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS**

In November 2000 I arrived to Er-Riad as a new Russian ambassador. As usually, there was composed a list of most influential political figures and representatives of business circles of the country to

establish with them useful contacts. Comparing the recommended list of businessmen with the information on the biggest companies of Saudi Arabia, I paid attention to exclusion from it of some corporations. Particularly, it concerned group bin Laden, which was mentioned among the ten biggest family business communities of the country possessing many billion properties. The rather significant circumstances were the reason of it.

The company of bin Laden family was considered as a conservative amalgamation with traditionally trustworthy relations with the ruling Saudi family; the company was specialized in construction of objects in Mecca and Medina, the center of objects of Muslim worship, the place, which attracted pilgrims from the whole world. The orders for construction of mosques, hotels and other buildings in this region demonstrated the most favorable attention to this company on the part of the king of Saudi Arabia, who was called in the country to be “the Custodian of the Two Sacred Places” (the biggest mosques in Mecca and Medina), of his circle and of the whole religious and administrative higher state administration.

As was considered, with due account of the above said the unconditional priority of bin Laden company was consolidation and extension of the shaped privileged connections with the royal establishment. For this period of time, Russia maintained with Saudi Arabia rather complicated relations due to acute disagreements on the “Chechen” issue. At all forums the Saudi representatives rigidly criticized the actions of Moscow in the North Caucasus. For its part, the Russian Federation used the sharpest words accusing Saudi Arabia of direct support of the separatists.

The other reason of the bin Laden representatives’ exclusion from the list for arrangement of meetings was the meaning, shared by diplomatic circles in Er-Riad, that this company was a traditional and

confidential partner of Americans, particularly of companies, which were close to the family business of Bush-elder and Bush-junior. It was considered that bin Laden group would hardly agree “to diversify” their foreign connections, especially with Russia, being afraid to spoil the relations with America.

It should be said that already in this period of time, i.e. before the events in September 2001, “the factor of Osama bin Laden” existed as a known representative of the public opposition to the regime of the ruling circle of Saudi king. It should be mentioned that before the events of 11 September the political circles of Saudi Arabia expressed the opinion that the main part of the bin Laden family did not share the views of Osama bin Laden and was not liable for his activities.

The line for “estrangement” of Osama was proved in 1994 officially by his deprivation of Saudi citizenship, while the family in various forms expressed disagreement with his behavior and his political views and dissociated from him.

What were the reasons of this “counter regime” behavior of Osama? The beginning of his carrier did not predict appearance of the mutual relations of this kind with the ruling circle of the king. For the period of Osama activities in Afghanistan he kept his confidential relations with the high royal circles of Saudi Arabia. He performed some delicate missions aimed at consolidation of Saudi positions in the country and in the region as a whole. At this time Osama established close ties with American secret services. He became sure that he could attain a lot in his life by his resoluteness and determination.

The good starting positions in Osama’s relations with Americans were conditioned by the well maintained connections of his family with the leaders of the USA. He used this capital to reach higher stages of political and business circles in the USA. In Afghanistan he was able to

develop efficient and confidential relations with Americans for the sake of counter-actions against the Soviet forces in this country.

After termination of his “Afghan mission”, using the established contacts, Osama made an attempt to become a connecting link between the establishment of Saudi Arabia and the USA. However, this “moderator” extracted from the Saudi royal circles was not charged with such commission. They had already well established connections with Washington and did not need “honest brokers”.

The activities of Osama, formerly supported in time of “Afghan” period, were considered as unnecessary by the royal circles. His rapid movements under conditions of the conservative governance characterized by the contemporary Saudi elite caused its dissatisfaction. As a result, Osama’s relations with the Saudi regime started to deteriorate after his return from Afghanistan. It seems that ambitious Osama, with his urge towards glory and money, was unable to find an adequate place for himself in the conservative and rigidly controlled system of official and business relations existed in Saudi Arabia. Osama was irritated that his political capital gained in time of his activities in Afghanistan turned out to be unused. It seems that this factor was the reason of his gradual transformation from a servant of the king into a critic and enemy of his regime.

It should be mentioned that the riches and the authority of Saudi family, which came to power in the beginning of the XX century, were contested by the opposition groups in Saudi Arabia and abroad. The opposition groups in London and other western capitals carried out their activities for decades and tried to oust the Saudi usurpers from the mechanism of power and to liquidate the source of their riches – the monopoly rights for extraction and export of oil. Certainly, Osama was aware of these forces’ activities, but as a very self-assured man he decided to wage the struggle for power In Saudi Arabia self-

dependently, having formed a mighty group of supporters under his guidance. Osama in his illegal propaganda stressed that the ruling Saudi dynasty had already performed its historic role in uniting the country and may be replaced by other people, who correspond to the new tasks and challenges confronting the peoples of Saudi Arabia and of the Arabic world.

From the middle of the 1980s, Osama started to unite with the people, who were dissatisfied with the situation in their countries and were ready to struggle by any means to remove from the key factors of political and economic power the ruling elites in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other countries of the Arabic-Muslim world. The start of the struggle against the Saudi rulers and the ruling regimes in the countries-allies of the USA in the Near East actually automatically meant the confrontation of bin Laden with official Washington.

Starting with criticism of some aspects of American policy in the Near East, bin Laden soon became convinced that anti-Americanism gives great chances for formation of a rather wide basis of his adepts and supporters.

A very significant and not yet discovered genuine underlying reason of reciprocal relations between Osama and the USA is hidden in this circumstance. His anti-Americanism is not at all the candid result of perceptions relating to the policy and role of Washington in the Near East and in the Arabic and Muslim world. It is not the consequence of his disappointment in this policy and of his review of the appraisals of the preceding period. Certainly, the cynicism and the selfish ends of Washington's policy in the countries of the third world were quite evident for him during the period of his joint activities in Afghanistan. One has only to make a guess what was the actual attitude to Americans on the part of bin Laden.

Criticism of the USA and further the struggle against Americans by terrorist methods were used by bin Laden as an efficient propaganda device to attract as many as possible the people, primarily representatives of the youth, who had nationalist and anti-American feelings.

Some other significant factor should be mentioned. Many researchers try to understand for what reasons bin Laden for several years (in the second half of the 1980s) had his main quarters in Sudan. It is worth explaining it.

The question is that since the middle of the 1980s bin Laden concentrated his criticism in the existed regimes of the Arabic and Muslim countries “sold out” to Americans. The regional organizations of these countries were also subject to harsh criticism for their unscrupulousness and conciliation. The League of Arabic States (the headquarters in Cairo) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (the headquarters in Saudi Jidda) were included in the list of such organizations. The very rigid Islamist regime of Sudan, and well educated and charismatic theologian and politician Turabi was being considered as a real inspirer and actual leader of this regime.

For the second half of the 1980s, the regime in Sudan started to present itself as an almost unique “legal” regime from the point of view of observance of Islamic norms. At the same time, Turabi and his adepts started to try to gain influence in the Organization of Islamic Conference. However, soon it became clear that they were not powerful enough to achieve this aim. Further, Turabi and his group of adepts were engaged in creation of “alternative” pan-Islamic structure – the People’s Islamic Conference with the headquarters in Khartoum.

Osama bin Laden turned out to be in the capital of Sudan just in this time. However, the People’s Islamic Conference remained a marginal group, and bin Laden terminated his cooperation with Turabi,

having been convinced that he should make his own independent attempts to come to power and to unite under his slogans his adepts in Saudi Arabia and other countries of Arabic-Muslim umma.

The group headed by bin Laden changed its name several times. Al-Qaeda became the most known name of it. It is possible that in future the story of the origin of this name will be a well-known historic anecdote.

In Arabic the word “Al-Qaeda” has several means, and they by sense are connected with the notion “foundation”. One of the meanings is the center, where concentrate from where information and directions are disseminated. When the author heard the name “Al-Qaeda” concerning the organization headed by bin Laden, his first impression, still kept in his memory, was as follows: it imitated the citation from the known bestseller about Schtirlitz: “Center – Yustus”. Most likely, the conditional name of the center, headed by bin Laden (“Al-Qaeda”), was translated by a not well educated translator as a name of the organization. Further, to a rather great extent of the wide spread campaign of American mass media after the events of 11 September this designation took root rapidly.

Probably, bin Laden as an ambitious man liked this word and accepted it as a name of his organization.

The sources of the contemporary international terrorism are rather vague. It is not accidental. In this case, there are many crossings of professional politicians, military officials and international adventurers with various criminal organizations and groups not only in the Arabic-Muslim world but from other countries. Surely, the financial factors compose the foundation of the phenomenon of contemporary terrorism. As a whole, the international terrorism should be regarded as a specific direction of the international criminal syndicate.

It is significant to indicate the place occupied by bin Laden in this criminal community. In this context, the author proves his agreement with the conception of “four storey” of the contemporary international terrorism. The substance of it shall be reduced as follows.

The first, “low” storey of the international terrorist structure consists of direct executors of terrorist acts. According to the representatives of the law enforcement bodies of several countries, including the countries in the Near East, after detainment of these elements of terrorist movement they in most cases are not aware of the customers, who delivered orders to commit the crime: the value of their information is rather limited. Often they are either zombies or deluded people with personal reasons of dissatisfaction with the existing situation. As a whole, the people of this echelon of the terrorist organizations do not make decisions relating to the strategy of actions. They are the first victims in the course of terrorist operations. According to some information, the leaders of the terrorist movement, in case of need, prefer to liquidate them by imitation of “acts of self-sacrifice”.

The second “storey” is composed of the local cells and organizational structures responsible for recruitment of executors and for the realization of scenarios of the terrorist acts. This seemingly “higher” storey of the organizational terrorist structure differs not much in terms of information and decisions on terrorist acts from the direct executors. They as well receive the orders and directions.

The third “storey” consists of the leaders. This role is played by the “symbols”, primarily bin Laden. It should be said that information for the public “consumption” on the plans and aims of the leaders often came by rather simple manipulations through mass media, including Internet, via some inter-Arabic TV channels or from them themselves. It is necessary to accept such “information” with great precaution. In

this case, the mechanism of throwing in mass media similar “documents” lies in wait for the experts.

It seems that it will be correct to speak also about existence of “the fourth storey” of the terrorist organizations. They are the well conspired secret structures, which are located not necessary in distant countries. And exactly the revelation of the substance of these “constructors” and leaders of contemporary terrorism is the decisive factor for a more successful opposition to this evil. The hidden motive for terrorist activities is the financial interest, the urge towards political power, naturally, primarily in the regions with certain “starting” conditions (Arabic countries, the countries of South Asia and others).

Adapting themselves to the anti-terrorist campaign, these structures spread throughout the whole world, skillfully using and abusing democratic traditions of many states, including states of the West. In this respect, the measures taken by the international community are quite justified, since they provide for the wide-scale struggle against terrorism, including the states subject to massive attacks of terrorist groups.

As a whole, terrorism, as it becomes clearer, is “an international project” with many components, while the most important of them is the financial basis of this phenomenon. More and more facts prove the mutual connection of “new” terrorist organizations with “traditional” criminal communities in the sphere of illicit narcotics commerce, illegal trade of arms etc. Regretfully, the work of the law enforcement bodies directed in finding out contacts among “old” criminal Mafiosi communities and terrorist underground has just made the first steps.

The financial component of contemporary international terrorism is a well prepared action aimed, like any financial operation, at ensuring not only reimbursement but also profitability of the invested means. Therefore terrorism according to certain logic selects both the sources

of getting money and the “addresses” of investments, made in the interests of terrorist organizations and the connected structures.

It is worth speaking briefly about the sources of the financial policy. By the present time, there have been discovered the main facts of getting money by terrorists from the Arabic-Muslim world. It is determined by a number of reasons, including big capacity of the widely collected charitable donations. According to Koran, the donations to the people in need represent a sacred obligation of each believer.

The way to the receipt of these money flows, in essence, is rather banal: justification of the thesis on “offended” believers as well as on the need to render assistance to Muslims in “problematic regions” of the world. For many years the leaders of radical and terrorist organizations impudently used it. It was not by accident that from the beginning the terrorist organizations paid their special attention to the rich oil producing states of the Near East. With regret, one should say that in some cases at a certain stage they ensured for themselves “understanding” on the part of ruling elites of these countries. It concerns as well Saudi Arabia.

For the 1970s-1980s, a kind of union of the new generation of Islamists-radicals and of some Saudi elite’s groups was formed. The radicals promised a “dynamic” extension of the sphere of influence of Islam in adjacent regions and in the whole world. Afghanistan became the most extensive springboard of activities carried out by radical and extremist forces.

As the author points out, the diplomats constantly drew attention of the leaders of Arabic and Muslim countries to absence of any prospect and dangerousness for them of the course to financial support and other forms of assistance rendered to extremist and terrorist elements and groups. The work in this direction should be carried out

further. The elimination of bin Laden is an episode on the way to reduction of the level of terrorist danger in the world. This policy should be continued marked by eradication of the causes of extremist feelings and by resolute and uncompromised struggle against international terrorism at all levels of this dangerous evil confronting the world community.

“Obozrevatel – Observer”, M., 2011, N 6, p. 37–43.

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THE IMPACT OF THE NEAR EAST ON THE CAUCASIAN EXTREMISM

The first official declarations on the direct connection of the international terrorism with the North Caucasus, particularly Chechnya, were made after 11 September 2001. Many analysts made a prognosis on the new orientation of Russian foreign policy in the Near East sector in compliance with the American course in the Near East (NE). The prognosis related also to the factor of allied relations between Russia and the USA as a whole: the researchers reckoned on the full support by Russia of the war in Iraq. However, the prognosis failed despite the conviction that creation of the stable union between the USA and Russia may be based on the common threat of the Islamic fighters-fundamentalists. On the contrary, maintaining rather close relations with Syria and Iran, Russia started to look for the allies in the name of Saudi Arabia (SA), Turkey and Egypt.

In February 2007, V. Putin became the first Russian leader, who visited SA. He proposed to conclude attractive contracts on construction of an atomic electric station, arms deliveries and export of oil. It was remarkable to note that the Russian president asked for a

greater quota for Muslim pilgrims to Mecca from Russia. As a result, the number of Russian pilgrims rose from 20 thousands to 26 thousands in 2007, including 3 thousand Chechens. In the past, SA was marked by the most frenzied criticism against Russia concerning Chechnya. Lately, criticism by official SA representatives stopped. In spite of official diplomatic steps of SA, according to some information, the biggest international Muslim organizations, which render assistance to international, including Chechen, extremism carry out their activities on its territory: Muslim World League, Faisal Islamic Bank, International Islamic Salvation Organization “Al-Igasa”, Organization of Assistance and Support of Muslims in the Caucasus, foundation “Home of Two Saints” (“Al-Kharamain”), National Commercial Bank SA (London and Cairo branches) and “Dalian Al Barakah” (London) controlled by investment-industrial corporation “Saleh Al Kamel”, which is one of ten biggest SA companies.

In 2008, the Russian-Turkish relations demonstrated the highest level of economic cooperation for the last two centuries, and the Turkish and Syrian business elites paid a great interest also to Chechnya proved by the meeting with R. Kadyrov on the territory of Chechnya in the end of May 2010. As a result of this meeting, an agreement with Akhmad Basruddin Khasan, mufti of Syria and with an assistant of the prime minister of Turkey was reached on further cooperation. At present, according to some information, a number of fictitious firms, which existed on the territory of Turkey and on the offshore of Cyprus, made financial transactions to Chechnya for the sake of support of extremism. The list of these companies changes actually every day. However, three permanent banks are also in charge of these activities: “Alfaizi Bank”, “Vakif Bank” and “Turka Bank”; more than 16 organizations render regular financial and ideological assistance to Caucasian extremists: “Committee of Solidarity with

Chechens SK”, “Party of Nationalist Movement”, “Religious Association “Nurdzular”, “Institute of Friendship and Brotherhood of Turkic States and Communities”, “Institute of Turan Culture”, “Foundation “Islakh”, “Institute of Cultural Education and Social Assistance to the Caucasus”, “Committee of Solidarity “the Caucasus” and others.

On 23 June 2009, the Treaty on Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Arabic Republic of Egypt was signed. The treaty included the following fields of bilateral cooperation, such as energy, including atomic and high tech industries, as well as cosmos. On the one side, Egypt is interested in the anti-terrorist cooperation with Russia, on the other side, 5 influential structures supporting extremism in the Caucasus have their headquarters on its territory: “Brigades of Islambuli”, “Holy War” (“Al-Dzhihad-al-Islami”), “World Islamic Council on Propaganda and Assistance” (“Daava va Igasa”), the religious university “Al-Az-khar”, “Islamic Group” (“Al-Gamaa-al-Islamia”).

The political and economic feasibility of strategic partnership with the East actualizes the significant problem – the religious issue, which directly concerns the terrorism both in the Near East and in the Caucasus. Exactly in connection with this issue V. Putin tries to reduce to nothing Islamic phobia in Russia caused by negative consequences of the situation in the Caucasus. Since 2003, V. Putin in his declarations starts to stress that terrorism can not be identified as some religion or culture. At the same time, underlining the fact that the Chechen terrorists were connected with the international criminal networks and narcotics trade, he avoids to make rigid declarations on Islam as a religion and NC as a nidus of terrorist activities. And the politically corrected behavior of the Russian party is connected with the circumstance that Russia expects to play a role of the mediator between

the West and the Near East in its policy in the Near East. Following official Russian contacts with “Khamas” (after its victory at the elections in Palestine, the refusal of Russia to consider it as a terrorist organization etc.) the relations with Israel deteriorated to some extent. Russia carries out the same policy relating to “Party of Allah” in Lebanon – “Khezbolla”. There is a widely spread meaning not without sense that the Russian party considers these organizations to be only political entities with a strong and self-dependent social basis.

As a result of Russia’s active cooperation in NE (in July 2006 after the death of the leader of separatists Shamil Basayev) the number of terrorist acts in NC reduced considerably. However, since 2008, according to a report of the Center for Strategic and International Research, the number of forceful acts rose rapidly, namely from 795 acts in 2008 to 1100 acts in 2009, while the number of suicide explosions in 2009 rose four times as many, and most of them took place in Chechnya. The western analytical centers qualify the year of 2009 as a bloody year, while the foreign press actively discussed the impact of foreign organizations and networks on the situation in NC. In particular, many experts confirm existence of rather close ties between the network of Al-Qaeda and the bandits’ formations in Chechnya. As it was known, Chechen field commander Khattab, killed in 2002, sometimes met Usama bin Laden during Afghan war of 1979–1989. American Ambassador to Russia A. Vershbow said after 11 September 2001, that the USA had admitted the activities of bin Laden and other international networks, which promoted conflict in Chechnya, including recruitment of foreign bandits’ commanders, like Khattab. The definite signs of Al-Qaeda presence in NC are the public decapitation of hostages and suicide bombers. On the one side, lately the number of explosions arranged by suicide bombers in NC might indicate existence of Al-Qaeda in the region, on the other side many experts share the

opinion that Chechnya is not the priority for Al-Qaeda but only one of the fields for global jihad.

Nevertheless, over 90 organizations exist in NE, which are connected to some or other extent with the support given to extremism in NC. Many structures carry out wide activities aimed at collection of grants for extremists in Chechnya by means of different false firms and offshore zones for transferal of financial means (a clear example – Turkey). For instance, in the United Arab Emirates the International Islamic Relief Organization jointly with the Human Appeal International created the special fund for assistance to Chechen refugees, which is in charge of transferal of financial means from higher hierarchy structures to other organizations. As a result, they reach the terminal – NC, Chechnya. It concerns foundations and organizations, which function officially under the aegis of assistance to Muslim brothers. It is significant to mention the fact that it is not advantageous for the Caucasian extremists to give up their region to any international terrorist organization. It would be not profitable either in political and economic terms, since for several years they have received financial means from various Diaspora and Islamic organizations in NE. Actually, extremism in NC resembles an investment project with a big share of investments made by the organizations of the Near East, which would have been impossible without probable state support.

*“Fundamentalnye problemy prostranstvennogo razvitiya Yuga Rossii: Mezhdistsiplinarny sintez”,
R-na-D, 2010, p. 70–73.*

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