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**Yuri Bocharov,**  
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**WHO CAN JUDGE?**  
**(On ratings of Russia in the world)**

The average estimates of life longevity in Russia make 67 years hence, Newsweek rating should be minimum 35<sup>th</sup> place and not 75<sup>th</sup> place. At the same time, life longevity in Iraq (61 years) is fixed by the magazine before Russia on 55<sup>th</sup> place. Any observer sees in TV only explosions, special operations and kidnappings in Iraq. Why it occurred to be on 79<sup>th</sup> place in the total account after India (78<sup>th</sup> place) but before such countries like Vietnam (81<sup>st</sup> place), South Africa (82<sup>nd</sup> place) and Syria (83d place)? Evidently, the American Administration needs to demonstrate to the whole world that the USA accomplished with credit its mission and built in Iraq a democratic developing state. This is the essence of this rating.

By the end of 2010, Newsweek published its rating of the best countries. The experts of the magazine analyzed the data of 100 countries by such items as health care, economic growth, education level, politics and quality of life. Finland got the first place and was followed by Switzerland and Sweden. The USA occupied 11<sup>th</sup> place, Germany – 12<sup>th</sup> place, France – 16<sup>th</sup> place, Israel – 22d place. The three last places were occupied by Nigeria, Cameroon, Burkina Faso. Among the states of the post-Soviet space, the leading place was occupied by Estonia (32d place), followed by Latvia (36<sup>th</sup> place), Ukraine (49<sup>th</sup>

place), Byelorussia (56<sup>th</sup> place), Kazakhstan (61<sup>st</sup> place) and Azerbaijan (69<sup>th</sup> place). The other former Soviet republics, the present independent states were not included in the rating. The Newsweek rating was cited in many publications and actually all sites. Thus, it formed the image of many countries for the nearest future.

However, this rating causes doubts, mildly speaking, of the readers, who are aware of the situation in the world.

Rating	Country	Education	Health care	Quality life	Economic development	Political situation
1	Finland	1	17	4	8	5
11	USA	26	26	9	2	14
12	Germany	16	7	7	16	12
16	France	14	7	11	18	16
21	Spain	32	3	22	19	27
22	Israel	41	7	25	15	27
23	Italy	34	3	20	44	22
32	Estonia	7	42	42	35	37
36	Latvia	25	52	41	53	38
49	Ukraine	40	75	40	66	50
51	Russia	31	75	50	36	75
52	Turkey	53	42	58	68	64
53	Jordan	44	61	57	40	73
56	Belarus	35	66	35	34	91
61	Kazakhstan	14	82	45	43	81
69	Azerbaijan	83	80	49	31	86
74	Egypt	60	66	61	83	74
79	Iraq	55	73	59	80	97
83	Syria	46	61	56	91	100

Even at a passing glance, the distribution of the rating places causes a lot of questions. It turns out that in Kazakhstan (14<sup>th</sup> place) the education level is the same as in France but twice worse than in Estonia (7<sup>th</sup> place), while in Israel it occupies 41<sup>st</sup> place. According to all other statistical data, which deserve confidence, the level of education in Israel is one of the best in the world. But the authors of the rating try to convince the readers that the level of education in Israel is worse than

in the whole Europe, as well as in Estonia (7<sup>th</sup> place), in Latvia (25<sup>th</sup> place), in Russia (31<sup>st</sup> place), in Belarus (35<sup>th</sup> place) and in Ukraine (40<sup>th</sup> place). According to other ratings, the universities in Israel are included in the first hundred of the best universities, where the universities of the mentioned countries are not included. But in the last account Israel occupies “the lowest” place!

The rating in “health care” is also doubtful. It is quite probable that the level of health care in Russia (75<sup>th</sup> place) is lower than in Germany, Israel and France (7<sup>th</sup> place); but where it is written that it is worse than in Turkey (42d place), Jordan (61<sup>st</sup> place), Egypt (66<sup>th</sup> place) and paradoxically even in Iraq (73d place)?

And what kind of term is “quality life”? According to the rating’s authors, in Russia (50<sup>th</sup> place) it is worse than in Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan and is slightly better than in Iraq (59<sup>th</sup> place).

The question is who has calculated the above indexes? As the author recalls his experience in basketball sports, the outcome of the international competition, according to the coach of his team, more often depended on the arbiter; and the players used to say: “the arbiter is the sixth player”. The American magazine Newsweek (one the big three magazines in the USA) was founded in 1933 and in 1961 was bought by F. Gram, the owner of newspaper Washington Post (with the head-quarter in New York and a Russian edition). The magazine is a propaganda device of “American way of life”. It is not worth asking a rhetoric question, whose interests serves the above rating.

The other question is the basis of the data. It is noted that the basis of the publication are the statistical sources of authoritative organizations of the world (WHO, IMF, World Bank, United Nations, USA departments, the CIA world book of facts. But the question is the numerous statistical reports on different items, which contradict each

other and causes great doubt on their authenticity. Therefore one may suspect the political order for the ratings. Let us see the facts relating to all parts of the rating.

Education consists of two sub-items: general literacy and number of school years. It is up to the honesty of the rating authors why exactly these two questions may give a true meaning on the national education level. According to the CIA world book of facts for 2002, the general literacy in Russia (the share of people older than 15 years, who know to read and to write) makes 99.4%. The number of years spent at school is mentioned to be 13.6 years, while in the other CIA report – 14 years.

As a result of such “estimations” Russia occupies the 31<sup>st</sup> place in the rating. Paradoxically, literacy in Iraq makes 77,2% and the number of school years – 14, but it occupies 55<sup>th</sup> place, which is better than Azerbaijan (83d place). The rating of Jordan seems to be not less ridiculous (44<sup>th</sup> place), although literacy makes 90% and school time – 12.8 years. As a result, these marks fix it at the education level of the CIS countries.

Healthcare is marked by life longevity. It makes in Russia 60 years, according to the rating’s authors. Their numbers allegedly are taken from WHO data. But the question is that the WHO statistics possess several items. The item on healthy life longevity in Russia mentions 68 years in 2008, while the CIA report – 66 years. According to the Russian statistical office, the life longevity in Russia in 2009 made 67.9 years. Therefore, taking into account the average data, the average life longevity in Russia was 67 years; thus, Russia should occupy not 75<sup>th</sup> place but minimum 35<sup>Th</sup> place. At the same time, in Iraq life longevity is mentioned to be 61 year. And it occupies 55<sup>th</sup> place, being before Russia. Any person sees in TV nothing more than explosions and kidnappings. But why Iraq occupies 79<sup>th</sup> place, following India, being before Vietnam (81<sup>st</sup> place), South Africa

(82d place) and Syria (83d place)? It seems that the USA wanted to demonstrate to the whole world that it fulfilled its mission and built in Iraq a democratic developing country. This is the basis of the rating.

The section on life quality consists of 7 sub-sections based on the reports of UNDP, WHO, World Bank and CIA world book of facts. It is worth considering CIS states, where the level of living is known to the author very well, and the countries with higher rating than in Russia. The first place is occupied by Belarus (35<sup>th</sup> place), Ukraine (40<sup>th</sup> place), Latvia (41<sup>st</sup> place), Estonia (42d place), Kazakhstan (45<sup>th</sup> place), Azerbaijan (49<sup>th</sup> place) and Russia (50<sup>th</sup> place). In the table, the places of the countries are mentioned in the column on quality life (Russia – 50<sup>th</sup> place).

Quality life	35	40	41	42	45	49	50
Income inequality in family between man and woman (0% – excellent, 100% – very bad) UNDP	27.9	28.3	36.0	35.7	33.9	36.5	37.5
Gender gap: socially, economically and culturally determined gap between men and women (0 – bad, 1 – ideal)	0.714	0.690	0.70	0.74	0.7	0.663	0.699
% of people living on less than \$ 2 per day	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Personal in \$ consumption	2920	1871	6480	6116	3497	2209	5326
Suicide successes per 100 000 people	6.8	9.0	9.1	8.4	12.7	1.9	20.2
Ecology impact on people's health	74.7	73.9	76.9	75.1	69.5	62.7	68.8
Unemployment level	1%	4.8%	14.3%	16.6%	6.3%	6.0%	8.9%



In all CIS countries the percent of the people living on the sum of less than \$ 2 per day is the same – 2%. The same is in Europe – \$ 1.99. The question arises: is it actually so or the authors of the report lacked data? At the same time, in Iraq the same index makes 8.03%, in Turkey – 8.23%, while in China – 36.2%.

The index of suicides for each 100 000 persons differs greatly from the reports presented by other organizations and statistical offices of these countries, although the trend is marked correctly. For instance, according to Russian statistics, the number of suicides varies around 30 people. According to the reports of EU countries, this index varies as follows: the average size – 20 people, France – 18, Germany – 13 and in Spain – 8 persons. At the same time, The CIA indexes mentioned in the rating have been reduced by ten times! For 2009, the Estonian institute for health development declared about reduction of suicides and made public the number of 20 people, while the CIA rating mentioned the number of 9.1 persons or twice less. Probably, exactly such “play” leads Estonia to the list of other countries as the leader among the post-Soviet states. This is an evident falsification of facts for the benefit of political interests: to show that Baltic countries, which have chosen “western way of development”, immediately started to take the lead over other post-Soviet countries.

The level of unemployment in these countries does not correspond completely to the data presented publicly by the state committees of these republics. It is in Belarus – 0.9% (in the report – 1%), in Ukraine – 1.9% (4.8%), in Russia – 8.2% (8.95%), in Latvia – 17.3% (14.3%), in Estonia – 17.5% (16.6%). Thus, the level of unemployment in Russia and Ukraine is set too high and in Latvia and Estonia is put too low. Whom to believe? The more so, as the change of each number in the sub-section of the report sets the country to quite another place in the rating.

The section devoted to economy consists also of seven sub-sections and allegedly is based on the reports of the World Bank. Probably, due to the fact that in this section all numbers may be easily verified it corresponds more or less to the reality. Azerbaijan outstrips here all post-Soviet countries and occupies 31<sup>st</sup> place, Belarus – 34<sup>d</sup> place, Estonia – 35<sup>th</sup> place, Russia – 36<sup>th</sup> place, Kazakhstan – 43<sup>d</sup> place, Latvia – 53<sup>d</sup> place, Ukraine – 66<sup>th</sup> place. The numbers in the row “economic development” correspond to the place of the country in this section (Russia – 36<sup>th</sup> place).

Economic development	31	34	35	36	43	53	66
Average index of GNP growth for the last ten years (\$ thousands)	10.4	11.6	18.7	15.1	11.8	14.5	6.4
The countries, which can not depend on agriculture and/or natural resources (%)	23.8	45.7	68.0	57.7	51.0	74.0	54.7
The percent of industrial production in the GNP	22.8	22.8	22.8	16.2	22.8	22.8	14.8
Innovation index. Readiness to invest in the sphere of knowledge	3.53	–	3.64	3.35	31.5	2.94	3.21
Scale (from 1 to 183) of normative legal promotion of business	38	58	24	120	63	27	142
Number of years from registration to insolvency declaration	2.7	5.8	3.0	3.8	1.5	3.0	2.9
Time (days) needed to start business	10	6	7	30	20	16	27

However, the lack of description of the aggregated principle to compose the rating in this and other sections does not let make the conclusion on correctness of its composition. Actually identical estimates on the percentage of industrial production in almost all CIS countries raise doubts. It is worth mentioning that in the final rating of Russia it is mentioned that its population makes 139.4 million people,

while the personal income accounts for \$ 9370. According to Rosstat, the population of Russia was 141.9 million people, while the personal income was \$ 11474. It is clear that this small difference changes the whole picture of the rating.

The section on political stability consists of three sub-sections which cause great doubts in terms of their objectivity. The section’s material is based on the information presented by Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and “Freedom House”, which are engaged in various sociological and economic studies. It is difficult to appraise their objectivity, since they lack logical and arithmetical account of the section. The CIS countries are set in the end of the table: Russia (75<sup>th</sup> place), Kazakhstan (81<sup>st</sup> place), Azerbaijan (86<sup>th</sup> place) and Belarus (91<sup>st</sup> place). Meanwhile, Estonia (37<sup>th</sup> place) and Latvia (38<sup>th</sup> place) take a great leave over them. At the same time, Turkey occupies 64<sup>th</sup> place, Jordan – 73d place, Egypt – 83d place. Probably, to the opinion of the report’s authors, the political situation, more precisely democracy in these countries is equal to the situation in the CIS countries. It is true that democracy in the CIS countries is far from perfect but not to the extent like in the Near East!

Political situation	37	38	75	86	81	91
Level of free participation in elections (1 – the very free, 10 – not free)	1	1.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	6.5
Democracy index. Participation in political and public activities. (Greater from 0 to 10)	5	6.11	5.56	3.33	2.78	3.33
Political stability	71	69	64.5	65	72	64

It is unclear, why “the researchers” appraise these countries with the gap of 10–15 places. Why democracy level is higher in Jordan than in Egypt and is much better in comparison with Syria? Given all

failures of democratic institutions in the CIS countries, they represent a more democratic regime than the royal power in Jordan.

And who else “appraises” us? Hundred ratings are regularly made public in the world taking into account actually all nuances of our life. With the help of advertising and PR some of them shape the public opinion and consequently the image of the country. Lately, some other ratings were publicized. The international magazine “International Living” annually publishes the study on quality of life throughout the world. In 2010, the rating included 194 countries, and France for the five consecutive years has occupied the first place. But the above cited rating mentioned France at the 16<sup>th</sup> place, including only its 11<sup>th</sup> place in section relating to life quality. And these reports were composed for the same year! The rating of “International Living” listed almost all post-Soviet states. The leading state is Lithuania (30<sup>th</sup> place), Latvia – 36<sup>th</sup> place, Moldavia – 52<sup>nd</sup> place, Ukraine – 68<sup>th</sup> place. Georgia and Armenia occupy places from 96<sup>th</sup> to 101<sup>st</sup>, Belarus and Russia – from 109<sup>th</sup> to 119<sup>th</sup>, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – from 134<sup>th</sup> to 140<sup>th</sup> places. Kazakhstan occupies 152<sup>nd</sup> place.

As is said in the report, in order to compose the rating the researchers used 9 indexes: cost of living, economy, culture and entertainment, environment, freedom, health care, personal security, infrastructure and climate. The appraisal was made by each index on the basis of different data received from “numerous sources”(!). In section “economy” of this report Russia outstrips all CIS countries and the Baltic countries, but in the sections “culture and entertainment” and “health care” Russia turned out to be placed after Baltic states. Infrastructure in Russia is considered to be worse than in Moldova, Kazakhstan and Belarus, but in return cost of living is the minimal, while personal security is better only than in Georgia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

However, having understood how these ratings “are composed”, it is not surprising that that Israel occupies only 47<sup>th</sup> place after Moldova, Albania and Ukraine. In section “economy” Azerbaijan has the same rating as Belarus, Iraq and Lebanon.

The rating composed in 2009 by the analytical group of the World Economic Forum (WEF) contains list of 133 countries in terms of their competitiveness; Azerbaijan occupies the highest place among all post-Soviet countries – 51<sup>st</sup> ; Lithuania – 53<sup>d</sup>, Russia – 63<sup>d</sup>, Kazakhstan – 67<sup>th</sup>, Ukraine – 82<sup>nd</sup>, Georgia – 90<sup>th</sup>, Armenia – 97<sup>th</sup>. Jordan (50<sup>th</sup>) and Turkey (61<sup>st</sup>) occupy better places, while Egypt (70<sup>th</sup>) outstrips Ukraine. The rating is composed with due account of 12 indexes of competitiveness of the country.

Whom should one believe? As it is evident, all depends on who counts and what for!

Thus, who is to blame that they “think” so about us and what to do? There are no people responsible for it, since it is difficult to answer the question: what official is liable for the image of the country: the president? the premier? the deputies of the parliament? the Foreign Ministry? the officials, the leaders of public structures and of various foundations, the editors of local mass media?

All of them take part in forming the image of Russia, but nothing of the kind is included in their official duties. And if the item is a common matter, it belongs to nobody, and as a result everybody’s business is nobody’s business. The image of the country as a big mosaic is composed from separate particles. But the artist is always one person. Therefore one person, one structure should be liable for formation of the country’s image. At present, nobody denies significance of the image of any object, be it a financial company, a politician or variety show star, a good or country. But the most interesting is as follows: all of them, except the state, keep the process

of image creation under their control and constantly improve it. However, it is a paradox that all of the above mentioned persons and entities interested in their own image greatly sink in estimation, if the country, where they live and work, has a negative image.

*“Strategiya Rossii”, M., 2011, N 1, p. 71–78.*

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### **RENAISSANCE OF ISLAM AND THE NEEDS IN ISLAMIC EDUCATION**

For the last twenty years the rebirth of Islam was going on in an intensive way, and many experts had good grounds to regard it as a renaissance of Islam. This appraisal is substantiated by the following: rapid construction of mosques, good attendance by young people at public prayers on Friday, intention of thousands Russian ethnic Muslims to get Islamic education in foreign Islamic higher education institutions, creation of religious-cultural organizations, publishing and mass media centers, Islamic periodic publications etc.

The process of Islamic renaissance is complicated and contradictory, which is determined by a number of factors. The restoration of the social institution of Islamic religion is going on in the post-Soviet Russian society, where by the law of social-psychological inertia there function ideological norms of the Communist doctrine greatly distorted in Soviet Russia. For the second part of the XIX century the ruling regimes in the former so-called people's democracy (GDR and others) adopted a quite loyal attitude to religion, while in the USSR the confessions were subject to various repressions. The efficiency of this attitude to Islam is reflected both in

consciousness of political leaders, scientific community, in mass media and at the level of daily life.

It is worth analyzing the impact of Islam on the needs in Islamic education. The process of renaissance of Islam in Russia to a large extent will be determined by the situation of national Islamic education. The present demands in Islamic education appraise its condition and the results of its development in future depending on types and models of educational institutions, which function in a definite region.

For the period of 2009, a group of sociologists of the North-Caucasus State Technical University studied Islamic education in four Federal Districts of the European part of Russia (the Central District – Moscow, the North-Western District – St-Petersburg, the Volga Basin District and the Southern District). The aggregate research is represented by five main quotas: religious and circular higher educational institutions, umma and the religious leaders, elder school students-graduates and their leaders, mass media, experts in religion and education. In total, the research covered the whole specter of consumers and providers of the services connected with education in the sphere of Islamic history and culture.

The main empirical methods of primary sociological information were as follows: questioning and individual thorough interviews. A special method was elaborated for each quota of the aggregate object of studies. Thus, the six separate questionnaires were composed for collection of information: for students of higher education institutions, professors, school graduates, their parents, students of mosque schools as well as medrece's students. The questionnaires were distributed in all ten chosen regions to the fixed categories. In some regions, due to the circumstances connected with distribution of quotas among specific regions, not all targeted groups were subject to questioning. The experts in religious education, mass media, religion and governance were in

charge the quality of interviews. From 5 to 10 thorough interviews were taken in each region chosen for study. The number of organizers of interviews was as follows: 450 professors of higher education institutions and medreces, 758 parents, 821 school graduates, 467 students of higher education institutions, 481 students of medreces, 185 students of medrece schools, as a whole – 3142 respondents. And 58 printed and electronic texts were subject to content analysis.

Since the majority of ethnic Muslims live in the Volga Basin District and the Southern District (in time of research, at present – the North Caucasus), the information presented below refers to the data received in these Districts. The study was arranged in the Nizhni Novgorod region, in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, as well as in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Stavropol krai.

The graduates of the high and higher religious professional education get the status of religious Islamic servants and are sent to perform services in mosques by the Spiritual Departments. For the next five years, the leaders of Islamic education estimate the needs in qualified clergymen in the European part of Russia to be two thousand graduates with medrece diplomas. The most urgent needs of them are regarded to be in the North-Caucasus and the Volga Basin Districts.

The Islamic spiritual leaders and experts in higher Islamic education determine as an optimal the quantitative correlation of needs in qualified clergymen possessing general professional religious education and in experts in Islamic theology, history and culture, who have received higher professional education justified by state certificate 10:1. Thus, for the next five years it is necessary to educate not less than 200 specialists in Islamic theology, history and culture. Taking into account the fact that after graduation from the education Islamic institution not more than 50% of the graduates express their wish to



work according to the received profession, the number of trained specialists should be raised minimum up to 400 persons.

The authors of the research project proceeded from some main ideas and hypothetical prognoses. They thought that side by side with definition of needs in professional servicemen of Islamic cult, specialists in history and culture of Islam, Islamic theology, arrangement of education activities with due account of confessional direction it was necessary to find out needs in education and in the number of future students of higher and high professional education as well as of their parents.

The school graduates – ethnic Muslims pay potential interest to professions connected with religion, correspondingly: in Nizhni Novgorod region – each third graduate, in Tatarstan – each fifth, in Bashkortostan – each fourth, in Dagestan – each third, in Chechnya – each third, in Ingushetia – three fourths. The rather great difference in interest paid to Islamic education among Ingushi graduates may be explained by the fact that for the last many years in Ingushetia the basics of Islamic religion were taught at general school.

In all studied districts the students of schools at mosques paid greater interest to religious professions than the graduates of general schools. The parents of the graduates in different regions are differently aware of the needs of their children in religious education. The wishes of the parents relating to religious profession of their children differ as well.

In Tatarstan the number of the school graduates' parents aspiring for religious profession of their children is half as much again the number of their children, who wish to get religious education.

In Bashkortostan the number of parents, who want that their children should get religious education exceeds greatly the number of graduates sharing these intentions. The prevailing number of the

parents, who prefer Islamic education for their children, means that the general school education does not give to the school children the adequate knowledge to make the choice for the benefit of professions connected with Islam.

In Dagestan the situation is vice versa: the number of school graduates wishing to get religious education one and a half time exceeds the number of their parents with the same wish. It seems that the parents have concern about religious education for their children. It is connected with the above mentioned purposes.

The choice of the school graduates to get education, connected with religion, in Islamic or state higher education institutions is characterized as follows: In Tatarstan – 4:1; in Bashkortostan – 5:1; in Dagestan – 4:3. The arguments for religious education expressed by the graduates in the Volga Basin are less cogent than the arguments mentioned by the school graduates in the republics of the North Caucasus.

The trend was found out: the need in high professional religious education as a self-purpose (“for my-self”), as a way of thorough knowledge of Islam, of raising personal Islamic culture. This trend coincides with the position of spiritual Islamic leaders and medrese heads, who say that Islamic education is needed not only for professional carrier but also for a more profound knowledge of Islam by the youth.

In the course of implementation of the research project, side by side with other factors, which have influence on formation of needs in Islamic education, the experts studied materials of printed and electronic mass media playing great role in formation of professional orientations of the school graduates and in shaping of their parents’ preferred option. According to the research materials, the potential consumers of education services are better informed about existing

Islamic institutions than about state higher education institutions with teaching subjects connected with religion. The main channels of getting information about religious education are the non-formal communication channels in local community (family, acquaintances, friends, other relatives). In Dagestan and Chechnya the TV programs play the role of this channel.

The problems of Islamic education are not dominant materials in Muslim electronic and printed mass media. The information is reduced mainly to mentioning of the problems of professional level of clergymen and experts in Islamic theology. At the same time, the mass media does not mention the probable ways of solving these problems. It shows the need in closer reciprocal action of scientists, priests and journalists for the sake of elaboration of ways and means and forms of solving problems of Islamic religious education. The lack of federal TV programs and channels of Islamic orientation was marked in all studied Federal Districts.

Thus, the analysis of the information, collected thanks to the project's implementation, justified the supposition that due to absence of unity in Islamic religious community in the European part of Russia and due to absence of united conception of national Islamic education and enlightenment, due to inadequate information about Islam in curriculum of general education, the positions of employers and potential consumers of education services in the sphere of Islam do not coincide with each other. This fact reflects in aspirations of the medreces' students and the students of religious higher education institutions for their employment after graduation from these education institutions. In Nizhni Novgorod region and Tatarstan about half of graduates from mederece are sure to some extent that they may become clergymen in their preferred region, while half of students in higher religious education institutions are sure to some extent that they will

find a job according to the received profession. In Bashkortostan over half of students expressed such conviction, and in Dagestan the prevailing majority of students were sure of it.

The lack of a choice for Imam in a rural district to ensure the adequate material maintenance for his family is the main factor of medrece graduates when they take the decision in favor of the priest's carrier. In contemporary Russia the rating of religious education coincides with its rating in foreign countries, where military, technical, scientific and circular humanitarian subjects occupy the dominant position.

One of the general conclusions of the study is as follows: the renaissance of Islam has not been reflects in the needs in Islamic education of ethnic Muslims, who live in the European part of the country and graduate from the general school. There is a good reason to assert that at present in Russia there is no alternative to Islamic education and enlightenment, which is organized and arranged within the context of Russian historic and ethnic-cultural traditions as a important factor promoting further renaissance of Islam/

*“Mir cherez yazyk, obrazovaniye, kulturu:  
Rossiya-Kavkaz-Mirovoye soobshchestvo”,  
Pytigorsk, 2010, p. 172–178.*

**R. Mukhametshin,**  
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## **FORMATION OF CONFESSIONAL POLICY IN RUSSIA: THE EXPERIENCE OF TATARSTAN**

At present, the main participants of formation in Russia of confessional policy stand out in relief quite visibly. But as potential subject of this policy they have not yet become its actors. The

organizational and structural feature alone is not sufficient for the subject of policy. It is significant to fix its aims of participation in political life, the ideological orientations and main principles of its existence. What is going on in this sphere in the region, what are the perspectives and problems in formation of confessional policy? The situation is described below.

### The Spiritual Departments of Muslims (SDM)

In the beginning of the 1990s, the emergence of Spiritual Departments was determined by many factors. First, the processes of “democratization” and “sovereignization”, as well as disintegration of the USSR (December 1991) promoted to a large extent the radical changes within the framework of official religious institutions in the USSR and Russia. Second, the national movements unfold mainly in former autonomous republics were regarded by the Spiritual Departments as a needed attribute of statehood and spiritual renovation. At a certain level, it testifies to the fact that originally the Spiritual Departments were aimed at achievement of the other tasks than formation of valuable confessional policy. Since national movements and emerged public-political movements tried to use the religious factor for the sake of their strategic tasks, the newly appeared Spiritual Departments had to play their role mainly in the national-political field. For instance, as Damir Iskhakov, one of the ideologists of the Tatarian national movement for the end of the 1980s–1990s, considers, the Spiritual Department of Muslims of Tatarstan, although being an independent organization was developing as a fraction of national movement (Kazak time, 1998). The religious leaders themselves do not deny it. For instance, V. Yakupov, deputy mufti of SDM RT drew attention to the fact that they themselves grew out of them. Actually, up to the middle of the 1990s not only SDM RT but also other Spiritual Departments to a larger extent were sooner political than confessional

organizations. The Spiritual Departments, which lacked control over periodic publications and education institutions and which did not possess either efficient local structures or permanent financial sources, experienced difficulties in finding their political niche and in reckoning on understanding of ordinary believers.

However, since the middle of the 1990s in many Spiritual Departments there were created the vertical structures of governing Muslim community and its institutions. But has this organizationally optimal system become a valuable subject of policy, including confessional policy? Have they possessed the necessary internal resources and significant intentions to participate actively in the process of creation of principally new relations? Up to the present time, they have not achieved it. Certainly, the Spiritual Departments try to determine the main principles of their relations with the main subject of confessional policy – with the state. The principles are as follows: the principle of loyalty and the principle of separation of religion from the state. These principles are not sufficient in order to occupy an active political position and to formulate clearly the political aims and intentions; these principles do not provide enough knowledge for formation of confessional policy but they are quite adequate and acceptable for operative governance of religious relations.

The principle of loyalty in case of necessity makes it possible for Spiritual Departments and their structures to apply to the authorities, saying that the believers are valuable citizens of society and are in need of support on the part of the state, appealing to the fact that the problem not solved at the level of religious society sooner or later will disperse throughout the whole society and will penetrate into different spheres of life.

The principle of separation of religion from the state usually is used for protection of religious organizations against interference in

their internal affairs by the authorities. However, different Spiritual Departments of Russia have different points of view on efficiency of the existing structures and on the reciprocal relations with the state. It is quite natural, since they have different resources, the unequal number of Muslim communities and education institutions kept under their control.

In Russian option this principle rather underlines dependence of Muslim organizations on the state than their determination as equal partners. For the last years, the Spiritual Departments of the regions therefore pay much greater attention than beforehand to compliance with the article of the constitution about the secular characteristic of the state. At present it has become clear that the Spiritual Departments confront directly the need to determine in a more clear way their role in the sphere of political relations. They comprehend that they lack adequate resources, primarily economic resources. As is known, the lack of fixed internal mechanisms of functioning actually reduces to nothing the aspiration for forming independent policy. At present, as a result of ousting from Russia of actually all foreign Muslim charitable foundations the Spiritual Departments have no other choice except arrangement of relations with the state. In its turn, the state comprehended the significance of consolidation of its position and influence in the sphere of religious relations and for the last years took active steps for consolidation of its support in the confessional sphere. Taking into account the demonstrated support of the Russian Orthodox Church by the Russian authorities, the Spiritual Departments of Russia should more clearly determine the main specter of their activities.

Many leaders of Spiritual Departments understand well that in order to solve any significant problems they should start to comprehend their activities. There are several aspects of this problem: In what way is it possible to overcome the split in Muslim umma of Russia, to what

extent it is feasible the existence of many Spiritual Departments, how much are they efficient as institutions of governing Muslim communities?

In the end of 2009, the main leaders of Muslims of Russia, namely T. Tadzhudin, R. Gainutdin and I. Berdyev discussed the need of creation of the United Spiritual Department. Many analysts and religious leaders themselves pay attention to complexity and difficulty on the way of solving this problem. For the mid-term of the 1990s, V. Yakupov drew attention to the fact that the period for the 1990s was characterized not only by the renaissance trends, but also by the split with its negative impact. The specific generation of the post-Soviet clergy was to blame as far as the split is concerned. There are no objective reasons for this split, since it is based exclusively on ambitions of a small group of people. V. Yakupov justifies the need of unification by the fact that the institution of Church lacks in Islam. The role of Church in Islam was always played by the state. Up to present, the evident structural absence characterizes Muslim society in Russia. And it will remain, if the stereotype of relations between the state and Islam like between the state and Orthodoxy is not changed. It is necessary to take into account the specifics of Islam, the lack in it of the institution of Church and of the clergy in Christian perception. The distance of the Russian state from Muslim problems within Russia results only in the situation, when other states establish their control over Muslim structures in Russia. Should the Russian state clearly determine its policy in Islamic community in Russia even if through an authorized by it structure, the situation, like in the XVIII century, would quickly become normalized.



## **The clergy**

The formation of the clergy as an independent stratum in Russia was terminated for the second half of the 1990s. Although the Muslim clergy may only relatively be regarded as a social stratum due to its small size, the lack of fixed social-legal status and economic basis, nevertheless the process of its formation was marked by disputes among religious leaders on many principal issues. First, the clergy, mainly Tatars, is characterized by its heterogeneous composition, since city and village imams, medrese teachers have different status and social position. Second, the heterogeneous feature of the clergy is determined by its ideological-political position. Formation of the world outlook directions, particularly of the youth, to a large extent depends on the perceptions acquired in education institutions.

The main part of the clergy consists out of representatives of the so called people's Islam, who traditionally are connected with rural districts and in terms of their social origin and material position do not differ a lot from the main part of the rural population. The majority of rural imams being "unofficial mullahs" instantly were called to be the official local representatives of Spiritual Departments, although they lack elementary religious education and perform their obligations due to absence of better trained religious representatives. However, emergence of new imams does not mean that they are ready to step down and offer them their places. But owing to many reasons young imams do not come back to rural districts or fail to accommodate to rural life.

By the end of the 1990s, the activity of the clergy in Tatarstan intensified, although the conditions were not quite favorable for it. Before the beginning of the XX century religious consciousness was an organic and needed element of the social structure of society in Tatarstan, while the clergy had a stable situation and a determined

status, but at present this organic feature and need are not the evident phenomenon. Therefore the clergy has to look for new ways and forms for consolidation of its place in society.

In order to determine its place in political life of multi-confessional society the clergy needs to measure its interests and correlate them with the interests of the whole society “keeping its face”. This problem for the clergy turned out to be rather complicated due to many reasons and demands significant intellectual efforts. In this case, the clergy may count mainly on its own forces, since it should elaborate its own position on many theological and political issues. The position of political leaders and of national intellectuals is not always acceptable for it. There is some logic and some reason that for the last years the official clergy distanced from the national movement and its leaders.

The crisis of the national movement and the absence of its thoughtful attitude to Islam acceptable for the clergy promoted elaboration by the religious leaders of their own position. The clergy could not any more rely on the national intellectuals, who with enthusiasm supported the idea of Islamic renaissance but further started to form national ideology, where Islam was regarded as the ethnic-cultural factor. It is difficult to elaborate theoretical foundations without participation of theologians. But this problem is still urgent. It should be mentioned that the religious and world outlook views of the clergy do not always coincide with the position of the intellectuals. The religious leaders agree completely with intellectuals on the need of a thorough study of spiritual destiny of the people but propose their own interpretation of some public-political phenomena and teachings. It concerns primarily the principal events, notions and teachings, such as “dzhadidizm”, “kadimizm”, “Muslim reformation” and others, since different approaches to spiritual renovation of society were traced.

The intellectuals have not yet elaborated new conceptual foundations for comprehension of the spiritual destiny, and therefore the books presented for contemporary readers are represented by works written by the so called “progressive” wing – the attitude to religion formed within the context of Muslim reformation and Dzhadidizm. The intellectuals see exactly in these works the ideological-theoretical basis of national renaissance. The clergy is concerned about renaissance of Islam in society and primarily is interested in return of the part of spiritual destiny, which kept and consolidated traditional Muslim society in Tatarstan and today would promote this process. It is quite natural, since in Tatarstan religious life is being restored thanks to traditionalism, in words of A. Malashenko. The intellectuals try to restore traditions of Muslim reformation and apply to the ideological destiny of its representatives. But this destiny has not yet been comprehended in the context of contemporary problems. However, by the end of the 1990s, the trend to self-dependence in theoretical works of the clergy acquired the distinctive shape. The religious leaders became convicted in their need and intensified their religious and world outlook research.

But the clergy and its structures lack stable internal financial resources and material-technical basis, and this circumstance causes to some extent formation of the clergy’s adjusted position, which is reflected in expressed loyalty to the authorities not always supported by the state; therefore the clergy have to pay attention to the interests of those, who keep the external financial sources under their control. This situation, on the one side, creates problems and, on the other side, postpones their solution or pushes aside contradictions and differences with those, who take decisions on financial support or on refusal to give such support.

The contemporary Muslim clergy mainly is satisfied with ideology of political indifference of religion, which makes it politically indifferent. For the period since the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, certain attempts were taken by religious representatives to take part in political life of Russian society. For many reasons and not only due to incorrect actions of the clergy these attempts failed. It may be said that the Muslim clergy in the region gradually acquires the features of social stratum and rather actively forms its world outlook intentions. But up to present the clergy rigidly limits itself within the framework of religious rites, keeps aloof from political activities and does not express its political will. At present, the clergy therefore lacks political identity and as a subject of political life joins other political strata, which are nearer to it by origin or by local residence etc.

Recently, new trends emerged in the national composition of the Muslim clergy. It is connected primarily with formation in the regions of Tatars' traditional residence of Muslim communities by representatives of the Middle Asia and the Caucasus, who are marked by higher level of religiousness than Tatars and who form majority in mosques and, correspondingly, try to change imam for the representative of their nationality.

The number of Tatarian imams gradually diminishes, and the Tatarian language ceases to be used in praying in traditional mosques of Tatars. This process is a form involving Islam in the all-Russian identity, a new trend of creating of the all-Russian and to a large extent of Russian-cultural, Muslim identity, since most city mosques are filled today by Muslims of various nationalities, notes S. Gradirovsky. According to him, this process is going on thanks to objective reasons, and it is not planned and is not specially developed by anybody. However, the situation is much more complicated. According to V. Yakupov, in most Russian mosques, except Tatarstan and

Bashkortostan, the prayers' language is being changed for Russian. If no measures are taken, soon Islam in Russia will cease to be the religion of Tatars and the praying in the Tatarian language. To a large extent the Tatarian youth shares Salafit and wahhaby ideas, which refuse to take into account the national component. The young Tatars are often to blame that the Tatarian language becomes a forbidden language, notes V. Yakupov. He thinks that a great input into liquidation of the mosques with praying in the Tatarian language is being put by representatives of the Tatarian intellectuals, who are concerned only about reformation of Islam, i.e. the sense of their efforts is reduced to the idea of constructing "Islam" without praying obligations. These appeals essentially slow down re-Islamization of Tatars, who forget about namaz and leave mosques; but the southern colleagues immediately capture them. One can not help agreeing with V. Yakupov meaning that these processes are dangerous for the future of the Tatarian nation, for preservation of its ethnic component. He concludes that it is problematic to unite and to protect the people without the center of its consolidation, such as the mosque. The shariat justification of keeping the Tatarian language in mosques is mentioned by him as well: the mosques are the realty donated on the way to Islam; the ancestors gave money just for the mosques with praying in the Tatarian language, and their will should be sacred for the present users of the mosques' buildings.

These changes will lead to transformation of religious identity, since the factor, called to be the language of communication will appear in its sphere, S. Gradirovsky thinks. The Tatarian language as a language of identity gradually is being pushed backwards. But will these assimilation processes be accelerated by this fact? Will Islam become in this situation a deterrent factor of radicalization process? It is worth recalling that exactly within the framework of khanafit mazkhab

“Tatarian” Islam functioned with rather big ethnic component, which helped it to construct the supple model combining pliability and survival. Modernized “pure” Islam thoroughly throwing away mazkhab traditions, disregarding ethnic component and ignoring the system of rites and ceremonies, will be able to put its contribution into formation of new identity of Tatars? The answer will be: rather not.

It is possible to appraise the condition of the contemporary clergy on the basis of the results of the expertise (40 interviews) arranged by the author, who talked with representatives of Muslim elite in the Volga-Ural Basin in 2004. A number of meanings may be cited in this respect.

1. Whom do you consider to be the most authoritative scientists in the sphere of Muslim theology? Which their works are most significant for you?

The analysis of answers to this question gives it possible to be convinced that most representatives of the contemporary Muslim clergy have not received valuable religious education. Mentioning of some casual names of scientists clearly demonstrates the lack of theological education. Some names of scientists are mentioned fairly often, particularly, Abu Khanif, al-Gazali, including contemporary theologians Yusuf Kardavi and Kharun Yakhya. As the most authoritative Tatarian scientists are regarded to be R. Fakhretdinov, Sh. Mardzhani and M. Bigiyev. Regretfully, this list of names does not permit to make appreciation of the theological views of the clergy. On the contrary, it creates an impression about spontaneous theoretical thoughts. This conclusion is proved also by the answers to other questions.

2. What mazkhab is supported at present in Russia? Is the problem of mazkhab urgent for renaissance of Islam in Russia?

The answer to this question may be divided into three types: 1) mainly khanafit mazkhab is mainly supported in Russia, but the problem of mazkhabov is not urgent; 2) the problem of mazkhab is urgent as a historic tradition. But the situation has changed, at present mazkhab exchange their experience. There are no scientists, who are able to carry out this work, and therefore one should be above the division into mazkhab; 3) mazkhab is a method of solving religious-legal problems, and therefore it is very urgent.

As it is seen, the attitude to mazkhab, particularly in determination of their place in the process of religious renaissance, demonstrates the absence of unity in its comprehension. It shows primarily that the theological-legal aspect of religious renaissance is regarded not as the most urgent one. But shall the system of rites of Tatars-Muslims be formed within the framework of certain specific theological-legal space to be determined? Is it possible to form it without due account of specifics of mazkhab? Probably, only a small part of the clergy ponders over these problems. The majority of the priests naively suppose that it will be possible to ensure renaissance of Islam by means of propaganda of its principal ideas without any legal basis. One should not forget that mazkhab represent the centuries-long history and traditions, which should not be ignored. Disregard of traditional for the Tatars mazkhab will not result in its disappearance, but it will rather become replaced by another mazkhab.

The different attitude to Sufism was reflected in the answers – from – refusal to recognize its role to its discussion as a tradition and recognition of its perspectives in Islamic renaissance. The given answers are united by the abstractive views, the lack of knowledge of local materials and peculiarities of Sufism in the region. Only four answers to the questionnaires contain the name of one the most prominent representatives of Sufism – Zainulla-ishan Rasulev. The

other representatives of Sufism are not mentioned at all, while Sufism played a great role in preserving Islam in the Volga Basin.

Almost the same were the responses to the question: What is your attitude to political parties and movements? The respondents regarded their role in renaissance of Islam as negligible and proposed to keep aside from political parties. Such unanimous reaction of the clergy demonstrates that the process of politicization of Islam in Tatarstan is in embryo and that its feasibility is not recognized. There is no comprehension that consolidation of all forces of society is very significant for national renaissance. There is no understanding that at present religion is presented in society mainly as an element of national self-consciousness (in 2002, about 80% of young people-respondents (up to 30 years old) considered themselves as believers, but only 4% of them performed all rites). Is it not a serious warning on the need of elaborating new methods of work with the youth with due account of its notions about Islam? Obviously, the answer is yes. But the clergy not simply ignores but also sets at defiance the probable cooperation with political and public organizations. However, only a small number of these organizations and movements remained in Tatarstan. But there exists the World Congress of Tatars, and cooperation with it has attained only the initial stage of arrangement.

The respondents to the question on their attitude to non-traditional religious trends expressed mainly also a soft and pleasing meaning. They asserted that their role and influence was exaggerated and that they do not threaten at all traditional Islam in the region. Thus, the Muslim clergy of the region still lives with perceptions, which were formed for the second half of the 1990s. It only approaches to the new stage of religious renaissance. The tempos and characteristic of religious renaissance in Russia depends on the tempos of comprehension by the Muslim clergy of the need of radical changes.



## **Common believers**

The common Muslim believers rarely acted as an independent political subject, since their interests were mainly expressed via the community, particularly its initial cell – makhallya. The traditional Muslim society was rarely characterized by the situation, when political activities of parishioners acquired distinctive shapes. The motives of their political participation were formed under direct influence of imam, who among believers actually always enjoyed great authority. In the end of the XX century the situation radically changed. The process of forming initial cells of Muslim communities – makhalli is going on within the framework of renaissance of Islam. But up to the present time, they still do not play a great role in believers' life in the districts of Muslims' compact settlements. Today, imam enjoys authority only in the sphere of religious rites, and his influence actually is not dispersed to the other spheres of parishioners' life arrangement. Therefore common believers theoretically might express their political position. But it does not occur, since at present for the majority of believers Islam is the system of rites and an element of national self-consciousness. And their political interests and political behavior are formed outside their religious perceptions. Today, according to sociologists, it is possible to establish the fact of closely interwoven various forms of self-consciousness: religious, confessional and ethnic. At the same time, religiousness comes forward as a peculiar form of ethnic-confessional and ethnic-national self-consciousness.

Probably, therefore the contemporary Tatarian believer identifies himself more with the nation than with the Muslim umma. This sphere also is subject to uneasy transformations, though. The Tatarian language ceases to belong to the sphere of national identity. The system of common occurrences and rites is accepted in a rather simple way, and there appears the new generation of Tatars-Muslims, who are

brought up on the basis of religious values, which are alien for their nation. Since radicalization is going on mainly only within the framework of theological perceptions, the authorities have no significant reasons to take any measures against these communities. The official Islamic institutions, precisely Spiritual Departments are not engaged in solving this problem, and they themselves are far away from Islamic values, which are traditional values for Muslims of this region. Being separated from centuries-old theological Muslim traditions of their region, most contemporary Muslim leaders are unable to critically perceive the alien traditions, since they are not aware of other values, which might be used as a basis for their activities.

### **Muslim means of mass information and publishing activities**

The Muslim periodic printed materials started to be published since the beginning of the 1990s. At present, over 30 newspapers and magazines and 10 Internet-sites appear in public. The more significant newspapers are “Iman” (Kazan), “Islam Nury” (Naberezhnye chelny), “Islam Minbare” (Moskva), “Sovremennaya mysl” (Moskva), “Musulmansky vestnik” (Saratov), “Risalat” (Ufa). Most publications belong to religious associations and public organizations. The religious journalism has just started to restore, and the level of Muslim publications is rather low. They lack analytical materials, and the information bloc is characterized by one-sidedness, and actually more than half of materials consist in information taken from different sites, most publications are devoted to description or interpretation of religious rites, the group of authors is rather small limiting the number of reviewed problems. The Muslim means of mass information have not yet occupied their niche in the process of forming public opinion.

Probably, primarily it is caused by the lack of self-dependence of Muslim publications in terms of political information.

It should be admitted that the publishing religious sphere in Tatarstan is more developed than in other regions. Nevertheless, the textbooks used as training-methodical used as textbooks in Muslim education institutions. For 20 years of existence of Muslim education institutions in Tatarstan actually not a single textbook was prepared and written with due account of local Khanafit traditions. The textbooks used in higher education are translated from foreign editions and do not take into account the peculiar features of Islam in the Volga Basin. The conviction is being formed that local Muslims lacked the needed textbooks and their own theological books, although, as it is known, the theologians of Tatarstan wrote excellent textbooks, which still are used in the republics of the Central Asia and the Caucasus. But the tutors of the region's religious education institutions are not aware of them and do not pay any attention to them.

### **The public-political organizations and movements**

Coming back of Islam to public and spiritual life to a great extent is connected with activities of public-political organizations and movements, which under contemporary conditions play a great role in forming mass consciousness. The characteristic and level of their influence on this process are determined by many factors, though. As far as situation in Tatarstan is concerned, one should take into account some factors. First, the impact of national public-political organizations and movements on mass consciousness even for the period of upsurge of national movement in the 1989s–1992s was not significant, as sociologists assert. For instance, in August 1991 as followers of the All-Tatarian Public Center (ATPC) accounted for 6%, as followers of party “Ittifak” – 2.5% of the respondents to the questionnaire. Second, the

Islamic component was a pure declaration and was reduced to recognition of its role in keeping of all-human values, to a basis of national culture and moral health in program documents of influential organizations, including the above mentioned ones.

For the period from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, the public-political movements and parties précised and concretized their attitude to Islam. Of a rather great significance was the circumstance that for the period of its upsurge the Tatarian national movement was concerned about ideas of national statehood with a clear circular feature characterized even for the radical wing of national movement (for instance, party “Ittifak”). The problem of religious renovation within the framework of spiritual renaissance of society in Tatarstan was considered as a declaration, and the role of Islam was not precisely determined in the process of national rebirth. Only since the middle of the 1990s, following the fall down and the crisis of national movement, turned out to be in the center of attention of its leaders. But the accents were somehow changed: the determination of the role of Islam in spiritual renaissance of society in Tatarstan was replaced by the attempt to use the Islamic factor in consolidation of their shaken position.

Thus, the national movement in Tatarstan in the name of its most prominent representatives could not to the utmost use the Islamic factor for achievement of their purposes. The national movement goes on through the crisis, which caused its radicalization and holds it away further from a chance of thoughtful applying of the rich experience of the Tatarian society in the sphere of state-confessional relations.

### **The academic scientific circles**

For the years of the Soviet power, the studies of Islam and Muslim theology in Tatarstan actually lost their centuries-long

traditions. The history of Islam in the Volga Basin was actually not studied even in some research works devoted to Islam and published in the USSR. The question is that in this time two trends in research of Islam traditionally existed in national Orientalism. First, Islam attracted the researchers as a significant component of public-political life of Muslim states, which demanded the scientific comprehension in order to carry out the thoughtful foreign policy of the Soviet state in any region of the Muslim East. Many works were written about history and spiritual culture of separate Muslim states (of the Near East, the South-Eastern Asia and the Central Asia etc.), where the Islamic factor was considered as a most significant element of public-political life. Second, the works, which developed the best traditions of European and national research of Islam, were published sometimes. However, following the established world traditions in Orientalism, the researchers limited their works with studies primarily of classic Islam and actually ignored the modern and the most modern periods. They proceeded from the meaning that the Turkic world and the more so the Volga Basin represent the periphery of Muslim civilization and therefore is not interesting very much for research of classical Islam.

Should one project these trends to the study of Islam in the Volga Basin, one would see that it did not attract attention of experts either from the point of view of forming “big” policy or in terms of research of various aspects of classical Islam. Therefore it was quite logical that, leaving aside atheistic studies, in the Soviet Union Islam was subject to study in neighboring zones with other Muslim states (the Middle Asia, the Caucasus), while the experts in Islam actually kept away from their research the Central zones of the country.

The new trends formed in research of Islam in the post-Soviet Tatarstan. On the one side, it is connected with creation of the structures engaged in studies of Islam (the department of Islamic

research in the Institute of History of AS RT, the Institute of Orientalism in Kazan University, the Russian Islamic University), on the other side, it is connected with formation of new methodological approaches to study of Islam. One of them is the urge towards overcoming a certain limitation, which consists in perception of religion as a closed phenomenon subject to a small external impact including a – political influence. The interest to Islam in Russia has increased. It is too early to say that the methodological stereotypes, ideological and psychological prejudices shaped for the years of the Soviet power in relation to Islam have been finally liquidated. Islam in Russia, being transformed into the most significant factor of its internal and foreign policy, today is subject to study mainly by historians and political scientists; and the study of Islam is concentrated on appraisal of influence of Islam on public-political life of one or another region or a state as a whole. The analysis of Islam as an ethnic-confessional and cultural phenomenon in history of Russia and of its Muslim peoples has not become a significant subject to research on the part of national Islamic studies.

Up to present, the traditional methodological research methods prevail in Tatarstan. The phenomena, such as zhididizm, kadimizm, Tatarian Muslim reformism still remain subject to thorough research. The basis of source study of Islam is the weakest aspect of Islamic research. The existing sources in Arabic characterized by complicated theological contents are still available for a small group of people due rather to unusual content apparatus. The scientists of Tatarstan educated in the traditions of Kazan research school of publicists' history regard Islam in the context of development of progressive philosophical thinking, do not analyze the Tatarian traditional society, which to a large extent shapes public consciousness.

The research of Islam makes first timid steps in restoration of former traditions, while Muslim theology actually remains a terra incognita. The activities of the Russian Islamic University and its just received license for theological studies reassure to some extent, but it is a long-term perspective. Thus, the main actors in the state-Islamic relations in Tatarstan have been designed, and they have mainly determined their positions, world outlook and the sphere of their political activities. But these actors have not yet formed the valuable political principles, which might be used by them as the guiding principles in activities of these actors. Therefore their political behavior does not let them reduce various political actions to the separate actions within the system, which in this case is called the confessional policy.

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## **THE ISLAMIC FINANCING METHODS IN AZERBAIJAN**

The idea of national statehood in Azerbaijan by historic traditions is closely connected not with Islam and religious values but with secularism and anti-clericalism. Therefore it is not a surprise that one of the key partners of contemporary Azerbaijan is not Iran but Turkey, which rigidly sticks to the principles of secularism. In other words, the national nearness between Turks and Azerbaijanis turned out to be more important than common religious belonging: as is known, in Iran like in Azerbaijan the majority of the population consists of Shiites.

Implementing in the consecutive order the principles of secularism, the Azerbaijani officials automatically appear against any projects at the state level, if the word “Islamic” is mentioned, even when it concerns such phenomenon as Islamic finances and Islamic banks, in particular.

All initiatives aimed at making amendments in the banking national legislation to eliminate hindrances to creation and functioning of Islamic banks run across incomprehension of regulating organs usually citing article 7 of the constitution of Azerbaijan, which stipulates that Azerbaijan is the democratic, legal, secular and Unitarian republic, while its article 18 proclaims separation of religion from the state and legal equality of all confessions.

The Islamic Bank of Development and other members of IBD group repeatedly applied to the government of Azerbaijan with the request to give support to the process of reformation of the banking and tax legislation for the purpose of eliminating obstacles to development of Islamic banks; however, the Central Bank usually demonstrates its reserved position concerning Islamic banking affairs. In Azerbaijan there is no legal and normative basis for development of this banking sector, according to E. Rustamov, the chairman of the Central Bank. As he thinks, the perspectives of inculcation of Islamic banking in the country will be regarded within the framework of the general strategy of the banking system’s development and will be appraised from the point of view of a probable benefit to the economy of Azerbaijan given by the Islamic banks.

The other criterion taken into account by the Central Bank is as follows: the mentality of Azerbaijanis. Should the principles of Islamic financing coincide with national mentality, it might be possible seriously to think about development of the Islamic banking affaires, to the mind of the chairman of the Central Bank. According to him, the



Azerbaijani mentality combines modernism, European thinking and national originality; at the same time, any probable model should be tested.

Except subjective reasons on the way of development of Islamic methods of financing in Azerbaijan, there exist also objective obstacles. The banking sector of Azerbaijan is characterized primarily by the inadequate development of capital markets, a weak transparency of the banks and gradual and small alleviation of dominance in markets on the part of state banks. In terms of capitalization, the banks of Azerbaijan are inferior to the banking systems of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Taking into account the above said, one should not be surprised that the sole Islamic bank in Azerbaijan is not marked by Transparency and openness. According to all official documents, “Kausar Bank” is a typical traditional bank. It should be said that information on “Kausar Bank” as well as on businessmen trying to arrange their business in accordance with shariat is disseminated mainly by word of mouth and not by means of advertising.

The documents of “Kausar Bank” actually do not contain Arabic terms to indicate the financial methods, which correspond to shariat. And what is more, in the official information on the bank disseminated in Azerbaijan the part devoted to its Islamic feature is reduced to a minimum. For instance, the booklet in English characterizes activities of the bank as “Islamic banking”, while in the booklet printed in the Azerbaijani language the term “Faizsiz qazanc” is used, which means in English “Non-interest banking”.

The leadership of “Kausar Bank” is not in a hurry to advertise its services not only for political reasons. The information on the bank is disseminated mainly via the system of social ties. As a consequence of this reserved policy carried out by the leadership of the bank it is possible to mention that many Muslims in Baku simply do not know

that the Islamic bank was functioning in the country for more than five years.

“Kausar Bank” is one of the first commercial banks in Azerbaijan. It received its license in time of the Soviet Union in 1998 and up to September 2001 was known as “Universal Bank”. On 21 October 2002, the National Bank of Azerbaijan gave “Kausar Bank” a new license for carrying out its banking activities of all types. The same year, “Kausar Bank” started the process of clearing its former credit and deposits port-folios from *riba* and also ceased its participation in all transactions including money-lending. All interest liabilities of clients to the bank were sold to a specialized company.

“Kausar Bank” is recognized by the world Islamic banking community as an Islamic bank. The bank is a member of the General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions and of the Organization for Accounting and Audit for Islamic Financial Institutions. At the same time, it is early to say that “Kausar Bank” provides the complete line of Islamic banking products. At present, “Kausar Bank” proposes for its clients only four Islamic banking products: 1) opening and processing of investment accounts on the basis of *mudarab* mechanism; 2) credit arrangements for business according to *musharak* mechanism; 3) credit arrangements for physical and legal entities by means of purchase and sale of the bank’s accepted bills; 4) financing purchase of automobiles, household technique etc. by means of mechanism *idzhara va iktina*.

Due to existing in Azerbaijan legislative limitations for banking trade activities, *murabakh* mechanism may not be used by “Kausar Bank”. The lack of adequate financial resources also hinders “Kausar Bank” to extend its activities.

“Kausar Bank” has no chance to apply some Islamic agreements and realizes its potential in financing *halal* sectors of national economy.

As an example one may cite the project of \$ 100 million for construction of four high buildings in Baku, where “Kausar Bank” took part in its financing.

In 2004, “Kausar Bank” signed the agreement with the Islamic Corporation for Development (ICD) of the private sector (established in 1999 as an affiliated structure of IMF). Under this agreement, the ICD assumed obligation to give financial support to implementation of a rather great part of the project. The same year, the agreement was concluded on purchase by ICD of a part of stocks of “Kausar Bank”. For a long time the project could not be implemented, since the main condition of the constructors was the complete financial support to the construction. Further, the project was essentially amended. For instance, the construction of the skyscraper of 45 stories was changed building four houses of 24 stories. Afterwards, the decision was taken to create a complex of two 39 – stories buildings of 170 thousand sq. meters. It was possible to get \$ 300 million, provided by Korean traditional banks, for the sake of implementation of the project. In sum, the participation of “Kausar Bank” in this project was reduced to a minimum, and the request to get \$ 5 million from ICD was dropped. The floor-space of the skyscrapers was projected to sale for officers and apartments. The managing company ”Baku Pride” was founded by the Korean party with minimal participation of an Azerbaijani partner close to the leadership of “Kausar Bank”.

It seems that up to present the Islamic financial institutions in Azerbaijan may realize their potential in the best way exactly by means of making investments in business, which does not contradict shariat, and not by extension of their products’ line. It is proved by creation of the Caspian International Investment Company (CIIC), which started its activities on 13 June 2008. Its establishment was the outcome of the agreement on creation of the investment company working on the basis

of Islamic principles; it was signed in 2006 at the international investment conference, organized by Islamic Bank of Development in Baku.

The owners of CIIC are the Islamic Corporation for Development of Private Sector (75%) and the belonged to the state Azerbaijani Investment Company (25%). The main task of the new company is the attraction of foreign investments to Azerbaijan and the participation in the world market. As projected, for the next two years the capital of CIIC will be raised almost 23 times up to \$ 70 million.

At present, CIIC takes part in financing two investment projects, and the company's analysts study over ten perspective proposals. The priority directions of the activities of the company are as follows: agriculture, pharmaceuticals, construction materials' production, the services' sector. All investments of CIIC may be made only in the spheres allowed by shariat, including purchase of the stocks in other companies and by becoming their stockholders.

The cooperation of Azerbaijan in the sphere of investments with Islamic financial structures is not limited with the projects, which get financial support of CIIC. On 25 May 2007, the Financial House of Kuwait and the Azerbaijani Investment Company (AIC) signed the memorandum on intentions. In March 2009, the Kuwait-Azerbaijani Investment Company (KAIC) with fixed capital of 410 manats (\$ 500 thousand) was founded. By the end of 2010, the stockholders of intend to raise it up to \$ 20 million (75% belongs to "Turkapital" – a subsidiary company of Kuwait Financial House, while 25% – AIC). The priority direction for KAIC and AIC is financial support to the projects, which do not contradict shariat, in the spheres of commercial realty, agro-industrial complex and logistics. The other significant direction of the company's activities is providing consultative services to Azerbaijani and foreign companies.

Various foundations of the countries of the Persian Gulf (the Saudi Development Foundation, the Abu-Dhabi Development Foundation and others) also carry out a rather great investment activities. However, up to present, the Islamic Bank of Development (Azerbaijan joined it in 1992) remains the biggest Islamic financial institution, which makes investments in Azerbaijan. In 2009, the IBD allocated \$ 201.5 million for financial support to construction of electric station Cenub on the basis of istisna mechanism. Within the three years program of the IBD, adopted in spring of 2010, the bank plans to allocate \$ 404.6 million for various infrastructural and agricultural projects in Azerbaijan. About 25% of the total amount of already made investments of the IBD in Azerbaijan were directed to financing the agrarian sector, one third – to improvement of transport infrastructure, development of small and middle business, amelioration of living conditions of forced migrants.

At the same time, the IBD is engaged in making projects for creation in Azerbaijan of an Islamic bank. Nik Zeinal, former director of regional office of Islamic Bank of Development in Almaty mentioned not once that the IBD was ready to render assistance to Azerbaijan in order to establish an Islamic bank, if the government of the country initiates this project. Akhmad Mukhammad Ali, the present resident of the IBD spoke about it in his interviews.

The lack of acceptable for Islamic banks legislation and the guarded attitude to Islamic banking affairs on the part of the regulating bodies restrain the initiative of other Azerbaijani banks in the sphere of Islamic methods of financing. For instance, in October 2007 the International Investment Bank (IIB) of Bahrein purchased 49% of stocks of Azerbaijani “Amrakhbank”. As is known, the IIB gives support to development of Islamic banking affairs both in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. In a short period of time after purchase of

“Amrakhbank”, the leadership of the IIB made public the plan of its transformation into a valuable Islamic bank proposing a full list of Islamic banking products. However, these intentions were not realized due to the same uncertainty of the legal status of the future Islamic bank.

To the author’s mind, one should not appraise the future of the Islamic banking affairs and Islamic financing in a very pessimistic way in Azerbaijan. Taking into account the interest to Islamic financial services in the republic, given the guarded position of the authorities, it is possible to make a prognosis that the development of Islamic banking will go on according to the same scenario as in Turkey: from non-recognition as valuable banks to giving them the special status (partner banks).

*“Islamskaya ekonomicheskaya model  
i sovremennost”, M., 2010, p. 277–28.*

**Askar Akayev,**

first president of the Kyrgyz Republic (1990–2005)

**KYRGYZSTAN: DISTURBING PREMONITIONS**

The people’s revolt in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 instantly liquidated the regime of Bakiyev and set a new stage in the post-Soviet history of the republic. A group of politicians headed by R. Otunbayeva in a self-styled way proclaimed itself as the Provisional government. Being aware of the danger, they, nevertheless, did not take measures to prevent bloody inter-ethnic clashes in the south of the republic. The conflict resulted in several thousand victims and caused vast material damage. The members of the provisional rule in a way of voluntarism in the state of emergency imposed to the country the referendum and hastily adopted new constitution, which proclaimed Kyrgyzstan a

parliamentary republic, although it was unprepared for it. The elections to the parliament took place on 10 October 2010. The contradictory results of the elections raise great doubts in ability of the present power to ensure fulfillment of promises for the better future. The destiny of the country, the preservation of its territorial integrity and national survival are at stake.

For the last five years, Kyrgyzstan as a result of consecutive internal political troubles became a kind of fright. Meanwhile, the experts watching the situation in the Central Asia know well that for almost fifteen years the republic at the first stage of the post-Soviet development was regarded as a model of sustainable development and “an island of democracy” in the region. The small country in the Central Asia, which was situated far away from the world centers of force and was relatively weak in terms of economy, was becoming more significant in the world community. The situation changed on 24 March 2005, when in Bishkek the coup d’etat took place under the cover of the “tulip” revolution, the third one in the series of “color” revolutions, which were arranged beforehand in Georgia and Ukraine.

The author, being the president of Kyrgyzstan, knew it but still did not believe that the hostile Trans-Atlantic wave would cover the republic with such force. The adventure of Washington seemed to make Kyrgyzstan a testing area for promotion of democracy according to the American scenarios on the territory of the Central Asia. At that time, the experts of the USA “brain centers” did not foresee a significant moral damage to American interests in the world. At present, under the influence of events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, the external attempts to incorporate democracy are understood as a direct threat to stability and prosperity of the countries being subject to American pressure. However, the “revolutionary lull” is not a prediction of

Washington's refusal from subversive activities in the post-Soviet world.

For a short period after the popular uprising in April, the provisional government prepared a draft of the new constitution and arranged its approval on 27 July by the national referendum. Two months later the parliamentary elections took place. Why the presidential republic was transformed into a parliamentary republic for such short time? The analysis of the events in 2005 gives the answer.

R. Otunbayeva and the majority of "new rulers" were active participants of the coup d'état on 24 March 2005. The opposition succeeded to take power not thanks to attractiveness of its program aims. Its ideas were reduced to the appeal "Down!" The main reason of the opposition's success consisted, probably, in refusal of the author as the president of the state to respond by force and to use arms against the crowd, gathered on the capital's main square and instigated by the opposition's leaders, to storm the government's building. The president issued the order "do not shoot". R. Otunbayeva was the main ideologist of "tulip" revolution, and the easy victory in March 2005 raised her self-estimation. It conditioned her further reason to break relations with Bakiyev. In April R. Otunbayeva used the chance to become the leader of the opposition and to oust her former boss from the political arena.

Bakiyev, unlike Akayev, did not intend to step down without fighting. He ordered to shoot at demonstrators. Over 80 people were shot to death. The political fire in Bishkek provoked the bloody inter-ethnic conflict in the south of the republic, which resulted in 2 thousand new victims. The change of the leader of Kyrgyzstan was accompanied by huge material demolitions, economic and social disturbances, loss of democratic and humanistic orientations. It was the price paid by the people for R. Otunbayeva coming to power.



Are there persons, who have been convicted if not by court but by public opinion for the anti-constitutional coup d'état in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan? Nobody was mentioned. On the contrary, the initiators and organizers of the coup d'état occupied the highest state posts posing as national heroes. What is the aim of the present key leaders with their doubtful democratic convictions, if morally they are engendered by the coup d'état? The concern of the first president is caused by the maintained ties of the present leadership of the republic with the foreign organizations, which pursue their own aims and are ready to use the methods of coup d'état and to introduce into national life elements of chaos. At present, such phenomena are used to be called "guiding chaos". This chaos seems to be guided by the Trans-Atlantic bosses.

The speech of R. Otunbayeva as a new president on 10 November 2010 at the first session of the new parliament should be mentioned. Side by side the intension to join the number of developed countries of the world, she said that life itself would make appraisal, whether the parliamentary rule would be acceptable for society. It means that R. Otunbayeva herself is not sure of this. When will life give its answer to this question: in five, ten or twenty years? The imposed parliamentary regime seems to be an adventure.

Another detail is significant. The key line in the speech of R. Otunbayeva is the thought about Great Kyrgyz Roaming from place to place. She declared that the Great Kyrgyz Roaming "opened in its history a new page". Actually, the roaming period is a remarkable historic period of the Kyrgyz people. However, at present, keeping memory of history, one should orient himself to the modern foundation created for the years of sovereign development. Underestimation of significance and firmness of this foundation built in the republic by collective efforts of the multinational community would be nothing else

but a crime in face of the civil great deed of the people. Movement forward with the head turned backwards will hardly lead to a grand purpose.

In politics it is equally dangerous both running ahead and moving backwards – there is small choice in rotten apples, as they say. The Bakiyev course aimed at fixing in the country of the family-clanish system of governance of the medieval khanate type turned out the popular uprising with destructive consequences. The first stage of Otunbayeva period is connected with the activities of the provisional government, which resulted in blood, victims, many state and political failures.

R. Otunbayeva regards the passage of the republic to the parliamentary power system as a main result of governance. The successful examples of parliamentary governance mainly in developed countries are connected with the century-old system of state governance. In this respect, it is worth recalling election of the new deputies corps, elected on 10 October 2010. Out of 29 political parties participated in the elections only five of them succeeded to overcome 5% barrier: Ata-Zhurt, Social-Democratic Party, Ar-Namys, Republic and Ata-Meken. As a whole, they collected 36.3% of votes, while the share of the rest parties made 63.7% of votes. For the sake of comparison, it should be stressed: on 22 November 2010 of parliamentary elections in Moldova the four parties, which took the upper hand, collected 91.4% of votes. The election barrier prevented election of the four parties' deputies, who collected only 8.6% of votes.

In Kyrgyzstan after October elections there shaped an illogical correlation of one third to two thirds between the victor-parties and parties-outsiders. As a result, the new composition of the parliament may not be considered as a parliament based on the will of voters, i.e. as a representative organ in general meaning of this term. Almost two

thirds of voters are deprived of the right to have their candidates as members in the new parliament. This configuration of the parliament and the state system based on it foresee instability from the beginning. The people in Kyrgyzstan itself, suffered by a row of political troubles and social-economic difficulties, as well as in the international community tired of incomprehensible change of power in Kyrgyzstan seem to perceive these events as fait accompli and have to reconcile with it. But the forced calmness is very deceptive.

It seems that the greatest danger for the present political life in the republic represents the following circumstance: at present, the main political force able to assume liability for the country's destiny has not formed. There is no all-national leader enjoying wide public confidence. The votes among the victors were divided in diapason from 8.5% (Ata-Zhurt) to 5.5% (Ata-Meken). Probably, there is in the world no country with the parliamentary system where among the victors were no party, which received at least a half of votes, while in total the elected parties would not enjoy the support of the majority of electorate.

The party, which received only 8.5% of votes, occupied the first place. And the other circumstance causes concern. The first place among "victors" occupies the party, which is regarded nearly as a representative of interests of ex-president Bakiyev, overthrown by popular revolt; the lesser number of votes was received by the party headed by O. Tekebayev, who claimed for the role of ideologue of parliamentary system and was the president of the commission, which drafted the constitution. R. Otunbayeva as a president for the provisional period turned out to be in an enviable position. In these circumstances she had to grin and bear. The results of the parliamentary elections may not be considered as a full fiasco for her. They showed that the provisional rulers were to blame for the situation when the

country turned out to be politically split and lost the orientation of sustainable movement forward. R. Otunbayeva lost the credit of confidence after bloody events in the south of the country. The course for the parliamentary republic turned out to be separated from realities of life and creates more problems than solves them. The author does not doubt good intentions of R. Otunbayeva, but mentions that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Is there a way out? As is known, there are no situations without a way out of them when the question is solving problems subject to human will. At present, in contemporary Kyrgyzstan even most “terrible” general F. Kulov will hardly assume the role of dictator. After the coup d’etat in 2005 the Bakiyev team was more occupied not with care for the people but with internal group struggle and with distribution and re-distribution of the national wealth for the benefit of this team’s members. The provisional government did the same, and the country turned out to be on the eve of economic collapse. The country fully depends on international assistance. According to experts of World Bank, the budget’s deficit accounted for \$ 335 million in 2010; the local experts estimated it twice large. At present, the urgent national needs make up \$ 1 billion, while the external debt accounts for \$ 2.6 billion. Since 2005, due to the permanent political crisis economy of Kyrgyzstan was characterized by sustainable stagnation raising significant problems in the social sphere. Over 40% of the population lives under the line of poverty, which tends to grow.

The “provisional rulers” demonstrated their incompetence in economic management and state governance. They were responsible for the explosion of inter-ethnic violence in the south of the republic in June 2010 resulting in gigantic number of victims and material damages. R. Otunbayeva turned out to be incapable to carry out efficient policy aimed at reconsolidation and consolidation of two

southern communities. The remained metastases predict repetition of inter-ethnic conflicts in the future.

The outflow from the republic not only of Uzbeks and Russians but also of Kyrgyz was raised due to the growth of inter-national tension and the fall of level of living, particularly comparing with the first fourteen years of sovereign development of Kyrgyzstan. The present tension in inter-national relations equals the social-economic troubles emerged after 2005.

The internal stability of the countries going on through the transitory period of their development may be based on three main factors: sustainable development to democracy; significant social-economic progress, particularly with due account of interests of ordinary people; achievement and maintenance of inter-national peace and consent.

The present power in Kyrgyzstan has not succeeded to get results for the better in either of these spheres. The rapid passage to the parliamentary rule was imposed to society. The shortcomings in the parliamentary elections predict new troubles. The economic regress inflicts a direct blow to the interests of the majority of the population, but patience of people has its limits. The growing outflow from the republic of the most active part of the population is fraught with national troubles.

At present, in the republic there is no all-national leader, who would combine all trends of state and public life and would direct the country to a clear aim, would inspire the youth and other strata of the population. The public figures possessing not only state wisdom, prescience and other personal good qualities but also the constitutional prerogatives are needed for fulfillment of such aims. The parliamentary system, imposed on the country, due to its peculiarities prevents appearance of the leaders capable to accomplish the key

reforms and changes. The role of the president under the new constitution is rather virtual than real. The new constitutional changes are imminent. They will be painful. The present power will try to prevent them. But they are the must, and this is a key variant of exit of the country out of the deadlock.

The “weather-wane” Bakiyev diplomacy was characterized by Kyrgyz political scientists A. Knyazev as “to have it both ways”. Regretfully, the concerns appeared that the present leaders of Kyrgyzstan may follow Bakiyev way in foreign policy. At the first session of the new parliament R. Otunbayeva spoke about certain external destructive forces, which provoked the conflict in the south of the country, about external threats and an attempt to arrange a coup d’etat with external support... The hints and semi-hints create the basis for different questions: what kind of forces and what objectives they pursue? R. Otunbayeva keeps silent...

The external capacity as alpha and omega of the state policy was the basis of the first president’s policy of Kyrgyzstan. Neither state in the contemporary world may carry out its policy without support on the part of allies and friends. One may cite the example of the USA, which participate in NATO and maintain cooperation within the framework of international organizations in Asia and in the Pacific. Without support given by Russia Kyrgyzstan would hardly emerge as a sovereign state, which through fault of Bakiyev and his “tulip” supporters confronts a national catastrophe.

The centuries-old history of relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan lacked “black” pages. In 1785, the wise decision was taken by the ancestors, who appealed to Empress Great Catherine to give to the Kyrgyz Russian citizenship. Irakly II as the tsar of Georgia expressed the same appeal to Russia two years beforehand. The Kyrgyz and the Georgians were kept as the nations thanks to Russia. The

orientation to Russia as the most reliable friend and ally is firmly fixed in Kyrgyz national sense.

If at present a referendum on the republic's entry into the RF or on formation an allied federation (confederation) with Russia were held, the majority of the Kyrgyz would vote for such idea. And what is more, the success at the elections of such parties as Ar-Namys (Kulov) and Republica (Babanov) to a large extent was conditioned by their open pro-Russian orientation. The voters supported friendship with Russia and extension and intensification of allied relations with Moscow. The failure of Ata-Meken at the elections seemed to be related to the unfriendly anti-Russian speeches of its leader O. Tekebayev.

The foreign policy, as is known, concerns the all-national interests. All political parties have to come to a consensus. The personal sympathies and antipathies of individual politicians to some countries should step behind the all-national interests. The author is concerned about position of R. Otunbayeva in relation to Russia. The meaning of the public opinion on her pro-American feelings is hardly accidental. The situation should be considered abnormal, if the majority of the population oriented to Russia shares the opinion, which does not coincide with the state's head views related to her selfish or unselfish aims.

The concern about pro-American position of some members of the present government of Kyrgyzstan does not imply appeal for liquidation of American base "Manas" on the republican territory. This base is a significant part of the global infrastructure created for the struggle against the main source of terrorism kept in Afghanistan up to the present time. The coming exit of Americans from this country should mean the simultaneous closer of base "Manas". It is more significant to ensure the departure of Americans from internal life in

Kyrgyzstan. It is sufficient to say that they had their impact on it by their active participation in coup d'état in 2005 and that Kyrgyz society will experience its hard consequences for a long time. According to the obtained information, American experts played an important role in elaboration of the new constitution proclaiming creation of parliamentary republic, which was disapproved by the people at the elections. Is it to be not a new coup d'état? One should repeat: "Be afraid of Americans, who bring misfortune".

It seems that under present conditions the imperative in foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan should become the return to the principles formed as a result of wide public discussion at the first stage of contemporary statehood. Russia, neighbors of Kyrgyzstan in the region, other friendly states in the post-Soviet space should further remain the priority policy direction. Kyrgyzstan is connected with them by historic destiny and long-term living in Common Home – the Soviet Union. The Kyrgyz people will remain for ever "society of common destiny", in words of known political scientist N. Vert.

The mighty social-economic and cultural rise of most Soviet Union Republics, being now independent states, in those times to a large extent was ensured at the expense of Russia, where the tempos of development sometime essentially lagged behind the tempos of development of distant republics, including Kyrgyzstan. It would be Pharisaism to speak about colonization by Russia of Eurasian lands in the west and the east. The attempts to bury CIS and other inter-state organizations created after disintegration of the USSR contradict the key interests of the peoples. And in this case again the roots are hidden on the Trans-Atlantic territory. To the author's mind, the many-centuries historic route shows that Russia was given to Kyrgyzstan by God and history. Orientation to Russia is a key guarantee of



overcoming the present crisis, the way of the republic out of the approaching historic deadlock.

One should remember Lev Gumilev's appeal to unite in order not to disappear. It was proclaimed in summer 1991, i.e. in time of reconstruction in the Union, when great social-economic troubles emerged and country started to disintegrate. L. Gumilev saw well the threat to the Soviet multi-national state. The putsch in August 1991 was a fatal event for destiny of the Union. The failure to ensure unity and to arrange resistance to destructive forces resulted in the loss of common country.

The present events in Kyrgyzstan may give an analogy with the events, which took place twenty years ago. The parliamentary elections, although arranged on the seemed democratic basis, still keep the concern. They only revealed the level of the existing threat, of the internal political separation as a environment of parasitic forces preparing Herostratos plans. The coalition of the parties-victors at the elections in Kyrgyzstan, given majority in the parliament, according to the constitution, got the right to elect the speaker and the prime-minister. The first coalition was created in November 2010 on the basis of three allegedly close to each other parties in terms of their ideology: Social-Democratic Party, party "Republic" and "Ata-Meken". However, due to inter-party disputes the coalition existed only for three days. The deadly blow was inflicted to it by failure of O. Tekebayev, the leader of "Ata-Meken" to be elected to the post of the speaker of the parliament.

The negotiations lasted for two weeks with active participation of R. Otunbayeva terminated in election to the post of the speaker of A. Keldibekov, the leader of "Ata-Zhur", which resolutely demanded the re-consideration of the constitution for the benefit of the presidential-parliamentarian form of governance. Actually, against the

background of other probable candidates he seems to be the most promising politician.

As was expected, social-democrat A. Atambayev, supported by R. Otunbayeva, became the prime-minister. He will have to wash away his guilt for collaboration with Bakiyev (he was the prime-minister in his time). By December 2010, the new power was formed according to the parliamentary type. But the question remains: for how long time? The main doubts are connected with the following: the country will be governed by the coalition, which was based on only one fourth of votes! It would be an illusion to expect the longevity of the three parties' coalition due to disputes and differences among the leaders. The inevitable struggle between the three parties of the government and the two opposition parties will grow. The opposition is not inclined to compromise, and the most favorable behavior of the political class in Kyrgyzstan became the search for probable combinations of three parties for the nearest future. At the same time, many politicians forget about principles in case of getting power.

The present political situation in the republic resembles the picture described in the well-known fable, written by I. Krylov, on a swan, a crawfish and a pike. As is known, they tried to move a loaded cart, but the swan pulled it up, the crawfish was moving backwards, while the pike dived in water. Many Kyrgyz politicians behave in the same way. The exaggerated power ambitions, opposing interests of the main participants of the political process in the republic is difficult to combine. The correlation of ambitions and interests is possible only on the basis of firm democratic convictions. However, they will hardly be possessed by the people, who built their political carrier by means of coup d'etat and other anti-constitutional acts covered by false revolutionary slogans. The exit from this impasse is possible only in case of emergence in the republic of new political leaders free of the

past dubious burden, who have proved by their deeds the devotion to democratic order of national life. The present political elite will create obstacles to this process, but the situation will be changed.

The government in parliamentary republic usually is headed by a politician. But under the present conditions in the republic this practice should not lead to the complete politicization of the government's composition. It should be formed primarily by professionals marked by the highest expert potential from representatives of all parties and public movements. The creation of the "national and united" government may save the country, given the change of the structure of the parliamentarian majority resulting usually in radical restructure of the government.

It is high time to throw away the revolutionary demagoguery and to start a normal state construction and to restore economy. The "street democracy", which promoted many present party and state leaders in Kyrgyzstan, should step down, if the country wants to survive. R. Otunbayeva and other republican leaders should finally demonstrate their ability to solve key problems of state and political life, of daily life of people using civilized acceptable forms of work in society, parliament and local communities via the system of territorial self-government and by use of potential of civil society's institutions etc. It is high time for opposition parties and movements to refute to apply primitive actions based on slogans of "Ketsin!" type and to be engaged in practical deeds.

If the present rulers in Kyrgyzstan regard the people as a mighty force able to take actions thoughtfully and collectively and not as a illiterate human masse following like zombie their leaders in time of street demonstrations, they should propose society the all-national consolidating program aimed at overcoming the national crisis, the intensification of national life in all its aspects, the enter of the country

into the flow of international life, like it at the dawn of independence. The elaboration and adoption of such program under the present existing conditions is not less important than the adoption of the constitution. Why not to implement this all-national project on the basis of wide discussion of the program's draft and by referendum? The achieved result would be generously repaid.

The present situation in Kyrgyzstan one can not help regarding as critical. The “tulip” revolutionaries violated the country in the most perverted form, destructed the results achieved for the first fourteen post-Soviet years. For the period after April 2010, R. Otunbayeva and the group of leaders coming from the “tulip” past took desperate attempts to lead the country out of the chaos, which they themselves were to blame. The declarations, made by the president on 30 November at the OSCE summit, held in Astana about the achieved stability in the country do not correspond to reality; they were made either due to the feeling of self-deceit or for the sake of exaggerating some positive aspects of national life and for leading the OSCE partners astray. Despite the self-glorification by the present rulers of their actions in the sphere of installation of the parliamentary system in the country, there are great doubts relating to the chance itself to fix this system in political life of Kyrgyzstan. To the author's mind, this system will be rejected by the people. The construction of the renewed system demands a thorough and full account of the centuries-long complicated historical experience, including unnecessary expenses of the post-Soviet period.

The wording “Great Kyrgyz Roaming” repeated by R. Otunbayeva, on the one hand, deserves attention, since she tries to prove radical decisions taken by “the provisional rulers”, by references to historic realities. Both Great Roaming and nomads' democracy existed in Kyrgyzstan. The nomads lived in hard conditions, and those,

who think that there existed unlimited free community of nomads, are wrong. The critical living conditions of nomads forced them to stick to rigid discipline. And in case of external military threat the regime of community life was characterized by the slogan “each Kyrgyz is a warrior”. The power hierarchy existed, and the will of the leader was the law. The principles of nomadic democracy conditioned by demands for survival of people under hard natural conditions were put into life in a rigid way by wise and authoritative leaders. The heroic epos “Manas” clearly proves it for the attentive reader. The pastoral illusions of nomads’ life, expressed by R. Otunbayeva, have nothing to do with reality.

Given the analysis of the key role of the parliament, one can not help seeing that under conditions of internal unstable situation in the republic the characteristic of this role shows that the prolonged collective decisions create inevitably the situation of ambiguous state power, its separation from current events in the country. The personal responsibility of the president is the necessary attribute of state power in most countries of the world. Hence, the conclusion: the review of the present option of the constitution of Kyrgyzstan is unavoidable. The only condition for this review is as follows: it should be made without revolutionary Sabbath and social troubles, which became an image of the country for the last five years.

The author experiences sharp pain, when it is needed to write and to speak about hard situation in the native republic, where he worked for almost 40 years as a scientist and state leader. However, the bitter truth is more useful for society than a sickly-sweet demagogic deception. Some other thing gives hope for belief in a better future. The history of Kyrgyz statehood numbers twenty two centuries. There were catastrophic downs and rapid ups. The Kyrgyz people will go through the present downfall engendered by the “tulip” revolution. The people

will go through it primarily thanks to the due account of the five years of infamous Bakiyev period of contemporary republic's history. The people will stand the unnecessary expenses of the "provisional" politicians. The people of Kyrgyzstan will sustain, since nearby there were and is the Russian people, who regard the destiny of the Kyrgyz as their own one. The rulers come and go, but the people rest. This is the hope.

*"Svobodnaya mysl", M., 2011, N 2, p. 5–20.*

**Arkady Dubnov,**  
political observer

### **TAJIKISTAN: THE NEW OPPOSITION TO THE OLD PRESIDENT**

The president of Tajikistan, Emomali Rakhmon, was the first leader of the post-soviet state with the Islamic population who has tried to change a style of the relations with the people after a succession of the upheavals along the "Arabic arc". No wonder that just 58-years old Rakhmon retaining the power in the country during 19 years is permanently inside the top ten of the leader lists taking the chances to be overthrown being regularly renewed by the different world mass media. As early as in February Emomali Rakhmon agreed to receive three inhabitants of the kishlak near Dushanbe where the local authorities began demolishing the houses. The president reacted in such a way to a protest rally; nothing of the kind has happened before. In two weeks the Tajik ombudsman Zarif Alizoda presented the report on observance of human rights also for the first time. He informed that about fifteen thousand of the persons registered a complaint on occasion of disseisin, illegal acre allocation and the other injustices from the party of the local authorities.

On the eve of the holiday Novruz being celebrated on 21 March the numerous portraits of Rakhmon himself were unexpectedly disappeared from the streets of Dushanbe. The high-ranking projectionist of the ruling People's Democratic Party, Usmon Solekh, clarified: "It's coming from the president policy opposing the authoritarianism and cult of personality; he doesn't need in such externals of people's love. The president also instructed the local authorities in the past to prohibit his personality praising". Nevertheless, as the Tajik political scientist, Rajabi Mirzo, noticed the president portraits have never been removed previously.

At last, at the end of March several soldiers of the armed opposition, the participants of the armed clashes in autumn 2009 in Taval'dare were amnestied. The sentences for several tens of the other soldiers sentenced to life imprisonment or to 20-30 years were considerably commuted.

These measures were welcomed in the country. "Many accused in terrorism and extremism receive too long prison sentence and it can be a catalyst of the further situation escalation",- the chief of the association of the political scientists , Abdugani Mamadzimov, says. The speaker of Upper Chamber, the mayor of Dushanbe Makhmadsaid Ubaidullaev, also announces about the regime relaxation. He recommended Procurator-General and the law-enforcement agencies "to assume the measures for the stability protection, to enforce rule of law, to tighten supervision over abiding of a law and not to allow the human rights abuse" alleged on "the situation having become spontaneously complicated taking into account the social and economic problems in some countries". "The speaker's declaration is a preventive measure; there is no a revolutionary situation in our country now", – Mamadzinov reassured the expert community. As a whole there is really no political force or bright leaders being ready for drastic

measures to neutralize Rakhmon's regime. The more especially as "pressure" in the protest "pot" was successfully "relieved" by two legal opposition parties (there are 8 parties in the republic) including the Islamic party of Tajikistan revival being the single one based on a confession. The newspapers are issued only once in a week but the independent mass media are a visible factor of socio-political life. Traditionally the journalists' activity in Tajikistan doesn't depend on loyalty to the power so they are allowed to express their own point of view being sometimes openly opposition.

Internet zone is limited in Tajikistan and it can't be compared the Arabian countries. In Tajikistan not more than a quarter of the population has access to network mainly the government employees, students and workers of the international organizations. The youth of 20–30-years old is mainly interested in entertaining portals and introduction sites and least of all, in the serious analytic or political sites. Besides, Internet services are difficult of access because of high prices in the towns but in the villages they are inaccessible because of power supply problems. The functionaries use a well-tried method of consolidation in front of external threat when there is a need to ease criticism of the press. The choice is small: it's either the leadership of the neighboring Uzbekistan "putting obstacles in the way of Rogunskoy hydroelectric development in Tajikistan" or "some influential circles in Russia fueling anti-Tajikistan moods". Today the civil war fatigue syndrome from the in the middle of 90-ss of the past century that never overcame continues to weigh in favor of the ruling regime. The civil war carried away several tens of thousands of people and more tens of thousands made run away in Afghanistan and other countries. The national reconciliation between Rakhmon's government and opposition in 1997 didn't attain its goal. With the lapse of time opposition supporters are persecuted by the power. Moreover, trying to be secured



himself against the most ambitious associates Rakhmon began also persecuting them. As a result the regime is degraded into typical nepotism where the members of the big president family (he has nine children) and his fellow-citizens have a control over business and force structures. According to “Transparency International” a corruption level in Tajikistan is the highest not only in the region but all over the post-soviet area.

Generally those who are ready to rise in arms against rakhmono regime today (there are 300 persons of them) are located and hide in the mountains. More several tens of the Tajiks can join them from abroad. It's important to mark that they are the second generation of the Tajik opposition having not found themselves in the present social medium – the children of both the former oppositionists and the people's front being offended by their own power. However, according to data this frond consolidation is practically impossible because of the single leadership and serious financing lack.

Official Dushanbe tried to limit the increasing influence of Islam long before uprisings in Tunis and Egypt. One began closing the unregistered mosques as early as in summer of the past year and the imams were strictly ordered the sermon themes. In autumn 2010 Emomali Rakhmon declared that the young Tajiks studying the Islam “fall under the influence of the extremists and become the enemies”. In the autumn of the past year the authorities made 1400 students studying in the countries of the Middle East return to Tajikistan including more 200 students from Iran according to the report of the well-informed American Internet-portal *Eurasianet.org*. In December 90 children faced with a prohibition to go to school under the Iranian embassy in Dushanbe. A tendency to limit a distribution of the Shiite version of the Islam among the Tajik-Sunnite brought to a cooling of relations between Tajikistan and Iran.

In March there was information leakage from the American sources that special operation forces of USA dislocated in Afghanistan are allowed to penetrate into the territory of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan “to perform operations for home defense”. As *Eurasianet.org*. informs this instruction is dated by August 2009. According to the document three groups of the American special operation forces were prepared for such operations for the first February 2010 within the “regional re-orientation”. At the same year the special operation forces took part in the soldier liquidation having penetrated from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. To these report comments the American embassy in Tashkent pointed than “special operation forces of USA will continue a conventional military cooperation with the armed forces of Central Asian countries”.

Probably trusting in such support and hoping that Washington won't demand the pressing reforms from Dushanbe because of Washington's tendency to secure the stability in “the Tajik home front”, Rakhmon announced that “artificial acceleration of the movement process along a democratic tack isn't advisable”. However, there is a risk for uncontrolled event development. Bakiev's regime was deposed in several days after Russia imposed the export tariff for diesel oil and fuels and lubricants imported in Kyrgyzstan. Beginning from the first of April 2011 Moscow increased the export tariffs for oil and oil products imported in Tajikistan by 16% in average. The Tajik farmers can be dissatisfied with it as the spring work was in a full swing when the tariffs were increased.

During the last half a year the prices for food were sharply increased in Tajikistan: for flour – 80%, for sugar – 25% and for rice – 23%. If to take into consideration that 40% of the Tajik are living rough it is thankless occupation to forecast social consequences of such price

increasing. All the more nobody knows whether the Tajik did as the president told them to victual for two years in advance...

*“Rossiya v global’noy politike”,  
M, 2011, N 2, March-April, p. 134–137*

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**THE INTELLECTUALS AND DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS  
IN THE POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN**

A democratic process of the political institutions is going on with direct involvement of such actor as the intellectuals. To our mind monitoring the specifics of the opposition intellectual project legitimation in Uzbekistan can promote to define some frame scenario of the democratic institution legitimation (and concretely the intellectual role in their projecting and escort) in the republics of Central Asia as a whole. The intellectuals as creative political actors took a direct participation there.

The political activity of the representatives of university professorate, artistic bohemia, writers, poets and musicians was really high. There was no doubt in orientation of the cultural elite move.

The intellectual opposition understood the democratic perspectives in Uzbekistan long before the post-soviet transformations so the opposition announced its intentions in an organized way. The increase in the Uzbek intellectual movements is synchronized with the institutionalization of the similar movements in the other post-soviet systems. The mono-party system disintegration and a conversion to multiplicity of parties also optimized a political and party development in Uzbekistan.

In 1988 the “Birlik” (The unity) was formed. In “Birlik” the known Uzbek intellectuals – the university professorate, the musicians, the writers and the scientists found common ground. All the creative grounds of the Uzbek society were presented for the intellectual referent movements supporting its large-scale participation and popularity. The party was very popular and it allowed expanding its social base of support. Especially the actions of “Birlik” reach out to the town intelligence and the students supporting Salekh in confrontation with the republican power. The main body of “Birlik” was: Mohammed Salikh – the poet, scenarist and one of the movement founder “Erk”. The deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan (at present he is persecuted by Karimov’s regime and lives in Sweden); Abdurakhim Pulatov – the doctor of engineering and one of the founders and leaders of “Birlik” (at present he lives in USA); Vasila Inoyatova – the leader of the human rights organization “Ezgulik”; Dadakhon Khasanov – the popular poet and singer and the founder of the movement “Birlik”; Zakhid Khaknazarov – the composer, conductor and co-chief of “Birlik”. Just the students were the principle moving force of the Turkish-Meskhetian pogroms in the Fergana valley in 1989. Their ideological program of “Birlik” was quite attractive for them. “Birlik” was preferably oriented at the national Uzbek revival being understood and interpreted in the different persons like the other democratic movements emerging over the post-soviet area at that time. The members of “Birlik” drew attention to many themes annoying the ruling regime. The ideologists appealed the republican power to solve problem on the Uzbek language status, to pay attention to ecological problems (the drying up Aral Sea) and to end with outrage in the army.

The number of “Birlik” followers was quickly increased and according to some data it could be by order of 300 thousand people by the beginning of 1990-ss. In 1991 “Birlik” was officially registered. But

“Birlik” activity was ended in Uzbekistan – Karimov’s regime was being strengthened making this measure quite reasonable.

Now “Birlik” isn’t the formal party; it’s excluded from the parliament mandate candidates and it can’t nominate candidates for the presidential election and etc. Such conjuncture inevitably has an impact on “Birlik” electorate outflow. So, the leaders of “Birlik” try to find the new forms of institutionalization (a participation in the new political force – “Sunny coalition”).

“Birlik” activity becomes half-legal and comes to publishing the different editions. One publishes internet-journal “Kharakat” allowing expressing bold enough terms to the power. In its turn the power develops the relations with “Birlik” hardly including a total pressure on some individuals, scare-mongering, beating-up, arsons and kidnapping. Birlikovtsy must leave Uzbekistan in Turkey, Norway, USA and Ukraine because of guarantee lack. The leader of “Birlik” lives in Washington. The Uzbek apparatus also opposes to the intellectuals in the information field. One can observe rhetorical statements at intellectuals-oppositionists. Karimov’s adviser L. Levitin determines sidereal hours of such oppositionists – “the periods of social and spiritual crisis of the society, statehood disintegration and change of public landmarks. In spite of intellectual’s inconsistency they try to unite in the struggle with the authorities and consolidate their efforts in order to take away the power from the authorities”.

The other project is the political party “Erk” (Will) established in 1989 on some intellectuals’ initiative separated from “Birlik”. The poet M. Salikh was one of the founders of “Erk”. At that time his name was mentioned as one of the symbols of the national revival and the representatives of the national intelligence –the figures of culture, the humanists and the active students – united around it. Such popular

figures as A. Arifov, K. Razykov and T. Yuldashev were of the great importance in the activity of “Erk”.

The author of the political program “Erk” is the known Uzbek opposition political scientist – T. Yuldashev. This program includes the appeals to “establish the general welfare (free education, public health, housing and communal services, to set a computer with Internet access for the account of the state and etc.) to make the country the most powerful one in the world. The program also assumes a partial privatization of the land. “Erk” expressing the radical demands of the authority advances in popularity of the town intelligence and educated provincials oriented at the agricultural sector. “Many young Uzbeks have already acquired computer skills in order to get materials the state tries to prohibit”, the American specialist on Central Asia, M. Olcott, notes. Thereupon it’s not coincidence that the ideologist of “Erk” declares Internet’s theme being especially urgent for the Uzbek youth aiming at information horizons expanding.

The party pinned some hopes with a possibility to take part in the presidential election 2007 but the ruling regime of Uzbekistan made itself safe against hypothetic de-legitimizing. M. Salikh lives in Sweden like the most of the other Uzbek oppositionists; they can’t appear in Uzbekistan because of the numerous risks.

“Birlik” and “Erk” never could avoid the political divisions under conditions of stiff competition on the right wing of the political spectrum of Uzbekistan. There can be a concrete tension at present. One can observe high instability within the parties. Some intellectuals needing in the rostrum are ready to present their own interpretation of going on conflicts and their reasons. The atmosphere of suspiciousness provokes the mutual accusations in “double-dealing” and loyalty for the authorities. So, “some erkovtsev” openly appeal to overthrow “Karimov’s regime” and with it go freely all over the country, agitate

for and live high. The others are arrested, tortured and subjected to persecution. Both those and others accuse each other in the cooperation with the Uzbek, the American and the Turkish special services.

At the beginning of 1990-ss the party “Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi” came from the structures of “Birlik” (free peasants”. A potential social basis of the given project – the Uzbek peasants – has been already in the sphere of power interests. But it was going on only at the stage of the Uzbek pluralism formation. After that the party is out of a real political discourse during some period. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2000-ss it revives and the intellectuals managed to reserve to themselves the brand of “Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi”. At the first national assembly of the party on 6 February 2003 in Tashkent one announced about a new opposition force establishing, party’s constitution and program and also goals and problems defining. Such political figures as M. Malikov, O. Karimov and Z. Caidov are the main body of “Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi”. The politicians-women – the candidate of historical sciences, H. Khidoyatova and the human rights advocate, E. Urlaeva are also very popular among the party’s followers.

“Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi” is oriented at prosperous farmers, businessmen and at last at the peasants themselves. According to the different data there are about 100000members in the party preferably consisting of the peasants of the Fergana valley. H. Khidoyatova confirms it in the interview for the independent edition “Fergana.RU”.

One can see that the party uses a very popular rhetoric –its demands are understandable and laconic. The intellectuals of “Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi” are the reference group. The mass and spontaneous protest actions of the Uzbek peasants in some regions of Uzbekistan in 2004 promoted to popularity increasing of “Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi”. Then the peasants showed themselves as the opposition force being capable of turning the policemen cars and rows

of shopping stalls upside down but the intellectuals, on the other hand, look like sophisticated negotiator solving the problems with the authorities turning a thing to advantage.

It's difficult to speak about that "Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi" is optimal opposition project in modern Uzbekistan though the party leadership makes the active attempts to position itself just in such way. "Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi" actively cooperates with the American NPO being occupied with democracy development in Central Asia, with the block "Ukraine" and with the Kyrgyz and the Georgian partners. "Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi" castigated Karimov's actions on the events in May 2005 in Andizhan increasing its rating.

It's interesting that the Andizhan events in May 2005 were the result of the organization activity "Akromiyya" – a radical religious sect and according to the Uzbek authorities being connected with "Khizb-ut-Tahrir" and the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan). The intellectuals could also participate in the activity of "Akromiyya" otherwise it would be difficult to speak about its large-scaled popularity. Some intellectuals understanding what role the mobilized and controlled Islam can play in some Uzbek regions try to play also this card.

So, A. Yuldashev, the founder of "Akromiyya" and serving a sentence at present has many nicknames and somehow each of them poses him as the intellectual-"mullah", "the mathematics teacher" and "the independent Islamist". During the short period of time A. Yuldashev managed to establish quite independent organization – community defending its members economically; many neophytes entered this organization owing to this important argument. Official Tashkent found extremist motives in the activity of "Akromiyya" so its activity was stopped.



“Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi” understanding the importance of its own position formulating with respect to the Andizhan events hot on the heels “Ozoddekhkonlar partiyasi” tried to make itself known by means of some actions. The important decision of “Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi” was the attempt to count the victim number of the Andizhan tragedy. The party activists went from house to house and wrote down the names and data of the dead. The foreign community’s response for the Andizhan events was also hard-line enough because its position coincided with the Uzbek opposition’s position.

At the same time “Ozod dekhkonlar partiyasi” didn’t manage to consolidate the Uzbek opposition and act as the authoritative political force for the Uzbek right nationalists from “Birlik” and “Erk”. The Uzbek oppositionists couldn’t but understand that one needs one project to resist successfully to Karimov’s ruling regime containing the most representative program regulations for the opposition forces of the Uzbek political spectrum. It’s quite probable that it caused the institutionalization of one more project – “Serkuesh Uzbekistonim” (the sunny Uzbekistan). The leaders of the coalition are H. Hidoyatova and S. Umarov. The youth-democratic party “Dovyurak” is also included in the “Sunny coalition”.

According to S. Umarov the program “Serkuesh Uzbekistonim” began getting many businessmen, the scientists, the artists and governmental middle officers involved in the work. The Uzbek intellectuals having estimated in time a political conjuncture in the republic on the eve of the forthcoming electoral cycles also relate to the given project. The goal of “Serkuesh Uzbekistonim” is “not mass protest action organization or “color revolution” preparation but the unity of the democratic forces of the country for a constructive dialogue with the authorities about the necessity of the political and economic reforms”. But S. Umarov will speak that “the tulip revolution in

Kyrgyzstan promoted to the coalition establishing in many respects and the Uzbek regime will suffer the same fate and when it is overthrown there must be a plan to save our country from a political and economic chaos. From the point of the author's view the appeals to economic and political reforms from the party of "Serkuesh Uzbekistonim" leaders weren't accentuated enough. There were own reasons for that hidden behind the experience of the previous resistance to the ruling regime.

It's no doubt that "Serkuesh Uzbekistonim" was concerned about its political predecessor fates so "softness" of rhetoric was somehow to affect on hypothetic chances of the ruling regime and legitimate the given project. Nevertheless, the disorders in Andizhan took place in a month being suppressed by the ruling regime. Of course, the representatives of "Serkuesh Uzbekistonim" couldn't but express their abrupt attitude towards the regime actions having demanded the immediate resignation of the government and holding early election of Uzbekistan president during three months.

R. Darendorf noted once that "the intellectuals are indispensable constituent of a civil society". A free country needs the critics not associated with power structures. M. Dogan confirms that "when the intellectuals dispute the existing regime its legitimacy becomes poorer". The situation in Uzbekistan at the initial stage of the post-soviet transit confirms it. They haven't been loaded with the responsibilities before the society and its expectations the intellectuals had some advantage allowing them criticizing the regime. The Uzbek political process development showed that the intellectuals didn't become the pronounced and active political actor.

It was caused by some reasons associated, first of all, with a definition of the ruling regime in Uzbekistan. The external factor is also associated with the position weakness of the intellectuals. The ruling regime being brought together with the powerful geopolitical allies

interested in the stability can conduct impudent policy with respect to the Uzbek intellectual forces as just their direct participation supports instability in the country hypothetically being capable of distributing all over the region.

Russia also promotes to the ruling regime in intellectual removing from the political field being interested more in the strategic partnership in central Asia. I. Karimov demonstrates his own irreplaceability practically for all the authoritarian geopolitical partners: “Islam Karimov contrived to maneuver skillfully between the main foreign-policy partners during practically the whole period of his government keeping the good relations with USA, Russia and China. During these years the president of Uzbekistan almost persuaded all these countries in his irreplaceability. It’s clear that it’s needless to say that the intellectuals can change into the key political actors under such conditions when high enough external legitimacy is typical of the ruling regime and when I. Karimov is advantageous for many reasons in the context of the existing geopolitical trends. Time will tell how the situation in Uzbekistan will be developed in future.

*“Sotsyum I vlast’”, Chelyabinsk, 2011, N 1, p. 51–56.*

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