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**THE ISLAM-CHRISTIAN
“DIALOGUE” IN RUSSIA**

The dramatic strained international and inter-religious relations over the post-soviet area laid stress on the inter-religious dialogue during the post-soviet period of the Russian history. The soviet policy for such conflict prevention based on atheistic propaganda and blurring of distinctions between the ethnos became quickly non-topical and one couldn't change it. So, the authorities delegated much powers for the public figures and spiritual leaders to prevent the religious and national conflicts being especially interested in the regular structures where the people of the different nationalities and religions could speaking their language.

The inter-religious dialogue during the newest period like during the soviet period was aimed, first of all, at peace-making efforts; however, its tasks were more to it than that. Not all the people were permitted to take part in it but only the representatives of the most important religious traditions of Russia, being named as “traditional confessions” in 1997. The main participants of the inter-religious actions in the post-soviet Russia were the Orthodox Christians, the Moslems, the Judaists and the Buddhists and sometimes the Catholics

the Old Believers joined them but the followers of the new religious movements have never joined them.

Mutually useful cooperation between the traditional confessions could actually defuse tension in the sphere of the inter-religious and the international relations and also additionally helped to optimize a process of Russia's spiritual renewal. By the joint efforts the spiritual leaders of the different religions could make the authorities to realize the important initiatives in protection of the traditional spiritual values of the Russians. Unfortunately, the situation in the inter-religious dialogue in the post-soviet Russia turned out to be not such unclouded as during the first inter-religious meetings during the soviet period. Some Moslem leaders of Russia didn't lose the opportunity to be reputed as mouthpieces of the Moslems by means of attacks at the other religions. Besides strained relations such policy caused Islamofobia increasing as typical citizens of Russia didn't know about the Islamic community split and took strong statements of some muftis on the television screens and the pages as a consolidated position of all the Moslems.

The leaders of the Muftis Board of Russia were especially distinguished themselves on this path. The young mufti, Ravil' Gainutdin, tried initially to be isolated himself from his teacher as much as possible, Talgata Tajuddina, being known for his warm relations with the Russian Orthodox Church and adopted a very implacable stand with respect to the Orthodox majority. He tried to be reconciled with Moscow Patriarchy in 1997 after bitter attacks in the middle 1990-ss having even issued a special fatwa concerning a respect for the Judaists and the Christians; however, he didn't manage to have a constructive cooperation with the Orthodox believers. So, in September 1998 Gainutdin having met the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Alexis II, made haste to declare that the Patriarch deprived the archbishop

Yaroslavskogo and Rostovskogo Michah of office that supposedly interfered with second mosque building in Yaroslavl. But indeed no sanctions were imposed on the archbishop but the first personal meeting of Gainutdin with the Patriarch was also the last one.

No doubt that the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church leaders towards the Moslem spiritual leaders of “old” and “new” generation was noticeably differed. The Orthodox community couldn’t but take a notice of the splits and deposition of the respectable muftis; all the more the persecuted representatives of the “old” generation had to ask the Orthodox brothers to help them –as, for example, the supreme mufti Talgat Tajuddin in the autumn 1994. Besides, the leadership of Moscow Patriarchy couldn’t but be upset because of offensive critics at their old partners for the inter-religious dialogue where the initiators were their pupils and followers having betrayed them. Eventually, the Orthodox believers doubted very much in the new mufti legitimacy; many of them looked openly the criminal elements or extremists. In the aggregate this all made the relations difficult with the Supreme coordination center of the spiritual boards of Russia’s Moslems and then also with the Russia Council of muftis.

For their part the new leaders of the Russian Islam didn’t hide a hostile attitude towards the Orthodox believers. While the ROC was negotiating with the Caucasus Moslems on the Chechen crisis regulating the mufti R. Gainutdin was interviewing in the following way:” Unfortunately, the supreme hierarchs of our churches mainly have a meeting, declare but those achieved agreements aren’t put into effect in practice. And I would like to give the example. Both Holy Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia and the other leaders meeting with the Moslem religious figures say that the Chechen conflict doesn’t concern religion. We respect each other and appeal our faithful to follow the road of the peace and harmony. At the same time ROC

directs its churchmen in the army waging a war at the territory of Chechnya. Sending the soldiers to the war they give their blessing to them to kill. And the Moslems having seen that the churchman of ROC gives his blessing to them to kill and sacrifices the weapons ask: where is that sincerity, where are those agreements that “we won’t stimulate a war and murders of our citizens?” In March 2000 in the Memorial synagogue on Hill of Respectful Salutation at the third meeting of the Inter-religious board of Russia’s muftis the mufti, R. Gainutdin, created a stink about the presence of the supreme mufti T. Tajuddin there and left the meeting having stated his position in the article: “Who is to profit by the Moslem split?” written by his counselor Vyacheslav-ali Polosin in the “Moslem newspaper”.

The main idea of this article is that Russia’s Moslems have only one lawful leader – R. Gainutdin so the actions of ROC are provocative having invited “dust-laden figure of the past” – the supreme mufti T. Tajyddin. “And who in general needed to invite Ufimskoe central spiritual administration being “alternative” to the Board of Russia’s muftis? What was the reaction of the metropolitan himself if only he came to the meeting of Inter-religious board of Russia’s muftis and saw the churchman G. Yakunin near being anathematized by him, the Kiev patriarch, the bishops of the foreign and catacomb churches? Has the metropolitan himself the authorities to represent the interests of the most ancient Christian church in Russia – Old Believers’?” – the author asked.

Since 2005 the Board of muftis began sharply criticizing the initiatives of ROC concerning introducing the basic principles of the orthodox culture at the schools and renewal of the military churchmen institution in spite of the fact that the mufti R. Gainutdin signed before with his own hand the appeal of the Inter-religious board of Russia to the minister of education, V.M. Filippov, on separate teaching of the

basic principles of four traditional religions of Russia in the secondary schools. His anti-orthodox statements at the conference in February 2006 were at his zenith when he accused the Orthodox hierarchs of conscious understatement of the Moslem number that are indeed in 7 times more in comparison with the Orthodox Christians.

The other representatives of Russia's mufti board agreed with their leader. Co-chairman of the mufti board Saratovskoy oblast cardinally made the relations worse with Saratov eparchy of ROC; at first he wrote the eulogistic foreword for the anti-Christian book "The Gospel by the Moslem eyes" and then he deprecated poklonnyye kresty setting. The representative of the Board of muftis in the Far Eastern federal district the mufti Abdulla-Damir Ishmukhammedov announced at the beginning of 2009 that the Orthodoxy can bring to a social explosion in the Seaside region and after having received the angry reproof from Vladivostok eparchy which broke the relations with him.

The most drastic consequences for the Christian-Moslem dialogue were the rhetoric of the leader of the Spiritual Administration of the Moslems of the Asiatic part of Russia, N. Ashirov, and U. Idrisov, the leader the Spiritual Board of the Moslems of Nizhegorogskoy oblast. At first, on the fifth of December 2005 there emerged a set of some Moslem figure opinions on the site of V.-Ali Polosin that demanded to remove the Christian symbolism from the Emblem of Russia. Nobody knew why the supreme mufti, N. Ashirov, the Karelian mufti, V. Bardvil and the leader of the Spiritual Administration of the Moslem machinery of Nizhegorogskoy oblast, D. Mukhetdinov, noticed the crests and St. George on the emblem only in five years but their statements drew broad resonance. The discussion on the emblem changing was quickly escalated into scandal where all the leading mass media broadsided "gerbophobov". The statements of the representatives of ROC, the Judaic and the

Buddhist centers weren't stronger. The mufti R. Gainutdin was invited to the Administration of the President where he reminded about inadmissibility of such statements and he was urgently recommended to denounce the declarations made by his associates. The next day the Moscow mufti announced that "we live in the secular state and respect the state symbolism of the Russian Federation adopted by the State Duma and approved by the President of Russia", however, his associates remained at their opinion. At the end of February-beginning of March Ashirov made some strong statements with respect to the Orthodox believers, the Judaists and bureaucrats especially being up in arms against the optional teaching of "The basic principles of the Orthodox culture" at the school under the Russian embassy in Havana. "The parent decision can't run counter to the Constitution. If the parents want tomorrow for their children to learn "Mein Kampf" is will be lawful and the director of the school is to bow to their wishes? There are the state norms!", – he announced to "Interfax". As a result, the press service of the Council of Muftis apologized for the anti-Semitic declarations of the supreme mufti but Ashirov personally – for the Gospel comparison with "Mein Kampf". In March of 2008 N. Ashirov switched over to "the Jewish" theme elaborating his declarations for the theme of Israel, Zionism and the Jews as such. The Jew response for these declarations was quite predictable having again demanded the explanations from the Council of Muftis. But now the Federation of the Jewish communities announced about freezing in relation with the Council not having got the intelligible reply. The leader of Council of Muftis, R. Gainuddin kept giving no response at first being put into the very awkward spot by his associates. Really, he could not denounce anti-Zionist Ashirov's declarations –it would mean a political self-killing both in the Arabian world and among the majority of Council of Mufti followers. But the support for his straightforward co-chairman

promised him a deep displeasure of the authorities and automatic withdrawal from the inter-religious dialogue. So, the Moscow mufti has been kept silence for a long time but cliché repeated on his site that “official position of Russia Council of Muftis is developed and adopted jointly and voiced by the Chief of Russia Council of Muftis or authorized persons” but the journalists and other provokers where the bishop Egor’evsky Mark, the deputy chairman of the Department of foreign ecclesiastical relations of Moscow Patriarchy was named are responsible for this conflict.

The public Chamber tried to reconcile a developing dispute, however, the representatives of Council of muftis didn’t come to the meeting so the members of the commission on the international relations and freedom had anti-asharovskoe petition. Nevertheless, one managed to reconcile the parties in a high spot of the conflict – the chief rabbi of Russia Berl Lazar and the mufti R. Gainutdin met each other through intermediary of some dignitaries and had a joint petition where nobody was condemned. Gainutdin promised Berl Lazar to take Ashirov out from the co-chairmen of Council of Muftis at least if not to get rid of him.

It seemed that the leader of Council of Muftis managed to save face, however, Visam Bardvil being the member of Council of Muftis of Kareliya had a special opinion in this respect. After a long-awaited conciliation he actively supported its associate Ashirov attacked “criminal Zionism” with renewed vigor. The indignant Jews requested the official response of Council of Muftis again where one traditionally answered about “persons having the right to express the official position of the Council”; V. Bardvil wasn’t condemned, however, it was promised not to allow such statements. This promise lasted exactly 24 hours – till that moment when N. Ashirov has dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s having announced that FJCR carried out provocations

against the Moslems and deluded R. Gainuddin whereas the overwhelming majority of Russia Moslems sincerely don't like the Zionists. "I am sure that he (the Moscow mufti) will never condemn those people that condemn the Zionism crimes", – Ashirov announced to "Interfax". As a result FJCR officially broke off the relations with Russia Council of Muftis which was mentioned by the chief rabbi Berl Lazar in January of 2009. "We suppose that there are the radical forces in Russia Council of Muftis but unfortunately the situation isn't under Mr. Gainutdin's control. He assured us that he doesn't agree with the mufti Asirov; we heard it many times. So, we have practically no relations with Council of Muftis. When we receive their invitations we don't accept them. I communicate with Mr. Gainutdin as with one of the muftis", – he announced to the newspaper "Izvestiya".

In September of 2005 the leader of Spiritual Governance for Moslems of Nizhegorodskoy oblast Umar Idrisov said in his speech devoted to the tragic events in Beslan:" In October 1552 the Russian army being addressed by the words of encouragement by the clergy was permitted to slaughter all the Tatars of man sex in Kazan, everybody being higher than the wheel rim" ipso facto practically equated the Orthodox clergy to the spiritual leaders of terrorists-filicides. In autumn of 2005 there appeared the materials in the site of Nizhegorodskogo Islamic High Council sharply criticizing the celebration of the National unity day accusing ROC of its improper lobbying, informed about the anti-Islamic collusion of the Moscow Patriarchy with power and appealed the Moslems to influence on the election of the next Holy Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia. As a result in December of 2005 Nizhegorodskaya hierarchy made the following declaration:" Lately some representatives of Spiritual Governance for the Moslems of Nizhegorodskoy oblast made declarations destabilizing the existing inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations in the region. So,

Nizhegorodskaya hierarchy of ROC states that Nizhegorodskaya oblast was always characterized with tolerance, inter-religious peace and mutual respect for the traditional religious communities of our country. Such irresponsible actions of the representatives of Spiritual Governance for Moslems of Nizhegorodskoy oblast are provocative and are aimed at fomentation of international and inter-religious antagonism. Nizhegorodskaya hierarchy is seriously worried about the above-mentioned and appeals everybody to confront to the attempts having become more frequent to loosen the stable political and religious situation in the region” and after that it broke all the relations with Spiritual Governance for Moslems of Nizhegorodskoy oblast.

This official rupture of the relations between the Orthodox believers and the Moslems happened for the first time in the modern history of Russia. The inter-religious dialogue culture is quickly dropping as it was informed by the Inter-religious council of Russia with the concern in spring of 2008. The bitter moments in the Orthodox-Moslem relations in Russia will be only more with the lapse of time so one of the Moslem diplomacy tasks in this field will be new forms of dialogue developing and elimination of outright Christianophobov from the participation there.

“Natsional’nye interesy”, M., 2011, N 1, p. 36–39.

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**CONFLICT POTENTIAL OF THE MODERN
DIASPORAS IN THE RECEIVING SOCIETIES
(by the example of Rostovskoy oblasti)**

One had to begin speaking about “the world diasporization” as one of the scenarios for the mankind development because of rapid

increase of immigrant communities and their institutionalization. Diasporas seriously influence on the receiving countries. They change their demographic structure, ethnic and confessional composition. As for determining a term “diaspora” the situation in the scientific world is complex. We imagine diaspora as the part of ethnos dispersed over the territories occupied by the other ethnic communities; the activity of this part is to preserve and recreate its ethno-cultural make-up and to consolidate its members according on the ethnic basis. The diaspora is mainly characterized with “historical homeland” presence; maintaining the collective memory about geographic location, history, cultural achievements; establishing economic ties with a new place; natural reproduction of a group quantity at the given territory.

Trans-nationality is one more important feature of diasporas. Diaspora transformation (“trans-national communities”, according to V.A. Tishkov is the result of spatial relocation changing, the new carriers and communicative possibilities and new types of activity. Some member relocation to a new territory for living is organized and supported owing to a communicative space of ethnos. The cultural and confessional distinctions from the receiving society promote to diaspora unity. These distinctions, on one hand, bring to a greater alienation with respect to indigenous population but on the other hand, stimulate the initiation of ties with compatriots, its culture renewal and diaspora structure strengthening as a whole. However, diasporas aren’t similar and not all their members are equally ethnocentric. Here two obvious situations are possible depending on diaspora culture’ and diaspora’ stability to assimilation or acculturation: the integration in the receiving society is planned when there is a low stability but a cultural conflict is planned being to our mind the basic in this situation with respect to possible ethno-political conflicts when there is a high stability. The second variant is typical for those groups preferring to settle compactly.

They establish original enclaves where one lives not only according to their own cultural norms but they try to put the laws of the origin country into effect what is more serious and dangerous; “trans-nationalization of the place” is happening. It concerns such communities as Chinese, Turkish, Arabian and some others. Just such Diasporas carry the most conflict potential. The people can live isolated in these enclaves during the years not having learned the language of the country of residence not to speak of its culture and the laws.

Russia taking into consideration a permanent growth of migration flow density and a numerical growth of Diasporas isn't exclusion here. Diasporas became the most important factor of social, cultural, political and economical spheres of the region so it allows optimizing a management in the sphere of inter-cultural and also ethno-social relations when studying them. However, the role and the place of diaspora communities in the social life of the Russian regions are specific. Especially, the Northern-Caucasus region is distinguished by. The modern ethno-cultural ethno-confessional map forming in Rostovskoy oblast took place in two stages.

The first stage: a great number of the representatives of the Caucasus people began coming to Rostovskaya oblast approximately from the middle of 60-ss of XX century. They settled mainly in the south-eastern and then in the eastern areas of the oblast. The majority of the newly arrived were the Chechens returning little by little from the Central Asia after the Stalin deportation (the main kind of activity is agriculture and sheep breeding). In 1970 the Chechen quantity doesn't exceed 2527 but by 1979 there were 9183 people. By 1989 the majority of the Chechen diasporas live in Dubovskom (more than 2 thousand); in Zavetinskom (about 4 thousand); in Zimovnikovskom (more than 2 thousand), in Proletarskom (more than 1 thousand) and Remontnenskom (more than 2 thousand) areas.

Except the Chechens in Rostovskoy oblast one notes a proliferation of the representatives of the Dagestani people – the Dargins, the Avars, the Lezghins, the Kumuks, the Tabasarans and also the immigrants from the South Caucasus – the Azerbaijanians. The Caucasus diaspora expansion was mainly caused by a seasonal work system – the exit of manhood being capable for working from the North-Caucasian and trans-Caucasian in more economically developed regions of the USSR including Rostovskaya oblast.

The last wave of the Moslem population migration to the Don was associated with the USSR dissolution. The main factors of migration, firstly, were the blazed up conflicts over the post-soviet area having entailed a wave of forced migrants, secondly, economic crisis. The distinctive feature of the last migration wave was that the majority of newly arrived were expatriates from the Caucasus and the Middle Asia. According to census figures of 2002 the number of ethnos representatives traditionally professing Islam was about 110 thousands of people in Rostovskoy oblast (approximately 2.5% of the population).

So, two independent types of diasporas were formed at the territory of Rostovskoy oblast being notable for a completeness of a social adaptation process: traditional and new. The traditional diasporas of the oblast (the Armenian, the Greek, the German) are characterized with a long-term tradition of residence in the region. It determines on settlement specificity, settlement type, employment trend, a high degree of socio-cultural adaptation and feebly marked proneness to conflict and a domination of a cultural orientation the organization activity.

The second stage (the new diaspora communities) – were formed in Rostovskoy oblast during the post-soviet period. The key conditions for diaspora forming were both stress (the Chechens, the Meskhetian Turks) and economic (the Dargins, the Avars and etc.) reasons. The migration wasn't under control. The representatives of the young

diasporas live in the countryside in overwhelming majority; Their residence is very compact in the limited number of the region. The new diasporas are characterized with a relatively high level of migration and natural increase so the youth rate is very high there. This type is specialized in the concrete kind of activity, in particular, sheep breeding. The new diaspora adaptation depends on culture of the local society being also explained by cultural-religious differences.

Ethno-confessional balance change in Rostovskoy oblast was followed by the conflict situations, for example, the conflicts with a participation of the representatives of the ethnic Moslems: the Meskhetian Turks, the Chechen and the representatives of the Dagestani people (in Bagaevskom, Remontnenskom, Sal'skom regions). The representatives of the Cossack movement of the Don took part in all these conflicts. However, the most of the interethnic conflicts were mainly either economic or criminal but there was no religious confrontation. On the other hand one can not but admits the ethno-cultural basis of such conflicts as the similar situations draw a very wide response in the society of the native population trying to separate the participants of the conflict just on the basis of ethno-culture but not of a personal economic success or belonging to the criminal communities.

The conflict trends in Rostovskoy oblast urge the representatives of ethno-organizations on cooperation with the representatives of the native population. The Cossacks as one of the agents is of the special importance to govern the given conflicts. Some endorsed agreements on peaceful coexistence between the Cossacks and the representatives of diasporas are evidence of it. One tries to understand the necessity of good-neighborly relations; the spiritual adviser forces are united with to control emerging contradictions: religious-cultural communication becomes one of the leading on the way to agreement.

We suppose that not socio-economic (unemployment, living conditions, ethnic crimes) but socio-cultural and cultural-psychological factors (cultural distance, negative ethnic stereotypes) determine the conflictogenity of the new diasporas. So, it's supposed to initiate a policy to change a strategy of the new diaspora communities with respect to socio-cultural norms of the majority and also to prepare the local population for a positive understanding of the other cultural groups and possible conflicts with them in order to prevent cultural conflicts between diasporas and the receiving population. From this point of view the diasporas are recommended to adopt a strategy of a cultural adaptation creating conditions for conflict eliminating in the sphere of the cultural and interpersonal communications.

We think that logic of consensus ethno-cultural paradigm is a methodological background where diasporas are considered to be not only as conflictogenic but also as a positive resource in the poly-ethnic societies. The ethnicity as a factor of everyday reflection determining a scope of engagement both at interpersonal and inter-group levels is positive under the given approach. The use of a constructive resource of the national-cultural autonomy institute is of great importance. It's also necessary to combine the national-cultural activity with the activity on integration, inclusion in the institutions of the civil society, coordination of diasporas public association activity from the party of state power. The goal of the above-mentioned administrative strategies is a prevention of ethno-political conflict personality in the receiving society.

Sovremennoe razvitie regionov Rossii: politico-transformatsionnye I kurturnye aspekty”,
Ufa, 2010, p. 228–232.

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**FORMATION OF POLITICAL PLURALISM
IN KABARDINO-BALKARIA IN THE END
OF THE XX CENTURY**

Today, the contemporary stage of Russian history may be appraised as the most dynamic period of its development. Starting from the middle of the 1980s, side by side with radical changes in the political and state structure, the deep changes in political consciousness take place, the process of its radicalization and mastering of liberal-democratic values goes on. The political parties and public-political movements represent an efficient means of political activities. The peculiar party system in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic is characterized by correlation of two known polar configuration inherent in Russia as a whole (conservatives – radicals) and in national republics (ethnos – ethnos) and by their transformation into the four-polar system. Its composition is as follows: Communist organizations, democratic, ethnic-national and common-civil movements. At the same time, the first three of them lost their popularity, while the last one gained in its influence.

It is possible to distinguish some key moments in the gradual development of the political situation in the republic. In the beginning, for the period from 1985 to 1989, the spontaneous growth of political pluralism was going on outside the CPSU, and later it continued also within its framework. The period from 1990 to 1991 was marked by differentiation of the political structure, by emergence of embryos of new parties and proto-party structures. Following the events in August

1991, the passage was started to the actual multi-polar system with extreme political polarization.

The peculiar orientation of the main political forces was gradually crystallized. The main criterion of their determination may be their attitude to such basic priority as the rights of the person and the society. The priority of individual rights is the principal value of the two out of four political forces in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic. It was advanced and in consecutive order defended primarily by public civil movements, which were characterized by the non-traditional multi-national composition and orientation to the inter-ethnic peace and consent as well as the unity with democratic movement. The civil movements were represented by the Kabardino-Balkarian branch of the Party of Russian Unity and Consent and by the Kabardino-Balkarian regional branch of the all-Russian public movement “Honor and Motherland”. The democratic movement was close to the common civil movements in terms of their basis values. It included both the branches of the Russian and republican parties and movements, including the public-political movement “Russia, Forward!”, the Kabardino-Balkarian organization of the Republican Party of the RF, the Movement for Preservation of Unity of the KBR.

The ethnic-national movements in the KBR were represented by such organizations, as public organization “Adyge Hase”, the Congress of the Kabardin People, the public organization “Tere”, the National Council of the Balkarian People, the Adyg People Party, the public-political movement “Kabarda”, as well as the public-political movement “The Russian-Speaking Congress, “Slavs” etc. They were characterized by the common feature – the refusal to recognize the priority of human rights for the benefit of “the sovereignty of nation”. They came forward to advance the priority of ethnic common features in all spheres of public life, including political activities.

The Communist movement consisted from the Communist Party of the KBR and the Communist Union of the Youth of the KBR. Their members regarded the personal rights as the secondary rights comparing with the interests of the class (social stratum). They counted both on the traditional working class and the lumpen-proletariat, the stratum, which was growing jointly with the structural reforms. The public associations included trade unions, unions of creative workers, associations based on the interests of their members (hunters, dog-breeders and bibliophiles), sports unions and others.

And special attention should be paid to the national-cultural associations. By the end of the 1990s, over a dozen of such associations existed in the republic: the association of Koreans “Chinsen”, the Greek community “Ellada”, the union of Germans of the city of Nalchik “Vidergeburt”, the republican society of Meshs (Georgians Muslims) “Salvation”, the Jewish public-cultural center “Tovushi”, the Ossetian cultural center “Nikhas” and others. In spite of a short period of their existence, these organizations did a lot for consolidation of the international peace and consent in the republic.

It should be taken into account that the group of public-political associations included the entities, which proclaimed their existence and stopped at this point (for instance, the public organization “Caucasus-Crimea”). Many associations were composed of a small number of members, including sometimes only a few persons (for instance, the Greek society “Ellada” and the Ossetian cultural center “Nikhas”). Some organizations existed nominally and did not carry out any political activities. At the same time, some organizations were not political entities according to their statutes and aims of activities, but nevertheless actively participated in political life (the cultural-national organizations).

It may be asserted that for the end of the XX century the republic experienced the stage of the multi-party system's formation. The party represented a rather significant and influential political force, which was able to ensure election of its candidates in the parliament and to uphold via them its drafts and decisions. By the end of the XX century, such parties were in the process of formation in Kabardino-Balkaria, and they were marked by a strong orientation to the leaders and a rather weak social basis. But one should be interested in creation in the republic of the efficient multi-party system with actually functioning political parties.

Fundamentalnye problemy prostranstvennogo razvitiya Yuga Rossii: Mezhdistsiplinarny sintez", R-na-D, 2010, p. 79–81.

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THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN THE REPUBLICS OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY

The national structure of the population is one of the most significant characteristics of any society, since it determines many features of its public-political, economic and social-cultural life, particularly of the poly-ethnic-cultural societies, and most republics in the North Caucasus are exactly such societies. And it is just owing to this fact it is necessary not only to fix the existing ethnic-demographic situation in each of them, but also to study its possible dynamics for the foreseen perspective.

For the last 30–40 years, the processes going on in this sphere show the original “problematic” feature of the project relating to ethnic-cultural integration of the North Caucasus into Great Russia through the

process of the Russian (and wider – Russian speaking) population striking root in it. From the beginning of the 1970s, its number in the macro-region started to reduce. Taking into account the positive index of natural reproduction of the Russian population at that time, the question is the migration outflow. It started in Dagestan. For the 1960s, up to 25 thousand Russians left the republic. For the 1970s, the emigration started to increase in Checheno-Ingushetia. Several thousand Russians left North Ossetia and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. As a whole, the outflow of the Russian population from the republics of the North Caucasus accounted for 90-100 thousand people for the 1970s and surpassed 110 thousand people for the last decade.

For the 1990s, the emigration of Russians acquired the unforeseen scales, becoming a rapid “evacuation” or even a flight. It is difficult to interpret otherwise the events in Chechnya and Ingushetia for the 1991–1993, when about 200 thousand people (mainly Russians) left the republics. According to the population census, about 25 thousand Russians lived in Ingushetia, and three years later (September 1992) only 10 thousand Russians lived in the Ingushi Republic. And the greater outflow of Russians and Russian speaking population characterized the situation in Chechnya.

The population census in 2002 confirmed the outcome of the “de-Russification” of both republics – about 20 thousand Russians in Chechnya (without federal servicemen) and 5–6 thousand – in Ingushetia. Many of them are old people, who are not able to change their place of residence. It is hardly probable that after hardships of two military campaigns they will change the place of their residence in the present relatively stable situation. Despite limited migration losses, the age structure of the Russian republican Diaspora promotes their constant reduction.

Dagestan is the third republic of the North Caucasus, where the ethnic-demographic processes objectively lead to complete de-Russification of the population. Both the natural reduction and the intensive emigration of Russians play their role in this process. The role of the latter factor was the most decisive for the post-Soviet period. The reduction of the Russian population in Dagestan for the period from 1989 to 2002 accounted for 45 thousand people: only 10 thousand people – the natural reduction, while 35 thousand people – the migration outflow.

For the period from 1995 to 1999 the migration attained its maximum: annually 4–6 thousand people left Dagestan. The liquidation in 1999–2000 of the separatist regime in Chechnya makes it possible to improve the situation in adjacent republics. The outflow of Russians from Dagestan is being reduced. For the first years of the XXI century it was marked by reduction 1.5–2 thousand people, but for the 2003–2005 it was characterized by 1.2–1.5 thousand emigrants. But still for the last years the size of migration exceeds the natural losses of the local Russian population. For the period from 2002 to 2007, the number of Russians in the republic reduced by 8–9 thousand people and accounted for 110 thousand people (105 thousand people excluding federal servicemen) by the year of 2008. Given limited scales of Russian ethnic presence in the republic, the specter of its actual evolution is very limited. Even, if the local power succeeds completely to stop migration of Russians (which is hardly probable), their share will reduce up to 3% by 2030. The share of Russians may reduce to 2–2.5%, if the present tempo of their emigration remains. This narrow diapason (2–3%) represents the common corridor of “chances” of the Russian Diaspora for the next two decades.

For the period from 1989 to 2002, the Russian population in Kabardino-Balkaria reduced from 240.8 thousand to 226.6 thousand

people. The total loss accounted for 14 thousand people, including 12 thousand people due to natural losses and only 2 thousand people as a result of migration outflow (in average, 150 persons annually), according to A. Dzadziyev. However, he mentioned the other number – 0.8 thousand annual emigrants in another source. But in the beginning of the XXI century the scales of emigration reduced and the lower number of Russians was related to the natural losses. For the last years the annual natural losses of the republican Russian population reduced to 2–3% from 0.4–0.5% for the period from the middle of the 1990s to 2004–2005. However, the method of taking into account different ages testifies to a greater probability of the more rapid diminishing of the number of Russians for the next 10–20 years. It is connected with the age structure: the average age of local Russian exceeded 38 years (higher than the average index in Russia). In 2009, the total number of Russians in the republic may be accounted for 214–218 thousand people, according to the expert estimation. Actually, given any dynamic scenario, Russians will keep the second place in size after Kabardins as a significant ethnic cultural component. However, the dominant share of the youth in the emigration flow leads to the gradual aging of the remained Russian population. Since a certain moment the rapid significant reduction of the number of the Russian population will take place.

For almost half of century (1950s–1980s) Russians constituted the most numerous ethnic group in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. As far back as 2002, they made more than one third of the population of republic's residents (by this index the republic was exceeded in the North Caucasus only by Adygeya). At the same time, the outflow of Russians from the republic was rather significant for the post-Soviet period. From 1989 to 2002, about 18 thousand people left the republic (the annual loss accounted for 1.5 thousand people). At present,

Karachaevo-Cherkessia surpasses other republics of the North Caucasus in terms of emigration outflow. Only the great concentration of the Russian population in the republic puts off the time of its “deep” de-Russification (comparable with the scenario in Dagestan) later to the next decades.

However, this prolonged time distance provides for probable essential changes of migration activities connected with a complex of factors, including ethnic-political and social-economic situation in the republic, the level of inter-national tension etc. The diapason of probable scenarios of numerical dynamics of the Russian population includes both rather pessimistic variants (a sustainable and rather significant reduction due to natural and mechanical losses) and more optimistic scenarios (for the next 10–20 years, reduction of the outflow of Russians, given a higher birth rate).

For the 1900s, the North Ossetia – Alania is characterized by a moderate (by estimates in the North Caucasus) migration of Russians: the annual outflow from 1989 to 1998 – at the level of 0.8–1.0 thousand people, which reduced to 0.7–0.8 for the period in 1999–2002. In total, the reduction of the Russian population was equally caused by the natural losses and the emigration. The limited outflow of the Russian population (and wider – non-title) from the republic remained in the period from 2003 to 2007. For this period of five years about 6.3 thousand people (mainly Russians) left North Ossetia. In other words, at present, the republic’s annual loss accounts for several hundred Russian residents. This process is rather sustainable, A. Dzadziyev thinks. Thus, for the period from 2002 to 2009 the number of Russians might be reduced from 165 thousand to 153–155 thousand people. In any case, their ethnic presence in the republic remains rather great.

Adygeya is the only republic in the North Caucasus, where Russians represent the leading ethnic group. It is significant that as far back as for the 1990s characterized by the upsurge of local nationalism Adygeya remained an attractive place for Russian migration. On the other hand, the experiments of the republican authorities aimed at the return to historic Motherland of descendants of mukhadgirs of the XIX century led to limited results (several hundred re-emigrants). The territorial place of the republic within the borders of Krasnodar krai (the center of migrants' attraction) supposes preservation of the flow of migrants from other regions of the RF in Adygeya. This inflow to a big extent of probability compensates the natural loss of the local Russian population, which may even increase its size comparing with the level of the beginning of the XXI century and keep the Russian population as a leading ethnic group for the longest perspective.

*“Fundamentalnye problemy prostranstvennogo razvitiya
Yuga Rossii: Mezhdistsiplinarny sintez”,
R-na-D, 2010, p. 244–302.*

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AZERBAIJAN:

THE CORK IN THE CASPIAN BOTTLE

The Caucasus is the place of meeting of Europe with the Eastern and Western Asia. The inscription in Latin left by Roman centurions demonstrate that Azerbaijan was located on the European border since the I century of our era, but later the Romans came back and declared that human being was unable to live under hellish conditions of Gobustan hills. You have to pass agreeable looking forests in the southern part of the Caucasus near the Georgian border and still more

one hundred and fifty km through the territory burnt out by sun to reach the capital of Azerbaijan – Baku, which means “windows of the sun”. Azerbaijan, located between the Russian Caucasus and the Talysh mountains of Iran, is the last ingredient in the strategic model for transformation of Europe into the alliance based on common values and not only on common culture. Europe will perform its mission on the geographic map only in case, when it will be able to accept in its society of the people with Asian sole.

As a new border of the West, Azerbaijan still does not want to belong to it. The middle-aged mosques, the clumsy tenement-houses of the Soviet époque, the tall glass office houses are the symbols of amalgamation of the East and the West, of the past and the present, which may be seen in Baku. In the old days, caravans with silk and species past there, uniting Turkic, Arabic, Indian and Chinese worlds via Baku, Tebriz, Samarkand and Kabul. The Talysh mountain resembling temples recall the image of Kashmir. An Azerbaijani historian compared Azerbaijan with a bird, which needs the wings of the West and the East in order to fly. The green color of the Azerbaijani national flag means Islam and the red color means freedom, the blue color – belonging to the Turkic tribes. In 1918, Azerbaijan became the first Muslim democratic state, which provided for women the right to participate in elections. Although 8 million citizens of the country are mainly Muslim Shiites, Turkic nationalism and also Soviet atheism – attached the secular status to the country. The majority of schoolchildren consist of girls, and the statute of the Soviet epoch – the woman taking off the yashmak remains in the center of Baku; this statute is placed before the office of the Iranian national bank.

However, women in Baku carry mini-skirts, in nearby city of Nardaran – more often Muslim kerchiefs, while Arabic inscriptions are written on many walls. Like in Turkey, Islam comes back in

Azerbaijan. The process started as a result of overthrow of the Soviet regime, the presence of Chechen refugees, as well as the financial support given by Iran to construction of mosques and propaganda by mass media in the poor southern districts near the Iranian border. These are all signs of development. In order to withstand radical Islamism it is necessary, like in Turkey, to teach genuine Islam at school under the state control. Otherwise, many young poor unemployed people will first get acquainted with Islam in radical mosques in the waygoing on in Arabic countries, thinks a postgraduate in Baku.

Z. Brzezinski named Azerbaijan as “the cork in the Caspian bottle”. The oil and gas deposits are the symbol of these places since ancient times. As far back as in the V century before Christ the fire-worshippers constructed temples on the shore of the Caspian Sea. For the beginning of the XX century Baku became the biggest producer and exporter of oil, and Russia in those times interfered in the affairs of Nobel and Rotschids. For the Soviet times, it kept under its control the oil in Azerbaijan, which produced in the period from 1920 to 1935 more than 70% of the whole Soviet production; soon after proclamation by Azerbaijan of its independence Russia jointly with Armenia tried to overthrow nationalist leader A. Elchibey. The positive result of the Soviet regime is as follows: existence of the balneology resorts providing medical treatment and heal by means of Naftalan oil.

Azerbaijan is one of the few places in the world, where pollution may become a place for sightseeing. Baku is located on a small peninsula in the Caspian Sea and is full of rotten pipes. The authorities try to minimize the oil leaks and organize for tourists the sightseeing helicopters’ flights over the abandoned oil drills on the shelf of the Caspian Sea. Nearby, there is Bibi Kheibat mosque, which is the sole mosque constructed by the government. Its special meaning relates to the fact that after its demolition in Stalin time the extraction of oil in the

republic was reduced. The monument to Marx in Baku has been replaced by a petrol filling station possessed by Azpetrol.

Some Azerbaijanis have a dream to transform their country in Caucasian Kuwait. Azerbaijan as a source of increasing oil shipments to Europe has become the richest country of the Trans-Caucasus. The six stars Excelsior Hotel commissioned by the customs minister might call this building “Bourge-Baku” which resembles the high-scraper in Dubai. The descendants of the oil barons, who built the center of Baku in the XIX century, came back and build houses in the suburbs of the city.

Unfortunately, Azerbaijan possesses hydrocarbons but lacks wisdom. The question is, will the country accumulate it before the oil disappears for the period of some decades. Azerbaijan functions under political conditions created for one person – G. Aliyev. He was an extraordinary leader in a small country, who not simply expressed the national character but eclipsed it. After G. Aliyev’s death the procedure of power inheritance to his son Ilkham was arranged by quasi-elections, which proved the evident outcome. If you want to know the name of the victor after elections in 2003, you should primarily find out who calculates the votes, said a representative of the opposition, which seeks for support in the country and abroad. Ilkham is the symbol of flourishing and development, and taken together it means the stability of the state. But this is glossing over the truth. The reactionary old guard keeps a lot of power, since it possesses governance experience lacked by the young leaders. The airport in Baku has the code, which resembles the name of father Aliyev – “GYD”. Azerbaijan remains his country to a large extent even after his death.

Corruption is a moral equivalent of war, it renders lifeless Azerbaijan, an Azerbaijani employer said to the author, having returned to the USA from Baku. He repeated the meaning of many

representatives of the Azerbaijani Diaspora. Most of 30 richest Azerbaijanis occupy the posts of ministers or are members of the parliament (called Majlis like in Iran). They compete only in the size of the bribe for getting the state post, in the number of built villas, in the size of the mansion in London. The Aliyev dynasty applies the compromises with due account of the existing situation. The caviar trade is officially forbidden to protect de-population of sturgeons; however, Aliyev's friends use smuggled caviar as a source for enrichment.

The open clanship is the natural feature of life in the Arabic-Turkic-Eastern world, and double standard is the norm of life. Corruption is incorporated in national culture, which is the origin of its deep root. The families in multinational society of Baku bribe officials to ensure entry of their children to prestigious schools, and the latter bribe professors to get good marks to avoid hard studies.

The probable choice of the government of Azerbaijan for governance of incomes received by selling energy resources is as follows: either their re-distribution for the sake of development like in Norway, or being stricken by "resource curse" like Nigeria will keep a petrol-state of Russian type, where oil and bank sectors are closely connected and the market deforming amalgamation of the government and the oligarchy results in their enrichment at the expense of high oil prices and currency exchange rates. The state oil company of Azerbaijan hindered arrangement of audit of its financial accounts. It blocked the proposal to place abroad the state fund for financing infrastructure and social expenses in order to ensure transparency of operation.

In Azerbaijan only some efforts were exerted to develop industries except oil extraction; and many districts of the country lack regular electricity supply. One million of citizens are the forced

migrants, who left Nagorny Karabakh in the course of the conflict; they are settled in over-populated community apartments and in university hostels, but the government ignores them.

In Azerbaijan oil does not correlate with democracy exactly due to the limits of the oil resources, while profits are gained only thanks to the high oil prices. I. Aliyev dismissed some ministers, members of the old guard for financial support given to the opposition and for the suspected participation in the failed plot against him; others were arrested for the alleged failure to pay taxes. Ilkham preferred the control over the state budget to the detriment of democratization. Only the regimes sick with paranoia raise the number of OMON servicemen which exceeds the number of people, who take part in protests. Sometimes Ilkham allows meetings, the other times he suppresses them with forceful measures, demonstrating his play with public opinion.

The corruption, existing in Azerbaijan, is a burden both for Azerbaijan and the West. Finally, we see the same regime, which was promoted by Russia and Iran exactly due to the benefits they get in this way. Having pushed a Turkish company aside out of the contract on the national electricity network, the authorities of Azerbaijan opened widely the door for Russia and rendered assistance to installation of its full monopoly over the system of electric energy supply in the South Caucasus. Due to weak diversification of economy, the second big source of incomes for Azerbaijan consists out of currency remittances of two million Azerbaijanis living in Russia. The criminal groups engaged in narcotics smuggling on the Russian and Iranian borders possess political connections. As a result, Russia as usual keeps significant means to have influence on the foreign policy of Azerbaijan, while Iran has an impact on Shiites living in the country. NATO advances the idea of the military base location to keep under control the Caspian Basin and Iran, while Russia proposed the USA to take on

lease the radiolocation station in Gabala. As a politician in Azerbaijan said, this country is not in need of American assistance, since it would only aggravate its difficulties. The sympathies of Azerbaijan are as volatile as its alphabet, which was changed several times among Arabic, Cyrillic and Latin letters.

In 1959, American representative in United Nations H.C. Lodge put the question: the USA may get the upper hand in war, but will it be able to suppress revolutions? In 2005, I. Aliyev expressed his negative attention to the parliamentary elections and pointed out that they would not have any impact on the course of the government. Although the elections did not correspond to the OSCE standards, the USA approved the results. However, it would be better, if the USA and the European Union promote emergence in Azerbaijan of a more influential opposition and render assistance to the parliamentarians-reformers. The countries of Eastern Europe, members of the Second World group, carry out their activities in Azerbaijan and cherish hopes that the government of the country, the naughty child, will pay greater attention to the friends than to the external forces, which perform the role of tutors. Irrespective of the way of coming changes – as a result of coup d’etat, people’s dissatisfaction or military invasion, the formation of true democracy will occur only in case, when the people will be able to exert pressure on their entrenched rules and to make the power system be an open society. If it takes place, the need will disappear to arrange another “water melon” or “caviar” revolution and the country will enter the way of creating the western political system.

“Any name suits us, but not “former USSR!”– a young official of the foreign ministry told the author. A few citizens of Azerbaijan know what the European Union is, but they do not want to be outside its framework, since they are convinced that the EU is more preferable than the CIS, which is dominated by Russia. Actually Azerbaijan has

become a part of Europe. It depends on European investments directed to development of non-energy economic sectors – wine-making, citrus plants and cotton growing. At the same time, many thousand workers of the energy sector of Europe – from installers in oil extraction sea platforms to top managers – depend on creation of highly paid jobs in Baku, the starting point of pipelines laid along the southern shelf of the Caspian Sea being the ancient trade routes. The Caucasus may become the distant and disputed point of the eastern part of the West and may become the boundary, which will determine most of all the future of Europe as a self-sufficient superpower.

Summing up the above said, the following conclusion should be made: Europe should strain itself. “The All-European Home” grows much more rapidly than historian A. Tailor predicted and transforms itself into a multi-level community uniting its members and partners and companions with determined for them various rights, obligations and subsidies. Former history marked by disputes did not inspire optimism concerning the future of Europe, but already today it flourishes and possesses the might of the superpower. At the same time, Europe demonstrates the growing aspiration for transforming all countries within its orbit, and it succeeds in it better than any other superpower. Within the framework of Europe, the Kurds enjoy protection from Turks, the Bosnians and Kosovars – from Serbians, the Ukrainians and the Georgians – from Russians. At the same time, by means of the set of institutional approaches the European Union succeeds to promote their fruitful cooperation. The Union applies the strict criteria of membership and does not reckon on mastering by any one “the European feature” without exerting any efforts, although its attributes may be easily acquired, particularly under the aegis of its new companions.

As European leaders extend the collective Empire in the space from the Atlantic Ocean to the Caspian Sea they hear the Mephistophelean warning pronounced by permanent pilgrim Mendosa in J.B. Shaw play on man and superman about two probable tragedies in human life: when the cherished wish is not fulfilled and when it is fulfilled. If the intellectual stagnation demolishes the consent of more than twenty capitals about substance and aim of the European project and the optimistic ambition will be replaced by the fear of the perspective of determination of borders near some most unstable regions, the Europeans will lose their strategic appetite just in time of their greatest success. At present, a lot of cooks scurry about in Brussels kitchen, and it is not clear whose recipe will overcome.

The expenses of the lost extension surpass a lot the price to be paid for continuation of the present course; thus, the European imperial expansion illustrates Newton law of inertia: the moving object continues to move. The natural conclusion is as follows: Europe should be afraid of peace, which is able to engender a trend to self-complacency and to provoke an external threat. The logic of imperial super-tension of forces in this case turns up down, since the refusal from extension represents the actual agreement with a long-term stagnation. If the European Union ceases to continue its extension, four autonomous forces kept under control by London, Brussels, Ankara and Moscow will appear in the western zone of Eurasia; but four wheels do not turn around with the same speed. At the same time, outside the framework of the collective West these four forces as well as the USA will confront greater challenges in the region located far away of the western borders of Europe, exactly in the Central Asia.

“Vtoroy mir”, M., 2010, p. 9–98.

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**THE RESOURCE FACTOR
OF NATIONALISM IN KAZAKHSTAN**

For many reasons Kazakhstan was formed as a multi-national and poly-ethnic state: the policy of resettlement carried out by Russian czarism for the second half of the XIX century, which was continued further in the period of Stolypin reforms, deportation of Koreans, Chechens, Ingushis, Kurds, Germans, Poles and others for the 1930s–1940s, finally, the virgin lands campaign transforming Kazakhstan into the state, consisting at present of over 130 ethnoses.

As a result of disintegration of the USSR many states in the post-Soviet space confronted the migration problem of their citizens, who formerly lived within these states. It concerned primarily the Russian speaking population (Russians, Ukrainians and Germans). It is necessary to consider this process in a quiet way. Naturally, many peoples of the former USSR wish to live within their national states, and it is impossible to stop this process. At the same time, any person as a citizen of one state has the right to identify himself and connect the future of his children with another country, all the more, if it is his historic Motherland. One should accept this fact as an objective phenomenon in the post-Soviet ethnic-political space as a result of disintegration of the USSR and of the economic and social-cultural crisis in the republics. Therefore migration will go on no matter how we oppose it.

For the last almost twenty years after the disintegration of the USSR the indigenous population of the Central Asian states increased greatly. For instance, at present, the Kazakhs account for more than 60% of the population in Kazakhstan. Is it good or bad? On the one side it is good, certainly. Despite all collisions of the past time, when the

Kazakhs were on the brink of dying out as an ethnos, they were able to withstand and to revive. But, on the other side, this situation creates the problem for a calm life of other ethnoses, primarily for the Russian and Russian speaking people.

To the author's mind, the question is that either Russians do not see well that after the disintegration of former mighty state everything has changed or they still have the sense of imperial superiority and do not want to give up the thought. This is exactly the origin of the problem of resource nationalism as a factor and level of its impact on inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan.

What is included in the meaning of resources? In the widest sense, the resources consist of the means and the potentialities, which are applied in case of needs (spiritual, political, administrative and electoral etc.). In the case described below it is the accumulating negative resource of unrealized aspirations of the title nation, which acquires urgency against the background of unsolved problems. The representatives of various peoples live calmly and peacefully in Kazakhstan. Many families are characterized by international marriages, including Kazakhs. The question is that after the marriage with the representative of another ethnos (for instance, the Russian-Slavonic origin) the Kazakh ceases to be Kazakh. If the head of the family remains Kazakh, knowing the language of his ancestors and his culture, his children fall out from the Kazakh gene fund and are not aware of "what herd to join". But they are not regarded as elements of resource nationalism, since they have nothing to protect except themselves. At the same time, resource nationalism is the potential source of destabilization of political and inter-ethnic relations.

The most vital problems of the Kazakh nation remain unsolved. In their own country the majority of Kazakhs remain the poorest citizens of the country (except the high state officials and their

relatives). One may raise the objection to it and say that not only the Kazakhs but also others are poor. But the others may not be considered as a resource factor for the simple reason that they are a minority. They have no practical chance to solve their problems except their loyal attitude to the ruling power.

Probably, the Kazakhs represent the most patient nation in the world. But patience may come to the end, and a social explosion may follow it. Therefore the ruling power should not avoid the moment of solving the title nation's problems. The question of the state language has not been decided. Twenty years have past, but nobody intends to learn it, although many people share the opinion that it is necessary master the Kazakh language to know to speak it. The state program for functioning and development of languages is aimed at it for the period of 2011–2020.

It is a common secret that for many representatives of the Kazakh ethnos a great problem is the loss by its majority of the national language, which questions a chance for mastering by them of their culture, since the language was and rests the most significant means of culture's translation. However, side by side with the verbal language there exist also non-verbal languages. The human identity in general and ethnic identity, in particular, is reduced not only to verbal identifications and implies a multitude of practice, including corporal and behavioral actions. The person expresses his identity not so much by saying "I am a Kazakh", as by behaving in a definite way in leisure-time, in getting meals, in accommodating his apartment, in choosing his wife, in arranging his marriage etc. The non-verbal language is used to express his ethnic identity. The ethnic belonging pre-determines the incorporated in him ethnic history, the ethnic identity, his manner of behavior, the way of thinking and speaking.

The problem of Russians in Kazakhstan is closely connected with the problems of the Kazakh nation. There are three aspects in the approach to this problem: the psychological, political and social-economic aspects. The psychological aspect of this problem consists in the impact of fatal Stalin doctrine, which blocks the passage to democratic forms of cohabitation of peoples. At present, while Russians demonstrate the painful reaction and apprehension to become infringed in their rights, the Kazakhs due to the planned destruction of their spiritual and traditional culture in the past are unable up to now to start a wide use of their native language. This “mental constraint” leads to the sense of inferiority of the Kazakhs in the milieu of the Russian speaking co-citizens of the country, which is originated by the situation in Soviet time, when the lack of knowledge of the Russian language actually meant “professional non-fitness”.

The other urgent problem able “to flare up” in the inter-ethnic relations, inter alia, is the unsettled housing issue. The majority of Kazakhs do not possess their own housing. This situation creates the problem in adjacent districts near Alma-Ata: Bakaya, Shanyrak, Akbulak, where the authorities destruct houses, actually wage war against the residents, Kazakhs by nationality, who have arrived there from depressed regions of the country. This raises the lasting question: “What to do?” Those, who once visited a Kazakh aul, see the living conditions of the people, whose name was taken to call the country. Probably, therefore the contemporary “white bone” from costly apartment is against demonstration of the film “Tulip” decorated by the prize of international contests. Perhaps, the truth of the film hits the nail on the head of high officials, who occupy expensive apartments.

Some people may raise an objection and say that the Kazakhs themselves are to blame. The author agrees with it. Great poet Abai spoke about it. More than hundred years have past since his death, but

nothing has changed for the Kazakhs. The same problem of existence of the Kazakh people still is urgent.

The resource nationalism intends to develop and possesses a trend to the progress. Since the beginning of the 1990s up to the present time about 1.5 million ethnic Kazakhs returned to Kazakhstan from adjacent republics of the Central Asia and from China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran and Russia. Their problems have not been solved. The repatriates may count only on the accommodation substance, which is not sufficient even for purchase of a small land plot. The paradox picture has emerged. The ruling power has initiated the resettlement and later did not give support to the migrants, except a limited assistance rendered to the eastern and southern regions of Kazakhstan. The new settlers were abandoned by the authorities, and the amalgamation of disillusioned migrants and “resource Kazakhs” creates “an explosive mixture” out of different social-marginal elements.

Marginalization and impoverishment of the title ethnos is exactly the resource factor of destabilization of inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan. The events in Bishkek showed that, irrespective of peaceful relations between neighbors, other people may enter your house and ask to liberate it. In case of refusal, the best chance would be a flight.

The majority of Kazakhs were on the roadside of privatization, personalization of property, financial-credit resources, accumulation and capital turnover. The Kazakhs were late to apprehend their humiliated social losses as a result of market state reforms, the humiliation of their material and cultural situation in their own country. The objective conditions for the social explosion have shaped in Kazakhstan. The question is the tempo of development of subjective factors, of spontaneous and organized actions of the large groups of

people. Undoubtedly, the national and ethnic background, the associations based on defense of national interests will play the dominant role in this process.

Summing up, it should be said that the unsolved social-economic problems of the main part of the population of the country were always the reasons of inter-national and inter-confessional clashes.

“Sovremennoe razvitiye roionov Rossii: politico-transformatsionnye I kulturnye aspekty”, Ufa, 2010, p. 79–83.

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THE CHANGE OF POWER IN KIRGIZSTAN:

A NEW TURN IN GREAT GAME

The change of power and the subsequent inter-national clashes in the south of the country made experts and journalist discuss again the security problems in the Central Asia. Some of them, for instance A. Pabst in his article “A New Game in Central Asia as Kirgizstan suffers” (“the National”, 18 June 2010) recalled the New Game in the region for the XIX century-the beginning of the XX century plaid by the Russian Empire and the British Empire and try to extrapolate its principles to the present situation.

To A. Pabst mind, the events in Kirgizstan were caused by the rivalry for political hegemony in the Central Asia in the XXI century between Moscow and Beijing like in the XIX century between the two empires (Russian and British). At the same time, the West allegedly only watches this rivalry, which does not let assert that the world gradually approaches the universal model of liberal market economy. To what extent is rightful the similar historic extrapolation, all the

more, the reproach, if not the imputation in hindering public progress of two influential but not the only geopolitical subject in the region?

The temptation of the historic analogy is great, since the situations seem to be quite similar, and one wishes to explain everything by external forces. However, everything is not so simple. The events differ in substance, form and aim. First, it is not the inter-imperialist war aimed at enslavement of indigenous peoples. Second, the territories are not seized and the borders are not re-divided, like in the past. Third, not so much the re-division of the spheres of influence as the struggle for change of the development model with traditional patron-client relations for liberal market democracy goes on (which is ignored by the opponent). Actually, Russia and China occupy the most powerful positions in the region. At the same time, the economic influence of the latter is growing by great tempos. Only for the period of the world crisis in 2009–2010, the CPR made investment in economy of the region in the form of loans, credits and material assistance, which exceeds several times the corresponding investments of Russia, the USA and the EU. At present, China occupies the economic niches, which Russia did not want or was not able to keep.

However, it would be incorrect to speak only about economic interests and positions of only these two states. The countries of the region are also interested in extending their exports; and it concerns not only Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which possess big reserves of hydrocarbons, gold, uranium and other non-ferrous and rare-earth metals. Kirgizstan and Tajikistan, which lack so big reserves, also to a large extent live at the expense of development and export of small deposits of gold and silver. The export of the main resources is directed to the West.

However, the flows of the main export product – the hydrocarbons – from the region are rather peculiar. The principal

pipelines have been laid from the region to Russia and China. Beijing intends to use the Central Asian hydrocarbons for their own needs, while Moscow is mainly charged with their transit to Europe. Since Russia uses its pipelines for political games, the European consumers with the USA support try to re-direct some flows of oil and gas to the non-Russian energy routes. Let us recall many proposals to Kazakhstan to join the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and lobbying in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan of construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline with its further connection to the projected European gas pipeline Nabucco.

One should not forget that even the greatest investments in the resources extraction industries of the region were made by European and American companies. For instance, by 31.03.2010, according to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the share of American investments in the mining industry of the country made 39%, the share of the Netherlands – 26.7%, of China – 9.4%, of Russia – 1.7%. The same situation is in the gold mining industry: the main partners of Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan are American and European companies. The interests of Russian, Chinese and European actors are interwoven in construction of transportation communications.

China makes investments not only in construction of routes from the country to the Central Asia but also in modernization of transport infrastructure within the region. These investments, on the one hand, let extend the Chinese business, particularly from the bordering Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous region, in the Central Asian market, on the other hand, by means of “opening” of the closed economic space of the Central Asia to ensure security in the border Chinese territories. At present, 87 transport routes function, including 43 for passengers and 44 for cargoes shipment – with Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan. Within the framework of the Organization of Cooperation of Railways,

the International Union of Railways and UN ESCATO, the “Northern Corridor” is subject to a thorough study. It is the sole international route, where the direct tariff schedule of traffic from China to Germany and the simplified customs and border procedure are agreed among officials of the railways of Kazakhstan, China, Russia and Byelorussia. Beijing proposes for the states of the region to create the transit railway for a distance of 4 thousand km from the Chinese-Kazakhstan border through Kazakhstan and further to Turkmenistan and Iran with the European track gauge (1435 mm). China, taking into account the interest of the CA countries in the transport exits to the sea, opened province Sinkiang for cargoes transit to port Gvadar in Pakistan. The other option of the Eurasian railway transport corridor is the restoration of the so called Great Silk Route in its modern variant: from the south of Japan by means of submarine tunnel through the Korean channel and via the Republic of Korea and China to Europe.

One of the priority projects is the construction of the highway and the railway the CPR – Kirgizstan – Uzbekistan. As a result of the negotiations for thirteen years the parties succeeded to determine the strict direction of the ways. However, it is necessary not only to construct the mentioned ways and to create the land transport system but also to execute the complex of inter-state measures for the maximum possible reduction of transport expenses and transit tariffs. The optimal way of lobbying the corresponding decisions for the CPR is within the framework of ShOS. The European Union also gives active support to the development of transport infrastructure along the line East–West. The Central Asia is located far away from Europe. Two regions are connected by some modern routes, and most of them are laid through the territory of Russia. The construction of the modern transport system and diversification of its directions is a must for extension of trade and economic reciprocal actions as a whole. It is

impossible to avoid formation of favorable transit and customs conditions for functioning of this transport direction. The project TRACEKA became a model project in this respect. Over 40% of its budget is directed to implementation of investment infrastructure projects. As a whole, with participation and support of KES there were implemented 60 projects for the amount of 121 million euros.

The strategy of its development up to 2015 determined the main priorities and the most significant tasks for promotion of trade, transport and transit in the region. For this sake, the administrative border procedures are being simplified and harmonized, the basis of the integrated multi-model transport system is being shaped and the tariff policy of international shipments is being perfected. New instruments are applied for attraction of external investments in the infrastructure of TRACEKA and for consolidation of cooperation with the European Union. In particular, the following technical projects were implemented for the sake of development of the transport corridor: harmonization of border procedures, the united policy of transit customs and tariffs, general legal basis for transit shipments. Many member-states of TRACEKA adopted some new normative acts promoting rapprochement of their legislative acts with western standards in the transport-communication, trade-economic, investment and other spheres.

As it is evident, not only Russia and China carry out their activities in the Central Asia. Other national states and inter-state organizations in the CA region and in adjacent regions as well as of the outside regions realize their interests in the region itself. It means that not only two actors, as A. Pabst asserts, form and carry out their activities in the Central Asia.

The roster of the main external actors in the sphere of regional security remains unchanged: Russia, China, the USA and the EU.

However, the forces are distributed in another way. All these countries participate in settlement of the main issues of regional security – the struggle against religious extremism and terrorism as well as narcotics traffic. China, though, unlike Russia, the USA and member-states of NATO do not possess there military bases and supplementary military objects but cooperate within the framework of ShOS and at the bilateral, mainly diplomatic level.

It is high time to pose the question: are Russia and the USA the allies or the rivals in the struggle against terrorism? On the one hand, they cooperate for the sake of ensuring the anti-terrorist campaign of the USA in Afghanistan: non-military cargoes of NATO are transported via the air space of Russia. On the other hand, there exists a constant hidden counter-opposition relating to the military objects on the territory of the Central Asia. The USA regards the region primarily as a strategic base for the long-term domination there and for its military presence in Afghanistan. Washington prefers amalgamation of Afghanistan and the Central Asian states in the united region – the Great Central Asia with the aim of withdrawal the region's states from the exclusive influence of the adjacent powers – Russia and China, and for withdrawal of Afghanistan from the orbit of Pakistan and Iran. This project was originated in the Institute for Studies of the Central Asia and the Caucasus at the J. Hopkins University in Washington and became widely known after publication of the corresponding article of its director F. Starr in magazine “Foreign Affairs” in 2005. As a whole, this strategy is directed to installation and maintenance of the USA dominance in the region by means of consolidation there of the role of Pentagon and NATO. The American experts express their common opinion that for the last ten years the military component is the dominant factor in relations of the USA with the Central Asian countries and often contradicts the general policy of Washington in the

region. For instance, the ministry of defense of the USA intends to construct some military objects in Afghanistan and in the region. In particular, the USA intends to locate an operative military base near Afghan city Mazari-Sharif at the distance of 50 km from the Uzbek border. The USA intends to build the border guards' points and the training camps for creation of local security forces in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan. The location of additional bases is not so much the alternative to "Manas" base in Kirgizstan as a new American strategy based on the principle – bases located everywhere, considers A. Malashenko, an expert of Carnegie center in Moscow.

Russia also aspires for extension of its military presence in the region, primarily in Kirgizstan. However, its reciprocal actions with K. Bakiyev government did not bring positive results. And what is more, Bakiyev clan, having got political and financial support, did not fulfill a single promise or provision in the signed document. The stumbling-block in the Russian-Kirghiz negotiations on creation of a new base was the place of its location, according to some experts. Bishkek proposed to locate the military object in the Batken region quite near to the border of Uzbekistan. Tashkent disagreed with it, since it is afraid of intensified actions of extremists in this case. Uzbekistan is one of the most significant strategic partners of Russia in this region. Therefore Moscow will look for an option, which will be acceptable for all. Besides, the interests of Russia and the USA have been crossed there. Washington declared that it intended to locate in Batken a military training center, although no corresponding documents were signed. The events in April upset these calculated plans of Russians and Americans. They had to postpone realization of both projects.

The new authorities of the country raised these issues again. R. Kazakbayev, the minister of foreign affairs of the new government declared that the issue on location in Kirgizstan of the second Russian

military base remained quite urgent. Bishkek reanimated this issue to balance the correlation of military forces on the territory of the republic, some experts think. Due to the lack of specific agreements of the base it is difficult to appraise its ability to stabilize the situation in Kirgizstan. It is too early to speak about the owners of these objects. Up to present, Bishkek simultaneously makes equal proposals to both powers. Under these conditions, the leadership of China comprehends that it lacks the sufficient forces to oppose the USA in the region on a large scale and prefers to create the regional security system within the framework of ShOS. Thus, the military-political and geo-strategic correlation of forces is not shaped according to the dictate of the “Great Game” of growing again “Old Eastern Empires” – China and Russia but are formed under the impact of the multi-component Great Game (using the terms of A. Pabst) with participation of the biggest world actors – the USA and the EU – and the Central Asian states themselves playing certain role, which is far from being passive.

The appraisal of the contemporary situation in the Central Asia should not avoid the countries of the region. They should not be regarded as the objects of international manipulations. In this case, A. Pabst is right when he said that the region’s states for 19 years of their independence did not succeed to construct not only the universal model of liberal market democracy but even its pre-market image. It is connected not so much with the relatively equal forces of external actors in the Central Asia as with the internal political situation in the states of the region.

Having acquired independence, they declared preservation of the secular way of development based on democracy and market economy. However, the CA countries lacked the experience of democratic governance, at the same time the ethnic-bureaucratic states never existed in the CA. The feudal system of khanates functioned in the

region up to the second third of the XIX century presupposed the absolute power of the rulers and did not depend on their nationality. The Russian czarism, which replaced this regime, did not intend to disseminate democratic ideas in new provinces and did not form its administration by the national principal. The Soviet power divided the Central Asian region into the national republics but did not get rid of totalitarian methods of governance there. Actually, by the beginning of the 1990s, the democratic political culture did not form in the region, which promoted preservation of the ancient-long social relations of traditional society.

At the same time, regionalism started to gain in strength. The formed rigid vertical of the supreme power smoothly transforms into multiple power clannish pyramids. Not a single president was able to destruct the clans' connections. They only balance these connections by often cadre movements without favors to the closest circle. The phenomenon of clanship reflects the traditional-patriarchal and social-cultural foundations of the population. Their essence is as follows: the main part of the population regards the institution of the state power as a system of the fair distribution of social and material benefits.

From the legal point of view, the CA states are considered as the democratic republics. The elections of the presidents and of members of the parliaments take place regularly, the power functions are divided etc. But, in point of fact, democracy in the region is limited to some extent comparing with classic western models. The so-called delegated democracy exists in the CA states, and they are more adapted to the traditional structure of regional communities. The functions of various branches of power are transferred to the presidents. The difference among the CA countries consists only in the size of the delegated power. Thus, in Kazakhstan the alleged lesser impact of the leader of the state on the legislative and judicial branches of power has been

created, while in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the president's power is not limited by any conditions.

Since Kirgizstan had moved further on the way of democratic reforms and economic openness, it is not by accident that it became the territory of more often people's disturbances and coup d'etat. As experts predicted long time ago, the experience of building the western model of political system in Kirgizstan would in the best case result in the collapse of the system itself. But the worse outcome took place: the uncontrolled breeding ground of permanent instability was created in the region.

This situation was formed not for the last five years during K. Bakiyev rule. This process started in A. Akayev time. The democratic institutions put into operation by the first president of Kirgizstan, given the lack of the corresponding political culture and powerful presidential rule, resulted in chaos. The new democratic system was unable to demolish the ancient-long social relations of the traditional society. This duality radically distinguished the country from the neighboring countries, where the traditional system of the powerful leader of the nation was formed with the account of inter-clannish mutual ties and nominal democratic institutions.

The ethnic-social peculiarity of Kirgizstan is the existence of a rather big Uzbek Diaspora (about 25% of the republic's population) in the south, in the Kirgiz part of the Fergana valley (Uzbeks make not less than 40% of the population in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions) and in the north, in Tokmak district. The Diaspora consists of the more developed part in the poor country but actually does not participate in its political life. The ethno-bureaucratic policy relating Uzbeks is seen in the information and education spheres. The shaped disproportions could not help giving occasion for inter-national clashes.

The economic situation contributes to complications in the country. Unlike the neighboring countries Kirgizstan lacks big deposits of hydrocarbons, uranium and gold (although it still maintains its economic position thanks to its gold mines), which are in great demand in the world market. Kirgizstan possesses the only rather significant regional natural resource – water. However, the Kirgiz government failed to make it a commodity, due to the strong opposition of neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, being the main consumers of it, with tacit consent of big world and regional powers.

The narcotics' traffic has transformed in one of the main items of income of not only of the criminal groups but also of the illegal business of the ruling elites, given the weakness of the central government and amalgamation of ruling structures with the criminal groups. For the period of independence, the impoverished people to get resources for support of their families had to arrange transport of Afghan narcotics via the country's territory in the northern direction. The Federal Service of the RF for Control over Illegal Narcotics Traffic stresses two main directions of Kirgiz traffic – “Sogdi” and “Batken”. In both cases narcotics comes from Tajikistan and concentrates in Osh region, which is the point of departure via Jalal-Abad to the north of the country and further to Kazakhstan and Russia. As a result of one operation to stop activities of a transnational criminal group, which shipped Afghan heroin to Russia, over 50 kg was seized in 2009. The narcotics' barons have a rather great impact on the political situation in the region. Exactly they arranged the disturbances in Osh and Jalal-Abad and bought arms. The conflict is advantageous to the narcotic's traders' groups: when military forces and secret services are engaged in suppressing disturbances the flow of narcotics going on through the territory of the republic grows undoubtedly, according to some information.

The last inter-national clashes were marked by participation of religious groups. The leaders of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Union of Islamic Jihad provoked the pogroms, according to the official information. Their strategic aim became the overthrow of the constitutional system in Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan for the sake of creation of Islamist state of Caliphate and with the perspective of transfer of the unstable zone to the territory of China and Russia. These organizations maintain direct contacts with movements “Taliban” and “Al-Qaeda”. The Bakiyev clan was considered as a main customer.

The events in spring-summer of 2010 in the south of Kirgizstan demonstrated all contradictions inherent in the country: the weakness of the ruling power; the narcotics’ business adapted to the authorities; the impoverishment of the population; the consolidation of criminal structures and their coalescence with the ruling structures; the growth of religiousness, particularly in the south of the country. The application of the ethnic-national factor is the simplest means of solving the problem of contradictions between the old and new power, between the criminal and the power, the re-distribution of property and the control over narcotics’ traffic. The Kirgiz-Uzbek contradictions were always the smoldering fuse. However, the re-distribution of power and consequently of property in the country has not been terminated. The government of Kirgizstan legalized by the referendum in June the passage to the parliamentary form of governance, and in October a new parliament should be elected. The key members of the present cabinet, different political forces, leave the posts and concentrate in the struggle for power. At the same time, Jalal-Abad and Osh remains the smoldering fuse of misery and inter-religious mistrust.

As far as the impact of the events in Kirgizstan on the region is concerned, the use of inter-ethnic tensions in the Central-Asian region is the non-risk enterprise. The national enclaves of the title nations exist of the neighboring states exist in all countries of the CA. The ethnic-bureaucratic policy of the authorities aggravates the inter-ethnic relations. It may lead to the spread of inter-ethnic oppositions in the whole Fergana valley (the mostly populated multi-national part of the region, marked by great influence of radical Islamism), divided among three states (Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). In case of such scenario, the valley shall transform into a permanent hot point of instability and extremism. The worst variant will be the emergence of a belt of instability from Afghanistan to the borders of Kazakhstan and further to the north. However, neither the countries themselves, particularly, Uzbekistan as the biggest state in terms of its population (29 million people) nor the external actors (Russia, China, the USA and the EU) are interested in it.

The existing situation is rather troublesome for Uzbekistan indirectly involved in the conflict, despite very considerate and thoughtful actions of Tashkent. Some appeals were made to bring its troops into Kirgizstan. The party in exile – “Birlik” made the following official declaration: “The armed forces of Uzbekistan should play the role of peace-making forces and put under their control the southern part of Kirgizstan, primarily Osh region, and stay there up to the time of restoration in Kirgizstan of the legal power and to keep peace of two relative peoples. This action is needed not only for protection of the Uzbeks living there but also for preserving historic authority of the Kirgiz, who lack traditions of the statehood”.

The similar feelings exist also within the country, but they are rigidly suppressed by the authorities. The president of Uzbekistan officially declared that neither Uzbeks nor Kirgiz are to blame for the

conflict. The external forces organized the diversion and urged towards involvement of Uzbekistan in this opposition. I. Karimov sees that such actions might lead to military conflicts with the adjacent states, while either Tashkent or its neighbors are not interested in it.

At present, Uzbekistan is a host country for hundred thousand refugees from Kirgizstan, and it has to accommodate them in the overpopulated valley, which will cost a lot. At present, the main task consists in avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe able to provoke the flow of refugees to their historic Motherland. The inter-ethnic conflicts may become a problem in Uzbekistan itself, where live from 500 to 900 thousand Kirgiz, according to different estimates. Over 250 people flee away from the Kirgiz enclave on the territory of Uzbekistan as a result of pressure of refugees from Osh, since the Uzbek authorities started to settle them there. The extension of inter-national contradictions may greatly raise the outflow of Kirgiz from Uzbekistan.

Up to present, the region lacks any efficient mechanisms for overcoming the humanitarian catastrophe. The documents of the ShOS are still inadequate, although four out five CA states are its members, and the response to an external aggression would confront hindrances. First, the mechanisms are fixed only on paper. Second, the forces of fast reaction (KSOR) have not yet been formed. And the most significant aspect of the problem is as follows: the document foresees the external aggression against all member-states and not the conflicts among them and the internal conflicts in member-states. The located on their territory NATO forces and their support detachments lack such authority either. Therefore it is lawful to speak about the re-division of the spheres of influence in the Central Asia between Russia and China, taking into account their stronger positions in the region. Russia, China, the USA and the EU have a great potential both for cooperation and for rivalry. It is determined to some extent in economic terms. Gradually,

China started to occupy the leading positions, and China for the mid-term perspective will become the principal economic subject in the region, and the situation in Kirgizstan will not have a significant influence on position of the main actors.

As far as security is concerned, the often veiled opposition between Russia and the USA will raise in spite of rhetoric on the reset of Russian-American relations. It is connected with the introduction of clarity into policy of B. Obama Administration in Afghanistan and creation of a system of military objects round it. Russia and China will not stop arranging their attempts to limit western military presence. Probably, the new ruling powers of Kirgizstan in order to consolidate their positions will intensify their cooperation with Russia and will agree for installation of new military bases on its territory. However, it will result in consolidation of military positions of the USA in other countries, primarily in Uzbekistan.

The events in Kirgizstan actually did not change the distribution of the external actors' forces but to a large extent complicated security in the region. It will make them look for new ways of strengthening here their strategic positions. Russia most likely will try not only to extend its military presence in Kirgizstan but also the powers of the ODKB. However, this aim should be achieved in the course of a rather prolonged and delicate process to avoid abruptly the relations with Uzbekistan. The USA will carry out further its policy of extension of military presence in the region for Afghan and Middle East policy as a whole. China as usual will be over-cautious and will wait and see having agreed for cooperation between the ShOS and ODKB only in case of rapid and significant enforcement of American military forces in the region. As a whole, the Great Game will continue and will involve greater number of actors under contemporary conditions.

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**THE POST-SOVIET SPACE:
CONVENTIONALITY OR REALITY?**

The post-Soviet space is considered below not as a conglomerate of territories of new independent states emerged after liquidation of the USSR but as a certain political, economic, humanitarian and cultural-historic community. The experience of common life in the Soviet Union and the long-term active reciprocal ties connect the population of most countries of the region. The mutual action of these countries has its own political-organizational basis, which consolidates gradually, although seems to be rather amorphous. At the same time, inclusion of former Baltic republics of the USSR (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and at present members-states of the EU and NATO into the post-Soviet space would be wrongful, since over there the elite and the population perceive themselves and actually represent a part of the European integration and of the Trans-Atlantic and not at all the post-Soviet space.

The member-countries of the Community of Independent States form primarily the post-Soviet space: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine, as well as Turkmenistan. The latter has the status of observer in this organization; however, which is more significant, orientates to economic and humanitarian reciprocal action just with former union republics. Actually, Abkhazia and South Ossetia may be included in the post-Soviet space, although it is not institutionalized. These young states in some or other way are included in it by means of Russia.

At the same time, the presence in the post-Soviet space does not depend on the subjective will of any separate state. It is determined to a deciding extent by the objective circumstances, which can not be changed instantly. The decision of the national leadership is not sufficient in this case. It should be the result of the radical changes in economy, including the culture of production, as well as the change of political traditions, psychological condition of the people, their mentality etc. And all this needs time. The post-Soviet states are connected by a dense network of formal and informal reciprocal action and, despite national specifics, have many common features, solve similar problems connected with consolidation of the recently acquired statehood in the context of new public relations. The material discussed below has the following task: on the one side, to appraise the capacity of the uniting trends within the fixed territorial limits and, on the other side, to find out the disintegration factors. In other words, the question is to determine the potential sustainability of mutual relations of most former Soviet republics as a local system of the contemporary international relations. Only in this case it will be possible to make hypotheses concerning their future role and place in the globalization process.

The Community of Independent States created immediately after liquidation of the USSR is the most extensive structural entity in the post-Soviet space. Although it did not fulfill its original formulated functions (keeping the united defense, economic and humanitarian space) and, probably, will not fulfill them in future, it played a rather essential positive role in the process of division of “union property” and formation of new independent states. The attempts to transform the CIS into an efficient organization and, in essence, to re-integrate the former union republics (even if on a new basis) turned out to be unavailing.

There are many objective and subjective reasons of this failure. They consist in the policy of Moscow for the 1990s and in the position of Kiev, which originally regarded the Community as an instrument of “civilized divorce”, and in dissatisfaction of most Soviet republics by the Belovezhsk agreement of the three republics-founders of the USSR (RSFSR, USSR and BSSR), which terminated the existence of the Soviet Union. But the determined factor in this respect is the great difference among development stages of former parts of the former united state. They demonstrate adherence to different forms of political systems and social-economic models, different mentalities of their citizens and the cultures of production. At the same time, each of them has its own appraisal of common history and perception of their national interests, which do not often coincide with the national interests of other CIS participants.

Under the historic conditions of the USSR, only Russia could play the role of the uniting force in the post-Soviet space. However, Russia turned out to be unready for it. In time of B. Yeltsin presidency, Russia was subject to the aggravate crisis and survived the hardships of the transitory period, went on through the period of acute struggle for power and property, was waging the exhausting war in Chechnya. The institutions of state governance were in great extent paralyzed, and the army was in the state of decay. The idea of “shock therapy” was discredited in the eyes of the leaders of new independent states. The Russian partners in the CIS were looking for new foreign policy orientations. Given the weakening positions of the RF in the Community, many centers of the world politics actively were engaged in the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet space. The leading western powers and the countries, such as China, Turkey and Iran, rapidly filled in “the vacuum of the force”. This circumstance to a large

extent promoted the structural-organizational separation within the Community.

The states, which still appreciated the allies' ties with Russia (Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan) preserved their membership in the Treaty of Collective Security (DKB). At the same time, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to take part in prolongation of the Treaty (April 1997). Jointly with Ukraine and Moldavia they created a new association – GUAAM, which was aimed primarily for limitation of Russian influence in the Trans-Caucasus, in the Caspian and the Black Sea zones. As a whole, the process was going on directed to diminishing the ties among the former union republics and, correspondingly, to “coming unraveled” the post-Soviet space.

Under conditions, when the USA tried to consolidate its military presence in the Central Asia (bases in Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan, the attempts to come to an agreement with Tajikistan on location of military objects, the plans for creation of such structure as “the Caspian Guard” etc.), the Treaty of Collective Security, signed in 1992, did not respond to the essential needs of today. The decision was taken to transform it into the Organization of the Treaty on Collective Security (ODKB). The Statute and the Agreement on the legal status of ODKB were adopted in October 2002. The Agreement contained an article of collective liability of members of the Treaty in case of aggression against one of them. And what is more, four years later the statute documents of the Organization were supplemented by the provision on the obligatory agreement by its members concerning the location of foreign military contingents on their territories.

Thus, Russia actually ensured its more efficient control over its space to defend it at least within the limits of this alliance. At present, seven states are members of ODKB: Armenia, Byelorussia,

Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its task is as follows: to counteract to the external risks, to take actions against international terrorism, religious extremism and narcotics' traffic.

It was decided to form within ODKB a well armed and trained group – the Collective Forces of Operative Reaction (KSOR), which will be formed by five countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Armenia). The activities aimed at realization of this decision were started in Summer-Autumn of 2009. The headquarters, the training camps etc were located in the city of Osh (Kirgizstan). In October the large-scale training exercises of member-states were arranged in October on the territory of Kazakhstan under the name of “Mutual Action – 2009”. The training exercises were aimed at organizing the response to the attack of armed bands against a conditional state. At the same time, ODKB member-states show their wish to avoid limitation within their own framework and to take part in other systems of international security and to promote its enforcement. The leaders of ODKB at their meeting in Dushanbe (on 31 July 2009) discussed the internal aspects of their cooperation as well as the issues of coordination of foreign policy training courses and carrying out the coordinated policy relating to such organizations, as EU, NATO, OSCE and UN. In the course of the meeting the item of the agenda was discussed on the support of joint support of Russian initiative on conclusion of the Agreement on European Security. The situation in Caucasus and Afghanistan was also discussed. It should be said that the member-states of ODKB, if they do not take part in military actions against talibs, nevertheless, give an essential support to the forces of the western coalition, providing for them transit corridors and trade centers for delivery of non-military cargoes as well as recently the military cargoes. In particular, in September 2009, a new transit agreement between Russia and the USA was put into force on delivery to

Afghanistan and arms by the Russian air bridge. The question is the passage of ten (and more) American military transport airplanes per day.

The parties display their interest in military-political, military-technical cooperation as well as in creation of the corresponding collective structures, and its shown in the bilateral ties of Russia actually with all former union republics, including Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Moldavia and Ukraine. It concerns the deliveries of arms and military technique on preferential terms, the training of military specialists, the cooperation in the sphere of the military industrial complex (MIC) etc.

Russia has efficient military bases in Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, its servicemen are located also in Armenia and in the zone of Trans-Dnestr conflict. Since 2008-2009, the Russian body guards started their service in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian detachments of the conventional forces are located there. The radio-location and cosmic detection stations in Byelorussia (Baranovichi and Vileika), in Azerbaijan (Gabala) and in Tajikistan (Nurek) are used for the interests of the Russian military command. However, it is possible to speak about the united defense space even within the framework of ODKB only with certain degree of relativity. Russia maintains its security mainly by its own so to say vertical efforts (including its powerful rockets nuclear capacity), since other ODKB members have much less limited capacities. But the matter is not only this fact. The differences in the geopolitical position of new independent states determine the nuances in their appraisal of the sources of real and potential threats to security. For instance, Uzbekistan had its own reasons to avoid participation in KSOR, including the tense relations with Kazakhstan (for the whole post-Soviet period), the inimical relations with Tajikistan, the dissatisfaction with the decision of Moscow to locate the

base of KSOR not in Uzbekistan but in Kirgizstan, finally, the wish to abstain from taking other obligations. However, the matter, probably, is more significant. The Uzbek leadership in this way informs Washington about its readiness to resume military cooperation with the USA, which was interrupted after the Andijan events in May 2005. The other clear example testifies to the lack of complete and unconditional unity of the military-political allies of Russia. It is characteristic that not a single member of ODKB, having condemned the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia in 2008 and approved in principle the actions of the RF to force the Tbilisi regime to peace, did follow Moscow to recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is evident that they did not want to complicate their relations with western countries.

A rather dense substance of reciprocal ties among former union republics also makes it possible to speak about certain unity of the post-Soviet space. The considerable share of external trade turnover of the CIS countries accounts for the partners in the Community, primarily Russia (except Russia itself and Azerbaijan). A great role is played by the border trade, which actually is not estimated by the official statistics. The lack of visa regime allows citizens of the CIS freely to move within its limits, makes easier labor migration. Millions of residents of the former union republics have jobs in Russia and send home their earned money, which in Tajikistan and Kirgizstan make the sums comparable with the state budgets of these countries. The new independent states have to retreat into themselves, since their industrial and agricultural production (with rare exception) does not withstand competition in the world market. The trips of labor migrants outside the post-Soviet space may confront difficulties not only due to visa, legal and language barriers but also for the reason of the low qualification of Gastarbeiters.

At the same time, the enclave feature of the post-Soviet space relating to the globalizing world consists not in its small inclusion in the globalization processes but in still going on process of formation and consolidation of private property. The ruling circles of most countries in the post-Soviet space comprehend the need of radical market reforms, which become the condition for overcoming the social-political and technological backwardness, while the external economic ties may not be reduced to a simple trade turnover. They have to coordinate their activities in the sphere of economy with the partners in the CIS, to create the corresponding mechanisms, providing the latter with some transnational functions. Up to present, the economic integration slips. In this case, the lack of activities of the Eurasian economic cooperation (EvrAzES) is a negative example. This situation is explained by the lack of internal pre-conditions, namely the weak industrial basis and poor development of market relations. This is an exclusive circle.

In the Central Asia, Kazakhstan demonstrates the greatest successes and, like Russia and China, is ready to participate in implementation of expensive and large-scale projects. The sphere of activities is very great – from extraction and transportation of hydrocarbon resources, development of such resources as uranium and gold to construction of electric stations, railway and automobile routes.

For the post-Soviet period, the infrastructure objects of the Soviet time (gas and oil pipelines, railways and highways etc.) kept mainly under Russian control tightened the new independent states. However, this resource of unification most likely will be reduced. For the last decade, the energy policy of Russia in the post-Soviet space was characterized by a constant raise of economic pragmatism. For 2005-2006, the concluding stage of transferal of reciprocal action with former

union republics in the energy sphere to the market relations was terminated.

The new mutual relations in the energy sphere in principle change the configuration of the post-Soviet space. The question is that the intensification of competition among producers of hydrocarbons for markets was started and was going on. Azerbaijan delivers oil to Europe via the pipeline Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan implement the projects of energy transportation to the southern and the south-eastern direction (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China), reducing their dependence on Russian transit. The construction of the Trans-Caspian pipelines is not excluded; these pipelines will allow them enter to western markets avoiding the territory of the RF. Russia itself tries to diversify the routes of export of its energy bearers (the pipeline “North Flow” along the bottom of the Baltic Sea; “South Flow” – on the ground of the Black Sea; via the territory of Eastern Siberia to China and the Pacific Ocean) and reckons to consolidate its positions in relations with transit countries: Ukraine, Byelorussia and Moldavia. The authors of collective studies “Russia and the World in the Beginning of the XX century”, conducted by the institutions of social sciences of the RAS, rightly stressed that for the CIS states the question was as follows: would their development be rapid and would it bring results, if they were integrated with Russia or with anybody else, primarily with the EU? Certainly, the RF is interested in cooperation with the EU and the USA, in attraction of foreign investments. However, other questions arise as well. The first question is, whether and to what extent the states of the post-Soviet space are ready to master the experience of the developed countries of the world, to accept the models not only of economic but also of political development according to the western example? And the second question is as follows: are the participants of

the EU ready to include them in their structure in perspective? The answer is evident: they are not yet ready to do it. At the same time, the authors of the cited study are absolutely right, when they conclude that the USA and the EU regard the cooperation with the post-Soviet states, inter alia, as an important factor of deterrence of Russia, being their competitor. However, up to present, this cooperation is rather limited.

The cultural-historic common feature of the states in the post-Soviet space (given difference of national traditions and mentality) is a rather essential, however, not the principal, factor of maintenance of this space. This common feature, shaped as far back as in time of the Russian Empire and finally formed in the Soviet period, still exists. Despite the seemed ephemeral feature of this phenomenon, which lacks any numerical estimation, its presence (like the interests of security and economic development) has a rather great impact on the type of relations among former union republics.

At the same time, for two decades of the separated existence, the changes took place in the sphere of human connections, which do not promote preservation of the united language information and intellectual space. At present, the problem of keeping and extending the sphere of use of the Russian language in the CIS countries is quite urgent. This problem is characterized not only by its humanitarian but also by its political substance. Russia, striving for keeping its influence in the Community for a long time, is interested in preserving the situation, when not only the present but also the future generation of political leaders, business elite, intellectuals and common citizens of neighboring countries (in direct and indirect meaning) will speak with Russians in the same language.

Some new independent states, formed after disintegration of the USSR, adopted the laws on the language. They contributed to exclusion of Russians and Russian speaking citizens from the organs of state and

local governance, from high executive posts, including social and production spheres. It promoted the outflow of the Russian speaking population, including most qualified specialists. As a result, the potential of the former union republics' development is being lowered. Many Russian schools and higher education institutions with teaching in Russian were closed. At present, when the power and property in the post-Soviet states are divided among local clans, the task of modernization of economic development comes forward. It is difficult to achieve this task without close cooperation with Russia, and therefore the situation started to change to some extent. Education in Russian, giving opportunity to study in Russian higher education institutions becomes an urgent request and even a prestige. The essential augmentation of Russian budgetary means for support of Russian schools in the CIS countries is a device for probable consolidation of the traced trend.

G. Berdymukhammedov, the president of Turkmenistan, connecting the successful future of his country with its rapid modernization, seems to acknowledge that the country needs qualified cadres, who are well trained in all spheres of science. It is impossible to ensure implementation of educational projects without Russia. This question was discussed as far back as in his first meeting with president of Russia V. Putin in Moscow in April 2007. Two weeks later both presidents took part in founding of the school with teaching in Russian, which should function on the basis of Russian curricular and Russian attestation for graduates. Turkmenistan asked for an assistance for creation of the International University (as the department of the Moscow University), primarily for the cadres of professors.

Kirgizstan expresses its permanent interest to education of their citizens in Russian. As far back as in the beginning of the 1990s, exactly in Bishkek the Russian-Kirgiz Slavonic University was

founded. At present, the commission of its branch in the Moscow suburbs Mytishchi is subject to discussion to make education here accessible for young Kirgiz, who temporarily stay and have jobs in Russia.

Tashkent also feels the rising interest in education of the national youth in Russian higher education institutions. Uzbekistan is interested primarily in training of qualified engineers and technicians; the leadership of the country needs them for the accelerated economic development. The specialists in economy and the oil and gas sphere are in great demand. It is not accidental that for the last years, already three branches of the most authoritative higher education Russian institutions were established in Tashkent: Plekhanov Academy, MSU and Gubkin Academy of Oil and Gas (in September 2007).

It is evident that Russia is interested for the long perspectives in implementation of the education projects of the CIS countries. In essence, the question is formation in neighboring countries of the new generation of the political, military and intellectual elite, which is loyal to Russia. It is urgent more so, as in some former union republics the reduction of the sphere of use of the Russian language is accompanied by the rise of interest in education in English and graduation from higher education institutions in the West.

It is rather significant that the leadership of Kazakhstan took the decision to change the Cyrillic Kazakh alphabet for Latin alphabet (in 2007). This official decision was apprehended in mass media as a political step and the urge of Astana towards a distance from Russia. However, this apprehension seems to be unfounded. For 1920–1930, Kazakhstan as well as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan used Latin alphabet and late changed it for Cyrillic alphabet. Following the proclamation of independence, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan returned to Latin alphabet. Kazakhstan did the same for

the pragmatic reasons. N. Nazarbayev determined it as follows: at present, the Latin graphic determines in the communication space, and it is not by accident that many countries, including the post-Soviet union republics adopted it. In other words, the former union republics, including Kazakhstan, strive for ensuring the direct access to the world sources of information, advanced technologies and for promoting cooperation with the countries of the West.

At the same time, for the last years, the interest paid to the Russian language in the post-Soviet space not only remains but even rises. However, it seems to lose, probably, its former almost dominant position. This fact should be accepted as a phenomenon of the globalizing world and not at all as the schemes of the competitors. Meanwhile, the Russian elite should not rest an indifferent observer of the trends unfavorable for Russia. The state support of various programs aimed at extension of the sphere of application of the Russian language abroad, intensified for the last years, should further be in the focus of the Russian leadership attention.

The restoration of the united cultural milieu existed in the USSR but greatly eroded for the post-Soviet period is another direction in the field of humanitarian cooperation of Russia with the CIS countries. It is not worth discussing particularly the assertion that not a single national culture may successfully develop without reciprocal action with cultures of other peoples. The Russian culture was always a part of the world culture. In Soviet time, it enriched itself and absorbed the most important achievements of many peoples of the USSR. At the same time, exactly by means of inclusion in Russian culture and Russian language environment the writers, such as Ch. Aitmatov, F. Iskander, N. Dumbadze and others, enjoyed widest popularity and became classics of the Soviet and the world culture. The same concerns the cinematograph, which hardly could have been created outside the

Soviet cultural context, as well as the development of dramatic and opera-ballet theaters, the dance groups etc.

After disintegration of the Soviet Union, when the creative associations of writers and arts representatives of the multinational country were liquidated, when Academy of Sciences of the USSR was transformed into the Russian Academy of Sciences, when the state borders emerged among the union republics, the creative and scientific intellectuals of the former Soviet Union turned out to be separated, many former ties were lost. These processes went on under conditions of the gravest extensive economic and political crisis in the new independent states. It was not a question of scientific and cultural development, of the reciprocal action in these fields. The question was the physical survival. Only for the latest period of time, when the CIS participants went through the first stage of the state construction, the leaders paid attention to the problems of science and culture. In August 2005, at the meeting of the leaders of the Community in Kazan the agreement on humanitarian cooperation was signed. The Forum of the creative and scientific intellectuals of former union republics, held in April 2006, determined the spheres, forms and principles of this cooperation.

At the same time, of great significance is the reverse process. Not only foreign audience is in need of the information. It is desirable that the Russian citizens should be informed about life of the nearest neighbors of the RF. The TV of the RF contains many programs on exotic countries of the world but no one big TV channel (out of dozens) shows regularly any programs about the present situation in former union republics, about their history interwoven with the Russian history, about their architecture, culture, traditions and custom, about their role in the common civilization development of the post-Soviet world. (As exception, the current events, political cataclysms, street

disturbances, demonstrations are covered by the news programs). The same concerns the publications. Meanwhile, the existence of the united information environment is one of the conditions of keeping the common post-Soviet space.

* * *

The above analysis shows that at present the post-Soviet space, given the contradictory processes going there, does not correspond to the criteria, which make it possible to appraise it as a trans-national political space. It is possible to say about correlation of the interests of most state in this space for ensuring their security. And that is all. The political elites and the business community of former Soviet republics perceive the urgent need to overcome the economic and social-political backwardness of their countries comparing with the developed powers of the world. The collective efforts and the support of the more “advanced” partners are needed for achievement of this task. The states of the post-Soviet space as a whole possess the unique pre-conditions, which allow them to expect to occupy an adequate place in the globalizing world. They possess a vast territory and huge transit routes, the biggest natural resources, including the energy resources, a great scientific and intellectual capacity. The cultural-historic common feature and the remained humanitarian ties are able to alleviate the cooperation directed to realization of the determined competitive advantages.

But given the political-organizational structures formally aimed at regional integration, common political institutions (the rules of political life) and all the more the mechanisms, which would ensuring these rules in the whole post-Soviet space, lack here, as well as there are a no fixed perspectives of their legalization, since neither the post-Soviet elites, nor the population as a whole in the formed circumstances

constitute the transnational community directed to its political “assimilation”.

“Transnatsionalnoe politicheskoe prostranstvo: Novye realnosti mezhdunarodnogo razvitiya”, M., 2010, p. 37–50.

Pain Emil,
publicist

THE COMMUNITY SLAVES

The multiculturalism is one of the most ambiguous terms of the political lexicon, since both adepts and opponents of multiculturalism appraise it from different positions. The similar collision emerged in the course of discussion of the political declarations made in the end of 2010 the beginning of 2011 by the leaders of three countries – Germany, Great Britain and France relating to “failure” of multiculturalism policy.

Two groups of critics appraise multiculturalism. The conservative criticism (often called by observers to be “cultural imperialism” or “new racism”) proceeds from the need to change multiculturalism for monoculturalism and insists to install the legal regime characterized by privileges for dominant cultural groups (religious and ethnic). The adepts of such position (neo-Nazis in Germany; activists of extreme right “English League of Defense” in Great Britain or party of Marin Le Pain in France) disapproved the declarations of their present national leaders considering them as “toothless”, “empty PR” and “deceit of the society”. At the same time, the position of A. Merkel, D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy is closer to the liberal criticism of multiculturalism, which proceeds from the assertion that preservation of cultural peculiarity is the unconditional right of all

citizens. However, the keeping of this peculiarity is not free, and it takes place under the pressure of the communities and contradicts the rights of other people, the principle of equal rights and civil substance of contemporary society. For instance, D. Cameron for the sake of overcoming the cultural split of society and installing positive pluralism proposes to replace the present narrow-community interpretation of multiculturalism by the liberal-civil conception called “energetic liberalism”.

In the author’s opinion, the civil integration does not oust traditional cultures but supplements them. The civil culture develops with the national cultures and does not replace them. To the mind of the British leader, integration will take place, if the people belonging to different cultural communities, “having liberated from the state pressure, will acquire the common aim”, for instance in terms of common civil concern for the good of each in their country as a united home.

The liberal criticism of multiculturalism includes the following arguments: this policy ensures the state support not so much to the cultures as to the communities and groups, which without foundations assume for themselves a mission to represent the interests of the whole ethnos or religion; the state sponsorship directed to the communities stimulates development by the group of community identity, which suppresses the individual identity. This policy fixes the community’s power over the individual deprived of any chance for the option. Besides, the full prohibition of interference of the state in the affairs of communities, proclaimed by libertarians-anarchists, would lead to the same result: the individual becomes a slave in the community without any protection on the part of the state; multiculturalism artificially conserves the traditional-communal relations and hinders individual integration of representatives of various cultures in civil society. There

are many cases in European countries and the USA, when the people, having lost their ethnic or religious identity, have to return to it only due to the government policy, which sponsors not the culture but the communities (their schools, clubs, theaters, sports organizations etc.). For the 1990s, in Russia the subsidies provided for “indigenous small peoples of the North” caused rapid “growth” of the number of these groups at the expense of representatives of other cultures, primarily Russian, who started to regard themselves (evidently only by documents) as representatives of indigenous peoples with intention to get social benefits; the main shortcoming of the policy of multiculturalism is the fact that it provokes segregation of the groups, creates artificial borders among communities and forms a kind of ghetto on the voluntary basis.

In many countries of the world there appeared the mono-ethnic, mono-religious or mono-racist quarters and education institutions. The tables “only for blacks” emerge in students canteens. The “Asian” hostels or disco-clubs for “colored” with prohibition for “whites” were arranged. In 2002, imam of a small French city considered as impossible the arrival to this settlement of Martin Obri, the mayor of the city of Lille and the candidate of the Socialist Party for the presidential post. Imam called the small city to be “Muslim territory”, which forbids entry of a Christian woman. This is an example of the paradoxical and widely spread situation: at the level of the country multiculturalism turns out to become a fixed monoculturalism and segregation at the local level. For the 1970s, the same paradoxical transformations were the basis of the idea of multiculturalism. This policy, according to its architects, should have protected humanism, freedom of cultural self-expression and democracy. Actually, in practice emergence of closed settlements and quarters leads to appearance in them of alternative governance institutions, which block

activities of the elected authorities at the level of city and country. Under these conditions, protection of human rights is impossible. For instance, young women from Turkey or Pakistan, arrived as wives of residents of Turkish quarters in Berlin or of Pakistani quarters in London, occur to less free and protected than at home in their Motherlands. Over there, their relatives could protect them from excessive arbitrary behavior of the husband, father in law or mother in law. In European cities these young women are not saved by relatives or law. The caricature of multiculturalism deprived of values of humanism, promotes in European cities such archaic features of traditional culture, which have been forgotten in the countries of immigrants' origin. In some Islamic countries women became members of the parliament, judges, ministers and even head of the governments (in Pakistan, Turkey) , while in the Islamic quarters of European cities Turkish, Arabic or Pakistani woman may be killed for any disobedience to her husband, for any suspicion of adultery, for a not taken kerchief. It is true that in Germany a Turkish woman Aigel Ozkan was nominated to the post of minister in the province Low Saksonia; but she represents only a small group of immigrants who succeeded to leave the local community and could integrate individually in German civil society.

In closed Islamic quarters of Berlin, London or Paris the youth has much lesser chances for socialization and adaptation to the local conditions than the youngsters of the same age living outside these voluntary ghettos. Exactly due to this fact the slaves of communities are not competitive at the general level of the country. By the beginning of the 2000s, in Berlin only each twelfth Turkish school boy passed the examination in high school, while each third German school child passed such exam. Evidently, there are more unemployed Turkish young boys than German young boys. In 2006, 47% of Turkish girls of age less than 25 years and 23% of young Turks of this age were

unemployed and lived owing to social subsidies. At the same time, the chance to get these subsidies for indefinite time does not stimulate immigrants for integration in the society of the host country. The sociological studies show that the Turkish youth in Germany demonstrates lesser aspiration for integration than the Turks of the older generation. This is a real expression of failure of the multiculturalism policy, more exactly of cultural disintegration policy.

At the meeting of the State Council of the RF, held in February 2011, devoted to discussion of the problems of inter-national communication, president D. Medvedev tried to rehabilitate the word “multiculturalism” and said that the new modern slogans of its failure were not applicable in Russia. However, the Russian leader himself not once criticized the same aspects of multiculturalism like his European colleagues. He did it particularly often in his characteristic of the situation in the North Caucasus, where multicultural disintegration is clearly displayed in clanship, ethnic separatism and religious radicalism. All this creates almost insurmountable obstacles for governance of the region, shapes the unprecedented wave of terrorism, not speaking about the problems of modernization of this territory. The president of Russia, like European leaders, not once associated the problem of overcoming such parceling with civil integration, which was defined by him differently. At the meeting of the State Council, held in December 2010, devoted to the explosion of Russian nationalism, Medvedev regarded it as development of “All-Russian patriotism”, while at the meeting of the State Council, held in Ufa in February 2011, he qualified it as a task of formation of “the Russian nation”.

The Russian version of multiculturalism policy is older and much more complicated by its consequences, than European policy. Multiculturalism as a form of promoting the group and community identity was an inseparable part of Stalin policy of creating national

republics (union and autonomous) and national districts and regions. However, in Soviet time the disintegration consequences of such policy partially were liquidated by the imitated feature of the whole system of autonomies, which covered behind its façade the united territorial-Party governance. The problem was aggravated in the post-Soviet time, when the local elites tried to fill by the real substance the formal and imaginary sovereignty of their republics.

The decade of the 1990s passed under the sign of mobilization of the population of the so called “title nationalities” in the republics of Russia arranged by the local elites in the struggle for republican sovereignty. In a number of cases, such mobilization resulted in direct armed clashes of large groups of the population with the federal power as was in the Chechen Republic. For the first decade of the 2000s, the situation changed, and the other problems were concentrated in the focus of events, namely, the ousting by the recipient community, primarily by residents of biggest cities of Russia, of migrants belonging to different ethnic groups.

This problem engendered conflicts among different groups of the population, which resemble the event occurred in Kondopoga in 2006. At the same time, the ethnic-political system in Russia for the 2000s resembled more the problems of the global “North” countries. This resemblance seems to let Russia to a greater extent to apply foreign conceptions and cultural practice, migration and ethnic policy. However, in reality the chance of direct implementation of positive conceptions and practice is very limited.

In the West xenophobia of the host countries’ societies is directed mainly to immigrants, i.e. foreign citizens arrived to these countries from abroad. In Russia the main object of xenophobia comes out not so much the immigrants as the internal migrants, citizens of the Russian Federation, residents of the republics in the North Caucasus.

This distinction alone shows that the applied in the West policy of alleviation of migration problems at the expense of restricted entry of foreign citizens and changed conditions of providing for them citizenship or residence permit can not be used as an instrument of solving Russian problems of inter-ethnic and religious tension. The direction of legislative and political-practical development in the sphere of regulation of migration, human rights protection and ensuring the rights of national minorities in the EU countries is mutually tied at the institutional level (they are included in the united block of governance) and in terms of ideology (they are founded on the common values of human rights). But in Russia the united ideological foundation for integration policy does not exist at all and the governance itself, like legislative practice, is separated. For the 2000s, the migration policy was subject to changes. But the ethnic (“national”) policy of Russia remained intact in the position formed in the 1990s. The conception of the state national policy, adopted in 1996, is not being reviewed. For the period of 2000–2010, the legislative activity of the State Duma in the sphere of ethnic (“national”) policy was paralyzed, while the ministry charged with carrying out this policy and renamed several times for the 1990s was liquidated.

In the West, the main innovations in the sphere of ethnic and migration policy are formulated by political parties and institutions of civil society, are subject to public discussion; further, they are adopted and codified by the legislative power becoming the norms for the executive power. In principle, the other way of formation of policy in all spheres of life exists in Russia. Its principles and norms are formulated by the executive power and later are adopted by the parties represented in the Federal Assembly. This way of policy functioning limits participation of the expert society and of the wide public circles in its elaboration and realization, meanwhile a chance of taking

counter-productive political decisions is very great. At the same time, the parties ousted from real participation in formulating the policy and not burdened by liability for carrying out this policy are inclined to populism. It is not accidental that actually all parties represented in the Russian parliament make use of ethnic phobia and migrants phobia, while in the largest countries of the EU such parties either are not represented in the parliament (like in Germany and Great Britain) or are represented by the minority of the population (like in France). Russia is within the list of European leaders in terms of mass migrants' phobia as well, although it is behind such EU countries as Hungary, Latvia, Greece and Portugal.

In EU countries the main mechanism of carrying out ethnic-cultural and migration policy is put into practice by mutual action of the executive power and the institutions of civil society. The institutions of civil society are very weak in Russia. And what is more, Russia, according to materials of international research, among 28 countries of Europe is marked by the lowest level of value of civil solidarity and mutual ("horizontal") confidence. At the same time, it will be impossible to improve the situation only by means of information manipulation for development of "All-Russian patriotism". All this makes intensification of the process of civil integration hardly probable in Russia for the nearest future.

Still, the author believes that the movement of Russia from the multi-cultural split to the multi-cultural integration strategically is unavoidable. Russia entered the way of innovative modernization, and it is not a slogan of the regular leader but a vital need for the country, which is marked by great history and great culture. The innovation economy itself is inevitably in need of modernization in the political-legal and social-cultural life as the breath needs the exhalation.

"Novaya gazeta", M., 18 March 2011, p. 16–17.

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