

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

**RUSSIA
AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2011 – 6 (228)**

**Science-information bulletin
The Bulletin was founded in 1992**

**Moscow
2011**

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CONTENTS

<i>O. Kuropatkina.</i> Religion and policy in modern Russia.....	4
<i>S. Sergeev, A. Salagayev.</i> Transformation of the provincial Soviet Tatarian nomenclature into the regional ruling elite of Tatarstan.....	10
<i>E. Burla.</i> The religious situation in contemporary Adygeya	22
<i>Aleksandra Takova.</i> The ethnic-political processes in Karachaevo-Cherkessia in 2005–2010.....	27
<i>V. Manatova.</i> Will the assertion about existence of local civilizations in the North Caucasus go beyond the talking stage?.....	31
<i>Arif Yunus.</i> Azerbaijan has become a factor in Islamic global war against the West	41
<i>V. Gelbras.</i> Kazakhstan after crisis	48
<i>A. Bolshakov.</i> The foreign policy of Kirghizstan in the context of conflicts' change in the post-Soviet space	58
<i>Khakim Rakhnamo.</i> The place and the role of Islam in the history of Central Asia (view from Tajikistan)	71

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RELIGION AND POLICY IN MODERN RUSSIA

The religious organizations are separated from the state and are equal before the law according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In fact, the religious organization participation in policy is limited by it. The religious tradition of Russia isn't also mentioned in the Constitution. Meanwhile, the state support for the religious organizations is guaranteed (at the different level) in legislative acts in 84 countries of the world. One mentions the God or there is a reference to a special religious tradition of the country in the constitutions of some countries of the western area – Albania, Andorra, Germany, Poland, Slovenia and Switzerland. A religious subject matter is also presented in the national mottos: the God is mentioned in the slogans of 29 countries (one should mention the Great Britain, Israel, Poland, USA and Denmark among them). The God or the other religious symbol is mentioned in the national anthem of 79 countries (there are the Great Britain, Italy, USA, France and Czech Republic among them).

In spite of the fact that the relations between the state and the religious organizations are much less detailed in the Russian legislation in comparison with the foreign countries it's known that the faithful take the active part in policy. Who can belong to this category? According to statistics the number of the Russians calling themselves as the faithful is steadily being increasing from the middle of 1990-ss. The

absolute majority having called themselves as the faithful consider themselves as the members of the Orthodox Church. But for the majority of those asked the Orthodoxy isn't observance of the religious rituals and the participation in the church life the churching supposes but it's only a national tradition. Besides, the audience not living according to the religious dogmas and supporting the Russian Orthodox Church as the institute prefers orienting at not the national religious traditions in everyday life but at society ethics closely associated with democratic values.

So, the majority of the Russians are nominally churchwomen. As for the faithful number then there is no state statistics in this sphere.

The main part of the faithful is legally associated in the religious organizations helping them to cooperate with the state. According to the Ministry of Justice data for 1 January 2007 the Russian Orthodox Church prevails over the religious organizations by a wide margin (71%), then the Moslem (12%) and the protestant religious organizations (2-5%) follow after. Old Believers', Judaism and Buddhist organizations take less than 1%. The Russian Orthodox Church and the Protestants (Baptists, Adventists and Pentecostals) are presented in all the subjects of the federation and the Moslems, the Catholics and Old Believers' – in the most regions. "The Orthodox" regions head the list (59%), then the "the Moslems" (21%) and "the Protestant" (20%) follow concerning "the sphere of influence", i.e. prevailing or noticeable number of the registered religious organizations in the regions.

In spite of the fact that the faithful aren't many they are often the active part of the civil society trying to hand its ideas both for the high society and the state. The political party creation is one of the common variants to carry its needs by a group joined together based on some criterion. However, it's prohibited to create parties based on religion.

But, at least, in 70 countries of the world (including, for example, Austria, Great Britain, Hungary, Germany, Denmark, USA, France, Switzerland and Sweden) such parties are legally recognized and actively work.

So, one can notice a trend: the religious parties are prohibited only in the developing countries but such parties are active in many western democratic states including stressed temporal France and USA.

And what is the attitude of the Russians towards a possible participation of the faithful in policy? According to data the attitude of the Russians' majority (67%) is negative towards the religious leaders' influence on policy but more than a half (54%) is positive towards coming to power of the faithful. One can suppose that being against obvious clericalism the Russians are ready to support the common faithful at the elections. Can one confirm this thesis? Let's appeal to history of the political parties based on religion abolished in 2003. What did they succeed in? The members of the Orthodox Church, the Moslems, the Gentiles and the Protestants in 1990-at the beginning of 2000-ss had few parties fighting for their own hand; however, these parties didn't win great achievements. So, one can come to conclusion that the majority of the Russians a priori supposing that the faithful are best of all others and that's why they will "impose order" but at the same time aren't ready to support their political ambitions.

One knows the religious organization practice to lobby for their interests by means of their representatives in bodies of power. In 2000-ss there were several attempts to run for local authorities from the party of the religious figures (the Pentecostal, the Moslem, the Orthodox, the Buddhist and the Pagan). As a whole such political activity was comparatively low. Some religious figures really became the leaders of local authority. The Moslems are in the lead among them.

There are some other ways to participate in policy. Though a direct propaganda for a concrete candidate is prohibited by the legislation of the Russian Federation, however, the appeals for civil duty performing aren't prohibited. According to statistics data a number of even such appeals from the party of centralized religious organizations weren't high. They were the most active during the parliamentary elections in 2007 and when Putin announced Medvedev as his "successor" so one can make a conclusion that their political views aren't independent but their primary aim is to establish relations with the existing power. One also states a clear political position seldom and can't decide to support governors openly in the regions of the Russian Orthodox Church's hierarchy being the biggest and the most powerful religious organization.

So, the mechanisms of a direct participation in policy turned out to be ineffective for the religious organizations in Russia. How on earth do the confessions hand down their interests to power?

First of all, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Moslems, the Judaists, the Catholics and the Protestants can hand down their proposals to bodies of state power and also present their conclusions for the projects of the federal laws touching their interests.

Secondly, the confessions can publicly protest (open letter, meeting, appeals and etc.) against their right violation, not only the religious minorities act in such a way but also the representatives of so-called traditional religions and even oftener. The complaints of the Russian Orthodox Church's members usually concern the arguments about belonging of historic landmarks and monuments of art to a state or to the Russian Orthodox Church; the Moslems' complaints concern a theological literature prohibition and persecution according to legislation on extremism; the Catholics' and the

Protestants' complaints – prohibition for action carrying out, lease and registration deprivation.

Thirdly, the faithful can actively act in public virtue protection front. From the middle of 2000-ss the faithful became more consolidated.

Fourthly, there is a mechanism for own interest lobbying through social structures. The leaders are the public organizations associated with the members of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Protestants.

Are these mechanisms really effective? Are a state and a society ready to come to meet the religious organizations?

According to survey data in 2007 the most part of the Russians (54%) trust to ROC. ROC yields only to the President of the Russian Federation (68%). Besides, the most part of the Russians (55%) suppose that ROC must have the special relations with the state. How is the state going to establish the relations with the religious organizations? As it's known in 2008 the President of the Russian Federation met officially only with the members of ROC, the Moslems and the Judaists. So, there was no official meeting with the representatives of the other confessions during the first year of Medvedev's presidency. As for bodies of local authority then they support ROC as the first confession in many regions, however, they seldom agree with extremely "pro-orthodox" policy. There where there are traditionally more the Moslems, the Buddhists and the Gentiles in comparison with the members of ROC the regional power supports, first of all, just these religions. The regional power attitude towards non-orthodox Christian confessions in the subjects of the Russian Federation varies from good to tolerant. The Lutherans have the best relations with authorities but the Pentecostals – the most conflict.

To what concrete collaborative mechanisms does the authority readiness for cooperation bring? First of all, the religious figures are included in Boards on collaboration with the religious unions. Practically all the major federal confessions are presented in Board on collaboration with the religious unions under the President of the Russian Federation: the members of the ROC and Old Believers', the Armenians-Gregorians, the Moslems, the Judaists, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Baptists, the Adventists and the Pentecostals). The local authorities usually take into account many-confession in the subjects of the federation: though the members of the ROC are the leaders in Soviets (100%) and the Moslems (80%), however, the other confessions are presented (the Judaists-45%), the Lutherans, the Baptists and the Pentecostals -39%), the Catholics -32%) and etc. Then, from the middle of 2000-ss one begins including the religious leaders in the public representations (for example, in the Public Chamber). The ROC, the Moslems, the Judaists and the Pentecostals are also presented. Bodies of state power and bodies of local authorities periodically make proposals in favor of confessions. Mostly the proposals are associated with the ROC and the other so-called traditional confessions. The most famous are the projects of the laws on "Traditional religions". The Russian state beginning from 1990-ss concludes agreements on cooperation with the religious organizations in the sphere of education, charity, patriotic education and etc.

The state clearly prefers the ROC as a partner (74% of all the agreements), then the Judaists follow (9%), the Moslems (6%), the Buddhists, the Baptists, the Adventists and the Pentecostals – 3%. The local authorities in the subjects of the Russian Federation usually noticing and recognizing many confessions, nevertheless, prefer concluding the official agreements with the ROC (83%).

Conclusions:

1. The religious factor is important even in such secular country as Russia and one should take it into consideration.

2. In many countries of the world the political parties are legalized based on religion so there are sufficient reasons to state a question on granting a charter for the Russian religious organizations to establish their political parties.

3. Nevertheless, the Russian experience shows that the parties based on religion weren't effective. The religious organizations preferred and prefer acting either by means of contacts with the representatives of power or through the social organizations.

4. Power is ready to cooperate with the religious organizations and come to meet them, however, clearly prefers the ROC or the other "traditional" religious organizations (in some subjects of the Russian Federation).

"Mir i politika", M., 2010, N 7, p. 86–90.

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TRANSFORMATION OF THE PROVINCIAL

SOVIET TATARIAN NOMENCLATURE

INTO THE REGIONAL RULING ELITE OF TATARSTAN

The study of the ruling elite of Tatarstan (RT) raises at least two related problems. In what way the elite for a short historic period (for 2–3 years) was able to ensure the actually monopolistic control over economic and political spheres of life in the republic?

The regional regime installed in Tatarstan in the beginning of the 1990s does not match one of the four types of regional regimes mentioned by V. Gelman. Resembling to a larger extent the type, called “the victor gets all”, the regional regime of RT differs from it in actual absence of elite changes and in rapid tempo of cessation of the undetermined situation and restoration of the control over the region by the elite.

In Saratov region, used as a research field for determination of the regime’s type, it was installed by the middle of the 1990s following for a rather long period the struggle among elite groups. Really, the rapid victory was possible thanks to the internal regional features, including unity of the victorious elite? To what extent this monolithic feature was kept further and is it the specific feature of the ruling elite of Tatarstan? First, it is necessary to answer the question about the reasons of the rapid and complete victory of the ruling elite of RT and the defeat of its rivals on the eve of the 1990s; later one should analyze its structure for the 2000s.

The peculiarities of both the transformation processes in the republic itself and of the contemporary structure of the elite in Tatarstan are connected with the specifics of “Soviet heritage” in the Tatarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Like in other industrial-agrarian regions, for the last Soviet period in TASSR the differentiation of the nomenclature elite was determined mainly by the spheres of activities of one or other nomenclature segment; and this nomenclature was as follows: the functionaries at the republican level (obkom), the administrators at the republican level (Council of Ministers); the directors of industrial enterprises (two groups – the directors of the enterprises in the oil industry and the directors of agricultural enterprises); the agrarian sector’s managers; the city functionaries.

The leading positions were occupied by the republican functionaries, but in 1989 the division of power was changed for the

benefit of the leading managers in the economic sphere. In September 1989, following the departure of G. Usmanov to occupy a high post in Moscow, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers and former minister of land-reclamation for 14 years M. Shaimiyev became the first secretary of obkom of the CPSU. This life vector of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was quite logical: the republican Council of Ministers was mainly in charge of agriculture, since 80% of republican industrial enterprises were subordinates to the federal authorities, 18% - subordinates to RSFSR and only 2% (trade, transport and agriculture) were in charge of the Council of Ministers of TASSR. Owing to the specifics of the resources kept under control by “the party functionaries” they maintained close contacts mainly with directors of industrial enterprises, while the functionaries of the Council of Ministers maintained contacts with the agrarians.

Probably, the great change of correlation of forces might not have taken place, but the democratic movement rendered assistance to M. Shaimiyev to get rid of his rivals. In February 1990, as a result of “regional revolutions” secretaries of the CPSU obkom A. Bulatov (formerly the head of holding “Myasoprom RT”) and A. Rodygin (formerly deputy director of Kazan radio-electronic institute) lost their posts. The Supreme Soviet of TASSR, elected in 1990, comprised many city and local party functionaries (25% of deputies), but the majority of deputies were secretaries of rural districts. The coalition of industrial and agrarian managers was formed. But what position was occupied by the directors of industrial enterprises and of the city functionaries?

The directors of industrial enterprises officially were subordinated to the Union and Russian structures but actually they were dependent on the regional leadership (obkom functionaries) in terms of decisions concerning priorities of the republican economic development

and the control over industrial management. The obkom party functionaries got additional authorities in governance of regional economy due to their greater role in the sphere of coordination of economic development officially controlled by numerous departments. As a result, the effect of the strong departmental subordination was displayed in Tataria in a different way comparing with other Russian regions marked by strong departmental feature, where the directors of big enterprises in many respects occupied the status, which was higher than the status of party organs. In TASSR the level of inter-regional autonomy of the most economic actors depended on the success of their mutual actions with the party elite.

The configuration of the actors raises questions about the events on the eve of the 1990s. If the level of mutual action between regional party functionaries and the directorate was so successful, why at the crucial moment of transformation the directorate rapidly lost its influence and a chance to have an impact in the favorable outcome for it? One should take into account some events, including the elections of people's deputies of the USSR in 1989. The directorate's representatives took an active part in the elections and ...confronted a vehement opposition of the new democratic movement. Many activists of this movement regarded the word "director" as a synonym of wordings "member of nomenclature" and "party bureaucrat", – the word, which was transformed into the negative label.

It is difficult to say whether this phenomenon was an element of the conscious political game or it was a spontaneous result; but the directorate turned out to become the functionaries' vanguard against the democratic mass movement; and this vanguard was greatly weakened and demoralized. For a long time a chance was lost for any mutual action of the directorate and the democratic movement against functionaries or agrarians.

Thus, the groups of the directorate and of the city functionaries submitted to the victors and to a large extent were integrated with them by the year of 1990. The pre-condition of this integration was slackening of the directorate (and in August 1991 – also of the city managers). The issue of an equal alliance or cartel was hardly probable as a matter for discussion, although some vital interests of the subordinate groups were respected.

Thanks to the wave of this support on 12 June 1991, the leader of the “integrated” elite was rather easily elected to become the president of the republic without any alternative. And what is more, the republican leadership, basing on the consolidated party-economy elite and enjoying support of the union center, was able not once to challenge the Russian leadership, which under the existed conditions lacked power to respond to them (August 1990 – adoption of the Declaration on Sovereignty of the Republic, which might be interpreted as an aspiration for sovereignty outside the framework of RSFSR; May-June 1991 – the refusal to take part in elections of the President of Russia). Therefore the behavior of the leadership of Tatarstan in the events of August 1991 was quite predictable: it supported the GKChP. Only on 19 August M. Shaimiyev had a meeting with G. Yanayev and on 20 August he made the following declaration to the leadership of the city and republican organizations: “I am repeating again: the laws, the Constitution and all decisions of the State Committee for Emergency in the country and the directions of the President of the Republic are valid and operate... Those, who will act differently, will be responsible for their actions according to the laws of the state of emergency”.

The directorate was ready to follow the functionaries and the agrarians, supporting the republican sovereignty, the demand of the union status, the boycott of the Russian leadership and approval of the GKChP, but not the separation from Russia and proclamation of the

state independence of Tatarstan. A part of the directorate disapproved these intensions, and for the period of 1991–1992 this fact was evident in the course of voting on key decisions in the Supreme Soviet. And what is more, a certain split took place in the directorate corps.

In October 1991, when a group of activists of ethnic-national organizations tried to take by storm the building of the Supreme Soviet and the issue of independence of Tatarstan was put on the agenda, some directors and their deputies formed the group “Soglasie” (Consent) , which represented “a broad front” of all partisans of Russian orientation. At the same time, “it was an open secret in the Supreme Soviet that Bekh, the general director of “Kamaz”, provided nationalists with money after a telephone call of his superiors”, according to deputy of the State Duma V. Mikhailov.

The stimuli constituting the burden on the directorate in the opposite direction, probably, were stronger, and the resistance on the part of a group of directors against the republican functionaries remained a rise in rebellion “forced to their knees”. The republican functionaries were able to propose to the directorate the way to keep their interests and enrichment in some cases. This way supposed a complete obedience of the directorate to the functionaries and non-interference in political line of the latter. This way, recognizing personal interests of one or other director, was incompatible with recognition of common interests of the directorate as a special actor or a separate group.

This way supposed at the first stage the transfer of the enterprises from the union and Russian subordination to the republican subordination, although they remained the state enterprises. As a temporary option the regional state property suited both republican functionaries and the directorate. Probably, at that moment some directors might prefer to see their enterprises as a state property. But,

on the one side, Russia did not display any interest for this turn of events, and, on the other side, the authorities of Tatarstan threatened the recalcitrant directors with all possible sanctions.

The following step was the privatization, which was started in Tatarstan at the same time as in other parts of Russia but was characterized by the following specific feature: it was effected by their “own” people for their “own” ones. Side by side the Russian vouchers were circulated simultaneously with privatization vouchers of Tatarstan (commissioned also in September 1992), while the trade of state shares started in 1993. It is impossible to assert that privatization in Tatarstan was executed exclusively according to the schemes of insiders. It was carried out mainly according to these schemes, and “aliens” were able to acquire a part of republican property usually only by decision of the president and only at the reciprocal basis, having proposed something valuable to the elite of Tatarstan. This course of events suited most directors: they got a part of shares and actually used the enterprise’s assets without outside control, since they were guaranteed from the sale to an outside investor by the control package of the state or by “the golden share” possessed by the republican organ of power.

As a result, by the middle of the 2000s, the republican leadership kept all republican enterprises under its complete or partial control. (If the state possesses less than 50% of shares, the rest of them belong to the companies of the leading republican functionaries or their relatives; the state has its definite part of shares in these companies).

Following the signature of the agreement between the state organs of the RF and the RT in February 1994, a threat on the part of the Center and on the part of outside economic actors was reduced to the minimum; the president basing on the support of agrarians and oil industry managers excluded from the political sphere, first, the democratic opposition and, further, the Communists and Tatarian

ethnic-nationalists. The ruling elite remained as a matter of fact the sole significant republican political actor. Exactly at this time, the ruling elite became subject to the political scientists' analysis.

A number of the mentioned characteristics of the RT regional elite remain valid up to the present time. As early as at that time, the ruling elite of the RT was mainly mono-ethnic (over 80% were Tatars). About 90% of the present political elite of Tatarstan occupied the former nomenclature posts (former party and state officials accounted for 60%). For the beginning of the 1990s, the representatives of the second and the third echelons of nomenclature came to power in Moscow, while in Tatarstan the first echelon still is the unlimited ruler composed mainly by the people coming from rural districts.

The specific rural culture brought by the ruling elite to the power relations includes the traditional norms of respect for rank, the internal rejection of the opposition and heterodoxy, the patronage of the people coming from their milieu and mainly of fellow-villagers, the suspicion to "aliens", particularly representatives of educated strata, the perception of their own infallibility etc. Almost all members of the local elite have higher education mostly in the sphere of agriculture (about 50% of the elite representatives graduated from agricultural and veterinary higher education institutions). Most representatives of the elite are the middle-aged people (40–60 years old).

At the same time, the main stable characteristics of the RT elite should be corrected to some extent. Since 1998, the group of "young financiers" (graduates of the Kazan financial-economic institute and members of the team of the prime-minister) gained in importance. The cadre changes in 2005, particularly since April 2005, when I. Metshin at the age of 40 years became the mayor of Kazan, promoted rejuvenation of the elite. However, the main body of the elite remains

as a whole quite stable without big changes since 1998 up to 2008 inclusively.

For a long time, the regional elite of Tatarstan might be regarded as a typical elite of the republics in the RF: the rural group by its origin, the nomenclature according to the former type of activities, the authoritarian-patriarchic group characterized by its political culture, the mainly mono-ethnic groups characterized by existence of clanship relations (the accent on personal loyalty in relations among the groups' members). At the same time, at present, the RT elite is characterized by its monolithic character and homogeneity in relation to the external environment.

A more thorough study of the biographies and mutual relations of the RT elite's members results in another conclusion. The RT elite actually is not as much monolithic as on the ace of it. It is united but consists of several groups, which are the elite groups of the second echelon (the sub-elite groups), to the author's mind, or "the clans" characterized by their internal hierarchic structure. Each of them has its own leader with the indisputable authority and an example for the group's members. These groups are separated from each other and sometimes are rivals. For the 1980s, the regional nomenclature to a large extent was structured according to the spheres of their activities; at present, the RT elite is structured according to the personal-direction principle, and economic managers, officials of the law enforcement bodies and mass media professionals may be members of the same group etc.

This model may be characterized as a "united but segmented elite", as an intermediate option between the model of the monolithic elite and the split of elites: within the framework of the united elite, there co-exist sub-elite groups, where some elite may cooperate with each other and create "the coalition", while the other groups try to question their hegemony and to defend their interests.

For the first half of the 2000s, it was possible to mention five sub-elite groups in the RT elite. Besides the group of M. Shaimiyev, a certain influence was enjoyed by the group of F. Mukhametshin (the speaker of the State Council of the RT), by the group of R. Minnikhanov (the prime minister), the group of R. Muratov (the vice-prime minister), and the group of K. Iskhakov (“Kazan group”). In January of 2009, M. Shaimiyev, who was included in the list of candidates for the post of the president of the RT, refused to accept this nomination. D. Medvedev proposed to the State Council the candidature of R. Minnikhanov, the prime minister of the RT, who on 4 February was elected the president of the RT. Following designation of K. Iskhakov to the post of the representative of the President of the RF in the Far Eastern Federal District, some members of his group were included in other groups, while others were designated to the official posts in the Far Eastern Federal District. At the same time, the leaders of the groups are included in the main republican group headed by M. Shaimiyev. The unity of the elite is kept in this way, despite contradictions among the leaders of the sub-groups (it is not excluded that quarrels among them are caused intentionally to give the great leader a chance to play the role of the principal arbiter and to let an ambitious second-rate leader down a peg, which happened not once with K. Iskhakov).

The other close milieu is composed of friends of “the family” (R. Minnikhanov, his brothers, minister of internal affairs of the RT A. Safarov).

Since the year of 2006, the RT elite was going on through the period of the most rapid consolidation; its level of consolidation surpasses its consolidation in the period of 1995–1997. It succeeded to minimize the influence of K. Iskhakov group and of other opposition outside groups, which are deprived of the chance to influence not only

the process of taking political decisions but also the political process as a whole.

By the time of forming by the leadership of “United Russia” the list of candidates for the post of the president of Tatarstan to be presented to the president of Russia (December 2009) it was possible to speak about three representatives of the regional elite, who had a chance to be the successors of M. Shaimiyev: the chairman of the State Council of the RT F. Mukhametshin, the prime minister of the RT R. Minnikhanov, the mayor of Kazan I. Metshin. The two of them are the leaders of the sub-elite groups. The choice of R. Minnikhanov as a successor of M. Shaimiyev was not accidental owing to the structure of the RT elite. The president of the RT is the leader of one of the strongest elite’s sub-groups, who is known as an efficient manager having his own team and not associated with the epoch of struggle for sovereignty in 1990-1994. The leaders of other sub-groups either do not have a strong team (“clan”) or have lost it, or have been too closely associated with the beginning of the 1990s. Probably, the move of R. Minnikhanov from the second highest post to the first highest post in the republic will accelerate further evolution of the regional elite, particularly its rejuvenation, and will ensure its smooth evolution.

For the 2000–2009, the elite in Tatarstan was marked by existence of some sub-elite groups, where their members are connected usually by common origin, which determines cultural and mental nearness and loyalty to the leader. The latter feature is particularly significant; the groups are identified by the family names of the leaders: the groups of Shaimiyev, Mukhametshin, Minnikhanov, Muratov. The interests of the elite groups may not coincide with particular issues; “the intermediaries”- the people, who are members of two elite groups simultaneously, provide the ruling elite with additional links.

The sub-elite groups in economy of Tatarstan to a large extent are congruent with the political elite groups: the economic managers connected with M. Shaimiyev have the most influential position; there are groups of enterprises connected mainly with R. Minnikhanov, F. Mukhametshin and R. Muratov. Therefore one may speak about a high level of universality of elite groups of Tatarstan (except the counter-elite, probably). Membership in the political elite automatically ensures an access not only to the power structures but also to economic resources. The period of formation of the regional elite, which consisted of a part of the old party elite, the relatives and friends of the clan as well as its new members, actually terminated by 1995. By this time the opposition actually sustained a defeat.

The lack of “external enemy” resulted in emergence of internal elite contradictions: in 1998 there appeared a split in the ruling elite (R. Altynbayev and others), and opposition further was expelled from the ruling elite of the RT. The first half of the 2000s was characterized by a latent opposition between the republican leadership and the administration of Kazan: the conflict between the group, headed by K. Iskhakov and the groups headed by R. Minnikhanov and R. Muratov. The success of K. Iskhakov group at the municipal elections in October 2005 became the precondition of its disappearance. By the end of 2005, the unity of the national elite was restored (by liquidation and partial integration of K. Iskhakov group); at the same time the stabilization was installed being the main slogan of the elite in the RT. The trend to rejuvenation and renovation of the elite in the RT is preserved, which was clearly reflected in the designation of R. Minnikhanov as a new president of the Republic of Tatarstan

*“Politeks: politicheskaya ekspertiza”,
S-Pt, 2010, t. 6, N 2, p. 31–57.*

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THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN CONTEMPORARY ADYGEYA

If one considers the North Caucasus as a specific boundary between Europe and Asia, between the Christian and the Islamic civilization, the Republic of Adygeya becomes a kind of outpost in this boundary. At the same time, the complexity of religious situation in Adygeya is correlated with the relatively quiet political situation. Although the specifics of the contemporary religious life in this republic may not be regarded as characteristic for all republics in the North Caucasus and all the more for other regions of the Russian Federation, the study of these specific features is important in principle in the search for the factors related to strengthening unity of Russia, to sizing up a probable ethnic, religious and other aspects of consolidation of a similar poly-ethnic community.

The aims of the present study are as follows: to see the common and specific trends in religious life of Adygeya, to find out the sources of the religious process specifics, to consider the problem of inter-confessional relations, to appraise the level of tolerance in society. The author used original field materials, collected in the course of ethnic-geographic expedition to Adygeya in October 2009. The materials of the State Archive of the Russian Federation were of great help.

Discussing the peculiarities of the religious life in Adygeya as a republic in the North Caucasus, one can not help paying attention to its geographic situation, exactly its borders. Complete integration of Adygeya in Krasnodarski krai, the lack of borders with any other republic of the North Caucasus jointly with its particularly specific borders cut by the Soviet scissors, guided by specific perceptions of in the process of unification of peoples, for the whole period of existence

of this subject could not help having impact on the national and religious situation in the republic.

The national situation in the republic was as follows in 2008: Russians – 275.2 thousand people, Adygs – 114.2 thousand people, Armenians – 15 thousand people, Ukrainians – 8.9 thousand people, Kurds – 4 thousand people, Tatars – 3.6 thousand people, Turks – 3.6 thousand people, Gipsy – 2 thousand people.

In addition, the people of other nationality in number from 1000 to 200 live in Adygeya: Byelorussians, Greeks, Azerbaijanis, Germans, Chechens. Of special significance is existence of the groups of new migrants: the Chechens re-settled in 1999 to Adygeya, mainly in Maikop, the capital of the republic, in number of 4000-5000 people, and Adygs, coming from Kosovo (200 people), who were proposed to settle in new aul Mafehable, which was built specially for them and still is not accommodated by all of them.

The religious life in Adygeya is marked by its complexity. The general level of religiousness of the population in the North Caucasus is higher as a whole than in other Russian regions, which is connected with predominance of the rural population with bigger religious traditions comparing with the city population. By 31 December 2008, there were registered 89 religious organizations, including 28 organizations located on the territory of Maikop.

The Orthodoxy claims for a non-formal status of “principal” confession and plays a dominant role in Adygeya. The North Caucasian eparchies of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), including Maikop and Adugeya eparchies created in 1994, are two of the biggest eparchies of the ROC. At present, 51 parishes are registered in Maikop and Adygeya eparchies, while only 10–20 parishes are registered in Siberian and Far Eastern eparchies. Regretfully, both the orthodox believers and the Muslims recognize the principle - “the people have

one faith”, and therefore “the historically Orthodox” or “historically Muslim” part of the population automatically is fixed to the Eparchies or Spiritual Departments, correspondingly.

Although, according to appraisals of the eparchy, about 70% of the Russian speaking population consider themselves as orthodox believers, including only 10–12% of those, who are aware of Orthodox dogmas, the local authorities consider Islam as a main religion of the republic. In this respect, one should pay attention to the cadre policy in Adygeya: about 70% of the principal official posts are occupied by the representatives of the indigenous nationality. The first mosque in the republic was built in aul Tahtamukai only in 1994, while 38 other mosques were built later for the period of 15 years. The total population of Adygeya makes 440 thousands, and the number of Muslims accounts for 150 thousand people, which represents the rise by one hundred times comparing with 1994. About 600-800 Muslims live in Maikop, according to Nurbia Emizh, mufti of the Spiritual Department of Muslims of the Republic of Adygeya and Krasnodarski krai; the mosque for extreme unction was opened in Maikop only in 2005. Although the Muslim communities in auls are not numerous (20–40 people), these estimations make appraise the contemporary situation of Islam, which is characterized by its “second revival”, as a just born religion.

The repatriates from the Near East countries, mainly from Syria and Turkey, play a significant role in Islamic renaissance. As a rule, they keep strong ethnic traditions correlated with a rather high level of religious self-consciousness. Unlike Adygs of the Near East, the local Adygs themselves do not recognize the dominant position of religion. At present, the indigenous population shares the view that the traditional values (adygage) play the leading role in their life, while the

complex of traditions, rites and faiths (adyge habze) is supposed to be older than the religious elements absorbed by them.

The residents of the republic hold the following position: there exist in the region two main confessions – Orthodoxy and Islam, as well as several traditional religions, including Armenian apostolic church and Judaism, registered in Maikop by one organization, accordingly. All other religious organizations are considered to be “the sects”, for instance, all Protestant churches in Adygeya and new religious beliefs (Jenovah’s Witnesses) and old-believers.

The North Caucasus, like the territories of Ukraine and the Baltic states, at present represent one of traditional centers of dissemination of Protestantism in the Russian Empire and the USSR. The church of Evangelic Christian Baptists in Maikop is proud of its over hundred year history. At the

Same time, Orthodoxy was disseminated on the territory of Adygeya for the IV–V centuries, but due to historic reasons it consolidated its position only for the second half of the XIX century, while Islam was a dominant confession for the period of XV–XIX centuries and goes on through the period of its renaissance now. With due account of a great number of Protestants in Adygeya and of the long history of this religion, it is necessary to consider as a positive factor the lack of any significant conflict between Muslims and Protestants.

The authorities display the policy of indifference towards Orthodoxy (the construction of the Orthodox Church cathedral in Maikop was started ten years ago and still rests unfinished) but limit the activities of non-traditional confessions. For instance, clergymen of Baptist church regularly have to visit the law enforcement bodies’ offices and to pay visits to representatives of the security forces. The authorities of Adygeya made the proposal to put into point 1 of

article 17 of the federal law on freedom of conscience and religious associations the new provision, which should prohibit propaganda and dissemination of religious literature in the kindergartens and schools as well as by private visits at home.

The special relations of the Orthodox Church with the authorities seem to be based on the common struggle against “sectarians”. And good and warm relations between the Muslim and the Orthodox leaders in Adygeya are consolidated on the same basis. Up to the present time, their friendship is built in the face of common threat. It is evident that the ROC lacks material and intellectual resources to oppose the consolidation of other confessions.

Summing up, it is possible to note a relative stability of religious life in Adygeya. Apart from the republican capital, there are several settlements, where simultaneously are registered two-three different religious communities. As examples, one may cite the city of Adygeisk, stanitsa Giagiskaya, settlement Krasnogvardeiskoe, auls Tahtamukai, Koshehabl, Ponezukai, Hakurinihabl.

In conclusion, it is possible to make some general prognoses about development of the religious situation in Adygeya.

Probably, the ROC capacity in the region has been already realized, and one should not expect to see a radical rise of the number of parishes and Sunday schools. The Church will try to consolidate its position mainly by cooperation with the authorities.

The reserves of the Islamic infrastructure have not been exhausted. The communities will be enlarged mainly by representatives of the youth.

At the same time, the relations between the ROC leadership and Muslim communities will be friendly up to the time, when they are united confronting a common threat in terms of acceleration of

activities of other confessions, and as long as there will not prevail the point of view of the clergy, which has a more radical conceptions.

“Etnicheskie traditsii pered vyzovzmi globalizatsii v usloviykh krizisa”, M., 2010, p. 71–76.

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THE ETHNIC-POLITICAL PROCESSES

IN KARACHAEVO-CHERKESSIA IN 2005–2010

For the whole post-Soviet period the Karachaevo–Cherkessian Republic was the zone of permanent ethnic-political tension. In the end of the 1980s – the beginning of the 1990s, the KCR was marked by the unprecedented mobilization of ethnicity. For the further period its capacity did not shrivel up and had a constant impact on the political situation in the republic. The often splashes of ethnic tension in the KCR (1991, 1994–1995, 1999, 2004, 2005–2006) coincided with the most significant political events, primarily with elections of the president and of the deputies of the People’s Assembly, with adoption of important legislative acts. The high activity of public and public-political movements, established according to the ethnic principle, demonstrates constant potential of the ethnic-political tension in the KCR.

The questionable successes of the period of consolidation of the power vertical, the unpopularity of the presidents’ political activities, the lack of positive economic dynamics and other general reasons created the sources for existence of constant latent public dissatisfaction, which periodically acquired open forms and were accompanied by splashes of activities by ethnic movements.

In this connection, a considerable test for firmness of the whole North Caucasian region and particularly of Karachaevo–Cherkessia

became the process of putting the local self-government system into conformity with the federal law N 131 on the general principals of organizing the local self-government in the RF. This law was called upon to create a new system of the local self-government consisting of district, city, rural municipal and city structures. The attempts made in Karachaevo–Cherkessia to realize the provisions of this law resulted in a new growth of ethnic-political contradictions; the widely used (in the 1990s) methods of political struggle were again adopted in practice: references to the facts of “historic offences”, the attempts to legitimize certain “collective rights of ethnos”, new projects of territorial re-division of the republic, restoration of formerly existed national districts etc. Thus, once more the axiom was proved that any land re-allotment or administrative re-distribution in the North Caucasus immediately acquires ethnic-political interpretation.

For instance, the separation of one third of land from Abazin aul Kubina and its inclusion by the official decision into the competence of Ust-Dzhegutin municipality caused intensification of activities displayed by Abazin movement “Adgylara”. Its leaders at the extraordinary congress (27 June 2005) protested against the division of the compact settlement of ethnos and demanded to create a separate Abazin district. The leaders of the movement arranged a series of meetings and pickets; as a result, the republican authorities had to take a significant decision. Five settlements were taken out and were separated from three districts (Prikubanski, Ust-Dzhigutinski and Habezhski), and as a result of it the Abazin district appeared on the political map of the republic. The formation of Abazin district in Karachaevo–Cherkessia created a precedent, which promoted activities of the leaders of other ethnoses. The leaders of ethnic movements in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria discussed the issue of using this experience.

In 2006, the demand to create the Nogai district was declared at the congress of the Nogai people. Soon afterwards, the Nogai district was established in Karachaevo–Cherkessia.

The representatives of the Russian-speaking population of Karachaevo–Cherkessia also raised the issue of creation of the Russian Cossacks district. However, this process was limited with oral declarations. The leaders of the Cherkessian national movement rapidly reanimated the project of “Great Cherkessia”.

The emergence of two new national districts on the territory of Karachaevo–Cherkessia, on the one side, demonstrated a high activity of public-political movements, and, on the other side, the lack of efficient legal mechanisms for solving the problems caused by ethnic-territorial contradictions.

At the same time, for the period of 2005–2006, new organizations emerged and started their activities in Karachaevo–Cherkessia; the first of them was the Congress of the Karachai People, which proclaimed as its primary aim the consolidation of the Karachai nation, its renaissance and development, the preservation of Karachai representation in the republican organs of power and the tenure by a representative of the people of the highest state post. To a large extent, in opposition to this organization there was established the Public Council of Peoples of the North Caucasus, including representatives of the Cherkessian, Abazin, Cossacks and Ossetian public organizations of Karachai–Cherkessia, while members of the Congress refused to take part in the Council. The ethnic absolute difference of these organizations also testified to a new aggravation of ethnic-political contradictions in Karachai–Cherkessia.

The other significant element of destabilization of ethnic-political situation in Karachai–Cherkessia was the violation of the principle of national parity in the state bodies, formed for the post-Soviet period.

Thus, the official power in Karachai–Cherkessia was represented by the president – a Karachai, the speaker of the parliament – a Russian, the chairman of the government – a Cherkess.

However, the break deviation from the former cadre policy was declared by B. Ebzeyev, coming to power in Karachai–Cherkessia (since 4 September 2008), who was not connected with the previous period of political development of the republic and, consequently, was free from informal obligations to any regional actors. The cadre revolution in Karachai–Cherkessia did not take place, but the national long-term parity was violated. In October 2008, V. Kaishev, a Greek by nationality was designated as the prime minister of the KCR, although, according to the principle of ethnic quota, this post should have been occupied by a representative of the Cherkessian people. In its turn, Z. Dokshokov, a Cherkess was nominated to the post of the speaker of the parliament.

The mentioned cadre replacements were subject to a wide discussion in Karachai–Cherkessia. In November 2008, Cherkessian organization “Adyge Hase” convened an extraordinary congress, where the discussion took place on the persecution of the Cherkess people in Karachai–Cherkessia and on their wish to create their own political entity. However, it should be noted that the cadre changes in the country resulted mainly in infringement of representation of Russians and not Cherkessians.

Further, the ethnic-political contradictions aggravated. It was shown by various extremist and nationalist critical publications in mass media and Internet, as well as by repeated protest actions, conflicts between groups of the youth, presented as daily quarrels. In this connection, the extraordinary congress of the Cherkessian people, held on 5 June 2010, was a symptomatic event; its delegates took the decision to urge towards creation of an independent subject within the

RF. This decision was supported by the Adyg movements in Kabardin-Balkaria, Adygeya and Krasnodarski krai.

The decisions of the congress were disapproved in Karachai–Cherkessia itself. The leaders of public and public-political organizations of the KCR (movement “Rus”, Batalpashinski division of the Kuban Cossacks forces, Osssetian organization “Alan”, Karachai “Dzhamagat”, Nogai “Birlyk” and others) in their declaration interpreted this decision of the congress as a destructive action, ignoring interests of the multi-national people of Karachai–Cherkessia, destabilizing the public-political situation in the KCR and in the North Caucasus as a whole.

Thus, the ethnic-political situation in the KCR keeps a conflict’s potential. The KCR needs elaboration and realization of the complex problem of modernization. Only its success is able to liquidate popularity of centrifugal trends in the milieu of ethnic elites and public groups mobilized by them. A special attention should be paid to the support given to the institutions of the civil society aimed at the constructive legal dialogue with the organs of power.

*“Fundamentalnye problemy prostranstvennogo razvitiya
Yuga Rossii: mezhdistsiplinarny sintez”,
R-na-Donu, 2010, p. 305–308.*

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WILL THE ASERTION ABOUT EXISTENCE OF LOCAL CIVILIZATIONS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS GO BEYOND THE TALKING STAGE?

The geopolitical unique situation of the Caucasus is quite evident. It is the region, where the religious barrier was displayed and

at the same time the centuries-old reciprocity of Christianity, primarily Orthodoxy, Islam and Buddhism was a long-term tradition; the dominant trade routes passed here. Therefore the Caucasus always turned out to be in the center of struggle among great powers of the ancient times, the Middle Age and the Modern Time, which aspired for realizing not only their military-strategic and economic interests but also urged towards dissemination of their civilization-cultural valuable systems.

The Soviet historians and ethnographers within the framework of formation analysis characterized the Caucasus as a complicatedly structured Caucasian historic-ethnographic province, rather logically separating the Trans-Caucasus and the North-Caucasian cultural region and Dagestan, which was close to it (primarily, in terms of formation models). Given separate questionable problems, the history of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia was quite adequately placed in the theory of social-economic formations adopted by the Soviet science. But it failed to work out the united approach to the typology and the level of development of mountaineers and nomads societies before joining Russia as applied to the peoples of the North Caucasus (including Dagestan), notes V. Chernous. The social relations of mountaineers were qualified as tribal, feudal-slavery, semi-feudal and semi-patriarchic, early-feudal and developed feudal, multi-structural etc.

For the 1970s, academician G. Melikishvili tried to find out the exit from the existed situation, proposing conception of “mountaineers’ feudalism”, which was further developed and concretized in works of Georgian ethnographers: Z. Anchabadze, A. Robakidze, G. Togoshvili, R. Khoradze and others. A certain sketchiness and static character of the proposed model as well as the marked typological and staged peculiarities (in particular, the absence of feudal property for land),

which in essence led “mountaineers’ feudalism” beyond the limits of the feudal formation, did not satisfy most experts in the Caucasus, although the theoretical research of Georgian scientists stimulated the study of the problem.

For the 1990s, the first steps were taken in order to apply the civilization approach to history of the Caucasus jointly with keeping traditions of systemic analysis characteristic for the research within the framework of formation methodology. R. Abdulatipov, T. Ktsoyeva and other ideologists of “the Caucasian Home” tried to substantiate the hypothesis of “the Caucasian civilization”, “the united Caucasian super-ethnos”, based on the common historic mentality. To justify lawfulness of elevating the cultural zone of the Caucasus to the rank of a self-dependent civilization some authors stress the following factors mentioned further.

The Caucasus is a mountainous country. The all peoples of the region possess the features connected with the long life in the mountainous natural environment: the peculiarities of economy and daily life, the coincided aspects of pre-Christian and pre-Muslim pagan beliefs, the common elements of myths, the specifics of morals and traditions. The mountaineers possess a peculiar mentality, emotional type, “the sun in blood”.

The specifics of economy, plant-growing, handicraft in the mountains and foot-hills had their impact on similar cloths, architectural forms and gastronomic habits. The common destiny, the opposition to the Iranian and Turkish expansion and the dramatic collisions of the Caucasian wars in the XIX century – all this unites the Caucasus.

The tribal and feudal relations are particularly close and rather firm. The life for many centuries far from big events of the world history, the complicated positive and negative relations with Russian

culture and the agrarian and pre-industrial situation for many centuries—all this is actually inherent in life of people in the whole Caucasus.

Many features of spiritual culture coincide. The epos “Narty” has much in common with works of Shota Rustaveli, the verses of Kaisyn Kuliyev resemble works of Rasul Gamzatov.

Even superficial consideration fixes the identical moments of national psychology: the freedom-loving spirit and hot-headed nature, recognition of authority of elders and scrupulous observation of etiquette norms.

The Caucasus is often used to be called “the second Eurasia”, the region, where Asian and European cultures are mutually correlated.

But other points of view exist as well. Reflecting the views of the researchers, who study this problem, the works are being published, which orient to description of various models concerning use of civilization approach to the North Caucasus. A. Anikeev develops the conception of the North Caucasian civilization and is occupied with the problem of its typology. The North Caucasian civilization is understood as a “human communal life” at the level of daily life. This term is often used in historic texts as a one of synonyms of civilization. Further, the authors determine the North Caucasian civilization as a peculiar social form of arrangement of human life based on the common principles (law, duty, faith, money etc.).

Despite the growth of the number of works proposing various civilization models for analysis of social-cultural history of the Caucasus or the North Caucasus, this problem was only raised and needs further discussion.

The peoples of the North Caucasus to different degrees were involved in the periphery of the ancient-eastern and antique civilizations and later of Byzantine-Slavonic and the two-vector Islamic (Sunni and Shiite) civilizations. The origins of formation of the

majority of contemporary peoples of the Caucasus as a result of the synthesis of the Caucasian substrata with the migration flows go the Middle-Ages, according to the researchers.

The successors of the East-Christian (Byzantine) civilization remain Armenia and Georgia, while Azerbaijan is a part of Islamic civilization. The mountainous peoples of the Caucasus, being subject to influence of various civilizations, religions and cultures, by the XV–XVI centuries created the “Caucasian mountaineers’ civilization” characterized by poly-ethnicity and religious syncretism; this civilization was marked by the correlation of mountains, foothills and plains, which determines mutual connection of terraced land cultivation, Alpine stock breeding and horsemanship, psychological features fixed by peculiar mountaineers’ codes, dominance of non-state (but not pre-state) forms of self-organizations, V. Chernous made the supposition. The term “Caucasian mountaineers’ civilization” seems to be more preferable than the “North Caucasian” term, since it covers some regions of the Trans Caucasus, is connected with some mountaineers’ enclaves in other regions of the world and differs from them primarily in their moral-ethic codes(Adyg, Habze, Apsuara, Namus and others), according to other authors of this conception. Besides, the space of the North Caucasus (including the adjacent territory) was a contact zone of the Caucasian mountaineers’ civilization with the world of nomads as well as with the Russian Orthodox civilization.

Having analyzed the specifics of the geographic environment, of the system of economic and political relations, of religious and spiritual values, E. Maiboroda asserts that neither the Caucasus as a whole, nor the North Caucasus ever represented a unique civilization, since the ethnoses of this region existed at different stages of historic development and often differed in the mode of life separated from each

other. And all the more, the sole Caucasian civilization did not and does not exist, being separated in the past by such mighty natural barrier as the Caucasian mountains, while at present – by the processes of disintegration and ethnic rivalry.

There is also a point of view of the authors, who consider that several civilizations mutually correlate with each other. A. Bijevo writes about existence of an original Adug pre-industrial civilization. A. Ahayev raised the issue of an original civilization in Dagestan. Having analyzed the traditional architecture, jamaat as a social institution, the influence of Arabic Muslim and of Russian culture, he came to the conclusion that Dagestan was an open and a conservative civilization. The culture of Dagestan was not dissolved subject to the strong impact of more developed civilizations. Having accepted Islamic dogmas, the Dagestanis remained faithful to mountaineers' customs. Muridism is another example of a symbiosis of Arabic Muslim dogmas and the mentality of Dagestanis.

Some attempts, which were made to create the united political system in the Caucasus, failed. The first experience of reforming the existed public order in the theocratic state was the attempt arranged by imam Shamil for the sake of uniting the peoples of Dagestan, Chechnya, Adug and Avar principalities for the period of the Caucasian war (1818–1864). The Kabardins remained loyal to Russia. The Ingushis actually did not take part in war, as well as the Balkars and Karachais. The internal contradictions among the peoples involved in Imamate (1834–1859), the refusal of Avar and Adyg princes to recognize some other's leadership led to disintegration of this state. After the Caucasian war the mountaineers' communities came back to the traditional life mode within the Russian empire.

The stage following afterwards may be connected with the process of installation of the Soviet power in the Caucasus and creation

of autonomies for the period of 1920s–1930s. In November 1920, the congress of peoples of Terek, held in Vladikavkaz, proclaimed establishment of the Mountaineers' Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; In January 1921, the corresponding Decree of the High Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR was adopted. The autonomous entity included Balkaria, Ingushetia, Kabarda, Karachai, North Ossetia and Chechnya. The process of separation in this artificial trans-ethnic entity occurred very soon, and on 7 July of 1924 the Mountaineers' ASSR was dissolved by the Decree of the HCEC.

It becomes evident that the experts in the Caucasus following the theoreticians of civilization conception directly connect the local civilization with existence of the state system. Proceeding from the absence of such united system in the Caucasus, they come to the conclusion that the Caucasus was never an original civilization.

For the beginning of the 1990s, the ideas of the Caucasian centrism were quite popular. It was supposed that the Caucasian centrism might become the theoretical and practical key principle for the peoples of the Caucasus; and it was supposed that it would be the basis of both the inter-Caucasian relations and the relations according to the principle East-Caucasus-West.

On the eve of the XXI century the civilization research became one of the most influential and perspective directions of social sciences. Against the background of the world processes, the question of civilization belonging and the connected problems acquired a special actuality, particularly for the countries and peoples, which were not definitely integrated in some or other civilization unity. Being in the zone of eastern and western civilization contact, periodically they turned out to be included in the frameworks of rather sustainable and sometimes accidental cultural unions. The contemporary western

scientific literature is characterized by various points of view on civilization belonging of the Caucasus and its different parts.

Being guided by certain criteria it is possible to regard the Caucasus as a peculiar sub-civilization, a number of authors think. These criteria were formed for the period of the Middle-Ages or before this period. The civilization represents a unity, but it is not homogeneous; within its limits one may indicate separate unities (sub-civilizations), where there exist certain determined mutual relations. The sub-civilization is a sovereign entity within the civilization, and it has its own system of values, norms and traditions. Should the Caucasus be considered a sub-civilization, it would be necessary to clarify its relations with other sub-civilizations, with neighboring civilizations as well as with the civilization, where it is regarded to be the sub-civilization. K. Katsitadze, having concluded that the Caucasian sub-civilization is a marginal zone among the neighboring civilizations, eliminated the need to comprehend this sub-civilization within the limits of any civilization.

The scientific literature contains the notion of “boundary civilization”; the Iberian-American, the Balkan and the Northern-Eastern Eurasian civilizations are included in the group qualified by this title. The following indications of these civilizations are taken into account: heterogeneity, poly-culture, liability, openness, elasticity, ability to acquire rapidly “alien” experience. These civilizations usually are regarded to be the result of the centuries-old symbiosis and synthesis of different cultures. From this point of view, the Caucasian civilization (sub-civilization) may be regarded as a boundary civilization.

According to the other point of view, the Caucasus represents a line of division among civilizations, the zone of their contacts. This version is described in the known work of S. Huntington, who

considers that Georgia, jointly with the whole Caucasus, represents the zone of contact and clash of civilizations. Christianity and Islam oppose each other over there, and one should take into account also political ambitions of the West. The consequence of this situation are the Caucasian conflicts, particularly the conflicts in Karabakh and Chechnya, since, according to S. Huntington, the most bloody conflicts in the world emerge exactly on the boundary territories of the civilizations.

Swedish researcher S. Korneli does not share the appraisal by S. Huntington of the Caucasian conflicts and regards that the Caucasian opinion of the theoreticians sharing the view on the clash of civilizations as nothing else as the stereotypes and the very simplified analysis of the conflicts. The determining factor in this region is the combination of nationalism and national interests but not the religious-civilization opposition.

The theory proposed by S. Huntington was questioned by many experts not only as far as the Caucasian problems are concerned, but it is difficult to disagree with the scientist, when he appraises the Caucasus as a zone of contact, the boundary among civilizations. For the whole period of its history the Caucasus actually represented a contact zone of western and eastern cultures and civilizations. As far as (marked Makfarlain) “the sad Caucasian scenario” allegedly drawn by the theory of S. Huntington is concerned, as S. Huntington noted himself, the meaning and authenticity of paradigm shall be appraised not by the meaning, whether it makes prediction on all what is going on in global politics, but by the answer to the question, whether it predicts more significant models than other paradigms.

“The peaceful Caucasus” and “the Eurasian corridor” are just the problems of global politics, and the significance of the theory on conflicts of civilizations is proved at least by the fact that it provoked

the search for alternative versions by politicians. The known initiatives of “the peaceful Caucasus” and “dialogue of cultures and civilizations” were the result of this research.

The other version regards the Caucasus as a united cultural space or cultural unity both from the historic and contemporary points of view. Actually, in this case the notion sub-civilization is replaced by the notion “united cultural space”. For instance, American researcher R. Suni noted that “side by side with national cultures, regional cultures developed as well...Thus, it is possible to speak about the Central Asian, Caucasian, Baltic, Eastern-Slavonic cultural spaces. For the whole period of its history, the Caucasus repeatedly was a witness to migration and movement of peoples. During these migration processes, the peoples mixed, the ethnic borders disappeared, determining creation of the multi-national Caucasian culture. This culture is very diverse, and at the same time it differs essentially from other cultures”.

Some researchers admit the version of probable existence of the Mediterranean civilization and discuss the Balkan-Caucasian type of this civilization unity. This point of view is based on the comparative analysis of psychological features, such as: the orientation to the event or relations; the relations between parents and children; the normative and actual distribution of gender roles.

Thus, all enumerated points of view give us information about great interest to the problems of the Caucasus, which exist in the scientific literature. Despite the lack of unity in the issues of civilization self-determination of the Caucasus, there exist some features, which are cited by all researchers of this problem. Summing up, it is possible to make the following conclusions. All researchers have agreed as follows:

- the Caucasus represents a united cultural space;

– the certain type of mentality is inherent to the ethnoses settled in the Caucasus;

– the existence of the common of traditions;

– the system of life reproduction;

– the normative-legal relations.

To the mind of the author, the Caucasus represents by itself a certain civilization system. Proceeding from this, it is evident that in the Caucasus there exist some local cultures, which are united in the common civilization system.

*“Severny Kavkaz v sovremennoy geopolitike Rossii”,
Makhachkala, 2010, s. 203–211.*

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**AZERBAIJAN HAS BECOME A FACTOR IN ISLAMIC
GLOBAL WAR AGAINST THE WEST
(the interview to IA REGNUM)**

IA REGNUM: You are the author of some books about Islam in Azerbaijan, about influence of various radical Islamic groups on the processes going on in Azerbaijan. What is the present scale of growth of Islamic impact on the opposition in Azerbaijan and what trends of its development are expected in the future?

A.Y. In time of my preparation of the first book many people expressed their skeptical attitude to its contents, since it was difficult to believe that political Islam sometimes would become a factor subject to fixed attention to the significant game in the political life in Azerbaijan. It was difficult to believe my prognoses. But the following was evident

for me: immediately after disintegration of the USSR, three vectors were formed in political life of Azerbaijan.

One of the vectors – the Russian vector, exactly, was always weak. Correspondingly, the Russian direction of political life and the connected with it parties, organizations and forces were weak. Some people believed Mutallibov, others – the social-democrats, but we understood that this vector in our life would not play an important role, at least in the nearest future, for our generation.

The dominant vector was directed to the West. Correspondingly, the nationalist problem, connected with it, was a significant factor.

The third direction was the religious, Islamic vector. It raised rather an interest than the serious attention to it. The interest was quite natural, since the population consisted of Muslims, was a part of Islamic civilization. The interest to Islam as a confession was evident, but the Soviet period left its impact on the people, who mainly were atheists, and did not disappear without leaving a trace in the author's generation, which played its role for the 1990s.

The author proceeded from the prediction of the new coming generation, which would consider Islam to be not only a part of its culture but also partially as its belief. And the future depended on the number of believers and particularly on the number of believers interested in politics. Lastly, the most important was as follows: how long the people would believe and follow the second, the western direction. It became evident in 2003, when the belief in the West disappeared once and for all, when the faith of the public opinion in western civilization and its culture started radically to weaken. The talks about the need of integration in western structures were going on, but the strong disillusionment of the population had its impact. Besides, the authorities started a total campaign against the pro-western

opposition, and since 2006 the pro-western parties ceased their activities. Since 2006, the population was subject to Islamic influence.

Since 2006, the authorities were engaged in the struggle not against the pro-western opposition, which was defeated, while only occasionally its leaders made public declarations. The opposition meetings and demonstrations were not numerous (20-30 participants), their participants were arrested. On the contrary, the meetings of Islamists in Nardaran and other places against Israel, as a token of protest against caricatures of the Prophet and for other reasons became the norm of life. Formerly, Azerbaijan was not a party to the big global geopolitical confrontation of the West against Islamic world and this struggle was going on without us; but in due course many people could make declarations, protesting against bad living conditions of Muslims in Europe and somewhere else.

At present, Azerbaijan has become a factor in this global war. Nobody is surprised or perplexed, when meetings of Islamic political forces take place and declarations are made relating to prohibition of construction of minarets or other buildings in Europe, located far away from Azerbaijan. It concerns all the more the confrontation between Israel and Hamas, which does not concern Azerbaijan, leaving aside the fact that Israel is a strategic ally of Azerbaijan. It means that Azerbaijan has been involved in this confrontation against the background of the significant rise of the political role of Islam. In time, when the authorities totally prohibit any political activities, when the mosques have actually become the political clubs making it possible to arrange public discussions of what is going on in the political life of the country, the new trends appear under these conditions.

What may be stressed in connection with recent conditions?

First, it is the rising role of the youth in this situation.

Second, it is the yet weak attempts as the first intentions to maintain contacts of Islamists with the so called pro-western opposition.

These phenomena are very important, since it is evident that the youth will perceive Islam more seriously as a part of its faith. In contrast to the author's generation of atheists, Islam will be part of their life. It will not be contested. For instance, in Baku most girls wearing hijab do not represent the older generation. As a result, if 10–15 years ago the theme of hijab was unknown for Azerbaijan, today this theme is the primary point of discussion at the meetings. It was impossible to predict it beforehand, since nobody would have understood it.

It is necessary to take into account the number of believers. As far back as 5-6 years ago, the number of believers, who say Mohammedan prayer visiting mosques and belong to some religious communities, accounted for 7–8% and sometimes less percentage, today the number of believers makes about 15% of the population. The rise is evident. It is true that this number is not very big, since it is 15% and not 60–70% or even 100%. A rather great part of the population usually regards themselves as Muslims by birth, but they do not say their prayers visiting mosques. Nevertheless, the rise of influence of Islam in the population is evident. Of great significance is the prevalent number of young people among believers.

The opposition experienced greater difficulties in the provinces. In the capital the opposition representatives may apply to foreign embassies and offices of international organizations. They lack this chance in the provinces, where the local authorities suppress their activities. The opposition confronts the choice: ether to leave the country or to stay. Many representatives of the opposition left the country for Europe or Russia particularly after the year of 2003. The rest opposition representatives, who stayed in the country, experienced

greater difficulties especially after their disillusionment with the West, particularly with the USA. The situation aggravated, and as far back as 1996 the leaders of the Islamic party were arrested for the first time, and later they tried to get into contact with the pro-western opposition but did not derive encouragement from anybody. They were pushed out by society.

At present, the situation is different. The ruling power, actually, makes the pro-western opposition cooperate with Islamic party, which was always its rival. These parties have to maintain some relations against their common enemy – the ruling power. The latter delivers strikes to both the pro-western opposition and the religious structures. For the last three years, the authorities arranged the arrests of Islamists, prohibited construction of mosques and even demolished some of them, prohibited to carry hijab in educational institutions. The western opposition is also subject to persecution. The expected process is going on: the two rival forces are coming near to each other. To the authors mind, this process of rapprochement will go on.

IA REGNUM: Some weeks ago an action took place in Nardaran, which was attended by representatives of the Islamic Party, the PNFA and “Musavat”. On 2 April in Baku, the Public Chamber arranged an action, which was ignored by Islamists. What is the reason of it?

A.Y.: Neither “Musavat” nor PNFA took part in the action arranged in Nardaran. Only some members of these parties participated in the action, they arrived there to be informed about the event. This fact can not be regarded as a joint action. If a member of “Musavat” party attends a meeting of the social democrats, it does not mean that these parties started the rapprochement process. It is quite another thing that the declarations of the leaders of the pro-western parties about hijab and arrests of the party leaders mean that the trend of rapprochement goes on. It is a normal phenomenon in politics. The

pragmatic approach means that any party should look for its allies. In this case the information about a future alliance and about activities of Islamists was subject to a great distortion.

There exists the stereotype of a threat of the connection with Iran. It is considered that the presence of Islamists will inevitably create such state like Iran. Actually, there is the other option. This is Turkey, where Islamists are at power as well. They showed the example of the other option of political Islam. You should not regard that the union with the Islamists will definitely lead them to power or so more to such Islamic revolution. This is a highly distorted image. The other matter is application of the capacity of Islamists. This is a pragmatic step on the part of politicians, particularly if both parties are subjected to repressions. The political course of the ruling power makes them to agree to rapprochement. The greater this pressure, the faster is the process of rapprochement of these parties.

IA REGNUM: On Saturday 2 April, the opposition arranged in Baku an action of protest. Since the beginning of the year the intensification of opposition's activities, uniting some parties in the Public Chamber, took place in Azerbaijan. It was connected with the well-known processes in a number of Arabic countries. However, the parliamentary elections took place in 2010, but the pre-election period lacked opposition meetings. What is the reason of this?

A.Y.: The answer is contained in the question itself. For the whole period before the factor of Arabic events and their influence on various processes the atmosphere of depression, disbelief and disillusionment reigned in society of Azerbaijan. The pro-western opposition forces understood that the forces are not equal and they are doomed to failure. They tried to struggle and to offer resistance before the parliamentary elections and for the whole year. They tried to do something also in the period of rising prices of the goods of mass

consumption. But each time these actions were not supported by society. The fear, disillusionment and disbelief reigned in society. From this point of view, the events in Arabic world evidently had a great impact on the processes within it. They resulted in emergence of the youth's movement.

For the past time, the movement of the youth did not gain strength of such importance. Just thanks to the influence of these events the youth in the Arabic world becomes the vanguard of the movement and applies modern technology: Internet, Facebook etc. The meetings of the youth on 11 March or on 2 April were fixed exactly at 14 hours in the center of the city (Fountain place). The information on the first meeting was fixed only for 11 March without indication of the hour and the place of it. It was an appeal to all people, who worried about the destiny of the Motherland, to gather together as a token of protest. The meeting was not adequately prepared but it was held in defiance of the total campaign of threatening on the part of the authorities. The meeting showed that the fear in souls of the people started to go away.

This is the situation, which resembles the situation in the Arabic world. Some years ago the author visited Tunis. The atmosphere was the same as in Azerbaijan. It was difficult to foresee these events in future. But they did occur and provoked the blast in the Islamic, primarily Arabic world. At present, the Arabic wave comes to Azerbaijan, where the fear of the people started to disappear.

The second factor is the intensification of the youth movement.

The third factor is as follows: the emergence of new technologies, which were ignored beforehand.

It is necessary to pay attention to the fact, which could be difficult to foresee, but now even the arrest of the leaders of the Islamic Party was arranged after their interview was published in You Tube. As far back as two years, the events would have been going on in the

following way: Islamist would have arranged their press-conference in Nardaran and invited journalists to attend it. The latter would have written their reports about it. And that would have been the end. But now in the spirit of the times they published their leader's interview in You Tube. The former year is already history. The principally new situation has cropped up.

*The interview was published in site:
www.regnum.ru, 08.04.2011*

V. Gelbras,

orientalist

KAZAKHSTAN AFTER CRISIS

The strategic picture on the world map is inseparably linked with the ever increasing role of Kazakhstan in ensuring the energy security in the Eurasian continent. In terms of explored and blocked-out reserves of oil, Kazakhstan is included in the group of leading countries of the world and occupies the seventh place in oil fields, the six – in gas deposits and the second – in uranium. The proved extracting reserves of hydrocarbons in the RK, including the land, make: oil – 30 billion barrels (4.0 billion tons), gas – 3.0 trillion cubic meters. Within the framework of the CIS, the republic definitely occupies the second place following Russia in reserves of hydrocarbons. Only by these indications the geopolitical position of Kazakhstan acquires a growing significance.

The official appraisal of the impact of the world economic crisis on Kazakhstan was optimistic already in the beginning of its influence on economy. Despite the economic weakness of Kazakhstan, revealed by the crisis, the first vice-premier of the RK U. Shukejev said in May 2008: “I am sure that at present we overcome all consequences of the world financial crisis, which has only delayed somehow the rise of the GNP”. He considered: “the rapid growth of the real economic sector in the country will be realized for the nearest several years”. In this

connection, U. Shukejev publicly expressed his persuasion in the high investment capacity of business in Kazakhstan: “Investments of the national business have attained the amount of \$ 80 billion, and our businessmen are ready to make additional investments in size of \$ 40 billion in attractive for investment projects”. Actually, the situation is much more complicated than “certain delay of the GNP growth”.

According to the results of 2009, the republican GNP grew by 1.1% in real estimates. The crisis had a particularly big negative impact on economic growth for the first quarter of 2009, when the GNP reduced by 2.2% (for the first half year the GNP reduced by 2.4%). The situation ameliorated for the third quarter of the year. The result of economic development for nine months was – reduction by 1.5%. According to the official data, the situation in the damaged sectors of economy started to improve. Nevertheless, the economic development was marked by a rather essential reduction of tempos of economic growth.

The certain losses are inevitable in time of crisis. The retail turnover was reduced comparing with the period of 2008. The number of unemployed people made 6.3% of the number of the economically active population. The prices of consumption goods had risen. Leaving aside the unorganized trade, the foreign trade turnover for the period January-November 2009 was reduced by 37.8% comparing with the analogous period of the preceding year, including export – by 43.8% and import – by 25.9%.

The analysis of the financial-economic activities showed that 10% of state enterprises were insolvents, 10% were profitable, while other enterprises lacked profits. The greater losses were characteristic for housing and communal services, the most profitable enterprises existed in the fuel economic complex, in transport and communication (including mass media). The causes of the losses of the state enterprises were as follows: deterioration of capital funds demanding constant

expenses for repair and capital investments, inefficient use of the state financial means. Thus, despite differences in the appraisal of the actual situation in industry, all of them show a disastrous picture. The crisis only aggravated the situation of the state industry.

The crisis was accompanied by the growth of the foreign debt. The gross foreign debt of the Republic of Kazakhstan by the end of the third quarter made \$ 111.3 billion, which accounted for 100.8% of the GNP. For the first time, China became one of three main creditors of the country. In 2007, the Kazakhstan was in debt to China in size of \$ 1 billion, and in 2009 the debt increased to \$ 7.81 billion. The debt to China increased mainly due to financial support to the gas pipeline “Kazakhstan–China” and other projects connected with extraction of oil and gas. The weak aspect of Kazakhstan consists in the fact that the external debt by far exceeds the size of internal sources of capital, which makes, according to company “Troika Dialog”, \$ 80 billion. Exactly this matter explains the great activities of the government to attract big investments from China.

Appraising the situation, R. Akhmetov, member of the Committee of the Senate for finances and budget, said: “Probably, China will raise its presence in our economy. However, the fearful panic is out of place here. The national color of the money coming to our economy is irrelevant. The significant aspect of investments and credits is as follows: they should be offered at advantageous conditions for us. All contracts are concluded in accordance with the legislation of Kazakhstan and the international treaties; thus one should not be afraid of it. Evidently, it would be more correct to keep balance among the investors, such as Europe, the USA, Russia and China”.

The crisis revealed a peculiar feature of economic development of the RK for the preceding period. The rapid economic growth based on the fast rise of world prices for natural resources reduced the

attention to economic modernization, to development of competition, to structural reforms, to training of specialists-professionals, to the rise of professional prestige and intellectual capacity. A. Dangulov made the more thoroughly substantial conclusions: “The Olympic power has just started to comprehend: many misfortunes of the executive authorities and higher officials are a result of ignorance of basic rules of market economy and due to the lack of civilized business experience. The crisis laid bare the deep crux of the problem: akims, who are not aware of practical business experience, simply squeeze out administrative-financial resource from the power – considering it right and proper, since it is endless. Being inspired by European or American diplomas “bolshakovsks” got high posts without any practical experience. In future they may repeat an unenviable destiny of “mladoturks”. Given the lack of qualified reserve of the power, the latter may finally discredit itself in the eyes of the people”.

Further development in perspective

The president of the republic N. Nazarbayev in his speech at the 22nd meeting of the Council of Foreign Investors determined the investment priorities: “Today, I am giving the signal to the investors, including national, that we will work only with those, who will propose implementation of specific projects directed to diversification of economy and deep processing of natural resources”. In January 2010, the president defined the termination of work devoted to the long-term plan of development of Kazakhstan for the period to 2020. According to M. Tajin, the Secretary of the Security Council, “this document is not limited to the economic sphere, since it contains the clear way to our nearest future, represents the route to the nearest decade”. N. Nazarbayev approved the Conception of Development of Financial Sector of the country for the post-crisis period. The key task should

become the orientation of the financial system to provide the priority economic sectors with adequate resources.

Of great significance is creation of transport corridors, which are considered in the RK as one of the ways of diversification of economy of Kazakhstan and which are able to connect economy of European and Asian countries with the international communication arteries of Kazakhstan. It will make it possible for Kazakhstan to become actually an integrated state and to make earnings by cargo transit. The annual revenue of the countries, which provide their territories for transport of cargoes, surpasses \$ 1 trillion. The international transport corridor “Western Europe-Western China” may be the shortest route from China to Europe. It will be connected with the minimum number of participants-countries and, consequently, of state borders.

The time duration by the sea route lasts up to 45 twenty-four-hours’ periods, by Trans-Siberian railway – 14 twenty-four-hours’ periods. The time duration of the route from the port of Lyanyungan in Yellow Sea to the borders of European countries – last 10 twenty-four-hours’ periods. The corridor will ensure cargo-routes in three main directions: China-Kazakhstan, China-the Central Asia, China-Russia-Western Europe. Beijing made the public declaration about its plans concerning construction of the railway through the territory of Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which will connect the CPR with the railways of Iran and Turkey. All these countries have displayed their keenest interest to the project.

The direction China-the Central Asia is under great extension owing to construction of new railways on the adjacent territory of China – the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (SUAR). As a result, the growth of direct cargoes flows between China and some Central Asian states coincides with simultaneous extension of cargoes transportation from China to Russia and Western Europe. The

termination of construction of railway lines from China to Kirghizstan will inevitably result in development of new economic sectors in the Central Asian states.

The strategy and the new financial system will be one of the significant results and of the achieved conclusions. The reaction of foreign investors and partners to the complications in the economic situation in Kazakhstan has great impact on politics. G. Marchenko, the Head of the National Bank of Kazakhstan declared: “It would be a great mistake to rely so strongly on London, since many people disappeared in the period of crisis, turned out to become unreliable friends...The London investors talked about the long-term liabilities, but in 80% cases these words occurred to be a falsehood. We made a mistake, having paid no attention to Hong-Kong and the Near East, since it was too simple to get money in London”. The officials of Kazakhstan decided to diversify placing of shares of Kazakhstan’s enterprises in Asian countries.

The valuable economic relations supposing deep mutually beneficial cooperation have not yet formed between China, playing the strategic role, and the countries of the Central Asia. On the one side, the annually growing Chinese financial resources (investments and credits) represent a significant economic “support” for the Central Asian countries, while they play the role of the key factor in economic security for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. On the other side, the economic activities of Chinese companies in the Central Asia does not yet promote the valuable industrial and innovation development of the region’s countries, transforming them only into resource adjunct to China, Uzbek political scientists think. As they regard, very soon the Chinese factor will become vitally significant both for the CA and for the RF.

Political scientist D. Ashimbayev makes the addition to this appraisal of the situation: “Today, it is evident that the crisis was unable

to force the elite to make a radical change of its course, since this change, first, would mean the recognition of fallaciousness of the former policy, and, second, would cut it off from super-profits. As a result, the main direction of economic policy for the last years remained the support of just the economic sectors, which were the main “sinecure”: construction, financial-banking sector and state corporations.

On 1 January 2010, the mechanisms of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia started to function: the united customs tariff, the united rules of non-tariff regulation, including the united order of license official registration and of the foreign trade restrictions. In this connection, anticipating the review of the later stages of the Customs Union development, of certain significance is the appraisal of the outcome of integration processes for the preceding period. The European Bank for Development (EABR) summed up these results. In the beginning of 2010, EABR published the results of the first annual research devoted to the dynamic of integration processes in the post-Soviet space. The aggregated index of integration processes for the post-Soviet period as a whole demonstrates reduction of the level of economic cooperation for the 2000s. The level of integration of the CIS countries in the sphere of labor migration and reciprocal action in the market of education services rose greatly, while in the sphere of trade, energy and agriculture it fell down. In particular, the energy flows among the countries of the region were reduced four times comparing with the level of the 1980s, according to the project chief E. Vinokurov, the deputy head of department for analysis of EABR. The difference in macro-economic indexes of the post-Soviet countries should be taken into account. At the same time, the space of EvrAzES (three member-states of the Customs Union) was characterized by greater integration. It demonstrates the process of

crystallization of “the integration kernel” in the post-Soviet space, noted E. Vinokurov.

Russia is the biggest but not the sole integration center in the post-Soviet space, since the role of Kazakhstan as a second regional center of attraction of trade and labor migration grows rapidly. Tajikistan, Armenia and Kirghizstan are drawn towards them as the countries mostly integrated with other countries of the post-Soviet space.

On 1 January 2010, the Agreement of the United Customs Regulation and the Agreement on the United Non-Tariff Regulation of the Customs Union signified termination of the preparatory stage, and the new stage started up to 1 July of the same year. Since 1 July there will start functioning the Customs Code, while the internal customs official regulation of the member-states of the Customs Union will be abrogated. The formation of the united customs territory will be terminated, and the new stage of the Customs Union activities will start. For this period, the customs and other forms of border control among member-countries will be abrogated. By 1 July 2011 this process should be terminated.

Actually, the restoration of former Soviet United Economic Space (EEP) is realized on the fundamentally new, exactly market principals. The formation of the united space is connected with the process of overcoming different hindrances. According to some experts, these hindrances should be characterized rather subjective than objective phenomena. The main of them are as follows: the interests of the national bureaucracy, the official structures, which are losing sovereign self-dependence, and the monopolies, which urge towards reduction of competition, noted academician S. Glaziev and continued: “After the decade of disintegration and degradation, the emergence of the regional customs union in the post-Soviet space represents the most important geopolitical achievement giving specific advantages to

economics of integrated states. The restoration of industrial cooperation at the expense of giving up the customs barriers will invigorate and lead to a new qualitative level the former economic ties. The formation of the customs union means the great reduction of costs, extension of the production scales and higher competitiveness of national economic united on the same Customs territory”. According to appraisals made by scientists of the Institute of Economic Prognostication of the RAS, the aggregate integration effect, estimated by additional creation of the gross national product, by 2015 will make about \$ 400 billion. The member-states of the Customs Union by means of the integration factor will get additionally about 15% of the GNP growth by 2015. These estimates were made before the global economic crisis. Comparing with the present level of the GNP its growth will be greater as a result of integration processes, noted S. Glaziev in another article.

However, a rather great part of business community of Kazakhstan is worried by probable negative consequences of membership in the Customs Union. According to T. Akulov, the president of Independent Association of Businessmen of the RK, “one of the dangers consists in the fact that Russia as a country with the more developed industrial basis comparing with Belarus and Kazakhstan will strive for protecting its interests and ameliorating conditions for sale of its produce in the markets. At the same time, according to the projected change of customs for imported goods, the increase of customs will be applied to 5044 items out of 17 626 existing ones. In some case this increase will attain the size of 60%. Therefore the apprehensions of businessmen excited by decrease of profitability of production in Kazakhstan are quite justified, since the greater part of components is imported from abroad, while consumers express apprehensions relating to higher prices for different goods”.

According to the published information, I. Rogov, the chairman of the Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan, said that “the decisions of international organizations and their organs, created in compliance with international treaties, including the commission of the Customs Union, by general rule have the priority over (national) laws ...” In this way, the priority of the decisions adopted by the commission of the Customs Union over the national republic’s legislation is recognized. But at the same time, Kazakhstan has the right to appeal against the decisions of the commission of the Customs Union in the higher leading organ representing the heads of the Member-states of the Customs Union. “If Kazakhstan considers that some decision infringes upon its national interests, violates its sovereignty, the republic may veto it at the level of the highest organ of the Customs Union”, I. Rogov made the clarification. In this way he reassured all those, who doubted the advantages of the Customs Union. However, certain guardedness and even the conviction in the negative impact of this measure on economy of Kazakhstan have remained.

E. Zhanibekov is convinced that the industrial sector of Kazakhstan will suffer damage due to formation of the Customs Union. He expressed the crux of his position in the title of his article: “The role of the raw resources producer”. At the same time, he mentioned the meaning of T. Akulov, the president of Independent Associations of Businessmen. He considers the sphere of small business as a weak point of economy in Kazakhstan. And another failure is the fact that Kazakhstan lacks such tax legislation, which would create for businessmen in Kazakhstan “special conditions like in China”. “Only under conditions of existence of the latter, the Customs Union would ensure for us the rapid development of the industrial capacities in Kazakhstan”, said T. Akulov.

It is significant to know what sense would have the Customs Union, if all member-states determine “the special conditions” provided for

national enterprises. As far as the assertion concerning “the special conditions” of China is concerned, it is a misunderstanding caused by inadequate knowledge of the situation in this country. However, it is irrelevant to discuss this subject. The question is – Kazakhstan and the Customs Union

The Customs Union to a large extent actually is not a simple amalgamation. “The separate enterprises may confront difficulties, for instance, light industry, confectionery and liqueur-vodka, food factories etc. They will have to compete with Russian producers on the territory of Kazakhstan. It concerns particularly the border regions of the republic”, thinks economist K. Berentayev. At the same time, it seems that some authors fail to bear in mind that the purport of the created Customs Union consists not only in cooperation in the sphere of customs but also in creation of the united economic space. As far as disputed issues are concerned, their emergence is quite natural in case of such large-scale reconstruction of the economic reciprocal action of several countries. They may be settled in the course of determined, planned and mutually beneficial work of all members of the Union.

“Vneshnie svyazi stran Prikaspiya v usloviyah globalnogo protsessai i interesy Rossii”, M., 2010.

A. Bolshakov,

political scientist

**THE FOREIGN POLICY OF KIRGHIZSTAN
IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICTS' CHANGE
IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE**

For the last several years most post-Soviet countries carried out the evident multy-vector foreign policy. The clear pro-western vector is characteristic, however, only for Georgia and the Baltic states, which

are member-states of the European Union. No state in the post-Soviet space adheres to a full pro-Russian orientation. In this respect, Kirghizstan is not the exclusion. At the same time, the economic situation in the Kirghiz Republic is disastrous to such extent that the geopolitical games of the elite are nearly the sole method of efficient replenishment of its budget. Kirghizstan is simply unable to refuse to get the financial assistance for its economy of the leading powers and international organizations.

Kirghizstan depends to a large extent on the stronger neighbors, which urge towards the role of “older brothers” in relation to the small country (excluding Tajikistan). The north of Kirghizstan is closely connected with Kazakhstan and China. In the south the neighboring regions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan play the role of main partners. The Fergana Valley, like Germany in the medieval epoch, is divided by the borders of these countries. Kirghizstan has to maneuver and find its way out among the interests of these countries, periodically proclaiming its strategic partnership with Russia, the USA and the countries of the European Union. Of great significance in this connection is existence of airbase “Manas” on the territory of Kirghizstan. The airbase itself is a complex of various geopolitical problems:

First, the clash of interests possessed by different departments of the USA, Russia and China;

Second, the Afghanistan’s problem, which should be solved.

Third, the interests of the countries, located to the south from Kirghizstan, which comprehend that the foreign airbase in Kirghizstan may be regarded as a potential threat. This complex of problems is connected with the actual national interests of Kirghizstan, although it is discussed first of all as an issue of the rent payment.

The donors of Kirghizstan are as follows: the Russian Federation, the USA, China, Germany, Great Britain, Turkey, Switzerland and Japan, as well as the Asian Bank of Development, the Islamic Bank of Development, the World Bank and United Nations Development Program. Not a single country of the contemporary world is able alone to provide for Kirghizstan all needed financial means, and therefore the establishment of Kirghizstan will continue to try to find its way out in the labyrinth of contemporary geopolitics.

The conflicts in the post-Soviet space to a large extent are determined by geopolitical confrontation of the USA, the EU, Russia and China. The USA claims for the influence in the whole post-Soviet space, the EU included in its structure the Baltic states and displays its evident interest in the processes going on in European countries of the CIS. Lately, the EU has its impact on the region of the South Caucasus and arranges cooperation with the countries of the Central Asia. The latter region for a long time has been in the sphere of influence of China, which exerts great efforts to ensure its dominance in former eastern Soviet republics. Iran and Turkey have some influence on certain regions of the post-Soviet space. Russia regards the post-Soviet space as a zone of its most important geopolitical interests, which is quite natural. However, the lack of skill to come to an agreement with other countries, the permanent display of “imperial syndrome” questions the Russian strategy of activities in the whole diversified post-Soviet space. The main reason of a rather great increase of different inter-state conflicts in the post-Soviet space became the contradiction between the extension of interests of national political elites, which identify themselves with the state as a whole, on the one hand, and the limited existence of resources for realization of these interests, on the other hand.

At present, the political development in the post-Soviet space is marked by both integration and disintegration processes, and both of them are determined by internal factors and the contradictory external influence. The arrangement of external forces participating in elaboration of future configuration of economic space of the CIS more or less has been determined. Russia no more is the only partner for common development of the CIS countries. China and the European Union are ready to assume this role.

The conception of foreign policy stresses the main following priorities of contemporary Kirghizstan: consolidation of national security by foreign policy methods; formation of favorable external conditions for realizing development of national priorities; strengthening of the positive international image of Kazakhstan; creation of the efficient system of foreign policy activities headed by the ministry of foreign affairs of Kirghizstan in partnership with interested state structures and institutions of civil society. Given these priorities, it is worth considering mutual relations of Kirghizstan with the leading states and regional organizations of the contemporary world.

The aims of the USA in the Central Asia are quite evident. Of great significance for the USA is the formation of the region's pro-American orientation, the deterrence of influence of China and Russia, the creation of conditions for a direct opposition between Russian and Chinese interests, the use of the regional capacity for constructing a long-term dialogue with the Islamic world. For the eighteen years of the post-Soviet development, Kirghizstan in American foreign policy discourse passed the way from "the island of democracy" – a shop window of the probable Central Asian liberal development, created with assistance of the USA and the West, to an ally in the anti-terrorist coalition, exactly, in the military American operation in Afghanistan.

At the same time, one should take into account that the territory and services for creation of the military base were provided for Americans by the former government of Kirghizstan actually free of charge. For the years of independence, the interests and consequently policy of Kirghizstan relating to the USA were limited with commerce. Kirghizstan did not formulate any political, economic or other interests. The intentions to economic cooperation, the attraction of American investments covered the spontaneous aspiration for using the USA as a new sponsor and creditor. The USA rather actively supported the democratic choice of Kirghizstan, while president A. Akayev supported it personally. The USA consequently supported entry of Kirghizstan in the World Trade Organization.

Within the framework of cooperation of Kazakhstan with the IMF, the World Bank and other international economic and financial organizations, the USA rendered evident assistance to the country. The USA also gave the free of charge support and grants to Kirghizstan for the total sum of \$ 1 billion. But just the USA let the former president A. Akayev to transform democracy in commerce and into an instrument of profiteering. The system of political pluralism as a format and sense of relations between Kirghizstan and the USA has past, although Kirghizstan objectively is the sole central Asian country, which remains within the limits of democratic transit.

At present, the economic presence of Americans in Kirghizstan is rather small and will hardly increase. The American university of the Central Asia established with support of the USA government and the Institute of Open Society gradually was transformed into a habitual education institution. It does not enjoy any support of the governments of both countries and is not subject to negotiations between them.

The mutual relations of Kirghizstan with the USA to a large extent depend on the following factors: the Russian-American relations,

the activities of the regional international organizations with Kirghizstan's membership, the cooperation with international economic and financial organizations, primarily the IMF and the World Bank kept mainly under American control. The present government of Kirghizstan may not refuse to cooperate with these organizations, and therefore the sole probable way out of this situation is the joint work with rigid protection of the interests of society in Kirghizstan. It should be recalled that the problem of external debt, mainly to the IMF and the WB, remains unsolved: the writing-off or restructuring of the debt depends on the position of the donor-countries. Evidently, the absolute amount of the debt is not very great. But under conditions of the financial-economic crisis the pressure of the debt grows primarily in psychological sense. To solve the problem of the debt Kirghizstan needs to maintain dialogue from the position of its national interests with the USA, the IMF and the WB, but also it should ensure development of its own economy.

The development of relations with the European Union (25 member-countries), particularly with Germany as a leading partner and donor, remains an advantageous direction of foreign policy of Kirghizstan. At present, the European Union is its important trade and investment partner. After disintegration of the USSR, the European countries within the framework of "TASIS" program started to carry out various programs and implement different projects for development of the CIS countries, including Kirghizstan.

For the period of partnership with the EU, Kirghizstan received about 200 million euros for implementation of various projects. The annual technical assistance program in the amount of 10 million euros is carried out to settle the issues of Kirghiz-European partnership, trade-economic relations, including access of Kirghiz goods to the European market, the issues of investments, energy and transportation, protection

of environment. It is possible to mention as the perspective directions of cooperation as follows: the struggle against terrorism and narcotics traffic, the illegal migration and trade of human beings. The EU carries out the programs aimed at prevention of production and sale of narcotics in the Central Asia (CADAP) and border governance in the Central Asia (BOMCA).

Taking into account the water problem in the Central Asia, the ministry of foreign affairs of Kirghizstan carries out the work for experience exchange and for introduction of the advanced technologies, possessed by EU countries, in the sphere of rational and efficient use of water resources. For this sake, the EU carries out the program of management of water resources and agricultural production in the Central Asia “WARMAP”.

With due account of sustainable development of the sphere of higher and professional education in Kirghizstan and of existence of the adequately developed higher education system, the EU participates in implementation of education projects and gives support to the qualitative education system. Thus, further cooperation of Kirghizstan with the European Union corresponds to the national interests of the republic and will make it possible to elevate the authority of Kirghizstan in the world community.

The cooperation between Kirghizstan and China, started from zero in the post-Soviet period, achieved by this time a rather high level. It is characterized by the sustainable dynamic at various levels of the state power. For the last years, the transport infrastructure connecting China and Kirghizstan developed, while trade turnover grows in a sustained way. China and Kirghizstan take reciprocal action in international organizations, including mainly cooperation in ShOS. The main problems aggravating bilateral mutual action and hindering development of bilateral relations were removed for the period to 2005,

following settlement of the problematic issue on the border and signing of the main political document – the treaty on friendship, neighborhood and cooperation.

The leadership of the CPR was greatly concerned about the events during “tulip revolution” occurred in Kirghizstan in 2005, resulting in the sudden change of the highest leadership of the country and coming to power of the opposition forces. China occupied the position of wait and see, and expected the diplomatic initiative on the part of the new powers in Kirghizstan. Despite the position of some politicians in Kirghizstan, who continued to demand the review of relations with China, primarily the agreements on the state border with China, the president of Kirghizstan K. Bakiyev restored the relations with China to the previous format in the course of his visit to China in 2006. The contacts between ministries and official structures were kept maintaining, the trade turnover reached the record level of \$ 3.5 billion in 2007.

The CPR does not regard Kirghizstan as a main economic partner in the region. The CPR does not pay a real interest to the economic project of priority for Kirghizstan – construction of the railway China-Kirghizstan-Uzbekistan and export of electric energy from Kirghizstan to China. Within the framework of the long-term (for ten years) program of economic cooperation, China and Kirghizstan are engaged now in realization of a package of economic projects.

The mutual relations with the Central Asian countries play the particular role in development of contemporary Kirghizstan. The post-Soviet Central Asia lacks integration, while cooperation and reciprocal action of some international actors do exist. The economic structure and the nomenclature of goods of most countries of the region are identical, and therefore integration objectively was replaced by competition. The economy of Kazakhstan makes 65% of the whole regional economy.

Thanks to its economic capacity Kazakhstan claims for the role of the leader in the Central Asia. Energy is not the factor of integration in the Central Asia.

The relations with Kazakhstan represent the priority for Kirghizstan. Both countries are tied by special cultural and historic relations. The spiritual and language nearness of the Kirghiz and the Kazakh peoples is a generally recognized factor. Both countries actively cooperate in international organizations, such as CIS, EvrAzES, ODKB, ShOS. Not mentioning the problems caused by regulation of the water flow of Syr-Daria, the relations with Kazakhstan were developing in the epoch of A. Akayev almost without conflicts. Kazakhs were represented in the elite of Kirghizstan. For the 1990s, both countries came to the agreement on the return of all rented lands. By 2001, the demarcation of borders was mainly terminated. In January 2000, Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan signed the agreement on use of water of the rivers Chu and Talas. Despite the fact that A. Akayev, who lost his post as a result of the political revolution in 2005, fled first to Kazakhstan, the relations between the two countries did not attain the level of crisis. In December 2005, the right of Kazakhstan's property was recognized for several objects near Issyk Kul Lake, belonged to the Kazakh SSR before 1991. Both countries succeeded to come to the agreement on labor migration from Kirghizstan to Kazakhstan; the joint venture – enterprise “Kazkyrgaz” was established, liquidating a threat of interruption of Uzbek gas shipment to Kirghizstan in winter time. However, the Kazakh-Kirghiz relations are far from being an ideal picture. The Kazakh authorities take rigid measures relating to Kirghiz citizens coming to Kazakhstan. The route from the Talass region is laid through the territory of Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan, and Kirghiz passengers are subject to humiliating checks by the border guards of the posts in Kazakhstan.

The relations of Kirghizstan with Tajikistan are marked by partnership in international organizations (CIS, EvrAzES, ODKB, ShOS). The negotiations and meetings of representatives of both countries promote consolidation of diplomatic, trade-economic, cultural and humanitarian relations. In terms of economic, military-technical and geopolitical parameters, both countries are the weakest in the CA. They compete with each other in the economic sphere, their migration flows are directed mainly to Russia, although numerous Diaspora of Kirghiz and Tajik exist also in other CIS countries. The political elites of both countries try to leave the halo of “failed states”, to prove to each other their economic and military superiority, to occupy rather sustainable position.

The geographic parameters of two countries, limitations and unevenness of location of natural resources provoke expansion of groups of the population to the neighboring territories. The territory of Tajikistan accounts for 143.1 thousand square km (including 93% of mountains), its population makes 7 million (the population density surpasses 45 people per one square km). The territory of Kirghizstan is 198.5 thousand square km with the population of about 5 million (the density – 25 people per one square km).

The list of mutual Kirghiz-Tajik claims is concentrated in the Batken region of Kirghizstan on the border with Tajikistan (70 disputed land plots). On the territory of Isfarin district of Sogdi region of Kirghizstan (in Tajik enclave Voruh – 130 thousand square km) live more than 20 thousand people (95% – Tajiks). Up to the present time, the governments of the two countries failed to come to an agreement on determination of the disputed border land territory. Kirghizstan and Tajikistan fail to regulate the long-term dispute caused by contradictions in the sphere of use of the irrigated land plots. Such “small conflicts” may lead to use of military forces. At the same time, it

should be mentioned that the ruling elites might do their best to avoid such conflicts either within the framework of regional organizations or by means of mediation efforts exerted by Russia.

Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan represent specific poles in terms of public-political openness: the first one – the most open and free CA country, the latter – the closest state of the region in the whole post-Soviet space. The military and geopolitical contradictions do not exist in their mutual relations, but different models of economic and political development promoted the guarded attitude to each other for the longest time of the post-Soviet period. The political changes taken place in Turkmenistan for the last years made it possible for Kirghizstan to arrange more constructive relations with this state in the economic sphere. For the recent time, the cultural-humanitarian and trade-economic cooperation of two countries started to gain in its intensity, and both countries succeeded to maintain reciprocal action in the sphere of tourism.

China is interested in import of natural gas from Turkmenistan via the territory of Kirghizstan, avoiding the territory of Kazakhstan. Kirghizstan, like Kazakhstan, has the frontier with China and depends completely on gas shipped from Uzbekistan; therefore it intends to diversify its import. Kirghizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan signed the framework convention on protection of environment. It was the outcome of the work, carried out by the Inter-state Commission for Sustainable Development of the International Fund for Saving Aral. The convention pre-supposes the united demands in the sphere of protection of environment for all countries of the Central Asia”. A particular attention of the document is devoted to the scientific-technical cooperation for solving ecological problems and to preservation of biological diversity. A scheme of cooperation in ecological emergency was elaborated and adopted.

Uzbekistan traditionally plays a significant role for Kirghizstan in settling a number of political and economic issues. The diplomatic relations between two states are characterized by neighborhood and mutual benefit. In 1998, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed the agreement on the lasting friendship and cooperation, which to a certain extent promoted solving common Central-Asian problems: regional security, counteraction to terrorism and extremism, social development. The presidents and the prime ministers arranged regular meetings, but the real economic rapprochement did not take place. For the period after decision of Uzbekistan to suspend its participation in the Eurasian Economic Community both countries kept their membership in influential regional organizations, such as ShOS, CIS and ODKB.

The mutually beneficial trade-economic cooperation between Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan is governed by the signed agreements on free trade, promotion and protection of investments, avoidance of double taxing and by other significant bilateral documents. Despite extension of trade-economic cooperation for the last years, both parties are not satisfied by the general indexes of its development. There exist many chances for creation of joint ventures to develop natural resources, to produce construction materials, to use the reserves in the sphere of transport and hydroelectric plants. It is necessary to strengthen the mutual connections between representatives of business, science, culture and arts, in the sphere of sports, health protection, tourism and mass information. The bilateral relations are complicated by the consequences of the Kirghiz-Uzbek ethnic conflict in 1990, caused by existence of the great Uzbek community in the south of Kirghizstan and the small group of Kirghiz living in the Fergana valley of Uzbekistan. The realization of the rights of ethnic minorities is the

basis not only of bilateral agreements but also of stability in the Central-Asian region as a whole.

For the last time, the cooperation of Kirghizstan with the Russian Federation is on the rise in all spheres of public life. At the same time, Kirghizstan, finding a way round between Russia and the USA, succeeded to preserve the military base of anti-terrorist forces in the country, raised more than trice the profit received thanks to its presence, succeeded to get the external Russian debt's writing off, got the Russian grant and a part of the credit under privileged conditions. At the same time, the leadership of Kirghizstan kept a chance for a probable participation in tenders relating to airbase. The treaty on the presence of NATO servicemen was concluded for one year with the point on its extension and non-extension, if some other interested country, for instance Russia, makes a more profitable proposal to the Kirghiz authorities.

Within the framework of contemporary realities of the Central Asia, Kirghizstan needs objectively a close rapprochement with Russia. The neighbors of Kirghizstan – Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan – constantly make more rigid claims to Kirghizstan. Only the union with the Russian Federation makes it possible to withstand the rigid territorial ultimatums presented by the countries, which are more powerful in economic and military terms.

* * *

The multi-vector foreign policy is a sign of a certain maturity of the national state; at the same time, from the beginning it is a factor with probable conflicts, since it is oriented to various forces in contemporary world politics. But it is the reality, with which it should to be reconciled. One should forget about a chance to rely on the allies, which will be mono-centric in the foreign policy choice. Kirghizstan objectively is one of the states, closest to contemporary Russia.

Possessing no big energy resources and without developed economy, it will orient itself to the Russian Federation to settle some military-political and economic issues. Russia with advantage for itself may use geographic location of Kirghizstan to defend its interests in the Central Asia.

Russia will be unable to overcome disintegration of the post-Soviet space only with military and political mechanisms, it should submit to its CIS partners the feasible economic projects, which initially may involve only some states being the closest allies. In the post-Soviet space Russia should rather propose to elaborate and jointly discuss by the national states a new doctrine of their relations, which rather in detail reflects their perceptions of the configuration of the economic community, which they would like to create. Its central element might become the zone of free trade, which would overcome the existing trends to disintegration of the post-Soviet space.

*“Politeks: politicheskaya ekspertiza”,
S-pt, 2010, t. 6, n. 2, p. 100–114.*

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**THE PLACE AND THE ROLE OF ISLAM
IN THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA
(VIEW FROM TAJIKISTAN)**

The assessment of Islam place and role in the history and in the modern life of the people in Central Asia belongs to disputable questions arising recently. When taking up subjects matters associated with the distribution history of Islam in central Asian countries we inexorably face with a problem to describe this historical process and its consequences.

As it's known, in the soviet literature devoted to this theme there were such cliché as "Middle (Central) Asia conquest by the Arabs", "bloody marches of the Arabs in the Middle Asia", "struggle of Central Asian people against the Arabian oppressors", "heroic resistance of the local population to the Arabian aggressors", "heroic deeds of popular heroes in confrontation to the Arabs" and etc. As a whole the Arabian marches in Central Asia were considered as a tragic period of the region people history and traditionally were described in a low key.

As for the Moslem sources, first of all, such definitions as jihad – "sacred war" and Fatah – literally "opening", a conquest with a positive connotation are used to repeat the events associated with the Islam distribution in Central Asia. Some Moslem spiritual figures of the region suggested using just this terminology adopted in the Islamic tradition. The ins and the outs of the problem is that a terminology definition in the given case directly points out to world outlook of those using it and their Islam perception as a whole and a negative or a positive attitude towards a process of Islamisation in Central Asia, in particular. In order to reduce the debate heat on this problem the Ministry of education of Tajikistan recommended to use a neutral definition "Islam distribution in Central Asia" in the programs and teaching aids.

At the same time one shouldn't forget that it concerns not only the history of Islam in Central Asia but also its vital issues of the present being. The given theme becomes burning when it concerns the Moslem participation in the political life and the problem actualization associated with extremism and terrorism. Many problems arise. Is it correct to use such definitions as "Islamic extremism", "Islamic radicalism" and "Islamic terrorism"? The answers searching for these and the similar questions confirm that a correct scientific terminology working out is one of the acutest problems when studying Islam and the

modern processes and phenomena associated with it. Let's consider this problem by the example of Islam teaching in Central Asian institutions. The analysis of the educational programs and teaching aids of the institutions in Central Asia shows that some authors and drafters continue using scientifically unverified politicized terminology. So, there is the theme "The modern Islamic Extremism" in Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies in the program on a discipline "policy and religion being taught for the students studying "Religious studies" and "International relations". The other striking example is a program of the special course "The Islamic factor in the international policy and policy of the Russian federation". Here we can discover such themes as "Identity of Islamic extremism and terrorism" and "The effective way searching to neutralize the Islamic extremism and terrorism. Such works as "Islamic radicalism: genesis, evolution, practice" are in the list of the recommended literature on the course "History of the Kyrgyz philosophy" being read in the Kyrgyz National University.

One should note once more that the discussions on methodological problems often go beyond the walls of the institutions and their perception becomes broader when the Islam rapid reviving in the societies of Central Asia. In 2007 the group of the students of the Tajik National University registered a complaint to one of the most conspicuous religious figures of Tajikistan, imam of the mosque "Mukhammadiya", Vakhdatu-eshonu Nuriddinjogn for their teacher who according to them negatively thinks about Islam and its values using "hostile" terminology during the lectures. In response during the Friday prayer the imam publicly appealed the students to boycott the lectures of this and similar teachers and drive them out of the university. It's a striking example that a terminology definition has a strongly pronounced ideological and political hidden motive.

When constructing most of the educational programs associated with Islam their authors act on the premise that the students have a very vague image about this religion beginning to study a subject and so it's impossible to take up more special problems without a wordy prologue. So, in the most cases a prologue of a program takes from 20-50% of its content. It includes a base information on Islam (the third world religion rising, the main landmarks of a course of life of the prophet Mohammed, the giants of the faith, a short history of Islam distribution in Central Asia, information about the famous figures in Islam and etc.).

The materials on the Islamic subject matters are characterized by that the most of the educational programs don't include the modern urgent range of problems. The reason is: the main block of the literature in the Central Asian libraries and being available for the teachers and the students is devoted to the classical Islam. At the same time in some institutions of the region there appeared some special courses devoted to the problems of the Islamic public ides development into the New and the Newest Time and the Islam place in the modern world. In particular, there is a special course "The Newest Islamic trends" at the theological faculty of the Oshskogo State University. The list of literature being recommended by this program drafters is of particular interest. This list of literature is evidence of that the program of the special course was developed in Turkey for the Turkish students. As one of the cofounders of the theological faculty of OSU is the Turkish educational organization "Diyanet" then this special course is taught for the Kyrgyz students without some obvious changes. The other example of the educational course on the urgent Islamic subject matters is the above-mentioned course "Political Islam" developed by Tim Epkenkhans and being read in the American University in Central Asia.

In modern Central Asia a professional school of students of religion and the Islamists having legal capacity hasn't been formed yet.

In this respect it's significant that in the system of a secular high school of Tajikistan till up the Islamic Institution foundation in 2007 there was no institution, faculty or even department which would deal directly with Islam and prepare the corresponding specialists. Beforehand in Tajikistan there were studies of the Islamist circle were held only in the Institution of philosophy and in the Institution of the oriental studies of the Academy of sciences of the Republic Tajikistan.

Though the beginning of the foundation of center, departments and faculties of religious studies and Islamic studies in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was earlier than in Tajikistan, at the end of 90-ss but the professional religious studies and Islamic studies aren't the individual scientific fields in these republics for the present. So, we can state that the religious and the Islamic studies are mainly taught by the teachers having no proper professional skill in many institutions of central Asia. They are mainly the historians, philologists, political scientists and philosophers having no deep knowledge about Islam.

The absolute majority of the teachers and the students of the institutions in Central Asia can't speak the western and the eastern languages at the level allowing them to orientate freely in the corresponding literature on Islam. So, with some exceptions the teachers prefer recommending literature on the Russian language to read. However, a level of the Russian language among the students was lowered so that the students hardly cope with the Russian-language publications. The educational and the scientific literature on Islam in the library funds of the Central Asian institutions is very limited associated with a low productivity of the local scientists and material and technical problems of the printing. For example, the university textbook "The fundamentals of the religious studies" (the author is Sherzoda Abdullo) being the single one in Tajikistan issued with the limited number of 300 copies is a bibliographic rarity.

One can mark out some groups of the sources and literature in the compared bibliographies being in the educational programs on Islam or Islamic subject matters.

The literature in Russian is the most available for the teachers and the students for the present. Though the Islam publication use of the soviet period in the educational process was criticized very much lately nevertheless just they continue figuring in the bibliographies of many educational programs. It's associated with that just the soviet editions are completely presented in the institutional library funds and the teachers studied on their base.

The western literature in the classic Islam being in the bibliographies is mainly presented in the Russian translations during the soviet and the post-soviet time.

The western literature in the modern Islam gradually fights its way back to the educational programs on such courses as "Islam and policy", "The religious studies", "Religion and policy" and "The Newest Islamic trends". In particular, the program "The religious studies" launched at the department of the international relations, political science and the law of Tashkent State University and designed for the students receiving training in the special subject "The international relations" comprises thirty denominations of prescribed literature in Russian and Uzbek languages and about twenty denominations of additional literature in English including the modern western publications. The newest studies performed in the West are mostly represented in the educational programs of the American University in Central Asia and, first of all, in the program of the course "The political Islam".

The Islam sources and the theological literature presented beforehand only in the programs on religious studies and Islamic studies are included in the bibliographies of many programs on the Islamic subject matters. First of all, it deals with Koran. If to the end of

90-ss there was traditionally evidence of the Russian translations for the sacred book of G.S. Sablukov and I.YU. Krachkovskiy then at the present one appeals for the students to become familiar with the Uzbek, the Tajik and the Kyrgyz translations of Koran.

One more problem caused by non-professionalism of the teachers is associated with that some authors of the programs recommend the literature for the students being made in the bosom of the Moslem schools and trends which didn't obtain a circulation in and or that part of Central Asia. In particular, the drafts of the program "The Moslem theology" developed in the Kyrgyz National University is included in the list of the recommended literature of 5 works of the known Shiitic thinker Saiid Lari translated for the Russian language "The God and his attributes" (Baku, 1994), "The Prophecy" (Baku, 1994), "The basic provisions of Islam" (Baku, 1999), "Imamate. The Supreme power of the Moslem community" (Baku, 1996) and "The resurrection of the dead. The punishment and the life after the end of the world" (Baku, 1994). At the same time the works of the Turkish authors are widely presented in the programs of the theological faculty of the Oshsk State University.

The electronic resources. The electronic resource using in the Islam teaching is a new enough phenomenon in the practice of the institutions in Central Asia. The teachers and the students having obtained the access to specialized thematic sites of Internet have a possibility to familiarize themselves with sources and literature posted in the network. At the same time the educational programs published in the network became available for the Internet users together with the scientific electronic publications. In some cases the programs on religious studies derived from Internet are simply copied and used incorrectly in the educational process.

In the institutions of Central Asia the users of the electronic resources face with a great problem associated with that in the

educational-scientific practice the scientific and dissertation boards especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan don't stimulate the interest of using but sometimes prohibit using the materials from Internet when writing the dissertations and research works. At the same time the teachers of the older generation unwillingly assimilate the skills to use a computer and Internet preferring using the books.

Summing up the above-mentioned one should note once more that Islam teaching in the post-soviet Central Asia face with the ideological and political, methodological, educational, personnel and financial problems. To our mind the following steps can promote overcoming these difficulties the institutions of the region face with.

1. Many-sided in-depth study conducting of the Islam teaching system in Central Asia including its two main constituents – secular and religious education.

2. The teachers of Islamic studies disciplines and the scientists-Islamists should coordinate their efforts to reevaluate the old and work out the new methodological approaches of Islam evaluation.

3. A search of stable financing sources to have the necessary scientific and educational literature and also to publish the educational programs and books.

4. Electronic data base developing associated with a study and teaching Islam in the republics of Central Asia.

In conclusion one should note that the international project “Islam study and teaching in Euro-Asia” the initiator of which is the American Board on studies in the field of social sciences is the bright illustration of that a dialogue between the Islam teachers from the different countries can be so active and effective.

*“Izuchenie prepodavaniya Islama v Evrazii”,
M., 2010, p. 252-265.*

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Подписано к печати 12/V-2011 г. Формат 60x84/16

Бум. офсетная № 1. Печать офсетная. Свободная цена

Усл. печ. л. 5,0 Уч.-изд. л. 4,8

Тираж 300 экз. Заказ № 80

**Институт научной информации
по общественным наукам РАН,
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(по вопросам распространения изданий)**

Отпечатано в типографии ИНИОН РАН
Нахимовский пр-кт, д. 51/21
Москва В-418, ГСП-7, 117997
042(02)9

