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**RUSSIA: A WAY TO CATASTROPHE
OR MODERNIZATION?**

In Russia the ruling class almost always is full of optimism relating to the present and future time of the country and at the same time does not see that we lag behind other countries in the scientific-technical sphere and/or in public development. But, as history has shown, the excessive self-estimation failed all time. A.S. Benkendorf, an influential in the ruling circles chief of gendarmerie pronounced nice words to Nicolas I that the present situation of Russia “was excellent and it will surpass any positive predictions of the future”, but instantly after the start of the lost Crimean war, which showed uselessness of the regime, marked by “discipline of the rod”. Fifty years later the ruling circles deemed that Japan was not a rival for Russia allegedly capable to win by sheer numbers. (Evidently, being ignorant that the bourgeois-democratic revolution took place in this country and rapidly accelerated its development). The crucial defeat in the Russian-Japanese war provoked the first Russian revolution in 1905-1907, and the Bolsheviks ten years later used this experience and took the upper hand in the October revolution. And in 1913 the 300-years anniversary of Romanoff Dynasty was celebrated with excessive scales, while its organizers seemed to think that the Russian Empire would last for ever, that nothing would be changed in its social and cultural policy. But the

First World War showed that the social order of czarist Russia was marked by the rotten foundation.

The situation repeated itself in the other epoch characterized by the other ruling class and different social order, marked by an inadequate appraisal of the situation in the country and in the world. Just in time of a deep crisis of the Soviet economy and political system, being in need of modernization, the main ideologist and second in power person – A. Suslov seemed to be completely untroubled. He made the following remark concerning the manuscript of novel “Life and Destiny”, written by V. Grossman: this book would not be published in the future hundred years later. But the USSR disintegrated ten years later.

At present the same inadequate rule plays the game in the new country with new the economic and social order, with the new power. For the 1990s, in the course of reckless reforms, Russia lost a greater part of its industrial and scientific-technical capacity; and every year it stepped back in terms of all most significant indexes of life, while people’s ears suffered from the official beat of the drum about successes of Russia, “having stood on it own feet”, while actually only oil prices were rising in the world markets. The official propaganda declared that the country would soon become the fifth economy of the world (however, it was unknown what country would be pushed aside – the USA, China, Japan, Germany or rapidly developing India?), would become the world financial center, that Russia had already become an energy super-power. Actually, for the twenty years Russia not only did not come forward but stepped back in terms of some parameters. It occupied the 65th place by the index of human development, the 30th – by the education level, the 130th – by health care, the 105th – by quality of life, the 75th – by index of social development, the 35th – by index of economic development, the 71 – by attractiveness for life of people, the

136 – for peacefulness, and even the 172 place out of 178 countries – by “index of happiness”. Russia occupies the first places in hardly in the whole specter of failure in demographic, social, moral and spiritual spheres.

For the period of the crisis, the officials experienced difficulties in presenting the GNP rise due to augmentation of prices for energy carriers in the world markets in time of their small physical rise as a rapid economic development. According to the Rosstat, in 2009 the GNP fell down by 7.9%, the industrial development – by 16% (the biggest fall for the last 15 years). (The fall was actually bigger, according to an independent expertise). Russia out of all BRIC countries, “Big Eight” and even “twenty” most developed countries suffered most due to the crisis. Even in the USA, which provoked the crisis, in 2009 the GNP was reduced only by 2.4%. Russia did not enter the group of the most powerful economics but was pushed away to the 11th place according to the international rating agencies. Meantime, China and India, having stressed the development of industry and high tech, in 2009 raised the GNP accordingly by 8.7% and 6.5%.

The relative well-being of Russia is based on incomes from energy carriers, primarily oil, but the profitable oil will come to the end soon. The self cost of oil extraction will rise every year in Russia, while the rise of production of oil is expected for the nearest years in Iraq, marked by great oil fields and low self-cost. The sale of gas (Russia has great deposits of gas) does not compensate the fall of incomes from oil production. Greater quantities of liquefied gas come to the world markets. The production of shale gas was started in the USA, which stopped import of gas. The deposits of oil shale in the world surpass many times the oil fields. New technologies make possible the process of coal gasification, and the coal deposits are very great in the USA and China, being the main consumers of energy resources. On the initiative

of president Obama, a large scale program of solar energy use has been adopted in the USA. In China this kind of energy is used for heating of houses. The construction of atomic power stations was started in China, India and other countries. The childish care free existence by means of oil and gas pipeline will soon come to the end.

But the authorities initiated some expensive prestige projects instead of modernization of enterprises, which were constructed in Soviet times, and instead of ensuring rebirth of hardly existing scientific-technical potential. Having just renovated the city of Strel'nyia after the summit of "Big Eight" in St-Petersburg, the authorities started to construct a costly resort in Sochi for winter Olympic Games in 2014. The initial cost of 314 billion rubles will be increased twice or three times, according to some experts. And construction of the three km bridge Vladivostok-Russki and the related projects due to ATEC summit in 2012 will cost several hundred billion rubles. It is impossible to regard as responsible the policy, which puts to the first place the prestige projects to the detriment of development of the spheres determining the national image in the XXI century. The country lacks the resources needed for solving the most acute problems, related to its strategic interests and to its future.

The situation in the North Caucasus is characterized by either guerilla or civil struggle in separate republics. Long ago, the stake should have been made not on the military force but on the deep modernization of the whole region, which was damaged more than other regions due to the senseless imitated model of economic reform and kept in people's memory the horrors of Stalin's repressions. Over there, it is necessary to start economic development, to create jobs, to eradicate total corruption and unlawful official actions with the view to create the perspectives for the youth. This process will be the most efficient means to prevent extension of terrorism, which rises in the

corresponding (particularly social) environment. Evidently, big resources are needed for achievement of this aim, but they can not be compared with the price of human losses and probable consequences in case of a new deep crisis in Russia. As soon as Russia has recognized independence of small Abkhazia and tiny South Ossetia, both formerly de jure parts of Georgia, it should have done all possible to make peoples of national republics of the RF be happy with the existing situation and not strive for independence like the people in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Otherwise, Russia will have no more arguments to consider as unshakeable the territorial integrity of the country in the eyes of the world community. As correctly noted political scientist S. Markedonov, terrorism should be made irrational in terms of politics and economy. The population of the North Caucasus should see the benefits of support and protection given to Russia. If the people do not see it (but, on the contrary, see violation of laws by the local and federal authorities), they will be in sympathy quite rationally (and not because of arrival of bearded people from Saudi Arabia) at least with the opponents to the authorities.

Already in 2001, G. Malinetski (M.V. Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics) and S. Kurdyumov, Corresponding Member of the RAS warned about the coming catastrophe due to the mass failure of mechanisms and infrastructure due to extreme deterioration. The term “revolt of machines” appeared. They pointed out to a probable catastrophic scenario of development in Russia. But many people regarded the warning of the scientists as an exaggeration, since nothing dangerous took place. However, for the last two-three years, the repeated emergencies in enterprises and crashes on landing of airplanes took place. In June 2008, G. Malinetski said to a correspondent of newspaper “Izvestia” that the mentioned institute on the basis of dynamic theory of information made the geopolitical prognosis for

Russia up to the year of 2030. If the situation in the country changes accordingly in the way of inertia, the disintegration of Russia into the zones of other civilizations' influence will be probable without any external intrusion. The Far East will be divided between China and Japan. America will get Kamchatka, Chukotka and Siberia. The Muslim enclave and the North-West entity will emerge in the European part of the country. This situation corresponds to the CIA prognosis, where Russia is regarded as the zone of crisis and instability. Some American researchers predict disintegration of Russia to 5–8 states during the period of 10–15 years. The loss of life activity by a great part of the population is the significant parameter of this scenario. On 26 June 2009, at the innovation forum on the institutional integration of innovations Malinetski mentioned that the new, sixth technological revolution had started and that Russia entered it absolutely unprepared, that the question was not the economic success-failure but the existence of the state. The scientists of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the RAS made estimations and concluded that Russia lags behind by 40 years. The most important thing is not the money but the definition of the aim.

Not only mathematicians are worried about the future of Russia. In 2006, academician and prominent economist L. Abalkin mentioned three scenarios: transformation of Russia into a second-rate power as a resources producer in terms of its economy; disintegration of the country and its liquidation as a state; restoration of the former might and glory in a prolonged period of time in favorable circumstances. Academician R. Nigmatulin also mentioned three scenarios: the country will concentrate its forces and will change its course, while only the minority thinks so; a social explosion will take place; the degradation of Russian civilization and Russian standard of living. Prominent sociologists, including academician T. Zaslavskaya, express their

concern and stress the deep social stratification, grave demographic situation, decrease of the quality of population, degradation of science, decrease of levels of education and health care. T. Zaslavskaya noted in May 2006 that the shaped system was relatively stable but lacked potential and would turn around like toy “matreshka”, since the centrifugal forces were accumulated in it.

The critical comprehension of the works, written by P. Chaadayev and N. Berdyaev, is needed, to the author’s mind. Chaadayev was the first to point out that the enlightened circles of society were inclined uncritically to imitate all European thoughts and to perceive only the prepared ideas, which was the consequence of borrowed culture. However, he pronounced a lot of other ideas, which caused a fit of anger of Nicolas I and which were not shared by his friends. For instance, he asserted that Russia was going along the line, which did not lead to the aim, in other words, was going around and existed only to give a great lesson to the world. At present, some people say that we have achieved it, having convinced the world that it is impossible to construct socialism like we did it, that it was impossible to reform it in the way we did.

Berdyaev made the definition of the Russian identity: Russians by their spiritual structure are oriental people. Russia is the Christian East, which for two centuries was subject to the great influence of the West, and its upper cultural strata assimilated all western ideas. According to Berdyaev, Russia is neither East nor West; Russia is Eastern West. This phenomenon determines its national character, archaic type (collective unconsciousness), which has both all-human and specific features. For instance, the polar way of thinking (raising all-known extremes); dogmatism (emerged in the West and not universally perceived theory – either Marxism or neo-liberalism – proclaimed by its adepts as the absolute truth); the urge towards solving

complicated problems not by means of compromise but according to the principle “to stick to one’s guns”; irrationalism in case being the arbiter of peoples destiny, like election of the leaders of the state, when people take decisions based not on wisdom but on heart; the so-called daring, which sometimes is appreciated more than talent (for instance, a politician may win confidence of electors by his nice words); inclination of the people to accuse of their hardships not the leaders but their environment. (Foreign analysts were surprised by the fact that Russians, according to polls, gave bad rating to the government but appreciated Putin, who was its premier).

Berdyayev gave answers to the reasons of tragic development of Russia in the XX century. For a short period of time Russia twice changed the vector of social development, having sustained great losses, including irreversible ones. First, socialism was installed following the overthrow of capitalist order, and further Russian people refuted socialism for the benefit of capitalism. And the reason was – the split in Russian national consciousness, emerged after reforms of Peter I. Since that time, the Westernists and the Slavophiles represented the reality. According to the laws of social development, revolutions, as a rule, are replaced by counter-revolutions. The victory in the course of revolution usually is gained by higher educated, socially active and better organized westernists; but since they represent the minority they lose power afterwards. This was the case of events several years after the October revolution, when Stalin and his group of Bolsheviks, supporters of great power politics pushed away and even liquidated “Lenin guard”. And after the anti-Communist democratic revolution in the end of the 1980s-the beginning of the 1990s the liberals-westernists failed to keep power; for the following stages of the power struggle, the former officials of the secret service seized power (although some liberals preserved strong positions in economy). As mentioned in his

time the former chief of narcotics control V. Cherkesov, the heterogeneous and internally contradictory community of people, who chose in Soviet times as their profession the defense of the state security, turned out socially the most consolidated group...Falling to the abyss, the post-Soviet society grasped at this “chekist” hook and stayed suspended on it.

As they say, the things change with the times. And what hinders us to take actions?

First, It is the type of the state and of the power. As Berdyaev marked, we had taken the type of state from rotten Byzantine and “enriched” it with German bureaucracy. We imitated the cult of power and inclination to deification of the ruler. We received maximalism, dogmatism and the cult of sacrifice from Orthodoxy. Berdyaev considered that the historic destiny of the Russian people was unfortunate and full of suffering. Actually, often changes of civilization type, several hundred centuries of life in the situation of dependence from the Golden Horde, several hundred years of serfdom – all this and many other circumstances made us to be like we are. Our power either under the czars or afterwards urges towards the life-long rule, irrespective of its origin, considers the ordinary people as a low stratum. I graduated from the post-graduate course in the Academy of Social Sciences at the CC of the CPSU and was amazed to see the rapid change in behavior of my colleagues turned out to become officials in the office of the CC of the CPSU. I recalled the popular saying: “if you are the chief, I am a fool, if I am the chief, you are the fool”.

Having seized the ruling power (which is usually inseparable from privileges and/or property), our ruling class does not wish any changes, does not want to share something with the people. If Nicolas II (as some people of his closest environment advised him) agreed to install the constitutional monarchy and to go forward to the demands of

peasants, having obtained the support of the prescient part of the nobles, the October revolution would not have occurred. If Brejnev supported Kosygin reforms and insisted on gradual democratization of the political system, including regular change of higher officials based on the contest (like, for instance, in China), we actually would have been able to live in future in the socialist society with human image. But the blind egoism and stupid urge of the ruling class by means of twisting nuts and by brute force to keep all what it possesses, raises in society the feelings of inconsolable grief, fury and often hatred to the authorities, which transform themselves in time of crisis into the situation, qualified by one word – “Down!” The most radical strata of society urge not only towards getting rid from the hated by them regime but also from all things related to it. At the same time, many people incorrectly deem that the situation will not be worse. But a wise person once said that any desperate situation may be made more difficult. The greatest part of the population in Russia confronted such situation during the period after the change of capitalism by socialism and further of socialism by capitalism.

I was a witness and an active participant in the sphere of ideological struggle against the Communist regime. For a long time, it seemed to me that this regime would exist for ever, that the old people, having become senile, would lie for ever about preferences of the semi-barrack-like socialism over capitalism. In order to overthrow this hatred regime I was ready to support all those, who struggled against it. I was ready to close eyes when I was looking at our false liberal-democrats, at dubious human qualities of Yeltsin and others. The super-task was as follows: the Communist regime should be demolished. The ruling class is to blame in our aspiration “for demolishing everything” in the course of revolutionary changes. It is to blame for the great losses in the course of two evolutions. The rapid privatization deserves only censure, but

initially it was prepared as a means to deprive the Communists of the material basis for restoration.

Should our ruling class be far-sighted, it would have done everything to avoid revolution and would have “cultivated” itself the forces, which might come to power in case of the regime’s collapse. At present, such forces do not exist, although the great social injustice does exist. On the eve of the parliamentary elections in 2007 V. Putin mentioned that Russia needed two powerful systemic parties: the right-centrist party and left-centrist party. The right-centrist party “United Russia” was created according to the Kremlin project, while the left-centrist “Just Party” gradually gained forces. Further Putin unexpectedly changed his decision and headed the election list of “United Russia”, without being its member, at the parliamentary elections; the local official exerted “pressure” against the party “Just Russia” in the way as they did against the opposition’s parties. These elections are considered as the most “dirty” elections.

Second. For the twenty post-Soviet years, there have not appeared any new industrial enterprises, new technologies, new hydro-electric stations, ships, airplanes and even cars. Russia lost its advanced positions in cosmos and energy. The industries, created for the Soviet period, are not subject to renovation; it is necessary to construct new enterprises. Who is to blame? To give the answer to this question one should characterize the present ruling class. It is a peculiar symbiosis of bureaucracy, oligarchs and liberals with some “additions”. The bureaucracy is concerned about greatness of Russia, and it strives for raising it...by construction of new pipelines for gas and oil shipment to other countries, by prestige projects and endless PR on its successes in improving the situation of the people and in consolidating international authority of Russia. The greater part of oligarchs, being not confident in their future, tries to move abroad their financial resources and to

register their enterprises in other countries, de jure becoming not real Russians. At the same time, the liberals of the economic block in the government continue to follow the indications of “Washington consensus” which hinders development in Russia.

It is worth recalling its history. In 1989, economist J. Williamson of the Washington Institute for International Economics prepared for some countries with market economies of Latin America the recommendations for their development. They were as follows: the strict financial discipline; limitation of state expenses in the social sphere and infrastructure; reduction of tax rates; liberalization of financial markets; free exchange of the national currency; liberalization of external trade; free access for foreign investments; privatization; deregulation of economy; protection of property rights. These recommendations are based on the neo-liberal theory of M. Friedman and can be reduced to the known maxima of A. Smith: the market will regulate everything. The appearance of these recommendations coincided with collapse of real socialism, and Washington by means of the IMF started to impose them on the countries with transitional economy, primarily the former socialist countries.

None of the rapidly developing countries complied with the demands of “Washington consensus”, while those, which applied them, sustained fiasco. The transformation of the non-market economy into the market economy, particularly of the country, like Russia (great territory, different climatic conditions, great differences in the level of development in various regions, military by 70% economy, hundreds of mono-cities etc.), demands state regulation, indicative planning, protection of national produces from unfair external competition, currency control etc., which is definitely refuted by ideologists of “Washington consensus”. The Russian liberal westernists imitated totally these recommendations in the most brutal way, including rapid

privatization and universal liberalization. It was a catastrophe for Russia. If at that time the dominant economic theory in the West were ideas of Keynes, the quasi-liberals would have followed them, and it would have been at least better for Russia.

But without support of the political leadership the liberals in economic block of the government could not put into life these recommendations. It should be said that the administrative reform and the reforms of the health care, education and some other reforms were executed according to the American recommendations. The Russian foreign currency reserves are kept in the USA. Contrary to the national interests, Russia takes obligations of international (means – western) organizations. And not only private rich Russian businessmen but also high Russian officials keep money and buy realty abroad, send their children for studies to western countries. Hundred thousand lavish villas belonged to rich Russian businessmen and officials are located in western countries. Z. Brzhezinski ironically mentioned that the West should not be afraid of Russia, since it will never wage war against the countries, where its elite has so great interests.

But still another truth exists. The people did not protect socialism, marked by three generations of people, grown in its time, not only due to their disappointment with Lenin-Stalin model of socialism but also due to their inclination, mentioned by Berdyaev, to take action on the basis of the rule of contraries for the sake of fulfillment of the desired aspiration. We are dissatisfied with socialism and let us try to install capitalism. V. Surkov, first deputy chief of the presidential administration, was right, when he said that we did not know how to complete construction of something. R. Grinberg, the director of the Institute of Economy of the RAS gave the following answer to the question on the reason of Russia's failure to ensure its economic and scientific-technical progress for the period of 20 years: "The real reason

is one – the infantile-provincial philosophy of market fundamentalism, which seized the minds of the ruling Russian circles, which mastered only one thing: the market will regulate everything. And it did regulate it: all, which did not promise immediate enrichment, turned out to be closed or thrown away”.

The word “modernization” became fashionable after publication of the article “Go Russia!” written by president D. Medvedev. Certain provisions of the article were developed and supplemented in his second annual address to the Federal Assembly of the RF on 12 November 2009.

First, the president mentioned the problem of complex modernization of Russia, including the political system as well as economy. It provided for the gradual, stage by stage modernization, keeping stability in the country. Its final aim is creation of a flourishing open democratic society on the basis of innovated economy.

Second, in contrast to all what was spoken about rapid economic growth by the government and the leadership of the State Duma, Medvedev underlined the difficult situation of Russian economy, which actually was not developing for the last 20 years, leaving aside the GNP rise due to exceptionally high prices for the exported raw materials. He indicated the reasons of the lack of actual national development.

Third, the president said that modernization of Russian democracy, formation of new economy were possible only in case of use of intellectual resources of the post-industrial society without any complexes, openly and pragmatically. He said that Russia needed money and technologies of the European, American and Asian countries. Up till that time, no high official spoke so candidly and honestly like Medvedev did it.

Fourth, the president in a new way posed the question on the state foreign policy, which would exclude hostility, resentfulness,

conceit, inferiority complex, nostalgia etc., but would be based on the strategic long-term aims of modernization of Russia. All this is very urgent, since for the last years the official's conceit, ambitions and the game in "super-power" prevailed over national-state interests. Actually, the officials quite often behaved as if they lived in the Soviet super-power, "forgetting" that Russian GNP is ten times less than the American GNP and that the scientific-technical capacity was even less. Many analysts say that it is directed to "internal use" to compensate failures in civil spheres. But the story of purchase of "Opel" and other failed business projects showed that nobody in the West intends to render assistance to modernization of Russian economy. The West agreed to build in Russia only the enterprises of "screwdriver technology", which does not develop but annihilates national engineering ideas.

Fifth, Medvedev declared: "They will try to hinder our work. Some influential groups of corrupted officials and "businessmen", doing nothing. They have accommodated well. They "have everything". They are satisfied with all. Up to the end of this century, they intend to squeeze out profits from the rests of the Soviet industry and to squander the natural resources, which belong to all of us. They do not create anything new, do not want development to come and are afraid of it".

Actually, the direct and indirect opposition to realization of "new course" of president Medvedev did not keep us waiting for a long time. The president mentioned almost all negative aspects of our present life: ineffective economy, undeveloped social sphere and democracy, weak civil society, grave social problems, low level of life longevity of citizens, negative demographic trend and the state policy inadequate to the acute political problems in the North Caucasus etc. Evidently, the high officials, who glorified the achievements of Russia, could not like

it. The leaders of party “United Russia”, who supported Putin course of the natural resources’ oriented economy and even (to his own surprise) composed “Putin plan” based on his annual addresses to the Federal Assembly.

At the XI congress in November 2009, the UR proclaimed itself as a conservative party and declared its adherence to conservative modernization. But modernization in perception of president Medvedev and in general comprehension is the direction to revolutionary changes, while conservatism means preservation of the positive side of existent entity and gradual movement forward. But what valuable “good and everlasting” features are incorporated in political, economic and social life, as well as in the spiritual-moral sphere, which society would like to preserve? Is it possible to let Russia execute modernization according to the principle “we are not in a hurry” in the period of catastrophic economic situation and the fatal lag of Russia behind the developed, advanced countries?

In his turn, premier Putin, who, evidently, having not liked the idea of not only economic but also of political modernization, declared that “Ukrainization of Russia” should not be permitted in the course of making changes. But what does it mean? The difficult peaceful process of formation of the two-party system as a guarantee of keeping democracy and preventing return to dictatorship is coming to the end in Ukraine. Russia lacks such guarantees. The political class in Ukraine sustained the difficult test for democracy and prevented neither new revolution, like in some former Soviet republics, not the coup d’etat, like in Russia in 1993. Should there be no rude interference of external forces in internal affairs in Ukraine in the course of presidential elections in the year of 2004 the process of democratic consolidation would have been marked by the lesser number of conflicts.

The traditional misfortune of the Russian power consists in its conscious and unconscious change of causes for consequences. The mass protests of citizens in some neighboring countries against falsification of elections, corruption and misery was considered by the officials in Russia as an exclusively western interference; and instead of eradicating this evil in the country they took rigid measures, created the loyal youth's organizations ("Nashi", "Molodaya gvardiya" and others), adopted in a hurry some laws, which equated actions of social protest and protests against unlawful officials' acts to the extremist actions. Something similar to it was practiced in czarist Russia and in the USSR.

Will the president succeed in reversing the trend to a catastrophic development of Russia? The answer to this question can be made only in the spirit of antinomy, when it is possible to justify anything. By the way, Berdyaev liked to do it.

On the one side, it is difficult to refute the scientists and experts, who assert that in the visible future Russia will hardly change the vector of economic development. The more so, if for some time the prices for oil rise above \$ 70 dollars per barrel. The raw resources economy will inevitably lead to the impasse, which was mentioned by the president. It will give the start to development of a catastrophic scenario with unpredictable consequences. What is the crux of the problem?

First, the subject of modernization seems to be very weak, while the opponents are very strong. Medvedev mentioned them. The raw resources magnates do not need it, especially as many of them do not connect their destiny with Russia. The raw resources lobby is numerous and very influential. High officials may have shares in raw resources companies, according to analysts; accordingly, their interests coincide with interests of raw resources barons. The greater fruits of corruption

are received on the soil enriched by petrodollars. The “honeyed life” of showmen, stultifying citizens, and image makers, working for the oligarchy and bureaucracy, PR technologists, political scienyists and sociologists has grown on the same soil. The people are confused and many of them do not comprehend what will happen when the incomes received from sale of natural resources are reduced. The people’s collective memory still preserves the 1990s years of scarcity, and the people are afraid of losing even the modest earnings they have.

Second, President Medvedev seems to lack, except his administration, a powerful think tank, which would be able to produce the justified recommendations on the step by step actions within the framework of his determined program. It was clearly shown by the report “Russia of the XXI century: the Expected Tomorrow”, prepared by the Institute of Contemporary Development” (the president himself is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees). Its authors, chairman of the Governing Body (INSOR) I. Yurgens and member of the GB E. Gontmaher, actually proposed to the country a new liberal project, which was similar to the projects, accomplished by the team of Gaidar-Chubais. They rely on the values of liberalism and democracy, include Russia beforehand not only in the European Union but also in NATO, as if they are not aware of the other meaning on this score of most Russians.

Third, it is very difficult to solve the problem of modernization of raw resources economy. Economy and almost the whole infrastructure are in the state of disorganization; under these conditions it is necessary to solve two grandiose problems: re-industrialization and technological overthrow. A new industrialization is a must for innovated economy – there will be neither corresponding material preconditions nor human resources. And even the created in Russia probable innovations will be demanded mainly in the developed

countries. It is difficult also to solve the problem of accumulation of financial resources within the framework of present economic and financial policy. It was not solved even during “fat years”, while the gross external debt accounted for \$ 600–700 billion, according to some economists.

Fourth, modernization is comparable only with industrialization or creation of nuclear and rocket arms in terms of great scales of the tasks, of their complexity and efforts exerted by society. These projects were regarded by the elite and society as the condition of the country’s existence, were uniting the people and mobilizing them. What idea may unite the society, which seems to live in two worlds – the world of the rich and super-rich and in the world of poor people and semi-beggars? It is difficult to find out the answer. Besides, the president lacks his own party or public movement. At the same time, the old team, possessing influential positions in the organs of power, in economy, in mass media, does not recognize the collapse of its economic course and will not accept the idea itself of the large-scale modernization. If it recognizes this fact, its positions will weaken greatly on the eve of coming parliamentary and presidential elections.

Finally, with rare exceptions, for the first years of creation of new economy the living conditions of the greater part of population will deteriorate. For the sake of industrial and agricultural development it will be necessary to reduce export of energy carriers, metals, fertilizers, while the accumulation of capital to raise the level of investments will demand introduction of progressive tax for physical persons, reduction of super-profits of big companies, decision by the state companies’ high officials to renounce million-scale bonuses, premiums, “golden parachutes”, reduction of bureaucrats’ privileges and others. The elite, accustomed to live in opulence at the expense of natural rent, would hardly greet such policy.

On the other side, there were such cases in history, when one person might play a deciding role in destiny of the country. In China, Dan changed the vector of social national development, having transformed the CPC in an instrument of building economy of capitalist type, changing at the same time the social composition and ideology of the Communist Party. He was surrounded by talented economists and had a powerful team. As a result, for the period of 30 years of reforms China raised the GNP by 15 times and became the second economy of the world after the USA. Let us admit that our leaders lacked and could not have such experience of state governance, possessed by the Chinese leader with the outstanding talent. But the president of the USA R. Reagan, a former actor, also had no great governor's experience and, frankly speaking, was not a distinguished intellectual; however, he selected a talented team and with its help dragged out the USA out of the prolonged crisis and was considered as a strong man at the presidential post in American history.

The Russian president possesses so extensive constitutional powers that, showing his political will, he may dismiss any official, if the latter does not cope with his obligations or puts into life his own program, and may form such team, which will be able to lead the country to the way of good development. At the same time, the president will need a strong think tank and the support of the mass of people.

To the author's mind, this problem should be solved in the following way.

First, it is necessary to transform INSOR, characterized by the presence of many useless liberals of Gaidar-Chubais type, into a strong team of persons holding the same views, working for the president and not being engaged in self PR and, probably, appealing to western public opinion. There are experienced economists in Russia, who know how to

create new economy. For instance, academician of the RAS and of the European Academy, the president of the New Economic Association V. Polterovich is one of them. He advised M. Gorbachyov to start the reforms not in the political sphere but in the sphere of economy, like it was done already in China.

Second, the party “United Russia” might become the foot-hold of the president in implementation of his program, if by means of democratic elections it gets rid of “designated persons”. (President of Bashkortostan M. Rakhimov in his time said about them that they were not in command of three hen). They do not comprehend the role of the party and of the parliament in life of society, they do not see the misfortune, which inevitably will come across in the country, if the Russian people do not change the present economic course.

Third, it is needed to say the truth to the people that in case of modernization’s failure the country might probably disintegrate and disappear from the historic scene. And the historic experience shows: our society rapidly gets rid itself of indifference and inertia, gaining energy and resoluteness, only in time of mortal danger. But at the same time, mass media, primarily the state TV channels, should work for the interests of modernization and not for glorification of fake successes in the years of the 2000s, actually justifying the inertia way of development. Russia will need as well the change of social policy and improvement of spiritual-moral atmosphere in society.

For the nearest future, it will be evident, what out two indicated variants will become a reality.

*“SotsIs: Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya”,
M., 2010, N 11, p. 133–143.*

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THE MAIN PROBLEMS IN THE MOSLEM EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA

Education was always of primary importance in Islam as just people coming from religious schools have been shield and buckler of the Moslem religious doctrine being in principle characteristic for all confessions. In this connection beginning from perestroika there emerged the need for such schools as the possibility to get religious education in the USSR was minimal. As a rule the persons interested in the Islamic knowledge were to go to Central Asia where the traditions of the Moslem education continue to exist to some extent. One of the most famous religious schools was madrasah “Mir-i-Arab” located in Bukhara. The most present imams and muftis of the Russian Federation studied just there.

Proceeding from the existing situation the different courses to study Islam were organized in many Russian regions. Understanding that the similar courses don’t correspond to the modern requirements and aren’t notable for a high level some young people expressed a desire to study abroad where the Islamic education is better in comparison with Russia and even the Central Asian republics. The institutions of higher lever being officially registered and obtained a license were established in the largest Moslem centers such as Kazan, Ufa, Makhachkala, Nazran’, Nal’chik, Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod.

However, the young Russian Moslems could get higher Islam education in 1990-ss only abroad. They went generally in the institutions of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Algeria, Tunis, Morocco and

Sudan. Sometimes one could meet the Russian Moslem-students in Yemen, Indonesia, Lebanon and Oman.

During that period of time the tens of thousands of the young people from the Russian Moslems had a possibility to study in the Islamic states. It would seem that the Russian Islam had the reliable personnel potential in their person owing to it the Moslem religion will be revived very rapidly and the religious and educated people will be increased exponentially. Nevertheless, the process of the mass departure of the young people to study in the Islamic states - the process having no precedents in the history of Russia – wasn't positively efficient for umma power.

Let's mark some peculiarities having influenced on insufficient effectiveness of their study results:

1. Weak control of this process from the party of the Moslem structures.
2. The following problem emerged because of the first one: total coordination of student criteria sent abroad. For the receiving party – the Islamic institute in the Moslem countries – criterion was only one – student belonging to Islam. It was defined on the base of a student name or his parent name. Preliminary examinations for the Russian students in the Islamic institutions was either formal or was absent at all. So there were a considerable number of people having poor and low level of general education.

So the foreign higher Islamic education turned out to be such depreciated approach when “just about everyone” went abroad, their departure wasn't controlled and only a few managed to graduate from. It's also important that Russia signed no agreements concerning diploma of each other accepting with no Moslem state.

In 2000-ss the state power was concerned about the Islamic education problems. It conducted some measures directed at the educational program unification and the radical ideology abolition from them.

The State Duma of the Russian Federation also discusses the problems on radicalization attempt prevention at the legislative level and “starting to move” of the Russian umma, in particular, among the youth. The special-purpose Presidential program on personnel preparation for the religious boards of the Moslems in the secular institutions also acts successfully in Russia.

So, one began renewing and developing the natural system comprehensively under the Moslem religious and educational institutions.

If to approach this problem systematically then one will have to prepare the loyal personnel of the Moslem clergy during several years and one will be able to be engaged in a constructive dialog with. In its turn it will promote to prevent the radical and extremist idea distribution among the Moslems.

But up to date in spite of the improvements of the Moslem education development in Russia there are many unsolved conceptual problems. One can note the following ones among them: the totality of the Islamic primary, secondary and higher schools all over Russia wasn't established into the system up to date in spite of that 20 years have passed from the beginning of the religious revival. There is neither vertical (primary-secondary-higher) nor horizontal (between the institutions of the different regions) integratedness as before.

In what direction should one integrate the higher Islamic schools in our country? Now there is the standard in the educational area “theology” with qualification of bachelor; the first graduates have already received their state degrees. But as there is no necessity to

approve the single standard on religious trends without state diplomas (because this sphere isn't under the authority of the state) it will bring to that the religious educational trends, specialties in each institution absolutely differ as the educational programs. So, there are no common criteria of the institution activity concerning a quality. The competitions on the Arabian language and the Islamic sciences between the representatives of the different Islamic institutions can be only indirect.

The Moslem umma is administratively divided into the centers and there is no common interpretation of goals and objectives for the Islamic institution activity. In the middle of 1990-ss such approach as the Islamic institutions are a forge of highly educated imams i.e. the religious figures was widely distributed. The projectionists from the religious boards of the Moslems, muftis are characterized with such view at a concept of the higher Islamic religious education; this view emerged in the middle of 1990-ss when a rapid building of the new mosques in the big towns was accompanied with professional shortage. By the way, the leadership of the largest Islamic funds and sponsors of economically healthy states of the Persian Gulf understood this positions and allotted funds for these universities.

The representatives of intellectual circles had quite another approach. To their mind the modern Islamic institute must prepare, first of all, for the Moslem intelligence being knowledgeable both about so-called the religious sciences and secular ones, combines the both identities (civil and Moslem) and is ready for working both in the Moslem and secular offices – in the field of education, public institutions, mass media and etc. Just these principles are assumed as a basis for establishing the Russian Islamic university in Kazan in 1998 and just confrontation between these two positions brought to the conflict between the founders of the institutions in 2006. But we never heard the final answer where to move further.

Up to date the problem on the religious-legal belonging of ones or another Islamic institutions is particularly pointed; very often the representatives of quite the different theological traditions and the adherents of the different mazhabs (the teachers having learned in Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Malaysia have quite the different views) work and preach the corresponding views and knowledge in the same institute. Everybody teaches fiqh in such a way he studied in that country without taking into consideration a local legal tradition. That's why the unification of the educational programs of all the Russian Islamic institutions on the main religious disciplines – fiqh, tafsir and etc. is very important.

The Islamic institution qualification objectively impedes the Islamic system of education improving. Today there are two types of contingents for the top official of the Islamic institutions:

1. Secular scientists without religious education but having a scientific degree and being capable of educational process organizing according to standards of higher academic education;
2. The religious figures having a theological education don't know the traditions of academic science at all and can't organize educational and scientific processes.

The situation is worsened by that there are no high skilled professionals on religious education. Unfortunately, practically nobody works in the sphere of the higher Islamic education (almost without exception) among those graduates of the foreign Islamic institutions having the degree of master and living in Russia.

“Problemy stanovleniya i razvitiya musul'manskogo obrazovaniya na postsovetском prostranstve”, M., 2009, p.110–119.

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**ISLAM AND NATIONAL RENAISSANCE
IN TATARSTAN FOR THE BOUNDARY
PERIOD BETWEEN MILLENIUMS**

The contemporary system of ethnic-political relations is characterized mainly by their secular content. Nevertheless, the religious thinking of the people plays a certain, sometimes rather essential role both in the internal political life of separate countries and in development of inter-state relations. For the last decades in the XX century – the beginning of the XXI century in Russia and Tatarstan the Islamic religious factor became a significant component of ethnic-political life. In contemporary circumstances, the state religious policy in the Republic of Tatarstan is determined primarily by formation and development of the Tatarian people. As the world experience shows, for the period of formation, consolidation or renaissance of statehood there exist the need, side by side of other components, of the confessional and psychological community, coincidence of interests of the peoples of the country, and, otherwise, the transnational official ideology of the state is a must.

The national official ideology is based in Tatarstan on the following provisions: according to the Constitution, the Republic of Tatarstan is proclaimed as the state expressing "the will and interests of the whole multinational people of the Republic" (article 1); the Tatarian and the Russian languages are recognized as equal state languages of the Republic of Tatarstan (article 4); the Republic of Tatarstan aspires for creation of national capital without ethnic "image" etc.

It is necessary to consider in this respect also the attitude of the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan to religion.

The official religious policy in the multinational and multi-confessional Republic of Tatarstan is determined primarily by the Constitution of RT, the legislation of RT on freedom of conscience and activities of religious associations. For instance, the Constitution of RT fixes that “the citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan according to their convictions have the right freely to profess any religion or not to profess any religion...Religion and the religious associations in the Republic of Tatarstan are separated from the state”.

As a result of the analysis of the state-confessional relations in the republic the author stresses several main problems, which are quite urgent.

First of all, it is the problem of peaceful coexistence in the Republic of Tatarstan of two main religions – Islam and Orthodoxy. The analysis of activities of national public organizations and parties relating to their attitude to the problem of place and role of Islam in public-political and cultural life of the Tatarian people provides a chance to see clearly the religious situation in the Republic of Tatarstan.

According to academician, chairman of the World Congress of Tatars I. Tagirov, the national movement consists of various forms of activities, promoting development and realization of the national idea, being imbued with concern about general well-being of the people, showing perspectives for its independence and sovereignty. Therefore it may include the activities of individuals, groups of like-minded persons, as well as masses of thousands of people, participating in meetings and demonstrations in the streets and squares.

The Public Center of Tatars (PCT) carried out activities and accomplished great work. In its program documents PCT paid great attention to religious problems, since its main aim consisted in uniting all Tatars, living in different regions and countries. In order to achieve

this aim it was necessary to preserve the Tatarian language, to arouse national self-consciousness and unity of religious convictions.

In 1998, the conception of national movement was prepared and adopted by PCT branch in Kazan; it was published under the title “Nizamname” (conception). Side by side other criteria of national movement, it discusses the place and role of Islam in renaissance of statehood of the Tatarian people, in attainment of national independence, underlines a special significance of religion in preservation and development of the Tatarian nation, stressing significance of classic Islam; it criticizes activities of some representatives of the clergy – “Kadimists”, who appeal to Muslims-Tatars to abstain from political activities; it approves modernization of Islam with due account to historic situation and conditions, determined by place and time; it substantiates the need of existence of a sovereign state for a free development of Islam in Tatarian society.

In 1992, the idea of convocation of the national parliament – Milli Majilis – was proclaimed. It was supported by the left-radical public associations. In the introductory part of the law on Milli Majilis, side by side with other public-political and cultural-enlightenment issues, the issue of religion was raised. In particular, it was mentioned that in society of Tatarstan there were eradicated the roots of Islam, while spiritual demands were suppressed and immorality flourished. It was stressed that Milli Majilis should have the right to adopt laws on religious issues; at the same time, in the appeal to the Organization of Islamic Conference (Istanbul) it was said about respectful attitude to other religions. On 24 May 1994, the second session of Milli Majilis took the decision to elaborate the Code of Laws of Tatars (Kanunname), which was adopted on 26 January 1996. It was stressed in the Code that the main feature of Tatars is as follows: it is the community of people, who consider themselves as the representatives

of the Tatarian nation, speaking the official Tatarian language and considering Islam their spiritual-moral, material and social purport of life. Rafael Mukhametdinov and Fausia Bairamova, former leaders of the PCT radical wing, established the party of national type “Ittifak”; according to them, its strategic aim consisted in perspective creation of independent state of Tatars in the form of the Tatarian republic. The idea of national independence occupies the main part in documents of “Ittifak”, making it actually the national-religious party. F. Bairamova as the chairman of the party said that it struggled for the future, independence and happiness of the Tatarian people, for their return to bosom of Islam. Independence of the state is the hand work of the people, independence of the nation is faith and religion, asserted she. “Ittifak” explained in its program the attitude to religion in the following way: the ancient culture of Tatars is inseparably linked with Islam; it is necessary to give full support to the clergy and the religious communities.

The program documents were characterized by the prevailed pragmatism, directed to the primary solving of social-economic problems and, consequently, as a result of this, the national movement did not see any special need to elaborate the national conception and a large-scale program of national-cultural development. Probably, the change of national ideology for all-national idea played a certain role in this respect – in this case – for the idea of sovereignty of Tatarstan. Under conditions of the crisis, the radical wing of the national movement had to look for other ideological orientations to realize its political aims. In the course of search for a national-specific way of development the leaders of party “Ittifak” and Milli Majilis turned particularly to Islam.

In the documents, titled “Tatar Kanunah”, they made an attempt to connect nationalism as a political theory and practice with Islam,

though, not in its Tatarian reformed but in the classical variant of Islam. Such approach may be regarded as a wish to create the political conception, which perceives some dogmas of Islam as national doctrines.

It should be admitted that such approach is not new by all means. Nationalism and Islam came forward as powerful ideological stimuli of the social century many times in history. It also testifies to the fact that there exists a certain dependence of the level of comprehension by the people of all-national interests on the force of integration impact of the religious factor. At the same time, the historical events of the national movement in Tatarstan for the beginning of the XX century show that the religious doctrines with national programs and ideals are compatible with national programs and ideals only in case when they take action in one social space and use common aspects in their social-cultural foundations, are based on the deep stereotypes of consciousness, where religious ethic is closely connected with ethnic-national traditions.

The general democratic principles aimed at creation of conditions for functioning of these organizations and for attainment of their general political tasks prevailed even in the programs of the first public organizations with the religious trend of activities. The logic of this approach is quite explainable: a definite legal and political guarantee on the part of the state is needed quite evidently.

The Islamic democratic party of Tatarstan, established in 1991, finally had not come forward to the political arena. The main difficulties experienced by the party related to the social-economic, political and ethnic problems but not to purely theological problems.

The program documents of organizations and parties of the Tatarian national movement differ in the content and typology of directions as far as their attitude to Islam is concerned. It is possible to mention the moderate trend (the public Tatarian center “Imam”) and the

radical trend, including primarily radical-religious organizations (“Ittifak”, Milli Majilis) and the radical wing (“Azatlyk”); the secular (PCT) and anti-secular (“Ittifak”) trends. They differ also in their attitude to the national sovereignty, sovereignty of the nation (Milli Majilis, “Ittifak”) and to the state sovereignty, sovereign state (PCT). If TCT sticks to the ideology of regional nationalism, “Ittifak” and Milli Majilis proclaim ideology of Islamism.

As the analysis of the documents of public-political organizations and the party “Ittifak” shows, the politics has a certain impact on Islam in Tatarstan. It proves that any religion represents not only a system of views on the world but is also a social and political force.

It is possible to mention two wings – radical and moderate – in the national movement in terms of its attitude to Islam. The leaders of the radical wing of the national movement in Tatarstan consider that Islam should be the basis of the world outlook and of political culture of the Tatarian people, while for the representatives of the moderate wing this appeal is the return to Kadimism, to isolation of the Tatarian people from the present environment. Roshat Safin, the leader of PCT writes that today it is necessary to supplement religiousness with ideas of self-definition, to satiate Islam with Tatarism and to subordinate education to ideas of freedom and consolidation of statehood. He thinks that it would be incorrect to mix the earthly and beyond matters, the notions of “people” and “religion”. Although religion covers greater territory than the people from the geographical point of view, it is unable by its functioning to satisfy completely demands and interests of the nation, mentions R. Safin.

Placing to the upper level the interests of the Tatarian nation, R. Safin asserts that Islam is the common human teaching and is the ever-lasting and universal teaching for all nations. However, like other religions, Islam in practical matters (shariat laws) should take into

account the dialectical development of each nation, accustomed to the geographical and climatic living conditions according to achievements of civilization. Safin fixes for religion the minor role at the present level of social development. He considers that Tatars should primarily master Islam in terms of philosophic views on the universe as a source of cultural heritage of the ancestors, of the spiritual force of the nation and the moral canons.

The radicals of the national movement severely criticize the conception of ‘Tatarization’ of Islam. F. Bairamova said that the contemporary Tatarian scientists regard religion primarily as a moral-philosophic notion. To their mind, religion is needed for education of masses of people under the condition that it should be adapted to the existing regime, national life and civilization. Therefore they are ready to put Islam within the framework of ‘Euro-Islam’, repeatedly appeal to religious reforms – to new jihad, dream about nationalization of Islam. They concentrate their attention to the fact that ‘Tatarism’ will be unable to preserve the nation and prevent its disappearance or assimilation, they think that it is possible to save the nation only by way of the return to Islamic laws and dogmas.

At present, the religious renaissance is seen mostly in the sphere of enlightenment, related to the lack of really educated Tatarian theologians. Due to the artificial causation of times Tatarstan almost completely lacks its scientists, who in their own language would be able to make explanation of every sura and ayat, each word of Koran, giving good example of life; the clergymen lack secular education, while those, who have it, do not possess religious education. Therefore for the leaders of the clergy, of the national movement, of the republican government the issue of religious education of the population is very urgent in terms of formation of civilized comprehension of Islam and ensuring natural continuity of its

confession. In this connection, in Tatarstan the sphere of Muslim education develops rapidly, the educational courses are organized in mosques, the education institutions at different grades function in Tatarstan.

At the same time, facultative teaching of religions' history, including Islam, was introduced in the general education schools, lyceums and colleges in Tatarstan. Taking into account the above mentioned information, it is possible to conclude that the Muslim clergy in Tatarstan, the national movement and the Government of the RT share the united opinion relating to religious education, which should correspond to the spirit of the times and should put an essential contribution to the inter-national and inter-religious relations in the Republic of Tatarstan and in Russia as a whole.

As the leaders of the Muslim clergy and the national movement, as well as the scientists-experts in Islam in Tatarstan correctly said, the contemporary religious confession of faith to a large extent is characterized by the ritual experience, and perception of Islam from the philosophical, social, economic and moral-legal point of view still remains in the background. In this respect, the activities of religious educational institutions are very important.

The analysis of activities of the Muslim clergy and national movement at the stage of renaissance of Islam proves that they came to Islam as a phenomenon not only of religious life and world outlook but also of culture and ethnicity, as a serious factor of national movement and political struggle. The leaders of the radical religious wing of national movement in Tatarstan substantiate the national interests primarily by Islam, while their activities include national aspect with the dominant religious impact. In the course of the struggle for sovereignty of the Tatarian people they to a certain extent base themselves on the nationalist ideology, while in this ideology the

Islamist forms of nationalism and the idea of unity of the Tatarian people prevail on the basis of religious common character.

The leaders of RT and the national movement in Tatarstan pay attention to the need of training Muslim cadres in the country, with due account of unique feature of Islam in Tatarstan, which should continue the traditions of Tatarian theologians in the end of the XIX century – the beginning of the XX century. Although the national movement and national self-consciousness of the Tatarian people develop in a contradictory way and although they are marked by some negative aspects, as a whole, the national movement and Islam in Tatarstan reflect the processes of democratization and reforms in Russia, promote development of culture and the nation in Tatarstan under conditions of poly-confessional and multinational country.

The made analysis makes it possible to stress various groups in relation to Islam: from politologists of the official powers of the republic to the leaders of the moderate and radical wings of the national movement. The main idea of the official power is Tatarstanism, able to ensure the inter-ethnic balance in the republic. Euro-Islamism-Jadidism of the moderate wing may have a perspective in the undetermined future, though. The leaders of the radical-religious wing of the national movement stand up for penetration of Islam in politics, pursuing mainly ambitious aims of coming to power by means of religion.

“Vlast”, M., 2010, N 9, p. 108–119.

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THE IMPACT OF CONFESSIONAL FACTOR ON RECRUITMENT OF CADRES FOR THE TERRORIST UNDERGROUND IN DAGESTAN

Islamization of society. The rapid renaissance of Islam in the republic was started in the second half of the 1980s. For the period of

the mass demonstrations in 1987–1988 the population demanded to issue permission for construction of mosques. By the beginning of the 1990s the Islamic political parties were formed. Islam became one of the central factors of the republican ethnic-political process.

The “restoration-mastering” by society of the vast spiritual sphere, formerly forbidden for the main part of the XX century, was going on rapidly. This process was connected not only with the rise of the population’s religiousness but also with the differentiation and subdivision of the general number of believers into followers of traditional Islam, tarikatists-sufis and the adepts of Salafism. With due account of the fact that the “theological” differences were combined with ethnic separations projected in the religious sphere, Islam in Dagestan turned out to be incapable to play a consolidating role. Rather on the contrary, it became a significant factor of differentiation and polarization of the republican society. For the 1990s, all trends of Islam in the republic, irrespective of conflicts and on the basis of complicated reciprocal actions, demonstrated rapid development and numerical growth of their followers. From 1986 to 2000, over 1550 mosques were constructed in the republic, i.e. the annual rate of construction of mosques made about 100 buildings. In the beginning of the XXI century the rates of construction was reduced to some extent (40-50 buildings per year). But in terms of the cult network Dagestan occupies at present the first place among all regions of the RF (about 1900 mosques in 2007). In the beginning of the XXI century 15 Islamic higher educational institutions, including 33 branches, 136 medreces and 205 maktabas functioned in the republic. The total number of students made up 14 thousand people.

For the end of the XX century – the beginning of the XXI century, under public-political and social-economic conditions of Dagestan, Islamic “renaissance” and considerable growth of

religiousness of the population could not help becoming the systemic factor of the growth of the conflict-generating capacity and finally of extremist activity in the republic. The social realities of life in the republic accelerated and aggravated the essential “vices” of savage Russian capitalism, inevitably conflicted with the ideas proclaimed even by traditional Islam, leaving aside its radical trends.

Traditional Islam in Dagestan is not less politicized than fundamentalism. The social-economic and spiritual crisis in the republic demands that the religious leaders should give their answer to the main contemporary problems... Political Islam in Dagestan acquires its shades, there exist “the left” and “the Right” groups. The first of them proclaim the ideas of social justice, contained in sermons of the Prophet and proscribed in shariat. The others stress the firmness of private property as a foundation of Islamic state. But both are combined by enmity and even hostility to all things, which relate to the West, underlines S.E. Berezhnoy.

The idea of social justice is more clearly expressed in the salafit (wahhab) community. The ideas of pure Islam started to penetrate to the republic already for the 1970s. However, at this time they were rigidly neutralized by the Soviet power, and their influence started to grow only for the second part of the 1980s. For the first post-Soviet decade, a rather extensive salafit community was formed in the republic, including both moderate Muslims (the followers of Akhmad-Kali Akhtayev) and evident radicals, headed by Baggautdin Kebedov. The communities of salafits were grounded in many cities and villages.

The communities of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi were far-famed, and in 1999 a military operation was needed to liquidate them. Participation of wahhabies in the assault of the Chechen extremists against Dagestan turned out to be a rigid military operation against wahhab community of the republic. However, the authorities were not

in power to liquidate it completely. The evident for ordinary Muslims connection of the official clergy with the unpopular corrupted power promoted conversion of some “zealous” believers to radical forms of Islam.

The transition of a part of Muslims to the positions of “genuine” Islam, certainly, did not mean their automatic accession to activities of the terrorist underground (TU). However, since the end of the 1990s the republican law enforcement bodies kept the intent look at salafits. In this case the suspiciousness of the law enforcement bodies was quite justified, since the reinforcement of the republican extremist underground was executed at the expense of adepts of “pure” Islam. As a result of the intent attention of the law enforcement bodies which transformed into rigid forceful actions some salafits, in their turn, passed from passive sympathy to the underground to active forms of its activities.

Not all people, having made the first step on “the escalator” of growing opposition to the authorities, went further to the last step – to participation in terrorist acts and military actions. However, there have formed a reason-consequence chain of connections, functioning as a conveyer, which reinforces the military underground with new cadres.

At the same time, many followers of traditional Islam also step on “the escalator of violence”. As a result, at the present time, exactly the confessional channel of the cadre reinforcement of TU in Dagestan (and as a whole in the North Caucasus) may be determined as a dominant source.

And what is more, some researchers regard that the demographic basis of TU consists not of religious radicals but rather of representatives of the religious majority, i.e. traditional Islam, which is considered by the federal republican authorities as a tolerant Islam , which deserves recognition and all and every support. Actually, such

point of view on the situation is incorrect, since traditional Islam is politicized and often radicalized and even aggressive practically in all republics of the North Caucasus. S.E. Berezhnoy shares this point of view and asserts that in Dagestan traditional Islam is politicized not less than fundamentalism.

The question is not the assertion that the main principles of Muslim religion predispose the believers to terrorism to a greater extent than any other religious system. But, if you wish, Islamic civilization more acutely and painfully reacts to the contemporary modernization processes, connected both with positive changes in material-technical life of people and with perceptible deformations and losses in the spiritual sphere. These destructive changes are especially perceptive in the countries of overtaking modernization. With full extent, they are characteristic for contemporary Russian society and Russian capitalism. They are revealed in the way of formation of the latter through the shock therapy of society and the social-economic crisis, as well as in its evident features, including the extremely high level of polarization of incomes of the population, the clear social injustice and the rise of social pathology and the large-scale corruption of the state apparatus.

It is appropriate that sincere Muslim believers, under conditions of the contemporary reality of their republic, of the North Caucasus and the RF as a whole see many things which irritate and insult them very much. The Muslim community is not the exclusion in this enmity to the contemporary realities. It is sufficient to get acquaintance with the texts of many Orthodox authors to be persuaded in the analogous high level of internal rigid tearing away of the multitude of vices and “grimaces” of the contemporary modernized society. However, the social reaction of believers is different, being determined partially by systemic peculiarities of Orthodoxy and Islam. If an Orthodox with inveterate faith primarily saves himself, transforming his belief into a personal

“armor” against temptations and vices of the external world, a “true/zealous” Muslim chooses the road of struggle against this reality for the “correct” world.

If the struggle against evil by its means is inadmissible (simply not perspective) for the Orthodox, each Muslim is obligated to stop the evil. And it is possible to do it only by reciprocal force, by forceful “correction” of the unjust world. It is not a surprise that under conditions of the contemporary North Caucasus just the traditional Muslim majority, finally, becomes the significant resource of reinforcements for the underground.

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Thus, the concentration of protest energy was going on in various segments of social life in Dagestan. But the main, in essence, integral channel of its exit to the surface of public life (in the form of terrorist activities) became the religious radicalism in the beginning of the XXI century. Exactly at this time, the republican terrorist underground was going on through the concluding stages of its formation as a developed complex, which was able to re-produce itself, basing mainly on the internal resources. As it is known, the beginning of the XXI century was also the period of political stabilization in the RF, of a rather sustainable economic growth. The positive social-economic dynamics was characteristic at this time for Dagestan too. However, the process of radicalization of a part of republican society, started in the 1990s, continued its development and resulted both in the final formation of TU and intensification of terrorist activities in the republic for the last years.

It is worth recalling that for the first post-Soviet decade, related to the most intensified transformation of political and social-economic institutions, the criminal-corruption complex was formed in Dagestan.

Gradually the terrorist component was included in its “production” chains, making them more complicated (in essence, transforming into social “Gordian knot”). The republican terrorism to a certain extent was the religiously “shaped” radical social reaction of society in Dagestan to the large-scale corruption and inefficiency of the local authorities, to “putting to shadow” of the local economy and to polarization of the population’s incomes

However, the religious extremism, being by its genesis and its strategic aim rather a systemic “antipode” to the criminal corruption, in some or other way starts to use the discovered, in this space, financial and infrastructural chances. At the same time, the simple “roofing” soon starts to be supplemented by other role functions (for instance, by founding their own enterprises directly and financially oriented to the needs of the underground). As a whole, the existence of the developed corrupted sphere, of the powerful shadow segment, comparable recently in its scale with the legal economy, facilitated essentially activities of TU. The activities of the latter, in its turn, extended the “illegal” social-economic environment of life in the republic, significantly impeding the struggle against it.

In other words, the main element of the extremist underground gradually is being included in this criminal-corrupted system, shaped in Dagestan. In certain sense, it is possible to speak about the criminal-corruption-extremist complex of Dagestan.

At present, the main part of society in Dagestan remains a passive (or passively suffered) element: a kind of social-demographic “ordnance yard”, where the desperate struggle of conflicting parties is going on, finally, for the power over this narrow-minded “meat-jelly”. For a long time, some experts (for instance, A.V. Malashenko) have qualified the events in Dagestan as “a civil war”. However, being by its type a civil conflict, the struggle of the republican power against the

underground, nevertheless, may not be elevated to the level of “war” by its systemic format.

S. Slutsky. “Terrorresticheskoe podpolye na vostoke Severnogo Kavkaza (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia)”, R-na-Donu, 2010, p. 94–120.

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NATIONALISM AND ISLAM IN THE CAUCASUS: IDEOLOGICAL MEASURING

Religion plays a rather significant role in formation of the nation and the national idea. The irony consists in the fact that the world religions due to their universality are summoned to eliminate ethnic, language, political and other differences among people and peoples. Nevertheless, there exists a certain connection between religion and national self-consciousness. Some authors think that it is possible to speak about ethnic religion. In definite situation a certain nation chooses ethnic religion, feeling its distinction from neighboring peoples and states.

For instance, Iran kept its identity in relation to surrounding it peoples and countries, for some time remaining attached to Zarathustrian faith, later conversed to Islam, having elaborated its own Shiite version. It is significant that in Ottoman Turkey Pan-Islamism came forward as a kind of device to serve the interests of realization of the founding directions of Pan-Turkism. As the Empire was weakening, the Pan-Islamist elements in ideology of the country were replaced by elements of Pan-Turkism.

There were cases, when conversion to different faiths could result in creation of two different nationalities. The division of formerly

united people into Croats and Serbs was determined primarily by conversion of one part of the people to Catholicism and to the Latin alphabet, while the other part of the people adopted Orthodoxy and the Cyril alphabet; and both of them kept their common Croatian-Serbian language.

It should be marked that Christianity and other faiths continued to play a rather significant role in this respect. One should not forget that almost half, if not a greater part of the population keeps a different belief. At the same time, there are cases, when members of one ethnic-language represent different religious trends. For instance, Udins, adhering to the Lezgin ethnic-language group, profess the monophysite trend of Christianity, a small part of Lezgins are Shiites, while most of Lezgins adhere to Sunni version of Islam. Adjarians are Muslims, while Georgians profess Orthodoxy. There are adepts of Christianity and Islam among Ossetians. For the period since the end of the XV century to the XIX century Abkhazia was under the rule of Turkey, and a part of the population was conversed to Islam. However, in the end of the XIX century many of them were conversed to Christianity. For the last decade, due to the whole complex of factors Islam set the fashion in the discussion on geopolitical perspectives of the region, mainly Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, though. The main attention was devoted to the question whether Islam may become of a probable systemic factor for Azerbaijan and certain national republics of the North Caucasus.

The Caucasus, considered from the above point of view, is a part of the so-called “Muslim North”, which, in its turn, is a part of the vast Muslim world, where the countries of the Near and Middle East play a key role. For many centuries, Islam was a significant factor of spiritual and social-cultural development of countries and peoples of the region, contributing to extension and consolidation of their trade-economic and political reciprocal ties. This circumstance justifies the conclusion that

the confessional borders of the Caucasus as a geopolitical space go to the South far from the borders of the Russian Federation, as well as of the South Caucasus in the direction to the Near and the Middle East. It is not a surprise that after the disintegration of the USSR the post-Soviet Muslim peoples started to display rising sensitiveness to events and processes, going on in the Muslim world.

From the point of view of national security of the Russian Federation, of great importance is the fact that the Caucasus as a part of its southern “belly” represents a link of the so-called Islamic arch of instability, embracing the vast region of the Near East, Afghanistan, Kashmir and former Soviet republics of the Central Asia. This problem has been elucidated by the national and foreign science. It is worth briefly discussing its aspects, which may give additional information on the examined problem.

One can not deny the evident fact that Islam and nationalism in the Caucasus, like in the whole Muslim world, supplements and nourishes each other. It is significant that the rise of nationalism in the world goes on simultaneously and in close connection with the process of renaissance of Islam. The perception of life realities through the prism of religious beliefs has become a part of the world outlook of many peoples in the North Caucasus, of their culture, history and way of life. It is often rather difficult to clearly divide the religious and the national sides of their life. It becomes especially evident in politicized Islamic fundamentalism, which is the general definition of different religious-political trends, proposing their own specific ways, forms and means of solving problems, which confront the mankind under conditions of globalization and represent a significant threat to national security of Russia.

According to the existing data, at present the number of citizens professing Islam makes from 12 to 15 million people. It is not much

comparing with the scale of the world, but it accounts approximately for one tenth of the country's population Besides, after disintegration of the USSR the post-Soviet countries started to show greater sensitiveness and pliancy to the ideas, coming from the Muslim world. The trend to induce the Muslim republics into the orbit of economic, political and religious influence of the Islamic world was becoming more and more evident.

It is worth recalling that Islam is represented by dozens of different schools and directions – from the conservative (for instance, wahhabism in Saudi Arabia) to the modernist (Ismailites, headed by Aga Khan IV) trends. The radical movements of Islam are united in the group of “Islamic fundamentalism”. Two main trends of Islam are represented in the Caucasus – Shiites and Sunni, as well as some other trends – from moderate traditionalists to extremists.

Although Islam represents by itself a super-national religious system, it is used rather often just as a founding component of national ideology or nationalism, if not the national self-consciousness. One can not help mentioning another side of this phenomenon, i.e. the evident fragmentation. The perception of life realities through the prism of religious beliefs has become a part of the world outlook of many peoples, a part of their culture, history and way of life. Quite often it is difficult to divide clearly the religious and the national features of their life.

Like in the Islamic world as a whole, the attempts were made in the south of the post-Soviet space to achieve synthesis of Islam and nationalism to apply them for purely political aims. It should be mentioned that for the historical period, particularly in times of crises and crucial moments, the adepts of Islam often turned to the sources, to the fundamental principles and traditions of their faith. As fundamentalists, in terms of the sense of this notion, there should be

considered followers of the ideology, which is appealing to its original basic or fundamental foundations. This notion rightfully would be applied to all secular and religious trends of thinking, which come forward for purity of principles and values, for return to the historical sources. It is possible to say that fundamentalism, interpreted in this way, is the characteristic feature of all societies for the whole epoch, particularly for the periods of great social, social-cultural and political transformations.

The so-called political Islam or Islamism became one of its most significant displays. It is used as a general name to indicate different social-political trends, which regard Islam as a pivot of their ideology or as their own ideology. Political Islam is characterized by fundamental merger of internal and foreign policy, which, in its turn, is based on merger of state and religion. Its adepts consider shariat as a source of power. In terms of Shiite interpretation of Islam, the religious-political sphere should play the dominant role in society, while the other spheres are submitted to it at the level of theory.

As a whole, due to a complex of reasons, which have been in detail analyzed by national and foreign science, political Islam gained in scope for the second half of the XX century. The lack of a clearly elaborated system of Muslim education and of its own Islamic theological school in the region contributed to it considerably. From this point of view, a rather significant role in this respect was played by a fall of trust to ideals of communism and Soviet ideology. The tendency to the rebirth of interest to values, principles and doctrines of Islam became evident against this background. The most significant result and indication of this phenomenon became the appearance of many Muslim and religiously oriented organizations, unions and associations, which set themselves both political and purely religious, charitable, educational and other matters as an object of their activities.

It is not worth discussing and analyzing them, since they have been in detail elucidated by national political scientists and publicists. Besides, many such organizations were rapidly created and further rapidly disappeared from public-political arena, having not been able to transform in an influential force.

Islam is being used as a means of achievement of specific political objectives, determined by specific interests of the political struggle both in a separate Muslim country and at the regional and global level. In this sense, Islam should be regarded not so much as a religion but as a complicated religious-political doctrinal system.

Originally, the phenomenon of political Islam or Islamism as a significant political-religious force, able to have an important impact on the world realities, came to the proscenium in the course of Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Of great significance for politicization of Islam was the fact that ayatollah Khomeiny and his fellow-fighters transformed Islam into the state ideology.

Many Muslim countries took steps to extend and to consolidate positions of Islam in the whole world, often applying it for advancement of their national interests. Some of them allocate big sums of money to propagate Islam, to carry out religious-educational and charitable activities. The countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Egypt, the UAE and others, display the greatest efficiency in this sphere. Iran and Turkey started to display a rather great activity in this direction since the 1980s. Possessing big financial resources, they create throughout the world the supporting agencies for propagation, free educational institutions, build TV and radio stations, extend missionary activities, in great number of free copies they publish religious literature in the languages accessible for the readers etc.

Political Islam in its fundamental version became a kind of ideological platform of the forces, which come forward for the ideas of

separatism and pushing Russia out of the whole Caucasian region. Wahhabies selected the national republics of the North Caucasus, first of all Dagestan and Chechnya, as well as Azerbaijan. They nurtured the plans of creating a certain Caucasian caliphate. But the official religious structures of Azerbaijan, headed by Allahshukyur Pasha-zade, stick to their Soviet tradition and fulfill completely the will of the present regime. The official powers of the republic in the North Caucasus also wage active struggle against wahhabism.

The legislative acts, forbidding activities of wahhaby organizations were adopted in some republics. In terms of religion they aimed at setting off their interpretation of “pure Islam” against other Islamic trends, primarily against Sufi tarikats, disseminated in the North Caucasus. Thus, their activities resulted mainly in instigation of conflicts and animosity among Muslims. The spread of wahhabism in the region provoked the internal religious and inter-ethnic division.

The religious situation in the region was marked by the growing trend to braking up of official Islamic organizations, to intensification of their politicization, to aggravation of internal confessional contradictions, for instance, between Sunnites and Shiites, fundamentalists and modernists, wahhabies and tarikatists.

The struggle against this dangerous phenomenon is complicated by the lack of unity among traditional tarikatists. For instance, by the present time, there has been created the Council of Muftis of Russia, including muftis of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Asian and the European parts of Russia, of the Volga Basin, of Siberia. R. Gainutdin was elected as the Chairman of the Council of Muftis. But it would be an exaggeration to assert that the Council has become the center, which was able to unite all Muslim communities of Russia. Two-three and even several muftiyats appeared in some republic, causing tension and contradictions, disputes and constant conflicts among them. Only in

Tatarstan, thanks to M.Shaimiyev's efforts, by the legislative act it was decided that only one Spiritual Department should exist. At present, there exist seven Spiritual Departments of Muslims in the following republics of the North Caucasus: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and the Stavropol krai, as well as Adygeya and the Krasnodar krai. At the same time, numerous muftiyats of the country have agreed to unite only on the confessional basis, which means existence of self-dependent departments.

It is significant to take into account the existence of differences in traditional Islam itself, which is professed in the region. For instance, the situation in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan is marked by the prevalence of Sunni Islam of Shafiit mazhab in the form of Sufi orders (tarikats) – Nakshbendiya and Kadiriya, which, in turn, consist of murid or vird brotherhoods. The relations among some of them are characterized by tension and even by hostility. Khanifit mazhab of Sunni prevails in the central and the western parts of the North Caucasus.

Islam is often considered as a certain integral spiritual component of ethnic cultures of local peoples. And what is more, it is the factor able to unite the Caucasus almost in the political entity. However, the prevailing confessional pluralism in the Caucasus shows itself the groundlessness of similar claims. It is significant that the radical leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the period of both Chechen wars did not, at least publicly and officially, give support to mujaheds of the North Caucasus. The rapprochement of Shiite-Islamic Iran with Gregorian Armenia in counter balance of the Alliance between Shiite Azerbaijan and Sunni Turkey means a reappraisal of the confessional factor in the relations among the states in the contemporary world. At the same time, the Christian West thanks to the

hydrocarbon resources pays greater interest to Muslim Azerbaijan than to Christian Armenia and Georgia, which are less rich in terms of natural resources.

In this respect it is significant that for the period of the Russian-Chechen war the official position of the governments of most countries of the Muslim world, despite all talks about Muslim solidarity, were not characterized by any pro-Chechen trends. The separatist movements in the Caucasus, especially adepts of independence of Chechnya, enjoyed public support from the radical circles opposing the rulers of these countries. It is symptomatic that OIC, created in May 1972, carried out its activities at the inter-government level and, being the mouthpiece of Muslim propaganda all over the world, sets up its aim as promotion of development of economic, political and cultural cooperation of Muslim states. One should not appraise the activities of this organization in a definite way, since it unites the countries, which differ in criteria of the political regime, foreign policy orientation, involvement or non-involvement in inter-state and internal conflicts etc. Its leadership in the person of foreign minister of Iran Kharrazi declared that the Chechen conflict is an absolutely internal Russian constant which should exclude any external interference. The experts of OIC did not see in this crisis any religious aspect, leaving aside violation of international law norms. As far as other Muslim international organizations are concerned, their input in solving conflicting problems should be put on a modest air, since the OIC member-states are divided by great differences in many cardinal contemporary problems.

In the context of these facts, the author would like to warn about certain comments and semi-scientific views, which regard Islam, especially Islamic radicalism, as an almost systemic factor capable to determine political realities in the Caucasus. Almost all aspects of life of most Caucasian peoples were subject to secularization and

modernization by the present time. They had a great impact on not only social, economic and political structures but also on the way of life, the system of values, orientations and aims, undermined or completely destructed traditional institutions for regulation of daily life of the people. By the end of the XX century, the multilateral ties, integrally transpiercing economic, cultural, educational, spiritual, political and other aspects of life, became a stable and needed element of life in all republics and regions of Russia, an element, which could not be denied or ignored in order to prevent any damage to the vital interests of all peoples. The great majority of the peoples in the North Caucasus irrevocably mastered the most important aspects and attributes of the all-Russian way of life and integrated in it.

At the same time, the prevailing in Russia so-called Khanafit mazhab (interpretation of Islam) is characterized by greater temperance and tolerance comparing with other three mazkhabs. It should be recalled that the consolidation process of the latter took a very long period of time. While in some parts of the South and the North-East Caucasus it was adopted already in VIII–IX centuries, the process of its adoption by some peoples of the North Caucasus terminated only in the XVII–XVIII centuries.

Islam appeared in the Caucasus in time when the peoples had already a rather developed system of faiths, values, aims and habits, united by the notion of adats, which had deeper historic roots. Sufism occupied the dominant position in Caucasian Islam, having accommodated to the local conditions and having integrated in itself many elements of adapt. Myuridism in the Caucasus represented a trend of Sufism, emerged on the basis of ancient cults, some researchers think. Caucasian Islam is characterized by the close inter-connection of pagan and Bible beliefs. Russian Islam, depending on the regions, includes a number of essential elements of local national traditions,

which have not much in common with Islam itself. In the Caucasus quite often the question is not so much the renaissance of Islamic principles of worship as the restoration of norms of life and daily behavior, composing the basics of traditional adapt common to many peoples of the region.

Therefore it is necessary with great care to evaluate the rate of religious awakening of people, since often the question is the religiousness in daily life and at the level of common sense. Most mountainous peoples are Muslims in the same sense as the Russians, living in Krasnodar krai and Stavropol krai, are Orthodox. Nobody would think that the latter, under conditions of coming renaissance of Orthodoxy, would stick to the principles of Sermon on the Mount or would change the existing political structures by certain Christian theocracy.

The same may be said about the peoples of the Caucasus, professing Islam. For instance, in spite of the constitutional provision on the secular characteristic of the state, Islam makes an essential, if not the main, element of the state ideology in Azerbaijan. The green stripe on the state flag of the republic symbolizes it. The president of Azerbaijan and servicemen of its army swear allegiance to Koran. The religious Muslim feasts Kurban-bairam and Uraza-bairam are declared to be the holydays.

The religious fundamentalism quite often serves as a surrogate of ideology and mythology of ethnic-national, cultural, confessional or of some other self-identification. The appeals of certain forces in opposition and not only of these organizations to Islamic values are determined, inter alia, by their wish to attract to themselves the attention of public opinion, as well as of financial foundations and structures of Muslim countries. Not infrequently the Islamic rhetoric

serves to disguise the purely imperious longings of various claimants for posts in the power structures.

The apology of the Caucasian tradition, including its confessional aspect, is presented as an alternative primarily to “pure Islam”, which is perceived as an alien, different ethnic and cultural element. The traditional culture is engaged in fight on two fronts in the North Caucasus. On the boundary line between the XX and the XXI centuries, as its main enemy was considered not the innovation from the West but the fast penetration of different Islamic faith from the East. The term “different faith” is used not by accident, since salafiya (wahhabism) is considered by the local clergy and the majority of community, sharing the same view, as apostasy.

Thus, the rise of interest of some groups of the population in Islam should not be regarded as a determined trend to reformation of the way of life and of daily life based on the Islamic norms, while Islam itself should not be considered as a systemic factor from the point of view for formation of the state and political structure. And what is more, it is illegitimate to extrapolate the situation of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran or the impact of Islam on political life in Muslim countries, such as Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and others, to the Muslim republics of the former USSR.

The analysis of the actual situation shows that the renaissance and wide dissemination of religious beliefs are marked by formal and attributive features. The initial euphoria concerning total return of people to the bosom of mosque gradually changes for a sensible appraisal of the secular realities of the contemporary world. In other words, the hostility of certain Muslim circles to the West is determined not so much by the fact that in western countries they worship different Gods as because they reject the claims of the West, especially of the USA, for the dominant position in the world. In this respect, Islam and

Islamic world may become allies of Russia and other countries, which come forward against hegemony in the world of one country or a group of countries.

Summing up, it is possible to make the following conclusions. The whole point is that the discussion on Islam is unjustified, if particularly it concerns political Islam as an allegedly systemic factor, which is able to determine the political realities in the Caucasus, to change the characteristic and the vectors of its social and economic development. Islam is hardly able in the region to become the basis of sustainable national and political unions primarily due to its discordance. The ethnic-national, territorial, tribal, clannish, language, political, social-economic and other contradictions and conflicts among the peoples, living in the region, often are more potent than their common confessional aims and values. In many cases religious fundamentalism serves as a surrogate of ideology and mythology of ethnic-national, cultural, confessional or other self-identification. Islamic rhetoric quite often disguises the insurmountable claims, which various aspirants have on the posts in the power structures.

*“Kavkazsky uzel v geopoliticheskikh prioritetakh Rossii”,
M., 2010, p. 278–294.*

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**THE CASPIAN REGION AS A ZONE
GIVING RISE TO CONFLITS:
A THREAT TO RUSSIA**

The Caspian area is a zone giving rise to conflicts near the borders of Russia. The significance of the Caspian region in terms of geopolitics continues to grow owing to very great reserves of

hydrocarbon resources, which are concentrated in this region. The interests of the coastal states conflict with non-regional powers, primarily the USA and UE countries. The tense relations with Iran, aggravated due to Washington actions, complicate the situation. At the same time, the lack of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea makes the Caspian states vulnerable both on the side of external expansion and on the side of probable inter-regional disputes and conflicts, related to the usage of the Caspian resources, the regime of navigation etc.

Under these conditions, the leaders of five Caspian states, without waiting the final solving of the status problem, decided to come to the agreement and to legalize a number of provisions for ensuring the regional security. At the summit, held in Tehran on 16 October 2007, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation (RF) and Turkmenistan signed the joint declaration, which declared that the military forces of the coastal states would not be used for the attack against each other. It is symptomatic that for the period of time, when the nuclear program of Tehran had come under fire of leading western powers, the five Caspian states stressed that in no circumstances they would allow to use their territories for aggression and other military actions against any of the parties.

It is possible to consider as a key provision of the declaration the statement that only the coastal states possess the sovereign rights relating to the Caspian Sea and its resources. Pending the determination of a new legal status of the Caspian Sea and its water basin, the regimes of navigation, fishery and shipping exclusively under the flag of the Caspian states should be valid. Thus, the participants of the meeting clearly expressed their determination to limit the access to exploration and development of the Caspian resources for “the aliens”. It seems that the Tehran meeting gave the foundation for forming the structures of the Caspian cooperation, summoned to regulate not only economic but

also military-political issues in order to protect the Caspian region from external interference. But it is still premature to regard this issue to be finally settled. The Central Asia (CA) bordering with the Caspian zone has its own problems, connected with ensuring security. A number of sources of potential conflicts are known to exist here. Thus, due to the order and the distribution of water resources, the tense inter-state relations have shaped, on the one side, between Tajikistan and Kirghizstan and, on the other side, between Uzbekistan and partly Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Dushanbe and Bishkek are engaged in construction of powerful hydroelectric stations in order to ensure the needs of their countries in the energy resources (they lack hydrocarbons and do not have financial resources to pay for Uzbek gas). However, for the countries, located in the lower reaches of the trans-border rivers (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), these intensions represent a significant threat, since the amount of water, coming to them, would be reduced to a large extent, while they suffer already from draught. The parties are ready to invite UN and UE experts for regulation of “water” problem. It is difficult to say what would be the outcome of this dispute. But, if the mutually acceptable agreement is not found out, it would result in the regional split.

Some other factors giving rise to conflicts exist in the region. Actually, in each new state there exist ethnic enclaves, where citizens belong to the title nations of the neighboring states, which engender tension in the inter-state relations. For instance, potential disputes may emerge around the cities of Turkestan and Sairam, where ethnic Uzbeks account for 70–80% of the population. The share of Uzbeks rises also in the south-west of Kirghizstan and in the north of Tajikistan. The migration of the population is accompanied by the seizure of city quarters, aggravates the land question in the rural districts and aggravates the employment problem. In its turn, all this creates the

nourishing environment for a social explosion, for dissemination and consolidation of radical Islam. Thus, the situation in the Fergana Valley was marked by formation of the religious-extremist and extraterritorial underground, directly aggravating the situation in Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan. A well-organized wide network of activists are engaged in propaganda of their ideas within the local population, carry out activities aimed at recruiting and training fighters. The question is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which, contrary to its title, is international in terms of its characteristic. It aims at destabilization of the situation in the CA countries, at the overthrow of the existing governments and at the creation of Islamic caliphate instead of the secular states. It is evident that IMU was created according to the plans and by means of finances of foreign religious-terrorist centers, which continue to be its sponsors. At the same time, the aggravation of the difficult economic situation promotes dissemination of extremist ideology and explains the reason, why a great part of the population supports anti-government's slogans.

The religious-extremist underground is ready to start its direct actions at any moment. In summer of 1999, the armed attacks of IMU supported by international terrorists created a threat of the large-scale civil war in Tajikistan, Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan. It was possible to break the resistance of radical extremists only thanks to the joint actions of these countries with participation of Russia and Kazakhstan. The military uprising in Andijan (13–14 May 2005) occupies its place in the list of similar events. Although the fighters, relying on the support from the West, arranged its assault under the slogan of struggle for protection of human rights and presented as fighters for democracy, the composition of the participants showed that their aims did not have and could not have anything in common with protection of democracy in

Uzbekistan. In 2009, comparing with the 1990s, the number of them increased by several dozens.

At the same time, the CA countries and the RF remain interested in the military presence of western countries in Afghanistan. They provide transportation corridors to ensure the activities of the coalition forces. For this purpose in 2001 Kirghizstan agreed to grant on lease the airdrome “Manas” to the USA and its allies. However, Bishkek gradually became dissatisfied with the use of the airdrome and with behavior of the USA. The authorities of Kirghizstan started to regard the American military presence as an infringement of national sovereignty and an instrument of interference in its internal affairs. In February 2009 Kirghizstan denounced the agreement on use of the base “Manas”. The period of six months was fixed for liquidation of constructed military objects and evacuation of the personnel. It was a painful blow to the USA. Washington started an active dialogue with Bishkek to revise the taken decisions. The presidents of Afghanistan and Turkey Karzai and Gyul participated in the negotiations. The latter promised to provide big investments in economy of Kirghizstan. B. Obama sent his personal letter to K. Bakiyev and received a positive promising response. Finally, it became evident that Kirghizstan was ready to agree to prolong the American military presence; on 23 June the agreement was signed, and the USA got the right to stay on the territory of the airbase “Manas”, which only changed its title for “the Center of Transit Shipment of Cargoes to Afghanistan”. But the payment for the rent was augmented to \$ 60 million. The agreement on the American financial-economic assistance for the amount of \$110 million was signed.

The official reaction of the foreign ministry of the RF was restrained and unclear. It caused many speculations in Russian mass media. Some publications regarded K. Bakiyev’s decision as an unfriendly step relating to the RF, since the foreign military presence in the CIS did not respond to its

interests. Other commentators interpreted the event in the more extended international aspect of Russian-American relations, including the Bishkek agreement, which corresponded to the interests of both countries. The Russian-American agenda included the treaty on START-2, location of elements of the anti-missile defense in Poland and Czechia, extension of NATO to the east at the expense of Ukraine and Georgia. Since both countries expressed their intention to come forward to each other, Washington considered that Moscow should make a new significant proposal for the other two issues. Without specific details but following the logic of the matters it is possible to suppose that the Kremlin gave its agreement for use of base in Manas on the eve of the presidential elections and that K. Bakiyev could not have agreed to change the conditions of the rent without consultations with the Kremlin.

Moscow needs its trumps in the dialogue with Washington, and it demonstrates its readiness to further the success of the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. The indicative of this is also the decision of the RF to clear on its territory the way for the railway corridor to transport there non-military cargoes from Europe, as well as the agreement with the USA on air transit of American military cargoes and military personnel through the RF, signed in the course of B. Obama visit to Moscow in July 2009. At the same time, the question is not reduced only to the political conjuncture.

The presence of foreign military contingents in Afghanistan remains a deterrent factor against terrorism. In this respect, the interests of the RF objectively coincide with the interests of the USA and its allies. Islamabad and Beijing are also interested in restraining the destructive forces, carrying out their activities in the Afghan provinces and in the northern regions of Pakistan.

*“Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya”,
M., 2010, N2, p. 85–89.*

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CENTRAL ASIA IN THE LIGHT OF

THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN “RELOADING”

No doubt that “reloading” of the Russian-American relations declared in February 2009, the steps consequent thereupon aimed at mutual trust restoring, cooperative spirit adding in these relations are very important events for the foreign policy of Russia. No wonder that the theme “reloading” was numerously interpreted as both positive and critical in the scientific publications and also in debates having been being conducted and being conducted in the expert community. The given article doesn’t set the objective to analyze the Russian-American relations proper in context of their declared “reloading”. The object of our interest is the political and the international processes with Russia’s participation being developed at its background. Nevertheless, it’s also important to emphasize the sense and the meaning of “reloading”.

Obama’s administration had to normalize the relations with Russia (“reloading”) by virtue of series of circumstances. First of all, the process of OMC distribution but specifically – the Iranian nuclear program was hardly to be stopped or limited without the dialogue of two major nuclear powers: offensive on it continues to be perhaps priority trend of the American foreign policy. Secondly, the USA’s interest in the cooperation with Russia was increased because of the Afghan problem being no less important. Thirdly, the American administration had to seek contacts with Russia as China’s changing into the global super state launching a challenge in a way against the

USA's priority in the world economic system and policy and the USA's administration is concerned about excessive rise of this Asian neighbor and competitor in Central Asia.

“Reloading” didn't bring to the cardinal rethink of the USA's approaches to Russia's role over the post-soviet area though one can't but notice some changes. Today the post-soviet area isn't considered by Obama's administration as life-and-death interests of the USA and only some politicians continue to dispute Russia's right for privileged interests in the CIS countries denying its attempts to dominate in the former soviet republics. Besides, at large the existing American administration isn't characterized with “passionarity” which distinguished Obama's predecessors having vested themselves with a right to interpret democracy, define legality or illegality of the national democratic models having initiated into “color” revolutions in the CIS countries and the War 08.08.08. Washington took a detached stand in relation to “oranges” disappearing from a picture of Ukraine after the presidential elections (17 January and 7 February 2010) or the second Kyrgyz revolution 6–7 April 2010) though it can't be explained by administration “insight” relatively ineffectual efforts on democracy implanting in the transition post-soviet societies otherwise by “reloading” influence. Probably, the USA and its partners regarded more acceptable for them to depart from some their positions in the CIS countries because of resource deficit and the national instability caused by a global financial crisis and expecting to return there in near future. The famous American political scientist says:” When Obama's administration gets over the initial shock it will have to include the post-soviet area in the list of the American geopolitical priorities again. All our efforts in Afghanistan and also the West's presence in the center of Euro-Asia are put on the line”. For the present USA has no objection to Russia's saddling heavy responsibilities upon itself for

maintaining order in Central Asia and over the post-soviet area as a whole.

The Afghan component of “reloading”

The military operation of the USA in Afghanistan called as “Enduring freedom” began in October 2001 in response for the acts of terrorism on 11 September. Today USA declares formally about its two strategic imperatives in the conflict zone. The first one – mopping-up of “Al’-Kaida” and its supporter “Taliban”, the second – Pakistan’s radicalization prevention allowing to exclude a possibility of nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of the local Islamists. In contrast to the previous administration Obama’s team doesn’t concentrate its attention to the western democracy distribution in these states of the East. The renewed strategy (“doctrine AfPak as it’s named in the American political and media circles) for Afghanistan and Pakistan suggested by the American president provides for the active use of “lenient force”, diplomacy and compromise. The USA intend to realize these tasks after July 2011 – the period of “leaving” from Afghanistan declared by the president on the first December 2009 in the military academy West-Point.

Russia like the USA isn’t interested in Afghanistan’s turning into a source of threats for the world and stability again in order to have no “grey zones” where the international terrorists could find a resort and to undermine the basics of drug economy of Afghanistan. The Russian leadership also renders a practical assistance to the international coalition in Afghanistan. Russia concluded bilateral intergovernmental agreements with Germany, France and Spain on railway transit of their defense materials and personnel in Afghanistan via their territory. In July 2009 one signed the agreements allowing the USA to operate up to 4500 flights in a year above Russia’s territory to transit military cargo for the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Moscow also undertook to

prepare the Afghan policemen to fight with drug business on the base of one educational schools of the Interior Ministry. But it seems to be insufficient for Russia's partners on "reloading" and one persuades Russia to return in Afghanistan as an ally of those forces which in due time have been forming "united front of the Afghan people's struggle against the soviet occupation", formed the groups of the Mujahidins, armed them and helped to establish "Al'-Kaida" and "Taliban". Refusing from the participation in the military operations of the coalition forces in Afghanistan the Russian leadership states that the Afghan problem should be solved peacefully. In principle USA and its allies on NATO don't object to it. But besides formally declared tasks – security, struggle against "Al'Kaida" and talybs, restoration of a civilian rule in Afghanistan and the partnership developing with Afghanistan – the USA and its partners also pursue another goals having no attitude to Russia's interests in the region but being a challenge to them in a way.

So a military-strategic springboard is being formed in Afghanistan and Central Asia considerably exceeding those needs being necessary to conduct a local military operation set by time limits. About 40 military bases are included into this springboard. Some of them dispose of landing strips of 3,5 km, surface and underground structures and stations of space tracking and flight following. NATO's and the USA's military leadership gives to understand that it intends to maintain these strategic objects even after leaving in 2011. USA has the unique possibility to hold the key states of Asia (China, India, Pakistan and Iran) under constant scrutiny and also the post-soviet Central Asia and Russia. Besides, the USA can control flows of energy and pipeline transport of the Caspian region. Washington can also use the army presence to manipulate the different political forces and organizations (human rights, "opposition", religious-extremist and so on) in the

region in order to influence on the local governments according to orientation being necessary for the American policy i.e. there are the good reasons to assume that the USA will continue using Afghanistan's territory to consolidate in Euro-Asia being named as "the main geopolitical award for America" by Zbigniew Brzezinski in due time.

But such presence of outside military force without time limits in the region upsets the existing balances, undermines security and sovereignty and launches a challenge against the Russian interests proper in Euro-Asia seriously. China isn't also interested in USA/NATO presence in Afghanistan as their bases locate in close proximity to its borders but a war can cause separatist movements among preferably the Moslem Uigurskogo population of Sin'tszyan. China isn't also satisfied with the American military might strengthening in the South Asia: in 2005 Kyrgyzstan didn't allow the flights of the American "Avaks" from the base in Manas along its border with China however, nobody prohibits them to flight from Shindanda and Bagram. India also shares the Chinese apprehensions but for another reason: it is afraid of possible Afghanistan's absorbing by Pakistan what no doubt will make the main geopolitical enemy of India stronger in the region.

It seems that those are mistaken very much in Russia who came to believe that America and its allies will carry out "dirty work" in Afghanistan instead of Russia – will struggle against terrorism and religious extremism, eradicate drug traffic and so on and that's why Russia will benefit considerably from the international coalition support. Indeed USA as the largest world economic, military and information state which as before holds many things in the world in its check, first of all, studies its own interests in its foreign-policy initiatives also including the Afghan epic. And so the USA will do no

“work” instead of somebody; the USA “works” exclusively for itself and for its own interests. And these interests make no provision for Russia’s recovery as the great state, the support of Russia’s integration efforts in Central Asia and also Russia’s dominance in the energetic sphere.

It also seems to be illusory that the USA will make mutual concessions on the problems being painful for Russia, first of all, concerning the near-abroad in appreciation of Russia’s help for the Afghan operations of the alliance. It is true that now USA’s administration faces with more complex and urgent problems – the economic crisis meeting, the military phase of operations ending in Iraq and “AfPake” and the Iranian problem solving. However, the USA maintains continuity in policy concerning Georgia fighting with Russia in 2008: Pentagon renders real assistance to its remilitarization. There are some other examples.

One should especially emphasize the problem of drug traffic from Afghanistan and here there is the obvious divergence of the Russian and the American interests. Russia appealed many times and directly to the USA and the forces of the international coalition in Afghanistan headed by the USA for the end to drug flow intensified from this country after 2001. This threat is so ominous that V.P. Ivanov compared the situation on the Afghan heroin supply in Russia with the opium wars in China at the turn of XIX–XX centuries. Ivanov announced that drug traffic from Afghanistan took form of “aggression against Russia” the USA and NATO must take responsibility for. One devised the Russian plan to liquidate drug production in Afghanistan but the USA and NATO refused to discuss this plan and only advised Russia to take more active part in the struggle against talibs in Afghanistan. The leadership of the alliance doesn’t get into touch with

OBSE and SOC rejecting all their suggestions directed at synchronizing the efforts on the struggle against drug production in Afghanistan.

The Central-Asian element of strategy “AfPak”

The strategic importance proper of Central Asia is emphasized as since the summer 2009 it has been changed into the main route for the American and the European goods traffic in Afghanistan –so-called the North corridor (as opposed to the South one via Pakistan). As the Afghan campaign was nearing completion the American politicians began very often announced about mounting danger for Central Asia from the party of “Taliban” and “Al’Kaida”, about the danger of China’s, Russia’s and India’s strengthening in the region and that only NATO is the single military structure being able to function and secure of Central Asia. This fact only convinced Russia that the USA isn’t going to extend “reloading” of their relations with it to Central Asia planning to consolidate alone in the region.

Meanwhile escalation of combat operations can seriously destabilize the situation in Afghanistan/Pakistan because talib’s movements destroyed the existing system of checks and balances over the region. The ethnic Uzbeks and the Tajik joined to the Afghan “Taliban” had to hide from “vengeance” of the international coalition headed by USA/NATO or to organize own pockets of resistance. They consider returning home -the Fergana valley- to be alternative.

There is the other party of this problem. The ethnic Tajik escaping from Afghanistan will face with the problems as they provoke additional competition at the labor-market. The USA is interested in its military deployment escalation so information and predictions of the plans of “taliby and the Islamic extremists” can be information screen for the real military-political consolidation of the USA in central Asia after troop reduction being planned for 2011. The USA had to put out

considerable effort to persuade the countries of Central Asia that it doesn't consider them as adjunct of its policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such objectives as development and diversification of its energy resources, political liberalization support and observance of human rights, assistance to develop the market economy and implement economic reforms, prevention of total state disintegration were proclaimed as the priority ones of stated policy of Washington in the region.

Pentagon quickly found the alternative route via Kazakhstan when it had to stop temporarily its troop redeployment in Afghanistan via Manas because of the events in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. Having signed Agreement on strategic partnership with Kazakhstan the American leadership is going to flight in Afghanistan from USA via the North Pole and Kazakhstan's territory. One doesn't exclude the military infrastructure use of USAF in Kazakhstan what will mean future expansion of the military presence of the Americans in the region.

One can't exclude that in near future Uzbekistan and NATO will renew cooperation especially as because Uzbekistan announced about its readiness to render assistance to anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and allow Pentagon a transit of non-military goods via the airport Navoi for the increasing American contingent in Afghanistan.

So, the USA and NATO give preference to bilateral contacts in Central Asia. Owing to the cooperation with the regional associations – CIS, SOC and OBSE – the international legitimization of these secure structures (pretending to be NATO's alternative in its own way in the region) will be more and accepting the special role of Russia in the world policy having the leading part in these structures. It also means that USA's administration is going to make "reloading" suggested for Russia under its own terms being based on the strictly checked global

American interests. No doubt that they don't coincide with the Russian national interests.

The Central-Asian “seesaw”

The Central-Asian countries try to capture the full benefits from a competent geopolitical struggle in the region partly initiated by them using the different forms of the cooperation owing to the advantageous geographical location and playing the different geopolitical “cards”. Uzbekistan's policy is the striking example of it. This key state of Central Asia is together with Turkmenistan the largest individualist in the region: it avoids the participation in the military exercise of OBSE and SOC of there is only hint at the military or political integration. The Andijan events in May 2005 set Uzbekistan at variance with EU and the USA. However, USA as opposed to EU didn't impose sanctions against Uzbekistan and as early as in 2007 began contacting with Tashkent unofficially. When Obama became the president as it seems one tried officially to forget the differences. America returned in the Uzbek “vacuum” quickly where the main regional competitors of USA didn't practically consolidate their positions during this period. Official Tashkent doesn't accuse the USA of intentions to organize “color” revolution any more. But the USA didn't criticize Uzbekistan's government and its president because of the problem as the human rights. 11 January 2010 the president of Uzbekistan signed the decree “On measures on plan of actions implementation to strengthen bilateral cooperation between the Republic Uzbekistan and the USA for 2010”.

Uzbekistan was also active in solving some key international problems, firstly, the Afghan one. It was caused by, firstly, the continuous historical and cultural contacts between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan where about 3 millions of the Uzbeks live. Secondly, Uzbekistan is very concerned with instability in Afghanistan being

lasted several decades. Uzbekistan is interested in that the Afghan-Pakistan military zone stopped to be a refuge for the Islamic non-system opposition seriously threatening the ruling regime of Uzbekistan. So, it will continue accepting the American (together with the Russian) help to form the national combat-ready army and place its territory for the civil and military transit of the international coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan. At the same time Uzbekistan avoided Tajikistan's cooperation concerning the problems on the struggle against drug traffic and the board protection. It doesn't actively support Russia's/OBSE initiatives on Afghanistan what adversely affected the attempts to work out a consolidated attitude of the region states on the Afghan problem. Uzbekistan also distanced itself from some other regional initiatives on the Afghan settlement. To a certain degree such position was caused by strained relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan because of Tajikistan's and Kyrgyzstan's plans to construct Rogunskuyu hydropower plant in Tajikistan and Kambaratinskuyu – in Kyrgyzstan under the auspices of the Russian companies. There are also arguments on the influence in the region, the territories and the Fergana valley.

Uzbekistan continued maneuvering between the different centers of force being the follower of multi-vector course. Official Tashkent clearly gave to understand that it isn't going to surrender the regional leadership to anyone at all in Central Asia.

Kyrgyzstan can also share the palm in following "multi-vector" course; it places its territory for the military deployment both of USA/NATO and Russia/OBSE. Russia and its partners of OBSE and SOC tried to change this abnormal situation insisting either on stating of the exact terms of the American military personnel staying in Manas or this military object closing located in close proximity to OBSE's base under Russia's command in Kant where there is mainly the

Russian contingent. In February 2009 Kyrgyzstan's parliament upheld a decision to close "Manas".

Washington, however, didn't want to accept such loss because Kyrgyzstan was considered to be as the important chain of the American strategy in the region because of its advantageous geographical location and besides permanent political instability and love of gain of the ruling elites allowed to manipulate Kyrgyzstan's government and opposition.

As a result, the Kyrgyz president allowed the Americans to use "Manas" and besides, the Americans got Bishkek's consent to open "contra-terrorist training center" near the Chinese border – in Batken and it created problems for the authorities of China.

But these plans implementation was stopped then after the well-known events in Kyrgyzstan. In April 2010 R. Otunbaeva confirmed in the interview Associated Press that Kyrgyzstan will follow the pre-achieved agreements and extend a lease of their military base for a further year.

As for Russia it strives for creating a sphere of its privileged interests in Central Asia as soon as possible. It's clear that Russia's and the countries of the region's cooperation with USA/NATO brings to additional risks in such fields as the religious extremism distribution, terrorist activity and interethnic conflicts.

SOC could be a real a counterbalance to the existing challenges and threats. Now SOC possesses considerable resources and the human potential. Its total demographic potential is a quarter of the population.

Results and perspectives

So, "reloading" of the Russian-American relations was required only for a very limited circle of the international problems where the both parties tried to come to agreement. Direct consequence of this policy is signing a treaty on SNW. But one can also note the

deterioration in relation of Russia with its nearest neighbor and the important economic partner –Iran and Turkey’s involvement in the problems of the post-soviet area. China continues to be the greatest challenge to Russia’s interests actively becoming firmly established in the key industries and energy sector of the former USSR. Russia will continue the cooperation with China in counteraction to drug traffic, terrorism, extremism but the competition between both states will be maintained in Central Asia and as it seems the influence balance will be in China’s favor.

Afghanistan won’t be integration locomotive of Central and the South Asia. Afghanistan broken by the war had to survive for the account of the western donors. Drug traffic will feed the status quo preserving in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the foreign military presence maintaining here; drug traffic will be supported by those countries of Central Asia (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan) where drug economy will be instead of “normal” economy.

In near future USA won’t refuse from the world leadership and therefore, from the strategic presence in those parts of the globe where it’s associated with the American interest protection. They will maintain its presence also in Euro-Asia caused by resource-energetic factor. The USA will a player outside in Central Asia for some time but its involvement in the Eurasian affairs will depend on dynamics of the American national interests and tactics of policy.

Russia’s partners on NATO and also the USA and EU in spite of all the talks about “reloading” won’t be able to overcome the distrust to Russia. They will make their mind to equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation neither with Russia or OBSE or SOC even on such important problem as Afghanistan.

It will be caused by ideological reasons and also that strategy they aren’t going to refuse from: as far as possible to exclude Russia

from the key post-soviet republics, not to allow the integrating there where Russia will be able to play the significant role.

If the competition for the control over energy resources of Central Asia deepens then the foreign-policy independence of Russia on the international arena and its unwillingness to support many trends of USA/NATO's policy (with respect to China, the Middle East and Iran) will be a serious irritant for the West. But the competition between Russia and the USA in Central Asia won't be changed into the military-political conflict –at least during the period of Obama's presidency.

Russia having kept influence in Central Asian region will meet numerous obstacles for its interest advancing on the collective base – within the framework of the existing organizations in the CIS countries as the region itself isn't formed for the present as the united political and integration whole. And so the relations between Russia and the countries of Central Asia will be bilateral.

Simmering seats of instability in the Afghan-Pakistan zone of the controlled conflict, in Sin'tsyane, in the Fergana valley – mainly the Central Asian states, China and Russia are threatened with danger. Their possibility to begin to burn is very great what will make to check a real fighting efficiency of the existing security systems in the region (OBSE and SOC). It's clear that no partners of Russia of these structures will manage with increasing challenges and threats alone. The leading states will be becoming more active in Central Asia so the countries of Central Asia had to make non-simple choice – with whom, in what spheres and upon terms to cooperate. Not only these countries' future but also the situation in the region and their mutual relations with each other and with Russia depend mainly on this fact.

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