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DOES THE NATIONAL ELITE EXIST IN RUSSIA?

(by materials of "the Round Table"
in the magazine "Moskva")

Questions for reflection

1. Is it right that the determining subjects of the world history are the political, social and cultural elites? Is it possible to say that this is a certain unchanged historical law: "it was, it is and it will be like that"?

2. The lack of national elite in contemporary Russia has won the truistic recognition. What sense do you put into the notion of national elite? In what periods of its history did Russia have the responsible national elite? What such examples may be cited in history of other countries?

3. What does the contemporary Russian elite represent by itself? What is its social, group (clan), ethnic composition? What are its psychological characteristics? What kind of internal contradictions do exist within it?

4. Do the forces exist within the contemporary Russian elite, which potentially might become the basis for a new nationally oriented elite? Is it possible to speak about existence in contemporary Russia of a certain counter-elite (or at least of an illusion of it, potentially capable to replace the existing elite (or at least to enter the latter as an influential group)?

Elena Ponomaryova, candidate of historic sciences, assistant professor of MGIMO (U).

1–2. In the general notion of “elite” we can not ignore the theory of elites, created in the second half of the XIX century-the beginning of the XX century by Italian sociologists V. Pareto and G. Moska. Both scientists as the followers of great N. Machiavelli, elaborated their theory, disproving Marx. The elitists opposed the political interpretation of history to his approach to history as a conflict between economic classes. Marx determined the power as the economic domination, which meant for him the ownership of means of production, while the elitists asserted that the struggle was going between the ruling political elite and the elites which urged towards coming to power. In 1881, Moska formulated the theory of the ruling class, based on the evident postulate: “In all societies, from the semi-civilized to the contemporary ones, there exist always two classes of people – the class, which rules, and the class, which is subject to be ruled. The first class, always less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes the power, while the other class, which is more numerous, is being ruled by the first class, keeping the second class under its control”.

Thus, ***the ruling class exists under any form of rule***, notable only for the way of its formation. For instance, by the authoritarian regime it will be created from above – by the ruler, the leader, the dictator, who needs the supporters to govern the state, while in time of the liberal regime it will be formed from below, by means of elections as a coordinating mechanism. Although the ruling class consists of the minority of the population, this minority is better organized than the majority and therefore makes a rather closed and sustainable group. In 1897, Pareto introduced into the scientific and political discourse the

term “elite”. The scientist admitted that his choice was accidental to a large extent and stressed that the word “elite” might be replaced by any other notion and even a letter of the alphabet. But the elite, according to Pareto, is the aggregate of the people, possessing the highest indexes in their professional spheres of activities. For instance, the person, who was able to earn millions, will get 10 marks, the person, who earned thousands – 6, those, who hardly escaped refuge – 1, and those, who found themselves in the refuge should get 0. It means that the elite exists not only in the ruling structures but in any sphere of activities: the elite of politicians, jurists, thieves, chess players etc. The difference in the indexes of various people is determined by their psychological characteristic, intellect and mentality, and as a result of the initial inequality of people the division of society between the elite and the masses of people is inevitable; this is the historic law.

Thus, taking into account the interpretation of the elite, made by Pareto and Moska, the ruling elite is a close, small group of people, occupying high posts according to the level of its influence and political and social might. This group of people is characterized by a high level of organization thanks to the great competence of its members, while its authority is recognized by the majority as a result of recognition of abilities of each member of the group. There are different interpretations of the notion “elite”. It seems that the definition of O. Kryshtanovskaya represents an interesting approach to it. According to it, the elite is the ruling group of society, which is the highest stratum of the political class. The elite occupies the peak of the state power, controls the main, strategic resources of the power and takes decisions at the general state level. The elite not only rules in the society but also governs the political class, creates the forms of the state governance, preserving exclusive positions. The political class forms the elite and at the same time is the source of its recruitment. The division of the elite field is being made in

this way. In other words, the elite consists of the people, who directly make decisions and share responsibility for these decisions. This small group of people is surrounded by the heterogeneous and differentiated political class, ready to fulfill organizational and governmental functions and aspiring for being admitted to the elite. As the great commander said, the soldier is not too good, if he does not wish to become a general. E. Neizvestny in his essay "The reds, the greens and the drunkards" showed the hierarchy of the political space of the Soviet society. The appraisal of the present situation shows that the power structure has changed only a little. The reds are just those, who take decisions, the masters, the greens are the assistants, aspiring for cessation of writing reports and reviews for their bosses and for taking soft seats and possessing good cars.

The national elite should be regarded not in ethnic sense but from the position of the decisions, taken by the elite, which are oriented to the national interests of the given state, in this case – Russia. The nationally oriented elite should be responsible for its decisions not to a small group (1–2%) of the population but to the society as a whole, and should correlate its steps with the needs of the majority of the citizens of the country. This elite may exist under any regime and form of governance. And democracy with all its attributes – representative organs of power, elections, freedom of speech, unfortunately, is not the necessity, the condition of this elite's formation. Such elite strives for power not only for improving the national life, for raising the competitiveness of the country, as they say now.

3. The contemporary Russian elite is divided by the clan, by the ethnic and by the social composition. Except the ruling elite, responsible for the state decisions and enjoying the right of signature under the most important documents, determining the fate of the country, there exist other elites: the business elite, the culture elite, the science elite, the

military elite, the regional elite etc. The business elite is the most influential one in contemporary Russia. Sometimes it is not clear, whether business pays taxes to the state or the state pays to the business. The strange interlocking of politics and economy, of the power and the business has taken place. But this is not mortal. The most dangerous is that this centaur of the power and the money is not a creative force. Meanwhile, what colossal chances exist! In this regard, the following report, written by N. Krichevsky is recommended to read: “ The Post-Pikalyovo Russia: the New Political-Economic Reality”. The report describes in detail everything: what is the source of money, how they spend money, where the business structures are registered etc. A student, a girl of my group told me: “I read the report and cried. All of us, we will die, being in poverty and hunger”. This is a reaction of a representative of the youth to what is going on in the political-economic sphere.

4. The most significant issue is the question on existence in contemporary Russia, in the ruling elite of the forces, which could be able to become the basis of a new nationally oriented elite. However, up till now the answer to this question has not been found by the author. The problem is that the elite is the product of our society. The present representatives of the elite were educated not in some private schools but in the ordinary general schools, read Dostoyevski, Tolstoi, Chekhov and Saltykov-Shchedrin. Their parents were habitual doctors, teachers, servicemen, civil officials. But where Chichikovs, Kabanikhas and Smerdyakovs come from to power? V. Ovchinsky, a known publicist, regards that greed and lies are the main outcome of the anti-popular and anti-national elite. A good acquaintance of mine, an employee of a big construction company discussed the construction of a super market with the governor of a region in the central part of Russia. The business man promised to improve the infrastructure and to create several thousand

jobs, the governor replied that he was not interested in all this, since he did not intend to stay at his post for a long time and that he would agree to sign the contract only for the bribe of one million US dollars. As a result, the region suffered but the governor quite probably got his bribes from other companies. It means that everybody should live thinking about the future, otherwise nothing will change. This is one aspect of the problem. The other aspect is as follows: there are internal resources in the elite – in the middle size link, in the officers' corps, among intellectuals, serving the elite. But some other situation might come into existence: a part of the ruling elite due to the changes in the world conjuncture, in the internal life of the country will itself get rid of its most notorious part and start its new life. But this process will be very painful and dramatic. As A. Prokhanov noted, butterflies would cry, when disturbances start.

Oleg Kildyushov, philosopher, sociologist.

1. The answer to the first question to a large extent depends on the decision to agree with the old terms of the forgotten philosophy of history: “world history”, “subject of world history”, “historic law” etc. The other radical conceptual approaches exist, for instance, comprehension of the aim and direction of historic phenomena: history has no sense, as famous theoretician of science K. Popper said, but we ourselves may and should give it to history, i.e. to write the history, which is interesting for us. Other authors doubt of the determining role of the elite. L. Tolstoi was a definite opponent of elitism in conception of history. The great Russian writer formulated his position in the novel “War and Peace”: in order to study the laws of history we should change completely the object of observation, to forget about czars, ministers and generals, but to study homogeneous tiny elements, which guide the masses.

However, if we go down in the analysis of the historic process to the level of the people, who are the leaders of the specific time of history, the problem of the elite emerges, since, as Hegel says, individuals are at the head of all historical events and come forward as incarnation of the substantial action of the world spirit. This is just the functional definition of the role of the elite in history: the members of the elite are those who perceive the general as their private. Hegel in his work "Philosophy of Law" named in this sense the elite as "common estate".

2. In the science dealing with society, in sociology the social-class structure is subject to study by the theory of stratification, which proceeds from division of society into separate social groups (strata); the strata differ by profession, education, morality and ethicality, religious views and property, other qualities. The distinctions of the strata are determined by the common nature of public functions, fulfilled by individuals. It means that the inevitability of differentiation of society, the social strata result from specialization of separate parts of the social system, displayed by the professional division of labor, hierarchy of the leaders and executors etc. In this analytical and not evaluation sense the national elite exists in any society and any nation. Almost one hundred years ago (1911) R. Mihels, a prominent German-Italian sociologist, analyzing democratic, including left wing, parties formulated "the iron law of oligarchy": since the direct dominance of masses is technically impossible, any regime inevitably degenerates into the power of several selected persons, i.e. the elite (oligarchy); as soon as democracy attains the certain stage of its development, the process of degeneration starts and it acquires aristocratic spirit and sometimes aristocratic forms, turns to resemble the phenomenon, which it opposed beforehand; new accusers emerge from its own bosom and denounce it; however after the period of glorious struggle and the period of notorious participation in

the dominant rule they are dissolved in the old dominant class; however, new fighters come forward in the name of democracy; the cruel play goes on endlessly between uncured idealism of its new participants and the uncured thirst for power of its old ones...

The other matter is the evaluation of the elite's qualities, when the most significant is the collective responsibility of the ruling class and of its individual representatives. Within the framework of perception of nationally responsible elite usually the American elite is cited as an example, where carriers of "state men" like J. Bush-junior personify the typical dynasty, which determines economic and political life in the USA. The public American history is characterized by existence of personal history of mighty and richest dynasties, which personally decide the destiny of the country and the world in a way so strange for democracy. The American "example" displays the main political dilemma of the contemporary meritocracy: the social success of individual politicians allegedly estimated by society according to "objective criteria" actually is determined by various original biographic positions. The mechanism of closed self-production of elites, proclaimed by liberal discourse to be overcome by western Modern, comes back through the yard door. It is sufficient to recall presidents D. Adams and D.Q. Adams, T. Roosevelt and F.D. Roosevelt, the political dynasties Kennedy and Bush, some others. The numerous local clans, including senators and governors of the states exist in the USA. Americans are good masters in pretence and feint like in Hollywood. The elite of the USA tries to present itself in the country and in the world as the bearers of principles of freedom and political competition. However, from the European point of view, in comparison with European political standards, such self-stylization is below any critics, since democracy of American model is a mere plutocracy, when two hundred financial clans and political dynasties dominate and feign

democracy by means of mass media, possessed by them or by the friendly oligarchic structures. The going on global crisis best of all shows their “responsibility” to the world and America. At present, in the USA politics become the family business for greater number of representatives of known names. This tendency threatens to explode all frameworks of respect: over 50 American high politicians have relatives in the Congress of the USA. To some extent it resembles our situation, when all citizens have the right to elect freely representatives of one power group (the paradox of free but not honest elections).

3. The elite in contemporary Russia is usually regarded as a totality of social groups of the post-Soviet society, which from the point of view of objective social indications (social status and size of income and property) and of subjective stratification factors (certain self-identification and political strategy) are placed above all other, i.e. middle and lowest strata of poor and lumpen people. However, due to the small number of the elite’s members it is impossible to measure it in terms of sociology by usual statistics. Therefore the main method is the always questioned quality method of “inserted observation” – when a researcher studies the behavior of the elite directly in its activities. In this sense, all our people are qualified elitologists, observing, for instance, the freaks of the golden youth like the recent mortal rally of the heirs of “Cherkizon” in Switzerland.

The Russian elite always wished to arrange the public-political and economic life “like in America”. We see more often off-springs of many “dignitaries” at high position in business and state apparatus at the baby age in terms of top management. It is understandable – the ability for leadership and management of billions is put in them at the genetic level. We seem to wait not for a long time, when young owners of “federal” names will proclaim their rights for power and property at the national level. Indeed, their parents purposely “restored the vertical of

power” and “redoubled GNP”. Under the law of historic continuity all created by exorbitant work should be inherited by the following generation of the masters of new Russia. One should be assured that Washington would fully comprehend them.

In terms of composition of the elite the most “unpleasant” questions are those, connected with double deprivation of power/property – social and national, taking into account the non-proportional ethnic structure of the masters of new Russia. For instance, within the framework of democratic discourse it is impossible to explain, in which way a great part of national riches of the country turned out to be appropriated by members of the cosmopolitan and comprador business-elite often with Israeli citizenship (which is not characteristic for most citizens of the RF), who allegedly as efficient and transparent owners exploit dozens of millions of people (“YUKOS effect”). The population confronts another not less acute issue in daily life: why in many Russian regions the entire economies with millions of employees are kept under control by the people, coming from the near (the Trans-Caucasus) and internal (the North Caucasus) abroad (“Kandopoga effect”)? Unfortunately, there is no convincing and publicly admissible answer to these questions, while the authorities regard these questions as an encroachment on the basis of the state order. It means that these issues will be addressed by the democratic majority, passing by the institutions, which serve the elite, being unreceptive to the needs of the sovereign-people...

4. At present, one should try to comprehend what is the elite and what is its composition. The politologists and sociologists know that as a result of some analysis we shall see any groups of the elite, but the other methodological question is the way of getting the result. The “elitism” inevitably emerges through self-identification of the people and according to their social-professional status or according to their

incomes. In order to avoid ambiguity in comprehension of the elite (and the counter-elite) one should recall the definition of the elite, made by Hegel: “The activities of the common estate consists in protection of common interests”. If the elite of the country for some reasons refuses to take decisions, to determine the agenda, to construe the future, to interpret the past, to concretize the present and in case of social demand to correct the social reality within the framework of its own field of internal elite struggle for power and of its own procedure of internal competition, one should not be surprised that others will do it. In this sense, the Russian groups of the elite, as 100 years ago, should answer the most significant questions of national life. It means that from the responsible perspective they should propose to the nation the key institutions and notions, which would make it possible to address the ever-lasting “Russian question”. The consequences of “solving” this problem at that time we know too well.

*Dmitri Andreev, politologist, deputy editor-in-chief
of magazine “Political class”*

1–4. I would like to discuss another aspect of this problem. The definition of the “Round Table” theme supposes a determined number of ideas, which may be expressed by any thoughtful person. It is evident that the national elite does not exist. What to do? But why a group of thieves does exist instead of the national elite and swallows the Soviet heritage and squanders the hydrocarbon rent? More precisely, not why, but who is to blame in this case?

Let us begin with the seemingly other subject, with characteristic of the key feature of our civil society. Unlike its classical model, which maintains the competitive-partnership relations with the state power, the Russian civil society for several hundred years (minimum since Peter I and even earlier) adopted another type of behavior. Its main aim consists not in participation in state governance but sooner in protection of itself

against the state power and simultaneously to get something from this power by all means. Evidently, it means the defense against external threat and ensuring internal order and some freedom, but the main aim was to receive as much as possible and to give as less as possible. This shrewd attitude was a result of the spontaneous internal social protest against the excessive administrative regulation of every sneezing. This is the cause of a great need in rudiments of self-organization, when the state presence is reduced to minimum or to nothing. And abduction from the state of all, what is badly protected, is not a theft but a kind of an additional bonus for the post or position, i.e. the status rent; if it seems to be not a matter of valor but at least it testifies to readiness for such self-organization.

In the Russian Empire with its class complication and turmoil (for the last decades of the monarchy existence), due to the increased conflict between property chances and hierarchic determined admissions, these rudiments of self-organization were quite fragmented. The status rent is the disgusting evil, if the state power takes it, and simultaneously is a vital necessity, if it is taken for the holy cause, i.e. accommodation of rudiments of self-organization to spite the sovereign arbitrary rule. In any case, this was the point of view of the “progressive” public opinion.

For the Soviet time, the space of the public self-organization was significantly enlarged, despite the routine, enforced many times comparing with the pre-revolution period. On the one side, the authorities in certain sense even themselves sanctioned the priority of non-formal (meaning, to some extent non-state) relation in the course of personnel decisions at all levels and of property distribution (apartment, country-cottage, car and others) as well as of social benefits (prestige education, medical service etc.). The nomenclature rudiments of self-organization emerged, and the state liberated itself in this way from its

functions, transferring them to their own protectors. On the other side, the authorities did not encroach on various (not dangerous, from its point of view) forms of socialization of citizens (country-cottage and garage cooperatives, entertainment societies and others). And estimate discrepancy of the status rent became wider than before the revolution. As far as the authorities were concerned, it remained “corruption”, “bribery”, “theft”, while relating to the Soviet laymen it lost some approving remarks, made beforehand by representatives of “progressive” pre-revolution public society and transformed itself into the banal daily activities. The Soviet average man simply “got”, “brought from his work”, “received by agreement”, “won over”, “was in a whirl” – i.e. acted as “everybody”. And he had no complex about it.

For the 1990s, the relations between the regime and the self-organizing community were to a large extent based on its own momentum. The market simply was incorporated into the old mechanism but did not change it radically, first of all, due to the usual role distribution: the state did not refute, at least orally, its social guarantees, while society, in its turn, as usual regarded itself as a pleading and, consequently, a dependent party, which was doomed not to compete with the authorities but only to optimize the conditions of existence proposed by the authorities. Against the background of criminal privatization, where the difference between business and criminal act became almost indiscernible, the chances for such optimization were fantastic. Under conditions of rapid impoverishment and regular non-payments, the status rent remained the only source of existence for most Russians. And the officials were compensated by payment to them for non-participation in privatization or for their dissatisfaction due to the inadequate capitalization of the obtained (via dummies or by means of joint stock profanation) property.

The former islands (rudiments) of self-organization enlarged to the scale of continents, since the authorities, engaged in distribution of the state property, were not interested in it. The civil society did not confront any hindrance in order to protect itself, and the obtained freedom became senseless. Therefore civil society readily accepted the proposed by the authorities exchange of uncontrolled freedom for stabilization for the beginning of the 2000s. Both parties got benefits: the civil society actually connived at re-privatization and non-transparent use of natural rent, having received in exchange the chance to satisfy its interests (miserable, in comparison with the incomes thanks to redistribution of property and trade of hydrocarbons). The status rent remained the unique way of satisfaction of its interests for the great majority of civil society in the situation of underdevelopment of small and middle-size business and the lack of business experience (often also refusal to burden itself by inevitable risks). The bonus became for the employees not an additional income but the main source of existence.

The shaped order may be characterized as a status-rent democracy. Despite the reduced size of the excessive-public political activities for the 1990s, the authorities did not “freeze” Russia, did not rigidly limited “the lively activities of masses of people”, as liberal critics like to make accusations relating to the stabilization regime. On the contrary, the actual space of power was reduced for the 2000s comparing with the 1990s, concentrating to the control over the resources, the key enterprises and infrastructure objects, amalgamated later into the state corporations (which further seemed to be re-privatized). On the contrary, the society extended its chances, having been incorporated into the corruption vertical. For the 1990s the situation was different: the disbursed and badly controlled state property created local areas of power, competing with each other. This competition resembled a democratic public policy but did not ensure

incorporation of the society into the space of probable rent relations, created by privatization of the former Soviet state property. It may be said that democracy in Yeltsin time represented itself a form without substance, while under Putin – substance without form.

As a result, the power and the society started to exist in the same rhythm, striving for maximizing profits and minimizing expenses, i.e. by means of rent, re-privatization, utilization of the rest, agency and other non-productive forms of enrichment. Property, official post, public position, capabilities, status, connections remained for every man his small “pipe”, ensuring his well-being. Under these conditions, the legitimate rent and the illegitimate rent often turn out to be closely connected with each other. In its turn, this matter inevitably results in the sense mutation. The status rent out of the official post as an additional income ceases to be the end in itself, and the first place is occupied by transformation of the official, legal aspect of any relations between legal and physical subjects into the imitation and the cover of the shadow component of their communications. The criminal ethos more and more often determines the values and norms of the socially active population, dictates its manners and style. It is a paradox, but while the gap in the level of living between the poor majority and the rich minority in Russia rapidly rises, in the essence the present Russian society is characterized by the genuine solidarity. Its different strata are related by the way of getting income, when each actor as far as possible gets his rent – partially for himself, partially for payment to his patrons for the sake of his legitimization as an element of the corruption vertical.

Our abnormal elite is an integral part of the whole society, and one should admit it. The other matter is that this defect is not the result of an uncured illness but the consequence of bad education. In the situation, when the nation is mobilized, the rate of its good quality,

including the elite, increases greatly. The conclusion is evident. The non-mobilizing way of life is counter-indicative for the Russian people. Even a minimal and rather relative well-being results in decay. Those, who decay in a more rapid way, are members of the so-called elite, who by all means try to prevent new mobilization. Therefore the catastrophe under the guide of the present consumption oriented elite is at the same time a cleaning thunderstorm. What is the price of this storm? The price is high. But there is no other way out of this situation due to peculiarities of the national way existence. The risk is, probably, the greatest one for the whole history of Russia: the society, which confronts mobilization and is going on through this process, might lack the forces to withstand. But there is no alternative or other way of going forward in the process of history.

Mikhail Remizov, the director of the Institute of National Strategy

1–4. The Russian elite does not correspond completely to the classical examples of the ruling stratum. It is possible to stress minimum three radically anti-elite features, inherent in it. These features contradict the sense of the elite, since by the definition they make its representatives sooner the guided persons than the guides.

The first feature consists in the short horizon of consciousness. It concerns not the horizon of planning, but a short horizon of targeting, orientation of the aim. It is connected mainly with the lack of disposition to thinking in terms of extra-personal categories. A real aristocrat never says: this castle belongs to me. He says: this castle belongs to my family. The age of a human being is short, but the castle is the accumulated work and efforts of many generations. A certain scale should be correlated between the resources and those, who possess them. It is achieved not by enlargement of the personal ego but by membership in “collective personality”. For instance, the Japanese and

Korean corporations are such “collective personalities”. As capitalist successors of feudal clans they determine the horizon of their owners’ consciousness and may be subject to the strategy and may be engaged in a long play. On the contrary, one sees in the Russian corporations only the volatile covers for the interest of those, who keep them under control.

The second feature is the fetishism in relation to money and objects of consumption, i.e. worship to them (money and objects) and not to those, who create them. And they are created by the public relations and the human qualities, displayed by work and creation. This feature makes the typical Russian representative of the elite a typical consumer and not a creator of new values.

Finally, the third determining feature is the provincialism. The Russian establishment perceives integration into the western elite as the end in itself. In this way it objectively depreciates its own status positions, questioning the whole system, where they were formed. In other words, the Russian establishment’s member wants to be the second and even the tenth person in Rome but not the first one in Gallia. But what to do, as someone may say, if we are really like province Gallia? This is a bad argument. Exactly the provincialism of Russian elite makes Russia a province.

These and similar features give cause to criticize the Russian elite not from positions of populism (everybody is accustomed to it) but of conservative elitism. One may easily see the disgust of the ideologists of the latter (Nietzsche or Ortega-Gaceta) in the face of such “man of the elite”. Certainly, one may easily write off this enmity as the snobbery of the intellectuals, who “do not comprehend life”. But for us is significant the fact that these features are wrong not only from the esthetic or moral but also from the practical point of view. They are responsible both for the economic crisis in terms of Russian estimation and for the fact that

the destiny of elites themselves is questioned by the crisis. The short horizon of consciousness has made them the hostages of the permanent growth's utopia. It is high time to get rid of fetishism. It should be done not because the elites would consume less or worse products, but because the pyramid of demonstrative consumption, where they are at the peak of it, is being bowed. The carnival of the status consumption should not go on in the impoverishing society.

The failure of integration into the global elite represents a separate aspect of the economic crisis and a not less significant reality. And the question is not the determination of the limits of geo-economic expansion of the Russian capital but the evident lack of its integration's access to the shaped elite networks in the West. The mentioned social-psychological features of the elite are responsible not only for the conjuncture trends of the crisis but also for one of the principal systemic problems of our country – for the lack in Russia of the concentration of capital, needed for the capitalist development, i.e. for transformation of the surplus value into the capital. It should be stressed that the question is not the process of amalgamation (named usually centralization of capital), since it is quite all right by us, but it is “the play which brings to naught” and it is not the transformation of the surplus value into the cash, into the capital – the means of production, of creation of new values. In essence, the ability for such concentration is the unique cause, which makes capitalism a progressive structure. The main reason of this destructive choice consists not in the individual features of the people, members of the elite, but in the deficit of institutions, which discipline the elite and integrate it in society.

It is possible to distinguish two types of such institutions: institutions of tradition and mobilization. Only tradition and mobilization are the forces, which are able to transform the elite into something solid and valuable for society. In the West, the institutes of

the first type, i.e. the mechanisms of the elite's formation via tradition dominate. They are not only universities, they are closed societies and clubs, professional bureaucracy, influential academic-expert environment, integrated into the establishment not only on the basis of intellectual service. The economic and political dynasties are able to create and maintain the reputation for a long time. These and other similar institutions serve as the basis of the tried mechanisms of the elite consensus, which allows the developed societies to keep continuity and identity in the process of regular rotation of power. They may be called the invisible nucleus of democracy. From this point of view, the appeals to establish democracy, made by the West to the non-western societies, deprived of similar internal mechanisms, may be regarded as a refined humiliation. It is possible to grow such institutions, but the result will be received only for the long periods of time. Therefore the short stake relating to the elite is possible to make only on the mechanisms of the second type – the mobilization mechanisms. There is no other historic choice. The unique potential subject of the elites' mobilization at the present historic moment is the institution of the presidency, which has become the concentration of the sovereignty as such.

At present, a new expected agreement of Medvedev with the elites is being discussed. One party of this discussion demands a kind of charter of freedoms for the elites. Its opponents, as a rule, insist on preservation of the status-quo, i.e. the automatic prolongation of the agreement between Putin and the elites. It seems that both positions are wrong. The realization of the first position under conditions of "the long crisis" may equal a national collapse. The second option has the risk of transformation into such form of preservation of the results of the past ten years, which will be equal to its annihilation. The measures, taken under Putin for restriction of oligarchic power, seem to have the historic sense only as a preparation stage for something a more significant stage.

It concerns not only the elites but in general of the image of the country. The last decade is not a completed perfect example of social engineering to keep it unchanged, but the basis for national construction. Those, who want to consolidate the positive historic sense of the past decade, should not insist on preservation of the conditions of the former agreement but, on the contrary, to propose to reconsider it and to propose in the mobilization pact new, more rigid conditions of loyalty of the elites to the state and society. The main parameters of this pact seem to be as follows.

The national orientation of the elites. The question is not the patriotic rhetoric. The participants of the elite may keep it. Unlike their capitals, in the wide meaning: not only the financial but also the social capitals. But what is the way of their concentration at the national level? The proposals, made by V. Inosemtsev and N. Krichevski, seem to be feasible in the economic sphere: introduction of limitations on export of capital and of currency regulation measures, similar to those, adopted by Malaysia for the period of the crisis in the end of the 1990s. In the political sphere, the question is the consensus of the main players: in no circumstances we will trade the sovereignty, including the issues of political state loans.

The principle of personal liability, given to the people with great power and property, for the results of their activities. In terms of business community it would mean, for instance, saving enterprises and industries and not owners. It is not easy to separate them, but it is necessary to strive for it. Otherwise, the state will promote irresponsibility of the entrepreneurs, which to a large extent resulted in the crisis. As far as the administrative class is concerned, the question is the rigid and systemic rotation of cadres on the basis of determined criteria of the results, incorporated in the public contract of the official. At least, the ministers should occupy and leave their posts on the basis

of their public contract with the power and society. The liability system of the elites contains as well the criminal aspect, which should not be forgotten, although it seems to be inadequate to mention it.

The **technocratic aspect of the cadre policy**, i.e. the priority of the branch competence in terms of logic of patron-client connections. The clan logic in the state system is almost impossible to liquidate, but it is possible to limit it at least in the interests of joint survival. At present, there is a catastrophic deficit in branch competence, including the ministerial level. The introduction of formal criteria of professional expediency for the nomenclature of the government is a must. Among the criteria should be as follows: the profile education, the governance experience, the authority in the industry etc.

The principle of social liability. The creation of the social liability mechanisms is a rather difficult task. But in this case there exists a simple criterion for resoluteness to fulfill it: imposition of the income tax progressive scale. This is a part of the pact between the power and the elites and not one of the social-economic measures, since, in essence, the political decision of the power to limit the interests of the elites for the benefit of the social majority is a must. Although this decision is a forced decision, it should be recognized by the elites. At present, it is categorically turned down, for instance, under the pretext that it will be detrimental for the upper middle class. This is a habitual device for the elite: to take the middle class as a hostage of its interests. Evidently, much depends on the way of the scale construction. There is a valuable historic experience. In the USA the middle class was created artificially by the state in the period of one generation's life, under difficult conditions of depression and the world war. To a large extent it was created thanks to a rather radical progressive income tax. If in 1929 the richest stratum (0.1%) of Americans owned more than 20% of the national wealth, by the middle of the 1950s they possessed only 10%.

At present, the Russian power has to decide: are the words about the priority of the middle class formation only the loyal rhetoric or the political choice? Finally, the power is unable to dictate the elites to adopt the pact on the national and social liability, if it lacks a wide social support outside these elites, i.e. in the middle class itself, perceived not as “an aggregate of consumers” but as a social-economic and cultural kernel of society, as a qualitative national majority. It is impossible to get this support once and forever, it should be formed once again and more and should be maintained constantly.

Summing up, it should be said the following: in spite of the manifest of liberty of the nobles, we need the pact on turning the elite into a serf. Does it mean that liberalization, talked about recently, has been pushed into the background? Not at all. Liberalization is possible and is needed for the citizens. But the elites’ urgent needs consist not in liberty but in liability. To a lesser extent, this is the conservative and (in good meaning) elitist way of this issue’s comprehension. It consists in determining your own power and your own property by means of obligations and not by means of rights.

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THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF RUSSIA OVER THE POST-SOVIET AREA

The primary foreign-policy objectives of the most states are concentrated in that geographical region where they are located. So, the relations with the neighboring countries always prevail. For Russia these countries are the states of the post-Soviet area which were, are and will

be a zone of its vital interests for a historical perspective. As it seems to us it's dictated by no means to notorious "imperial ambitions" the concrete forces abroad try to attach to us persistently.

Russia's neighboring states have a special place in the system of the national interests. These countries are our nearest neighbors. The shared history and intertwined fates unite us. Vital interests of the Russian federation in the field of economy, security and defense are concentrated at the territory of the neighboring states and also rights protection of the Russia-speaking population whose protection ensuring is the basis of the national security of the country.

Always the economic interests were and are the main motives of foreign-policy aspirations of the great and small powers and their coalitions. When carrying out a policy with respect to the neighboring states Russia proceeds from that access affording to natural resources of the former USSR's states especially to oil and gas of the Caspian region corresponds to its pragmatic interests. Today the Caspian basin is considered to be as one of the regional centers on hydrocarbon production. One shouldn't consider oil and gas reserves of the Caspian region as vital to provide the international energetic security. Nevertheless, the given region on oil reserves can well fill a place being analogical to that now belonging to the North Sea and USA taken one with another.

The route competition of the Caspian oil transit gained unknown scope. It's caused by that geography of hydrocarbons delivery and also their transportation routes are exclusively important for geopolitical and geo-economic interests of all the countries of the world community. The Caspian oil transportation for the world market via its territory meets to foreign-policy priorities of Russia. The Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan "black oil" export for the world market via so-called "north" route is

profitable for our state as in this case the prices for oil pumping will be in the Russian treasury but not in budgets of neighboring states.

Though Russia has a developed network pipelines in the Caspian region unfortunately it has no a monopolistic right for raw hydrocarbons for the world market. Russia is actually the biggest “player” at the Caspian fuel-energetic market but not a single one. The big actors are Washington and Brussels. So, USA and EU actively lobby for the transit schemes westward – via the Caspian region, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.

As from a geopolitical point of view a transport corridor construction in the direction from the east to the west passing Russia in a concept of Washington and Brussels will allow:

- diversify the routes of energy resource supplies in order to relax the dependence of country economics on the biggest world suppliers of oil (OPEK as a whole and the region of the Middle East, in particular) and “blue fuel” of (Russia) and its energetic security ensuring in such way;

- put hydrocarbon reserves of the region under control and won’t allow these resources being at the disposal of those countries USA and Brussels consider to be their opponents or competitors (Russia and China);

- put the region countries under political control for the account of control over energy resources;

- provide geopolitical pluralism, independence (on Russia) of the new independent states.

Washington and Brussels use the different means, methods and instruments to achieve their strategic purposes. The main element of a single plan implementation to develop natural resources of the region by USA and EU is such organization as GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). So, activation of “efforts directed at joined

programs and projects... on transportation of energy resources of the Caspian region for the European energetic market using territories of states-participants of the Association is underlined in one of its documents.

One can conclude from the above-mentioned that Russia's position relatively, first of all, to route and scheme construction for transportation the Caspian hydrocarbons westward, secondly, to the regional organization GUAM will be negative as they don't correspond to the national interests of Russia. As it's written in Conception of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation approved by the president D.A. Medvedev "Russia's attitude towards sub-regional formations and other structures without the Russian participation over the area of neighboring states is defined proceeding from the estimation ... of their readiness to respect the legal Russian interests".

It's important for Russia to provide uninterrupted transit of its goods over the territories of post-Soviet states. The state needs for Russia's image as a reliable supplier of energy resources not only to make a good impression on the rest world though it's also important. As K.S. Gadjeiev thinks the country image "is the very important capital strengthening a geopolitical status of the state on the international arena, providing its security, defense and the national interests promoting. Unfortunately, there were cases when the international reputation of Russia suffered because of irregularities in transit via the republic of the former USSR.

Besides the economic interests the Russian Federation has the other group of interests directly pertaining to a military-political security. "Wishing a peace for yourself pray for a peace of the people around you", - the medieval Buddhist monk Nitiren wrote. It's especially urgent for Russia being interested in settlement of the existing and preventing the new troubled areas of the world and conflicts in the

regions bordering to the Russian Federation. Russia can't allow leaving its neighboring states at all or isolating from conflicts and all the more from participating in their settlement. Today and also in near future Russia will in one way or another involve, get mixed up in these events even against a will of the politicians being in power and supporting their groups of population due to many reasons. As it seems to us this is, first of all, a responsibility for the ethnic Russians fate (more than 20 millions of people) who are either involved in the regional conflicts or they are under converging gunfire of antagonistic parties. One should acknowledge a direct influence of instability on the situation in immediate proximity to Russia's borders. Besides, the ravages of the conflicts, violation of the human rights and violence cause streams of refugees and forced migrants the majority of which will go to Russia. At last, troubled areas of the world bring to involvement of the adjacent area citizens of the Russian Federation into the military operation (volunteers), loss of property for Russia and also the human victims during the forced operations to separate the opposing sides.

So, because of the above-mentioned circumstances Russia is interested in stability providing in the region, a minimization of risks and threats at its borders and the international tension relaxation there.

A number of strategic objects of the defense infrastructure are located at the territory of the neighboring states and as it seems to us Russia is interested in their keeping on a mutually agreed basis. Besides, there is optoelectronic center "Okno" in Tajikistan (near the town Nurek) including in the Russian system for space control. The given complex is for detection and identification of space objects at the height from 2000 to 40000 km above Eurasia, the North and Central Africa, the Indian and Atlantic oceans areas of water.

Russia is also interested in communication centers using located in some states of the post-Soviet area (Byelorussia and Kyrgyzstan) in

order to provide its military security. The data of communication centers perform radio communication with the ships and submarines being on combat duty in the areas of the Indian and Atlantic oceans in the interests of the NAVY of the Russian Federation. In Central Asia the Ministry of Defense leases some military grounds being of strategic importance.

The North Atlantic Alliance advance to the east especially for the account of Russia's neighboring countries admitted as members doesn't meet to the national interests and security of the country. To the specialists' mind the North Atlantic Alliance expansion for the account of the post-Soviet states inclusion and its military infrastructure approaching directly to the Russian borders makes a military situation complicated to a great extent.

NATO's expansion to the east has negative political consequences for Russia in spite of a very small chance of wide-ranging military conflict. First of all, it restricted Russia's freedom of operations over the post-soviet area and a choice of the national interest security. So, according to the above-mentioned reasons it would be more advantageous for Russia if security vacuum along the perimeter of Russia was filled with neutral (i.e. non-allied) states.

Drug traffic suppression via the borders of Community meets to the national interests of Russia. So, up to 99% of drugs is delivered in Russia either via the Central Asian republics or from there. It's associated with that Russia's borders with the southern neighbors are practically open. Only the land extension with Kazakhstan amounts to 7.5 thousand kilometers. Central Asia's "advantageous" geographical situation turned it into the large traffic artery for drug distribution. The Central Asian states are located between the biggest world producer of opium and the most profitable markets in the Western Europe. They border upon or are located near the countries of so-called "Golden

Crescent – Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran) but via China they have access to the countries of (Golden Triangle – Myanmar, Laos and Thailand) being one of the world leaders of opium drug producers. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan have the common borders with Afghanistan (1206, 744 and 137 km, correspondingly) being the largest producer of opium all over the world today. So, drug quantity produced in close proximity to the borders of the Central Asian countries is a challenge which its new and weak states aren't practically up to.

The component of the foreign-policy priority system of Russia is a protection of the Russia-speaking population being outside the country after the USSR dissolution and ensuring their rights and equal status of living at the territory of the states. It's caused by that the Russian Federation considers this problem as "its moral duty" as it's written in Conception of compatriots support abroad. The great number of the ethnic Russians lives in the former Soviet republics. By virtue of the presence of more than twenty millions of the Russian Diaspora in the post-soviet states Russia can't objectively but pay attention to the current events there, safeguard equitable and complete neutrality all the more the Russian-speaking population position is very difficult.

Though the constitution and legislative decrees of these countries proclaim the citizen equality irrespective of their national origin and a language, non-indigenous nationalities right protection in practice the Russian-speaking population feels nationalism demonstration not only at everyday but at official level.

Prevention of mass and forced violations of their rights; free expression, preservation and development of their ethnic, cultural, language and religious identity; their names and surnames using also in the official documents as it's accepted in their native (Russian) language meet to the national interests of the Russian Federation in the sphere of the right protection of the Russia-speaking population. So, the Russian-

language population protection, their rights and equal situation ensuring in these countries becomes more important component of the Russian foreign policy and the independent line in the national interest serving. All the above-mentioned allows making a conclusion that all the former Soviet republics is a zone of Russia's privileged interests by virtue of objective reasons.

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**THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE IN TATARSTAN:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES**

Since the beginning of the 1990s for the period of cessation of the atheist pressure on the part of the state structures a certain reanimation of the religious factor and the rise of the role of Islam in public life took place. The Muslim Tatars, having renounced the former conformism, started to show openly their adherence to Islam and its culture, to perceive themselves as a part of the Muslim world. The values and norms of Islam were incorporated into mass consciousness of the population and had a certain impact on the appraisal of the authorities' behavior and of the events, occurred in the world. By present, great changes took place in religious life of Tatars. The old mosques were renovated and new mosques were built, various Muslim education institutions were commissioned, including elementary courses, high education institutions (medreces “Tanzilya”, “Yulduz” in Naberezhnye Chelny” and others), colleges and higher education institutions (medrece “Muhammadiya”, the 1000 anniversary of Islam adoption medrece in Kazan and others). Many young people get education

abroad. Besides, religious newspapers and magazines started to be published, radio and TV programs with religious content were broadcast. Great popularity among believers is enjoyed by newspaper "Iman" ("Faith"), magazine "Iman Nury" ("Light of Faith"), published in Kazan, and newspaper "Islam Nury" ("Light of Islam"), issued in Naberezhnye Chelny. Nevertheless, the influence of Islam on moral-cultural renovation of the Tatarian society and solving of its social problems remains very small. The following main factors hinder transformation of the Tatars-Muslim umma: the remaining gap between the main part of the intellectuals and the Muslim clergy; the orientation of imams, including the imams, occupying high posts, not to spiritual but to material values; the lack of readiness of Tatars-Muslim culture to participate in the growing globalization processes, the excessive closure in "local" affairs and internal Russian politics; the increasing language and cultural assimilation of Tatars in the prevalent Russian and Russian-speaking city environment and the rapid reduction of the share of Tatars, living in the ethnically homogeneous rural settlements. The above mentioned factors explain the situation, when for most Tatars Islam is sooner an element of their identity, the heritage of the past, an orientation than their way of living and spiritual kernel. Shortly speaking, a great part of the people remain only Muslims by their origin. Islam rests against the background and does not play an essential role in shaping the cultural and ideal potential of the whole society. It is displayed first of all in the lack of an adequate system of Muslim education and enlightenment. The question is not only the lack of cadres but also of the system of organizing this work, directed to the restoration of traditions and their amalgamation with achievements of modern Islamic thinking. Hence, the need to elaborate the conception of Islamic education. The level of education in the present Muslim education institutions is lower than in the pre-revolution medreses, which applied

new methods. The imams, who received education in Arabic countries, profess Hanbalit and Shafiit mazhab (theological-legal schools), while Tatars are the followers of liberal Hanafit trend. The majority of imams, graduates of local religious education institutions possess a low intellectual level, and there are no theologians with good theoretical background, which has its historic explanation.

According to the discussions and publications, devoted to the education issues, there are two approaches to their settlement: 1) the Islamic education should be traditional, should be arranged in the Tatarian language and be free of any borrowings, alien to Islam, which finally lead to the oblivion of the maternal language and faith; 2) the Islamic education should restore the tradition of jadids, Tatarian Muslim reformers in the end of the XIX century-the beginning of the XX century, promoting study of theologian and secular sciences with due account of modern scientific achievements, thinking about the principle of idjitihad, widely propagated by jadids. According to this principle, the education sphere is (at least, should be) in the process of development, reacting attentively to the changes in the external milieu, adapting itself to the changing needs and at the same time actively having impact on the state of the milieu, pre-determining these needs. The followers of jadids (neo-jadids) take into account the fact that the world has entered the epoch of developed technologies, when their main, if not the sole, basis is the level of the people's education, and there is no alternative to this. Therefore they think that the Islamic educational institutions confront the task to prepare the graduates, who would pay greater attention to the essence and not to the form of the knowledge, would be characterized by wide views, tolerance, profound knowledge of Koran and Sunna, which allow to provide the Islamic substantiation of the issues, raised to the society. Taking into account the resources of the modern communication means, they should

maintain relations with the centers of Islamic science and culture, be able to carry on a constructive dialogue with the ruling power, to be its partner, to form the consciousness of its followers, to protect their rights by the constitutional methods. In other words, the question is the formation of the Muslim intellectuals, possessing wide intellectual qualities and being competent in the issues of Shariat.

In Tatarstan, the process of Islamic education may not abstain from a reaction to the rapid growth of tension in human relations at the national-ethnic and religious level due to the mental incompatibility of individuals and of human societies etc., which represent big hindrances for overcoming. The Islamic education has the ability to play a historic role in the salutary integration and harmonization of knowledge and faith, in prevention of irreversible deformations in the mentality of Tatars, professing Islam, mainly – in resurrection and in uninterrupted enrichment of their highest ideals and life priorities.

At present, except the problems, connected with perfection of Islamic education, the Tatarian society, according to many researchers, confronts the urgent task of the rebirth of the parishes (mahallya). As it is known, before the revolution of 1917 Tatars lived in mahallya. What is it? As it was defined by known Tatarian enlightener I. Gasprinsky, mahallya was a tiny state with solid connection among its parts and its laws, habits, public order, offices and traditions, maintained efficiently by the spirit of Islam. This community has its authorities in the face of elders and the whole parish, it does not need the higher recognition, since the power of these authorities consists in their religion and moral. The community has its own independent clergy and needs no sanctions or consecration. Any educated Muslim may be a teacher, muedzin, imam, ahun etc., if the community agrees to it. Professor of Spiritual Academy Bashanov considers that mahallya is a closed society, where the spirit of religious unity ruled. It was difficult to become a member of

this community even for another person with deep religious views. The work for the benefit of the parish was considered as a solemn duty of its representatives. The mahallya authorities oriented its members to achieve two vitally important tasks: in the economic sphere – to ensure the normal living level of life for their families; in the political sphere – to preserve their nationality and faith.

The initiators of mahallya rebirth in Tatarstan at the present time should take into account the fact that for the pre-revolution period the Tatarian local community possessed a considerable financial basis and self-dependence for carrying out its spiritual-enlightenment activities. The ability to establish in the parish the system of guardianship, regular charitable subsidies of the believers, the lack of a tax burden, the systematic support, given by the entrepreneurship's elite let Muslim communities function successfully without direct support of the state. Under present conditions, the creation of a reliable economic basis for functioning of Muslim mahallya parishes, of their education and organization structures confronts difficulties and represents the problem, which is impossible to solve, which is explained primarily by poverty of the people. Nevertheless, the organization of Tatarian mahallya, the legal substantiation and registration of it, the elaboration of its model status and arrangement of its work, based on this status, is being considered as an urgent task.

Taking into account the important role of Islam in preservation and development of the nation, scientists, public and religious figures of Tatarstan stress the need, basing on national traditions, to intensify the activities of the Spiritual Department in organization of the education process speaking the Tatarian language in the religious education institutions.

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M., 2009, N 4, p. 24–27.*

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**POLITICIZATION OF THE
NON-POLITICAL COMPONENT
IN THE SYSTEM OF RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS
IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS**

The Caucasus represents itself an association of peoples, cultures and languages, which are in the process of development and reciprocal action in this space for thousands of years. For the period of the XIX-XX centuries the fundamental changes took place in life of the peoples in the Caucasus: the peoples of the Caucasus joined Russia. This change contained the whole gamma of positive aspects but at the same time created a complex of problems with potential conflicts. In this regard, the policy aimed at reducing its influence is needed.

The Caucasian knot of conflicts gives in to liberation or relaxation with difficulty. Russia objectively by its millennial history is fixed in the Caucasian realities, almost in all conflicts both by a part of its territory, its peoples and by the long-term connections and interests in the Caucasus. They are determined both by the geopolitical position and the historic closest contacts and the traditional orientations of the economic and cultural common character of Russia and the majority of the indigenous population of the Caucasus. It is impossible to solve any essential problem in the Caucasus without Russia, without due account of its interests and direct priority participation. And those, who at present urge towards severance of the Russian-Caucasian historic-cultural association, do harm to their countries and peoples, irrespective of different extremist banners they come forward with – from national-separatists to Cossacks-unitarians.

It is worth examining the role and influence of non-political components of geopolitics in the context of the present Russian geopolitical course in the North Caucasus.

The appeals to leave the Caucasus are made not only abroad but also in Russia, which seems to be an enlightened country. The authors of the appeals do not understand that these appeals first of all are at variance with the national interests of Russia, of its integrity and unity. At the same time, the historic, specific role and position both of Russia in the Caucasus and of the Caucasus in Russia is not taken into account. In this case, these people do not perceive the fact that Russia will never be able to leave the Caucasus owing to the objective reasons, even if it wished to do it. Nevertheless, at present one may come across to some enlightened representatives of our time, who express opinions on the erroneous existence of the Caucasian geo-strategy in the system of internal geopolitical course of Russia in the historical perspective. The North Caucasus owing even to its geographic position can not be “a territory-strait”; if the North Caucasus is not a part of Russia, it will be a part of Turkey or will be transformed into a confederation of field commanders, who consider the southern borders of Russia as their “forests for hunters”.

The various approaches, supposing the complex study of political systems development's factors and their different realization in geopolitics, geo-strategy, geo-economy, despite evident achievements, seem to be insufficient for solving some problems, connected with description of evolution and reciprocal action of political systems. In order to find out the inner mechanisms of this evolution often it is not sufficient to apply “two-dimensional” conjugation of the political sphere with the space-geographical factors (as it is realized in geopolitics and geo-strategy) or of the political sphere with the resource-economic factors (as it is realized in geo-economy); but for this sake one needs a

study of a more complicated, “three-dimensional” reciprocal action of the political sphere simultaneously with the resource and the space-geographic factors, which will make it possible to have a “volumetric” picture of the studied processes. This threefold mutual action supposes formation of a new direction of research, which should be determined as “geo-economic politics” and which should be elaborated in practice according to the conditions of the North Caucasus.

The Russian geopolitics in the North Caucasus should consist on the face of it of non-political components, such as a geo-economic policy, a geo-religious policy, a geo-ethnic policy, a geo-information policy etc.

Economy acquires a greater priority in the state policy on the international arena. As was noted by Chinese researcher He Fan, competition and the struggle for the leading role in economy, the control and anti-control, sanctions and response sanctions, protections and counter-protections were transformed into the main forms of international struggle. In this context, it is even asserted that as a result of extension of competition “territorial states” were replaced by “commerce states”. The essence of this change consists in the transition from “power games” among the states, aspiring for extension of their territories, to “games for prosperity”, when the stake is the economic growth.

The words of the Chinese scientist are proved directly by the competitive struggle in the Caspian-Caucasian region in the market of the oil and gas resources transportation. The practice shows that the policy in its pure form (political-administrative regulation) should be replaced in the North Caucasus by the geo-economic policy. The struggle for the energy resources and the routes of their transportation in the Caucasian-Caspian region – presents a visual proof of it.

The continuing rise of oil prices and the analogous rise of oil consumption jointly with the growing dependence of most countries on gas deliveries explains the cause of an increased attention of big world players to the Caspian region. The attractiveness of the Caspian deposits of hydrocarbons (according to the expertise, 4% of the world reserves), inter alia, is conditioned by their relatively good geographic position. The value of the Caspian Basin as one of the centers of hydrocarbons' extraction becomes greater in connection with the rise of instability in the Near East, transforming this region into a kind of counter balance to dependence on OPEC.

The activities of Russia in the process of transportation of hydrocarbons to the world market represent a priority direction of the national energy policy, described in "the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period to 2020", adopted by the government of the RF on 28 August 2003. As it is stressed, the national policy in this sphere should be directed to the passage of the country from the position of mainly a deliverer of natural resources to the role of an independent participant of the energy goods world trade turnover. This task is dictated both by the trends in the international integration in the energy sphere and by the potential advantages of the qualitative change of the role of Russia in the world trade of energy resources.

The realization of this strategy confronts a real opposition on the part of other world players, which gradually build up their presence in the regions vitally significant for Russia, including the Caspian Basin. Up till present time, Russia was able to keep a part of its positions in the region; however, it is being actively forced out of the oil sector. The analogous attempts in the gas sector came to grief recently. The Caspian states pay great interest to a new export route, taking into account the over-loading of the main export oil pipelines and the difficulties of the Caspian oil shipment due to the raised amounts of the Caspian oil,

allotted for such shipment. Thus, one may see the gradual decrease of Russia role in shipment of the Caspian oil to the world market. Russia was overdue with the radical change in its infrastructure and is unable fully to use the advantageous conjuncture of the world oil and oil products market. The biggest project of the oil pipeline in the post-Soviet space was implemented without Russia's participation and even to the detriment of its interests. This project has been commissioned, but Russia is unable to set off against it an analogous in scale project. The oil pipeline Burgas-Alexandropolis has not yet started its functioning, which lets speak about the loss by Moscow of its leading position for shipment of "black gold" from the Caspian region. Nevertheless, it is probable that these dangers are premature and Russia may keep its leading position in oil shipment, if the start of "the oil boom" in Kazakhstan will be postponed for a long period of time. The prognosis may become unrealistic that the Caspian oil fields might attain the maximum output already by 2010.

The positions of Russia in the gas segment as the main supplier seem to be very strong and even inaccessible. It refers also to the Caspian-Black Sea region. Russia was able to restore its positions in the gas sector primarily with the help of the Caspian gas pipeline; the corresponding agreement was signed in December 2007 by the leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia in Moscow. A number of agreements on gas shipment around the Caspian Sea inflicted an irretrievable damage to the Trans-Caspian project, lobbied by western investors. China, actively extending its cooperation with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, is the sole significant competitor of Russia in the sphere of the Caspian gas transportation. At present, the perspectives of this project's implementation seem to be rather unclear, since neither the budget nor the technical-economic substantiation of the project was prepared.

In conclusion, it should be said that Russia as usual occupies a privileged position in the energy sector of the Caspian region. Evidently, Moscow is interested in keeping the existing position in the sphere of oil and gas shipment from the Central Asia. By means of the control over the pipelines Russia is able to have influence on the separate segments of the world energy system and on the geopolitical situation in the Central Asia and in the Caucasus. Nevertheless, more aggressive and pressing attempts are being made to exclude Russia from the Central-Asian region and particularly from the Caucasian region, which should urge on Russia to expedite projecting and taking responsive steps in the sphere of economy. Otherwise, the advantageous economic positions of Russia in these regions may become essentially weaker in the middle-term perspective.

A special attention should be paid to the Chechen Republic. The strategic communications are laid between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Primarily, it is the oil pipeline Baku-Makhachkala-Grozny-Novorossiysk. The basis of the lasting peace in Chechnya is contained in ensuring uninterrupted oil shipment by this route and by the second “pipe” from the Caspian Sea to the terminal on the shore of the Black Sea (Tengis-Astrakhan-Novorossiysk). The most important task of the Russian energy diplomacy consists in strengthening the significance of these routes as the main export directions for shipment of the Caspian oil to the world markets. One may easily see in the example of “the oil question” in Chechnya the correlation of geo-economic policy and geo-information policy. The perversion of economic facts and their transformation into political facts results in politicization of economy. The words “Chechnya” and “oil” turned out to be rhymed for the post-Soviet period. Hence, the perception that the main “driving force” of the political events in Chechnya after 1991 is the struggle for oil and control over its extraction, transportation and realization. The Russian mass

media and various public and political figures actively supported these perceptions. The thesis on the oil as “the curse of Chechnya” was propagated many times. Hence, a traditional high percent of respondents, who think that the oil is the basis of two Chechen campaigns for the 1990s. But the decline of “Chechen oil” was noted already in time of Brejnev “stability”. The other question is that Dudayev and his team in the beginning of the 1990s succeeded to convince the people that independent Chechnya would become “the second Kuwait”. The first rate significance of oil was stressed in this “picture of future”. It is ridiculous, but the rhetoric, habitual for any ethnic-national revolution (appeals to the future riches in case of liberation from the insidious center of empire) was accepted “by hurrah” not only by the mass of the Chechen but also by Russian journalists and their credulous foreign colleagues. Thus, oil became not only an economic but also an ideal-political factor (it remains like this at present). Thus, it is evident that oil in the regressive (in terms of reserves, extraction and refining) region could not provide richness for all citizens. But it could become a mobilizing weapon (“perfidious Moscow intends to capture our riches”) and ensure prosperity for a few people.

At present, the old model of world order is being eroded in terms of geopolitics and the states cease to be the sole geopolitical actors. The new situation is different: there appeared “actors outside sovereignty” (international organizations, regional administrations, religious, terrorist, separatist and irredentist organizations, political parties and movements, transnational corporations), which have greater and greater impact on taken decisions and are able to have influence directly on the course of events, to put greater input into shaping of the political map of the world.

Despite all this, the state should remain the unique actor in the internal and regional geo-politics. The Chechen Republic gives an example of what kind of event occurs, when the state refutes these authorities. The situation in the republic may be characterized as “Kadyrov caciquism”, when the relations between Moscow and Chechnya are as follows: it is more advantageous for the political establishment of the republic to demonstrate loyalty to the federal and regional power than to wage war. The demonstration of loyalty has turned out as a kind of business. Russia loses its positions in the Caucasus, and there a new generation of people will not be connected with Russia by any interests. The Russian policy in the Caucasus has an urgent political and social-cultural meaning for us at present and in the perspective. It is not a “pure” policy but life itself, and we are integrated each other into it. Against this background, whether we want or not, the social-economic and ethnic-cultural elements of the political strategy and tactics of our presence in this region represent the issue of high priority.

The question can not be reduced to the military-political aspects of the present conjuncture. The Caucasus and Russia are not only different civilizations but also the civilizations, which are integrated and have obtained a new inseparable for them quality. Therefore under present complicated conditions a thoughtful and correct long-term state policy is needed in the Caucasus, including a number of political components. It should be done, since in the North Caucasus the non-political aspects of life in society (ethnic, economic, spiritual) obtain the trend to politicization, which is both natural and artificial.

At present, there are no fixed mechanisms of protection of Russians in the Caucasus, of realization of the Russian state interests in the Caucasus. No sanctions are taken against those, who unilaterally infringe these interests, causing damage to Russia in the Caucasus. The

political will of the heads of the federal authorities in Russia and of the authorities of the Caucasian republics is displayed only in case of struggle against each other or by making various idle declarations. Not one victory was gained but with the detriment to the prestige of the state, the power and the peoples of Russia. Against this dim background, Russia itself is loosened, the Russian geopolitical space is being disintegrated, the authority, won for the centuries, is diminishing, the century-long hopes, cherished by the Caucasians for Russia and Russian culture, are being disappointed.

Up till present time, foreign political secret services and missionaries of all kinds make attempts to penetrate into the territory of the Caucasus, use its ethnic-cultural and particularly confessional closeness to transform the region into the zone of realization of their political-ideological and economic interests, to give support to anti-Russian political forces, aggravating the explosive situation in the Caucasus. Members of sects and fundamentalists in greater number penetrate into the region, propagating various extremist ideas. The local and federal authorities miscalculated, having in that time made advances to the ethnic-theocratic forces even in case of the displayed aggressive nationalism. At the same time, they, if not ignored, rendered insufficient assistance to the political forces, oriented to the pro-Russian, poly-ethnic course of society development, to the inter-national balance of interests and the inter-national consent.

The trend to re-direct the growing competitive struggle in all spheres of society into the channel of inter-ethnic rivalry is seen in the Caucasus and in Russia as a whole. The human relations, already deformed by thoughtless reforms, are subject to an additional test. And not all people withstand it. The personal qualities (professionalism, culture, good breeding, honor and dignity) are pushed into the background. The ethnic factor is also used to install the dictate over the

individual. The special measures are needed to ensure the state support given to development of poly-ethnic communities and the corresponding relations at all levels, directed to creation of moral-psychological climate of friendship and cooperation. The work, directed to shaping the culture of inter-national communication, has been stopped. The international relations are considered as only the zones of conflicts, tragedies and bloodshed, putting aside the century-long experience of friendship, common creative work and cooperation.

In the process of elaboration and realization of the Caucasian policy it is significant to avoid the conjuncture of playing to the gallery with separate ethnic groups, leaders by language, ideological and other reasons and to start implementation of complex state programs aiming at development of poly-ethnic, territorial communities. The aggravation of a confrontation policy is dangerous for the Caucasus and Russia, and it has an impact on the mass consciousness. And it may result in conservation of conflicts in this region, and as a result of it the Caucasus would be excluded from the list of regions characterized by advantageous economic and cultural development.

The equal rights of the citizens irrespective of their nationality should be ensured on the territory of the Russian Federation. One of the aspects of equality of the subjects of the RF is recognition and legal legitimization of the multi-national composition of all republics, territories, regions and autonomies of the RF. But the leveling of life of the peoples and of the territories should not be allowed under the slogans of equal rights and by absolute perception of human rights. The equal for all "rules of game" in the united state should be able to ensure actual equality of individuals and of the peoples irrespective of the territory of their residence.

The main substance of the ethnic-political problems in Russia is displayed in the most evident form today in the Caucasus against the

background of the problematic Russian-Caucasian relations and in the course of analysis of specific situations, related to inter-national conflicts. Hence, the priority of the thesis of historic reciprocal conditioning and inseparability of Russia and the Caucasus, which are doomed to live under conditions of dialogue and cooperation. The failures of the national policy of the federal center (actually, the lack of geo-ethnic policy in the North Caucasus) are displayed by inter-national clashes in the places of compact living of several big ethnic groups.

One should pay attention to the fact that the ethnic diversity in the Caucasus actually makes radical ethnic nationalism a political utopia (particularly, in the regions, where there is no great numerical domination of one ethnic group, like, for instance, in Karachaevo-Cherkessia). The struggle for the ethnic domination actually leads to the victory of the ethnic elite, which is quickly corrupted and limited to its own vested egoist interests. The masses of people are doomed to play the role of infantry servicemen at the meetings. As a result, for the second half of the 1990s, the ideas of radical Islam, opposing traditional Islam, penetrated the Caucasus.

The rows of supporters of the so-called wahhaby underground were augmented not only due to recruitment of extremists. Often it was the result of the protest (social or political) against injustice. As is mentioned in his book "Islam for Russia" by orientalist A. Malashenko, the activities, carried out by the authorities, often cause irritation of Muslims, loyal to the Russian state but sharing the negative attitude to its forced methods, used against Islamic opposition. The authorities do not distinguish Islamists to radicals and moderates and in general have the identical attitude to all Muslims, who by various reasons differ in the views from traditional Islamic clergy. Islam, ingrained in life of people for many centuries, periodically was disturbed by disputes between traditional Islam, connected with national religious rites and habits, and

“pure” Islam, which declared its freedom from “touches”, from national traditions. For the historic perspective, the same trend of Islam could play the role of traditional or “pure” Islam. For the period of the XIX century, the role of “pure” Islam was plaid by mystic Sufism, while in the end of the XX century this role was given to Salafiya (wahhabism) and the supporters of this trend of Islam declared war against traditionalists (sufi).

The “pure” Islam was disseminated in Chechnya (particularly after Khasavyurt), Dagestan and other subjects of the RF in the Caucasus, including the rather peaceful western part of the region (Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria). The well-educated propagandists of “pure” Islam differed from the clergy of the Spiritual Department of Muslims. “Pure” Islam as a protest ideology suits well the conditions in the Caucasus. Unlike traditional Islam, this system of Islamic views appeals to universal and egalitarian values above ethnic features. The followers of radical Islam do not pay attention to membership in tape, clan or ethnic group. It may be estimated as an answer to ethnic theocracy and ethnic clan system as the basis of distribution of power. Hence, a chance to form horizontal connections among activists from different republics in the Caucasus. Under conditions of an adequate ideology and concept of national construction, Salafiya became an integral factor in the Caucasus. However, the question is that the Islamic national project was developed as an anti-Russian venture, while many leaders of “renovators” did not share Russophobia and were ready to agree to the Russian jurisdiction in the North Caucasus under conditions of its total Islamization. At the same time, the Caucasian wahhabies reject the secular type of the Russian statehood and the institutions of the Russian power in the region. The Russian power (and the liberal modernization project as a whole) is threatened not by the underground bandits but by the politically and ideologically motivated people, who

perceive their aims and tasks, in contrast to the corrupted and depraved Russian elite (both official and in opposition). At present the main task of the federal power in the North Caucasus consists in dissemination of views, which stress adherence of residents of this region to the Russian Federation as Russian citizens. The majority of the population considers not the all-citizen Russian identity but its ethnic, confessional, relation adherence as the most important characteristic. In order to change this situation it is necessary to overcome the internal regional apartheid, to optimize the internal migration. The Russian authorities need a principally new cadre policy.

The “Russian idea” in the Caucasus should be realized not by the personally devoted bureaucrats and corrupted officials but by the politically motivated people (the Moscow representatives and the stratum of the so-called European-Caucasians, i.e. originals of the republics in the Caucasus, who intend to implement a modernization and not a tribal-traditional project). Exactly these two projects represent the possible trends of development of Russian geopolitical course in the North Caucasus. However, for the whole period of existence of post-Soviet Russia, the high ruling power instead of incorporation of official law systematically intensified non-formal connections in the North Caucasus.

In total, this policy resulted in the loss of the control and influence over the new course of events in the Caucasus. Should today the Russian power ignore the chance to solve the complex of social-economic and political problems in the Caucasus in the systemic way and stick to the cadre reshuffle and search of switchmen, tomorrow the Caucasus will be accommodated in another way according to the wish of other forces.

Keeping the present mechanical Kremlin scenario – “handing over all in exchange for loyalty”– may lead to the situation, when

regional elites finally privatize the power in republic. But the population, educated not in the American and European traditions of democracy, may start the struggle against unfair privatization of power under the Islamist and ethnic-nationalist slogans. In any case, there is no alternative to the consolidation of the state in this region, if Russia intends to keep the Caucasus. More precisely, the sole alternative is the existence of several federations, headed by field commanders. The other matter is the meaning of “consolidation of the state”. Evidently, it is not strengthening of the local ethnic nomenclature regimes and their corrupted ties with the Moscow patrons. It is neither the exchange of the regional resources and power for purely formal loyalty and not the chaotic reviews of passports and cleaning operations.

The key of solving this problem is outside the Caucasian region. All projects of adequate governance in the North Caucasus depend on achievement of one task. In order to de-privatize AOZT (closed stock company) “Chechnya”, “Karachaevo-Cherkessia”, “Adygeya” and other objects of the administrative market Russia should become a fully fledged state and not a corporation of the fed entities, a mighty state, which will not be able to be bought, while the residents of the Caucasus will be ready to swear allegiance to this state and serve it. The driving together students and state employees to the polling stations in the day of elections would hardly help it. On the contrary, a qualitative and free expertise discussion will help to make the right diagnosis of the sicknesses in the North Caucasus. The de-politicization of the Caucasian policy as a way out of the spheres of regulation is a dangerous trend. Exactly the state is the guarantor of law, legislation – freedom within the framework of the authorized.

The direct powerful (administrative-political) impact in the North Caucasus is neutralized and deformed due to the complex of regional specifications. Thus, a particular geo-strategy, including non-political

components, is needed for preservation and consolidation of the geopolitical control of Russia over the North Caucasus. The non-political spheres are being politicized to the detriment of Russia as long as the state carries out an inadequate (qualitatively) policy in the Caucasus. Thus, there exists the following alternative: to block politicization or to politicize for your own benefit; to carry out the policy, which will make it impossible to politicize the non-political spheres. The non-confronting model of geopolitics, just being such form of internal geopolitics, the geopolitics of relations between the center and the regions should be arranged on the basis of use of non-political factors.

The main threat to the Russian statehood in the North Caucasus is privatization (ethnization, ethnic-craticization, ethnic-eliticization, ethnic criminalization) of policy, when the state for some or other reasons lets slip out of its hands politics, it will be taken by someone and will use its own discretion usually to the detriment of state interests. The way out of the existing situation is in the adequate determination of the chances, widely provided by the two hundred years of actual experience of the Russian policy in the Caucasus. Not a single country possesses such rich experience of the Caucasian policy as Russia does, but not a single country did carry out a more thoughtless policy than Russia did.

“Rossiyskaya politika XXI veka: nepolitichesky potentsial politichskogo”, M., 2009, p. 282–300.

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**PARTICIPATION OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS
GROUPS IN POLITICAL LIFE OF KAZAKHSTAN**

After disintegration of the USSR one of the most important problem, having impact on stability of the political system of Kazakhstan, remains preservation of harmonic and balanced inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. For the last years, the ethnic-confessional image of the republic greatly changed, while, as beforehand, there are urgent many tendencies and trends, emerged almost two decades ago after disintegration of the single state.

The going on changes and migration processes are not as dynamic as for the 1990s, nevertheless, the statistics testify to significant changes in the ethnic composition of the population. In 1997, the population of the country consisted of 14995 thousand people, including Kazakhs – 7972 thousands (53.3%), Russians – 4490 thousands (30%), Ukrainians – 549 thousands (3.67%), Uzbeks – 370 thousands (2.47%), Uigurs – 210 thousands (1.4%), Tatars – 249 thousands (1.67%), Germans – 356 thousands (2.38%). By 2007, the population of the country augmented almost by 3% and was 15395 thousand people, including Kazakhs – 9110 thousands (59.18%), Russians – 3945 thousands (25.63%), Ukrainians – 440 thousands (2.86%), Uzbeks – 440 thousands (2.86%), Uigurs – 233 thousands (1.52%), Tatars – 229 thousands (1.49%), Germans – 222 thousands (1.44%). The share of the indigenous population raised almost by 6%, while the share of Russians decreased by 4.5%. The share of the Central Asian ethnic groups raised against the background of reduction of the number of European ethnic groups.

The regional situation is characterized by existence of big Diaspora groups, by concentration of the non-aboriginal population in separate districts. The great part of the Slavonic and German population is concentrated in the northern-eastern part of the country. The biggest Uzbek Diaspora was shaped in the South-Kazakhstan region, near borders with Uzbekistan. Uigurs live mainly in the southern-west of the republic. For the last years, the share of the Kazakh population raised as a result of internal and external migration and thanks to its traditional higher birth rate than the birth rate of the Slavonic ethnic group. The transfer of the capital of the country from Alma-Ata to Astana stimulated greatly the migration of the Kazakh people from the southern regions to the north. Not long ago many foreign observers predicted that Kazakhstan was doomed to the fate of the Soviet Union due to the poly-ethnic composition of its population. Z. Brzezinski, a known western geo-strategist even let a chance of the split under the impact foreign political factors: with the account of concentration of the Russian population in the north-eastern regions of Kazakhstan, the country may confront the threat of territorial separation in case of deterioration of its relations with Russia. Some American experts in the Central Asia noted the aggravation of internal contradictions in Kazakhstan as a result of intensive stratification of society between rural and city residents, the youth and the elders, the residents of the north and the south, the Kazakhs and the non-Kazakhs for the 1990s. Nevertheless, the republic succeeded to avoid significant cataclysms in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations. American experts explain the lack of disturbances in Kazakhstan against the background of bloody conflicts in many regions of the post-Soviet space in a rather specific way: with deeply rooted differences in political values between the main two nationalities of Kazakhstan, the preservation in the country of a calm social-political situation may be explained only by apathy of the population. However,

this social-psychological explanation of the situation does not mention all factors, which influence the course of events.

The migration, characterized by distinct ethnic component, was a safety valve for the period of the protests during the 1990s. Most emigrants left for Russia and other Slavonic republics of the CIS as well as for Germany. The analysts, criticizing the ethnic policy of the government of Kazakhstan, admit that many people preferred migration to the difficulties of integration under new conditions of life. For instance, A. Grozin in his time wrote that the initial cause of mass exit of Russians from Kazakhstan was a deep psychological discomfort and the permanent stress in the process of adaptation to the emerging ethnic-oriented regime, which coincided with accommodation to the market relations. At the same time, in the process of economic stabilization and amelioration of living conditions of the population the outflow of migrants decreased and even the inflow of immigrants started. As was noted in magazine "Mezhdunarodnye protsessy", after the outflow of the Russian-speaking and the German-speaking population to Russia, to the FRD and Israel the situation changed, and Kazakhstan became attractive for migrants from other countries. Many of those, who left Kazakhstan for some reasons, came back from other countries, including Russia.

The statistics show that migration continues to influence the ethnic composition of the population. Against the background of return to Kazakhstan of ethnic Kazakhs from neighboring CIS countries, China, Mongolia, Iran, Turkey, for a long time an important emigration to the historic Motherland of ethnic Russians, Germans, Ukrainians, Jews was going on. For the last years, the positive balance in external migration was fixed in Kazakhstan: in the year of 2000 the number of immigrants was 47442 people, the number of those, who left the country, accounted for 155749 people (the population loss – 108307

people); in 2004 the corresponding indexes were: immigrants – 68319, emigrants – 65530 (the positive balance – 2789 people. In 2006, the corresponding numbers were as follows: 66731 immigrants and 33690 emigrants (the positive balance – 33041 people).

For the last decade, another significant social-political factor became the “religious renaissance”. Some experts question the rightfulness of this notion, but one may see the growth of interest in religion at first sight. Lately, the following tendencies were evident: the growing influence of traditional religious institutions; the extension of social functions of religion; the extension of chances to get religious education; the intensification of missionaries and propagandists’ activities, representing various faiths (from traditional views in Kazakhstan to “exotic” and sectarian trends). The statistics note the rapid growth of the number of religious associations and cult constructions in Kazakhstan, while the sociologic polls fix the rise of qualitative religiousness of all groups of the population. The number of religious associations was raised, according to the official statistics, for the years of independence almost six times: from 671 in 1990 to 3783 in 2007. For this period of time, the number of Islamic parishes increased from 46 to 2144, while the number of the Orthodox parishes rose from 62 to 281 and of the Catholic parishes – from 42 to 98, of the Protestant parishes, including the Fifties and charismatic churches (from 457 to 1177). Owing to the active work of missionaries, non-traditional for Kazakhstan the Protestant charismatic and Methodist associations increased their presentation: from 13 in 1990 to 540 in 2007. The old Protestant parishes even disappeared or lost parishioners, for instance, the number of Lutheran associations, attended mainly by Germans, decreased from 171 in 1990 to 25 in 2007, since many Germans left for Germany.

At the same time, the ethnic and confessional membership was identified in the mass consciousness, which was characteristic for Kazakhstan. The program of perfection of the Kazakhstan model of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional consent for 2006-2008, adopted by the government on 15 June 2006, admitted that any complication, the more so aggravation of the inter-confessional relations would be transferred into the inter-national sphere. In spite of numerous declarations about the victorious march of globalization and westernization, the going on processes show that the problem of ethnic and religious identification and self-identification comes forward in the course of elaboration of strategic plans for the future. In Kazakhstan, being a state with the greatest number of ethnic and confessional groups of the population, the most significant condition of creative national development is maintenance of tolerant relations among representatives of all national and religious communities. The state policy is aimed at excluding the conflicting potential of poly-ethnicity and of poly-confessional factor and at making the most of it not as a basis to settle the existing issues but as a competition's advantage and a positive factor of development. These processes attract as usual attention of wide audience and demand further studies, particularly in the context of the existing reforms of the constitutional foundations of the political system.

Various public institutions, shaped in Kazakhstan, make it possible to represent at different levels the interests of various ethnic and religious groups. The creation of political parties, based on ethnic or religious distinctions, is forbidden by the legislation. However, there exist many national cultural centers, public associations and movements. For instance, Slavonic movement "Lad" and Association of Russian, Slavonic and Cossacks communities carry out their activities. National communities, business men's associations, associations of youth, national and cultural centers of Germans, Koreans, Tatars, Ukrainians,

Uigurs and of some other ethnic groups carry out their activities on the territory of Kazakhstan. Newspapers and magazines in national languages of these peoples are published, TV and radio programs in these languages are broadcast, several national theaters function. The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (formerly named the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan), established by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 1 March 1995, is the organ, summoned to consolidate the interests of all ethnic and religious groups in the country. The Regulations on the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, appended to the Decree, determined it as a consultative organ under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which may make recommendations. The sphere of activities of the Assembly (ANK) was determined as the sphere of inter-ethnic relations. The Assembly was perceived as an instrument of reciprocal action of the authorities and the ethnic communities of the country; therefore it included the representatives of actually all national cultural centers and other ethnic organizations as well as religious associations. The status of ANK was not mentioned in the Constitution, since it was considered as a public association, although with particular functions and objectives. As far as a probable role of ANK in legislative activities is concerned, for more than ten years it was limited with participation in the public-political expertise of drafts of law concerning the sphere of inter-ethnic relations.

It is significant that in “the Strategy of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan for the Mid-term period (to 2007)”, approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 26 April 2002, “politicization of confessions and ethnic-oriented organizations” was mentioned as a factor, which “might have a destabilization influence on the state of inter-ethnic relations”. However, the following stage of reforming the political system of Kazakhstan, connected with the amendments in the Constitution in May 2007, resulted in the change

of the role and the place of ANK in the political system of the state. N. Nazarbayev initiated these changes. In his speech at the joint sitting of the chambers of the parliament of Kazakhstan, held on 16 May 2007, the head of the state described seven main directions, which determined the substance of the constitutional reform: the re-distribution of the powers and liabilities of the authorities, the elevation of the parliament's role; the consolidation of the role of political parties; the development of local self-government; the perfection of the judicial system; ensuring the inter-national consent and reinforcing the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan; the further development of institutions of civil society; the consolidation of the system of protection of human rights and citizens' freedoms. The corresponding amendments were made in the constitution. In particular, the number of members of Majlis (the lower chamber of the parliament) was increased to 107 deputies: 98 deputies shall be elected according to the proportional system, while 9 deputies shall be elected by ANK. The number of members of the senate (the upper chamber) was increased from 39 to 47. This increase concerned the senators, designated by the president (from 7 to 15). The head of the state designates some of them after the corresponding consultations with ANK. The rest of the senators represent the regions of Kazakhstan (two senators from each region or each city of the republican significance).

It was expected that a relatively wide party representation in Majlis would be the first step to forming a balanced two- or three-party system, that the parties, reinforced by additional deputies, would become the support of the system of internal political restraints and counter-balances. The opposition, by chance, having received even a small number of mandates, might obtain a more solid basis and might become an instrument of expressing alternative viewpoints on the current events in the country. However, the elections, held in August 2007 under the new rules, ensured the monopoly of party "Nur Otan",

headed by president N. Nazarbayev. The other parties did not succeed to overcome the 7% barrier, and the “party of power” got all deputy places. The nomenclature-quota principle of the deputies lists reduced to null the projects on raising the role of party fractions in the representative bodies; the mechanism of consultations of the state head with the fractions concerning designation of the prime-minister resembles more a meeting with himself, since the fraction of the governing party was replenished with the president’s direct participation. Besides, under the adopted amendments, the former prohibition of political activities for the president was abrogated. The sole “alternative” fraction in the parliament, formally not representing the ruling party, is the group of ANK deputies. But this organization itself is formed and headed by the president. The election of ANK deputies took place on 20 August 2007. Nine deputies, representing biggest ethnic groups of the country, were elected on the non-alternative basis. They represented Kazakhs, Russians, Uigurs, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Germans, Balkars, Koreans, Byelorussians. The decision on fixing quota for ethnic groups in the lower chamber of the parliament was a key political innovation. Its aim was ensuring a more extensive participation of various ethnic groups, living in Kazakhstan, in public-political life of the country. However, even many big communities (for instance, Tatars, Bashkirs, Azerbaijanis, Turks, Chechens, Ingushis and others) will have to wait for their turn minimum up till next elections. With due account of the fact that over 120 ethnic groups live in Kazakhstan, many of them will hardly have a chance to receive a place in the legislative body. Although the idea of extension of participation of representatives of ethnic groups in the legislation creation process is not questioned, the mechanism of its implementation is not elaborated and is not fixed by legislation, which may lead to contradictions and conflicting situations.

The principle of quota places in the parliament of the unitary state on the national basis raises some doubts of mainly lawful reasons. And some analysts mentioned them before the constitutional amendments, made in May 2007. I. Kozybayev said that there were no guaranties that a member of the parliament, elected by the ethnic-national quota principle, would protect the interests of national minorities. B. Sultanov, the director of the Institute of Strategic Studies attached to the president of Kazakhstan, making a general positive appraisal of the constitutional amendments, mentioned “certain legal collisions”, engendered by determination of ethnic quotas. According to politologist K. Syroezhkin, “the dangerous precedent of quota presentation was created (today they are national minorities, tomorrow – social or religious groups, after-tomorrow – something else)”. A. Chebotarev, the head of analytical center “Alternative” had generalized the causes, which made him doubt the need to change the status of the Assembly: “...first, such privileges are not characteristic for the consultative-deliberative organs, like ANK; second, this co-optation contradicts the generally recognized norms of the election law, which supposes equal chances of candidates to the corresponding election posts; third, such system is characteristic mainly to developing countries of the third world, where the election standards essentially differ not in the better direction from the generally recognized norms in the civilized world”. Proceeding from this , A. Chebotarev thinks that Kazakhstan has made a step backwards.

The foreign experience shows that the quota principle, fixed in the legislation of some states, may hardly be regarded as a definitely positive principle. For instance, in Lebanon fixing of some highest state posts for the representatives of some or other ethnic-confessional groups did not guard this country from the endless civil war and rigid opposition. The ethnic quota more often, like in Bosnia and Herzegovina, represents the result of a compromise, which reflects the

need to stop the civil war and to conclude a peace agreement between the extremely exhausted parties. The discussion of application in Iraq of the analogous quota mechanism represents an attempt to save the country from disintegration into three parts: Shiite, Sunni and Kurds.

The political reforms in Kazakhstan are carried out in the period, when the inter-ethnic consent is put to the durability test. For the period of 2006-2007, the inter-national conflicts in the settlement near the oil field of Tengiz, in settlements Malovodnoe and Kazatkom of the Almatinskaya region forced analysts and the press to discuss the inter-national conflicts and the threat to stability. The conflict in Tengiz between the workers of Kazakh and Turkish nationality was connected with unequal conditions of work and remuneration of citizens of Kazakhstan and foreigners. Discrimination of local workers exists in many joint-ventures and foreign enterprises, and therefore the protest actions and strikes for the last years became quite usual events, particularly in the oil extracting regions, while in some cases they become the inter-ethnic conflicts. As far as the events in the Almatinskaya region are concerned, the disputes between the youth of the Kazakh and Chechen nationalities provoked the conflict. The dispute of every-day life turned out to become mass disturbances, which resulted in death of some people.

A number of social-economic and political reasons resulted in appearance of destabilization and local breeding grounds of tension. One may cite hard material living conditions of a great part of the population, particularly of the indigenous nationality, the unequal conditions of payment for work in the enterprises, owned by foreigners, the difficulties in adaptation and integration of oralmen (the Kazakhs-repatriated to their historic Mother-land from abroad, primarily from Uzbekistan, Russia, Mongolia, China and other countries) etc. But it would be a naïve supposition to negate the ethnic component in these

conflicts. Some other reason of these conflicts was called by analysts to be the cadre policy, which did not always took into account the poly-ethnic composition of the population in the country. The trend to raise the wide share of the indigenous ethnic group of the population in the organs of power exists in the state apparatus from the low to the upper levels. The same disbalance is being noted also in the armed forces and law enforcement bodies.

Some ethnic groups are consolidated in the historically shaped and kept for the years of independence branches, for instance, in heavy industry, construction, small and middle size business etc. But may this phenomenon replace the valuable access to the political, economic and ideological power resources? The apprehensions exited by ethnic-centric tendencies, particularly in case of cadre and language decisions, may provoke a new migration wave under the conditions, when Kazakhstan experiences acute need in scientific and governing cadres, in the highly qualified workers. The flows of Gastarbeiters, attracted by a relatively high level of wages would hardly compensate this deficit, since most newcomers are low qualified workers, engaged in hard labor and services.

The well-balanced cadre policy would make it possible to avoid a probable resentment, experienced by representatives of numerous ethnic groups, living in Kazakhstan. The authorities and law enforcement bodies do not adequately take into account the ethnic composition of the population in the region. It is urgent particularly in the places of compact settlement of various Diaspora. The introduction of the quota for ANK representatives among deputies intended to solve this problem to some extent. The election of members of the parliament, representing the Assembly, was an attempt to create a mechanism, allowing to inform the highest legislative organ about problems and needs of national minorities. Other steps should be taken at a more extended

level. The authorities in the center and local organs should take into account their daily activities and the ethnic language factor.

At present, de facto and de jure the Assembly is not only a public organization and an integral part of civil society but a component of the political system. This status is fixed in the Main law, which supposes the further legal-normative discussion of the ANK status, including elaboration of the transparent and needed by ethnic groups mechanisms of reciprocal action of various national cultural centers, the rules of election concerning governing organs of the Assembly. Probably, it is necessary to think about the chance of rotation relating to representatives of ANK in Majlis and senate in order to be elected to the legislative body as representatives of wider circle of ethnic groups, wishing to participate in national political activities.

“Politicheskaya konkuretsiya i partii v gosudarstvah postsovetskogo prostranstva”, M., 2009, p. 258–270.

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**THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE: THE LIFE AFTER DEATH.
THE LANGUAGE, POLICY AND A SOCIETY
IN MODERN UZBEKISTAN**

All the post-soviet states surely proclaim a language of titular ethnic group as the official one; four among them – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Byelorussia also stipulate for a status of the Russian language. It’s interesting that even those former republics having considerable language minorities at their territories (not necessarily – Russian-speaking) didn’t stipulate for their status in the constitution.

It's no doubt that mono-lingualism of the most former soviet republics reflected in many respect their yearning to isolate themselves from their former mother country – and, on the contrary, some concrete positions were reserved for the Russian language in those republics which were still under the Russian influence or could ignore the presence of the big Russian Diaspora at their territory. By the way just therefore the Russian language keeping in Central Asia is considered in view with the Russian minority position or especially during the last years – from the point of view of Russia's geopolitical interests aiming to keep its informational presence at the post-soviet area and improve its image.

In Uzbekistan – like the most other post-soviet republics – during the first years after the USSR dissolution the language became that “solidarity symbol”, symbolic capital which a political competition started around. So, the opposition party “Birlik” whose positions were still strong at the very beginning of 1990-s demanded to strengthen the Uzbek language role whereas there was no movement for the status preserving of the Russian language at that period. Though B. Anderson's model associating a state-nation forming with a literacy growth and “printing capitalism” development isn't quite applicable to Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan has been practically though that during the soviet period when almost hundred per cent literacy of the population was guaranteed, newspapers issue was organized and etc.) the language continues to be the important instrument of power legitimating.

At the same time not only a political factor associated with power strengthening and consolidation acts to the Russian language but also administrative associated with the costs minimization. From the point of view of administrative pragmatics a language policy is optimal which doesn't demand considerable additional investments what as for Uzbekistan would mean de-facto of the Uzbek-Russian bilingualism

preserving – only with the concrete redistribution of the investments to support the Uzbek one. Such approach – not so much pragmatic as inertial (because the administrative system of Uzbekistan is characterized with a high degree of inertia) – prevailed by the end of 1990-s when a tactical confrontation with a nationalist wing of opposition stopped being actual but not a language but “ideology of the national independence” introduction was a main symbolic capital from the end of 1990-s. From this out a sphere of the Russian language using was gradually decreased and stopped being a result of policy systematically implemented but began reflecting objective trends associated, first of all, with the lasting migration of the Russia-speaking population from Uzbekistan.

Today, according to the expert data 5 millions of Uzbekistan’s citizens speak actively the Russian language, 10 millions – passively what amounts to 70% of the population at large in aggregate. A number of people want to study the Russian language all over the republic is also great enough – more than 90%. The Russian language skills have the concrete advantages – not only information-cultural but also associated with job placement and aggrandizement especially in the administrative sphere where there is still the Uzbek-Russian bilingualism. The great part of the office work in the ministers and departments is being made in the Russian language. Though the Uzbek language prevails in the most local authorities, parliament, some state bodies (internal affairs bodies, courts and education system and health service), however, the Russian language holds its own in the higher echelons of power and also in some ministers and agencies to a great extent. Bills and draft resolutions, contracts and etc. are prepared preferably in the Russian language.

The majority of the present higher elite began its carrier during the soviet time when as it has been already told a proficiency in the

Russian language in the administrative sphere was more important than the analogue proficiency in the Uzbek language. In this sense some rigidity of the Uzbek elite, its very slow replacement with young personnel objectively promotes to preserve a status of the Russian language. It also causes a considerable part of people who come from the big towns in elites – especially from Tashkent and Samarkand – where the Russian language positions were always strong. Besides, many managers have difficulties in a new unused terminology in contrast to the usual Russian one because of the Russian term substitution for the Uzbek ones borrowed from the Old Uzbek language or the Arabian and Persian).

As for hiring of the Russian-speaking minorities not knowing the Uzbek one to a considerable extent then one can observe the most different variants here in dependence of a kind of work an applicant pretends to. Though the Russian-speaking respondents note that a demand for the Russian language skills made looking for a job difficult the statements that “in the second half of 1990-s only persons having the Uzbek skills were hired for a government service and a demand for the Russian language was decreased in this sphere” doesn’t correspond to the fact. No rigid requirements for a language are made as a rule because of low salaries and a high turnover of staff. Vindictive damages aren’t imposed for a lack of the state language skills but rare cases of discrimination are usually characterized as “a language factor” using as a resource of administrative pressure on subordinate.

It’s significant that the majority of the Russian-speaking population don’t make attempts to acquire the Uzbek language. It’s by that token, on one hand, cases of discrimination on a linguistic factor are rare but on the other hand, the state fluency doesn’t give considerable chances for aggrandizement because such aggrandizement will be stopped all the same at the concrete moment owing a worker non-

involvement – a representative of non-titular ethnic group – in the system of informal ties of relationship and association of the local elite.

At last, one can feel sentiments to migrate among the majority of the Russian-speaking population (especially of the youth). Generally, migration where the representatives of Uzbekistan's autochthonic ethnos were also actively involved in from the beginning of 2000-s promoted to the Russian language status increasing though there are no data at the present how much a labor migration in Russia promotes to the Russian language skills improving among the Uzbek population. (It's known, for example, that many labor migrants lead an isolated life and communicate with the external world only with the help of the person in charge – recruiter, manager of the works and foreman).

Information-cultural sphere is also bilingual. As a whole a number of printed matters are decreased in spite of a number of editions increasing in the Uzbek language (it's a general trend for the CIS countries) and they are much expensive relatively middle-income population. The main information resources are television, radio and Internet. Television and Internet are the most powerful resource to preserve the Russian language. A commercial advertisement became a quite unexpected agent of bilingualism in media area – the majority businessmen prefer advertising in the Russian language as it also gives a possibility to cover a larger target audience besides the existing element of prestigiousness. The Russian book output delivery was increased from the beginning of 2000-s though its most part is light reading and academic books.

As for the Russian language place in culture then one can, at least, with respect to the past twenty years – agree with the opinion of Yu. Podporenko: "The local subculture on the base of the Russian language not only doesn't disappear but becomes stable". The Russian poets having become known as early as during the soviet period

continue working. The Russian theatres also continue working: among 37 – 10 are Russian (shows are in the Russian and Uzbek languages).

The Russian language positions in education are also preserved. The Russian teaching is in 8% schools of the republic (38% - in Tashkent), the quantity of the pupils learning in the Russian classes is even increased during the last years. As for the institutions then the Russian teaching in Tashkent is 25%. As during the soviet period the number of the Russian-speaking students is more in the institutions associated with a teaching of exact sciences and technological disciplines whereas their quantity is much less in the humanitarian colleges (with exception of prestigious Institute of the eastern languages and University of the world economy and diplomacy). A share of who is studying in the Russian language in oblast universities is in 4 times lower in comparison with the capital (6%).

So, the Russian language having lost the former status and a great number of the carriers as a whole is more stable than it was predicted in the beginning of 1990-s. Though the Russian language was formally equalized with the languages of the other non-titular peoples today it is the second language after the Uzbek one in Uzbekistan. To our mind one of the main reasons of this stability is generation: in 1990-s and 200-s those generations entered the period of a social activity whose childhood fell on 1970-1980-s when the Russian language teaching was one of the priorities of the soviet system of education falling into decay but still powerful. How much will the Russian language manage to preserve its positions in the next twenty years?

A change of generations can be, really, one of the serious tests for the Russian language. The majority of those who was born at the end of 1980-s have got education back at that time when the Russian language didn't play the prior role. Besides, the Uzbek written language latinization and adoption of Roman alphabet brought to that the main

part of the students can't read a text written in Cyrillic alphabet or do it with great difficulty. Especially these phenomena will greatly influence on the administrative sphere where one observes inevitable – though slow – retirement of the elites having the soviet “the Russian-speaking” past from the political stage and accession of the new ones increased after the USSR dissolution; the Russian language won't be “working” for the majority of them even being at the level of a passive proficiency in a language.

Moreover, the Russian language is subject to irreversible qualitative changes: the linguists mark its aging.

One can understand the linguists' anxiety – really, earlier the Russian language in Uzbekistan was considered to be skillful and literary; now lexical structure of the language is depleted and a concept of a literary norm becomes vague. Though one can hear the analogical complaints in Russia, nevertheless, besides the same reasons (decreasing of education importance, offensive, “low” language expansion) there are well-known enough the processes of “the language death” in Diaspora when the new generations of its carriers either become proficient in the language of titular ethnos (in case if this proficiency guarantees some “bonuses”) or migrate.

Not only the Uzbek language but also the English will rival the Russian language. One can notice it not only in Uzbekistan but it also reflects the changes in the Russian language status at the international “market of languages” – from the beginning of 1990-s a number of those learning this language at the territory of the former USSR and abroad was sharply decreased. And though Olivier Rou's prognosis that in the Middle Asia “the Russian language won't be preferable foreign one for the elites in the near ten-twenty years and it will be changed with the English” seems to be rather untimely, however, it's possible

that as the Russian language will actually being a foreign language it will be difficult to compete with the English.

But one can suppose that it won't happen soon. The Russian language is still in demand in Uzbekistan where traditional bilingualism having the deep historical roots plays not the last role: the Uzbek language besides dialects, some "status" language – the Persian language, sometimes the Arabian which a clerical work was conducted on, decrees were written and prose and verses were written. With some certainty one can say that the Russian language continues keeping this "status" niche. Some mixed Russian-Ukrainian dialect development isn't also ruled out – as early as in the middle of 1980-s the researches noted the influence of "the Uzbek language on the Russian". At last, the Russian language still preserves its positions as a language of intra-regional (central-Asian communication) and here one can agree with A. Djumaev": One of the pillars of the regional cultural unity is the Russian language which we won't be able to understand each other in future without in the lateral sense of the word ("ignorant generation" enter already upon active life)". Nevertheless, it's difficult enough to predict how much longer "life after death" of the Russian language in Uzbekistan will last and what it will look like in 20-30 years – foreign or "dead" or will be preserved as mixed Russian-Ukrainian language.

"Neprikosnovenny zapas", M., 2009, N 4, p. 233–243.

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