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**THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON
POLITICAL PROCESSES IN
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA**

The history of corruption is the most unpleasant and scandalous page in political history of any state. Its flourishing demonstrates the decay of the state governance system and the moral degradation of the people, who, on the contrary, are called upon to show smart appearance of this state. But history gives evidence that society did not always perceived corruption only in the negative way. The origin of corruption was marked in the X century, when as imitation of Byzantine the “feeding” institution was created: the head of the state (duke) sent his representatives (voevodas, governors) to the provinces without payment. It was supposed that the population would “feed” its governor. The latter possessed great powers, and, evidently, the population did not stint its gifts. The “feed” received by these governors was divided between them and the state after their return to the capital. The mutual responsibility of provincial and central grafters originated in this way.

In middle-aged Russia “feeding” of voevodas and taking bribes for settling conflicts was considered as usual income of the people, servants of the duke, who also provided them with payment and land. The rise of the state’s central power resulted in limitation of citizens independence, provoking high and local officials to violate secretly the law in the interests of the people, wishing to get rid of the rigid control.

“Feeding” was officially abandoned in 1556, but the tradition to live and to get wealthier at the expense of citizens actually remained for a long time, probably up to the present time. The moral and official censure of bribe-taking was quite often pronounced: by metropolitan Kirill in the XIII century, later by Ivan IV Terrible, when the first execution for bribe-taking took place. The statute-book of Ivan Terrible officially proclaimed the struggle against bribe-taking. In time of Boris Godunov the officials, accused of bribe-taking, were publicly whipped and carried in town with the evidence of the bribe. But even these cruel punishments were unable to eradicate the criminal habits of officials. Corruption in Moscovia was accompanied not only by plundering of state treasure but also by accusation of other bribe-takers by other similar criminals in order to cover their own deeds. Corruption intensified the moral degradation of the state power and the flow of lies among competing elites and separate persons. “The criminal thoughts” were subject to proceedings, and officials had to apply falsifications to prove their “truth” and “honest name”. It should be said that since that time psychology of this sort of people was not changed a lot.

The irregular behavior of the officials will hardly promote consolidation and flourishing of the political might and authority of the state. Corruption and political corruption in particular is simultaneously the cause and the consequence of the weakness of the state as the bearer of the state power and the guarantee of social well-being of society. It is common knowledge that corruption in the state structures hinders not only successful development of state governance but also results in vast additional expenses of business and the population, which is an obstacle in the way of economic development of the country as a whole. The measures directed to the struggle against corruption are of high priority for Russia at the present stage. The level of corruption in Russia is highly inadmissible, according to the international ratings.

The national studies note the sustainable reproduction of corruption in Russian official structures (both in czarist and Soviet times) for the whole period of its history. This peculiarity of corruption was marked already in the beginning of the XX century by representatives of national sociological research of official structures. Having studied such form of corruption as bribe-taking, national researchers made the following conclusions concerning the type of this phenomenon in Russia: 1) the subornation of officials is a long-term tradition of the Russian state functioning; 2) the forms of bribery changed but its essence as a form of the abuse of power, as an official crime were kept intact; 3) the reproduction of this phenomenon was reflected in language (colloquial and literal), since there appeared its direct names and numerous aphorisms, like “to render homage to”, “treat with respect”, “recompense”, “feed” etc.

Researchers note that by the 1970s the Soviet nomenclature up to the leaders of the state and the Communist Party was totally corrupted. It is sufficient to recall “cotton”, “fruit”, “fish”, i.e. “Uzbek”, “Moldavian”, “Moscow” and other cases and investigations, which reflected only the visible, superficial part of this phenomenon.

The analysis of the obtained data, possessed by social sciences, reveals a kind of “plot”, which exists in the official hierarchy. The essence of this conspiracy is as follows: the officials know, who takes bribes and how much, but they keep silence, showing their corporate solidarity. They know as well that corruption is a bad phenomenon from the moral point of view, but know also that it is profitable to attain personal and more often egoistic aims. E.M. Primakov, former prime-minister of Russia (1998) admitted many years afterwards: “ As a prime-minister I asked all ministers, connected with currency and trade, to give me the written information about loss of money due to gaps in law. I was amazed not only of the amount of the loss but also of the fact

that everybody knows it. The dilemma was raised: if I make it public, I would have to use repression. It was impossible to do it, particularly with due account of the urgent task to stabilize the situation, aggravated by default. Then I decided to make a public threatening declaration to corrupted officials (which did not frighten them at all)". It means that the representatives of the high echelons of power kept the situation under control and even more actually created it, having directly participated in it. They are engaged not only in the governing of state affairs but also in corruption processes. Evidently, the second part of their activities is not public but is in the shadow of their official practice.

Corruption is one of the most significant and almost the central component of the phenomenon called shadow politics and shadow economy. Since economy and politics always exchange their resources, the reciprocal relations may have a great impact both on political and economic spheres of their activities. The shadow economy is perceived as certain "complex of ideological, technological and instrumental devices and actions oriented to formation of parallel (projected according to the fixed tasks) or alternative (opposition-revolutionary) institutional relations. The mere fact of being in "shadow" foresees various corruptive actions (bribes, "payments", monopolization, jobs for relatives etc.).

The shadow policy represents a coalition of various non-formal organizations for use of state resources. The fact of existence of such "zone" radically accelerates the process of loss by state institutions of legal and moral limitations. As a result, the official world of political and economic relations coexists with not less equally legal parallel "informal world" (marked by the qualities, such as self-organization, development of more complex public-political forms within the limits of given time). The unofficial sphere of national economy in Russia

plays a special role; the shadow economy, the business activities are executed outside state control and are not reflected in the official statistical data. Experts distinguish three segments in this field: white, grey and black. There are different direct and indirect methods of appraisal of the shadow economy's size. As a whole, in the world within the framework of this sector the annual added value accounts for the sum of not less than \$ 8 trillion, which is not fixed in the official data. According to the existing data, in Russia the shadow economy achieves 40% of the GNP. About \$ 37 billion are spent in Russia to pay bribes.

Professor A.A. Vartumyan comes to the conclusion that any augmentation of incomes in the shadow economy results in rise of the money's amount spent for paying bribes, which leads to further extension of the corruption scales. The greatest number of actions within the framework of shadow economy is executed primarily in the system of relations "state-business", i.e. "politics-economy". The objective contradictions between state structures and business are as follows: the interest of the state structures consists in enlargement of financial resources at the expense of tax payers, while the vector of business' interest is directed to the opposite side. Society suffers the main damage from illegal actions. Thus, the shadow relations between the state and business are directed directly against society.

The researchers note that the cause of Russian corruption's vitality consists in the scales of shadow economy, in excessive officials' abilities to give permissions, actually in total impunity. In Europe the fear to lose a great pension and the rigid system of declaration of incomes and property of officials and their family members becomes an obstacle to corruption. In Russia the sums of unofficial payments and bribes are so big that the fear to lose pension dissolves in temptation to get good existence for himself and for

children at the expense of two-three corruption deals. Nobody asks in Russia in what way officials and militiamen or judges have obtained and possess villas, which cost millions. Taking responsible decisions, the power elite sometimes is directed not by the state but by selfish ends.

At the present stage corruption in Russia has obtained a vast scale. However, it would be incorrect to consider the existing situation as an exceptional phenomenon. On the one side, at the initial stage of professional bureaucracy's formation corruption was a typical institution of Russian society. On the other side, the index of corruption's perception in contemporary Russia against the background of other countries of the world, including former Soviet republics, is rather small. The rise of corruption and its transformation into a social phenomenon of Russian politics is mostly destructive, since it is able to liquidate many positive achievements of the previous period of social-economic development of the country. In 2005 the market of Russian business corruption surpassed three times the income of the federal budget. The average size of the bribe, paid by businessmen to officials made \$130 thousand, while in 2001 it accounted only for \$10 thousand (the data does not takes into account corruption in highest echelons of power). In sum, the cost of goods and services in Russia due to corruption became 50% higher than abroad. Business pays corruption money as follows: to local authorities – 75%, to regional authorities 20%, to the federal power 5%.

The corruption consists in the following forms: bribery – 65%, relation connections – 52%, graft of state officials – 35%, machinations with state property – 33%, extortion on the part of officials – 30%, providing services with use of official post – 28%, illegal actions, taken in selfish interests – 14%, providing unlawful privileges 10% etc. According to the data, calculated in 2005, Russian officials received

only in the form of bribes \$ 33.5 billion. Officials get 10% of the sum of contract. The following spheres are characterized by corruption most of all: control, tax authorities, customs and license officials. Those, who decided to enter state service to become rich, try to occupy any post just in these state structures.

Concern is being raised not so much by the high level of corruption as by the trend to its growth. Particularly dangerous is the fact that corruption has penetrated, as many experts and ordinary citizens think, the law enforcement bodies, summoned to struggle against corruption. For the last time, the well known corruption scandals have a peculiar feature: the persons, charged with protection of legality, are mixed in it. The high level of corruption in this structure is a big obstacle to intensification of anti-corruption struggle. At the same time, it is stressed that not only “evil intent” of officials-politicians (corrupted people) but also failures of the legislative system itself promote corruption. Laws are “written” not with consideration of objective conditions but for specific “projects” of individual politicians or business groups, which creates conditions for corruption on the part of given persons.

The rise of corruption leads to economic inefficiency and unjustified expenses, while the profits, received by means of corruption, are used in the consumption sector. The unjust distribution of goods raises the prices for goods and services, resulting in their lower quality and reducing the competition capability and efficiency of economy in Russia.

The political corruption has a special impact on behavior of people at the elections. The review of corruption, made by V.L. Rimsky, in the course of elections reduces it to client trend in electors’ behavior. Although the notion of “corrupted electoral behavior” in political science is rarely used, there exists the well known

notion “electoral corruption”, while its substance becomes wider than the former notion. For instance, legal science determines the following forms of electoral corruption: 1) illegal financing of election campaigns; 2) use of “administrative resource”; 3) subornation (venality) of election commissions’ members with the right of casting vote; 4) illegal organization of information on elections, of referendums by mass media for vested interests; 5) subornation (venality) of the persons summoned to ensure openness and free speech of the election process; 6) subornation (venality) of the persons called upon to represent the interests of the candidates, election associations (the persons empowered to act for the candidates, the empowered representatives for financial matters); 7) subornation (venality) of the candidates, not connected with financing of the election campaign; 8) subornation (venality) of electors.

The main forms and technique of subornation of electors were tested in Russia already for the 1990s and were successfully used in the beginning of the 2010s. The evolution of the election system in Russia on the eve of the XXI century represents the passage from the group (elite) to the undivided authority (principal VIP) principle. For the 1990s, the elites themselves decided who should be elected to a given legislative body, while in the 2005 this right was taken away from them, and the President of the RF remained the only principal elector. However, some political observers regard this fact as a display of Russian democratic system: for the first time former shadow procedures of the Kremlin received the official status.

The corruption of the state apparatus in many societies is caused by motives of most private businessmen to violate law, while nobody intends to inform the authorities about it. All motives, characteristic for the private sector, are in favor of those, who violate rules and prescriptions. When the number of such decisions and limitations

becomes excessive, sooner or later the private sector (since all or almost all its representatives have motives to violate anti-market rules or to bribe officials) makes the government to be corrupted and inefficient. The peculiarity of contemporary corruption is its extension in consecutive order by including in the zone of its influence the spheres, formerly protected from corruption, particularly in law enforcement bodies and in higher echelons of power, which makes it especially dangerous. At present, there is no state organ, which does not provide corrupted services for business. The executive power actually alone distributes Russian markets of corrupted services. Its share accounts for 98.97% of the whole amount of corrupted services (to compare with the judicial power – 0.86% and the legislative power – 0.17%). The biggest corruption income is provided by the power function of the executive authorities, particularly by financial control and monitoring – 34.6%, licenses – 34.2%, tax collection and control – 22.0%.

Lobbying, particularly its illegal practices, makes a certain input in corruption's development. Legal lobbying provides a wide specter of services from expertise and promotion of drafts to maintenance of informal connections with officials and influence via mass media. Exactly on the basis of this practice the so-called “iron triangles” are being shaped – the sustainable connections among deputies, officials of branch ministers and corporations.

Many political observers note that the irresponsible and immoral power is always highly corrupted. One may make the conclusion that the level of corruption depends directly (proportionally) on its immorality. The higher is the level of immorality of the power, if not the law enforcement bodies, historians will discover embezzlement in its practice.

The privatization for the beginning of the 1990s may be qualified as corruption, since it created the social construction, the two poles in society: the poor majority (“new social low strata”) and the super-rich minority (oligarchs). The middle class as the basis of civil society does not exist in this format and under such conditions. The power itself (due to its inexperience or by hidden malicious intent!?) created favorable political-legal conditions for the unjust privatization. Exactly injustice is the indication, which determines the level of the power’s corruption. At the same time, the political and social injustice has economic roots.

K. Kabanov, the head of the National Anti-corruption Committee mentions that the system of corrupted payments makes 40-60% in the structure of corruption. Corruption takes place also in the system of state purchases, determination of quotas, for instance, in the sphere of natural resources usage and in other spheres. Under conditions of economic crisis, the corruption will grow, since the size of budgetary means, allocated for anti-crisis programs, was raised, while the control over their spending has not been shaped. The system of providing exclusive rights (benefits, including export and import, taxes, licenses etc.) creates advantageous situation for corruption. In the course of preparation of the concept of administrative reform various ministers and executive organs were asked what powers they lacked. In most answers the demand of licensing was mentioned.

The cheap labor force (mainly illegal), engaged in construction of elite buildings, is a profitable business for construction companies and banks, which are in charge of mortgage. In Russia the prices for apartments are excessively high, while services of migrant workers are very low. As a result, a small group of particularly enterprising people gets super-profits. And just they will do anything to keep this situation intact. Otherwise, they will have to raise the wages and to create human conditions of living for these workers, i.e. to raise expenses. But most

migrant workers have only one advantage – their readiness to live anywhere. Therefore it is more profitable to hire migrants than the local residents, who claim for normal working conditions. The existence of cheap labor force, used by the state, precludes in principle emergence of civil society in the country. At present, there exists the covered exploitation of work performed by the people, deprived of economic and political self-dependence. In 2004 all economists at the top of one voice spoke about this lack of balance. The rise of prices, according to doctor of economic sciences E.Panina, is the result of conspiracy of monopolists, who rigidly watched emergence in the financial market of new financial means (particularly cash compensation of benefits) to use them successfully. Monopolists raise prices to depreciate completely all compensations. The state wastes all these financial means, since the citizens do not succeed to use them in good time. Therefore the power of monopolists should be reduced. When prices are kept under control of the state, it is necessary to increase the incomes of the whole population. “The social standard of living” exists all over the world. It is a shame that Russia is the only country, where the minimal size of payment for work is considered as the standard of well-being.

Corruption, arranged by officials, delivers colossal damage to national interests and national security of Russia. It is actually “the fifth column”, the internal enemy, which penetrated the power structures. Corruption is a threat to development of state governance. Corruption inflicts a blow to national security of the country. In 2006, deputy general prosecutor of the RF A. Buksman compared the amount of corruption market with income of the federal budget and estimated it for more than \$ 240 billion. According to INDEM foundation, the size of annual corruption was raised from \$ 33 billion in 2001 to \$ 316 billion in 2005. According to some experts, from 30% to 50% of the organized criminal society’s incomes are used for bribery of officials

and for putting its representatives in official executives and legislative organs. The criminal elements, having penetrated in power structures, create advantageous situation for corruption. The researchers note that the authorities imitate some features of criminal culture, while criminal elements absorb separate elements of political culture. As a result, it may be difficult to distinguish “a thief in law” from a politician.

Russian mass media already in the beginning of the 2000s marked that “thieves in law” penetrated higher echelons of power. These facts may at least create a shock:

in the State Duma there are three (!) “thieves in law” and seven “thieves in authority” (i.e. those, who may be crowned in the nearest future). Certainly, they may be “the formers”, i.e. the former criminals, who abandoned criminal activities, but the fact remains: three “thieves in law” in the State Duma is too much;

in March 2001 there were 18 “thieves in law”, who occupied high posts in some ministries;

two criminal authorities with tattoos of “thieves in law” occupied posts in the presidential administration;

four well-known “thieves in law” planned to participate in elections to the Moscow State Duma on 16 December 2001, and they possessed the needed financial means to become Moscow deputies.

Judging by the financial means spent by the officials on themselves and their political projects, there is no financial crisis in Russia. All their failures the authorities try to cover by public declarations about the successes achieved by these authorities. The situation resembles the actions, taken by city authorities to the benefit of higher officials: the places with unpleasant waste plots of land, rubbish heaps and the old unfinished construction sites, started to cover them with gigantic fences with green bushes and windows.

The appeals for sparing the budgetary means proclaimed from high rostrums were not heard at lower stages of power. The mass media actually every day inform about expenses of the authorities at various levels to buy expensive goods. The authorities always find the needed means for summits and jubilees and say that they are not the end in itself and that significance is as follows: afterwards there will remain houses, bridges, roads and other items of infrastructure. But actually it happens not always so. The authorities are sometimes incapable to fulfill the programs of social support to the population but at the same time find the means to buy expensive goods. In this connection, mass media mention that even in time of crisis the population has to save on items of first needs, while the officials make declarations about inconceivable incomes... And it is worth recalling advice of D. Mendeleev to employees to be modest. But at present the officials accustomed to cover-up and to impunity understand even the hints, dropped by the Kremlin, of only being imprisoned. The anti-corruption grafts turn out to be empty words, since for some secret reason the provisions on confiscation of criminally earned property disappear in the final version of legislative drafts. Corrupted officials are not frightened at all by such legal proposals without provision on confiscation... One should not be surprised that despite “the relentless struggle” against corruption, the level of corruption, according to general prosecutor Yu. Chaika, rises annually by 5%.

At present, the authorities admit that Russia needs a real exit out of corruption crisis and not the politicized hysteria. For the sake of struggle against corruption the experts propose to minimize contacts of officials with businessmen asking for state services, to create and to use widely the so-called “electronic government”. Up to the present time, Russia is behind significantly the western analogues, and, if

modernization proclaimed by the president does not succeed, corruption will suffocate not only democracy but also developing civil society.

“The Caspian region: politics, economy, culture”, Astrakhan, 2009, N 4, p. 103–110.

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THE ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIA OF FOREIGN NON-GOVERNMENTAL RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

At present, a number of non-governmental religious-political organizations (NRPO) pursuing various aims and tasks carry out their activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. This specter of NRPO varies from the so-called “wahhaby” jamaats to religious-political parties like “Hizb ut Tahrir al-Islami” and extremist sects like “Nurdjular” and “Sulemandji”.

The Turkish religious-political sect “Nurdjular” intensified its activities. Its activities are oriented to the literary creative works of Turkish author Badiuzzaman Said Nursi (1876–1960) for the time of reforms of Kemal-pasha Ataturk. This period was characterized by the defeat of Turkey, ally of Germany, during the First World War resulting in the uncontrolled disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Under these conditions Ataturk proclaimed the course for modernization of Turkey, and de-islamization of traditional Turkish

society became the basis of his reforms. The secular characteristic of modernization reforms supposed the evident separation of religion from the state, which resulted in cruel persecution of Islam. The majority of the Turkish population professed and professes Sunni Islam of Hanafit type in the form of some Sufi orders-tarikats. As a result of reforms, carried out by Kemal-pasha, the Sufi brotherhoods were liquidated, and many its adepts had to leave Turkey, the number of Islamic educational institutions, mosques was greatly reduced, the norms of shariat were excluded from the legal process.

Against the background of decline and degradation of traditional Turkish Islam B. Said Nursi wrote some religious works called upon to restore respect of Turkish society to traditional Islam. Some researchers of literary creative work of Nursi regard him as a fundamentalist, which, probably, does not correspond to reality, since Nursi in his works positively commented activities of many Sufi tarikats, which have many adepts in Turkey. On the contrary, fundamentalists consider Sufism as a “sinful innovation”, being far from “pure” Islam. In other words, Nursi supported in his works the values not of fundamental but of traditional Turkish Islam. The works of B. Said Nursi do not contain any information, able to cause hatred or animosity, intention to humiliate a person or a group of persons for reasons of religion, national or other reasons, several experts stress. It seems that it is possible to agree with the authors of this expertise, who say that publication of works, written by B. Said Nursi, “in contemporary Russia is desirable to avoid probable inadequate perception, given classical commentary, possibly, in the form of preface, which could put the readers into the real picture of the definite historic period”.

At present, the leader of the sect Fetullah Gyulen Hadji-Efendi enjoys rather great political influence in Turkey, while he maintains contacts with the high officials, leaders of the state. He keeps under

control some Turkish mass media and pursues by means of them the propaganda policy for the benefit of ideas of Islamic fundamentalism and Turkish Pan-Turkism. The activities of the sect are arranged in a secret way, and new foreign members are admitted to the sect after thorough check of their loyalty. Each new member is instructed to keep secret his membership in “Nurdjular”. The sect has its own secret service, which is in charge of exposing agents of national secret services and law enforcement bodies. The organization possesses its newspapers, TV, holdings; its main spheres of activities are press and education. The financial means are received at the expense of grants and thanks to functioning of firms, banks and holdings, belonged to the sect. Besides, the leader of the sect F. Gyulen is able to finance it legally through Turkish industrial-financial corporations (holdings Ihias, Asya finans kurumu, Isik sigorta) and by means of foundation Ihias, which all possess their representatives in Europe and Turkey.

The events in Chechnya and Dagestan, particularly the terrorist acts, committed by Islamic extremists on 11 September 2001 in the USA, made the Turkish authorities take actions, directed to limitation of activities of “Nurdjular” within the country. The question is that the brotherhood, professing not only Pan-Turkic but also Islamist ideology, is closely connected with terrorist organization “Bozkurt” (“Grey Wolves”), shares its program directives and renders financial assistance to it. At the same time, the secret services of Turkey takes steps to extend the sphere of the sect’s activities abroad, regarding them as one of the means of consolidation of positions of Turkey in the countries of the Trans-Caucasus, in the Russian North-Caucasian region, in some Central Asian states-members of the CIS. At the same time, the special attention is paid to propaganda of Islamic ideas by means of creation of education institutions. More than 200 education centers, founded by the emissaries of the sect, propagate Islamic extremism and Pan-Turkism.

Simultaneously “Nurdjalar” carries out activities for implementation of the program aimed at training cadres of Russian Muslim clergy in theological education institutions of Turkey, where their personal and working qualities are studied, where they are get acquainted with ideas of Islamic extremism, national-separatism, where they are trained to be engaged in underground subversive actions after their return to the RF.

The preference is given to training of perspective young people with due account of their cadre capacity, a probable occupation of key posts in economy, science, government structures in Russia. Members of “Nurdjalar” propose the students to get big material and financial assistance in exchange for membership in the sect and participation in its activities.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the missionaries of “Nurdjalar” implement the program aimed at creation of education institutions (including the general education) on the territory of the Russian Federation. For the period from 1993 to 1999, the sect commissioned Lyceums in Astrakhan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Dagestan, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia and the Republic of Tuva. Mass media made public the information about activities of missionaries of “Nurdjalar” in Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria, in Volgogradskaya and Rostovskaya regions, in Krasnodarski krai and in Stavroposki krai.

The other organization, which carries out its activities in Muslim umma of Russia in order to recruit new members, including proselytes, is international terrorist organization “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami” (the Islamic Party of Liberation –“HT”), the Sunni religious-political organization, founded in 1952 in the city of Kuddus by judge of shariat court of appeal Takiuddin an-Nabhani (1909-1977/79). After his death the leader of the party became Abdul Kadim Zallum (born in 1925) from Palestine, who kept his post till 2003; the present leader is Ata Abu Rasht.

After the year of 1967 “HT” actually did not exist, having considered that it was impossible to arrange Islamic revolution under conditions of occupation by Israel. Ten years after the death of the leader of “HT” and twenty years after cessation of the party’s activities, during the first intifada in Palestine the leaflets of “HT”, printed in Palestine, were disseminated on the occupied territories.

In the middle of the 1990s, the organization with the same name appeared in the Central Asia in the form of mighty international association of Islamists. The organization structure of “HT” is not adapted to the Central Asian region, it was founded without due account of local traditions, imitating organization “Muslim Brothers” of the 1950s in Egypt. At the same time, some principal provisions (work in trade unions, sport organizations) were excluded from program documents of Egyptian Islamists.

Unlike other Central Asian Islamic extremist organizations (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – IMU, Tajik Islamic Opposition), which appeared in the form, determined by a complex of local ethnic-political and social-economic reasons, emergence of “HT” only partially corresponded to political demands and economic intentions of some strata of the population in the Central Asia. The experts think that there were no natural pre-conditions for emergence of “HT” in this region. For that period, the radical Islamic “niche” was occupied already in the Central Asian states, but “HT” without particular difficulties succeeded “to make agreement” with other Islamists on division of spheres of influence in the region.

Besides, in contrast to IDU, which was based on mainly marginal and poorest strata of rural population, particularly having suffered from reforms, carried out according recommendations of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (WB and IMF), “HT” oriented its propaganda, inter alia, to educated city citizens, dissatisfied with

the way and tempos of social-economic transformation. While IDU used mainly methods of local armed struggle in the traditions of the Central Asia (the bandits-insurgents movement of the 20s–30s years of the XX century), “HP” applies primarily “intellectual” and “high-tech” forms of organizational and propagandist work directed first of all to creation of efficiently governed trans-border network of its structures (“cells”) in different regions.

The experts note that “HT” is characterized by the fixed directive to win the political power by spreading its influence all over the world. Unlike simple Islamic extremist organizations, “HT” consequently creates its structures even in traditionally non-Muslim regions recruiting representatives of non-Muslim ethnic groups. The forms and methods of recruitment of new members by activists of “HT” resemble the methods of modern western totalitarian sectors like Jehovah Witnesses and Scientologists. In the course of recruitment members of “HT” stress not only the struggle for dominance of Islam in the whole world but also membership in the influential international structure, able to ensure the future of “HT” member. Unlike agitation and propaganda forms adopted by all Islamic extremist organizations (conclusions of religious authorities, sermons in mosques, audio and video materials, books, written by S. Kutba, Al-Maududi, Ben Baza, who are founders of Islamic extremism, as well as works of contemporary authoritative religious radicals), “HT” at the first stage of its activities in the Central Asia started to disseminate the series of books, written in the middle of the 1950s for residents of Palestine by not authoritative and unknown sheikh Takiuddin an-Nabhani. In contrast to usual extremist groups, each established and headed by the recognized spiritual and organizational leader, who is also an authoritative criminal, “HT” lacks the authoritative leader and probably is governed by a group of people.

The high level of management in “HT” was achieved by means of Internet, used by the party since its creation. The analysis of information-propaganda materials, disseminated by “HT” in the countries of Central Asia, shows that they do not correspond to mentality of local residents, to their national-psychological features and the system of value orientations. European or American specialists could, probably, participate in preparation of these materials. It was noted that propaganda activities of “HT” are carried out according to the principles and rules of contemporary political technologies.

Unlike the sources of financing local groups of Islamists in the Central Asia, based primarily on narcotics business, racket, trade of people, arms smuggling, theft of cattle, illegal privatization, the “HT” possessed unlimited financial resources from up to present unknown sources. The location of “HT” head-quarters has not been determined – probably Palestine, Jordan, Great Britain, which give financial support to it. Membership of “HT” is secret. The number of members is unknown, and, according to some data, there are 20 thousand members of “HT” in the Central Asian region. The “HT” regional centers are located in Great Britain (London), Germany (Frankfurt am Main), Turkey (Istanbul), India (Laknau), Saudi Arabia (Jidda), Palestine (New Jerusalem). The most active cells of the party carry out their activities on the territory of Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, Pakistan, Sudan, Tunisia, PRC, the Central Asian region of the CIS. The party publishes in Jordan its magazine “Al-Vai” (“Conscience”). The wide scale extension of “HT” activities was proved by its congress, held in London on 24 August 1996; about one thousand delegates from different countries of the world attended the congress. “HT” is forbidden in some states of Europe, the Near East and CIS.

“HT” is regarded as a terrorist organization and is forbidden in Russia by the decision of the Supreme Court of the RF on 14 February 2003. The organization is not officially registered and is represented by emissaries and numerous secret cells and adepts.

In order to achieve the fixed aims, the leaders of “HT” realize step by step the adopted plan, which foresees the gradual creation of the organization’s cells in various strata of the population of a previously determined country, the further consolidation and passage to public upholding of their interests and at the final stage to – the forceful seizure of power with the final aim of proclamation of caliphate and expansion to neighboring countries. All power in such state should belong to the religious figures of Islam and be subject to the laws of shariat. As one of the main directions in activities of the organization is considered the creation of the wide network of infrastructure (secret apartments, underground typographies, depots of material-technical and other equipment), recruitment of supporters in mass media, among students, influential Muslim spiritual leaders, experienced jurists (particularly from human rights protection organizations) in order to prepare in future legalization of “HT”.

At present, one may see a sustainable trend to the numerous and qualitative growth of “HT”. At the initial stage of its activities, “HT” recruited all those who wanted to join it, mainly unemployed and illiterate youth, but now the stress is made on recruitment of educated and cultured young people. “HT” recruits new members from persons under criminal investigation, prisoners, intensified its activities among students of high and higher education institutions.

“HT” carries out its activities, applying skillful tactics quite carefully. Representatives of “HT” denounce publicly the use of force for achievement of political aims. In the materials of the British branch of “HT”, taking into account western public opinion, it is asserted that

the party strives for creating caliphate only in Islamic countries, while in other regions, for instance in Europe and Russia, “HT” limits its propaganda with explanation of peculiar habits of Islamic way of life. The party pays great attention to attract to its activities and to recruit to “HT” the representatives of intellectuals, who enjoy authority and have influence on public opinion, who are able to raise the level of agitation and propaganda of “HT”. The party aspires for recruiting representatives of the political elite, who are able to have impact on the situation in the advantageous direction for “HT”. It pays attention to recruitment of officials in the law enforcement bodies: it plans to use them to overthrow the ruling regimes in contemporary Muslim countries and further to liquidate the state of Israel and to ensure extension of the caliphate’s territory by force.

This mechanism, used for attracting supporters and for arranging mutual actions, is characterized by its cheapness and efficiency, since, given skillful propaganda, it lets involve wide strata of society even in case of scarcity of active party members. Many documents of “HT” give evidence to intention of the party to split society. It concerns mainly the societies in Muslim countries and the countries, where exists a rather great and influential Muslim community (for instance, Russia). Ideologists of “HT” declare that Muslims should urge towards coup d’etat in the countries, where exist “incorrect” regimes, and towards restoration of “Islamic rule”. The similar appeals disseminated in various countries, split society. Muslims are disoriented in their political and social position: should they support the ruling regime or wage war against this regime in the name of creation of caliphate?

A lot of propaganda materials are directed to instigation of hatred and animosity, of humiliation of an individual, of peoples, countries, groups of countries for the reasons of nationality and religion. “HT” declares Jews to be the vicious and mendacious people, who hate

Muslims most of all. According to “HT” plans, the state of Israel should be demolished, since it is located on the territory of Palestine, proclaimed by the party as an Islamic land. The USA and Great Britain as well as the peoples of these countries are accused of kufr, i.e. of disbelief and animosity to Islam and Muslims. The Russian people are offended as the people annihilating Muslims in Chechnya. President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin was put in the list of persons, considered by “HT” as enemies of Islam. Muslims of all countries are called upon to proclaim jihad – sacred war against Christians and Israelites. The excessive influence of the countries of the West on Islamic world and the anti-Muslim policy, carried out by the USA and its allies, is called to be the justification of jihad.

A great part of program and propaganda documents of “HT” contains provisions, provoking Muslims to forceful actions and annihilation of people in the direct or veiled form. The use of force as a means of political struggle follows from the party doctrine itself, i.e. is one of the main instruments of the caliphate’s construction, since creation of this state entity supposes the review of the internationally recognized and relatively stable borders of contemporary states, which may be realized only in the forceful (military) way. Besides, the caliphate, according to the views of the party, should include some territories, won over by Christians from Muslims as long ago as in the XIV–XV centuries, particularly a rather great part of Spain (Andalusia), which is also impossible without the large-scale forceful actions.

The content of force, proclaimed in the views of the party on dissemination of Islam, is expressed by conception of jihad, incorporated in a number of “HT” documents. In most documents jihad is considered as a system of forceful actions, including military actions directed against the adepts of other confessions, the states, regarded as “enemies of Islam” (Israel, the USA, Great Britain, Russia), and against

their citizens, as well as against contemporary leaders of Muslim countries, who do not recognize “truth” of the views of this party and who intend to maintain dialogue with countries of the West and with Russia. Many documents of “HT” include repeated appeals to the forceful overthrow of the regime in one or other country, to liquidation of their leaders, which also proves the conclusion on the substantial role of forceful actions in political plans of the party. It should be noted that some categories of people, according to the views of ideologists of this party, should be subject not only to forceful actions, but also to physical liquidation (in particular, Jews, citizens of the state Israel).

“Nizb ut-Tahrir” has its own standard and easily recognized style in description of its views and appeals, characterized by simplification, clarity, emotion and repetition of the main idea of the document, which makes it possible to conclude that these documents belong to this party. A number of “HT” documents (articles in magazine “Conscience”, proclamations, instructions etc.) are written in the characteristic manner of presentation, which lets determine them and consider as documents of this organization.

The materials of “HT” contain mentions of other Islamic parties. However, “HT” makes the distinction for itself among these parties by the declaration that it urges towards unification of all Muslims and creation of the caliphate. “HT” criticizes activities of other parties for the limited nature of their political demands and social aspirations. A number of “HT” documents contain appeals for disobedience to laws of existing countries, including laws of the Russian Federation, because Muslims should not obey any other norms, except “orders of Allah”. At the same time, some documents include appeals for violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, directed to “liquidation of the Kremlin power” over Tatarstan and the Caucasus, and question legitimacy of the power of Russia over “occupied” Chechnya.

A threat to the constitutional order and sovereignty of the Russian Federation is contained in the attempts, taken by “HT” to aggravate the situation in the North Caucasus and to provoke separatist feelings within ethnic national groups in the North Caucasus. “HT” carries out its activities also to undermine the authority of the Russia power and trust to it, to include some territories of Russia in the so-called Islamic caliphate. The leaders and activists of “HT” regard its terrorist activities as a “minor” measure in case of impossibility to attain the fixed aims by political measures.

Other foreign extremist organizations show their worth on the territory of the Russian Federation rather poorly. Their role is rather reduced to the support of the extremist groups on the territory of the RF, which have already got some positions in local society, including the youth.

Thus, the Islamic extremism represents a real threat to the Russian Federation. The extremist structures display great interest to the youth of Russia, and make not only the law enforcement bodies but also the whole Russian society look for ways in order to take counter actions against extremism. The joint actions are the must to reduce greatly the level of the threat and to block its negative results.

*“The Islamic youth in contemporary world”,
N. Novgorod, 2009, p. 46–55.*

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THE CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN CONTEMPORARY TATARSTAN

For the historic period, the social-cultural space of the Republic of Tatarstan was shaped from Orthodox-Russian and Turkic-Muslim cultures, which influenced formation of mentality, traditions of legal and political culture, languages, literature, art of the people, living there. The leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan officially carries out the policy of multi-culture, stressing by all means the poly-ethnic composition of the population and the respect to ethnic-cultural needs and requests of the republic's population. This policy is presented at the Russian and world level as an example of successful development of ethnic cultures and their peaceful mutual enrichment. However, declaration of multi-cultural policy often is combined with carrying out ethnic-centrist policy. It is displayed even at the level of the established legal norms. For instance, it is said in the law "On Culture" that one of the main tasks of the cultural policy in the region is "promotion of development of Tatarian national culture, culture of the multinational people of the Republic of Tatarstan". Most arrangements, mentioned in the program, concern development of culture of all peoples, living in the republic; however, the priority is given to the proposed actions aimed at rebirth and preservation of Tatarian national culture. Preservation and development of cultures of the Republic of Tatarstan in mainly directed to satisfaction of cultural requirements and needs of the Tatarian people, living outside RT. Part VII of the second program

(2004-2007) is fully devoted to support and development of culture and language of Tatars, living on the territory of the Russian Federation, the CIS countries and Baltic countries. It let the leaders of Tatarstan use the means of the republican tax payers to render assistance to the Tatarian people, living outside the Republic of Tatarstan. Point 29 of part II in the second program, devoted to preservation and application of the real estate as a historic-cultural heritage, provides for preparation and publication of the code of historic and cultural relics of only the Tatarian people.

Language and educational policy. According to point 1 of article 68 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, “the Russian language shall be the State language on the entire territory of the Russian Federation”. Point 2 of the same article says that “republics shall have the right to establish their own State languages”. At the same time, the Constitution does not define the correlation between the state and republican languages. The law “On Languages of Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan” fixes legal equality of the Tatarian and the Russian languages. But in view of special measures needed for renaissance and development of the Tatarian language “the Republic of Tatarstan promotes preservation, development and study of the Tatarian language by Tatars and people of other nationalities, living outside the Republic”. The published program documents give support primarily the development of the Tatarian language, which was demonstrated by heads of some institutions, who raised by 15% the salaries of employees for knowledge of the Russian and the Tatarian languages. In this situation the leadership of the republic oriented the people of non-Tatarian nationality to master the Tatarian language and took measures to raise its significance.

The specifics of the Russian language's development in the contemporary language policy and the education system of Tatarstan are determined by a number of peculiarities.

First, as a common state language the Russian language for the entire history of the multinational state was for many ethnic groups the guide to the world and science, came and comes forward as a partial intellectual capacity of all peoples, living in Russia. The Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet society the already shaped Russian speaking community, which surpasses the Russian ethnic group.

Second, the acquisition of some features of sovereignty by the Republic of Tatarstan promoted discussion and further adoption of legislative measures aimed at support of development of languages of peoples of Tatarstan, while actually the priority's conditions were created for development of the Tatarian language.

Since the 1989–1990 school year, teaching of the Tatarian language was introduced in all professional schools and colleges and since the 1991–1992 school year in all Russia language schools, irrespective of nationality and wish of students; at the same time appeared the new Tatarian educational institutions – lyceums and gymnasiums. The number of hours for study of Russian was reduced twice comparing with other regions of the RF. Introduction of the united state exam (EGE) showed the trend to a lack of balance in the language policy, defined the poor knowledge of the Russian language by the graduated students from general education institutions.

Nevertheless, the Russian language remains the leading language in many spheres of life in Tatarstan: business, bookkeeping, science (nature and social sphere), high and higher education (except special humanitarian).

In spite of introduction of the Tatarian language as the obligatory item in the high and higher school programs, the Tatarian language did

not become the urgent point for most citizens. For the end of the 1990s, only 0.4% of Russians were able to use it at work. According to the authors' research, the Tatarian language was considered as the most significant by 4.7% of questioned Russian students and 0.8% – by Russian pupils (the corresponding indexes for Tatars were as follows: 4.2% and 2.7%). The youth, engaged in studies, prefers the Russian language out of two state languages. However, school and university students think that the English language as a language of international communication is for them in greater need than both state languages.

Thus, in spite of the efforts exerted by the republican authorities, the significance of the language in the region is determined first of all by its social need. The state status of the Russian language, its role in access to western culture, successful language adaptation in the education system and in science are for the peoples of Tatarstan more significant factors than the regional language policy, which actualizes the Tatarian language.

The obligation to learn the Tatarian language periodically causes irritation of many parents and students of non-Tatarian families. By present, it seems that even some adepts of the ethnic national movement started to understand that it is senseless to teach the Tatarian language to the pupils, who do not want to learn it. D. Iskhakov admitted it in public. Therefore it was proposed to concentrate the means to teach the Tatarian language to the Tatarian children and to the adults, who want to know the language better.

The policy in the sphere of ethnic culture. The adoption of sovereignty of RT determined the course towards maximum preservation of the Tatarian language, the people's archaic features as unique phenomena of the title nation. This trend is kept till present. At the same time, culture of other peoples, living in the republic, is being developed mainly under conditions of self-regulation due to lack of

attention to it on the part of the republican authorities. For the beginning of the 1990s, in the RT, on the initiative from below, there were formed ethnic cultural communities, public organizations, created by the ethnic, cultural and religious principle: establishment of the National-Cultural Centers (NCC) and the National-Cultural Autonomies (NCA); they became the promotion centers of ethnic renaissance and played a positive role in keeping traditions of their peoples on the territory of the republic.

The number of NCC started to grow fast in 1992, when 12 centers were created, and in 2008 the number of registered NCC made 123. The NCC community is characterized as follows: Tatars – 18, Chuvashis – 17, Tatars-Kryashens – 13, Russians – 13, Maris – 10, Udmurts – 9, Mordovians – 3, Bashkirians – 2; representatives of more 15 peoples created their NCA. The NCC keep in mind the whole complex of issues, connected with development of ethnic groups, rebirth, preservation and development of the native language, national traditions, education of attentive attitude to culture, traditional national festivities, habits and handicraft products. The representatives of the centers raise urgent issues of national schools, kindergartens, they render assistance to the talented young people. At present, such religious festivities as Sabantuy, Nardugan, Nauruz and Kurban Bairan are widely celebrated at the level of family in Tatarstan, while they are accompanied by mass performances, sport's games and fairs. Since 2002, the feast "Sabantuy" is included in the Roster of UNESCO as a chef-d'oeuvre of non-material culture and is celebrated not only on the territory of Tatarstan but also outside the country.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Russian religious ceremonies also were restored with the support of public organizations and the Orthodox Church. Having been revived in one village, they gradually extended the scale and geography of participants, forming

collectives all over the republic. The folklore occasion “Karavon”, arranged in the great village Russkoe Nikolskoe in the Lishevski district (which has the republican status since 2004), has become one of the most popular of the mass celebrations of Russian culture. In many Russian villages their residents revived at the level of every day life the tradition to celebrate feasts “Easter”, “Whitsunday”, “Apple Salvation”, “Christmas-tide” and others.

The folklore occasions of other peoples in Tatarstan are kept thanks to the initiative of the ethnic public society and owing to activities of national cultural communities. The traditions of celebration of the spring agricultural occasions gradually come back to the communities of compact settlement: Mordva – “Baltay”, Mari – “Semyk”, Udmurt – “Gyron bydton”, Chuvash – “Uchuk” and “Uyav”, Kryashen – “Pitrau”.

In spite of an essential input of Tatarstan in development of Russian and world culture, the share of representatives of other nationalities, except Tatars, in the creative art elite has greatly diminished. The propaganda of the Tatarian literature is quite significant in modern trends of books’ publication. Publishing house “Magarif” is specialized mainly in issue of the textbooks for the regional component. The Tatarian publishing house issues annually not more than 3-5% of books, written by Russian writers. Besides, the republican libraries are oriented more to the Tatarian readers: 1250 libraries serve the Tatarian population, 779 libraries – the Russian population, 142 – the Chuvashi, 32 libraries – the Udmurt, 14 libraries – the Mordovian population and 24 – the Mari population.

Various ethnic groups, living in Tatarstan, to a different extent are interested in their own ethnic (as a rule, traditional) culture. The research, arranged in the end of the 1990s by E.A. Bondarenko, showed that 43% of questioned Tatars responded that the national culture of

Tatars became for them closer and more interesting, while only 20% of Russian respondents displayed an interest to the their native culture. At the same time, two thirds of Tatars considered that advantageous changes had occurred in their culture, while Russians three times less positively appraised the dynamics of their culture. Besides, the researcher noted that, given this more advantageous appraisal of Tatarian culture, according to this personal appreciation, Tatars five times more often gave their expressed support exactly to the Tatarian culture (16.4% of Tatars supported the preferential support of the Tatarian culture, while only 3.4% of Russians expressed the analogous opinion in support of the Russian culture).

The purposeful program “The Development of Culture in the Republic of Tatarstan for 2004-2007” was adopted for the sake of preservation of the historical-cultural heritage as a condition of existence in the republic of living there peoples. The ministry of culture of the RT included in its roster from 5265 to 5532 historic-cultural objects, while 2558 objects are included in the State Protection Roster of non-movable monuments of history and culture. However, as a result of the short-sighted policy of the republican leadership some historical and cultural relics turned out to be under the threat of destruction, while in the course of preparation for celebration of the thousandth anniversary of the city of Kazan many old house in need of restoration were demolished. Some streets disappeared in the city (Professorsky by-street, Kasatkina street, Fedoseevskaya street and others). A great part of historical-cultural heritage of the former Russian part of Kazan (Pushkina street, Ostrovskogo street, Sverdlova street and others) disappeared. For the last five years, there were demolished the buildings, connected with the names of prominent fellow-townsmen – F.I. Shalyapin and V.V. Khlebnikov. There exist the memorable protection plates on the houses, connected with the names of

A.S. Pushkin, S.T. Aksakov, V.I. Kachalov, other Russian writers, whose life was connected with Kazan. The capital of Tatarstan, gradually losing its archaic originality, transforms into a faceless city with typical buildings, constructed of glass and concrete, losing mainly the historic-cultural heritage of the Russian part of Kazan.

The Russian public society at the federal and republican levels has to justify the need of keeping Russian culture. For instance, for ten years there was a discussion on the issue of conception of restoration of historical-cultural heritage of the country – Ostrov-grad Sviyazhsk, located on the island. On the territory of the island there are preserved and registered 62 memorials (including 18 – of federal significance). In 1996, UNESCO included Ostrov-grad Sviyazhsk in the roster of the world heritage. Within the framework of the program concerning small historic cities of Russia, the specialists worked out the project-conception of the main directions of social-economic and ecological renaissance of small historic city Ostrov-grad Sviyazhsk. The conception was adopted only in 2006 after preparation of documents for UNESCO program on restoration of the city of Bulgar – the holy place of the republic's Muslims.

Tatarstan is a special region of Russia, where exists a real basis for the dialogue of religions. At present, the regional authorities regard as their main task the passage from the need of keeping balance of interests of two big confessions – Islam and Orthodoxy to the task of maintaining legal equality of all religions and equal distance of them from the secular state. In order to maintain the public political stability in the republic the following conception was proclaimed: the compliance with balance of interests of the two main confessions – Islam and Orthodoxy and preservation of legal equality of all religions. However, the declared balance in practice is not always realized. According to the federal registration service of the RT, by 1 January

2008 there were registered in the republic 1404 religious organizations: 1056 – Muslim, 255 – Orthodox, 76 – Protestant and 13 – other confessions. As a whole, 1400 religious institutions perform their functions: 1150 – Muslim, 200 – Orthodox, 50 – other religions. For the period of November 2009, for the time of feast Kurban-Bairam, celebrated on 27 November 2009, 9 new mosques were commissioned in Tatarstan.

The religious organizations of the Republic of Tatarstan (dynamics of growth)

Year	Muslim	Orthodox	Protestant	Others
1986	18	15	1	3
2008	1056	255	76	13

The construction of the cultic buildings and restoration of the cult constructions, given to believers, demonstrates the process of religious revival in the republic.

The cultic constructions functioning in the Republic of Tatarstan

Year	Muslim	Orthodox	Others
Till 1917	1598	794	3
1989	3	4	1
2008	1150	200	50

Islam is the most spread religion in Tatarstan: 54% of the population regard themselves as Muslims. In particular, 44.6% of the rural population and 33.5% of the city-dwellers considered that “by

religion they become related with the people”, while 41% of Tatars, living in cities, considered the all-Islamic feasts as national occasions. Islam occupies the first place in the number of parishes: 1056 – registered and 50 – in the process of registration. The Orthodox diocese has 270 parishes, including 197 functioning parishes, and the others are under construction and restoration or are vacant and assigned. The former chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs at the Cabinet of Ministers of the RT explains the difference in the number of cultic constructions in the republic, given the relative equality of Muslim and Orthodox believers, in the following way: first, the numerous superiority of Tatars in the rural settlements; second, the canonical difference in use of cultic constructions (the traditional demands to building mosques are much more simple, while construction and internal decoration of Orthodox churches demands great material inputs), third, existence in Islam of the mahali (or the territorial quarter mosque) principle.

The spiritual department of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan (DUM RT) has a wide network of its structure, ensuring functioning of Muslim parishes; muhtasibats (45) carry out their work in all municipal districts under its guidance, while regional parishes - kzyzats perform religious judicial functions. DUM RT is also in charge of international connections with the Islamic world, of Islamic education, propagation, of statistics, science, work relating to the youth. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, “the rights of believers have been extended in enterprises and offices to provide them opportunity to perform ceremony at their working places”. The religious organizations acquired the right to create special networks of enterprises and offices to provide services for believers according to canonical rules. Muslims got the right to establish the network of halyal shops, Islamic tailoring establishments, “boutiques” with religious attributes and literature;

doctors of medical establishments received the right to execute the rite of paring. The confectionery's factory in Kazan produces sweets without alcohol and animal fat.

For the last years, DUM of the RT pays great attention to arrangement of various occasions, devoted primarily for the Muslim youth. In 2006, the republic initiated to convene the first All-Russian Beauty Competition among Muslim girls. In 2007, the first festival of Muslim mass media and publishing houses of Tatarstan was held in Kazan. The traditional republican days of the Tatarian youth are combined with the youth festival in the Volga Basin Federal District. On the initiative of young imams, the soccer competition for Cup of Muhtasib is held every year since 2005. It is connected not in the last instance with intensification of extremist Islamic trends in the republic.

As far back as in the 1990s, in some cities of the republic (Naberezhnye Chelny, Almetyevsk, Kukmor) there appeared wahhabies (more precisely, neo-salafits). But popularity of this extremist trend in the Volga Basin turned out to be much less than in the republics of the North Caucasus, while the attempts to strengthen its influence among Tatars of the RT failed. The clerical radicalism was spread to some extent among young mullahs and the youth of the republic's cities, where the cultural level either was not kept or was too small – in Naberezhnye Chelny, Almetyevsk and others. The situation is aggravated due to the fact that in these cities the background of social tension is great and the share of “semi-city” marginal groups is rather big. Such people are rather easily susceptible to radical ideas of different type- either ethnic-nationalist or religious.

For the second half of the 2000s, in Tatarstan a number of judicial proceedings relating to participants of some clerical extremist and terrorist organizations took place. For instance, over 50 persons were detained, including 23 persons accused of criminal acts, in

relation only to the case of terrorist organization “Islamic Jamaat” in Naberezhnye Chelny. In particular, one member of this organization was sentenced to life imprisonment, since in the forest near the city, regarding these people as those whose behavior did not correspond to the canons of Islam. For the period from 2005 to 2009, some judicial proceedings were arranged against the other extremist organization – “Hizb-ut-Tahrir” (“Party of Islamic Liberation”). The court’s attitude was not rigid to them, and several accused persons were released from custody in courtroom (since they had endured the punishment, determined by court, as far back as in the course of preliminary proceedings).

Orthodoxy is the second religion in Tatarstan in terms of its dissemination; it is represented by several religious organizations: the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) of the Moscow Patriarchy (255), the Genuine Orthodox (6), Old Belief Church (5). Orthodoxy is professed in the republic by many peoples: christened Tatars, Orthodox Chuvashis, Udmurts and Mordva; the latter since the year of 2004 received for some village and city parishes the right for ceremonies in their own languages. Since 1989, bishop Anastasy (Aleksandr Mikhailovich Metkin) was in charge of the Kazan Diocese of the ROC; he got his title of Kazan and Tatarian bishop in June 1993 after withdrawal from the Kazan Diocese of newly created Mari Eparchy. The Orthodox Church of Tatarstan is represented in Internet network by its official site “Orthodoxy in Tatarstan”, which is considered as the best in Moscow Patriarchy; and except the mentioned site, there exist more 10 Internet sites of the ROC.

Islamic and Orthodox educational institutions provide for religious education. The multi-stage system of Muslim religious education starts in ten medrees- professional religious education institutions, and Sunday courses are organized by each medreca of the

republic. In 2003, under the aegis of DUM of the RT the Center for Preparation of Hafizes of Koran (the unique in the RF) was created. The Institute for Higher Qualification of Imams and Preachers for annual training of 250 students, coming from many cities of Tatarstan, was established in Naberezhnye Chelny. The Russian Islamic University (RIU), established in 1998, occupies a special place among educational institutions of the RT (at present, 320 students from 22 regions of Russia and 6 countries of CIS study in the Islamic university, where there are also students from Turkey and China).

The Christian religious education institutions of the republic are represented by the branch of Moscow Svyato-Tikhvin theological institute in Naberezhnye Chelny and by Kazan spiritual seminary, created in 1999 on the basis of Kazan spiritual school. For the last years, not only cultic buildings but also other property, belonged to Church before the revolution, was given to Orthodox religious organizations. At the same time, the republican authorities often artificially dragged out the process of settlement of the issues of Orthodox believers and do not pay adequate attention to them.

Except communities and parishes of Islamic and Orthodox religions, Catholic, Judaic and Buddhist communities are registered in the republic. The so-called new religious movements are also intensifying their activities. Besides, a stable rise of Protestant parishes is registered in the republic, and although they are not marked by any certain ethnic composition, the number of Tatars gradually joins Protestant parishes, according to the Council for Religious Affairs at the Cabinet of Ministers of the RT.

The distinctive culture of Tatarstan, connected with the dialogue between Russian and Tatarian cultures, was shaped on the basis of foundation of Orthodoxy and Islam. The ethnic-religious and cultural development of the Republic of Tatarstan is characterized by

complicated and many-sided trends: reciprocal influence of Russian and Tatarian cultures, of Christian and Islamic values create a rather advantageous background for tolerance, multi-culture, opened space for influence of the West and of the East. But at the same time, since the earliest times the dilemma of coexistence of many cultures comes forward: multi-cultural development means provision of chances for development of conservative, clerical and ethnic-nationalist trends, which treat with reticence and animosity all unusual and new phenomena.

*“Sotsialno-kulturny portret Respubliki Tatarstan”,
Kazan, 2009, p. 94–118.*

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**THE ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
(Dagestan as an example)**

After disintegration of the USSR the role of ethnic and religious factors in the post-Soviet space rapidly had risen and for the further fifteen years was rising steadily, demonstrating the increasing connection with politics. The most complicated situation emerged in the North Caucasus, where the complex of inter-confessional and inter-ethnic contradictions was shaped, consolidated by a number of significant external factors, and gave rise to some acute and bloody conflicts.

The problem of Islamic fundamentalism in the North Caucasus has been reviewed by the author as a problem of the entire country, citing Dagestan as an example. The negative impact of the unstable situation in Dagestan on other regions of Russia as well as the influence of unstable public-political situation in the Caucasian-Caspian region

and the artificially aggravated situation in Dagestan on the national security of Russia as a whole are subjects to discussion. Extremism and terrorism as the phenomena should not be precisely connected with Islam and identified with religion in general. The studies of problems in North Ireland and some Spanish provinces, professing Catholicism since old times, show that terrorist organizations, pursuing certain political aims, exist also in the Christian world. Therefore the author discusses such political-religious phenomenon as terrorism under the cover of Islam.

The exact number of Muslims in Dagestan is unknown, but they undoubtedly account for not less than 90% of the population. According to the All-Russian population census in 2002, representatives of many nationalities spoke different languages. The Islamic extremists (terrorists) are considered in Dagestan to be the adepts of religious-political trend in Islam known as wahhabies. The terrorist acts of wahhabies are determined as their struggle for political power and influence in the region. The political-religious basis of the adepts of radical Islamic fundamentalism is the idea of separation of Dagestan from Russia and creation on the territory of the republic of the independent Islamic state with shariat governance.

The main ideologists of the Chechen bandits' underground - Mobladi Udugov, Dokku Umarov and Ahmed Zakayev (who obtained diplomatic refuge in Great Britain) have not been able to agree on the political system in independent Ichkeria. The main contradictions are as follows: should "new Chechnya" be an Islamic Republic with shariat form of governance headed by amir and a council of imams or an Islamic constitutional republic with the parliament and the president. They discuss it abroad, in countries of Western Europe. It is significant that they were leaders of the National Military Front and committed criminal crimes in the course of the both "Chechen" campaigns,

including kidnapping, slave trade, ordered assassinations. All of them are subject to international tracing, on the initiative of the RF.

After disintegration of the USSR the situation in Dagestan was complicated enormously. The economic slump, unemployment and the starting struggle among armed elite groups for redistribution of the state property and power conditioned a high level of the threat of inter-ethnic and further inter-religion conflicts. The situation was further aggravated by the lift of long-term prohibition of religion for the Soviet years. The rapid growth of the number of mosques and Islamic education institutions started in Dagestan.

Since the activities of extremist organizations intensified after disintegration of the USSR, the events in the North Caucasus for the last 15 years were directly connected with the urge of hostile foreign states towards the large-scale military actions to induce Russia to participate in a new civil war. Any war, particularly in the period of the world economic crisis, undermines already weak and unstable economy of the country, taking part in military actions, while it is much easier to exert external policy's pressure on the country with weakened economy.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the ideology of wahhabism has widely spread on the territory of Dagestan, where for the last ten years it passed from temperance to extreme displays, which represented a direct threat to the national security and territorial integrity of Russia. Adepts of wahhabism disseminated literature of radical type, started to publish newspapers with extremist and anti-constitutional content up to 1999, when these publications were forbidden by court decision.

These publications propagate overthrow of the constitutional order, instigate inter-national and inter-religious animosity. The numerous organizations and foundations, guided often under the rigid control by the American Administration, gave their support to extremist

activities in Dagestan. Various financial organizations acted legally as sponsors of these activities. Following prohibition in 1999 at the federal level of activities of some foreign organizations in Russia, the process of financing subversive activities and information war goes on up till present illegally with the assistance of mediation's emissaries of terrorist organizations, such as "Al-Qaida", "Hizb-ut-Tahrir" and others.

The officials of law enforcement bodies in the course of special actions regularly liquidate the so-called financiers of illegal armed formations, carrying out their activities on the territory of the whole North Caucasus, particularly on the territory of Dagestan. As a rule, they are foreign citizens, primarily of Arabic countries, members of international terrorist organizations and different Islamic foundations. Speaking about Islamic extremism in Russia one can not avoid the theme of international terrorism. In the course of special operations, the information is collected on participation in the military bands of foreign citizens of the following countries: Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and some African countries. As a rule, the citizens of these countries play the leading role in organization of activities of military underground, create training camps, arrange military training, give financial support to activities of bandits' groups and provide the groups of terrorists with the support of interested foreign organizations. Many foundations and Islamic organizations are situated in Arabic countries and on the territory of the USA and the countries of Western Europe, which pursue in the North Caucasus and the Caspian Basin the policy to achieve their geopolitical aims. Islamic radicalism and further Islamic extremism appeared in Dagestan as a result of internal reasons and the events in neighboring Chechnya, some experts make the conclusion. As the author thinks, wahhabism in Dagestan emerged and developed due to foreign intrusion, while all

other circumstances contributed to intensification of extremist activities.

The Caucasian-Caspian region as a key region for ensuring security of the southern borders of Russia simultaneously is one of the unstable regions of the world. A number of problems and contradiction, remaining unsolved as far back from times of disintegration of the USSR, justify this conclusion. Some of them are as follows: the struggle against illegal armed formations in Russia on the territory of the North Caucasus; the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts; the tense relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, caused by the claims for control over Nagorny Kharabah; by the situation across the other coast of the Caspian Sea - in Tajikistan, where its borders are protected by Russian border guards, by the problem of Afghanistan; in the south of the Caspian Sea – by Iran with its nuclear program. The interests of Russia and NATO are crossed in each case.

If the USA, according to program “Caspian Guard”, gets the chance of naval presence in Azerbaijan, like location of military bases in Georgia, which were used by fighters to penetrate in Chechnya and Dagestan through its territory, there appears a real threat of a new cold war Russia-NATO. The relations between Russia and European countries will deteriorate due to a probable threat of the loss of control over transit of Turkmenian gas to Europe at the ground of the Caspian Sea. It was not by chance that Russia came forward with the initiative to create an emergency component of the navy in the Caspian Sea (Casfor). Iran and Turkmenistan supported the Russian proposal, while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan responded to this initiative with great reticence.

For the periods of the first and the second Chechen campaigns the leaders of the illegal military formations (NVF) considered as their main aim the exit to the coast of the Caspian Sea. It was not by chance

that S. Raduyev, Sh. Basayev and Hattab (from Jordan) chose as an object of their assault exactly Dagestan and not other republics of the North Caucasus. The veiled attempts to extend borders of the Chechen Republic first to the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan and further by joining to Chechnya of the Kizlyar district with the exit to the coast of the Caspian Sea are being made up till present.

Since the middle of the XX century the world community has waged active struggle for great running short natural resources and unsettled territories of Russia. The secret services of some countries regard the North Caucasus, particularly Dagestan (the significant strategic region on the coast of the Caspian Sea), as a springboard for development and consolidation of influence and dominance in the region with further separation of the North Caucasus from Russia. The loss by Russia of leading positions in the Caucasus automatically results in weakening of Russian influence on the Caspian states: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. This result, in its turn, makes much easier for the USA and NATO countries get access to the energy resources of the Caspian Basin. The USA is interested in the sources of energy in the Caspian Basin primarily by expressing its wish to ensure its own energy security, as it was mentioned by the Congress of the USA (ensuring energy security is one of the main priorities of foreign policy). As J. Baker noted, for the XXI century the Caspian oil will be as important for the industrialized world as today is important for the world – the oil of the Persian Gulf. The biggest western oil companies (British Petroleum, Exxon Mobile and others), carrying out their activities under the aegis and in the interests of the USA, are being involved in development of oil fields in the Caspian Basin. Thus, the interests of the USA are oriented to the long-term diversification of oil and gas sources in the fields and deposits in the Caspian Sea in order to lessen energy dependence on the countries of the Persian Gulf, and the

more so, as the USA does not want to resume development of its reserves, which were put in dead storage, and to extract more oil in the Gulf of Mexico.

However, the reserves of the Caspian hydrocarbons are varied from huge amounts to a negligent size, according to different estimates. Therefore the wish of the USA and western states to keep the Caspian Basin under control most likely is reduced to the control over Russia. The political instability in the region renders assistance to the USA to govern this region and, consequently, to stir up the situation, which is also one of the key long-term aims of the USA. The destabilization of political and social situation in Dagestan is the task of great priority for American Administration, since Russia plays the key role in the Caucasian-Caspian region and may to a large extent have impact on the situation and political decisions in the states of the Caspian Basin.

The number of foreign citizens, participating in activities of bandits' groups on the territory of the republic, gradually reduce the amount of their financial support to these bandits groups consequently, according to secret services. As a result of the intelligent service's actions, the coordinators of subversive activities in Dagestan, such as Abu Omar, Abu Khafs, Khattab and others, were liquidated. Each "special operation" is an evidence of the hard work of officials of the law enforcement bodies for the sake of ensuring national security, since each measure taken for this aim, means prevention of another terrorist act and saving of people's lives. Thus, this is the result of a thorough work of law enforcement bodies to arrange counteractions in order to stop terrorist activities, and therefore the bandits themselves have to finance their criminal activities.

At present, the situation in Dagestan is aggravated to the braking point. There are certain objective factors, which emerged as a result of subversive anti-constitutional activities of extremist groups. In

Khasavyurt and Makhachkala up to recent time a sniper killed servicemen, officials of the procurator's office, of law enforcement bodies, secret services and other organizations, who carried uniforms and special outer-clothes. Actually daily, the officials of state establishments and members of their families receive letters with demands to retire and the threats of physical liquidation (which usually are realized). They accompany their threats with acts of threatening, such as shooting in direction of apartments, setting fire or exploding personal vehicles.

Members of illegal bandits' formations warned officials "not carry uniforms" and recommended women "to use hijab". The extremists disseminate leaflets with threats and assignments for the population. In mountainous villages and cities in flat country militiamen are assassinated, the official vehicles are exploded, while innocent citizens become victims. The cruelty and cynicism of terrorist acts horrify the people.

Some categories of civil persons were also divided by radical reasons. For instance, the sport's community of the republic is divided to "jamaat" and "tarikat". In Arabic, "jamaat" is a community, a brotherhood (of adepts of wahhabism, when people address to each other like "brother" and "sister"); "tarikat" – means the way, it means the shariat way of achieving nearness of a slave to the Mighty by means of eradication from his heart bad, mean thoughts and cessation of bad deeds. The conflicts between adepts of traditional trend of Islam and supporters of radical wahhaby trend occur regularly in various settlements of the republic.

As a result of special measures, taken for liquidation of members of illegal military groups, the officials of MVD, FSB, procurator offices, of military forces located on the territory of the republic, find the printed lists of names of these officials with their addresses and

plates of their cars. Since bandits have specific data on state officials and since they put ultimatums to them, they want to get the proof or disproof of the officials of these organs concerning their criminal acts. By means of blackmail or graft, the bandits make officials of state organs give them various information. As became known, some officials of MVD were recruited by extremists exactly on the ideological basis.

With due account of the described situation in the republic, it is possible to present a model of probable situation: 1) installation of emergency (KTO) regime in Dagestan; 2) some years of war, waged by insurgents, and further special measures with all consequences (arrests, control of territory, searches); 3) installation of the rigid regime of governance (probably, the direct presidential governance for a short period of time); 4) hard time and the process of restoration of peaceful life, of infrastructure, which demands big financial expenses.

The similar situation existed in neighboring Chechnya. The fighters, waging war against federal forces, recruited volunteers from the population. Those, who refused to join the bandits' formations, were usually killed. The relatives of the killed people became deadly enemies of these killers, the institution of blood feud still exists in the Caucasus, including Dagestan. Dagestan is a multi-national republic, therefore vendetta will be accompanied by inter-national contradictions.

The emergence of new political, inter-ethnic and territorial conflicts in Dagestan contributed to aggravation of the situation in the whole North Caucasus. This circumstance actually conditions emergence of the need to find out new ways of settling these issues, including use of military forces. In its turn, the fact of military actions, given some unsolved foreign policy problems, results in a fast economic slump, reduction of the small amount of production, rise of inflation and loss of positions in the region. In the republic, the fire may

brake out instantly, and it will be very difficult to extinguish the fire for many dozens of years. The peoples of Dagestan have endured bitter experience of resettling refugees, but in case of war the residents of the republic may themselves become refugees.

*“Kaspiysky region: politika, ekonomika, kultura”,
Astrakhan, 2009, N 4, p. 86–91.*

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**RELIGION IN GEOPOLITICS OF
THE CASPIAN REGION STATES**

At present a study of geopolitical factors influence on the stability of the states, on their development prognostication, on processes which can influence on their development in a varying degree becomes more urgent. In spite of ideological “background” prevalence a geographical factor became urgent in geopolitics of the different states of the world from 70-ss and it was caused by socio-economic reasons. A possibility to control ideological and spiritual environment of the other countries where religion is of importance became the most important indicator of the state influence in the region and in the world.

Geopolitics of the Caspian region is defined by a number of factors compared with its geo-strategic importance, oil and gas resources, possibilities of their delivery to consumers and also neighboring and nearness with China, Russia, Iran, the vast Caspian-Black Sea region and the Persian Gulf.

There emerges the idea in the European and the American science that religion can influence on the political life positively. Yu. Khabermas discusses in his book that a religious thinking is still of importance and even competes with a scientific thinking and how

urgent it can be in future. Religion became a political instrument in the western civilization long ago. As A.J. Toynbi noted, “monstrous birth of the modern western secular civilization... became possible... owing to renaissance of the Hellenic institution of “absolute” state when religion became one of the policy department”. Religion role revival for the politicians is the new infinite possibilities to influence on electorate.

In his day F. Brodel wrote about “long-term period of time” of mental and the similar structures, “slow rhythms” of the political process and “rapid time” of the events and individual life. To his mind the event kaleidoscope could not have an effect on the trends of “long-term time” and on the contrary, the deep processes aren’t always became apparent. Beginning from the end of the century before last a “long-term period of time” of the religious life began falling to the ground little by little and changing into its next stage of development. Probably, there is some civilized paradigm in the essential meaning of religion underlining originality and inestimable significant potential for its future development. One should suppose that the latter is hardly one of the most important indicators of religion vitality being a base of the given civilization in some societies and systems.

As it’s known during XIX–XX centuries the interaction between civilizations in the Caspian region was going on under the influence and under the sign of the western civilization. In many respects just the western methods of “public progress” brought to such unique historical-political phenomena such as young Turkism in Turkey and the pro-western reforms in Iran (even short-term existence of Gilyanskoy soviet socialist republic should be considered from the same perspective). The religious policy of Russia and England being unreasonable here and there and sometimes half-baked in their confrontation and advancement in Central Asia in XIX century brought to a considerable radicalization of the public masses and moods over these territories.

According to M. Weber economic, political and the similar specificity of the society is associated with religious dogmatic theology in this society. Religion postulates the human relations to a society and the world, a state and etc. It greatly influences on culture (including political) of the Caspian bordering countries; here Islam is something special.

Islam is typologically divided into fundamentalism, traditionalism and modernism.

The first two trends are mainly in the Caspian Sea: traditionalism in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan; fundamentalism – in Iran and in a certain degree – in Dagestan. Modernism being mainly of the Turkish origin is distributed everywhere excluding Iran.

Right to the present time the Caspian Sea was realized as a region where anachronisms of despotic Asia prevail as before, where only a force and money have real authority but the modern western civilization was powerless to break the medieval Islamic curtain. During the last two tens of the years of the last century Iran and Afghanistan presented themselves for the West as the embodiment of the most double-dyed stagnation being caused only by the Islamic civilization. The western analysts confirmed the idea of not only reactionary character but a terrorist point of the matter of the similar regimes. So, today this region was revived on a new round of the struggle for the influence in the world and in the concrete region having the most bloodthirsty, demonic aspect. Taliban's phenomenon, "state terrorism" of Iraq, the military operations of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan in the Asian countries of CIS, the activity of the Central Asian department of the Middle East moderate-radical party "Khizb-ut-Tahrir" and the nuclear arsenal of Teheran came in handy. Russia's attempts to strengthen its former position in the Caspian region is considered, in particular, as conniving to aggressive theocratic regime

of Iran, as an attempt to suppress a diversification of raw material supply routes for the West, again to strengthen its “imperial” influence in the region and are interpreted as directed against USA and its allies.

The specifics of the modern situation is that the politicians and the geo-politicians, practitioners and scientists design special maps where they mark borders and areas of influence not only of economic, administrative, political and other processes and phenomena but also religions and civilizations deliberately distorting the existing reality. As consequence these latter-day frontiers of civilized-religious ecumene a priori form some virtual regional civilized world which is supposed to be materialized. In some cases this imaginary “mental map” not coinciding with the existing realities brings, at first, to implied and then to real losses for “forgotten” or “pressed”, local civilization right to its total disappearance.

The similar activity, at last, can be “useful” for actors allowing forming little by little a necessary degree of the local population complaisance, its readiness for future changes even one could avoid or overcome them. The map of probable in future so-called the Big Middle East can be the example of the similar type of virtual-real geography, or rather a graphic geo-policy. It’s obvious that this material is applied – special geo-spatial symbols, ideas are designed aimed at cardinal change of borders of this vast territory where R. Peters also includes the Caspian region. So, the idea begins dominating over reality and pseudo-civilization is in hurry to take a place of a civilization.

A modern world development and production methods of knowledge (to realize the present processes and forecasting or to propagate false views) is evidence of that their geopolitical context, in reality, is called upon for limiting religious civilized or even political principles and paradigms proper influence. On the current round of history preference is given, at least, to a combination of these

paradigms in order to make their future development (in the form of stipulated policy matrixes, economy models and etc.) changed into pseudo-religions and pseudo-civilizations, into the new “cultural” patterns according to developed algorithms.

At present USA, the European states and Russia like some other leading countries of the world review their priorities, tasks and others. The world picture is changed within the shortest period of time and transformations seem to be far from finishing. Besides traditional saber-rattling there emerges a special ideological background in the Caspian region when politicians try to link together per se and orientation different potentials of religion and social factor. Religion, in particular, Islam is of no small importance instrument, saber in arsenal of the modern geo-policy as eventful perspective becomes exogenous when homogeneity of local cultural-civilized identity is watered down under action of inocultural including political, patterns.

Islam is subjected to transformation processes; it can be well changed with pseudo-Islam regionally – some doctrine on behalf of this religion giving a possibility to interpret any political situation in the region as “collision of religions” or “civilization collision”. It’s obvious that Russia is against geopolitical transformations and pseudo-religious factor role in them.

At present it become very urgent to study possible consequences of civilized and pseudo-civilized factors and processes influence on a regional situation and state security, one should consider not only the Islamic (pseudo-Islamic) and the Christian (pseudo-Christian) factors. The Caspian region is characterized with the influence of such religious systems as Buddhism, Judaism without speaking about the different branches of the above-mentioned world religions.

“Tsvilizatsiya I gosudarstvo na Vostoke”, M, 2009, p. 118–124

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**MODERNIZATION OF KAZAKHSTAN:
IN SEARCH OF ITS OWN MODEL
OF SOCIAL-CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT**

The scientists of Kazakhstan concentrate their attention on a wide sphere of problems, connected particularly with periodicity and historic stages of modernization of Kazakhstan, the social-economic conditions, ensuring its success (characteristic of the resources' basis, revelation and appraisal of social-cultural peculiarities of the population, the search for the national idea, mobilizing vital forces and integrating different interests of all ethnic and social groups, identification of civilization's belonging of society in the continental space of Europe-Asia, finally, appraisal of the actual process of contemporary stage of modernization etc.

The present process of modernization, endured by the Central-Asian states, is not the first one in their history, since it is possible to mention three stages of modernization: 1) modernization, realized by the Russian Empire on the basis of colonization; 2) the Soviet model of modernization, which had not been completed; 3) modernization after achievement of independence, realized on the basis of adaptation to western technologies and imposition of the system, which was forming in the West for many centuries, notes political scientist M.T. Laumulin.

At present, the process of distinctive return to the source, seen in "renaissance" of ethnic culture on the basis of historical traditions, goes on in Kazakhstan, like in many transit societies. In particular, it is displayed in rebirth of national cultural traditions, in greater interest to the national history, in aspiration for restoration of historic-ethnic symbols, in the rise of popularity of education in the state language, in the revival of interest in religious values, in greater demand for ethnic

style in music, literature, arts, cloths etc. Simultaneously, many scientists note the lack of perspective in contemporary globalizing world of isolationism combined with the urge towards preservation of culture.

M.M. Tajin, chairman of the Association of Sociologists of Kazakhstan, stresses that the social-cultural aspects are wrongly forgotten by the attention of expertise, while just they represent the growing field for research. It is difficult to ignore the assertion that, if culture is unable to support the social-political system, the stability of the latter may be questioned. The practice shows that exactly the social-cultural factors shape the so-called corridor of development's chances, since this fact has been admitted by the increasing number of experts. As M.A. Kul-Muhammed says, Kazakhstan constructs its future under conditions of mighty globalization's flows, coming both from the West and the East. The future will be bright, if the country stays on the solid foundation. This foundation of national and ethnic riches is rooted in national culture. The better will be knowledge of the culture, the greater will be the people's confidence in future.

The different views on civilization's belonging of the contemporary society in Kazakhstan are subject to discussions. Some scientists and public figures stress the trend and participation at the same time in two world civilization centers – Europe and Asia and, consequently, they stress its complicated Eurasian nature, its role as a self-dependent subject in the balance system of civilizations, cultures, peoples, religions and states. The others pay attention to the fact that in the foreshortened interpretation of civilization the Kazakh society in ancient times was and at present is a typical Eastern society, which represents “a split part of the Russian Soviet Empire and a lost child of Muslim civilization”, according to sociologist Jarmakina. The members of the third group of experts underline that the contemporary Kazakh

people primarily are rather Europeans by education and culture, than Asians.

Kazakh political scientist A. Gali considers that three worlds exist in the poly-ethnic society of Kazakhstan: the Kazakh language world (the Kazakhs and the other nationalities, speaking the Kazakh language); the Russian speaking world (Russians and the Russian language population); the Turkic language non-Kazakh population. For the Soviet period, the ethnic composition of the population of Kazakhstan became more complicated. Since the period of the 1970s, catch-words “planet of hundred languages”, “laboratory of peoples’ friendship” were incorporated in Kazakhstan. This process started before the revolution but intensified since the 1930s. According to the population census of 1920, in the steppe regions of Kazakhstan 38 nationalities were registered, the census of 1970 registered 114 nationalities, while in 1986 there lived people of 130 nationalities in the country.

Many Kazakh scientists are worried by the loss of national originality, and their views are based on perception that cultural diversity inevitably leads to conflicts or failures in the field of development. The historic experience of the countries, which endured the “over-taking” modernization, shows that the greatest successes were achieved by the countries, which succeeded to find out their own specific “image of contemporary time”, connecting original culture and mentality of modernization. The contemporary development showed many examples when the lack of wish to take into account the cultural tradition resulted in grave social troubles in time of advantageous economic circumstances. The most significant example of this type was presented by failure of “white revolution” in Iran, caused primarily by the great contradiction between the western political course of the shah regime and the traditions and mentality of the people. One of the

conclusions of the modernization theories is approval of the fact that culture, original values represent the sustainable significance for development of society.

Great differences in the views on the type of society in Kazakhstan in the continuum “contemporary – traditional” are subject to scientific and political discussions on the status of contemporary Kazakhstan. N. Nazarbayev considers that Kazakhstan is in need of elaboration of its own conception not so much of “over-taking” as surpassing modernization, - in other words, of its own model of national development. Evidently, the experience of the developed countries, which have completed these processes, should be taken into account but should not become subject to blind imitation. Kazakhstan has its peculiarities of development. The people of Kazakhstan may claim for their own unique Kazakh way.

U.S. Sarsenov notes that for the 1990s “submitting to the western influence, bringing knowledge about the new democratic order, to a large extent innovations resembled blind imitation of western values and sometimes turned out to be the unnatural intrusion of these values in Kazakh society with the other Eurasian mentality, which differed from mentality and type of actions of Europeans and Americans. The other mistake was as follows: in spite of imitation of alien ideas, it was impossible to copy the level of living in democratic states of the West. It sounds like a miracle: citizens do not get additional money thanks to democracy and meetings. But in 1993 people did not think a lot about it. It was the epoch of political copying”.

Different points of view exist on the type of modernization in Kazakhstan. Some experts think that the contemporary elite in Kazakhstan gradually becomes more westbound and that this trend will further go on, since the training program “Bolashak” till recent time was oriented to formation of cadres in developed western countries,

despite its extension in terms of geography. The westbound elite, the deep stratification of society and widely spread corruption are the display of non-original modernization.

Kazakh sociologist S.E. Zhusupov regards that the ruling elites are weakly oriented to modernization process: “We see the Eastern-European analogues of superstructure, a kind of basis, while some countries acquired the status of market countries, but actually we possess the Soviet superstructure. In some or other way, we need time. They say often that the population is not ready for it and that its mentality is inadequate to market. To my mind, the issue is, nevertheless, quite different: exactly the ruling elites have quasi-market mentality. Therefore they will need, probably, an essential period of time to shape the perception of the type of superstructure and to comprehend the essence of the needed process of efficient governance etc.” He added further: “Appearance of “color” revolutions is not accidental at all. The process of stagnation (we see either the stagnation or “the swamp” situation) sooner or later results in disaster”. Kazakh scientist A.N. Nysynbayev regards that a huge strata of laymen with low cultural (including political) level with passive attitude to the coming events, closed in the interests of individual survival under conditions of market economy, represent the breaking factor.

Some Kazakh scientists regard modernization of society in the light of imperative to create a national idea. At the same time, they note that, if it is difficult to formulate it for any mono-national society, it is more difficult to accomplish this task for such poly-ethnic society, which exists in Kazakhstan, since there appears the need of simultaneous synthesis of chances, wishes and aspirations of all ethnic groups of society in Kazakhstan and of transformation of the wide specter of perceptions in common united phenomenon – the all-national idea. The urge of the nation towards preservation of its specific

characteristics under conditions of globalization, which erodes national identity, the protest against it emerges and achieves the level of conflict resulting in acts of extremism and terrorism. It seems that a destructive protest is the failure of the nation to formulate its national idea with positive and creative capacity, able at the same time to keep originality of the nation and to integrate it in the contemporary world.

The national idea should promote entry of Kazakhstan in the global world in the way of dignity, its maximum participation in complicated global processes. The realization of national idea should become an adequate answer to contemporary challenges of globalization for the sake of ensuring further development of Kazakhstan forward for the benefit of the society and each citizen of the country. Globalization levels the specific content of actually any phenomenon of the contemporary world, tends to dissolve national identity. However, at the same time, globalization produces in national consciousness the protest against the loss by the nation of its specificity. It is impossible to say that globalization precludes formation of the national idea, since it only raises additional conditions for the substance and form of the national idea. The essence of these additional demands is reduced as follows: the national idea should not lead to isolation of the nation and the state, but it should “be open” to the world, should logically combine the specific national substance and general human values and aspirations.

The consolidation of society in Kazakhstan should be realized in the form of united nation, which is perceived as a civil and not as an ethnic community. At present, such united nation as a common entity does not yet exist in Kazakhstan. Ashimbayev and other researchers came to the following conclusion, described below. Some circumstances promote and engender vagueness of life’s orientations of citizens. The ethnic, political, religious consciousness of citizens in

Kazakhstan are dissolved and not firmly consolidated. Since the values at the development stages are embodied in models of social behavior, the social aspirations of the citizens are not united. Under present conditions, the ethnic self-identification does not render assistance to the consolidation. In many respects, it appeals to the past, but, given the past values, this identification turns out to be unable to withstand the challenges of the contemporary world, if it does not identifies itself in the present situation, based on new realities and new tasks. Thus, the national idea is able to achieve the multilateral task of consolidation of the nation, since it removes the uncertainty of aims and values, promotes formation of common public consciousness.

For the last time, the idea of steppe civilization and the role of nomads in the process of Kazakh modernization became actualized. Academician A.N. Nysynbayev puts the question: in what way should be correlated the values, connected with the passage to market economy and legal, democratic state (right for property, sense of proprietor, individualism, rationalism, personal responsibility and initiative) with traditional values of collectivism and social solidarity, rooted in national mentality of ethnic groups in Kazakhstan.

Since modernization supposes that Kazakhstan should take into account its cultural traditions and original values, in which way is it possible to combine the incompatible on the face of it basic values: individualism and collectivism, freedom and adherence to paternalism? He thinks that the answer is contained in the peculiarities of the Kazakh common law, steppe democracy and the corresponding mentality. It seems that there is no need to oppose the above said notions, since the historic past of the Kazakh people shows good social models, which demonstrated the way to make compatible individual freedom with the principle of collectivism and tribe outlook. The steppe civilization has absorbed the features of the East and the West. The phenomenon of

nomadism in an original way combines collectivism and individualism, etatism and liberalism. The political culture of nomads does not accept full domination either of corporate order or individualism. As a result, the nomad transforms into a kind of centaur – interconnection of individualism and corporate order, originated in the individual-tribe consciousness, making substance of civilization's mentality of nomadism.

A.N. Nysynbayev stresses that realization of key reforms of Kazakh society should go on not as a senseless copying of western experience of modernization and transformation, but as a process on the basis of specific historic conditions for development of Kazakhstan under conditions of globalization. Therefore for formation of civil society in Kazakhstan, showing creative personal qualities, it is significant to use the positive potential of the past, both of the Soviet and traditional experience, the values, shaped by them, which make it possible to achieve consensus, formation and development of institutions of civil society.

As a whole, it may be said that development of public thinking in post-Soviet Kazakhstan repeats the main ideas of modernization's theories. Both in science and in publications, in mass consciousness the aggressive westbound critics of national culture gradually are being replaced by appraisal of its great significance for civil society's development without conflicts. Kazakhstan in the process of political modernization made a significant step in the passage directed to the presidential-parliamentary form of governance, extending rights of the parliament. At the same time, there were made the decisions to give the first president the rights to participate in the presidential elections after termination of his current term. The deviations from the principles of democracy are justified by the fact that Kazakhstan goes its own way of

development, comes forward against accelerated introduction of democracy, the more so as from outside.

The modernization processes in the post-Soviet space have similar features, determined by common historic past (before the revolution and in Soviet times), with the impact on formation of close peculiarities of national identity, social-cultural intention and mentality of the peoples.

*“Fenomen modernizatsii i ego otrazhenie v soznanii
grupp:sotsiokulturnyi aspekt”, Novosibirsk, 2009, p. 85–98.*

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