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**MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIA
AND GLOBALIZATION**

The modernization problem has two aspects: the global aspect, connected with the events in the world for the last decades, and the local aspect, related to the lack of events in Russia. For the last years, it goes the way, which is opposite to the ways of other countries, and seems to strive not for industrial development but for de-industrialization. To the author's mind, the years of the 2000s in this respect became the greater lost time than the 1900s, since their priority characteristic, i.e. the maximum use of the energy sector, marked by a restoration growth for the first half of the decade and later by the actual recession for the last two years. At the same time, there were made no great successes, except in construction industry and some branches of metallurgy and the communication sphere, and these tasks are not on the agenda. The remarks below concern some aspects of modernization, brief description of situation in Russia and the theme of modernization in the world and globalization contexts.

The author sticks to the very restricted interpretation of modernization: it is the mobilization process in separate countries in order to reduce the lag behind the states-competitors. In the past time, modernization was realized for internal reasons: the industrial revolution in Great Britain, the rapid economic development in the USA in the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX centuries. They

were caused by the logic of national development and did not intend to overtake and to surpass other countries, but such modernization efforts remain an exception. One may ignore them for the sake of theoretical analysis and discuss the strategies aimed at reduction of the lag from the leader. Within the framework of such approach it is possible to reveal many common features, to make classification of modernization; this approach corresponds better to the interests of theoretical analysis than the review of any rapid economic development as a modernization.

Using this approach, it is possible to reduce the framework of research and to conclude that modernization as a model of overtaking development was particularly fruitful in case of competition between economies of similar types. The author discusses it in the categories of industrial and post-industrial economy and stresses that modernization was successful and achieved most defined targets, if the modernizing country competed with other industrial countries. History lacks examples of the post-industrial modernization. The post-industrial economy is not construed in the way which makes it possible to raise the speed of its development by some mobilization efforts. The creative activities, being the basis of post-industrial economy, depend on the motives, connected with maximization of free time and self-realization at the working place; it does not suppose the existence of mobilization paradigm, which existed and was put into life in case of intensified industrial development.

Should modernization mean what was going on in Japan and Germany in the end of the XIX century, in the USSR – for the 1930s, in Japan after the second world war, in South Korea – since the 1960s, within the framework of post-industrial economic systems and values, this mobilization, based on the administrative resource or exclusively on economic interest, is impossible. At the same time, the proportional reciprocal dependence of input and output is not detected in

information economy, and therefore mobilization of resources does give the result, which may be supposed to be in industrial economy.

However, modernization was successful many times within the framework of industrial system. A number of countries, particularly in the time, when industrialism was the universal paradigm (for instance, in the end of the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries), proving by its example that industrial modernization may bring forward formerly lagged behind countries and may remove former leaders from the first lines of rating. It is common knowledge - the experience of Germany, which became the principal industrial power of Europe, pushing aside Great Britain from this place; the USA became the biggest economic power in the beginning of the XX century; after the second world war Japan succeeded to push aside all other countries, except America. For the 1980s, many experts said that Japan is doomed to become the principal economy of the world, which, however, did not occur. Thus, in the situation, when both the overtaking countries and the countries-leaders take actions within the framework of industrial paradigm, industrial modernization, evidently, may render assistance to individual countries to overtake and to surpass the leaders.

By the end of the XX century, the situation was changed, since many western states became post-industrial economics. The events, occurred for these years, cover the radical change of the reproduction paradigm. The passage to the post-industrial paradigm has resulted in emergence of the situation, when western society started to exploit the non-material factor of production, i.e. the economic sector, which creates information, symbolic values. In this new situation, when Microsoft, a producer of computer programs, or Dior, a producer of cosmetics, export their goods (a disc with program product or a flacon of perfume), it turns out that not the product, elaborated and manufactured by the corporation, but its copy is being sold. The

production of copies costs much cheaper than production of the origin. In this way, western countries/companies start to produce the export of goods, which do not undermine monopoly of technology, applied for production of such goods. In this case there is no non-equivalent exchange, as anti-globalists often say, but there exists the factor, which results and will result in future in aggravation of global inequality.

It is not accidental that just since the 1970s, when the post-industrial trends were consolidated in the West, the scale of the world inequality started to grow. In the developed countries there started to grow inequality between those, who belong to the creative sector, and the workers of the mass production industries. Following passage of the West to the post-industrial model of development, the attempts of industrially developed countries to overtake it became senseless, since at present it is impossible to realize it. The problems of Japan are caused by this phenomenon. For the 1960s-1970s, Japan exerted great efforts to become a powerful industrial country, but by the end of the 1980s the expectations for the world leadership failed. Japan did not succeed to pass from copying and finishing technologies to creative post-industrial development, and as a result of it Japan rests the country with “the lost decade” of the 1990s and low rates of growth.

Japan, like other Asian countries, did not start to produce technologies. Up to the period of the 2000s, the volume of technologies’ export from Japan was four times less than its import of technologies; Japan presents one of the best examples of the situation, when industrial paradigm is unable to compete with the formed post-industrial paradigm. The discussions on the future of China as the principal economy of the world seem to be untimely. China will become the leader in terms of GNP but not in terms of quality of life and the GNP volume per one person. For the next 10-15 years, we will see a reduction of economic growth in the country and its economy’s

fixation on the place of the bigger economy than American economy; but China will not become the world leader in terms of innovations and advanced social technologies.

Why the development was going on in the described way and why the XX century was marked by many examples of overtaking modernization? To the author's mind, it was determined by the fact that within the framework of industrial paradigm technologies were adopted rather easily and the result of this adoption in various regions was relatively identical. At the earlier stages of industrial development, of the great significance were the territories of the states, the size of the population, its qualification, the amount of resources, the exit to sea and many other circumstances, while further the significance of these factors became much less. The example of Japan shows, how the country actually deprived of raw resources, achieved great successes. The example of China demonstrates how the country, possessing the labor force as the only resource, achieves great successes. However, the problem is as follows: modernization needs in its variant of the end of the XX century other main resources, which differ from the resources of the previous period. They are as follows: intellectual governance, clearly determined fixation of the tasks, efficient management by the political class and by the people, liable for national economic development, definite positioning of the country in the system of world economy and comprehension of the aspired aim. Regretfully, no one of the mentioned elements exists in Russia, and it is worth discussing it.

The mentioned elements are a must for modernization of our country, since there are no other limitations, to the author's mind. The access to resources is not restricted at present in the world, and the raw resources market is quite competitive. The technologies' market is also an open market. And what is more, for the last 20 years, the technologies represent the unique produce, which becomes constantly

cheaper in the world. The question is rather the political will and abilities of the elite. It is easy to see that the modernization's results differ greatly in the countries, which are almost identical in terms of history, regional belonging, possession of resources etc. We see the greatly different economic situation in Malaysia and Burma, in Venezuela and Brazil. It seems that these examples do not need any comments. The crux of the problem is as follows: to what extent the national leadership is engaged not in pure talks on modernization but in real political efforts aimed at achievement of the set task.

As far as the Russian Federation is concerned, to the author's mind, we confront a very complicated task, which may be hardly achieved for a number of reasons. First of all, there are many myths and prejudices concerning modernization. For instance, they say that Russia has no alternative but to agree to modernization. This point of view was disseminated as an ideological stock phrase, but it is very dangerous, since the alternative to modernization in Russia does exist: our development for the last ten years was exactly this alternative way of development. Going this way, the country may become new Venezuela, which had the highest per person GNP in 1977, according to the World Bank. We may enter the great group of countries, where political authoritarian regime is correlated with economic underdevelopment. Is it possible to change this trend? Is it determined by "the resource damnation", as they say? It is possible to break it, and "the resource damnation" has nothing to do here, and we need the political will and the clear comprehension of what we want to get.

And we in Russia lack the real will to get changes. It is determined by the fact that the contemporary Russian elite is the biggest beneficiary of the raw resource economic model. Its economic interests are definitely in the sphere of exploitation of natural resources and are partially determined by the sphere of financial speculation,

where mythical amalgamations and acquisitions take place, enriching the people, who are close to the political power. This elite has no motivations to change the status quo. At present, despite the economic crisis, the ruling power keeps under its rigid control the existing situation, and there is no chance of losing by it of its devices of political power for the next several years. And just for these reasons modernization in Russia is impossible, the author thinks.

At the same time, there is a potential for changes. First, despite the losses, sustained by Russia for the first half of the economic crisis, it keeps rather great financial resources. And it would be possible to “convert” by force the gigantic loans of national corporations into investments, transferring a part of these corporations’ shares to the creditors and making possible attraction of a great amount of foreign technologies to the country.

Second, for several months of the crisis the technologies became cheaper many times, and it is just the time for modernization.

Third, the deep crisis induces to consider the course of eight Putin years to be wrong and to re-direct development from the resource trend to the industrial assault.

To the author’s mind, industrial modernization should become the objective priority of the wise Russian power. If we want to get rid of the position of the raw resources adjunct of Europe and to avoid becoming a raw resources appendage of China (the situation aspired stubbornly by our government), we should go on the way of industrial modernization. One will hardly believe in a lot of Russian original technologies in the nearest future when Russia will be able to deliver these technologies to the whole world, having made a break to the future on the basis of post-industrial development.

It is not the reality, since technologies at the level of ideas are not worth of anything. The technologies are precious in case of their

application, if they are tested, proved and adjusted for production of valuable and competing goods. The technologies are not sold without it. No country may “avoid” the industrial stage of development and start its post-industrial future development. Many states, for instance the USA or the states of Western Europe, for some decades have been engaged in global out-sorting, transferring their industries to developing countries, but all of them long beforehand created their industrial complexes and perfected them to a high level of quality. The Great Britain, other European countries, the USA were in their time the biggest industrial centers of the world, and only having past this stage, having mastered its lessons, at present, they are able to transfer their mass production to developing countries. This situation resembles the time, when the school graduates enter higher education institutions and forget a part of the school curricular. But we expect that ignorant pupils, expelled from the fourth class of the secondary school are able right away to enter the college. All talks about the post-industrial future are futile before the country is transformed into the industrial developed power.

In order to execute modernization in the country, Russia needs not only technological borrowing but also economic and organization-political adoptions. Russia needs primarily even not the production lines and conveyor systems, new ships, programs but the social innovations and legal norms, which in most developing countries resulted in evident quality leaps. The question is the economic legislation, the repudiation of the organizational style of Russian bureaucracy not aimed at achievement of the results. It is necessary to forget about various financial indexes, which are not connected with the amount of production, with the share of the market with the renovation of the models. One should evaluate the actual production and stop talks about reforms. The national strategy should be construed proceeding

from the share of Russian enterprises in the market, their competitiveness and export perspectives. The super-profits, generated in the oil sector, should be directed not to the reserve fund but to the special funds of industrial modernization, although this complicated issue deserves special discussion.

The plans fail due to the lack of political will, which might execute this break. We see the low-level demagoguery, applied by elite itself and by many experts. The latter try to prove that we may exert our efforts and surpass the industrially developed countries on the basis of existing technologies, or they apologize the existing order, or try to find out external enemies, which allegedly hinder us to carry out modernization.

The issue of external enemies is worth considering within the context of globalization. The question is that the ideas of globalization were rejected to a large extent not only in Russia but also in many countries-failures. It is sad to see that Russia in Soviet times, having shown to the whole world a variant of globalization, joins the chorus of half-educated people, who assert that globalization is to blame for difficulties of developing countries. In this case one should divide the questions, determined by globalization as an objective phenomenon and the reaction to it of the governments of some or other countries. Globalization is an evident positive phenomenon. No successfully developing country achieved the progress as rapidly as in the period of the 1960s-1970s, when they started to use the advantages and chances of globalization. Neither South Korea, nor Taiwan, nor Singapore, nor Malaysia, nor Brazil would have achieved the present results, if they had no open external markets. If for the 1960s-1970s the international trade were characterized by the customs closeness, which existed before the First World War or in the end of the XIX century, any hopes of Korea or China for the industrial break would have been absolutely

fruitless. Exactly open markets, inflow of investments, chances to adopt technologies, transfer of enterprises from abroad to these countries made it possible for them to realize the break. The political rulers of the states, who did not carry out such policy and did not adopt their position on these issues but who now try to justify their own failure by talks on some ones' hostile actions, deserve not only disapproval but also disdain

We see now who has failed in the sphere of globalization. Most of these countries are not necessarily represented by authoritarian and undemocratic regimes but by the regimes, which do not apply any other methods of governance as only the most old-fashioned methods and other motives of leadership aimed at augmentation of their own well-being by means of corruption. It would be questionable to take into account the views of such leaders.

However, there are more significant arguments, presented by the foes of globalization. It is worth mentioning two of them. The first argument is as follows: not the most advanced industries are being transferred to developing countries, resulting in ecological degradation and excessive exploitation of the labor force. It is true that one may consider as unjust the wages paid in Indonesia, China, Thailand, which are not comparable with wages paid in the USA and the EU countries. But these problems should be solved by the governments of these countries. If the authorities of China, Indonesia and Malaysia raise the standards of minimum wages and adopted stricter ecological legislation, changed the dismissal rules, it would be not difficult to make western companies fulfill these minimum obligations. But if in China till recent decisions of the CC of the CPC the pension system did not exist at all, accusation of western companies in China of paying lower wages than in England or in the FRG would mean demagogy. The same concerns ecology. Soon China will become the biggest world

source of atmosphere's pollution, since it uses cheap coal for industrial purposes. The accusation of the companies, like BMW, Ford, Nike, that they transferred not very clean ecologically production to China would be a pure cynical assertion, since the greatest danger for global ecology is represented by the state enterprises in China.

Globalization does not ensure for workers of the countries in the distant regions the benefits, which enjoy workers in the developed states, but it is within the competence of the governments of these countries to solve these problems. If they are unable to protect their own citizens, the claims should be addressed to them and not to the companies, which move their enterprises there.

The last remark should be made concerning the financial flows, which, as it is often said (particularly after the Asian crisis in 1997–1998), provoke destabilization of the financial systems in developing countries. The fact itself is not questioned. The contemporary financial system is far from being perfect, and the present crisis shows that it needs significant reconstruction, which by all appearances will be made for the nearest 10–15 years. But it is ridiculous to hear the complaints of representatives of distant countries, including Russia, about rapid outflow of capitals abroad, which undermines stability of the financial system. But why did you keep silent, when this capital was rapidly invested in your economy, and did not sound the alarm? Already in 2006 president V. Putin said that the inflow of foreign investments was a great achievement of Russia, while the growth of capitalization of national companies was qualified as “result, which did not emerge by itself but was the consequence of targeted actions, taken by the state”. And now, when the capital goes away, the dissatisfaction appears. The same process took place in Asia as well. Nobody was concerned about the fact that Asian banks borrowed abroad big sums of money and invested them in speculative projects. After the collapse they declared:

those, who borrowed and not those, who credited, were to blame. It should be stressed that this was not the most correct approach.

Globalization opens the chances for modernization's successes but it should be subject to regulation. But globalization should be regulated by the governments of the countries-recipient of financial flows and new technologies, since the companies and the states, which are exporters of technologies and capitals, for objective reasons are not interested in regulation of their activities. The not satisfied entities should be interested in regulation. The developing countries have great chances to develop national legislation and to monitor its observance not only by foreign but also by their own companies.

It is evident that should customs tariffs be at the level of the period between the wars, neither China would have achieved the present results, nor the majority of Asian and Latin American economies would have attained the present level of development. The author is a convinced supporter of globalization and believes that this process can not be stopped: the talks about wretchedness of globalization due to the present crisis are quite premature, while assertions that this crisis resembles Great Depression are unfounded. It seems that by the end of 2009 we will see the resumption of economic growth in western countries. Time will show the size of economic rise in Russia and in other developing countries, but it is evident that the crisis will not result in significant replacement of the centers of economic power. The crisis will not bring radical changes, which are expected by many people. It is a mighty financial shock. Probably, it will be forgotten not as soon as the Asian financial crisis, but it will happen in the comparable time.

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**ETHNICITY ADVANCE IN HISTORIC SCIENCE
IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE**

The general trend, characteristic for the post-Soviet historic science, is marked by its rapid radicalization. The re-written “new” history in national republics acquired a clear ethnic color, which makes it possible to speak about growth of ethnic feature in historic science, about its specific foreshortened feature – ethnic history, forming civil consciousness in the post-Soviet states with its social and political consequences. The discussed post-Soviet historic science performs the servile functions: it serves the interests of new ruling elites and the perceived by them national aims.

The characteristic feature of the states, which replaced the demolished Soviet Union, is the process of writing by them “new” history, more exactly “new” histories of their “own” separate ones for each state. These histories in most cases have lost general features. They review the centuries of joint existence, make new accents. The new identity is based on the negation of the general Soviet identity, of general successes, failures and victories. The class, social and political factors of history have been pushed to the background. The ethnic factors have come to the foreground. It is considered that only “national” historians may write the real history of their country. The term “national” is being interpreted as “ethnic own”.

“New” history is called upon to unite the nation and to consolidate the state. Nothing unites the nation better than existence of common enemy. Since the new states obtained independence quite peacefully, without struggle, without any resistance, which never had happened in history beforehand, of great need became the myths that the new states had overcome and got the upper hand in the struggle

against Russia and Russians, who were oppressors, that history of the new states, overcoming “distance syndrome”, is more prominent and older than it was considered beforehand. Historic science performs servile functions: it serves the interests of new ruling elites and the specially understood national aims. Given heterogeneity and contradiction in historic knowledge in new independent states, it is possible to stress the sustainable trends and characteristic features.

The first and main peculiarity: its ethnic basis.

The second peculiarity: the anti-Russian direction, the search for an image of the enemy.

The third peculiarity: the review of the gallery of great figures and memorable days.

The fourth peculiarity: description in heroic style of national history, its interpretation with the stress on the ancient period and search for the roots in ancient civilizations.

The mentioned peculiarities may be illustrated by specific examples, which characterize historic knowledge in separate countries.

Ukraine. The historic knowledge in Ukraine was subject to the greatest radicalization. For the middle of the 1990s, the textbooks contained the clearly fixed ideological justification of ethnic-protection mechanism as a basis of Ukrainian statehood. This ideological justification includes perception of existence of allegedly centuries-old tradition of development of Ukrainian statehood since the time of Kiev Russ. The historic process is reviewed from the point of view of struggle for statehood in terms “loss-gain”. In this context, proclamation of independence of Ukraine in 1991 is interpreted as the main result and principal aim, aspired by the Ukrainian people for almost thousand years. The influence of the Russian language and Russian culture is estimated in the most negative way. The Soviet Ukraine is presented as a colony in the textbooks. The following idea is

elaborated: the progressive development of Ukraine was going on not thanks but to a large extent contrary to the Russian-Soviet influence. The characteristic feature of contemporary historic knowledge in Ukraine has become replacement of class, social and political notions by ethnic notions. The political regimes (totalitarianism, Communism) are not subject to accusation, but “Russians” allegedly are responsible for “spiritual Chernobyl” and even for the not advantageous demographic situation in Ukraine.

It should be stressed that in the places of compact settlement of Russians in Ukraine, for instance in the Crimea, former “moderate” textbook on history of the beginning of the 1990s are sometimes used at school.

Kazakhstan. Historiography of the post-Soviet states is characterized by the directive that only “a national historian” may write a real history of his country. The term “national” is being interpreted as “ethnic own”. Up till present, history of Kazakhstan was written not by Kazakhs. It is asserted as follows: “All written sources on history of ancient and middle-aged Kazakhstan represent the point of view of the people, who almost all time did not belong to these peoples...It does not allow to compare... events with perception of direct participants or of persons, who shared completely the cultural values and every day habits, or of the persons, who were nomads”.

In spite of the fact that the input of the Russian oriental scholars in creation of history of Kazakhstan has been recognized as an exceptional achievement (the works of N.A.Aristov, B.Bartold, V.V. Velyaminov-Zernov, S.P. Vladimirtsev, N. Krasovsky, A.I. Levshina, A.F. Ryazanov and others), their interpretation is considered to be “extra-spectral”. The public opinion is convinced that “real” history of Kazakhs has not been revealed completely or it is interpreted not in the correct way. As one Kazakh researcher writes, at present, “the

emotion in description of historic events prevails over the basic scientific research. It relates to overcoming a certain “complex” of nomads’ life, to comprehension of the fact that in the past we were not like all. The unique feature of nomads in mass consciousness was associated with “barbarism”, “backwardness”. And we had to prove by all means that we have a quite respectful past, full of mass humanism display”. The representatives of all social and humanitarian sciences were actively engaged in showing “proof” of it: by the middle of the 1990s, in Kazakhstan the most cited theme of dissertations was history of nomads, interpreted as history of “nomadic civilization”.

The historic science in contemporary Kazakhstan represents a rather motley range of expression: from myths, which substantiate that the Saks were direct ancestors of Kazakhs and Chenghizkhan was a Kazakh (K. Daniyarov), to the “old” Soviet professional historic school. The mass historic consciousness is also not uniform and reflects heterogeneous structure of contemporary society in Kazakhstan. A researcher writes: “the attitude of the Kazakh aboriginal population to history of the Russian Empire varies from rigidly negative ... to complete indifference”. (The author’s scale of estimates is worth mentioning: not from negative to positive but from negative to indifferent). “The Russian speaking population identifies itself mostly with the all-Russian history”.

The Soviet period is also appraised differently. For Kazakhs “these years are full of hardships and victims, are at the same time connected with the change of the cultural-economic order, acquisition of though fictitious statehood”. For Russians in Kazakhstan “it was the period not only of mass repression and arbitrary rule of directive-administrative system but also the period of status of the so called title nation, when they did not confront language problems and felt comfortable”. The author does not want to comment the remarks of the

cited historian, which are not fully correct, but wishes to show how today Kazakh historians themselves estimate the situation. The list of great historic leaders in Kazakhstan was also subject to changes. It was supplemented by names of Kazakh khans, bais, leaders of party “Alash”, by representatives of Kazakh intellectuals, victims of repression. The list of anti-heroes was enlarged by names of ataman Ermak, Soviet party figures F. Goloshchekin and G. Kolbin. The only event, which was not reviewed, remained the attitude to the Great Patriotic war; in this respect preservation of Victory Day as a state festive day is significant, since, as it is known, it is characteristic not for all post-Soviet states.

Like Ukrainian historians, Kazakh researchers introduce to the mass consciousness the myths that allegedly in Stalin times only the Kazakh national intellectuals were targeted subject to liquidation, that hunger in 1932–1933 was “specially” arranged to annihilate fully the Kazakh ethnos. The virgin lands theme is interpreted in a negative way: the development of virgin lands allegedly did not give any economic advantages but resulted in complete airing of fruitful soil in the vast territory, the central authorities intentionally carried out the policy of preservation of economic backwardness of Kazakhstan, developing only natural resources and extracting sectors of economy.

The common feature of the post-Soviet states is also the impact of the authorities on historic science’s development, considering it one of the main components of influence on the population. As one Kazakh researcher writes, from the point of view of the rulers, “history represents rather an applied device than the independent branch of knowledge”. Since the tasks set for the political power have changed, the new categories started to prevail in historic knowledge: the class struggle and proletarian internationalism was replaced by national independence, statehood, national interests; instead of notion formation

the notion “nomadic civilization” was used etc. Although president N.A. Nazarbayev already in the beginning of the 1990s declared the principle of “centrism” as the historic position, called upon “to keep memory, to consolidate consent” for preservation of unity of the heterogeneous society in Kazakhstan, “centrism” is being attained with difficulty in official historiography and in mass historic consciousness.

Georgia. The anti-Russian rhetoric of contemporary official history is combined by exalting national cultural-historic experience and stressing its “world significance”. It is asserted that “the started enter of Georgia in the sphere of international politics” as an independent subject is founded on its input into “the treasury of the mankind culture”. At the same time, historic and cultural achievements of Russia are estimated as much less significant, and against the background of them one can see “evident priority” of Georgia and Georgians as “the country and the people with more ancient traditions of statehood”. History, interpreted according to “the current situation”, nourishes contemporary official Georgian ideology, which in order to substantiate the chosen by the leadership of the country the western vector of development applies anti-Sovietism and clear Russophobia. All this makes changes in professional historic knowledge, leading it on the way of scientism.

Armenia. Practically complete absence of Russo-phobia is a particular feature of historic knowledge in Armenia. We see this rare peculiarity, probably, only in Byelorussia. There are four main themes in Armenian historic science: antiquity and exclusiveness of Armenian history and culture, primogeniture of Armenian Christianity, genocide of Armenians for 1915-1922 and, certainly, the Karabakh conflict.

Byelorussia. In Byelorussia there are historians, who have adopted a negative review of Russian-Belorussian relations, which testifies, by the way, to existence of freedom of speech in the country.

The critical peculiar appraisal of history is as follows: the criticism of “Moscow-center history”, the attempts to prolong to the ancient time history of Byelorussian statehood, starting from Polotsk principality, allegedly independent from Kiev Russ state. But these ideas were expressed only in some publications. Unlike other states, they did not represent the tendencies. As a rule, the historic textbooks in Byelorussia present a balanced appraisal of Russian-Byelorussian relations. By special respect is characterized the attitude to the joint struggle of Byelorussians and Russians (more often of all Soviet people) during the Great Patriotic war. In contrast to many other post-Soviet states, there is no war waged against memorials and graves in Byelorussia. The balanced appraisal of Soviet epoch prevails, it is recognized that Byelorussia received essential gains, including territorial addition. As a whole, the contemporary historic knowledge in Byelorussia is determined by moderate critical appraisal, by compromise in estimation of problematic situations and by self-sufficiency of Byelorussian ethnic self-consciousness, which is not in need of for self-affirmation in search for enemy.

Moldavia. In Moldavia they study today not the own history but history of Rumania. There are several common postulates: everything, connected with Rumania, is idealized, while all, which concerns Russia, is appraised in the increased negative way. This primitive scheme is the basis for any interpretation. For instance, marshal Antonescu, who received personal gratitude from Hitler for radical settlement of the Jewish issue, turns out to become a liberal and a democrat. In the same way there is arranged the description of the send world war. For instance, in the textbook “History of Rumanians. Modern Time” it is said that Moldavians of Transnistria (Transdnestr is called like that in Kishinev) were subject to “oppression of Russians”. Rumania turned out to be connected with Hitler, “being between two empires, deprived

of support, given by western countries. Thus, it became a probable object of attack both on the part of USSR and on the part of other neighboring countries, and the real danger threatened the territorial integrity of Rumania.

Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania. According to the program, approved by the ministry of education and science of Latvia, Russia is examined only in the context of world history and “very fragmentary”. In the description of the time, preceding the Second World War, the accent in the textbooks is made not on the Munich agreements but on the Molotov-Ribentrop pact. The period of time since 1940 to 1991 is called in the book as “occupation”, while SS legionaries are declared to be “fighters for freedom of their country”. The period of relations between Estonia and Russia for eight centuries is described in the textbooks as a constant sequence of wars and invasions, when small Estonia was always a suffering party. The list of burnt cities, killed peasants, demolished farmers’ settlements draws in consciousness of Estonian school children the picture of the many-centuries conflict and shapes the conviction that the geopolitical and cultural roots of this conflict have not disappeared. The logical conclusion, purposefully shaped in the minds of the people, who mastered such history, is the demand to make “this horrible Russia” answerable for it. The authorities react to it with readiness. Thus, the Latvian government intends to present a bill for the years of Communism. A special commission was established with annual budget in 200 thousand lats (\$ 400 thousand) to calculate “the damage”. In 2010 it should fix the total sum. The preliminary declared sum made \$ 60-100 billion, while the whole state budget of Latvia accounts for \$ 5 billion. The claims of other Baltic states turned to be less. Lithuania demands from the RF \$ 20 billion as a compensation for “the damage caused by Soviet occupation”. Estonia limited itself with \$ 4 billion.

Poland. The history of Poland is reviewed since its unification with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into confederated Rzeczpospolita in 1596. The recent times have been also reviewed: for instance, it is considered that the turning point in the Second World War took place thanks to participation of the Polish military contingent in the Western front, while the Eastern theater of military operations was the auxiliary front. The whole post-war period is presented as a difficult time burdened by Soviet occupation. The occupation by Hitler forces is described as a difficult but not desperate time incomparable with treachery of the Soviet occupation. And no casual mention is made that should not the Red Army liberate Poland, up to 85% of the population of this sovereign country would have been annihilated according to the plans of Hitler.

Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has also taken place in the line to get compensation from Russia. The deputies of the Azerbaijani parliament exactly follow the example of Baltic states and propose to establish the commission to calculate the sum of compensation, which Russia should pay “for the damage” suffered in the time of the USSR and even of the Russian Empire. The deputies are supported by local political scientists, who think that Russia should pay for the oil delivered from Baku, since “by means of this oil the USSR won the Great Patriotic War”.

The cited examples of re-writing history show the methodical devices and technologies, which the post-Soviet states apply, which have a definite impact on the population: school children, readers, spectators, listeners. Some of these methods are as follows: deliberate selection of historic facts, hyperbolic manipulation with figures, falsification, accusation of demonism and de-humanization of the opponents, as well as pure lies. Probably, all this reflects a kind of “illness of growing” of new states, which are incapable to ensure their self-assertion and to consolidate their societies in some other ways. The

formation of their self-identity is based on negation of the whole period of common history and on ignoring the common Soviet identity.

The Russian regions.

The ethnic historical method has occupied the principal place not only in new independent states. The same may be said about many national republics in the Russian Federation. The needs of politics and of ethnic self-consciousness contributed to the fact that the main themes of works performed by professional historians became the search for historic roots, ethnogenesis, exaggeration of national ancient history significance, glorification of national real and mythical heroes and deliberate search for “enemies”. Thus, national historians changed in principle the appraisal of the peoples’ entry in the Russian state. Some historians in **Bashkortostan** described policy of Russia as expansion. The consequences of this policy are appraised exclusively in the negative way; they assert that the Bashkir people, having joined Russia, confronted significant difficulties in struggling for the right of existence as an ethnos, while “the Russian people were inspired by the insatiable spirit of invaders”. For the sake of objectivity it should be said that side by side with “new” approaches to historiography there remained also “old” approaches, which interpret, for instance, joining of Bashkirs the Russian state as a progressive event without any doubts.

Historiography of **Tatarstan** stresses that the struggle of Kazan khanate, the intention to preserve “sovereign state” was “a genuine highest example of the strong spirit of our ancestors, who deserve admiration and imitation”. The day of capture of Kazan in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible was commemorated for recent years in Tatarstan as “Day of Memory” of the Tatar people (15 October), when mourning processions are arranged to commemorate “those, who died in the struggle for their independence”. It is significant that historians in national republics are often included officially in political activities. For

instance, a historian, former advisor to the president of Tatarstan for political affairs wrote in his book: “the myth about allegedly voluntary joining the Russian state by the peoples is fit for simple-minded people, who do not stick to the realities but are indulged in illusions”.

The aspiration of the authorities of Tatarstan to “justify” the ancient origin of its capital deserves the particular attention. The historical science usually cites dates of cities’ founding by their mentions in the chronicles. The first unquestioned date of Kazan’s mention in the Russian chronicles is considered to be the year of 1391. But this date “did not suit” for political considerations. It was necessary to find another date. The arguments for “the older” origin were based on the archeological find in the end of the 1990s of a piece of ceramic, qualified by scientists as an example of ceramic made in the X or beginning of the XI century, as well as the find of a Czech leaden coin of the X century and of an Arabic coin of the X century. “Thus, we supposed that Kazan may be 1000 years old”, said the chief of the Kazan archeological expedition. The historians fulfilled the political request and “found” the historic evidence. The whole administrative-political might of the republic was involved in determination of the Kazan birthday. Since 1996 the Kazan Council of People’s Deputies was involved in the work of scientists of the Institute of History in order to study the issue of Kazan foundation’s date. The city provided financial support to implement the research projects. In 1998, a special division of sociological and historic studies was created within the secretariat of the Council of People’s Deputies. About one hundred grants were sponsored, scientific-practical conferences were convened, while some foreign scientists were invited and republican researchers were sent abroad to archives and libraries.

The Volga Basin and Ural. Since the end of the 1990s, the historic science in national regions was engaged in making claims to

Russia in all its historic modifications, particularly concerning the USSR. The interpretation of the Soviet power's policy acquired the normative characterization: all non-Russian peoples allegedly turned out to be on the eve of ethnic disappearance, while their national culture, language, schools, religion experienced great difficulties. At the same time, the texts on history and ethnogenesis of the peoples, for instance in the Volga Basin and Ural, mention that all efforts exerted by "assimilators" did not give the expected results and that all Turkic and Finno-Ugor peoples from Oka to Tobol kept their integrity up to the beginning of the XX century and with some changes to the end of the XX century. The scientists, experts in ethnic history of the Volga Basin are called to be the Chuvash, Tatar and Mary experts. The real animosity marks the work carried out by these scientific groups, who aspire to justify that just the particular people represent the most ancient group on the given territory or that exactly the given people have achieved the highest cultural level, or they have the direct relative connections with the peoples, representing ancient civilizations: Etrusk, Shumer peoples or even Greeks. It is asserted that the Turkic peoples lived in Europe since ancient times and did not come from anywhere.

The special theme of dispute is as follows: who is "the real" direct descendant of the ancient state of Volga Bulgaria, on which territory live at present many Volga Basin peoples. Some experts regard "Chuvashi as the direct descendants of Volga Bulgars" and that the attempts to identify Bulgars with Tatars are wrong and tendentious. For the experts in the Tatar people the axiom is exactly the opposite: the ancestors of the Chuvashis had no statehood at all and they have nothing to do with the Bulgars. For them it is quite clear that the state of Bulgars was a great and mighty power of the world, which further transformed into Kazan principality; therefore only the Kazan Tatars are the direct descendants of Bulgars. The experts in Mary also make

their input into this discussion but limit themselves with supposition that it would be hardly possible to find out the exact answer to the question: from where and when the Mary people came and who were their ancestors? The experts in Chuvashis have to admit that the ethnogenesis of their people remains one of the most complicated themes, since the written sources on its history up to the middle of the XVI century lack almost completely.

These points of view have been worked out by the historians, who are liable for the social order, issued by regional authorities and local ethnic elites. In this connection, it is impossible to think about independence of academic scientific knowledge. The works of national historians are discussed not only and not rather in the scientific circles, their views are reflected in local press, in mass media; the widest strata of the population in the region get acquainted with them.

The North Caucasus. The researchers of contemporary historiography of the North Caucasus provide information on the works of local authors which often “are full of ethnic megalomania”, sometimes coming to absurd. National historians of neighboring republics “by facts” prove the diametrically opposite ideas, despite contradictions and exaggerations. “Freedom from the party censure turned out to be non-freedom from national elites”. For the post-Soviet years, in the republics of the North Caucasus, like in other national Russian regions, the re-appraisal of rating of prominent historic figures was going on. New heroes replaced old ones, mainly Bolshevik and revolutionary leaders, heroes of the civil war, party and state leaders of the Soviet times. The ethnic belonging became the obligatory criteria for taking place in the new list. Therefore the historic characters, who have rendered great services to the specific ethnos but who do not belong to it, were not included in the list.

In most republics of the North Caucasus the central historic figure became imam Shamil, whose two centuries jubilee was celebrated in 1997. Shamil, being the leader of mountaineers, has become the cult figure, and as a creator of Imamatus he was officially proclaimed to be the national hero. His glorification reflected the trend to making a myth out of his image. Side by side with Shamil, other prominent but not so known religious figures, educators, nationalist ideologists were included in the list of cult historic leaders. The reappraisal of historic positions was reflected in toponymy of the region. The process of changing names, started en masse for the 1990s, continues up to the present time. The city of Orjonikidze was renamed to its old name Vladikavkaz: former historic name, symbolizing “Caucasus ownership”, is the more longed-for name than the family name of a Georgian Bolshevik. The Chechens changed even the name of their republic, leaving aside the names of squares and streets. The monument to general Ermolov was demolished in this way in the Chechen Republic.

In the North Caucasus teaching of Islamic dogmas was legalized in mektebs and medreses. In regional schools teaching of history is based side by side with all-federal textbooks, approved by the ministry of education of the RF, according to the law on education, adopted in 1992, the textbooks, issued in the republics on national history, geography, literature and language (for instance, teaching of seven national languages in Dagestan”), form the basis for school teaching. In **Adygeya** the school curriculum contains “Adygeya etiquette”, and pupils study national music, handicrafts, arts. In schools of **Kabardino-Balkaria** they teach “Etiquette of Peoples in the Caucasus”, while in schools of **Dagestan** – “Culture and Traditions of the Peoples of Dagestan”. The authorities of **Chechnya** in general disapproved the

federal textbook of history and approved their own textbook, which contains its own interpretation of Chechen and Russian history.

At present, the works of most regional researchers are inherent in peremptory tone (with rare exclusions), lacked of significant evidence. They are characterized by disposition to the totally negative appraisal of the past events. The conclusions on the cruel expansionist policy, colonial yoke, assimilation, Russification, Christianization and genocide cover or pervert the actual more complicated picture of the Russian-Caucasian history... The dangerous virus of ethnic centrality has penetrated historic works, decreasing their rather inadequate level: as a result of rupture of scientific connections, financial problems of humanitarian sciences, the mass outflow of cadres. The oblivion of rich traditions of historic studies, devoted to the Caucasus (primarily of the pre-revolution) and the loss of elementary professionalism multiply appearance of pseudo-scientific conceptions, think some researchers.

In the North Caucasus, like in many other post-Soviet territories, there appeared many dilettantes in the sphere of history, who with ardor of neophytes started to refute the generally recognized scientific conceptions. The popular device in “vulgar historiography” was extrapolation of some ancient culture to the contemporary ethnos. Thus, the Balkars and the Karachays turned out to be “the descendants” of Shumer civilization (I.I. Miziyev), all Adygs were descendants of the Shumers, according to one version (Kagermazov), or the descendants of the Khets, according to the other version (A. Bakiyev), while the Vainah, i.e. the Chechens and the Ingushis “got” as their ancestors ancient Egyptians (A. Izmailov) and Etruscans (Yu. Khadjiyev, R. Pliyev), as well as Ossetians were supposed to be descendants of the Arians.

The characteristic features of the regional historic knowledge are its excessive politicization and provincialization. Each entity of the

peoples in the North Caucasus is closed in its private ethnic interests, disregarding the analogous interests of the neighbors and all the more the interests of Russia as a whole. The distinct peculiarity of ethnic claims does not exclude, however, some common qualities, characteristic for ethnic consciousness of the peoples in the North Caucasus as a whole. Its evident immaturity and even infantilism determine inclination to total mythomania of the past... These and other facts engender the syndrome of exaggerated expectations of such ephemeral notions as “historic justice” or “historic law”. The opposing starting points used to prove similar “rights” actually do not exclude the chance of mutually acceptable settlement of any disputed issues, for instance the territorial conflicts.

“Federal” Russian history. While in all former union republics and large national regions within Russia they started to write own history with exaggerated ethnic feature, the quite different situation was formed at the federal level. For the 1990s, in Russia at the federal level the flow of historic literature was not running short, which denounced the interpretation of events in Russian, mainly Soviet history exclusively in negative way. Actually, the authors as though competed among themselves in rigid assertions and exposures, depriving national history of heroism. Academic historians elaborated a project under the title “Five Percent of Truth”, substantiating that “known” history contains only 5% of truth, and formulated the aim to open eyes of the public circles to the rest 95%.

By the end of the 1990s, the flow of denunciations of “the cursed Past” started gradually to run short. The demand for historic sensations was gradually diminishing, the mass consciousness was fed up with negative information and was tired of general denunciation. The “federal” historic science was characterized at that period by total absence of studies of ethnic history, characterized for national

territories. Unlike the leaders of other states, emerged in the post-Soviet space, the Russia ruling elite up to the present time has not determined clearly its attitude to Russian problem and national Russian history. It means that creation of special Russian history, autonomous of history of Russia and the USSR, is not perceived at this level as a political problem and a state need. The search for topical “Russian idea” has become one of the themes of contemporary historic knowledge, while etatism became its founding principle. National idea is perceived primarily as a state, sovereign but ethnic idea. The attitude to Russian history is interpreted first of all as the history of the Russian state.

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CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM IN THE CASPIAN REGION

The Caspian region includes five countries, located on the perimeter of the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran and Turkmenistan. The Caspian Basin has a strategic meaning for security of new independent Central Asian states and the Caucasus as well as of China, Turkey and the countries of the South Asia, notes Askar Nursha. For leading western countries the significance of the region as a territory, encircling “the middle lands” of Eurasia, assumes the strategic meaning. Already in the 1990s, military NATO experts made prognoses on probable entry of Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the North-Atlantic Alliance, which would make it possible to keep Russia within the tight encirclement on land and sea.

In this region there are concentrated big reserves of hydrocarbons, which may be developed within the framework of international cooperation. According to prognoses of experts, the total resources of the Caspian Basin make about 8 billion of equivalent fuel, including the share of Russia in the amount of 2 billion tons. The region has the significant “cultural-civilization meaning” as a buffer zone, where world religions and cultures coexist. The religious and ethnic factors, obviously, aggravate its vulnerability to the external impact.

The development of events in the Caucasus and in the Basin of the Caspian Sea (BCS) shows the destructive anti-Russian actions according to the well prepared scenario. The program of undermining influence of Russia in the Caucasus and in the BCS is being carried out; the attempts are being taken to push Russia out of this region.

The world reserves of oil and gas provoked a ferocious struggle between the interested countries for getting high profits thanks to realization of hydrocarbons by means of their shipment through their territories, by means of fulfillment of their fuel-energy needs and by essential reduction of import expenses. Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, basing on religious factor and great material, financial and military support of the western countries and the USA, claim for the role of regional leaders in the Caucasus. The foreign countries are interested in joint development of oil reserves, but this fact does not guarantee stability in the Caucasus and the BCS, as well as unleashing military conflicts.

The geopolitical contraction of Russia to the borders of the RF again transforms the Caucasian region, first of all its southern part, into the sphere of competition/cooperation of the world and regional powers. The contemporary accents of “Grand Game” in this field are determined by the location on its transportation routes of the hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian Basin and the perspectives of

transformation of the Trans-Caucasus into the corridor which connects Euro-Atlantic with the Central Asia, avoiding Russia, Iran, China or restless Afghanistan.

The factor of the space occupies not only significant place in competition between the leading powers. Oil is not only economic, military-strategic but also political resource. In the beginning of the 1990s, one of the forms of geopolitical control of western countries over the North Caucasus became the ethnic-confessional separatism. After discovery in the Caspian Basin of great oil reserves, the conflict was started in Nagorny Karabakh, followed by conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and in the whole North Caucasus, noted A.G. Guseynov. Obviously, disintegration of the USSR and the market reforms, resulted in crisis in all spheres of public life, caused aggravation of the social-economic situation and inter-ethnic problems.

The territorial aspect of ethnic problems is urgent also in Russia. As one of important works on this problem is considered to be the study of political geographer R. Kaizer "Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR". R. Kaiser deliberates over the role of "territorial component" in formation of protonations and nationalism of non-Russian ethnic groups. The present process of globalization raises a special acute sense relating to the territory and the borders, S. Kara-Murza determines. The experts in ethnology stress the particular aspect of this systemic sense of a threat, which in the whole complex of threats, is caused by globalization. The danger of the loss of control not only over "the soil" but also over the natural resources results in great weakening of the protection force of the national borders. The ideologists of globalization present the mankind as a conglomerate of individuals, as "human dust". Globalization is being publicly declared to be the passage of the control over natural resources of the Earth to

the financial elite of the world (“world market” will determine the access to these resources).

The international terrorism by its nature does not differ from the political terrorism in a separate state: it is aimed at undermining stability of society, demolishing of the borders and usurpation of its territory. With the naked eye it is seen that the aims of globalization are the same: to get influence, power, wealth and re-distribution of property at the expense of public or international security. After the terrorist acts in New York on 11 September the USA pursued the course for forceful penetration to the Caucasus and the Central Asia. The USA unleashed war against the regime of Taliban in Afghanistan and located its military bases in the Central Asia, which terminated the undivided supremacy over this region. America started to re-train by NATO standards the Azerbaijani and the Georgian armies.

Many scientists and politicians are afraid that military cooperation of Georgia and Azerbaijan with NATO surpasses far away the frameworks of NATO program “Partnership for Peace” and is directed to establishment of the USA and its allies’ geopolitical control over the Caucasus. In this connection, Russia may confront the situation, when near its southern borders NATO will use its emergency forces for struggle against international terrorism with evident intention to locate the so-called “peacemaking forces” in the conflict region. All this may not help presenting a threat to the North Caucasus and all Caspian states. Dagestan has land and sea borders of hundred km long borders with Azerbaijan. The most significant Trans-Caucasian transportation routes and pipelines as well as multi-channel communications go through the territory of both republics.

Occupying the place as the point of crossing interests of various powers, Azerbaijan has to carry out the tried and flexible foreign policy. For the post-Soviet times, Azerbaijan succeeded to prove that it

is not a weak and dependent geopolitical substance; it plays the key role in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Probably, this is the unique example of a CIS state, which has successfully diversified its foreign policy. Taking actions, according to the principle "we lack friends and we lack enemies, but we have only interests", Baku succeeded to make great powers seek for friendship with a small state. Azerbaijan usually succeeded to fit the key to important international actors. Azerbaijan thanks to its location in the Caspian region is the connecting link between the South Caucasus and the Central Asia, occupies a significant place in Russian foreign policy. At the same time, under conditions of its involvement in the struggle against international Islamic terrorism, its relations with the politically stable secular neighbor-state, occupying irreconcilable position relating to the religious extremists, are very important. Taking into account the numerous Azerbaijani Diaspora, the factor of Azerbaijan has not lesser significance for Russia.

Twice more dangerous are the threats, emerging from the states of the South Caucasus (particularly from adjacent states on land and sea). The strongholds and strong points of terrorism were created in the countries-neighbors of Russia. Thus, the network of training camps for children with Arabic tutors was functioning in Azerbaijan: Muhammad Salam Abd al-Khamid of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad Ali Khoroko of Somalia, Arif Abdulla, Kaid Abd ar-Pakhman Khaurizi of Yemen and others. Apart from education, they were engaged in dissemination of religious literature, video-cassettes etc. in Dagestan and Chechnya. The stronghold in Azerbaijan is used up to the present time as an integral part of "global antifade", noted researcher of the Institute of Islamic Perception (Malaysia) Ahmad Faiz bin Abd ar-Rakhman.

The significance of the non-predicted events in the Caucasus was appraised by M. Iordanov, who described them in the following way

below. The Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan and the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia had their impact on Dagestan, where refugees found their shelter and enjoined medical treatment; arms and hard currency were transported through its territory, where fighters were hidden. Of special importance for the spread of terrorism in the republic was existence of the long border with Chechnya, since along both sides of this border there were settlements of thousands of Chechen Dagestanis and Dagestani Chechens, connected by many family relations and historic ties, when they lived within united theocratic state under common leadership of imams and waged war against the Russian Empire for almost the whole XIX century. Since the beginning of the first Chechen war dozens of refugees founded the shelter in Dagestan. With due account of the particular circumstances, of special relations between the republics, Russia did not moved its military forces to Chcehnya from the territory of Dagestan and did not locate there its strongholds to wage military operations. Nevertheless, three years later of the Khasavyurt agreements the Chechen fighters, their Dagestani supporters and foreign mercenaries, headed by Bassayev and Khattab, invaded Dagestan, where the situation aggravated due to the unforeseen flow of terrorism, displayed also in the form of Islamic extremism.

The numerous extremist non-governmental religious-political organizations (NGRPO), “charitable” foundations, societies and other structures of some states of the Muslim East carry out their activities creating the external Islamic terrorist threats. The following five countries of the Persian Gulf were the most active sponsors of the North Caucasian Islamists: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. Many mercenaries were arriving from other Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Pakistan etc.

Since the middle of the 1980s, the number of terrorist acts was growing in the RF. The geopolitical control was established in the

North Caucasus also by means of spread of radical Islamic trend – wahhabism. It is necessary to take into account the fact that on the territory of the South Federal District serious terrorist actions of bandit formation of separatists and religious extremists were taking place, liquidating shaking balance, crossing out the efforts of the federal center, local authorities to improve economic situation, to arrange peaceful economic development (events in Dagestan in 1999, in North Ossetia in 2004, in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria in 2005). The religious-political extremism of wahhabies attained its highest level for the period of intervention of international terrorist bandits' groups in Dagestan in August-September 1999. According to the data of the law enforcement bodies, the activities of terrorists in Dagestan had intensified. Only for nine months of 2005, over one hundred terrorist acts were committed, and representatives of law enforcement structures, officials and even scientists were victims of these actions. Having examined all terrorist acts, committed in Dagestan for the last years, and the appropriateness of their execution, M.Iordanov discovered that the certain forces were using terror as a means of redistribution of power functions and property. The post-Soviet capitalization has led to the criminalized symbiosis of power and money. It is difficult to enumerate such examples. Another terrorist factor in Dagestan became religious radicalism, enforced by Ichkerian influence. Hence, numerous terrorist acts against servicemen of the Russian army.

The problems of unity, territorial integrity and security of Russia are directly connected with the situation in the North Caucasus. The key position is occupied by the Republic of Dagestan, which has access to the Caspian Sea and international communications, has rich raw resources (two thirds of the Russian part of the oil shelf in the Caspian

Sea). This fact is comprehended by most sensible politicians in the center and by local officials.

Iran, keeping under its control a rather great part of world energy resources and occupying an advantageous strategic place, may compete with Russia. Iran is the only of the five Caspian states, which has a direct exit to the Indian Ocean, which gives it advantages for transportation of energy resources from the Caspian Basin. Iran, facing the problem of security in the Caspian zone, determines the aims of its long-term regional strategy as follows: the search for new markets for selling its goods, for investments to overcome the USA policy directed to international isolation of Iran, for use of its advantageous geographic location in order to lay and to direct through its territory the communications, the oil and gas as well as transportation flows. In the sphere of policy in relation to the region's states, Iran takes into account the level of their involvement in the blocs, hostile to Iran, the partner relations and unions.

Iran insists on partition of the sea on the basis of equal shares (20% to each state). According to this principle, the national sector of Iran would become larger than its border, if it were laid along the middle line. Evidently, it would engender new problems, for instance, restriction of freedom of navigation. It should be said that the USA and Turkey raised the issue of transporting to the Caspian Sea the ships of the third countries with the right to check the Russian cargo, transported to Iran. The Iranian official representatives consider that the agreements among Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on partition of the Caspian Sea contradict the existing legal documents, regulating the status of this sea. Iran proposes to lay several export pipelines for shipment of the initial and further of the main part of oil. Apart from the suspended "Iranian route" of oil pumping, Iran lobbies other projects, particularly, the gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia. It is

evident that the aim of Iran consists in ensuring its share in the Caspian oil and gas resources, in occupying the position of the main transit country. To achieve this aim Iran demonstrates a high level of pragmatism. Just therefore Iran, like Russia, is interested in economic and political stability in this region.

Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country, which has borders with Russia. The special border problem of Russia and its southern neighbors (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) is related to the partition of the continental shelf of the Caspian Sea. The main opponent of Russia became Azerbaijan, which insists on the complete division of the Caspian Sea among the coastal states and on leaving to their discretion the right to use their resources. Kazakhstan gradually occupied the position, which is nearer to the position of Azerbaijan, having agreed only not to extend the discretion right for use of water space (i.e. to divide only the sea bottom). The lack of the united approach to the issue of the status of this continental lake-sea resulted in the situation, when Kazakhstan initiated in 1993 creation of consortium “Kazakhstan Caspian Shelf” for exploration of its own shelf of the Caspian Sea with participation of big western companies; later Russia arranged an international tender for the parts of the Caspian water areas, regarded by Kazakhstan as their own parts of the Caspian Sea. In 1997, in this connection the first territorial conflict flared up and subsided for some time after the compromise, achieved in January 1998, to defer determination of the borders for the tender district until fixation of the state border and the general principles of the Caspian Sea shelf.

Turkmenistan, referring to its neutral status, officially recognized by the United Nations, is not concerned about legalization of any agreements on the Caspian Sea. Besides, the leadership of Turkmenistan in general regards to be premature to agree to the plan of partition of the Caspian Sea, favored by Russia, Azerbaijan and

Kazakhstan, up to the time of elucidation of relations with Azerbaijan concerning belonging of disputable oil fields, which are subject to claims at the same time of several Caspian states. As a whole, Turkmenistan expresses solidarity with Iran, which objects against foreign companies' activities in any forms in the disputable fields and against their unilateral development. The intractability of Ashghabad and Tehran concerning determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea is explained by the fact that, unlike Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, neither Turkmenistan with its small oil fields in the Caspian Sea, nor Iran with its huge oil possessions in the gulf have any point for accelerating the settlement of this issue. Just for this reason, they have chosen the tactic of protraction, when they lose nothing but intend to get some gains.

At the same time, the contradictions in the Caspian areas of oil and gas extraction create significant challenges and security risks; the unstable situation rests in the routes of hydrocarbons' transportation. Evidently, it is difficult to achieve the compromise in partition of the Caspian Sea, in particular in the sphere of its resources' development. It is displayed by economic and political rivalry unfolding for the sake of control over the oil fields in the Caspian Basin. The disputes, caused by existence of oil and gas reserves, will result in deterioration of interstate relations for a long time, according to the expertise. The main question is that solving of this problem directly depends on the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea and on the conclusion by all five regional actors of the comprehensive international agreement, which seems to be less believable in the nearest perspective.

By its own experience, Russia comprehended that a significant threat to its national security and territorial integrity originates from the international radical Islamist and nationalist terrorist groups, which try

to strengthen their positions in the regions of compact settlement of Muslims. The Islamist terrorism engenders significant problems for all states, including the states, which were not subject to direct attack of terrorists. First of all, Islamists actively use Muslim communities, located in non-Muslim countries, not only for collection of financial means and recruitment of mercenaries but also for execution of the direct terrorist acts. The problem becomes more significant, if one takes into account a great number of refugees from Muslim countries, i. e. the refugees, who settled in western countries; its significance was perceived by such countries, as Germany, Netherlands, France and the Great Britain. At the same time, numerous representatives of Muslim communities, involved in giving financial support to terrorism, are closely connected with legal business in these countries, and any measures directed against them might be difficult to take both for legal and political foundations.

The threats and challenges may depend on the following circumstances:

The extension of the sphere of activities of extremist groups to the Caspian region, i.e. use of terrorism as a new instrument of Caspian geopolitics. The mutual relations of the Caspian states and the third countries. It concerns primarily the relations between the USA and Iran, which balance on the verge of the significant political conflict.

The political processes in the Caspian states, since the internal instability will have impact on the Caspian situation.

The general world consumption of oil.

There are certain concerns of pessimists, which are caused by probable change of balance of military-political forces in the Caspian Basin, related to activities of China, and which also may provoke new inter-state tensions. Like the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Basin acquires evident signs of militarization, which is the logical consequence of

closer interconnection between geopolitics and geo-economy. At present, actually all Caspian states started to raise their military presence in the Caspian Basin.

One of the reasons of the Caspian Basin's militarization may be regarded also the lack of results of negotiations on the legal status of the Caspian Sea against the background of intensified development by Russia and Kazakhstan of oil fields and gas deposits in the northern part of the Caspian Sea. The growth of military forces of these countries as well as of Azerbaijan is directed to ensuring security of work of their and foreign oil and gas companies, under conditions of existing tensions among the Caspian states. The other essential cause of the Caspian region's militarization is also a real threat of extremist activities in the zone of oil extraction by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia. From the point of view of any terrorist organization, the diversion acts in the region of the Caspian Sea may result in rather significant consequences: (1) to provoke inter-state conflicts, particularly in the areas of disputed oil fields and gas deposits; (2) to undermine economic security of some states with state budgets, which depend on export of the Caspian oil; (3) to aggravate the investment climate, which will deliver a blow primarily against economy of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan; (4) to confront the terrorist acts, for instance, explosions of the functioning oil pipelines or tankers, which may result in serious ecological problems and probably to the inter-state tensions.

The present terrorist movement, confronted by Russia, consists in coalescence on the ideological basis of radical Islamism of religious, ethnic and criminal types of terrorism practiced by local groups, supported by the international terrorist structures. This circumstance demands corrections in the Russian policy in the North Caucasus. It is inadmissible to reduce the struggle against terrorism only to the

forceful component. It is possible to lessen the social basis of support, given to terrorists and separatists, only by means of neutralization of “key” factors, promoting intensification of terrorist acts. Apart from that, as the experience of many countries of the world shows, it is necessary to develop the anti-terrorist legislation and its application, to intensify activities of secret services in this direction, to take actions directed against financial support of terrorism, to carry out agitation and propaganda work as well as to arrange explanatory activities.

However, all these activities may prove to be inadequate, if Russia does not reduce corruption to the acceptable world level, does not overcome the systemic crisis, does not make the going on reforms attractive for the majority of citizens, thinks I.P. Dobayev.

Since the second half of the 1990s, the policy of Russia in the Caspian Basin was marked by certain positive steps and trends, demonstrating growing pragmatism of Russian diplomacy and its actions aimed at taking into account the new geopolitical realities. The activities of Russia in the Caspian region are not connected, like in Soviet times, mainly with the urge towards opposition to the West or to regional forceful centers. Both political and energy diplomacy tries to take into account the strategic priorities of the state. The principal aims of Russia consist in preservation of control over energy resources of the region and in solving the problem of territorial partition of the Caspian Sea.

And the not lesser attention is given to promotion of interests of national enterprises and energy companies, despite the fact that the views of the latter about some problems (the status of the Caspian Sea, the lines for laying pipelines etc.) often differ from the course of policy, carried out by the foreign policy and military official structures. It is obvious that Russian diplomacy confronts a rather complicated task: to coordinate and to reduce to a common denominator the Caspian policy

in such a way so it will be possible to take into account different interests, including the interests of Russian companies, participating in development of oil and gas resources of the Caspian Basin.

With due account of the scale of threats, connected with the spread of extremism and terrorism, the state should take measures in the sphere of adoption and execution of legislative measures. A special attention should be paid to public associations and religious organizations, which violate the aims and tasks, fixed in their statutes, and carry out activities which are directed to make forceful changes of the constitutional order, to undermine integrity of the state and internal security of the country, to strengthen separatism, to create illegal armed formations, to stir up national and religious hatred.

*“Severny Kavkaz v sovremennoy geopolitike Rossii”,
Makhachkala, 2009, p. 331–343.*

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SOCIO-CULTURAL CHARACTERISTIC

PROPERTIES OF KAZAKHSTAN’S POPULATION

The problem on socio-cultural characteristic properties of the Kazakhs is the subject of the Kazakh scientist and researcher discussions. The Kazakh scientists and researchers aren’t definite about it. Many Kazakh scientists and researchers pay attention, first of all, of the Kazakhs as the nation related to national development to the problems of culture, mentality, language and try to find the cultural peculiarities corresponding to the modern ideas of democracy and the market in the historical past of Kazakhstan.

Some consider that there are already the market instruments of economic management and the national capital in Kazakhstan, the

business class is developing and many other things. It moulds the corresponding public consciousness eliminating the national paternalism in Kazakhstan and mature enough enterprising succeeds it. Practically all the hard-working population possesses the market consciousness promoting a rising of the vital need level and the social standards of the Kazakhs.

N.A. Nazarbaev also notes the Kazakh paternalistic mood overcoming. He supposes that the Kazakhs have already overcome the outdated stereotypes of behavior. Simultaneously, he considers that it's unacceptable to absolutize a role of petrodollars in developing of the country economy as such approach can throw the country back. People must learn to live and work in such a way as if there are no oil incomes. He associates the human success with the accumulation of the human capital. As for the National fund it was established in order to accumulate savings for the future generations and as a reserve for crisis situations. The state must take care only of those who by reason of his age or state of health can't work and gain incomes. "It's the main principle of our reforms", – N.A. Nazarbaev notes. The Kazakh sociologist M.S. Azhenov also notes powerful influence of the market on a life style change of the Kazakh people, on psychology, on the manners and a scheme of life.

The new characterological features inevitably emerge under pressure from social changes in socio-cultural practices and the population consciousness. S.B. Alimova considers that the culture of the Kazakh society is notable for fragmentariness, mosaic, various, multi-faceted sometimes diametrically opposite values, guidelines and orientations of social groupings. A verbal choice in favor of modernization values isn't always accompanied by the corresponding changes in consciousness and behavior of the people. The active living position postulated by modernist culture is hidden and considerably

“concealed” by the old stereotypes. Sometimes modernist and the traditional guidelines and values are relatively conflict-free not only at the level of a social group but in the context of one individuality. So-called “hybrid consciousness” is being formed. This understandable enough duality defines consciousness and behavior of many Kazakhs. The Russian sociologist L.V. Korel’ names such phenomenon of consciousness imbalance and behavior as adaptive asymmetry when the people have to change the existing stereotypes of behavior for the “market” in “fire regime” (become a farmer, businessmen, “shuttle”, resale and etc.) but consciousness continues to be former).

According to the Kazakh philosopher A.N. Nysanbaev the Kazakh people is characterized with the following features: love of freedom in the form of relative freedom and equality of women, respectable attitude towards a personality and the lack of a servile authority worship; guideline for compromise as one of the basis categories in the mentality associated with the nomadic past of the Kazakhs. Simultaneously he notes a special role of Tengriism as a religious conception propagating harmony and appealing to interpenetration and cooperation of the opposing parties. The nomads used this guideline as a system of social relations. Later Islam consolidated it as a system of political rituals, as a form of hierarchical subordination and instrument of political leverage.

Compromise is a constituent of the political culture of the Kazakhs just during the period of Islam development and its scale penetration in all the spheres of the public life. The Kazakh belief in the predestination and stability of long-standing traditions and laws of nature also promoted it. Pliability and compromise meant for the Kazakhs as something more than simply agreement on the base of mutual compromises. The principle of compromise as a category of balance and stability penetrated in the political sphere of the Kazakh

society. The given principle is a sum of formal, on the first face, rituals and conventions forming prerequisites for a harmonic development of the whole society. The compromise principle blocks sharp political maneuvers and reduces the participants of the political process to obedience and conciliation. Sometimes this principle is as a stabilizer of the public-political relations and as a mechanism of balancing in the activity of the political system.

A.N. Nasynbaev and O.V. Nechiporenko suppose that the modernized changes in the post-soviet societies are linear, with a different speed and are very conflicting. According to them the social practices consist of the following heterogeneous components: traditional archaic structures; intermediate structures formed during the soviet period; transitional structures formed by the modern stage of modernization.

As N.A. Nazarbaev notes “the mentality of the Kazakhs is formed by several generations of the people being brought up in the spirit of the communist principle. Some of them used the recent changes with enthusiasm but very many –no. Subjective and objective factors influence on the people; they use to the current changes slowly expecting the state assistance to solve their problems as usual. Such philosophy and view of things prevent them from coping with the new difficulties and deprive of energy and wish to act themselves. It’s no secret that many officials don’t understand yet that a new role of the state is to form conditions where free citizens and a private sector will be able to take effective measures for themselves and their families but not decide for somebody. We must transform mass conscience with a patience based on the young generation being adapted to a new system of values better and having a new view at future.

As a whole one can notice that the principle grounds being typical for modernization theories are repeated in the development of the public thought in the post-soviet Kazakhstan.

The modernization processes over the post-soviet area have the similar characteristic features caused by the common historical past (pre-revolutionary and soviet periods) what couldn't but affecting the similar feature forming of the national identity, socio-cultural intention and mentality of peoples.

*“Fenomen modernizatsii I ego otrazheniya v soznanii subelitarnykh grupp: sotsiokulturny aspekt”,
Novosibirsk, 2009, p. 85–98.*

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HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL MOVEMENT FORMING IN KYRGYZSTAN

The plurality in Kyrgyzstan has no such deep roots as in the developed democratic states and that's exactly why its making is so complicated and contradictory. Failure and underdevelopment of the parties in Kyrgyzstan is explained by the long experience lack of the plurality being inherent to the west countries. The roots of the plurality in the republic belong to the second half of 80-s XX century but its development became possible as a result of the changes after the perestroika period. As early as in 1987–1990 such political formations as the debatable club “Demos”, the political clubs “Sovremennik”, “Poisk”, later on – “Association of Kyrgyzstan's electors”, a community “Memorial” began appearing on the political forefront one by one.

Aggravating housing and land problems especially in the towns Bishkek and Osh was the important factor for strengthening and organizational legalization of the national-democratic movement in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz national movement began increasing in high gear from the spring 1989. The housing problems urged the Kyrgyz youth on unauthorized seizure of ground areas and house building in summer of the same year. Confrontation between the authority and the youth was settled in favor of the latter. This victory soothed the complex situation but at the same time the youth was inspired for the further political activity. The youth was united and formed the organization “Ashar” which played a big role in forming the plurality in Kyrgyzstan to solve the problem associated with house building on the new areas. During a short period of time the youth began switching over from the economic problems to political ones.

In spring 1990, by the example of Bishkek’s youth, the Osh’s youth set its goal to get the ground areas has established the association “Osh aimagy”. Soon the organizations “Ashar” and “Osh aimagy” were politicized and set such goals as a revival of the national economy, culture, the language having laid the basis for the democratic political structure forming.

In 1990 there were the meetings of the youth in Frunze because of rumors spreading about the Armenian refugees coming and giving them flats. These actions laid the foundations of the new political structures forming. In March-April of the same year such organizations of the national-democratic movement as “Asaba” and “Atuulduk demilge” (The Civil initiative) appeared making up a nucleus of the republican association – Democratic movement of Kyrgyzstan (DMK). During a short period of time it committed some actions attracting the attention of the community having demonstrated the skill to organize the supporters and react to the urgent political problems very quickly.

From the very beginning DMK occupied the anti-communist positions. It was stressed in its program that a policy of the Kyrgyz language Russification was carried out under the banner of internationalism propagating and the nation merger. The communist party based on such ideological postulates as centralized planned economics, one-party system, proletarian dictatorship, social ownership for investment goods brought to critical crisis situations in economy, in international relations and social sphere. The Osh tragedy came through this crisis.

At the same time DMK declared about economic and cultural infringement of aboriginal nationality interests from the party of state bodies and so advanced the following main problems as the independent sovereign state establishing, democratization of the Kyrgyz society, the Kyrgyz people revival, presidential government, a struggle for freedom of speech and the press, a new Constitution adoption based on all people's referendum, symbols updating, frontier problem solving and the native historical names for the geographical and inhabited localities.

Being as the opposition to the Communist party of Kyrgyzstan DMK uses a tactics of power game on the official power structures by means of political hunger-striking, picket organization, unauthorized meeting holding where political requests are made. But later DMK lost its pin and couldn't reorient under the new political conditions. Complex and questionable processes were going on in the movement. As a result they brought to that the movement fell to the small political parties and later such parties as "Etkin Kyrgyzstan", "Asaba", and "Ata Meken" were formed on their base.

The party of the communists registered on 17 September 1992 was regarded as the most powerful and organized among all the Kyrgyz parties. It's explained by that fact that it could attract many former

workers and active public figures of the Communist party of Kyrgyzia and the majority of the population (especially in the rural areas) supports it. Its main goal is democratic state building based on the real socialist principles. One more party – Social-democratic- was formed on the base of Kyrgyzstan’s Communist party.

All the parties have their own representatives in Zhogorku Keneshe but none of them is a ruling one as has no the majority in its chambers but unlike PCK a Social-democratic party is regarded as pro-government because it has more its members in Legislative Assembly.

As it’s known Kyrgyzstan is the agrarian country; two-thirds of its population live in the countryside and is directly or indirectly associated with animal agriculture and agriculture so “The Agrarian party” (AP) forming was quite naturally determined.

On 13 April 1994 the Constituent conference of “The Kyrgyzstan unity party” took place. The Unity of manufacturers and businessmen uniting the economic managers, scientists, economists and businessmen was the initiator to establish it.

The events going on in Kyrgyzstan at this period promoted to establish the new parties. So, for example, celebrating 1000 anniversary of the epos “Manas” the party of regeneration “Manas el” (Manas’s people) was formed.

All the other political parties are also for democracy, sovereignty and they differ only by their attitude towards the urgent problems. The first political parties weren’t understood and supported by the government and the population. There was no information on good and full-length information on their mission, a strategic plan so such organizations were interpreted as wasting asset by the government. The first law “On public associations” is evidence of it where there was no distinction between the political parties and public associations though these subjects’ activity, mission, methods and goals differ cardinaly.

Cardinal changes in the society took place owing the parties and just they are the carriers of the new political power.

If to speak about the peculiarities of the Kyrgyz political parties then they are characterized with confusing position, program vagueness, the methods made at large to realize assigned tasks and the lack of the concrete social base. What is the reason of the party underdevelopment in Kyrgyzstan? The problem is that our society has no experience in plurality. Besides, Kyrgyzstan is preferably agrarian country; two-thirds of its population lives in the countryside but a political movement is intensely in progress in the countries with the developed industry and a large number of the citizens. It's known that the mentality of the farmers is in that they aren't politicized to a great extent. There isn't also a middle class. According to the international experts about 60% of our population is below the poverty line. One should also state that the country is uncultured politically because democracy isn't only a form of government – it's, first of all, a style of life. The plurality can't be mature without the mature political culture.

“Istoricheskoe prostranstvo”, M., 2009, N 1, p. 201–205.

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**FAMILY AND MARITAL RELATIONS
IN THE POST-SOVIET TAJIKISTAN**

The family structure has undergone both quantitative and qualitative changes during the period of the Tajik society transformation. A large broadened family, i.e. a family including more than two generations traditionally predominated in Tajikistan. The soviet state pursuing a policy to improve women's position followed a view of a woman as a worker and a mother. The concrete conditions

were created to combine these roles: there were the nursery schools, holidays were paid out and etc. The Tajik women made considerable progress in the different spheres of the public life. In the public health the women accounted for 83,7% of all the workers, in offices of culture – 56,8%, in the system of education – 50%. In 1991 the women accounted for about 40% of the working force.

This model fell to the ground after 90-s. On the one hand, the reason was a migration “village-town”. The official statistics indicated that from 1990 to 1997-ss the incomers in the towns exceeded the number of those having left but one could observe quite the different trend in the countryside. On the other hand, economic crisis and difficulties of the transit period bring to that the traditionally large families including several generations break up. Nuclear families are formed of two generations. Besides, chaos period, control relaxing from the party of the corresponding state structures, religious-cultural order revival were the reason to form some freedom of views for marital relations and the family. More than 60% of the families in Tajikistan are created without a registration in the registry office. The weddings are celebrated as usual, the families are created but without legal execution in the registry office. A marriage is canonized according to the norms of the Moslem law – shariat. In Unlike “civil marriage” in Russia and in Europe where it has a legal status it’s illegal in Tajikistan.

During the soviet period the marriage in Tajikistan was also entered into according to a religious custom “nikokh” but without a document confirming a registration of the marriage in the registry office it was prohibited to officiate. According to experts the patriarchal structure and family and marital relations weren’t broken in Tajikistan in spite of the women participation in the paid work, policy of destroying a religious custom and emancipation of women. At present a

percentage of religious marriages without a registration in the registry office are high enough.

The tradition of the early marriage is revived in the republic; such marriages are traditionally canonized only according to the custom “nikokh”. The girls under age from the large family are married and a pride price is supposed for them. This form of ransom occurred during the soviet period but it was automatically considered as a feudal lord-bai survivals. It was openly published only in 1986 during the period of democratization and glasnost. And the scientists addressing the family and marital issues are to take it into account. According to experts poverty is the reason of this social and living phenomenon revival in the modern Tajik society. The parents themselves choose a husband for daughters in order to improve economic conditions and set the other children to their feet. According to data UNIFEM, in 2006, approximately 5% of the married women are without their consent but the parents chose a husband for their daughter in 65%.

In 90-s one raised a problem in the parliament of Tajikistan to permit plural marriage officially. In Russia this problem was also discussed because plural marriage is practically legalized in some regions of the Northern Caucasus. T. Tajuddin and R. Kadyrov also suggested legalizing plural marriage in Russia.

One of the reasons on this problem is women’s dependence on men. The results of two public inquiries in the different districts of the country in 200 and 2001 confirm it. For the question: “Is economic dependence of the women the main reason for plural marriage distribution in the country?” (2000) answered positively 44,9% but in a year – 63,9%.

The marital relations in the republic are regulated by its Constitution, the family, criminal and civil codes of the Republic Tajikistan. Only marriage causes the rights and duties of the married

couple registered in the registry office. The Article 170 of the criminal code of the Republic Tajikistan prohibited plural marriage being determined as “living together” with two or several women keeping house with them”. One is punished by paying a fine up to 2000 of minimal salaries or correctional works up to two years or limitation of freedom up to five years or arrest from 3–6 months if to break the article. In cases of plural marriage the wives have no reason to go to arbitration as the court can’t solve the problem on economic responsibility and duties of the parties because such family relations aren’t legally confirmed. In 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted against 30 persons for plural marriage but in 2003 – 567. According to experts one of the reasons is labor migration of men, especially the young ones. Annually more than 700 thousands labor migrants come only in Moscow and mainly they are of marriage age. One can observe obvious unbalance in the society: women are more than men.

Plural marriage distribution in Tajikistan is associated with the civil war consequences. During the period 1991–1992 more than 24 thousands women became widows. There are many widows with children without bread and butter after the civil confrontation in Tajikistan during 1992-1997. During this period the parents married off the girls under age of 13–15 years in order to save the family honor. After the war many young men of a marriage age went off the republic in search of a living. At present according to unofficial data about one million of the citizens of Tajikistan went off in search of living and they are mainly the men.

The Tajik expert of the second wives problem M. Khagai divided conventionally such women into two groups. The first group is mainly the village women or town women having a low level of education, without own income divorced with the first husband or are widows,

sometimes with the children of the first marriage. Only neighbors and the relatives know who has several wives.

The second group of the second wives is the town women with a high level of education, divorced widows or sometimes the women who have never been married. Usually they are the second wives in order to become a mother or just love a married man. These relations differ from the first ones that the relatives don't know about it and as a rule they are unfamiliar with the first wives. There are many prejudices relatively polygamy in Islam. Islam admitting a limited polygamy doesn't encourage it. According to experts the second marriages are a mystery for the first wives in many cases. The first wives learned about the second ones occasionally sometimes many years ago. All the requested women answered that the wife must be only one. The men having had the experience of polygamous family relations also considered that it's better to have one wife because it's difficult to support everybody and the wives always had scandals. There existed such situation in the Tajik society that a religion, in the given case Islam serves for the men as a cover of their manipulations over the women.

During the soviet period in Tajikistan only 0,5% of the men and 0,8% of the women at the age of 50 years have never been married, i.e. mainly the men could have no family in the European part of the country being once the united country but in the eastern and the southern parts of the country including Tajikistan – the women. According to experts the reason is one – only a man has a traditional right for a choice. Besides, some educated girls had no family in some regions of the republic because one preferred uneducated or undereducated girls. The educated girls seek to exercise their right for a choice: have love-match or have no family choosing a carrier. In the countryside and the monogamous families are formed without a

registration in the registry offices. “Nikokh” is a confirmation of the family status of such families for the community and it’s enough to pronounce a word “talok” three times for a divorce. This word means a divorce according to the Moslem tradition. A migrant goes off in search of a living in Russia where he meets somebody and is getting his divorce with a wife by a phone. In spite of the fact that our state is secular many men use the religious laws. It’s a serious problem now. A woman can’t continue living in the husband’s family and she must leave his home practically empty-handed because all the property is registered for the husband’s parents.

There were also ideas on age for the girl marriage increasing. According to the Family code the marriage is permitted from seventeen years. But according to experts there are cases of the early married life girls of 13-14 years old especially in the countryside.

In Tajikistan strengthening of patriarchal and modernization trends influence on mutual relations of the sexes in the family and in everyday life. The men continue to be considered by the Tajik society as “breadwinners”, however, there are families where the wife’s income (24%) are mainly the same with the comparison with the husband’s income but 19% have even more. In the most poor and underprovided families a woman has economic power in contrast to well-to-do households. She finds means to support a revenue-short family. In a word, non-traditional forms of family and everyday life emerge in the Tajik society. Some women in spite of the everyday life complexity managed to get used to circumstances and difficulties and began playing a considerable role in socio-economic sphere.

“Sotsiologiya vlasti”, M., 2010, N 3, p. 74–88.

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**RUSSIA AND CHINA IN THE CENTRAL ASIA:
COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?**

Preceding the main subject, it seems to be feasible to explain the widely used term “classic Central Asia”. The notion “Central Asia” has not yet acquired the unified interpretation in contemporary political science. Big countries and international “players”, possessing their political and economic interests in the whole world and/or in its many regions (RF, China, the USA, European Union, India and a number of Islamic states) often define in a different way the limits of the Central Asia. The world political and scientific definitions contain: a) “classical” Central Asia, the North-West situated near the borders of the USSR/Russia with China and Mongolia, in the east the region is located to Great Khingan, Ordoss curve of river Huang He and Sino-Tibet mountains in China, in the south it reaches upper Indus, as well as, – b) “new” or post-Soviet Central Asia composed of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The term “Central Asia” was put into the world political circulation in 1993, when at the summit of the heads of the member-states of the USSR it was proposed to name in this way the region, consisted of five countries.

The growth of influence of China in “classical” Central Asia is evident. The development of strategic relations with PRC in this region ensures for Russia both present and future priorities and needs of cooperation; therefore, as is understandable, great interest is paid by the RF to different mechanisms and projects of Asian cooperation, where China has stable positions and great experience. Obviously, the rise of political influence of China is not supported by the USA and its allies; on the contrary, through various structures they try to deter this

process, applying not always correct means. China regards Russia in the Asian space as a natural ally against the rise of hegemony and dictate of one country. The views of two countries on problems of strategic security in the CA, cooperation and its development in the region are near or coincide.

The international-legal level of relations between two countries, as it is known, is based on the fundamental basis of Chinese-Russian cooperation, including thousands of documents and ensured by work of dozens of inter-official commissions and structures. The key document is the signed on 16 July 2001 in Moscow the treaty on good neighbor relations, friendship and cooperation. This document reflected the realities of bilateral relations – the joint urge of the RF and the CPR towards formation of multi-polar world, efficient counteraction to international terrorism as well as to the destructive world financial-economic crises. Russia has determined its attitude to rapidly developing China as to a long-term strategic partner.

For the XXI century the following factors raise their significance: dependence of China on Russian energy resources and of Russia on Chinese investments and technologies, experience of integration in world history, wise combination of liberal and state approaches to economy. The significant task of systemic interpenetration of two cultures and civilizations was achieved. The Year of Russia in China in 2006 and the Year of China in Russia in 2007 were celebrated and showed that the shaped structure of non-formal, people's relations is being improved. Actually, the leaders of the RF and the PRC have raised the process of Russian-Chinese rapprochement to the higher level.

The post-Soviet Central Asia.

The comparative analysis of the RF and the PRC.

Under conditions of impact of the world financial crisis on the region of the post-Soviet Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan), the role and significance of Russia and China in rendering assistance to implementation of anti-crisis national programs assumes a special interest. The comparative analysis of Russia and China examples shows an appreciable evolution in perception of the RF and China in the region. The political elites and the public circles of the CA countries think that in terms of security and economic cooperation Russia and China objectively come to the forward positions as the most efficient states, capable to provide a wide specter of services and chances both at the level of bilateral cooperation and the multi-lateral formats, within the frameworks of ODKB, EvrAzES. Besides, against the background of western discussions on alleged subversive actions and existence of “dangerous and perfidious” Chinese strategies relating to the Central Asia, Russian and Chinese initiatives actually contribute to the support of underdeveloped countries of the region, to the development of their economics, infrastructures, rise of the social level of the population’s living, deepening the positive perception of two countries in the Central Asia.

At the same time, the process of shaping images of the RF and China in the CA is marked by certain specification, connected with both the historic basis of Russian (Soviet) and Chinese presence in the region and the present realities of bilateral reciprocal actions of the RF and China with each of the CA states. In general, the historic basis of Russian positions, primarily the whole Soviet past, despite the remained negative feelings of the population and of the political elites of the region relating to ideology of the CPSU and its national policy, promote to a larger extent just the positive image of Russia. The CA countries mainly have preserved the basis of industry and infrastructure, as well as the cultural-language basis, formed in time of

the USSR, which today promotes successfully modernization of independent states.

The historic experience of mutual cooperation of China with peoples of the region is mainly connected with the attempts the Empire's dynasties to consolidate dependence of this region, to transform the CA peoples in the vassals of the Empire. The Kazakhs, the Kirghiz, the Tajiks, the Uighurs and many other ethnoses keep in their consciousness the negative historic stereotype of China, perceived as a threat to independence. On the other side, the contemporary experience of mutual cooperation of the PRC with the CA countries changes this (traditional) stereotype, creating a new, positive image of China as an economically powerful state, capable to render assistance to weak economies of the CA states.

The Chinese-Kazakh model. Evidently, Kazakhstan remains the main priority for China in the CA region in terms of bilateral cooperation's development. According to experts of the Chinese institute of international relations, the cooperation of China and Kazakhstan in the energy sector is the starting point and the guiding direction of extending mutual actions of China in economic and trade spheres with the CA countries. The share of Kazakhstan in the trade turnover of China with the CA countries, members of ShOS, makes 80%. Kazakstan exports to China energy resources (oil and gas), which account for 63% of the whole export, non-ferrous and ferrous metals (mainly as scrap), steel – 24%. In exchange Kazakhstan receives products of engineering and metal-working industries (72%), food products (11%) and other goods of muss consumption, a lot of which might be produced in Kazakhstan. The rise of the trade turnover goes on mainly thanks to the trans-border free trade zone, opened in 2006. It is evident that a certain quality change took place in the relations between two countries; it became systemic and comparable with

“great” Euro-Asian powers (India, Russia). Thus, the image of the PRC in Kazakhstan is connected with shaping of some “investing model” of the rich state, making big investments in the fuel energy complex and greatly surpassing Russia in this sphere. Apart from positive aspects of this phenomenon, public opinion and mass media of Kazakhstan show dissatisfaction (concern) about massive Chinese participation in development of oil and gas resources of Kazakhstan.

Tandem Russia-Kazakhstan at present ensures stability in the Central Asia, drawing a different image (distinct from Chinese) of Russia as a state partner for affairs of security in the region. And not only bilateral projects but also joint participation in ODKB contribute to it.

The following events were significant in principle for Astana and Moscow, which took place in 2006: 1) ratification by the parliaments of the agreement, concluded in 2005, on the Russian-Kazakh border; 2) in January signing in Astana of documents on creation of the Eurasian bank of development (EBD) with the authorized capital of \$ 1.5 billion (2/3 – Russia, 1/3 –Kazakhstan). It was decided that on the territory of two countries (and in future of probable new members) the bank shall be not liable to pay any taxes, fees and duties.

The policy of Russia in relation to Kazakhstan is characterized by a new quality of political confidence, diversification of Russian projects (energy, chemical industry, investments, cosmos, banking), rise of bilateral trade turnover at the expense of Russian export.

On 20 December 2007, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed the three-lateral agreement on construction of the Caspian gas pipeline. In May 2007, the four-lateral agreement on extension of capacity of the gas pipelines system Middle Asia-Center (MAC) was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The signed documents clearly show that the issue of Kazakh gas transit will

become significant for Russia, China and Kazakhstan itself in the nearest time. In perspective, the annual amount of 80-100 billion cubic meters of gas may be shipped through Kazakhstan, which will become the cross-roads, where Turkmen and Uzbek gas will turn either to Russia or to China.

Comparing “image” specific features of the two regional cooperation’s models (CPR-Kazakhstan and RF-Kazakhstan), one should note not only some (objective) lack of convergence of interests within these two pares but also the probability to liquidate the rising contradictions, if cooperation of these states (particularly, in the energy sphere) is carried out at the three-lateral level (RF-PRC-RK).

The Chinese-Kazakh agreements (achieved at the negotiations in 2003 and 2004) on construction of the oil pipeline to China and on development of the Chinese investment activities in the oil and gas sphere of Kazakhstan were not positively commented by all experts in Russia. Some experts considered them as certain hidden anti-Russian steps on the part of Astana. Other experts regarded that China had intensified its policy related to Kazakhstan because Russia had postponed implementation of Datsin project. On the contrary, some analysts considered intensification of Chinese-Kazakh cooperation in the oil industry as the wish of Beijing to create the energy “corridor” in the direction of China, alternative to western companies, and stressed that it does not create any challenges and threats.

It should be mentioned that, projecting this discussion to the present realities, all reciprocal suspicions of the 1990s have gone to the past. The RF, the PRC, the RK have justified their rights for diversification of energy export without any detriment to each other. In 2003, Kazakhstan raised the issue of the chance for Russia to participate in shipment of oil to China in combination with Kazakhstan’s projects. Many experts in Kazakhstan expressed doubts

that Kazakhstan would be able simultaneously to fill all pipelines by oil, including the principal pipeline to China. In this connection the perspectives of new cooperation between Astana and Moscow appear. Some companies of Kazakhstan proposed Russian colleagues to consider a chance to enlarge to 30 million tons the annual amount of Russian oil for pumping through under-loaded oil pipeline Atyrau-Samara and other transit oil pipelines with the perspective of Russian oil export by the principal pipeline to China. The participation in such project may have a rather good perspective for Russia, since shaping of a kind of Russia-Kazakhstan oil cartel might enforce the position of Moscow and Astana as sellers in the world oil markets.

Chinese-Turkmen relations are based on the commissioned in December 2009 new gas pipeline Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China and the further development of energy cooperation. The decease of S. Niyazov in December 2006 and election in February 2007 as new leader of Turkmenistan of G. Berdymukhamedov made some accents in the Chinese-Turkmen relations. Beijing was concerned about probable political destabilization in Ashghabad and deviation of the new leader from traditional neutrality to greater rapprochement with the West, which might negatively influence the stable relations between two countries. The change of leadership made Beijing intensify preparation of gas project on the planned import of Turkmen gas. The implementation of the gas project started in August 2007. The mutual trade turnover between PRC and Turkmenistan for the period of 1997-2008 increased almost by 19 times – from \$ 19 million (1997) to \$ 453 million (2008). The main items of Turkmen export to PRC – energy bearers and products of oil-chemical industry (85%), cotton oil and other types of cotton raw materials, produce of textile and light industry. China exports to Turkmenistan production of industrial-

technical devices and construction materials (60% of Turkmen import), consumption goods (over 30%).

The present format of **relations between Turkmenistan and Russia** in the gas sector is connected with the perspectives of Turkmen gas deliveries to Russia. The pipelines, existed since Soviet times (Asia-the Center), do not cope with the amount of gas shipment. In case of greater deliveries, construction of new pipelines and consecutive rise of Russian or other (Chinese, Iranian, Kazakh) investments will be needed for implementation of projects. Russia and China confront each other in eastern part of Turkmenistan. Russia intends to rise greatly import of Turkmen gas by the MAC system. In the course of implementation of Chinese-Turkmen gas projects Turkmenistan may arrange an auction on the prices for its gas. “Gasprom” was traditionally oriented to keeping monopoly and low import prices. However, it will be rather difficult for Russia to keep monopoly for purchase of Turkmen gas.

The Caspian problems directly influence Russian-Turkmen relations. The potential sphere of cooperation is their reciprocal interest in mutual development of Caspian resources. The main hindrance for all Caspian states is determination of the legal status of the sea. In its turn, this problem “disintegrates” into separate bilateral “options” relating to five Caspian states – Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. The known position of Russia is as follows: “water” is a common property, the ground should be divided into five sectors. The agreements on division of the ground have been signed already between Russia and Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan. The problems relating to the Caspian Sea are still not solved between Iran and Turkmenistan.

CPR – Kirghizstan. The so-called tulip revolution in Kirghizstan on 24-25 March of 2005 was a difficult test for Chinese-

Kirghiz relations. Chinese experts expressed their concern in this respect, related to the aggravation of trans-border Uighur separatism, probable change of attitude to ShOS by the new leadership of Kirghizstan. China enforced its trade presence in Kirghizstan. Its export surpasses import from Kirghizstan by 32.5 times. The share of China in trade turnover of Kirghizstan accounts for almost 90%. Beijing, aspiring for better relations with new leadership of Kirghizstan, increased its credited import from Kirghizstan. Creation of the free trade trans-border zone between two countries accelerated this process. Since both countries are members of the WTO, the access of Chinese goods to markets of Kirghizstan is easier than to other countries. The export from Kirghizstan includes textile raw component (leather and wool- about 25%), ferrous and non ferrous scrap (about 60%). The components of Kirghiz import are as follows: machines and equipment (6%), foods and other items of mass consumption goods (about 85%). In other words, the image of China for the Kirghiz people at present is the following: the state, which maintains trade with Kirghizstan, being for it “the elder trade brother”.

Russia-Kirghizstan. Kirghistan in time both of the first president A. Akayev and the second president K. Bakiyev was always one of the outposts in the Central Asia. The collective emergency forces’ detachment located in Kant was an integral part of the structure – ODKB. In September of 2003 the ministers of defense of Russia and Kirghizstan signed the treaty on the status and conditions of location of the Russian air base in Kirghizstan, which was officially grounded on 23 October 2003.

Another feature of “Akayev” period of Russian-Kirghiz relations was as follows: the Russian leadership after the known “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine with restrain regarded the course of A. Akayev, directed to open relations with the West, democratization

in the country, which in reality resulted rather to corruption and shadow business. For A. Akayev period, the American military base was located in Kirghizstan (airport Manas), commissioned in December 2001 within the framework of anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. In autumn of 2003 the agreement between the USA and Kirghizstan on activities of the base in Manas was extended for other three years. The remaining “parallelism” of military presence of Russia and the USA in Kirghizstan had negative impact on bilateral relations between Russia and Kirghizstan.

The gradual growth of Russian capital’s presence in Kirghizstan is marked in the economic sphere. The size of investments of the RF in economy of the republic grows annually by 30%.

The RF – Uzbekistan. In the end of the 1990s, president I. Karimov, as it is known, tried to shape the strategy of rapprochement with the USA. Russia was apprehended in a cool and sometimes unfriendly way. The Russian economic growth since 2000 (against the background of economic stagnation in Uzbekistan) objectively raised interest of Uzbekistan to Russia. Keeping in mind the significance of the economic factor and its influence on evolution of Tashkent’s policy relating to Russia, the complex of security issues seems to play the main reason of development of relations with Russia. Uzbekistan, having signed with Russia on 16 June 2004 the treaty on strategic partnership, actively participated in the summit of the heads of member-states of ShOS (17–18 June 2004), which becomes more and more the counterbalance to the American influence in the region. Uzbekistan entered this organization 2001. In 2006, I. Karimov insisted that Americans should leave this base in Uzbekistan, and following the long-term negotiations Washington had to submit to the demand of Tashkent and to leave the base in Uzbekistan. Moscow and Beijing made the impression on the Uzbek president, since they did not lectured

him how to govern and develop the state, society and democracy, were interested exclusively in affairs of security and economy, preservation of the general status-quo in the region, which coincided completely with the interests of Karimov. But in the beginning of 2009 Tashkent, having recalled about advantages of economic assistance of the West, suspended its membership in EvrAzES, which caused the negative reaction in Moscow.

China-Tajikistan. For the years of civil war in Tajikistan (1993–1997), China, confining itself to the principles of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in internal affairs, did not support any of the parties, limiting itself to rendering to the republic of humanitarian and technical assistance. The amount of trade turnover accounted for \$157 million in 2005, \$323 million in 2006, \$482 million in 2007. The main items of export of Tajikistan to China are the raw resources: aluminum, other non-ferrous and rare earth metals, cotton fiber; the Tajik import from China consists of not complicated produce of engineering industry, mass consumption goods. Within the framework of ShOS, Tajikistan got from China the preferential credit in the amount of \$600 million, which is used mainly for construction of electric power line 500 “South-North” and electric power line 220 in Khatlon region as well as for construction of tunnel under the mountain pass Shar-Sharon the route to Dushanbe-Kulyab. China gives great support to the Tajik light industry (production of cotton and silk fabrics).

In view of prominent economist Khajimakhmat Umarov, just the flow of cheap (at the prices 2-3 times lower than average world prices) mass consumption goods, delivered by China, helped Tajikistan to realize its program of struggle against poverty. For the last two years, the share of the poorest stratum of the population decreased from 83.4% to 64%. The following projects are being implemented with assistance of China: reconstruction of the cement enterprise in

Dushanbe, production of sodium hydroxide, deliveries of equipment for pits and of mining equipment for development of tin and tungsten deposits. Of special importance for the republic are deliveries of light agricultural machines and lift linkage for them, as well as aggregates for small hydroelectric stations and windmills for mountainous districts. For the period of 2006–2007, the support, given by China to construction of the first hydroelectric station of the cascade of such stations in Zeravshan valley demonstrates a firm decision of the PRC to raise in terms of quality its investment activities.

The RF – Tajikistan. The relations between Moscow and Dushanbe passed hard tests for the period of civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997) and for the years of restoration of peace in the republic. The specifics of contemporary Russian-Tajik ties are determined by a number of contradictory factors.

First, it is necessary to take into account the problem of Tajik labor migration (mainly illegal) in Russia. The annual flow of Tajik migrants to the RF in search for work makes from 300 to 500 thousand people. The Russian authorities try to put this process under the legal and administrative control, but de facto migration and further migrants' activities are kept under a weak control.

Second, Russia has drafted some big investment plans for Tajikistan. In its time, RAO “EES of Russia” in its time signed an agreement with the government of Tajikistan on the conditions of share participation of the RF in implementation of the project aimed at termination of construction of Sangtudinskaya hydroelectric station with the planned investment of \$250–300 million. Before 2007, Russian company “Rusal” prepared some projects on construction of Rogunskaya hydroelectric station and concluded the agreement on reconstruction of aluminum enterprise in Regar and construction of the second in the country aluminum plant with projected capacity of 200

thousand tons per year. The company was able to make investments in the size of \$1.2 billion in economy of Tajikistan. Due to the exaggerated technological demands of the Tajik side concerning the height of the Rogunskaya hydroelectric station's dam and due to other claims, "Rusal" withdrew from this project, giving the chance for other aspirants to participation in Tajik projects.

Third, one should take into account functioning of the Russian military base in Tajikistan. The motorized infantry division N 201 was used as a foundation of the base; its detachments were located in Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab. The Russian base in Tajikistan became one of the mightiest links in the security system of ODKB in the Central Asia. With due account of the Russian-Tajik agreement on the working regime of Russian mountainous station "Nurek" ("Window"), which has for Moscow the strategic significance in the sphere of cosmic tracking, it is possible to put this factor into the positive outcome of this partnership.

Fourth, it is necessary to mention the problem of Tajik-Afghan border and security of Russia. On 16 October 2004, the border services of Russia and Tajikistan signed a special agreement on the gradual passage of border guarding from Russian to Tajik detachments of border guards, which terminated in 2006. Regretfully, the service of Tajik border guards did not promote strengthening of the struggle against narcotics traffic, which was increased by 3.5 times by 2006. Local residents joke with regret that today the border is "divided" among relatives and chiefs of Tajik (Afghan) tribes, living on the opposite sides of the border, where each tribe has fixed its price. The certain "tribal privatization" of the main trans-border channels and routes of narcotics transportation took place. It is a significant question, who benefited and who lobbied on the Tajik side the decision to replace Russian border guards by Tajik border guards. Probably, the negative

results of the border “reform” were taken into account by the presidents of Russia and Tajikistan at their meeting in Sochi on 26 May 2006, when they agreed on coordination of cooperation in the border region and approved a program of assistance to Tajikistan for formation of the border service of this republic.

It is possible to conclude that the relations between two countries are based on: a) the interest of big Russian business of state and non-state companies in Tajik market of electric energy and aluminum; b) the significance of military component, which has for Russia both global strategic (complex “Nurek”) and regional meaning (the 4th base).

* * *

Summing up the review of the present existence and of evolution of the images of Russia and China on the “post-Soviet” territory (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), it is possible to make the following conclusions.

The aggravation of the problem, related to maintenance of trans-border security, the opposition to hegemony of the USA, and mainly the problem of ensuring economic interests becomes the mighty factor of giving positive images to Russia and the PRC in the CA space. Despite lack of convergence of Russian and Chinese particular economic interests and their certain disparity to aspirations of the CA states, there are no reasons to say that these differences determine shaping of “final” images of the RF and the PRC in the region at this stage. The key “image making” factor remains a mutual advantage of economic reciprocal actions of China with the region’s states at the bilateral level, on the one side, and cooperation with Russia with the same countries (in the bilateral format as well), on the other side.

The comparison of the Chinese and the Russian images in the CA is characterized by the specific perception of Russia and China by the CA elites and by the peoples of the region. The peculiarities of Russian image are connected with: a) the common character of cultural-language traditions, which is being traced also today; b) greater (comparing with China) common historic and economic roots; c) stronger positions of Russia in the sphere of regional security. The peculiarities of the Chinese image in the CA are determined by: a) greater potentialities of the PRC economy at present stage comparing with potential of national economy of the RF, successful Chinese reforms and efficiency of the anti-crisis program of the PRC; b) availability for the nearest perspective of big financial-investment projects for development of infrastructure and other spheres of economy in the region's states as well as achievement of real positive results at the stages of implementation of these projects; c) finally, stronger positions of China in the sphere of economic cooperation.

As negative factors, having impact on shaping image of the PRC in the CA, should be mentioned the remaining concerns of weak states of the region (Tajikistan and Kirghizstan) about the uncontrolled extension of the Chinese presence in economies of these countries and about transformation of the latter into the raw resources addition to China, including complete "erosion" of national economies. The procrastination of the RF (in comparison with China) in submitting and implementation of economic projects has a negative impact on formation of Russian image.

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