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**THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERALISM**

The research interest to the phenomenon of sovereignty, to its political, social-cultural and ethnic-national aspects did not run short for the whole period of modern political history of Russia. The multi-rhythm of phenomena, characterized by the notion “sovereignty”, is being stressed by its three types: “the state sovereignty”, “the people’s sovereignty”, “the national sovereignty”. On the one side, each type of sovereignty has its specifics, on the other side, all these types are closely connected with each other. The analysis of the state sovereign’s perceptions, elaborated by various state legal schools, shows that the general sense and substance of the state sovereignty in most cases, on the one side, comes to the supreme power of the state in the country in relation to all other existing within its limits social powers, various associations of citizens and in relation to the citizens themselves, and, on the other side, it is associated with the independence of the state power of the given country relating to other sovereign state powers.

The national sovereignty is the right to political, economic and cultural self-determination of the nation for preservation of its distinction, way of life, language and culture for ensuring free development of the nation. However, the political-legal aspect of the

people's right to self-determination affects the international legal principle of the territorial integrity of the states. The question is, in what way to coordinate the principle of self-dependence of peoples and nations with the principle of inviolability of the state borders and territorial integrity of the states?

The problem of national sovereignty is closely connected with the contradiction between aspiration for general human integrity and national separation, between consolidation of the ethnic feature of public relations and the need of orientation to the common human values, between compliance with human rights and stability of sovereignty (state or national).

As the bearers of the national sovereignty there come forward the communities, based on various types of self-identification: territorial, civil, ethnic, religious and lingual. At the same time, proceeding from social (cultural) basis of community, known as the people or the nation, the constitutional-legal and international-legal forms of realization of the national sovereignty shall be different.

For a long time, in the Soviet Union the national principle was considered the main, if not the sole, principle of the federal state. The Declaration of the Rights of the Workers and Exploited Peoples proclaimed that the Soviet Russian Republic was established on the basis of a free union of free nations as the federation of Soviet national republics. The nations received the right to self-determination and consequently a certain (to some extent formal) sovereignty, since the federation was an exceptional need for the creators of the Soviet state as a means to solve the national problem.

At present therefore some republics insist on the ethnic basis of their own statehood. As a rule, the leading role of the "title" ethnos is being stressed. This perception represents not only "care" for development of this ethnos but also usually justification of exaggerated

claims of the republics for the state sovereignty, since according to the ethnic interpretation of sovereignty only the subjects of the federation, established on the basis of national principle, may possess the status of the state. At the same time, these republics ignore the absence in the Constitution of the RF of the definition of the subject's status by ethnic peculiarities of the population's composition and by the fact of existence or the lack of the statehood.

It is evident that the lack of the national sovereignty's definition by the legislation within the framework of the federal state and legal mechanisms of realization of national sovereignty of the Russian Federation's peoples in the internal forms of self-determination does not promote consolidation of the territorial integrity of the country.

The threat to disintegration of the Russian Federation consists in its legislation, as V. Bagdasaryan thinks. The article 5 of the Constitution determines as "states" the national republics of the RF. The federal structure of the RF has no analogues in contemporary world practice. The national autonomies have not been given the status of a state in any country, except Russia.

The type of contemporary Russian federalism and the political vector of its development to a large extent are determined by realization of national sovereignty as ethnic and territorial communities, including multinational Russian people. The main conditions of realization by the peoples, living on the state's territory, of national sovereignty, of the right to internal political self-determination are as follows: compliance with the rights of other peoples and the lack of threat to the territorial integrity.

At present, the Russian political elite is convinced that a significant instrument of achievement of the urgent aim of contemporary state construction – the leveling of legal status of the subjects of the Russian Federation – is the creation of economic, social

and political conditions for ignoring ethnic communities as subjects for realization of their rights to self-determination in political forms.

However, the practice of federal relations demonstrates contradictory and inconsistent impulses in the high echelons of power. Some time ago, M. Remizov, president of the Institute of National Strategy, making comments on the treaty for delineation of competence with Tatarstan, presented by V. Putin to the State Duma, said that one of some systemic achievements of V. Putin's epoch was turn off the road of agreed federalism. According to his appraisal, the preconditions were created for leveling the present "defective" federalism, characterized by its evident systemic contradictions between nominal equality and actual inequality of the subjects, between the constitutional and the agreed models etc. Unfortunately, at present all this is being made null and void. The special treaties with Tatarstan and Chechnya not only aggravate ethnic asymmetry of our federalism but also start a new stage of centrifugal processes. For the period of weakening of the federal center, confronting "transit of power" problem, the so-called national republics and further Russian regions will struggle for leveling their status to make it equal to the level of Chechnya and Tatarstan or, as a minimum, will fix the basic injustice of the contemporary state order, according to M. Remizov.

In his turn, A. Porfiryev has hopes of gradual refusal from agreed delineation of powers between the federation and the subjects in the course of the regions' amalgamation, which would make them efficient and would exclude the threat to the territorial integrity and the civil peace in the country under condition of realization by peoples of the Russian Federation of their national sovereignty in the forms of internal self-determination. At present, rather wide circles of the scientific and political environment share the view that development of federal relations on the way of passage to equality of the RF subjects in their

relations with the federal powers, equality of citizens irrespective of national, language and religious distinction, recognition of cultural pluralism would promote development of civil basis in the national-territorial entities, being subjects of the Russian federation.

However, as E. Maiboroda considers, the principle of “symmetric federation”, fixed in the Constitution of the RF in 1993, did not change the existed reciprocal relation between the Federation and its subjects. It may be explained by the fact that the main difference in legal status of the subjects of the RF, dictated by the principles of their creation (national and territorial), existed from the beginning of federal construction on Russia’s territory. The acquisition of “sovereign” rights by national entities was going on the way of their priority over the rights of territorial entities.

The politicians’ activities are based on the works of experts, who express often different and sometimes opposite points of view. For instance, M. Stolyarov shares the point of view that in the federal states there is a clear separation among questions of the federal competence, mutual governance of the federation and its subjects, exclusive governance of the federation’s subjects. The interference of sovereign entities in the sphere of their own competence is not allowed and is qualified as unconstitutional action. Thus, to the mind of this expert, the adequate division of competence and terms of reference in the federal state makes quite possible peaceful coexistence of two and more sovereign states.

The conception of “symmetric federation”, characterized by its modernization, has also its adepts, who criticize ethnic federalism and refute the chance of subject’s rights existence in ethnic communities. For instance, V. Tishkov criticized the legislative activities of the State Duma of the RF, based on the doctrine of collective rights (ratification

by the State Duma of the European frame work convention for the rights of national minorities).

A. Saveliyev thinks that Russia has to keep the unitary forms in order to govern a great geopolitical space, possessing equal in substance but undivided sovereignty over various territories. According to him, the construction of a European state (a federation of territories with equal status) does not suite Russia for historic reasons. To his mind, in order to consolidate sovereignty of Russia it is necessary to get rid of federalism and not to transform it, to reform it or to interpret it in the positive way.

G. Tulchinski in general considers that the RF is only a nominal federation and that there is no historic legal substantiation of Russian federalism. To his mind, nobody has yet justified the need of federalism for Russia, as nobody justified the contrary.

M. Afanasyev thinks that under Russian conditions it is impossible to solve the problem of social trust and to consolidate the civil involvement skills, pointing out that the vast territory itself does not suppose the republican, particularly federal order of national life. From the point of view of bearers of traditional “statehood” idea, the size of the territory only intensifies the need in the vertical of power to ensure bureaucratic governance of all parts of the controlled space. For many centuries of human history the people thought that only the authoritarian governance suits most countries. But, as mentions M. Afanasyev, the federation was invented by the founders of the American Constitution as a new for those times unknown way of organization of the republic in the great political space. Consequently, the great territory of Russia is the challenge to probable principally different political answers.

In conclusion, one may say that at present the Russian Federation has not been determined in perception of national sovereignty in terms

of scientific or political-legal field. At present, the complex critical comprehension of the existing system of federal relations and elaboration of systemic measures for their perfection is quite possible. In this respect, a special urgency acquires the analysis of the place and significance of national sovereignty in political-legal origin of contemporary Russian federalism.

“Vlast”, M., 2010, N 3, p. 4–8.

G.Murklinskaya,

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**THE COUNTERACTION AGAINST THE
CONTEMPORARY THREATS
IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA**

The threats to security of the southern boundaries of Russia and of all states of the Caspian Sea region aggravate essentially against the background of the growing conflict between Iran and the USA, threatening to turn out into its military stage. The USA does not keep back its interest in the seizure of the military-political control over the territory from the Persian Gulf through the Caspian Basin and the Caucasus to the Black Sea and the Crimea. One can see the painfully pulsating arch of instability – the civil and inter-ethnic conflicts – on the whole southern perimeter of our borders. It forces us to think once more about our internal stability and mobilizing preparedness of civil society to repulse any forms of aggression in case of a direct threat of interference (under any pretext) in our internal affairs and of the attempts to destabilize the situation in our borderline regions and republics.

The gravest threat, creating preconditions for the outside interference and different types of aggression from information-

ideological and cultural-civilization to military actions, is caused by the semi-underground terrorist network and by the fifth column of ascendancy agents of regional and world historic antagonists of Russia in national republics.

The struggle against the terrorist threat in the country supposes creation of a complicated, well-coordinated multi-level program and in general of a state system, including dynamic and constructive cooperation of the state structures and the non-governmental public organizations as a part of civil society. It should be taken into account that we deal not with one type of terrorism, but with its different types in terms of objectives and sources of financing. Their common feature is the method of achievement of the set objectives. It should be admitted that it is impossible to get rid of political terrorism. As soon as antagonism exists in society itself, the clashes of different groups will take place, and sometimes they will be in the form of terrorism.

Therefore it should be said that the author speaks about the form of political terrorism, caused by religious Islamic extremism and about adjacent ethnic and regional separatism, as well as about a new phenomenon in our life, such as the crimes, committed on the basis of hatred. The factors, contributing to strengthening of terrorist threat in specific circumstances of Russia, may be divided into some main components:

The accelerated modernization at the scale of the country and region, the progressive lag of traditional societies in national republics;

The terrorist potential of the republics in the process of progressive archaic and marginal state, the permanent leadership (or clans' elites), almost full financial state subsidies, resulting in corruption of the power system at all levels.

The clan-cast system of power promotes faster stratification – separation of society into the social strata, which do not mix, and its

polarization. At the same time, most living generations still remember themselves, being equal members of the social state not separated by partitions – the USSR. Evidently, such forceful change of the social status without aspiration for its improvement for them or for their children can not help accumulating great negative protest energy against the system of power.

The conditions for rigid inter-ethnic and internal ethnic competition are being also created in small multinational republics, “shut up” within the borders of their geographic space by dissemination in central, wealthier and perspective regions of xenophobia. The going on aggravation of crisis elements in the republics of the North Caucasus in all spheres of life creates the situation, when each new generation starts its life with lesser cultural and educational capacity and consists of potentially “not wanted people”. The situation in Russian distant regions is not better, since the generations of “not wanted people”, street children, and abandoned children represent the source of mutual distrust and cruel competition among young people for “a well paid job”. This mixture is more explosive in national republics due to additional specific conditions. If one makes an addition to this situation of activities, carried out by external anti-Russian forces, directly interested in destabilization of the Caucasian region and supported by the well rooted and expensive network of agents, by the anti-Russian ideology, elaborated for almost two centuries, one may conclude that some stabilization, achieved thanks to the efforts, exerted by the law enforcement bodies, represents only a respite, which should be used to work out the comprehensive complex measures for neutralization of negative factors, provoking strengthening of terrorist threats.

Even in case of immediate elaboration and introduction of such complex measures, for a long time the republics in the south of Russia will remain a potential social and operative base for development of the

terrorist network and of bandits' groups, composed of national people and foreign mercenaries. Such Caucasian scenario may and should be prevented by development of civil institutions, public opinion and disapproval of xenophobia, hatred, aggression, which are the most efficient element of counteraction against extremism.

One of the most significant aspects of this complex program should become the information-psychological protection of the population from the directed hostile psychological impact by preventive information-psychological stereotyped analysis of situations and information. Various public associations should become an important element of shaping public position and views of the majority of the population: associations of children and young people, rural and religious communities, ethnic unions of representatives of one ethnic group, living on the territory of other ethnic groups. It is important to use all elements of information impact on these groups of people to use early diagnosis and to prevent xenophobia or aggressive behavior of these groups' members, of members of their families or their relatives. Society should master to solve the emerging problems by public ascendancy over individuals and to elaborate mechanisms of including, if necessary, the state structures in ensuring reintegration in society of the people occurred due to certain circumstances in the complicated situation, forcing them to extremism. These mechanisms include social and psychological aspects of targeted individual work with the people turned to be in the zone of risk.

As a whole, the state and society should work out a system of mutual actions in forming mass consciousness and educating new generations in the spirit of tolerance and civil responsibility. The aim consists in elaboration of immunity at the level of mass and individual perception of the main types of hostile information ascendancy. Three types of psychological ascendancy should be named: ascendancy over

law-abiding citizens; ascendancy over those, who are in the zone of social risk or due to ethnic mentality are predisposed to destructive models of behavior; ascendancy over the antagonists. The aim of information-psychological ascendancy over antagonists (in this case over those, who in their anti-constitutional activities has passed the point of irrevocability in society) is usually considered suppression of his will, disorientation, gradual guidance to the meaning that any resistance to the authorities and all the more continuation of terrorist or other anti-state, ant-public and other distracted activities lacks any perspective and is doomed to failure. The only way out is to surrender, to start peaceful way of life.

And the military solving of the problem may be mentioned only as the fourth direction. And in this direction the basis of struggle against terrorism and other forms of anti-constitutional activities in the proper state, particularly state terrorism, may be the targeted special operations. At the same time, the principal and coordinating link among all directions should remain the invisible work of secret services. Exactly the reconnaissance communities possess adequate mass of information and specialists for carrying out counter-terrorist and information-psychological operations. The developed civil society is characterized by the fact that all its non-governmental public organizations, associations, unions strive for constructive and open cooperation with the authorities to prevent criminal acts, connected with racial, ethnic or religious hatred, separatist or religious-extremist ideas. As a good example of relations between the state and civil society we can consider the work carried out to prevent conflicts and crimes, based on hatred, in California, in the cities of San-Francisco and Los Angeles.

Russia still has to pass the long way of acquiring experience and building the civil society, able in constructive mutual actions with the

state to solve the problems of ethnic, racial and confessional relations. At the first stage of this way, probably, the success could be achieved by means of elaboration of the complex program of methods and main mechanisms of reciprocal action of society and state for the sake of ensuring safe development of multi-confessional and poly-ethnic regions of the country. The aim of such complex program should consist in involvement of instruments of civil society in settlement of vital issues, using its channels in mass media (and other means and methods of influence on mass and individual consciousness), and it would be necessary to carry out the needed work. Otherwise, the attempts to solve the problems only by military methods will result in unpredictable results, destructive for the country.

Huan Carlos Marigella, the theoretician and legend of terrorism, in his book on theory and practice of “city guerrilla” in the beginning of the 1970s made the recommendation to transform terrorist acts into a political crisis and further into the civil war. As he says, it is necessary to struggle against the power in the way, which will transform this power into an awful tyranny, to make every day life of the people unbearable and to provoke panic and chaos in society. The authorities will inevitably enact martial law to install order. But it will not stop the terror, since its logic is inexorable. Bombs will explode and people will be killed, the police will apply cruel methods of struggle... As a result, the population will rise in rebellion against the army and police. If everyday life is imperiled, the instinct of self-protection and wish to live prevail over the reasons of wisdom of the most patient people. These theoretical recommendations are used by all contemporary terrorist organizations. In the beginning of the century the terrorist organizations in Latin America sustained defeat in the struggle against regular armed forces in rural areas and lost support of local population, and therefore they started city guerrilla; the contemporary terrorism is

characterized by organized cycle activities, since it takes into account the experience of former terrorists. The observers of events in Chechnya long time ago predicted the start of a new circle: the full or partial change of the armed struggle's tactics by the Chechen underground organizations.

Each century advances its projects of uniting the world – Messiah ideas, which oppose “old world”. For the beginning of the XXI century, two ideas, being contradictory on the face of it, became most urgent: globalization in American way and jihad as the idea of installation of a certain world Islamic caliphate. However, the peculiarity of the second idea is as follows: actually it performs up till present the untidy work for realization of the idea of globalization. But it does not make it less dangerous: it is as if Fascism in Germany before the second front opening.

The forces engaged in the struggle for realization of jihad idea may be divided as follows: the ideologists of contemporary jihad with world known names and the analytical centers of foreign secret services – being the brain of the project; the international terrorist network with its bases, specialists, military experts and experts in waging psychological war (tactic and strategy), with due account of the specific ethnic regional conflicts – being as if the organization's body; the third part not in significance but by the relative order may be considered the number of people, who are in charge of financial and material support of this complicated system.

Apart from global projects, there exists regional jihad for all regions and even small enclaves with Muslim population. Implementation of some or other projects depends on the political order, and this order is not always directly connected with the main project. The implementation of any project demonstrates sooner the existence of some coincidence of NATO and the USA interests with the

interests of the countries-satellites in Islamic world. For some time, such coincidence of interests existed by the USA and Afghan mojaheds: the USA could not allow the USSR to get dominance in the significant geopolitical direction; the USA seized Afghanistan by mojaheds' efforts and made it to be its stronghold in Asia.

One of these regional projects remains Chechnya, but it would be impossible to push it out of structure of Russia without Dagestan. Two main obstacles prevent implementation of Dagestani jihad project: the enmity of the majority of the republic's population and the rigid position of the official power. In such cases the usual method consisted in initiation of a kind of "orange" or of some other "revolution". The fulfillment of this task by Jihad underground organization became more complicated owing to adoption in the republic of the new law on elections and thanks to the partial change of the ruling elite's composition. Up till present time, the strategists of the information-terrorist war made their main stake on habitual and fed up Ichkeria's terrorists, since analysts of western secret services supported them and their structures, while western mass media publicized them. At present, the number of Arabic and Chechen "names", getting money, was reduced almost to null and void. Other "authoritative" leaders of bandits' groups in Chechnya will not appear (for certain objective reasons).

The bandits' groups in Dagestan occupied for some time the depended position and participated in terrorist acts and military clashes to a lesser extent, keeping their potential. This fact preserved for some time the danger of transfer of military actions to Dagestan. Today it is possible to say that this threat has been liquidated up till now. What is more, most bandits' groups, "returned" from Chechnya to Dagestan, lost their leaders and were dispersed. At the same time, the foreign policy position changed, and Arabic oil states lost their interest in

further financial support in Dagestan to implementation of Arabic geopolitical project, which sustained the crushing defeat in Chechnya. Evidently the situation is changing and the Dagestani project, judging by intensification of underground activities, has been determined by the controlling secret services to be a self-dependent direction.

The formation of a united extremist movement, composed from different fragments, is going on in the world. They consist from underground extremist and terrorist groups of different Islamic trends and ethnic composition. The uniting components are as follows:

- The creation of a world Islamic caliphate as a general declared aim;

- The complicated multilevel system of subordination, which allows western secret services and connected special services of Islamic countries-satellites of America to use this global network in the geopolitical interests of the West (at present, more and more in the interests of one power – the USA);

- The common sources of financial support, the methods of struggle and even arms and training in the same camps by the same instructors.

For recent time, all this makes some researchers of political science qualify them as the reserved geopolitical enemies, living for some time under cover of diversion-terrorist Special Forces.

The Chechen underground organization was represented mainly by “wahhabism” in direct military form. It was oriented to Saudi Arabia and other Arabic countries-satellites of the USA, and this fact made it an inevitably torn away entity. In Dagestan rather big “wahhabi” forces are unable to place themselves at the head of separatism or opposition due to their alien origin. The jihad underground organization in Dagestan traditionally oriented itself not to distant Arabs but to Turkey and the North Caucasian Diaspora in this country. Jihadizm in

Dagestan is a complicated and fragmented entity, including not only and not so much “wahhabis” but also radical Islamists, being traditional Muslims. Due to some reasons, a part of jihadists were oriented more to information activities and public support of separatism during the first Chechen war and continue to occupy such position in covered form now (Aesopian language of articles, written by some intellectuals).

With some evidence, one may say after liquidation of bandits’ formations in Chechnya that exactly Dagestani jihadist underground organization inherited the uncovered part of “wahhabi” special forces, whose members now are engaged in training of young people in different groups. The objective pursued by these underground Special Forces is as follows: to live under cover on the territory of the enemy and to wait for its hour, arranging terrorist acts and diversions. The general ideological approach, making it possible to recruit the youth in Islamic regions, which, mildly speaking, do not feel sympathy for the West, consists in “world jihad”, guided and directed in the channel, beneficial for the customer. Regretfully, the underground organization both in Dagestan and Chechnya represent exactly such fragmented Islamic conglomerate, united only by ideas of jihad and the dollars’ and ideological support. At the same time, some members of the underground movement work under cover in all structures, including higher echelons of power.

It is necessary to mention another grave analytical mistake, connected with the lack of systemic approach and with inadequate account of dynamics of processes, going on in Islamic world. It is a paradox but the defeat sustained by the fighters-jihadists in the course of military aggression from the territory of Chechnya contributed in general to consolidation of position of Islam in the North Caucasus. At present, the question is that this consolidation promoted consolidation of the state and overcoming conflicts by means of Islamic tolerance

potential, patriotism and law-abiding behavior of Muslims. It should be taken into account the following: first, on the one side, traditional clergy seemed to consolidate its position, on the other side, its authority among the young people and representatives of the middle-aged population decreased; second, the youth acquired internal need in its own Islamic self-identification, consequently raised its interests in study of Islam primarily by Internet and in Islamic higher educational institutions.

The attention of the youth to Internet-Islam with aspiration of young people for justice and maximal wish to achieve it resulted in gradual virtual adherence of increasing part of young Muslims of Russia to the world Islamic umma, which lets speak about existence in their consciousness of elements of double citizenship: Russian and “caliphate”. Indirectly it is proved by the rise of the number of volunteers from Muslim regions of Russia in the groups of talibs in Afghanistan. The recruitment of Islamic young people is effected to the regions of the world, where armed clashes take place. The rotation of these contingents will result in further radicalization of Islam in Russia.

Similar events occurred in Saudi Arabia and other Arabic countries, when mojaheds from these countries took part in armed actions against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Having come back, the former participants of armed actions displayed absolute intolerance to heterodoxy. The second factor of radicalization of Islam will become further Islamic education of the population in Muslim regions, particularly in cases, when teaching of Islam becomes an obligatory discipline in the general education schools, as the clergy actively demands it to be adopted.

Following the natural generations’ change within the clergy of the republics, the last remnants of the so-called “traditional Islam” will sink into the Lethe of history, where they will be adequately

interpreted. In particular, in Dagestan since the times of the Chechen war the activities directed to re-consideration of the Caucasian region's history are carried out with the view of creation of a kind of united ideology. According to this interpretation of history, there were no revolution, no patriotic war, since these events represented only the stages of the everlasting Caucasian war. Even at present, some mass media agencies publicly propagate this ideology.

All above mentioned creates ideal conditions for gradual substitution of mentality of all peoples in the North Caucasus, for transformation of greater number of young people into active "citizens" of the world Islamic caliphate. As an example at the initial stage of local use of the "virtual Kuwait" effect in the North Caucasus we can consider to be the site www.Ingushetia.ru, connected with the clans, which have been pushed aside from power but still possess a rather great anti-Russian capacity and enjoy support of external forces. In this respect, the phenomenon of "virtual Kuwait" may be realized practically everywhere. The international law up till present almost does not regulate and does not establish rules of procedure relating to many issues and legal collisions, emerging in the course of spontaneous self-development of elements of these network structures. At present, there exists a chance of their use for direct interference in internal affairs of some other state and for carrying out of various network operations and diversions for the sake of changing the constitutional system of this state.

Colonel-General A. Safonov, the special representative of the President of the RF for the issues of international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism and transnational organized criminality, mentions seven stages of world jihad, planned by Al-Qaeda in 1998 ("Krasnaya Zvezda", 11.04.2007). The first stage, called "Waking Up", provided for a mighty strike against the western world (2000–2002).

The attack of 11 September played this tragic role. The second stage, called “Stand up from Kneel” (2002–2005(6)) was planned to draw the West in aggression against two-three Islamic states. Such situation exists in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the probable war may begin against Iran. The aim of the following stages consists in achievement of Islamic solidarity and (at the fourth stage) the overthrow of secular regimes (called by adepts of jihad as regimes of Islamic heretics) in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and other two-three states. According to these plans, caliphate will be established in the period of 2015–2020. In the perception of talibs and al-Qaeda only in this way the Islamic model will get the upper hand in the clash of civilizations. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that to all appearances this scenario shows a rather efficient realization of this strategy.

The existence in Russia of Muslim regions and enclaves with a great number of youth, which associate themselves not with Russian civilization, like older generations, but with certain Islamic umma and then with Islamic caliphate, creates a potential threat to security of the state. In order to prevent such development of events it is necessary to start the work with all elements of civil society for the sake of integration of the Islamic youth in Russian society, to prevent its self-isolation and full concentration in ideological directions of the external forces.

The success of these technologies in Yugoslavia makes the West suppose that after creative review and corresponding correction it would be possible to use them also against Russia, in particular in the North Caucasus. But the situation and the mentality of the population in the North Caucasus essentially differs from the former situation in Yugoslavia, which resulted in its defeat and which now threatens to ruin Serbia. Undoubtedly, the North Caucasus and particularly Dagestan were and are subject to massive information pressure with the

aim of changing historic memory. As was mentioned, one of the elements of this work is replacement of Russian and Soviet history by a kind of myth, a surrogate of history of imamat in Dagestan in times of war waged by Shamil and of the world Islamic caliphate. Thus, in the republic there exists an intellectual semi-underground organization, which at present is privately rather supported than disapproved by a great part of the ruling elite. In other words, there exist in parallel with official in the information space: “history”, “ideology”, “legal system” of a mythical state – imamat. “The citizens” of this “imamat” are mainly the same people, who associate themselves with a virtual Islamic umma and form various network structures, including terrorist groups. But the main part of this network is still in “dormant” state.

The above mentioned information does not mean that Islam should be presented as a Devil or be transformed into a world threat. One should rather agree with S. Markedonov, who considers the North Caucasus as a kind of frontier. Contrary to the ideological stagnation of the elite like two-faced Janus, the virtual space is characterized by the constant information-psychological war, by the struggle for spirit of the people. In the course of this information war, the general priorities and moral imperatives of new Russian world will emerge.

The urgent creation and introduction of a complex program for working out mechanisms of mutual action of state and civil society is a must. This program should include models and technologies of information work with the population of the country and counteraction against hostile information technologies. This work should aim at working out “immune systems” of the population against similar technologies in order to prevent the West “to take a leap in the dark”, as secret agents say, and to use Muslims against Russia, like it happened in Afghanistan and Chechnya. In the course of this struggle Islam should transform from a destructive weapon of the West again into one

of the ideological link of the Russian statehood, a significant and natural element of traditional Eurasian civilization. The re-grouping of the elite clans in Dagestan instead of expected change of elites provoked acceleration of transformation of the anti-Russian underground, having allowed it to integrate in the system of power under more advantageous conditions. One should not forget that the open and directly alien “wahhabism” in Russia is being replaced by a new “virus” of extremism, which is ideologically more adapted to mentality of the peoples in the North Caucasus and which has mastered mimicry for some time and is able to penetrate the state system and society.

*“Severny Kavkaz v sovremennoi politike Rossii”,
Makhachkala, 2009, p. 231–243.*

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**THE CIVILIZATION-CULTURAL DIALOGUE
IN THE CAUCASUS – THE BASIS
OF REGIONAL STABILITY**

The problem of stability and security in the Caucasus and in the south of Russia is one of the most complicated and acute problems in the Russian Federation. Many authors try to comprehend and to explain it by means of methodological, precisely speaking ideological “clash of civilizations” construction, introduced in scientific discussion by S. Huntington. This is the basis of the myth, widely spread in western and partly in national literature, on incompatibility of the Caucasian peoples’ traditional culture with modernization and the modern democratic system. It is justified by the alarmist picture, constructed on

absolute meaning of terrorism and extremism, which hinders to see the dominant of the all-Russian co-citizenship, the mutual cultural germination of Russia's peoples, determining the all-Russian identity.

Meanwhile, the complex approach to history and contemporary social life in the Caucasus and in the south of Russia demonstrates dominance of constructive, peaceful mutual relations of the region's peoples over marginal separatist, extremist and terrorist phenomena (without lessening their social danger). The author defends the constructive dialogue, precisely multilingual contacts, of civilizations and cultures in the Russian Caucasus, which lets understand historic and contemporary processes without glossing over the truth, on the one side, and without calling forth demons, on the other side. In this context, the North Caucasus since ancient times, since the period of the modern man and the race formation has been the space of the dialogue of civilizations, religions, ethnic cultures, traditions and innovations, other institutions of social life.

The contemporary society in the North Caucasus is the result of many centuries social process of contacts, which goes on now and is the pledge of development of peoples and polities of the region. The local autochthon peoples (the Caucasian type of the South-European sub-race of the Great European race – the bearers of Nacho-Dagestani and Abhaz-Adyg pre-languages of the North Caucasian language group) kept constant mutual action with each other. Since the first half of the millennium B.C. the peoples of the Iranian language (Scyths, further Sarmats and Alans) were involved in this process. They became a part of ethnic and social-cultural history of actually all contemporary peoples of the region, particularly of Ossetians-direct successors of the ancient Indo-Europeans of the Caucasus. Since the middle of the first millennium A.D., the Turkic nomads (Huns, Bulgarians, Khazars, later Pechenegs and Polovts) played a great role in transformation of ethnic-

cultural and demographic image of the North Caucasus. Their heritage is seen in anthropology, languages and culture of contemporary peoples of the region, particularly of Turkic language peoples – Karachai-Balkarians, Kumyks. The period of the Mongol dominance in Eurasia (XII-XV centuries) also left traces in history of the region.

As a result, the North Caucasus is characterized by the racial diversity with coexistence of various anthropologic types of the South-European race: the Near Eastern type (Abkhaz, Armenians), the Caspian type (Azerbaijanis, Kyrds, Alysh and others), the Pontic type (Balkars, Ingushis, Kabardis, Karachais, Ossetians, Chechens and others). Besides, the Eastern-European type of the Great European race (the Slave peoples) and the Central Asian anthropologic type (Kumyks, Nogais) are represented in the North Caucasus.

The language picture of the North Caucasus is more complicated but organic and mutually penetrated: the North Caucasian family (Nakho-Dagestani and Abkhaz-Adyg groups) of the Sino-Caucasian Macro-Family of languages; the Indo-European languages (Russian and other Slavonic languages, Armenian, Ossetian, Tatar, Kurdish and other languages), the Turkic languages (Karachai-Balkarian, Kumyk, Nogai), the Mongolian language (Kalmyk).

The dialogue in the sacral sphere resulted in the phenomenon of religious syncretism, characteristic for most autochthon peoples of the region: since the first centuries A.D. various local beliefs were subject to influence of Judaism, further of Eastern Christianity; since the VII century the long period of influence of Islam started there. It is impossible to understand the present religious situation, the particularities of religious consciousness of the peoples in the North Caucasus without due account of complicated mutual penetration of these religious systems.

Since the times of Kiev Russia, particularly since the XVI century this multilateral dialogue of civilizations and cultures included Eastern Slavonic peoples (Russians). Till the end of the XVIII – beginning of the XIX century, this cultural exchange process was dominated by the Eastern channel, which translated to the North Caucasus the experience of two great social-cultural systems of Islam – the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire, having impact on all spheres of social life of the peoples in the region. The Caucasian mountains' civilization was not the object but the subject of this reciprocal action.

Following the North Caucasus' joining the Russian Empire (the end of the XVIII century-the year of 1864) the Eastern channel was ousted by the Russian channel, which started to play the role of translator of modernization processes in the region. The North Caucasus acquired via Russia all modern forms of professional culture and arts, positive law, the model of existence on the limited territory of coexistence of Orthodoxy, Islam and Buddhism. The system of distribution of spheres of Russian law, shariat and common law functioning was fixed in the legal sphere of the Empire. By the beginning of the XX century, despite inevitable contradictions and conflicts, the region as a whole organically integrated in the social-cultural system of the Empire.

The revolution of 1917 and the civil war nearly demolished integrity of Russia in its southern boundaries, while the socialist experiment resulted in both great achievements and losses of many achievements in social-cultural dialogue of the previous period. The religious culture, including constructive coexistence of confessions without proselytism on the historic territories of each other, was lost. The experience of combination of different legal systems in the state-legal relations was abandoned.

Nevertheless, preservation of the dominant role of Russian culture, in spite of Soviet ideological prevalence, via dialogue of cultures on the basis of Cyrillic alphabet and general literacy allowed establishing the contemporary structure of economy, science and education. The Russian language not simply replaced Kumyk (Turkic) as the language of inter-national intercourse but also extended considerably the space of the language dialogue in mutual action of cultures in the North Caucasus, became the channel of their involvement in world culture. By the 1990s, the North Caucasus was transformed into the highly developed social-cultural region.

In the end of 1980s-the beginning of the 1990s, the crisis of socialist ideology as a world outlook basis of systemic integrity of meta-national common character of the Soviet people and its culture resulted in fragmentation of the post-Soviet cultural space, which becomes a mosaic, multilateral entity, composed from different types of various cultural systems. Under conditions of the crisis and modernization processes, the significance of traditional forms of culture of the North Caucasus' peoples was raised. They were engaged in contradictory reciprocal action with other forms of traditional culture and modernism, Russian culture and culture of the North Caucasus' peoples; the contemporary inter-cultural communication is ambivalent, and it is characterized by various vectors and is not reduced to opposition or synthesis.

For the first decade of the XXI century, the dialogue forms of mutual actions as the basis of re-integration of social-political and cultural space were restored. As a consequence of this phenomenon, the conflict of ethnic-confessional identities was weakened, while gradual consolidation of Russian civil identity took place. Such social choice is able to restore the forming for the last two centuries systemic unity of

the North Caucasian culture and its synthesis with Russian culture, with rebirth of the Russian civilization model.

The Russian cultural tradition never set as its task the full assimilation of peoples of Russia, which keep originality of their traditions and cultures, moral standards. For two centuries, the development objectively made peoples of the North Caucasus live closer to each other, transformed the North Caucasus into an integral and advanced part of the civilization-cultural space of Russia. Just Russian culture, in reciprocal action with ethnic traditional cultures, strengthens the common character of the North Caucasian culture and peoples of the region.

The irreversibility of integration processes is determined by the spiritual and moral transformation of Russia, based on the inter-confessional and internal confessional dialogue. Its most significant subjects are Russian Orthodox Church and Islam as traditional religion in the south of Russia. The fast religious renaissance as a response to the crisis of value and moral system of the Soviet society emerged and to some extent continues to develop under conditions of the lost religious culture as a result of the prolonged administrative almost complete monopoly of atheism. As a result, the confessions in Russia confront the problem of conflicts, radically interpreting some religious dogmas without due account of a rich theological experience. Nevertheless, in all subjects of the RF in the South the Orthodox Eparchies maintain tolerant and constructive relations with Spiritual Departments of Muslims. The joint declarations and actions, which disapprove extremism, terrorism, attempts to stir up inter-national and inter-confessional tense relations, are well known. The other question is that it would be desirable to make these relations more efficient and systemic. The restoration of spirituality and morality will be impossible without it.

The imperative of the efficient dialogue between Orthodoxy and Islam in Russia is overcoming the internal Islamic contradictions, which is connected with radicalization of some religious groups and active use of pseudo-Islamic rhetoric by extremist and criminal groups. At the same time, one should not forget that dissemination of Islam in the region for the period of the 1990s was going on under the impact of a number of geopolitical, internal social-economic and ideological factors. The determining ones were the internal factors – the systemic crisis, de-modernization of economy, the lack of distinct policy of the federal center in the Caucasus, corruption of authorities, the absence of any social prospect etc. At the same time, one should not underestimate also the external factor. After disintegration of the USSR the North Caucasus turned out to become a border region. Actually, 38 states, leading international organizations and transnational companies made declarations about their interest in this significant military-strategic region with transport routes and energy communications.

A.V. Malashenko and other experts consistently deny the chance for dialogue between religions. It seems that it is true, if it concerns dogmas of mono-theistic religions. The recognition of some other religion or confession as an equal participant of the dialogue would mean for religious consciousness the start of apostasy. Therefore the ecumenical projects, construction of a united world religion are doomed only to a partial success and lack popularity in Russia. Nevertheless, in the long historic perspective some syncretic forms of religions may be shaped (Islam, professed by the peoples in the North Caucasus with elements of paganism and Christianity, is an example of it).

The subject of dialogue, more precisely of discussion among several participants, in the confessional space may be devoted to social issues. In this case, the subject of such discussion, like confessions, should be the state and institutions of civil society. These subjects may

be as follows: the social doctrines of confessions (the social doctrines of Orthodoxy and Islam are characterized by close, non-concurred positions and also the positions, which contradict liberal perception of human rights); the problem of introduction of the courses of basics of religious (Orthodox, Muslim, Buddhist and others) cultures. The problem is being acutely and differently perceived by society, but it is very important. One of the factors of dissemination of religious radicalism and extremism is the low level of religious culture. Besides, is it possible adequately to understand folklore, classic Russian culture without knowledge of basics of Orthodox culture or to bring back morality in the sphere of contemporary Russia outside without religion? Therefore not only confessions but also the state and society are interested in raising the level of religious culture, taking into account the consequences of atheist decades. The discussions may be devoted to the substance of the courses, forms of education etc., including as follows: counteraction against ethnic-religious terrorism and extremism, using the accumulated experience; ensuring the situation, when servicemen-believers may satisfy their spiritual needs. These and other problems may be interpreted and comprehended in a different way. Therefore it is significant to ensure such discussion.

The correct accusations of some religious figures in hypocrisy, displayed by them in settlement of important spiritual and social problems, in the attempts to use them in their own private interests, are often made public. But in the course of reciprocal action of the confessions, of the authorities and of society, actually officials and liberals do not play the hypocrite, rejecting also Russian traditional religions like also the adepts of the last liberals? But it may not be a justification to refuse to take part in such discussion, the more so, as this discussion will go on spontaneously with the not predicted results. But the attempt to push religions into the reservation or to make them

marginal will lead to the most probable outcome: rise of extremism on the religious basis.

At the same time, by the middle of the 1990s, when the federal center was losing the real political control over regions, in the subjects of the Federation there consolidated the bureaucratic authoritarian ethnic regimes, which came forward on behalf of title ethnic population of the republics. They concluded a kind of “social contract” with the federal center. The ethnic bureaucratic circles suppressed the extreme forms of ethnic nationalism (both of “indigenous peoples” and the Russian Cossacks), forced to go underground radical “Islamist” movements. Simultaneously, they relied on support of DUM, defended the constructive and peaceful traditional Islam, and stressed the Christian-Muslim character of the Russian state. The federal center did not interfere in affairs of ethnic bureaucratic regimes and oriented to the support of functional stability.

The ethnic bureaucratic regime plaid the positive role in freezing separatist trends but turned to be quite inefficient in the economic sphere, in its ability to modernize, being subject to corruption. The lack of social-economic perspective, the great gap in incomes promoted radicalization of the population, particularly of the youth. The federal and regional authorities, DUM turned to be unprepared to the ideological counteraction against pseudo-Islamic radicals, laying main emphasis on administrative prohibition of “wahhabies” activities in the republics, which actually resulted in police methods of suppression of their legal forms of activities. At the same time, actually in all republics there appeared underground societies (“jamaats”) of extremists, using Islamic rhetoric and radical criticism of existing crisis, inefficiency and corruption of the authorities.

On the eve of the XXI century, two expert appraisals prevailed in public opinion: certain idealization of traditional Islam and demoniac

estimation of “wahhabism” as a pseudo-Islamic extremism. The recurrences of such approach take place usually in connection with big terrorist acts (Beslan, Nalchik), but a more balanced and differentiated approach has been fixed, which does not ignore a chance of extremist acts under the influence of politicization in the circumstances of crisis processes both among Salafits and traditionalists and even modernists in Islam.

Summing up, it should be admitted that the Islamic factor is not the dominant one either in aggravation of inter-ethnic relations or in the peace making process, although in the last case the capacity of Islamic umma is used insignificantly. The Islamic umma in the North Caucasus is fragmented not only within the borders of the subjects of the Federation but also according to various trends, tarikats, virds (in the North-Eastern Caucasus), which tells on inclusion of Islam in ethnic identity of local peoples and ethnic groups. The Coordinating Council of DUM of the North Caucasus is unable to overcome this differentiation. As less perspective in this respect are considered to be the unified efforts exerted for the sake of “Arabization” of local Islam or its modernization directed to de-construction of traditional Islamic institutions, while the latter approach started to gain influence recently.

Thus, the multilateral discussion of confessions, to the author’s mind, in the South of Russia is needed and is possible. The social sphere is subject to this discussion, but there are many other complicated issues, which correspond to the interests and values of the subjects of the RF. The conditions of the constructive (and not conflicting) discussion should be the repudiation from discussion of dogmas, since each religion and confession has its logic, the space with different symbol, sign and language. The democratic state and civil society in order to avoid conflicts may by means of discussion with confessions render assistance to find their place in the social space.

Unlike the West, which tries now to put away the external attributes of religiousness (hijab, cross etc.) with the hope to lessen pretexts for inter-religious animosity, the Russian Empire possessed experience in education of the population in the spirit of natural tolerant perception of religious symbols of different peoples. In the XX century Russia lost these traditions, but they seem to be most perspective traditions from the point of view of maintenance of the inter-religious peace under conditions of religious renaissance.

Side by side with solving economic problems, raising efficiency of state governance, the actualization of the civilization-cultural multinational discussion is the condition for successful re-integration of the South of Russia, for liquidation of social evils and normalization of inter-state relations in the Southern Caucasus.

“Kavkazskaya tsivilizatsiya: istoricheskoe i kulturnoe nasledie narodov Yuga Rossii”, Magas, 2009, p. 140–150.

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**THE ELITES AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS
IN THE GEOPOLITICAL SPACE
OF “THE GREAT CASPIAN REGION”**

The region, situated in the center of Eurasia, is axial not only in geo-geographical but also cultural-historic and political terms. The Eurasian geopolitical ax goes on in the direction of the territory between the rivers Volga-Ural, the Caspian Sea and further the Persian Gulf. Consequently, the three zones exist in there: the north (Volga), the center (the Caspian region) and the south (the Persian Gulf). The countries, which are situated there, were always in the center of geopolitical attention, since history determined for them the role of

“great moderators” of political processes. The states, geographically fixed to this axis, traditionally are named “the Caspian states”. But not only they may and should be regarded to belong to this region. It is possible to speak about the whole system, which was formed historically and which functions at present around this geopolitical Eurasian axis. The analysis of the existing geopolitical doctrines of the main countries of the world lets determine the borders of the geopolitical region. These geopolitical borders differ to some extent from purely geographic borders, and this circumstance demands a special explanation.

The Caspian region is a vast zone adjacent to the bordering territories, which turn out to be involved in certain political-economic and social-cultural relations. The Caspian region itself conditionally may be divided into four zones: “North” (Russia and Kazakhstan), “the East” (the republics of the Middle and the Central Asia), “the South” (the zone of the Persian Gulf and the Near East) and “the West” (the Caucasus). This division concerns especially the geographic location. Besides geographic location, the author considers its geopolitical structure, which differs from the above geographic description.

The geopolitical space of the Caspian region may not be limited with five states, which have direct access to the Caspian Sea. “The Caspian Five” (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan) has the addition of “The Caspian Ten” (Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Iraq, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan), which is supplemented by The Three World Interested States (the USA, the EU, China). This extended interpretation of this geopolitical space makes it possible in complex to take into account all changes, which take place there or which have an outside impact on it. Therefore one should determine in the geopolitical

structure of the Caspian region its components, such as “the Caspian ax” and “the Caspian arch”.

With this approach to the problem, one gets the whole system of countries, which in their relations to some extent concern the Caspian region. “The Caspian Five” comprise the so-called geopolitical “ax” of this region, while the countries of “The Caspian Ten”, making a kind of crescent, represents itself “the Caspian arch”. The World Three represents the forces, which from time to time interfere in this geopolitical process, defending their national interests. Given these three components, it is possible to speak about existence of “the great geopolitical Caspian region”, which is great in direct and indirect meaning of this word, since it will be actually the center or the heart of the whole Eurasian continent.

The pressure of the ax on the arch and of the arch on the ax is measured by the size of the geopolitical instability of the arch and by the level of economic self-dependence of the ax. When the arch is unstable, the ax is stable. The arch is strained due to the outside pressure, the ax produces its own tension. This device of internal state of the heart of Eurasia is beneficial for the whole continent. The geopolitical space of the Caspian region is the community of states, united by geographic, political, cultural, social-economic, religious and ethnic values. The geopolitics of the Caspian region is the white spot, gradually filled with colors. The other geopolitical regions (zones) have already been “colored”, while this region is in the beginning of being fulfilled, i.e. it started to transform into a valuable palette. It should be “colored” not in the utopian ideological tone but in the objective realistic tones. The contemporary geopolitical models should be constructed not on the basis of an emotional appraisal of the historic past but in the healthy pragmatic way of today.

The course of political events goes of very slowly in the Caspian region in order to keep the tricky peaceful situation and to prevent a chain reaction of geopolitical conflicts. Many ideas rest to be unrealized: the consolidation of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the creation of the organization of the Caspian economic cooperation, the creation of the Caspian innovation university etc. The search for the answer to the post-industrial challenge of the XXI century remains to be without attention to it. It is still a latent threat, which in the perspective may become the most acute problem of the international community of this region. Globalization coincided in time with the process of industrialization, forcing people to see in these processes a certain common feature, some emerging internal unity, which will be the crux of the new historic epoch. Formerly, in words of A. Toynbee, the challenge of the epoch demanded from the elites to take mainly forceful decisions, while the post-industrial century demands from them the maximum mobilization of their intellectual abilities and efficient use in their practice of the so-called “high technologies”.

The cultural space of the Caspian region represents a patch-work quilt with many holes and slits. The most important thing is the fact that the dialogue of cultures, being a stake of many adversaries of the theory of “the clash of civilizations”, is still at the initial stage of its formation and lacks adequate authority and position in world community. Therefore the most urgent theme should become the theme of open (liberal) education, the community of autonomous universities (the Caspian scientific-cultural dialogue of “professors” and students). And what is more, the symbol of the XXI century should become not only simply accessible education but also the open elite (high quality) education. Should this system fail to develop in this region, it will remain a backward addition to the world.

The discussion of political culture should refer to the correlation of political and moral behavior of the ruling elites. In every day practice the political elites in official relations tend to show tolerance and promote political dialogue but in their unofficial relations they demonstrate inclination to conflicts and forceful solving emerging problems. There exist two parallel spheres of relations – the official (tolerant) and unofficial (conflicting). These two extreme phenomena in turn occur to prevail over each other.

Given these mentioned negative features, the Caspian geopolitical region, despite all existing world risks, demonstrates an example of peaceful coexistence and even dialogue of civilizations in the name of the Russian-Asian boundary. The countries, adhering to this geopolitical region, lack serious conflicts with each other. All (or actually almost all) conflicts are caused from outside parties.

The principle of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups, which differ in terms of culture and history, functions in practice in the Caspian region. When the West was elaborating the principles of political correctness and tolerance as the vital conditions of coexistence of the great community of people of different nationality, color of skin, in the center of the Eurasian continent this tolerance existed for many centuries. The West came to the political correctness after the unprincipled cruelty of the crusades, which created hostility between the Christian and the Muslim worlds. The clash of civilizations is the ideology of new crusaders of distant regions of the western world. The present political correctness of the West is its atonement for the flames of the Inquisition, witch hunting and fanatic religious wars.

The wars for geography of the Caspian Sea are impossible due to poverty of its landscape. But the wars are possible because of rich natural resources of the Caspian region. The reason of the conflict in this region is not on the surface but in the depth. The war may be

waged not according to political maps but by Mendeleev table, the more so, as the centers, possessing old oil fields (for instance, in Saudi Arabia) are on the eve of exhaustion of their natural resources. The principal world actors (primarily, the USA) are well informed about it and did their best for the years of the 2000s to consolidate their military-political presence there.

The conflicts in the Caspian region are quite different (ethnic, political, religious, economic and social) and are displayed at various levels. One may not try to solve them with methods tested in other regions. The Caspian region is located between two political systems – Western and Eastern. The mixture of European and Asian features make these conflicts quite special. The attitude to democracy, freedom, traditions and innovation is different. The experience of forceful (Iraq, Afghanistan) or voluntary (Pakistan, Turkey) democratization leads to mixed results. The reciprocal relations of local states with the main geopolitical actors (the USA, the EU, China, the RF) represent the most significant component of international policy of this region. Their skill to find common language with them determines the outcome of cooperation: they may become “friends” or “enemies”.

“The Caucasian Mountain Range” is the most problematic zone for Russia in the Caspian region. Out of Russia’s federal districts, the SFD is the most problematic. Up to 90% of all ethnic and political conflicts on the territory of the RF take place in the SFD. Since the times of this territory joining the Russian Empire, this territory was the zone of constant social-political tension. This tension led to local wars rather often, while social-political cataclysms often threaten to aggravate the geopolitical situation in the region.

For the 1990s, the South of Russia was its part, where the ruling party and its elite did not enjoy support of the majority of the population. For the 2000s, the situation somehow changed. However,

the support is given to the party of the power not so much by the free will of the local population as by the notorious administrative capacity. The federal elite buy from the regional elite its loyal attitude to the Center and Russia as a whole. “The paid off policy” is vicious both from the moral point of view and from the point of view of the existing legislation, since it does not solve the problem but plunges it deep down, intensifying and at the same time putting on a mask separatist feelings and corruption among local population and in the authorities.

The political elites of the North and the South Caucasus are struck with one common illness – ethnic bureaucracy and clanship. “The mountain law” is more powerful there than the civil and state law. Therefore this is the zone of higher level of corruption and ethnic conflicts. Exactly the political national elites are the bearers of these phenomena and their active participants. The gradual coalescence of the state structures with criminal elements goes on. Over there they even try to find out a certain “ideological” substantiation and justification of involvement in law enforcement bodies of the people, former participants in military bandits’ groups. The latter circumstance shows that the ethnic bureaucratic elites lack internal resources to solve self-dependently the raised problems and that they have to ask for help not of the federal center but of “their former enemies” in order to ensure unity exceptionally on the basis of their ethnic group.

At the same time, the conflict of interest among these ethnic political elites is not excluded, since they compete for a better image in the eyes of the federal center. The latter is needed by them in order to get the needed financial support for wealthy existence. It is a common secret in Russia that these subjects of the RF get subsistence and will never be (in the nearest future) self-dependent in terms of economy. In this respect, they present for Russia the evident economic burden. But the geo-strategic circumstances prevail over economic ones. The

following policy is carried out with success: the federal money in exchange for loyalty to the federal center. But this tactic, being justified now, can not be transformed into strategy and last for a long time. This situation is characterized by its exclusively temporary period.

The geopolitics of the ruling elites in the Caspian region represents by itself a turmoil and an addition to their foreign policy strategies. If some of them (for instance, Iran) try to break the rigid frames of the world actors, they are qualified as “rogue countries”, although their fault was only the wish to find out their geopolitical identity. The instability in the Great Caspian geopolitical region has an inevitable impact on the political climate in the SFD. The countries of the Caspian arch arrange constant pressure on the Caspian ax, trying to establish their own (if local in space and in time) control or impact. In this case, the question is not so much rivalry and struggle of political systems and economics, as the characteristic of the elites’ struggle and the elites’ quality.

The situation is being aggravated by the fact that the political elites, characteristic of the transitional period, rule in these countries. All of them are examples of the elites of the industrial century and do not perceive the features of the post-industrial century and their tasks I this century. The present time demands the revolutionary change of the elites’ quality for the time of the transitional epoch, when the developed industrialism transforms into the initial post-industrialism.

History of Russia is characterized by its lag behind completely (not always) successful development of Western Europe. Therefore the slogan of modernization of the country was always popular in Russia. And the time of the appeal for the innovation development did not come. The complex of permanent lag, of the elite’s inferiority was formed and expressed in Soviet times in the famous slogan “To overtake and to surpass!” The situation in Russia is always characterized by modernization and by reformation. But modernization

by itself means admission of the lag, while the orientation to innovation shows the urge towards equality with the leaders.

The present elites serve not the country and not the people but exclusively their own objectives, on occasion the corporate interests. Their egoism is not the best basis for fruitful development under conditions of post-industrial world of the XXI century. The high level of corruption is the tribute laid to the political fashion of the XX century. But this fashion in the coming century may play a trick to it. The elites will adapt to the newest conditions of the post-industrialism, but with this baggage, like corruption, they will not be able to cope with this task. The obsolete type of the political elite in future may become the main threat to national security of Russia. The obsolete means are not adequate to norms and demands of the post-industrial century. And obsolete are actually all contemporary political technologists, fallen to the lot of the XXI century as a destiny of the XX century.

The critics of the ruling elite see a lot of faults – from the moral degradation to the social-economic irresponsibility. Their remarks are described below. The quality of the local elite, which aspires only for a house in Great Britain, is very low. The critics of the elite are dissatisfied with the artificial parliamentary system and the artificial parties, the chorus practice of the power with the oligarchs, who have moved to a distant place only by word of mouth. Russians should think about the country they need themselves, about what they should change to make Russia attractive for them themselves. The principal challenge of the present time is the challenge of the post-industrialist world, while the present elites do not have answer to it. It is especially evident at the regional level. The regional elites decide purely tactical questions, which cover the strategic perception.

The Caspian region represents the mixture of industrial and pre-industrial societies, which do not comprehend the post-industrial ideas

of the XXI century. In some countries the XX century has not yet started. Industrialism is based in the region's countries primarily on the industry, engaged in extraction of resources. The gas and oil is the symbol of political culture and the main accursed problem. The Caspian region and the adjacent zone of the Persian Gulf (as the southern belly of this central Eurasian ax) became in the XX century the resources' super-polar of the world policy. What will happen with economy and politics of these countries, when the post-industrial world passes to the alternative sources of energy? According to Ya.Plise, new qualitative perception of all spheres of public and political activities, including new geopolitical world order, the post-industrial high scientific technologies will overcome this crisis and put into correspondence the factors, which contradict the general logic of the world development.

The introduction of high scientific technologies into public and private life of citizens and politicians will directly be dependent on the qualitative economic position of the state. But this introduction may be so rapid that the ruling elites will lack time for cultural-historic adaptation to these new conditions. The Russian political elites started to understand it. In any case, their political rhetoric is marked by alarming words about inadequate modernization of the country and about the need of exactly innovation economy's development. But the manner of this proposal causes euphoria among adepts of the power and bewilderment among independent experts. Russian society has to study and to appraise the present initiatives of the power, and it has to see whether they correspond to the all-Russian interests but not only to the corporate interests. Russia should come forward. But in what way is it possible to do it? And not only the politics but also the political science itself should give answer to this question.

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RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN
THE EASTERN-KAZAKHSTAN OBLAST

Religion is of no little significance in the life of the modern society and one can't but take its influence into account. The republic Kazakhstan is multi-confessional state being conditioned by multiethnic state. The population addressing to religious values after having become independent was one of the aspects for total culture renaissance. There appeared tendencies of faith revival, renewal of discriminated religious organizations and groups status; overlapping of interethnic contradictions and with inter-religious ones, migration processes, distribution of religious movements being new for the Kazakhstan confessional area made the public situation difficult.

All these processes have also a regional specificity one can't but take into account when elaborating balanced, scientifically grounded state policy adapted to the conditions of concrete regions in the field of religion. The Eastern-Kazakhstan oblast has a special place among the regions of Kazakhstan. Being a boundary oblast it's characterized with ethnic and religious variety. The representatives of more than 100 nationalities live in this oblast. The important component of any ethnos culture is belonging to the corresponding religious confession. According to data given by the Council on religious association relations 257 religious associations representing 20 confessions were registered at the territory of the Eastern-Kazakhstan oblast (EKO) as of January 2007. The leading confession is Islam as sunnism of hanafiyah body characterized with tolerance to heterodoxy. Islam is professed by the Kazakhs, the Uigurs, the Uzbeks and the believers of the other nationalities. The oblast numbers 65 Islamic religious organizations. The most such associations are registered in Semipalatinsk. Orthodoxy

in the Eastern Kazakhstan is the second religious trend for prevalence and number of the believers (after Islam). Oblast numbers 30 Orthodox parishes and 4 Old Believers' Churches.

The last decades are marked with a sort of "religious boom": we observe the new religious organizations together with position strengthening of the existing religious ones. So, the Protestant confessions (61 associations) enhanced their activity – evangelical Christians Baptists (28), Jehovah Witnesses (10), Seventh-Day Adventists (5), Church "God's grace" (4); non-traditional Protestant churches (29) – Full Gospel Church (21), "New life" (5), "Mission Agape" (3); non-traditional religious cults (8) – "Faith Bahai" (2), Krishna Consciousness (2), Church of scientology (1) and "Akhmadiisky zhamagat" (2).

The following became clear as a result of the analyzed materials: about 71% of the Eastern-Kazakhs consider themselves as the faithful. Among them 53,1% of respondents consider themselves as the Moslems, 24,8% – the Orthodox believers, 2,7% – the Catholics, 0,5% – the Buddhists and 18,6% – the atheists. The respondents were distributed according to the ethnic belonging by the following way: 58% – the Kazakhs, 35% – the Russians, 7% – the representatives of the other nationalities. It's interesting that the highest index of the faithful is registered among the youth – 65%. 24,7% of the respondents consider themselves as the unbelievers.

Some questions were set in order to reveal the religious belonging influence on the socio-political views of respondents, in particular, concerning the influence of the religious associations on interethnic relations in the different fields of the public life. Those prevail among the respondents who consider that the religious associations don't considerably influence on the living conditions of the people. Those who is sure in the positive influence of confessions on

interethnic relations underline, first of all, their common aspects – contacts in the family and circle of friends. Some (4,5 – 12,4% among the respondents concerning to the different spheres of the public life) consider that the given organizations have a negative influence.

It's significant that desiring to underline a positive role of a religion the respondents made examples associated with Islam and Christianity but a negative influence of the religious organizations is associated, first of all, with the activity of the new religious associations.

Some questions were suggested in order to gauge respondents' opinion in a quality manner revealing the religion position in the scale of human values. So, a national belonging (46%) and citizenship (40%) were significant for the citizens of oblast. A religious belonging takes the last position. One should note that more frequent a national belonging is identified with a religion in public consciousness (the Moslem-the Kazakh, the Christian-the Russian and etc.)

One should note characterizing the attitude towards the people of the other faith that as a whole the respondents are tolerant to the people leading a religious way of living (about 60%). But the attitude of 2% respondents towards the faithful is negative.

70% of respondents accept to live with the people of the other faith in the society. Only 4% of respondents are against it. About 20% of the oblast citizens had difficulty to answer for the raised question causing anxiety. The fifth part of the oblast population can't express their attitude towards social realm, their moods and actions are practically unpredictable now.

As a whole the respondents (80,5 and 80,9%, correspondingly) demonstrate tolerance both towards the people of the other faith and the persons of the other nationality. Depending on the circumstances 12,3 and 12% of respondents can be aggressive and intolerant to the

representatives of the other nationality and the persons of the other faith.

Separation of religion from State is the most important principle having received recognition in many countries and their constitutional entrenchment. The present regime is mostly conditioned by a tendency to restrict religion monopoly in fulfilling ideological function because religion has a powerful potential of action on people's consciousness. More than a half of respondents would like to see Kazakhstan as secular state. Less than 2% of respondents would prefer seeing Kazakhstan as Islamic state in near future. One should note that 28,5% had difficulty to define their position; it accounts for nearly one third of respondents.

Both the faithful and the atheists were unanimous on deciding Kazakhstan as a secular state, the age of respondents had no impact on deciding on the country future. The nationality didn't impact on the answer variants.

Estimating a political and religious situation in EKO as stable one can note that only 2,6% answered positively for the question: did you face with the conflicts on a religious base. More than a half of respondents (64,6%) can say no similar case. However, 15% found difficulty in replying and 18,1% refused to answer for this question. The citizens of EKO named exacerbation of international relations when mentioning the possible reasons of the relation deterioration between the representatives of the different religious convictions. Material and economic contacts deterioration were the second problem. Increasing activity of extremist groups are also of significant importance. 23,2% of respondents couldn't answer for this question.

Today such important problems as inter-religious conflicts and religious extremism are in the limelight of the oblast citizens and mass communication media. No religion is secured against fanaticism of its

followers and its using for political purposes. According to many experts the initial cause of the extremist organization activity increasing is socio-economic problems. One can't but agree with such conclusions because socio-economic problems really provoke the radical mood increasing in the society.

The results of the study confirm this fact but one is satisfied with that fact that more than 50% of respondents will support the radical religious groups under no circumstances. But the population of EKO are badly informed of the extremist religious group activity so 33,8% of respondents have no information about their impact and 31,4% of respondents had difficulty to answer for this question.

As a whole the oblast citizens consider that there is no a real threat and particular reasons to worry concerning the religious extremism distribution in Ust -Kamenogorsk and in the eastern Kazakhstan. As a result one should note that the present state of the religious situation in the region can be characterized as stable and relaxed. There are no serious contradictions between confessions which could bring to a social destabilization at the national level. There is optimal dialogue between the state and religion. According to respondents the necessary factor of stability is mutual understanding, affinity between people independent of their parentage and religion. It's obvious that the authorities began considerably supporting religions (first of all, Islam and the Orthodoxy); their neighborhood is defined by cultural-historical peculiarities of the region and at the same time try to tighten control over the other religious associations. As a motive one mentions the necessity of preventive measures for terrorist acts committed under the mask of the religious extremism.

Religiousness distribution after the USSR disintegration only underlines its ethnicity considerably so international relations can also be the criteria of interethnic conflict. It's necessary to keep in mind that

the oblast citizens (especially the youth) are mostly subjected to the religious extremism impact because of ignorance of fundamental truth of Islam or the Christianity. The religious situation is being complicated. It's mainly conditioned by an active invasion of new religious trends having broken the traditional ethno-confessional balance and worsened inter-confessional competition. It complicates the religious situation gathering a negative potential in the inter-confessional relations.

“Politilogicheskie I etnokonfessional’nye issledovaniya v regionakh”, Barnaul, 2009, p. 275–280.

Askar Akayev,

the first president of Kighizstan,

foreign member of the RAS

KIRGHIZSTAN: HAVE THE EXPECTATIONS COME TRUE?

The turbulent events, which for the rather short period of time – from the autumn of 2003 to the spring of 2005 – shook Georgia, Ukraine and Kirghizstan, could hardly be regarded as accidents. They became the consequences of grave difficulties occurred in the post-Soviet world. In 1991, having departed from the landing pier called “totalitarianism” most new independent states were unable in good time to make fast to the new pier – “democracy”, drifting in the raging sea.

The first post-Soviet decade with its unavoidable grave crises (expected only by some people) during the transition period did not result in the turn to better life. The euphoria's expectations of the people for the fast positive changes did not come true. The internal turmoil was growing. It closed down upon the public Washington's dissatisfaction with the development of democratic processes in new

independent states. The political pressing was started from behind the ocean. The powerful levers for reconstruction of life in the post-Soviets pace were put into operation according to the transatlantic scenarios. The creation and consolidation of opposition movements was stimulated. The latter got big financial resources, received their own electronic and printing mass media. The institutions of civil society, directly connected with the irreconcilable opposition, started to grow mainly with the assistance, rendered by foreign sponsors.

“The color revolutions” as a new political technology aimed at power seizure

The so-called color revolutions became the consumption product of the society, created by the new political mechanism with the transatlantic control panel. The definition itself of “color” pre-supposes that due to its internal character it represents not an internal social phenomenon but a top-down event, serving vested interests of the internal and the external forces, connected with it. The attempt to qualify them as “revolutions” seems to be inadequate, as they say “if chimney is lower the smoke is thinner”. The mentioned interests concern only the seizure of power, including the forceful liquidation of the predecessors by coup d’etat.

After the ‘tulip’ revolution in Bishkek (March 2005) the attempt was taken in Uzbek Andijan to use this “revolutionary” tactic. The attempt resulted in the bloody event. Since that time the turmoil around “color” revolutions subsided. However, it would be an illusion to think that the “color” revolution ideology has disappeared. It seems that after evident failures of “color revolutionaries” in Tbilisi, Kiev and Bishkek and the bloody event in Andijan this ideology was conserved for future events. Probably, it may be resurrected in a new form Therefore it is

worth mentioning its previous history. The forceful interference of the great powers in the affairs of other states to advance their own interests was considered nearly their natural right. In the years of “cold war”, the USA and the USSR did not lag behind each other to extend their zones of influence, in using for these objectives the military force, the methods of political control and ideological influence. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, American chances for diversification of external influence methods were increased greatly. The practice of unilateral and group forceful actions was supplemented by the mechanism of “humanitarian interventions”, related to the conception of “limited sovereignty”. The conception of “humanitarian interventions” was even legitimized by the United Nations Organization.

In both cases – in case of one-sided and group forceful actions and in the case of “humanitarian interventions” – the achievement of the fixed objectives demands to take expensive mass military actions with use of armed contingent on the unilateral and coalition basis. All this is accompanied by bombardments, land operations, mass victims of servicemen and civilians, large material destruction as well as elements of moral losses, rise of political and moral cynicism in the world. The part of world community, not involved in the corresponding actions and bellicose rhetoric, reacts usually negatively to each case of external interference in affairs of sovereign states. This was displayed clearly during intervention in Iraq. Probably, the exclusion was only the Afghan anti-terrorist campaign in the end of 2001.

At present, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq started to be appraised differently. In both cases the military actions of the USA and its allies will lead to the failure with severe global consequences for the struggle against international terrorism and Afghan narcotics’ traffic. At

the same time, the medieval clerical dominance will probably come back in Afghanistan.

In contrast to the expensive military operations, which were the burden to the state budget in the amount of hundreds billion US dollars, the “velvet” revolution in Yugoslavia, to some estimates, cost only 40 million US dollars, while its cost in Georgia was twice less. In Kirghizstan, by appearance, “the tulip” revolution was least expensive: the technology was tried and tested in action; the local expenses were lower.

The rightfulness of the analytical summing up of the events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kirghizstan is connected with the following fact: the three countries were formerly the parts of the Soviet system. The events were executed according to the scenarios of one Transatlantic center. The attempts to present the “tulip” revolution as an event, which had only national roots, are totally unfounded. The leaders of the Kirghiz opposition before this event had been invited to Washington and evidently had discussed not the tourist best valleys of the local mountainous regions. The group of opposition activists visited Georgia and Ukraine to get acquainted with “revolutionary” experience there. The new political technology was transferred and passed on a baton to the Central Asia.

The coup d’etat which assumed the aspect of a “tulip” revolution

Given the common genetic features and external similarity of “revolutionary” processes in the indicated “three”, the political catastrophe in Kirghizstran in March had its specifics and differed essentially from the preceding events in Tbilisi and Kiev. On 24 March 2005, the constitutional state overthrow took place in Kirghizstan with all characteristics of such events. This conclusion is proved by the

serious analytical research and appraisals of numerous political observers.

The true perception of the matter makes it possible to see and objectively to estimate the activities of the forces, which seized power in an anti-constitutional way and further could not get rid of this stigma. The coup d'état in Kirghizstan was not based on a wide people's support. The ideological bases of the opposition was extremely small, being expressed mainly in slogans "Down With!" The small part of the crowd, having been instigated by the opposition's leaders and been drunk and been doped, started to storm the Government's House. The narcotic barons and leaders of the organized criminality did not spare money. The acts of vandalism, which spread from the Government's House to the streets, were characterized by marauding, pillage of shops and arson, having caused the irreplaceable damage to business in the capital.

The organizers of the events in March were interested in the forceful conflict with the authorities with inevitable human victims, which morally would justify their bellicose adventurous intentions. Having understood that this turn of events threatened with transformation of street disturbances into the bloody civil war, president of Kirghizstan A.Akayev, being guided by humanitarian convictions, issued his final order: "Do not fire!"

The following question may be asked: why the Kirghiz society, known for the century-long freedom love, displayed passivity, having confronted the act of the state overthrow. This question refers first of all to the position of the president in those days. In case of open opposition of two forces, the situation would have turned to become the national catastrophe up to the disintegration of the country to the South and the North. This alternative was absolutely inadmissible personally for the president as the head of the state and as a whole to the interests of the

republic. As history showed, the rulers come and go. The destiny of the people should not be at stake – this is the position of the president A. Akayev. Besides, the Kirghiz society was not passive. For the period of more than two consecutive years the country was shaken by political turmoil, by mass demonstrations, which demanded resignation of the just brought to light president. In some cases, manifestations in the center of Bishkek nearly ended with another assault against the Government House. Sometimes the fate of president Bakiyev hung on a thread. He was able to keep his post to a large extent by means of incorporating in society the fear, defamation of opponents, use of means of political intrigue and perfidy, use of methods of policy of threats and bribery and other cynic devices.

For the five years after the events in March, one may point out several stages in panorama of life in Kirghizstan. The first stage was marked by actions of the new president directed to keeping the seized power by cynical deals with criminal authoritative bosses and narcotic traffic barons, which tried to incorporate their representatives into the power structures and demanded their share of the state “pie” for their assistance and active participation in coup d’etat. At this stage Bakiyev put to the side of the political process and transformed into marginal persons most of his companions-in-arms, who marched with him at the head of the mass manifestation on 24 March 2005. A number of deputies and public figures were assassinated in the country. The secret service planted narcotics to the luggage of ex-speaker O. Tekebayev, a leader of the opposition. In Warsaw, where he arrived by air to participate in the OSCE meeting, he succeeded to prove his innocence; otherwise he could have been imprisoned for a long time. Another leading member of the opposition, former foreign minister A. Dzhekshenkulov was arrested because of the fabricated accusation in assassination. The cynical provocation was arranged against

members of A. Akayev's family. The threatening aspect of all these actions was quite evident.

At the second stage, Bakiyev set the more significant task – consolidation of his power. In February 2007, Prime-minister F. Kulov was forced to resign, while he as a member of the pre-election tandem Bakiyev-Kulov after the presidential elections in July 2005, questionable in terms of democratic rules, seemingly legitimized for Bakiyev his place in “duumvirate” governance of the country. The attempts, made by Kulov, to join the opposition and to become the leader of the anti-Bakiyev “People's Front” were resolutely suppressed. “Iron Felix” was skillfully discredited. One by one the main opposition leaders disappeared from the political scene of the republic, while some of them were directly won over by high state posts.

The new Constitution, adopted in autumn of 2007 under the pressure of Bakiyev, introduced the party principle of formation of the parliament and radically enforced the prerogatives of the head of the state. The quickly created pro-presidential party “Ak Jol” as a result of elections, held in December 2007, got the absolute majority in the national parliament (Jogorku Kenesh). It was an obedient supplement to the presidential administration, which kept under its control also the judicial system and the main mass media means. The conclusions of the Venice commission for the constitutional situation in Kirghizstan contained the following remarks below. The principal aim of the new Constitution is establishment by all possible legal means of the unquestionable superiority of the president over all other state branches of power. It corresponds to the authoritarian tradition, which Kirghizstan tried to overcome. The president evidently dominates and appears as the main player, being the arbiter of the political system. And what is more, if there are no legal limitations for the terms of reference of the president and if the opposition has few chances to be

heard, the consequence may be the change of power, based on a revolution and not on the peaceful transfer of power.

On 23 July 2009, the pre-term presidential elections took place. As it was expected, the president in force won the elections. The new period in the political life of the republic started – the stage of absolute consolidation of power of Bakiyev. Exactly this period attracts the greatest interest from the point of view of an analysis of the way, passed by the republic after the coup d'état, of the fulfillment by the new power of generous promises and of realization of the public's expectations. For this period, the political processes were going on in a complicated way, in zigzags and, finally, from the point of view of Bakiyev, achieved the level, which resembled Boris Godunov's exclamation in exultant tones in the known opera: "I have achieved the highest power!"

Two weeks before the presidential elections (10 July 2009) Bakiyev gave interview to Newspaper "Izvestia" under the title "The principal resource of development – consent and dialogue". The observers of the events in the republic estimated these words of Bakiyev as cynicism. The person, who came to power as a result of coup d'état, which aggravated the situation in the country and caused the permanent political crisis, suddenly transformed his personality in a pious person, who started to speak about humanist ideas and to dream on consent. The resource, mentioned by the head of the state, was totally destined for consolidation of his personal power. He was not in need of revolutionary element any more.

Any analysis of the situation in the country starts always from the subject of economy. Under conditions of the global crisis, characterized by the collapse flourishing economies of the USA, the EU, Japan and other countries, it is difficult to suppose that economy of Kirghizstan could avoid big losses and depression. According to the

most pessimistic scenario of the government, the fall of the industrial output for the first quarter of 2009 should be accounted for 6.6%. It turned out to be 20%, while import of food products was raised by 13% for the same period of time. It means that national economy does not ensure the needs of citizens, who get less and less produce, that food production security crumbles away. And the question is not the world crisis, as the leadership of the country tried to convince the people. The reason should not be searched abroad, it is within in the country.

In autumn of 2009 the World Bank published its report, which contained the rating of the countries by the index of simplicity for business activities. Kirghizstan and Georgia occupy high places, having left Russia behind. There is a Russian saying that simplicity is worse than theft. In this case, simplicity both in Georgia and Kirghizstan may be evident but in Kirghizstan there is no economy, able to ensure the needs of society.

But where the financial means for pensions and social benefits come from in Kirghizstan? Evidently, the national economy did not produce them. The stake is made on external sources. As it was happened in history of Kirghizstan not once, Russia rendered great assistance in the form of free grants in the amount of \$150 million to keep the budget and the interest-free credit in the sum of \$300 million; this assistance allowed Bakiyev to find the way out of the critical situation, to put up a good show. The more essential positive factor became the decision, taken by Moscow, to provide almost \$2 billion for construction of Kabaratiskaya hydroelectric station. It was a real ring-buoy for the president.

Mystery behind the cloak of democracy

The genuine remote sense of reforms, carried out by president Bakiyev after March of 2005, was displayed fully only in autumn of 2009. On 20 October he made public the promised long time

beforehand conception of the reform of state governance. It was really unprecedented. The Administration of the President was liquidated; it was replaced by the Institution of the President. It included the state bodies, directly subordinated to the head of the state: the president's apparatus, its secretariat, the Central Agency for development, Investments and Innovations, the state council for affairs of defense, security and legal order, as well as the state ministry of foreign affairs. The structure of the government was radically changed. The Security Council was replaced by the so-called presidential meeting. It is significant that some elements of the reform do not comply with the Constitution. It is evident that as a result of it the president concentrated in his hands the limitless power, in particular under conditions of complete obedience of the parliament. The significant step of the head of the state became designation to the post of prime minister of his old companion-in arms D. Usenov, whose personal loyalty to Bakiyev was tested convincingly after the coup d'état. E. Baisalov, a well-known Kirghiz political scientist in October 2009 qualified the presidential reform as a revolutionary measure only in the sense that it changed completely the whole system of state power. Covering it by slogans of optimization of the system of governance and reduction of apparatus, K. Bakiyev finally concentrated power in his hands. It is senseless to speak about a super-presidential republic, since there is direct evidence of incorporation in our country of the quasi-monarchic system of governance, concluded the expert.

The issue of property in all post-Soviet countries attracted to itself main attention for the transitional period. The issue was settled in a different way with inevitable failures. But in no other country it was possible to see the frenzied urge, like the urge of the Bakiyev group after the coup d'état towards division of the national property. Already in March 2005 a special government's commission was established

under the leadership of vice-premier D. Usenov in charge of making full inventory of national property; the commission determined “what is placed where” and designated its interests. For the last five years much of it was seized but still a lot remained. Therefore the thoroughly perceived and projected for a long perspective became the decision of the president to include the Central Agency for development, Investments and Innovations in the structure of the Institution of the President. In essence, this agency became the principal body in the whole power structure of the republic. Its significance was increased enormously with designation of the president’s younger son Maxim to the post of the chief of the agency.

The mass media in Kirghizstan made a lot of public materials under the slogan: “Maxim, younger son of president Bakiyev and his friends have executed the financial seizure of Kirghizstan”. It was pointed out that (the thirty years) younger son of the president of Kirghizstan had nearly as great power as his father. For a short time, Bakiyev-younger built his financial-industrial empire.

Under the present alarming conditions, shaped in the republican economic and financial sphere, one should look for the main answer to the question: have been realized the expectations of Kirghiz society after Bakiyev coming to power? Privatization by Bakiyev clan of the state power raises great protests. Finally, the people voted not for Bakiyev’s younger son, who actually started to govern without control. One more dangerous consequence of the changes in the country became the perspective of the inherited transfer of power from father to son. The system of khan, quasi-monarchic power automatically presupposes preservation of power by the family clan, which seized it by some or other way, especially in a forceful way to governance of the state. The “khan” trend in the activities of Bakiyev was seen quite evidently.

Diplomacy of “weathercock”

The Kirghiz society with great enthusiasm greeted each new step in development of Kirghiz-Russian relations. The unprecedented in the post-Soviet history became the signature in July of 2000 in the Kremlin at the level of the presidents of the Declaration on Everlasting Friendship, Union and Partnership between Kirghizstan and Russia. A. Akayev signed the Declaration and was proud of it, as he himself notes. Our sister-nations maintained friendly relations for more than two centuries. Our wise ancestors 225 years ago sent a diplomatic mission to Russian Empress Great Katherine with the request to give Russian citizenship to the Kirghiz. The question was national survival in the face of devastating after-effects of foreign inroads. The Russian support had a great impact on those who wanted to enrich themselves at the expense of our people. For the second time Russia rendered it saving assistance for the 1920s, during the Bolshevik's administrative-territorial demarcation. The inclusion of the Kirghiz Autonomous region in the RSFSR for the initial period saved the small Kirghiz people of being dissolved in the common Turkistan environment.

The role of Russia in determination of the Kirghiz people's destiny after disintegration of the USSR should be appraised with gratitude. The situation, mildly speaking, might be different... The slogan, proclaimed by A. Akayev, “God and History gave Russia to us” – reflects the many century realities in the destiny of the Kirghiz people. In times of Akayev presidency all possible was done to consolidate the friendship between Russia and Kirghizstan, to multiply the positive aspects of cooperation between them.

The metamorphoses, taking place now in the foreign policy of Kirghistan excite my anxiety. The orientation to the firm friendship with Russia, not dependent on conjuncture factors, is being eroded. In search for benefits Bishkek makes oscillatory movements between

Russia and the USA. The situation relating to American air base “Manas”, dislocated on the territory of Kirghizstan, became a test of foreign policy orientations of the new power. The decision on closure of this base, made public by president Bakiyev at the summit of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation and confirmed by the official decision of the national parliament, was soon annulled. The base remained in the same place under the cover of “fig-leaf”. The presidential 180° turn became the American lavish financial “recoil”, to all appearance, very beneficial to Bakiyev clan. It was the evident perfidy in relation to Russia. The Kirghiz were always honest people and never betrayed and sold the allies. It occurred that the USA as though outbid Kirghizstan. The Russian magazine “Expert” in November 2009 noted that Russia gave the leaders of Kirghizstan more than \$2 billion, paid a half of this sum, signed the documents, which provided for liquidation of the American base on the Kirghiz territory. The Kirghiz leaders did not demand from Americans to liquidate the base but demanded from Russia to pay the second half of the indicated sum of money, took money from Americans and responded to the Russian objections that the American base allegedly was transformed into the center. Using these primitive cynical subterfuges, they got money both from Russia and the USA.

The analysis of the failures in life of the Kirghiz people for the last five years may refer to other aspects. The problem of energy supply is very acute. The interruptions of electric energy supply create difficult conditions for people as consumers. The intention of the authorities to raise almost ten times the tariffs for heating and electricity will drive most people into a corner.

In the aggregate of all features and particulars of contemporary development of Kirghizstan, the author comes to the described below conclusion on construction in the country of the khan system behind the

screen of democracy. The trend to creation in Kirghizstan of the clan and family power is clearly displayed. The five years drift of the republic from former well-being via some failures resulted in evident autocracy. Did it correspond to the expectations of the people after events in 2005?

Despite these gloomy appraisals of the present situation in Kirghizstan, I remain an optimist concerning perspectives of my republic's development. The historic destiny of Kirghizstan is characterized by difficulties, the contemporary hardships did not avoid the country. Many peoples just survived for the period of hard times, achievements and failures, but they found the ways to the dignified outcome from seemingly blind allies. I am convinced that the project of creation a Kirghiz khanate with inherited power will fail in the XXI century. The course with the trend to development of democracy, positive reforms, determined for the years of the first presidency, will overcome. The democratic wave is getting more powerful impulse, which will not leave out Kirghistan.

Having been closely connected with the republic by many means, I see clearly that resuscitating springs come out of the present pressure, new forces grow, which will never reconcile with the return of the country to the medieval khanate order of national life. These facts give hope to the people.

“Svobodnaya mysl”, M., 2010, N 2, p. 27–40.

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**TAJIKISTAN: POTENTIAL
OF FRONTIER COOPERATION**

After the USSR dissolution the countries of Central Asia officially adhere to a principle of inviolability of borders. Such decision

was fixed in August having signed the Declaration by Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan where the parties declared a collective responsibility for inviolability of borders with the third states and about inviolability of new borders. However, in practice the states of Central Asian region face with a number of hard frontier problems and contradictions considerably complicating political and trade-economic contacts between them. Trans-frontier cooperation is considerably complicated because of unfinished delimitation and demarcation of “internal” boundaries between the central-Asian states serving interests of frontier ethnoses.

A sharp question arose on drawing and development of the new state borders of Tajikistan after having declared independence. Frontier regime imposing guaranteeing a necessary level of the country security and territorial limits defining for sovereignty impact were required for development of a new nationhood. Numerous knots of interstate contradictions were a result of changing administrative borders into state ones. The republic is contiguous with Uzbekistan in the west and in the north (border length -1161 km) and Kyrgyzstan (911km), in the east – with China (522 km), in the south- with Afghanistan (1387 km). A small territory of Afghanistan being by width from 15 to 65 km (Vakhansky corridor) separates Tajikistan from India and Pakistan.

All oblasts of Tajikistan are frontier. 26 administrative areas among 59 are frontier but there are border check-points and transport connection only in 19 among them. Infrastructure of frontier zone is mostly developed along so-called old borders left after the USSR, i.e. the borders with Afghanistan and China. Trans-frontier cooperation at the different parts of the Tajik border depends on character of relationship of the frontier states and the existing border problems between them.

The Tajik-Uzbek border

The Tajik-Uzbek interstate relations are the most complicated and conflicting among bilateral relations among the countries of Central Asia. Their high proneness to conflict is associated with the problems on a lack of proper regulation of some sections of common borders, using water and energy resources, territorial claims and ethnic contradictions. So far, in spite of Uzbekistan's and Tajikistan's participation in CIS, EAEC, CSTO and SCO the problems on mine clearing of the Tajik-Uzbek border aren't solved.

The citizens of frontier areas have the right to be in the neighboring territory no more than 5 days without visa. Thereby, many Tajiks are longing for being admitted to the Russian citizenship in order to get to neighboring territory without difficulty. Crossing the border check-points the citizens of frontier areas of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have to use unlawful ways to cross a border because of the barriers often resulting in criminal or administrative prosecution, explosion by mines and etc. Beginning from 1999 after the acts of terrorism in Tashkent Uzbekistan mined unilaterally a frontier on its part. According to official returns it was done to defend Uzbekistan from the armed soldier of the Islamic movement penetration. More than 120 dangerous sections on the Tajik-Uzbek border –more than 25 millions square meters and 700 km of roads are mined and are dangerous for transport and people.

One of the reasons for contradictions between the region states is a difficulty to observe economic interests on maintenance and exploitation of hydro technical objects when Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan bear general expenses to keep hydro-irrigative systems in a working order but Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan use most of water resources.

Hydro resources are Tajikistan's wealth. The country ranks third in their reserves in the world and second – over the post soviet area. 60% of fresh water capacity of the region is in glaciers of this republic. In 2009 water-energy argument broke out with renewed vigor between two countries after Tajikistan's adoption a decision on construction of Rogunskaya hydroelectric station by its own forces. It caused a very negative response from the party of Uzbekistan having developed into unofficial blockade of Tajikistan (goods transit, gas supply stopping, energy blockade in wither, mass communication media's pressing and etc.).

At the same time not only Tajikistan will profit from Rogunskaya hydroelectric station's construction – a new station will allow Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan flooding 3 millions hectares as a whole. Now the neighbors don't hurry to share their income with Dushanbe being gained for the account of Tajikistan's river water – Syr Darya, Pyanja and Vakhsha what, in particular, contradicts to UN Convention 1997. According to international water use right Tajikistan is to have income-sharing and compensations the neighbors have using water resources of the republic.

According to experts in Tajikistan the republic of Central Asia must use the new economically mutually acceptable principles and mechanisms of water use. Dushanbe suggests building such mechanisms into Interstate agreement on water and energy resources of the river basin Syr Darya being developed by the region state.

General opening and use of natural resources deposit at the frontier territories can be the important constituent of the Tajik-Uzbek relations. The big Konimansur – the second among the largest deposits of silver in the world is located in the north of the republic near the border with Uzbekistan. According to specialists silver reserves will be enough more than for 150 years annually mining up to 50kg if to

organize operations correctly. Tajikistan leads in stibium reserves in CIS. The largest deposit is “Skal’noe” (more than 50% of stibium reserves of CIS). 214 deposits of the other natural resources are in Sogdiiskoy oblast being contiguous with Uzbekistan. Kshut-Zauranskoe and Fan-Yagnobskoe coal-mining deposits are the most perspective among non-metallic mineral resources; one can get cheap liquid and gaseous fuel out these coals. Coal reserves are here more than 1 milliards tons. Coals are of high quality and a great heating capacity; 80% among them are coking. Oil deposits at the border with Uzbekistan were actively mined during the soviet period. Oil was supplied in the Fergansky oil-refining plant. Now oil is refined in Tajikistan.

The Tajik-Kyrgyz border

Frontier problems between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are far from a final decision. Territorial arguments began here during the soviet period at the beginning 80-s. Up to 70 questionable sections are in Lyailyaksky district of Oshskoi and Batkenskoi oblasts of Kyrgyzstan, Isfarinskoy district of Sogdiiskoy oblast and Jirgital’skom district of Tajikistan. Power industry, rational and effective use of water resources, general mineral exploration and mining operations, transport infrastructure improving and common transport policy implementing, joint enterprises establishment in the industry, cooperative supply developing and trade classification of export and import operations increasing are the priority trends of the Tajik-Kyrgyz cooperation. Practically all the arable lands and pastures are cultivated in the frontier districts of the both republics. Land deficit and border uncertainty has already caused the armed conflict between the Kyrgyz and the Tajik in Batkenskoy district. Rapidly growing unemployment among the youth also strengthens tension in the frontier villages. Low living standards of

the population, unemployment against background of critical deficit of lands and water resources brings to that interethnic tension doesn't slacken in the frontier districts of the both republics.

According to experts the arbitrary demarcation between the central-Asian republics during the soviet period when economic reasonability was a determining factor but ethnic and national factors were of minor importance is the basis of the arguments. The Tajik enclaves at the Kyrgyz territory create additional difficulties during the negotiations. Moreover, these enclaves become more isolated from Tajikistan and also from surrounding Kyrgyz territory. Isolation causes a feeling of alienation preparing the ground for the Islamic radicalism and ethnic nationalism.

The Tajik-Chinese border

People's Republic of China is the only among the frontier countries having no unsolved border problems now. China pretended to three questionable sections at the territory of Gorno-Badakhshanskoy autonomous region the entirety containing more than 20 thousands square meters. Dushanbe ceded to Peking only 4,5% (990square meters) of questionable territory after the painstaking work of the experts and the negotiations of the joint commission of the CIS countries during 6 years (this commission was formed in 1992 of the representatives of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Tajikistan).

The boundary between the countries passes along highland territory being difficult of access. In June 2006 one began demarcation operations here being ended in 2008. The highway via the pass "Kul'ma" was opened in autumn 2004 and it was one of the most important results in solving frontier problems. The direct transport corridor Tashkurgan (China) –Khorog via the pass "Kul'ma" (4363 m) on Sarykol'skom mountain ridge opened the direct access for Tajikistan

to Sin'tsryan-Uygursky autonomous district (SUAD) (China) and via Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. A high level of the ethnic contacts between the frontier districts of Tajikistan and SUAD where the Moslem population lives allowed bolstering trade-economic ties.

China is in the leader five of foreign trade partners of Tajikistan. The country has this republic lead in joint enterprise number. China actively invests the Tajik light industry, in particular, cotton and silk industry besides building and power industry. The Chinese companies could get involved in joint development fields of gold and silver, coal and rare metals owing a transport access of the region via the pass "Kul'ma".

The Tajik-Afghan border

The border passes along the river Pyanj, Afghanistan is contiguous with Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Autonomous oblast, Khatlonskaya oblast, Voseisky district and also Jilikul'sky district where there is a nature reserve "Tigrovaya balka" at the frontier territory. Tajikistan and Afghanistan are united with the common historical past, common cultural values, traditions and customs, common religion and language. As early as in April 2005 11 interstate and inter-government agreements were signed between the countries; one of the most important agreement is "Treaty of friendship, cooperation and good-neighborliness between Republic Tajikistan and the Islamic republic Afghanistan". The cooperation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan is based, first of all, on security insuring in the region and on hydroelectric and transport-communication project development.

Since October 2001 Tajikistan implements uninterrupted transit supply of the international humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan's population. Procedures of customs and border procedures between two

countries are simplified. Dushanbe provided air and ground area of the republic for rescue and humanitarian operations by forces of the international anti-terrorist coalition. According to UNO more than 60% of the whole humanitarian assistance of the world community for Afghanistan is supplied via Tajikistan. The Tajik airline was the first among the CIS countries which fixed scheduled flights in Kabul. A number of bridges are built at the border via the river Pyanj in order to restore economy and a social sphere of Afghanistan.

The frontier cooperation includes not only security but also assistance for a development of legal trade and transit making the living conditions of the frontier communities better. Program of the European commission on “Assistance in border control and drug distribution prevention in Central Asia” includes adjustment measures of this activity. The program is directed towards the assistance for state departments of Tajikistan being responsible for border security and struggle against drug traffic. This activity is carried out in close cooperation with the countries-members of EU, USA and some international organizations.

Transport is the important trend of the Tajik-Afghan cooperation. One can observe Tajikistan as one of the main transit ways in Afghanistan taking into account border length. Thereupon the parties place special emphasis on bridge building via the frontier river Pyanj, road network and infrastructure development. The problem on railway line building “Dushanbe-Kurgan-Tyube-Kunduz” is considered. Tajikistan will get access to the ports of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf when these object building is ended and the roads are reconstructed in the north of Afghanistan.

The other important trend of two countries cooperation is hydropower engineering. As early as in March 2002 “Protocol on electric main re-building and new object building” was signed between

the Department of Energy of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Water Management and Energy of Afghanistan. The energetic company “Barki Tochik” carried the work to completion on electric main rebuilding during carrying out this project. As a result Tajikistan has a possibility to supply annually energy by volume 1,5 milliards kW/h to the neighboring districts of Afghanistan in summer. In 2008 Dushanbe put forward a proposal on the international energy consortium establishing with a participation of USA, Pakistan, India and the other countries to build Dashtijumskoy hydroelectric power station on the river Pyanj (rated capacity 4 millions kW and annual production 15,6 milliards kW/h of electricity). Water as the most valuable resource under conditions of Central Asia can be used by volume 17 milliards m³ both for watering in reservoir of Dashtijumskoi hydroelectric power station and for the needs of agriculture of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

* * *

The neighboring with four states creates prerequisites for Tajikistan’s changing into the important chain of transport communications connecting the countries of central Asia and CIS as a whole with the Eastern and the South Asia. The peculiarities of the geographical position of the republic, its mountainous relief, the lack of sea and river routes, underdevelopment of railway road and sky way network demands highway building and motor transport development in Tajikistan. Today more than 85,3% of the total flow of traffic in Tajikistan is realized by motor transport.

Vast network of highways built during the soviet period was the part of the large allied infrastructure not accounting the needs and demands of some republics into account. Tajikistan’s center was

connected by the roads running across the territory of allied republics. The problems on transport transit along the territory of the neighboring states emerged after the independent states formation and customs “wars” flared up. In winter the northern part of the republic and the Pamirs were completely isolated until recently from the center.

Outlets of Tajikistan to the world transport arteries run across the territories of the neighboring republics so Tajikistan’s economy faced severe problems because of breaking economic relations within the bounds of the former USSR. The country turned out to be in transport isolation. Republic remoteness from the world transport arteries, high costs of traffic, the lack of roads which would connect Tajikistan with perspective trade-economic partners and the region neighbors –China, Pakistan, India and Iran – don’t favor the development of economic relations under new conditions.

Tajikistan’s cooperation with contiguous Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan is being developed irregularly and inconsistently with the exception of China’s cooperation investing not only economy of the republic but giving credits for Dushanbe but rendering a great humanitarian assistance. The problems of frontier relations with China are practically solved and two states successfully expand trade-economic relations.

At the same time a number of questions on bilateral relations are still unsolved such as elimination of visas and mine clearing of the borders with Uzbekistan, territorial and water problems with Kyrgyzstan, continuous flow of drugs from Afghanistan and terrorist sallies from contiguous territories. Tajikistan will have perspective for constructive interaction and mutually advantageous cooperation ahead of it when controlling the existing contradictions gradually and step-by-step and solving all the problems of bilateral relations.

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