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CONTENTS

<i>N. Shmelev.</i> Russia's modernization problem: State role.....	4
<i>A. Yunusova.</i> Islam in Russia.....	13
<i>G. Klochkov.</i> The internal reasons of the ethnic-political conflicts in the south of Russia.....	18
<i>Z. Dzarakhova.</i> Ingushetia on the eve of the XX-XXI centuries: ethnic-political and geopolitical realities	27
<i>Saltanat Ermakhanova.</i> Modernization of society in Kazakhstan: stimuli and barriers	31
<i>Andrey Bolshakov.</i> The mutual relations of Kirghizstan with the republics of the post-Soviet Central Asia.....	34
<i>Elena Ionova.</i> The impact of external factors on relations between Russia and Turkmenistan	42
<i>E. Kuzmina.</i> The peculiarities of the internal political and the international situation in the Central Asia.....	50

N. Shmelev,

academician of Russian Academy of Sciences

RUSSIA'S MODERNIZATION

PROBLEM: STATE ROLE

Today it's practically useless to contrast capitalism with socialism, dirigisme with liberalism and planned with market economics in a traditional way. The one and the other are certainly in any economically viable and progressive country. In reality one can hardly answer positively: where is socialism more today – in USA, in Russia or in China? It's impossible to separate a strategic and cementing role of a public dirigisme from free private enterprise as a basis of economic life of any sound society in the modern economics. But today no successful market economy exists without elements of planning (direct or indirect) though ideologists of liberalism are still deliberately blind to this fact. In the same way the statements like “one needs more state” or on the contrary “one needs less state” are really and practically groundless. All this isn't any more than prejudice, pure ideology. One needs a state not more, not less but “as much as one needs” preceding from the problems the society is faced with at the present or at the given period of time. A direct state influence is necessary even if for one simple reason at some stage: there is no other social force being capable to assume the most urgent problem solving in the country. At the other stage a state role can be weakened as the new forces emerged in the society: not being urged on from without and relying only on their interests they can be the

independent main motor of the social development. And again a need for a state can be sharply increased in the society especially during the crisis and later on – this need can be weakened when moving to a long period of a stable development. The economic history of many modern states convincingly indicates it.

There is unique position in the Russian economy: the Russian monopolies in the leading branches of industry and sphere of services gain systematically profit at the level of 100–300–500 and more annual interest rates when average annual norm of profitability in the world is of order 9%. No self-respecting private Russian company or corporation as men say “won’t bend down” if investments in new cases won’t promise minimum 100% annual interest rates of profit in perspective. This outrageous level of profitability is characteristic, first of all, for such highly-monopolized branches as oil and gas industry, iron and nonferrous metallurgy, some other rough manufacturing, all housing and the most part of civil engineering, pharmaceuticals, alcohol turnover, trade and etc. Why is it so? Firstly, one should say that the Russian big business was deeply corrupted by practically free privatization and famous “loans-for-shares” from the very beginning and also by multiply artificial difference between internal and external (export) prices for the same production. Secondly, a political and economic (but often corruption) pressure of monopolies allowed and allows them to misappropriate of order 60% and more natural resource royalty for energy and primary resources at any existing taxation scale (for comparison: 10-20% in Saudi Arabia and Norway). Thirdly, it becomes more evident that a traditional monopolist practice for supporting a corresponding level of prices (speak plainly - collusion) is a daily reality of the Russian life and only a strong state can break this practice.

The most important conclusion on the above-mentioned is probably the following: there will be no answer for the question how to

organize economic modernization in the country until more or less natural rate of profitability for all the leading private (and often for state) enterprises is established in the Russian economy. Probably, some measures of compulsion (not only tax) are necessary from the party of the state with respect to monopolistic structures. What, on what scales and will the state have a will, forces and determination for this – this is the other matter. We proclaimed a goal – market economy building. But it means that not monopolies but a competition, freedom of enterprise and freedom of flow of capital from a branch in a branch is a motive power of everything including modernization processes in economy. At present our private capital can't be such power because of untimely obesity or on the contrary, weakness. A state must help it. Modernization isn't only one or another trend. First of all, it's its mechanism. Where to move is more or less clear even now. But nobody knows exactly how to move.

A direct business of the state must include an organization and a subsequent service of the leading innovation enterprises in the most important branches of economy: electronics, information systems, engineering industry, engineering tools, aircraft building, instrument making, nuclear power engineering, biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals, defense industry and etc. There is a strong possibility that most of them will be privatized with the lapse of time and the rest will be in the status of government enterprises for a long time (if not for ever). The country can't close eyes to such fact any more: during the last 20 years no new serious industrial enterprise, no power plant was built in Russia except the Sakhalin project. The Russian economy transition to a new modern economic order is probably impossible without a new building and new government (failing private) investments.

One can observe a dramatic lag of the Russian fundamental and applied sciences during the last 20 years and the state must firstly

overcome it if to set problem of modernization in Russia seriously and take the leading positions in the world. The fundamental science exists in the country for the account of the past results and it will probably be on the level of the highest world standards only in two-three generations. The position of applied science is worse: it was practically destroyed during the years of unreasonable reforms. There is only one way out – to increase the fundamental and applied science financing sharply from state budget because it is a real source to support science at this conjuncture. For the present a private sector is interested in succession “education – fundamental studies – developmental work – implementation –operation” only at the last stage of this chain. As a rule it is interested in neither fundamental nor even applied studies preferring to buy result of work. The state begins concerning itself again not only about academic institutions, newly-emerging research universities and usual institutional science but practically about the whole spectra of applied researches.

In the first place modernization is human capital assets. It results that technical education, technical secondary development is laid special emphasis on; renewal of thoughtlessly disorganized system of technical-vocational education, first of all, preparation of regular labor force of high qualification. And again it concerns a state. A serious modernization is out of the question if, for example, one should look for welders to construct new submarines in Severodvinsk almost all over Russia.

Small and medium enterprises are traditionally underestimated in Russia; today their share in gross domestic product is in 4-5 less than in the most highly-developed countries. Meanwhile it's known that such enterprises in market economies are the main employer and the source of technological advance at all the stages of economics. Phenomenal rapid progress after 1978 was based on small and medium enterprise

developing during the first 20 years both in the town and in the village. China went over to a diversification of modern branches of industry including high-quality productions only having revived half-dead country and awaken the people. In Russia the conditions for small and medium enterprises seem to become worse with the lapse of time. If at the turn of 1990-s one needs about three months to file a new enterprise then now – more than a year. There is still a criminal racket; state racket and unbelievable scales of mass corruption only supplement it.

It's also impossible to think about some modernization progress till the present really tragic position of the Russian village won't be adjusted more or less. Dozens of thousands of villages vanishing from the map of the country, withdrawal of one third agricultural land uses from circulation, scuttled two thirds farm stock – it will be possible to overcome these incredible losses only during decades. But how? Can these badly controlled giant latifundia (sometimes up to 500 thousands hectare) having today according to some experts approximately 60% of farmlands of the country modernize the agrarian sector to a considerable extent? Or will 50% of the Russian agricultural industry continue depending on the different numerous “small and the smallest subsidiary personal plots”? Or is the country irreversibly doomed for relying on food import always which in many towns, for example, defrays 40-70% of consumer market? It's one of the most important problems of future structure policy of the country modernization. As the global experience shows the agricultural industry of neither EU, USA, Canada nor some other countries will reach the present level of the development without a direct and per se non-market public support. May be, all these agricultural holdings, repainted collective farms and state farms especially in fertile lands – a sort of clusters for technical and marketing service of agricultural producers – will be able to survive for a long time. May be we'll see a revived landlord sector (“Prussian way”).

However, it seems that Russia unduly neglected fruitful ideas of the re; “cooperative movement” suggested by A. Chayanov and being widely practically distributed in the countries of the West Europe.

It’s clear that a goal of declared course for modernization is to awake, first of all, creative activity of the people, shake up the society and may be to give the country something being like a new national idea, however, built not on some absurd and even on messianic faint efforts but on practical vital needs of every person. One needs naturally a corresponding social climate to solve such problem so there must be a social justice in the country and confidence of the population in the leadership of the state and its institutions. Unfortunately, for the present Russia is the most socially unjust state among industrially developed countries. It’s doubtful whether there is such dangerous morbid gap between incomes of the poorest 10% population and the richest 10% ones: 1:25 – officially and 1:60 – unofficially. There is the interpretation in the world that such gap can’t be more than 1:5 –1:6. One can observe it in Europe now and it guarantees the lack of revolutions, general strikes, mass protest movements and etc. Besides, the Russian population is aware of that a person work is always evaluated in the country as minimum as possible beginning from after 1917 and till now. A salary part in gross domestic product in Russia has never increased more than one third whereas it has never decreased lower two thirds in the other developed countries. It’s also difficult to justify fixed “flat scale” of taxation in the country: 13% of a profit is paid both by the most low-paid worker and a billionaire. About 50% and more of high profits are imposed taxes in the leading countries of the West. Simultaneously, the Russian population faces the trend contradicting to the whole world development – decrease of extra-market forms of a social support for people, commercialization of public health and education, increase of utility and transport payments out of wage hike,

pensions and etc. Everything takes place in the developed world quite opposite.

Russia can hardly solve such the most urgent problems as a fortune of 500 single-industry cities where about 25% of the country population live and closely associated a constant threat of serious unemployment with it relying only on market forces and private business. Private capital can't solve a problem of single-industry cities; it can only allow them more or less painlessly dying. Today the main role to save single-industry cities imperatively belongs to the state (of course, with the help of the national and foreign capital) and it can avoid it by no means because the best intellectual and highly qualified forces of the country, i.e. its future, are concentrated in single-industry cities.

It's also impossible to understand why our leadership's attitude towards some well-tried methods of the struggle with unemployment is so cautious meaning, first of all, public works. Once USA and Germany came out of a deepest recession in this manner and today public works are one of the main methods of so successful struggle against a world economic crisis in China. Meanwhile, public works could improve many branches of our infrastructure with due organization (of course, complicated) in Russia. How many years can't we construct 800 km of highway Chita-Khabarovsk? And it's only one of the numerous similar examples.

Meaning a radical modernization of the Russian economics one can't forget external conditions to put such strategy in force. Some strands of foreign policy of the state are absolutely imperative in this connection. We probably tried too hard to open our economics which has never faced a serious competition being in isolation during several decades. A traditional export of energy source materials didn't face competition in practice at the markets developed by us long ago but manufacturing industry product export (preferably armory and

production of some branches of general engineering) can be named as export only by any possible stretch because export was often made on the base of non-repayable credits. Of course, export of energy source materials will possibly be a base of all our system of external economic relations. There is nothing bad here. It guarantees a profit. If we manage to achieve competition positions in the world as a result of modernization policy, export diversification in favor of manufacturing industry product and many-sided public support then one will probably manage to correct some instability in the system of our external relations.

The situation is worse with import. As a result of excessive transparency of the Russian economics during the last 20 years our import dependence on food, some leading branches of machinery building, electronics, instrument making, information systems, pharmaceuticals and etc. exceeded far the recognized world threshold of security. It seems that now there is time for limited moderate protectionism in order to keep a national market for our producers there where it's possible and effectually. It includes such measures as corresponding selective customs tariff and quota; careful ruble devaluation; stimulation of direct foreign investments but not import especially import substitution; agriculture subsidizing even if in the scales being comparable with ones accepted in the West now; and of course, public support of national industries, first of all, machinery building being capable of "forcing import out" being indispensable for the present.

Our monetary and financial policy is also to be changed seriously. This is to stop government revenue placing in low-percentage foreign capital issues, renewal of obligatory sale of the main foreign exchange receipts in rubles, direct government control of private debt practice, outflow of national capital for abroad and etc. It's also necessary to

acknowledge that at this juncture Russia's WTO accession is beyond the purpose. As for export it will hardly give more than 2–3 milliards of dollars in a year but many consumer industries and our most technically perspective manufacturing industry being a basis of modernization plans will be under the threat. One thinks that it will be more useful to postpone our accession for 10–15 years if we begin seriously preparing our economics for new and probably stricter competition conditions. It's significantly that it took 15–20 years for China for WTO accession preparing beforehand having laid the American and European markets in a store of its products.

Russia's modernization strategy can't but take demographic and territorial problems of the country into consideration. Measures on rise in births and mortality decreasing without the most serious organized immigration especially in the districts behind the Ural will hardly overcome the Russian population decreasing. May be this problem won't be super urgent even during several decades. But it's necessary to solve the problem of brewing economic postponing (and even a possible formal separation) of these districts now.

“Vlast”, M., 2010, p. 15–26.

A. Yunusova,
doctor of sciences (history)

ISLAM IN RUSSIA

Ethno-confessional processes with Islam participation in Russia, from one hand, are more or less constructive being headed and controlled by a public need, synergetic. One can say that destructive consequences of “state separation from church” are overcome; consequences of the later miscalculations and mistakes of ecclesiastical leaders settled down to a course of the poor Russian ummah schism in

90-ss of the last century are gradually being overcome. The most part of experts are sure that Islam has regenerated in Russia. Therewith several problems frustrating the formed idyllic ideas on this revival are just now emphasized in the Russian Islam besides organizational unity lack and religious education drawbacks. Characterizing the results of post-perestroika period for the Russian Islam D. Khairtdinov writes: “In those times (the beginning of 90-s) the Moslem leaders didn’t really know what measures they should take firstly and secondarily under those new conditions and properly struggled against bureaucracy violence and money lack – it’s correct and true; but another matter is also true – even at that time many imams and leaders defined quite different values than religion for themselves and take only their own narrow interests later on. The interests of the people and the religious leaders didn’t coincide but in some cases the Moslem community was alienated from its official leader. We see the results today: clan system, heredity, closed corporative group forming around many and many Moslem figures of Russia. It’s no doubt that one of the limited interest consequences of that or any person is dissidence among imams. Under these conditions a growth of opposition moods among some strata of the Moslem people especially among the youth became objectively inevitable. The Islam leaders didn’t take some steps to coordinate the positions of the different groups and just then the communities emerged being differently nicknamed and named following some mufti examples. Seeds of discord greened out not only on the Caucasus but also in many native Tatar-Bashkir districts were planted several years ago and the Moslems must remember it today”.

Radical ideologies were distributed in separated Moslem area; extremist religious-political organizations prohibited in the Russian Federation such as “Khizb ut-Takhrir al’ Islami” found their followers very easily. Today the following processes with the participation of the

Moslem leaders or without their participation took place in the Russian Islam:

- redistribution of the Islam area of Russia between both the old participants of split and the new actors – the leaders of the different movements with the Islamic slogans and rhetoric;

- the Moslem clergy politicization;

- Islam “nationalization”, interpenetration of religious extremism with nationalism of the regional “super activists” on the base of Islam.

Besides, the religious leaders fairly defending the Moslem community autonomy began pretending for exclusive rights to solve economic, juridical and constitutional problems being the state prerogative. But one will hardly find ten persons of those in ummah itself who possesses the corresponding knowledge to solve such problems. The named phenomena are typical for the Turk-Moslem society throughout Russia.

The Russian Islamic area distribution on the example of the Southern Ural and the Volga region

Russia’s Central Spiritual Governance of the Moslems (RSGM) and its subdivisions are a stronghold of the traditional Islam – non-politicized, moderate, tolerant and peaceful being completely loyal to the state and its laws. Among the clergy one can observe a low level of a political activity, comparatively low level of a religious education, spiritual function limitation with religious rites in that degree which satisfies parishioners. One can’t consider it from the point of view “bad”/“good”; they only state a real situation which doesn’t agree with the modern trends of the Russian Islam development and is criticized by some Moslem leaders, public Islam-oriented movements especially the young Moslems waiting for the new changes.

The Moslem organizations being at the junction of Europe and Asia, between Siberia and Central Russia are greatly influenced by two centers of the political consolidation of Islam within Russia which were established after the split of Russia's Central Spiritual Governance of the Moslems in 90-s of the last century – the Board of Muftis of Russia (Moscow) and Spiritual Governance of the Moslems of the Asian part of Russia. The board of muftis of Russia and Spiritual Governance of the Moslems of the Asian part of Russia are firmly united by the general interests, ambitions, commercial partners and financial sponsors for a long time. They practically divided the Moslem area within Russia: the board of muftis distributed its influence up to the Ural (R. Gainutdin) but behind the Ural – Spiritual Governance of the Moslems (N. Ashirov). The movement “the Russian Islamic heritage” joins them; its activity was carried out taking onto account the interests of the board of muftis and Spiritual Governance of the Moslems.

There is Russia's Spiritual Governance of the Moslems (Talgat Tajuddin) between them and its influence is distributed over the half of parishes of each among the south-Ural regions, one part of parishes of Permskaya, Ul'yanovskaya, Sverdlovskaya oblasts, Chuvashiya and Mordoviya. A number of parishes dependent on Russia's Spiritual Governance of the Moslems (RSGM) aren't constant; together with mosques of RSGM mosques of RBM and SGM of the Asian part of Russia are built and opened; very often the parishes are persuaded to have the other subjection after the departure of RSGM' representatives and a mosque's opening. At the present OOD “the Russian Islamic heritage” gets involved in mosque opening as it had place in Chelyabinskaya oblast though it isn't its statutory functions but cultural heritage of the Moslem civilization of the Volga region, the Ural, Siberia and the Caucasus are beyond this structure's attention.

What does it bring to? We can see by way of example of the Volga region that as a result of RSGM's split and many Islamic High Council forming for a short period the Moslem community was qualitatively changed (mainly in the Tatar community). Here it's characterized with a high public and political activity of the Moslem organizations and leaders, not infrequent Islam positioning as alternative of national idea but the Moslem elite – as ideological opposition, trends of the Islam modernization and innovations in the sphere of the Moslem economy development, culture and education, close contacts with the foreign Islamic funds. Here one can observe advanced, comparatively young –according to the age of the leaders – quickly adapting to the modern economic conditions but also politicized Islam. The Moslem clergy of the given region being mostly susceptible to the different radical Islamic ideologies confidently defends the interests of the extremist organizations in the courts and creates the human rights centers. Besides, it itself is often a generator of the radical demands and claims with respect to a state and power.

The carriers of the political activity and Islam politicization in the Volga region are representatives of the Tatar ethnos. The words “the Tatar” and “the Moslem” are interpreted as synonyms in the regions of the Volga region but Islam – as the Tatar religion. Islam and its slogans are needed by the Tatar political elite as an instrument to mobilize a political activity of ethnos and “revival” itself of Islam happens under the sign of the Tatar nation rebirth here.

Islam is apolitical and it isn't a factor of influence on state power in Bashkortostan, Orenburzh'e, Chelyabinskaya and Kurganskaya oblasts. As for “bashkirskogo” Islam it isn't out of the sphere of the initiatives of the Bashkir national revival ideologies both during the period of the state sovereignty developing and now when a federal center gradually stops using a word combination “a state sovereignty” of

the national republics. Islam isn't politically dependent on the Bashkir political elite and it isn't a slogan of the political manifestations of the Bashkir youth; it simply remains a belief of the Bashkirs. Such Islam doesn't fit in with ethno-system of the Southern Ural. It greatly depends on peculiarities of Islam distribution and functioning over this territory. Characteristics of the Islam in the Volga region slightly belong to Islam in the Southern Ural and Trans-Urals where one can observe confusion of the ethnic Moslems – the Siberian Tatars, the Kazakhs and Bashkirs.

As far as moving to the east Islam is ever more characterized with traditionalism revival, a low level of socio-cultural mobility of the Moslems, a distinction between “rural” and “urban” Islam being persistently preserving, orientation of the clergy and the leaders at a state and demonstrative loyalty with respect to top leadership of the country and regional authority.

Increasing activity of the representatives of RBM and SGMAP in the regions dependent on RSGM indicates a keeping trend to redistribute the Russian Islam area. A goal of this redistribution is the Islam holding forming within Russia. It per se is in RBM, SGMAP and OOD “RIN”.

There emerged the new actors of a process confronting not only a traditional organized system of Islam in Russia but also a system of state-Islam relations. The carriers of the political Islam being opposition to “Putin-Medvedev regime” are “Islamic committee” of Geidar Jemal’ and structural subdivisions of the movement “Islam nation” initiated by him in the regions of the country. The methods of network marketing are also used allowing making ramified hierarchic structures.

The Islamic area redistribution and the Islamic opposition forming is made when there is a real danger of mass distribution of extremist and radical ideologies in the Moslem society. In 2005-2008 there were criminal cases according to the fact of the activity of

extremist religious-political party “Khizb ut-Takhrir al’-Islamiya” and the other radical organizations formed according to a system of ramified hierarchic structures in Chelyabinsk, Magnitogorsk, Orenburg, Tuimazakh, Baimak, Buguruslan, Yekaterinburg – in all oblasts of the Ural and Transurals.

It reflects a general trend of the new structure of “new Islam” and “new Moslems” forming in Russia. The first stage of this process is a confrontation the traditional Islam in all its manifestations –organized, socio-cultural and mental. Herewith one of the most effective methods of competitor striking was selected – its cynical discredit, massive attack on the carriers of the traditional Islam using mass communication media and electronic technologies looking for a support in government bodies, State Duma and in surroundings of the country president.

*“Etnos. Obshchestvo. Tsvivilizatsiya:
II Kuzivskie chteniya.” Ufa, 2009, p. 36–40.*

G. Klochkov,
politologist (the city of Astrakhan)
**THE INTERNAL REASONS OF
THE ETHNIC-POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN
THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA**

The South Federal District is the most complicated and mixed region in terms of its composition in the Russian federation. Therefore the SFD always was, is and will be the place of constant collision and dialogue of ethnic groups, cultures and even civilizations. The conflict and the dialogue in the SFD will take place simultaneously, comprising various aspects of public and spiritual reality of individuals, society and state.

The Caucasus is an integral part of the Caspian region. Like the Middle Asia, it represents its “western” and “eastern” wing. But unlike the Middle Asia, the northern part of the Caucasus is an integral part of Russia, and therefore our interest to the Caspian-Caucasian region is quite evident. The Caucasus is characterized by a high density of the population and by the highest level of its clan structure. It is impossible to ignore the stabilizing impact of the “Russian” participation there. The people, coming to the Caucasus to find their jobs, should stay there for life and think about their children and great-children. Therefore Russia will develop and grow to the south in the Caucasus. It will enlarge its territory by Siberia, as they say, but will grow, however, in the south.

Like all other conflicts, the regional political conflicts relate to the government’s actions or to the re-distribution of power and to the changed political status of the region. In the mentioned region they are aggravated by mighty ethnic conflicts, which do not coincide with regional local conflicts on the same territory and hinder prediction of their development from the scientific point of view. And rather the ethnic than the political traditions prevail in the ethnic conflicts. Often just they determine the political culture of the region and the dynamics of regional conflicts. The separatist idea is the political shaping of ethnic-cultural traditions of each region. Exactly separatism aggravates the relations, elevating them to the level of political processes. The idea of separatism in itself is a conflicting phenomenon, and forceful solving of this problem may be regarded as the destructive start of regional policy.

The situation in the republics of the North Caucasus is characterized by the strong “traditions of the mountains”, blood feud and clans’ relations. The armed internal clashes within clans occur permanently, and the authorities are unable to investigate the related crimes (including the crimes against the federal forces). The explanation

of the present separatism's reasons on the face of it may seem to be a paradox: nationalism becomes stronger due to weakening of the state system. However, it is not a paradox, since security of most states is being ensured by the world community in the name of most powerful states. Russia confronted this problem exactly in the 1990s, when the state power was weakened to such great extent, that "the national distant areas" spoke about transformation of federalism into con-federalism.

In this case, the traditional substance in the public system prevails over innovation (modernization), and therefore the classical principles of democracy and liberalism often acquire "exotic" shapes. For lack of the external foe (real or virtual) the traditional society annihilates itself, i.e. discovers an enemy among its own people, disintegrates into the circles, tapes, families, finally individuals at war with each other, when one may find out someone, who is not as faithful and orthodox as he himself. The way of life ensures, i.e. allows to make savage acts to those, who live in another way of life, promotes and justifies – provides with respect of the less desperate or more adequate members of society and makes it possible to relax in forceful acts. Assassination of ordinary people and not officials, who are responsible for taking actions, directly shows the objective: annihilation of the people, who do not resemble you (in faith, mentality, manners, determined arbitrarily), while all the rest is the pretext.

The North Caucasus is the zone of the constantly putrefying conflict mostly at the clan (tape) level even within one ethnos. Chechnya of the 2000s is a classical example, when the Kadyrovs clan occurred to take power. Its conflict with the Yamadayevs clan was widely discussed. As noted the Russian mass media, the parties of the conflict were met with no sympathy, while the war itself was called as "fight of Heroes of Russia for Moscow". Both sides accuse each other and appeal to Moscow, seeking protection rather on the part of the first

state politicians than of the law of the RF. Up till recent time both parties possessed the armed services, controlled by them, and each leader tried to recruit supporters among servicemen of the other party by different means. Each leader considered himself as a person of higher prestige. President D. Medvedev said in June 2009 in Dagestan: “The problems in the North Caucasus are systemic problems. They are as follows: the relative poverty of the population, the high level of unemployment, the monstrous scale of corruption. Regretfully, it is accompanied often with the loss of confidence to the authorities”. The latter circumstance is the most dangerous phenomenon, since it leads to separatism and forceful methods of solving disputable problems. Peace in the region to a large extent is based on the authority of the federal and local power. Corruption is the most dangerous foe of authority of any political-administrative elite. The enemy within the country corrupts and weakens the system of social-political relations.

Corruption is one of the most negative factors in development of contemporary ethnic-political conflicts. In this region corruption correlates with the terrorist threat. Corruption of officials and politicians is the main subject to discussion by mass media. The public circles are being permanently informed about the results of the struggle against corruption, but they know well that this struggle is a form of struggle of the political elites for power. Under these conditions it is difficult to speak about sincerity and efficiency of the struggle against this social evil. The state bodies should arrange the struggle against corruption, but it should be kept under the public control. Which public organizations should be in charge of it? It is another matter. But there is no doubt that exactly the institutions of civil society are able and should do it in democratic countries. Should Russia be a democratic country, the segments of civil life should be developed there.

The ethnic-political conflicts in the North Caucasus are deeply rooted in social-political bases. Since the contemporary situation is characterized by systemic crisis, the measures to be taken should be systemic and not separate actions or provisional campaigns. The anti-corruption federal roster of documents, adopted in 2009, is just one of the ways, which in perspective should promote decrease of social-political tension in the SFD. It is pointed out that Russia needs a real way out of the corruption crisis and not a politicized hysteria. The specialists propose to minimize the contacts of officials with the customers of the state service for the sake of struggle against corruption. The social-cultural problems also aggravate tension in inter-ethnic relations, for instance, one of these problems is a very low level of culture and education of the population. V.V. Putin admitted: “mass illiteracy is the nutrient medium for the ideologists of the inter-civilization split, propaganda of xenophobia, national and religious extremism, finally, for the international terrorist activities”. The elevation of the cultural level of the population is the pledge creating adequate foundations of the regional civil society, which will itself build barriers on the way of extremism. Minister of culture of the RF A. Avdeev noted that the flourishing countries in terms of economy, being undeveloped culturally, might not be regarded as great countries. At present, there exist other criteria of greatness: not only the quantity of arms, but also the level of scientific-technical progress and of mastering new technologies. The South of Russia only in the XX century produced a lot of talented figures of science, culture and politics. Only in the XX century actually in the regions of the future SFD there appeared national theaters, museums, universities and departments of Academy of Sciences.

The education system plays a great role in development of national self-consciousness. Its orientation to spiritual values determines

also the cultural-political orientation of ethnos itself and of the political elite. The small ethnoses, integrated in great state entities (for instance, Russia), apart from their ethnic culture, occur to be included in the culture of the national majority and often are bearers of cultural space both of “small” and “big” language. After proclamation of its independence Abkhazia selected Russia as its spiritual orientation. The education system of Abkhazia was included in the education space of Russia. According to the leaders of Abkhazia, its residents could have access to the world education space. Many graduates from local schools are oriented to receiving higher education in the higher education institutions of Russia.

The disposition of the national elites towards conflict or compromise to a large extent depends on the quality of their political culture and primarily on the quality of their upbringing and education. As many experts indicate, the essence of ethnic-cratization of the regional power in national republics of the RF is displayed in absolutist ethnic origin, characterized by exaggeration of the national feature in existence of the society and the state, when the main vital problems of one nation are solved to the detriment of interests and aspirations of other nations and nationalities. The question is the current policy, which abases and hurts dignity and way of life of other peoples. The ethnic-cratization of the power is displayed by creation of the privileged position of the autochthons.

What is the weakness and viciousness of this practice? In the course of carrying out of ethnocratic policy the priority is given not to a person but to the nation, and as a result of it all economic, social and spiritual processes go on in the light of this nation’s interests. It becomes particularly evident, if it concerns the political sphere, where interests of the ethnocratia are observed rather rigidly. The priority of the nation’s interests over the personal interests relates to creation of a

number of privileges only for the part of the population, which belongs to the predominant nation. The ethnocratia shapes ethnic interest and places it in the forefront among other probable values, ignoring completely the priority of other personal interests, which are negated and humiliated in these circumstances. The ethnocratia maintains the opposition of national and personal interests deliberately, striving for aggravating existing contradictions. By its ideological activities, the ethnocratia tries to overcome its original political inferiority, such as the lack of traditions of the sovereign nation. This ideological-political conflict concerns not only interests of the particular ethnic elites but also honor and dignity of the specific ethnos. The question is the chance and the ability to address self-dependently social-economic, political and social-cultural issues. The public consciousness proceeds from the idea that independence of the particular ethnic group should be displayed not only by its political right to execute self-determination but also by its ability to maintain itself independently in social-economic terms. If the nation is unable to solve its problems, it is impossible to speak about its self-determination. In the political sphere, ethnocratism tries to convince the majority of its nation in validity of its claims for wider authorities among neighboring peoples by various propaganda means and by psychological ascendancy. Ethnocratization of the power is characterized as well by consolidation of the privileged position of representatives of “its own people”, which is displayed by recruitment of “its own people” to occupy the posts in favorable “social niches”.

The present threats of emerging political conflicts based on ethnic contradictions are caused not only by activities of fighters, but to a large extent by the consequences of the lack in the North Caucasus of democratic institutions and governance procedures. Corruption flourishes just in national republics; for instance, according to some review, for the period of 2008 in Ingushetia 1.7 billion rubles

“disappeared” in the construction sites. Nevertheless, the federal power promised to provide 29 billion rubles for 2009-2011. There are no guarantees that this sum of money would disappear as well, as was noted by mass media. For a long time other republics of the North Caucasus also take federal “ration”, but one can see no economic positive results. They skillfully use the theme of terrorist threat and write off many their mistakes, referring to these bloody events of the contemporary world. Sometimes just the authorities themselves provoke internal ethnic social-economic conflicts. And if in Chechnya they succeeded to reduce the level of the terrorist threat, terrorist acts take place almost every day in Ingushetia and in Dagestan. The separate subject to discussion should be the theme of corruption in the official circles, as well as the impact of corruption on dynamics of conflicting relations.

The large-scale corruption among state officials at various levels, including the law enforcement bodies, creates a great problem in the process of settling the issues of ethnic conflicts. Corruption makes it possible for terrorists and their accomplices to get the needed documents, to penetrate into official structures, militia etc., to buy arms, to overcome the covering force on the way of their journey, to arrange counter-intelligence, to receive information on plans and projects of the authorities. The Russian mass media publicly admit that corruption in Dagestan is characterized by its ethnic and clan basis. Each clan “buys” a lucrative job for its representative, who within his competence should place his relatives to the respective posts. And nobody worries about the professional qualities of these people. This “strange” social-economic and corruption-criminal atmosphere in Dagestan does not promote the inter-ethnic peace and consent and hinders legal capitals and real investment projects coming to the republic.

According to mass media, the regime of reciprocal action of the federal center with the republics of the North Caucasus remains unchanged for the last years: do, what you want, if only war, i.e. separatism is averted. The elites in the southern republics detect this trend well. The events, occurring in the region, for a long time have not been colored black, i.e. the color of separatism, but only a tinge of this phenomenon. Separatism serves only for making a fuss. The other thing is the struggle of the local clans for getting budgetary financial resources. The federal center has not succeeded to construct the power system in national republics, when the situation would depend not on the leader's qualities but would be based on the institutional schemes. And it seems that nobody is worried about this problem... The experts even dispute – whether it will be useful to arrange a wide scale struggle against corruption in the republics of the North Caucasus or it would be better to abstain from it, since it only destabilizes the situation there. The answers to these questions are the most urgent issues for the federal elite, since they determine to a large extent the integrity and the perspectives of further constructive development of the RF.

*“Kaspiyski region: politika, ekonomika, kultura”, Astrakhan,
2009, N 3, p. 39–43.*

Z. Dzarakhova,

Deputy minister for public relations and international relations of the Republic of Ingushetia, doctor of historic sciences (the city of Nazran)

**INGUSHETIA ON THE EVE OF
THE XX-XXI CENTURIES:
ETHNIC-POLITICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES**

At present, Ingushetia again is a widely discussed theme of the current events: the series of provocative crimes and the large-scale discussion by mass media go on jointly with prognoses and appraisals. The information assault on Ingushetia and consequently on the South of Russia (the problems are closely interwoven) is a tragic but not unexpected event. It is possible to make the conclusion from some publications that the aggravation of the tense situation in the republic has a double loading. On the one side, it is the provocation against the Republic of Ingushetia, which was able to restore its statehood, for the sixteen years period was able to prove urgency and significance of its rebirth for the republic and Russia. For the period of the 1990s, characterized by conflicts in the North Caucasus, Ingushetia became a host country for a lot of forced migrants from North Ossetia and the Chechen Republic, having displayed the Caucasian sense of taking others' misfortunes hard. The number of forced migrants often succeeded the size of the republic's population. It is possible to say that Ingushetia prevented a catastrophe, having accepted sometimes the excessive burden of humanitarian problems.

At present, Ingushetia is the Mother country for representatives of over 60 nationalities. There are no inter-national and inter-confessional opposition in this republic. The religious path of the Ingush people, having accumulated elements of pagan and Christian cultures, for a long historic period having worshipped various cults and the highest

substance – Dyal (highest God), has led it to Islam in Sunni interpretation. Islam was adopted by the Ingush in the XIX century on the basis of the highly developed ethnic system “ezdel”. Islam was adopted peacefully, since there were no contradictions with the foundations of the Ingush traditional culture. The morals of Islam and the ethnic system “ezdel” produced the culture, which was unique in terms of substance and form. Tolerance and respectful attitude to other peoples and confessions is incorporated in culture of the Ingush.

The foreign services provoke aggravation of tension in the republic to destabilize the public-political situation in the region and, finally, in Russia. Ingushetia transforms itself into a hot point of ideological and information diversions on the part of the West, the countries of the Middle and Near East, says V. Likhachyov, doctor of legal sciences, According to him, it is not accidental, since the geopolitical re-distribution of the world goes on at the present time. The present time is complicated and contradictory. The constructors of disintegration of the USSR change their methods but not the final aim. The question is the security of the separate subjects and of Russia. One may see intensification of activities of the criminal forces in various republics of the North Caucasus. Both national and religious factors are used to split the Russian society. The common efforts should be used to oppose it. Nationalism, narcomania, terrorism, religious extremism – are all the links of one chain. The events, taking place in the country, should put all Russians on their guard.

For the time of the events, which took place in South Ossetia, nothing occurred in the republics of the North Caucasus. As soon as the events in South Ossetia fell down in intensity, the terrorists started to arrange their criminal activities in the North Caucasus. It means that these events were interconnected and directed against Russia.

The regional policy, carried out in Ingushetia within the framework of Russian civilization space, confronts the geopolitical interests of various foreign states. At present, the leadership of Ingushetia carries out the policy in the channel with the leadership of the federal center, but suddenly there appear “the persons concerned” about the citizens of this republic. They remember in Ingushetia the speech, made in 2007 by G. Bush, who was “worried” about destiny of Nazran in Ingushetia, as well as the seminar, arranged in Washington in November 2007 by Jamestown foundation on the theme “Future of Ingushetia”, and Yu. Latynina’s speech, pronounced there. Ingushetia has become the zone of tactical and strategic interests of the USA. Why the Trans-Atlantic politicians wished to use Ingushetia for their geopolitical interests? The small region has accumulated too many problems, which should be solved jointly with the federal center. Did Ingushetia attract their interest by accident? Ingushetia is the creation of new democratic Russia. It is an index and the justification of the legal basis of new Russia. Exactly therefore the federal center will render assistance to this subject for the sake of its final consolidation. It is so not only because of this. Since 1770, when Ingushetia joined Russia, it remained part and parcel of its territory.

Over 50 thousand forced migrants from North Ossetia and the Chechen Republic are still settled in Ingushetia. Although they go back to Chechnya, the imitated return to North Ossetia was going on for a long time, and some villages turned to be inaccessible for return of Ingush migrants. For the complicated period of the 1990s, there were published long texts on assault of Ingushetia against North Ossetia in 1992. The account of these events is as follows. The events in North Ossetia, called as “the Ossetian-Ingush conflict”, took place in October-November 1992. At that time Ingushetia was mentioned only in the Decree of the President of the RF of 4 June 1992. And when the events

occurred, there were no official structures of Ingushetia, since the republic itself did not exist. About what attack do they speak about?

Ingushetia is located near the state border of Russia with Georgia, and it is long of 84 km. For the period of 16 years Ingushetia lacks the borders. Probably, the USA will carry out its ideological activities in direction to Chechnya, Ingusheti, North Ossetia, as was written in some publications in 2008. The State Department started to make invitations to muftis of the republics of the North Caucasus within the framework of program “Islam in America”. In 2009 the leaders of the Muslim clergy in the North Caucasus refused to go to the USA due to the unfriendly policy of the USA in relation to Russia. “The West was always behind the extremists and terrorists in our republic; and Russia today resolutely come forward to the world arena. Many do not like it. Therefore the West tries to use national and religious factors in order to aggravate the situation in the country”, said mufti of Kabardino-Balkaria Anas Pshikhachev. All these activities are directed to aggravating the public-political situation.

In order to exclude any pretexts for external forces to use the problematic situations it is necessary to correlate all actions strictly with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It concerns as well even the prolonged problem of the Prigorodny district and the return of forced migrants. The Prigorodny district is a part of Russia. The same refers to North Ossetia and Ingushetia. What is the matter? The most important issue for everybody is preservation of Russia. It is possible to do it, strengthening it in the legal sphere and observing the Constitution of the RF.

Mass media may influence on consciousness of millions of citizens. But it remains unclear, in what way do some representatives of mass media use this chance. For some of them the most important is to produce information for the public resonance. And they do not care, if it

is false or not. Someone deliberately or not deliberately performs the role of instigators, causing alarm, “prognosticating” consequences. This also represents an information assault on the subjects of the SFD. Ingushetia made its choice for Russia not at the present time. This choice was made two hundred years ago. For the period of the XIX–XX centuries, Ingushetia provided for Russia 5 generals of the czarist army and dozens of holders of George orders; for the years of the Great Patriotic War the Ingush jointly with all peoples of the USSR violently participated in the battles, started from the Brest fortress to Berlin; they displayed mass heroism and stopped the enemy in time of war near Malgobek; at the Olympic games in Beijing in 2008 they received two gold medals, including the first gold medal of Russia, got by Ingush wrestler Nazir Mankiev. The peoples of the North Caucasus and Russia have rich ethnic-cultural traditions, which consolidated their union since ancient times. The security of Ingushetia means the security of the whole Russia. No external attempts will change the pro-Russian course of Ingushetia, of the Russian rear in the Caucasus. At present, the leadership and the people of Ingushetia repulse the challenge set to Russia as a whole.

*“Severny Kavkaz v sovremennoy geopolitike Rosii”,
Makhachkala, 2009, p. 74–79.*

Saltanat Ermakhanova,

candidate of sociological sciences

**MODERNIZATION OF SOCIETY IN KAZAKHSTAN:
STIMULI AND BARRIERS**

Modernization of society in Kazakhstan confronts on its way various barriers and hindrances. What is their hierarchy? Which main

factors, according to expertise, put obstacles on the way of modernization of Kazakhstan? The biggest among them was a group of factors, conditionally called “the human factor” (79.6%). This factor was composed as follows: the corruption of state officials, the general poverty of the population, which hindered its economic activities, the lack of qualified people, able to arrange business, the inclination of the population to the traditional social-cultural examples, contradictory to new democratic and liberal values.

It is significant that existence in society of different social-psychological types of people in terms of modernization, according to experts, is as follows: the modernists-rationalists (33%), being able to carry out successful activities in new and complicated circumstances, are ready to run great risks and to start new business, are able to compare input and output, possess skills of calculation etc., the schemers (39%), who correlate in themselves both rational and traditional qualities in consciousness and behavior, and, finally, the traditionalists (28%), who remain under the direct mighty influence of cultural, social-economic specific features of their country, observing the deeply rooted traditions.

The incorrect economic policy of the authorities of Kazakhstan is the second mighty factor, putting obstacles to the modernization process (74.2%). This factor is characterized by the following indexes: the unfeasible use of the national wealth, including natural resources, the emphasis laid on development of raw resources sectors of economy to the detriment of its other sectors, the underdevelopment of free economic zones.

The weak status of legal institutions, the lack of legal order occupies the third place (33.5%) in the list of factors, hindering modernization.

The fourth place in the list of such factors is occupied by “technological stagnation” (27.3%). It is characterized by two indications: the lack of the high tech zones and the inadequate inflow of advanced foreign technologies.

Finally, the fifth place is occupied by “the general unreasoned modernization strategy”.

As it is evident, there exist two main problems of modernization in contemporary Kazakhstan: the corruption of state officials and the unfeasible use of the national wealth, including natural resources. It may be supposed that they are closely connected with each other: corruption is needed for serving economic interests and needs of the groups of influence, urging towards possession and disposal of the national state riches; unfeasible use of the national riches, in its turn, consists partially in the process of providing, “maintaining” corruption and of “ensuring the share” of corruption agents.

According to the data of the World Bank, which studied corruption in the countries of transition economy (former socialist countries and Turkey), the highest level of corruption in such countries is in those of them, where the governance produces less results and the activities of the authorities are less efficient. At the same time, the corruption schemes are more complicated in the countries, where the transition period is still at the relatively initial stage. According to the same data, for the period of 2002-2005 in Kazakhstan the observers noted a definite decrease of “corruption tax” (in percent of annual income of the company), which suggests certain optimism. As it is evident, the ruling political elite of Kazakhstan should carry out further the policy aimed at strengthening these positive results and intensifying its efforts in the sphere of “anti-corruption therapy relating to society”.

Apart from the factors, which hinder modernization, there are other factors, opposite to them in the essence, while being symmetric to

them, i.e. the factors, which stimulate and intensify the modernization process in contemporary Kazakhstan. The economic block occupies a special place in the roster of these factors. It is the principal factor in terms of modernization (90%). It has two components: the rich national resources of the country and the foreign investments in its economy. They are the main factors in the whole complex of them, which ensure the modernization process. But lesser input into it is made by other factors, such as “intensification of information flows, communications and international reciprocal action” (33.5%), “development of political institutions” (32.7%), “human factor” (23.1%). Finally, the following determinants had a small impact on modernization: “growth of technological level of production” (15%), “development of legal institutions” (9.6%).

*“Phenomen modernizatsii i ego otrajenie v soznanii subelitarnykh grup: Soziokulturniy aspekt”,
Novosibirsk, 2009, p. 117–123.*

Andrey Bolshakov,

candidate of sociological sciences

(the Kazan State University)

**THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF KIRGHIZSTAN
WITH THE REPUBLICS OF THE POST-SOVIET
CENTRAL ASIA**

For the last several years, most post-Soviet countries carried out the evident multi-vector foreign policy, and the policy of the complete pro-Russian orientation is not inherent in any country of the post-Soviet space. In this respect, Kirghizstan belongs to this group of countries without exception. Besides, the economic situation in Kirghizstan is so grave that the geopolitical games of the elite are almost the sole way of

efficient contribution to the budget. The republic, with due account of economy's state, is unable to ignore the financial assistance of great powers and international organizations. Kirghizstan to a large extent depends on more powerful neighbors, striving to play the role of "older brothers" (except Tajikistan) in relation to a small country. The northern part of Kirghizstan is closely connected with Kazakhstan and China. In the south the main partners are the neighboring regions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Fergana valley is divided by the borders with these countries like Germany in the middle age. Kirghizstan has to make evolution among the interests of these countries, periodically proclaiming its strategic partnership either with Russia, or with the USA and the countries of the European Union. The existence of air base Manas" is a revealing example in this respect. The air base itself is the complex of various geopolitical problems. First, it is characterized by opposition of interests among different authorities of the USA, Russia and China. Second, it is the problem of Afghanistan which should be solved. Third, the countries, located to the south of Kirghizstan, take into account the existence in Kirghizstan of the foreign air base, which may be considered as a potential threat. The whole complex of these problems is connected with the actual national interests of Kirghizstan.

The main donors of Kirghizsta are Russia, the USA, China, Germany, Great Britain, Turkey, Switzerland and Japan, as well as the Asian Bank of Development, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program. No country of the contemporary world is unable alone fully to ensure all needed for Kirghizstan financial assistance, and therefore the process of manoeuvring of its establishment in the labyrinths of present geopolitics will continue.

The special role in development of contemporary Kirghizstan is played by the reciprocal relations with the Central Asian countries. The integration in the post-Soviet Central Asia does not exist, but there

exists cooperation and mutual relations of a number of international players. The structure of economy and the nomenclature of goods of most countries of the region are identical, and therefore integration is objectively replaced by competition. The share of Kazakhstan in the regional economy accounts for 65%. Taking into account its economic capacity, Kazakhstan claims for the leading role in the Central Asia. Energy is not a significant factor of integration in the Central Asia.

Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan

The two countries are connected with each other by special cultural and historic ties. The spiritual and language closeness of the peoples of Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan is a common knowledge. Both countries actively cooperate within the framework of international organizations, such as CIS, EvrAzES, ODKB, ShOS. Leaving aside the problems, created by regulation of the Syr-Daria flow, the Kazakh-Kirghiz relations in times of A. Akayev were developing almost without conflicts. The elite of Kirghizstan comprises representatives of the Kazakh people. For the 1990s, the governments of two countries concluded the agreement on return of all lands, rented in Soviet times. By 2001, the demarcation of state borders between them in the main was finished. In January 2000, Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan signed the treaty on joint use of waters of the rivers Chu and Talas. Despite the fact that in 2005 A. Akayev, thrown down from his post, flew first to Kazakhstan, the relations between the two countries did not experience any crisis. In December 2005, the Prime Ministers of the countries confirmed the property right of Kazakhstan for several objects near Lake Issyk-Kul, possessed by the Kazakh SSR before 1991. They agreed on the simplified system of labor migration from Kirghizstan to Kazakhstan; and a joint venture – enterprise “Kazkyrgas”, created at the meeting, liquidated the threat of cessation of shipment of Uzbek gas to

Kirghizstan in winter time. For the period of 2007-2008, the investments of Kazakhstan in economy of Kirghizstan increased to a large extent. It was agreed that the Kazakh companies would take part in the tender for implementation of the big investment project – construction of hydroelectric station “Kambarata-1”. The cooperation between the two countries is developing in the humanitarian sphere, the Forum of intellectuals of these countries was convened, and the quota of Kirghiz students in the higher education institutions in Kazakhstan was raised up to 100 people.

However, the Kirghiz-Kazakh relations are far from being the ideal relations. The Kazakh authorities establish more rigid rules for Kirghiz citizens, coming to the neighboring territory. For instance, Kirghiz passengers, going by the way from the Talas region, are subject to humiliated checking on the border posts of Kazakhstan.

Kirghizstan and Tajikistan

Kirghizstan and Tajikistan are partners in some post-Soviet international regional organizations (CIS, EvrAzES, ODKB), actively cooperate within the framework of ShOS; the official negotiations and meetings of representatives of these countries are conducted in the friendly atmosphere and contribute to consolidation of diplomatic, trade-economic, cultural and humanitarian contacts between two countries. Both countries are the weakest partners in the region of the Central Asia in terms of some economic, military-technical and geopolitical parameters. They compete with each other in the economic sphere, the main migration flows from these countries are directed, first of all, to Russia, although numerous Kirghiz and Tajik Diaspora exists also in other CIS countries. The situation in Tajikistan is directly connected with the permanent civil war in Afghanistan. The political elites of Kirghizstan and Tajikistan strive for leaving the halo of “the

failed states”, for justifying the economic and military superiority to each other, for occupying sustainable position. The geographic parameters of two countries, the existence of limitation and unevenness in distribution of natural resources provoke expansion of some groups of people and further cultivation of neighboring territories. For instance, the territory of Tajikistan accounts for 143.1 thousand square km (with 93% of mountainous part of it), while the population makes 7 million people (with its density of 45 persons per 1 square km). In its turn, the territory of Kirghizstan consists of 198.5 thousand square km with the population of 5 million people (characterized by the density of 25 persons per 1 square km).

The roster of mutual claims of Kirghizstan and Tajikistan concerns primarily the lands of the questioned border territories, particularly in the Batken region of Kirghizstan, where there are about 70 questioned plots of land. Kirghizstan contains Tajik enclave Voruh, which is a part of Isfarinsky administrative district of the Sogdiyskaya region of Tajikistan. This territory (130 thousand square km) is populated by more than 20 thousand people (Tajik – 95% and Kirghiz – 5%). Every year the heated controversy between the residents of the border districts of two countries ends with the attempts of their governments to regulate somehow the situation. However, these attempts failed, since Kirghizstan and Tajikistan are unable to come to the consent on determination of the status of the questioned bordering lands. The prolonged conflict between Kirghizstan and Tajikistan is based on the old dispute concerning the land-water resources. Since the 1980s, the grave clashes between Tajik and Kirghiz took place, for instance in villages Voruhe-Tangi (1982) and Match-Aktatyr (1998). The fruitless attempts to regulate the contradictions, including demands to give Tajikistan the questioned territory, resulted in the new escalation of tension (1989–1991), accompanied by the threats to grow into a

direct conflict between two parties. In 1998, new conflicts related to distribution of water resources, occurred on the territory of the Batken district.

For the last three years, the analogous border clashes took place mainly during the spring field-work. The well publicized case took place on 26 March 2008 in the Batken region, when over 150 Tajik citizens, headed by the chief administrator of the Isfarinsky district, invaded the territory of Kirghizstan and, using the excavator, tried to demolish the dam of the channel, which prevented irrigation water coming to the Tajik territory. Such “small conflicts”, in case of unfavorable development of further events, may result in armed forceful actions. Under conditions of more often disturbances on the bordering territories and in case of conflicts in the process of determination of belonging of different plots, in case of disputes about water etc., any one-sided actions on the part of Tajikistan or Kirghizstan without due account of the other party’s opinion, may result in inter-ethnic conflicts. This course of events seems to be not in the interests of the ruling elites of the two states, which will try to solve the disputable problems within the framework of regional organizations or with the mediation of Russia.

Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan

Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan represent a kind of poles in the sphere of public political openness. Kirghistan is the most overt country in the Central Asian region, while Turkmenistan is the most closed state in the Central Asia and in the whole post-Soviet space. The military and geopolitical contradictions actually do not exist in the relations of two countries, but different models of economic and political development promoted the watchful attitude to each other’s actions for the longest time of the post-Soviet period. The political changes, which occurred in

Turkmenistan for the last several years, let the leaders of Kirghizstan arrange more constructive relations with this state in the economic sphere. For the latest period, the cultural-humanitarian, trade-economic cooperation between two countries started its development more efficiently; the countries succeeded to organize reciprocal action in the tourist sphere. China is interested in import of natural gas from Turkmenistan via the territory of Kirghizstan, avoiding Kazakhstan, and is ready to make investments in implementation of this project. Kirghizstan, like Kazakhstan, has the common border with China, depends completely on the unique source of gas delivery, i.e. Uzbekistan, and it intends to diversify its import. Kirghizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan signed the general convention on protection of the environment. It was a result of the prolonged work of the Inter-state Commission for Sustainable Development of the International Foundation for Rescue of Aral. The Convention “supposes the united demands in the sphere of the nature protection activities for all countries of the Central Asia”. The document pays special attention to the scientific-technical cooperation for solving ecological problems and for elaboration of common actions to keep biological diversity. The scheme for cooperation in time of ecological emergency was elaborated and adopted.

Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan

The chiefly friendly and mutually beneficial relations are maintained between two countries at the diplomatic level. It is common knowledge that in 1998 Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed the agreement “On Eternal Friendship and Cooperation”, which to some extent promoted solving common Central Asian problems: the regional security, the counter action against terrorism and extremism, the social development. The presidents and the Prime Ministers regularly arranged

their meetings, but the real economic rapprochement did not occur. For the period of time after Uzbekistan suspended in 2008 its participation in the Eurasian economic community, the other two countries remained members of the influential regional organizations – ShOS, CIS, ODKB. The cooperation of Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan received a new impulse when K. Bakyev came to power. The two countries agreed to arrange the close reciprocal action in the activities of the border guards, the customs services and the secret services for the sake of the intensified control over the state border. The main stress in the inter-state negotiations was made on the issues of further extension of trade-economic cooperation, particularly the efficient functioning of transport routes and energy resources. The mutually beneficial trade-economic cooperation between Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan is being adequately arranged by the signed agreements on free trade, stimulation and protection of investments, on avoiding twofold taxation and by other significant bilateral documents.

At the same time, the events in the Soviet times in Osh (the Kirghiz-Uzbek ethnic conflict), the existence of the great Uzbek Diaspora in the south of Kirghizstan and the relatively small number of Kirghiz, living in Uzbekistan, to a large extent complicate the bilateral relations. The realization of the rights of ethnic minorities (Uzbek and Kirghiz) is the basis of not only of bilateral relations but also of stability in the Central Asian region as a whole.

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The Republic of Kirghizstan maintains diplomatic, military-technical, trade-economic, cultural and humanitarian relations with the greater number of the above mentioned countries. But exactly the great powers and the states of the Central Asian region determine the main trends of the internal and external development of the Republic of Kirghizsta. For the last year, Kirghizstan, finding the way round Russia

and the USA, achieved a lot: succeeded to keep in the country the military base of anti-terrorist forces, raised by more than three times the income of its location, secured writing off the external debt to Russia, received the Russian grant, as well as the preferential credit. At the same time, the leadership of Kirghizstan preserved the chance for further bargaining relating to the air base. The agreement on presence of NATO servicemen shall be concluded for one year with probable prolongation or without prolongation, if one interested party, for instance Russia, wishes to make to the Kirghiz authorities a more favorable proposal. Kirghizstan within the framework of present realities in the Central Asia objectively needs the close rapprochement with Russia. The neighboring countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) constantly make greater border claims to the republic. Only maintaining unity with the Russian Federation, it is possible to withstand the countries, which are more powerful in economic and military terms and which deliver rigid territorial ultimatums.

“Tsvivilizatsiya i gosudarstvo na Vostoke”, M., 2009, p. 23–44.

Elena Ionova,

candidate of historic sciences (IMEMO RAN)

**THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL FACTORS
ON RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
TURKMENISTAN**

The dominant of cooperation of Russia with Turkmenistan remains the export of Turkmen gas to the RF. For the 2009, the dialogue at the highest level was going on: in September and December two working visits were made by D. Medvedev to Ashghabad , while G. Berdymukhamedov visited Moscow in March and November. Besides, the negotiations at the highest level were held during meetings

within the frameworks of the CIS. They concerned the search for addressing the questioned issues (primarily the amount and price of the Turkmen gas purchased by the RF) and determining new directions of bilateral cooperation. For 2009, Russia, despite extension by Turkmenistan of its external economic ties, kept the leading position in the foreign trade turnover of the republic. For 11 months its amount made up \$5.5 billion (without taking into account the gas component, the trade turnover of the two countries did not exceed \$900 million, though), at the same time the Russian export to Turkmenistan increased by 2.5 times. With participation of Russian investors, 127 projects are being implemented in various sectors of economy and in the social sphere. The leadership of the RT stresses that the relations with the RF are going on within the framework of the long-term strategic partnership and do not depend on the international conjuncture and are not subject to the external impact.

At the same time, the changed realities make essential corrections in the relations between two countries. The list of factors, having direct impact on mutual relations between Russia and Turkmenistan, inter alia, consists of the following: first, intensification of economic relations of Turkmenistan with other economic partners, reflected, in particular, in the realization of the principle of multiple variation of the routes for export of the Turkmen gas, and, second, the world financial-economic crisis. The commission on 14 December 2009 of the gas pipeline Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China meant that Russia ceased to be the sole importer of the Turkmen gas (excluding the small gas import by Iran) and its supplier to the world market. For the nearest 30 years, the gas will be shipped to China, which gradually becomes one of the biggest markets for the supply of the raw resources from the Central Asia (in 2006 the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan was put into operation). The Trans-Asian gas pipeline, constructed for the shortest period of time

(only for two years), becomes for the PRC a real step forward on the way of diversification of the sources of the energy supplies, which is the aim, aspired for by all countries-importers of oil and gas, striving for ensuring energy security. The new pipeline means a lot for Turkmenistan: first of all, ensuring the sustainable sale of the produced gas, the shaping of its price on the basis of market competition and, as a whole, reduction of the republic's dependence on the RF in the sphere of these raw materials' supply to the world market. The construction of the Trans-Asian gas pipeline, estimated by the interested Central Asian countries as "the transaction of the century", acquires a special significance also from the point of view of the perspective integration processes. The pipeline may become an important factor both of the internal-regional (combination of resource, industrial and transit capacity of three countries of the CA) and of the inter-regional integration (the quadripartite format with participation of China but without Russia). In its turn, this process may lead to construction of new partnership schemes.

The leaders of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in their speeches relating to the commission of the gas pipeline stressed exactly the project's integration aspects. N. Nazarbayev said: "This is a great project. The pipeline restores the ancient Silk route." He noted as well that this fact would lead to the consolidation of positions of the Central Asian region in the world energy system. I. Karimov declared that the pipeline, constructed for the sake of reaching China, "changed the geopolitical map of the Central Asia" and would contribute to consolidation of energy security in the region and in the world. At the same time, the leaders of three Central Asian countries stressed that the Trans-Asian gas pipeline contributed as well to creation of the vast energy infrastructure with all accompanying elements – the industrial and social objects, the communications and new jobs. It should be noted

that the Russian business succeeded in making its contribution to implementation of this project: one of the most complicated parts of the pipeline was constructed with participation of Russian companies.

At the same time, there is quite evident the growing dependence of economy of Turkmenistan, like of other countries of the region, on China, which more actively penetrates to their markets. As it is known, the energy resources of the CA countries attracted the interest of China and represent the main factor of Beijing's interest in the region. It is accompanied by the rise of the investments' amount in the economy of the CA countries and by provision of beneficial credits for specific projects. At present, the development of the Turkmen-Chinese relations takes place not only in the raw materials sector but also in the wide specter of the economic development. The Chinese investments, according to the official data, made up in 2009 over \$1billion and 1.4 billion yuans; in Turkmenistan 53 projects are being implemented in the gas and oil sphere, in the sectors of telecommunication, transport, agriculture, textile, chemical and food industries as well as in health care and construction.

The strengthening position of the Chinese capital in economy of Turkmenistan promotes the rise of influence of China. In particular, the Chinese national oil company (KNNK) possesses the contracted territory "Bagtyyarlyk" with the oil field Samandep, the starting point of the natural gas' shipment by the Turkmen-Chinese gas pipeline (the Chinese investments were used also for construction there of a big gas processing enterprise). This corporation, having received in 2007 the license for exploration and extraction of gas there, remains up till present the sole foreign company, extracting gas in Turkmenistan. Like in other republics of the CA, Beijing uses there the mechanism of providing beneficial credits for various projects. For instance, in 2009 the CPR became the biggest creditor of Turkmenistan. At the same time,

KNNK, like companies of South Korea and UAE, won the international tender for the total sum of \$9.7 related to different contracts. In December 2009, Turkmenistan and China signed a package of new beneficial agreements mainly on development of transport and communication.

For 2009, the alternative direction of the Turkmen's gas export – to neighboring Iran – was being extended. In July 2009, Ashghabad and Tehran concluded the agreement on construction and putting into operation of the second gas pipeline for gas shipment from Turkmenistan to Iran. Finally, the diversification of export routs for “blue fuel” (gas) was supposed to ensure the widely discussed in the republic construction of gas pipeline “Nabucco” in order to ship gas directly to Europe round Russia. The implementation of this project reflects the old wish of the EU and the USA. Brussels with greater attention examines the energy resources of Turkmenistan, and many European companies are ready to make investments in exploration and extraction of gas. The coincidence of interests of Turkmenistan and the European Union resulted in 2009 in intensification of relations at the inter-state level and in the partner ties between separate companies of European countries and Turkmenistan.

In November 2009, G. Berdymukhamedov made his official visit to Italy; as a result of the visit, the inter-government agreements (for instance, the agreement on support and protection of investments) and contracts with big companies were concluded. In particular, there was signed the memorandum on mutual understanding between the state agency for governance and use of hydrocarbon resources under the president of the RT and corporation ENI, which, as expected, will be the first Italian company to go to the Turkmen market. Besides, in 2009, there was signed the memorandum on the long-term cooperation with one of the biggest European companies – German firm “RWE AG”.

Turkmenistan concluded with this company the agreement on division of production in the course of development of one of the oil-gas blocks in the Caspian shelf. The proposals for development of sea deposits were made by French companies Total and CDF, by energy holding BP, by Austrian company OMV.

Lately, in the course of search for investments Asghabad pays great attention to development of relations with Japan. The Japanese capital already implements 23 investment projects; the most active work is carried out by the following companies in the Turkmen market, which opened their representative offices in the republic: “ITOCHU Corporation”, “IGC Corp.”, “Foreign Trade Company Abdul Hadi”. In December 2009, G. Berdymukhamedov made his first official visit to Japan with the objective to attract new Japanese investments in economy of the RT. In the course of the visit, the ways of mutual actions in the sphere of transport and communication, construction, textile industry and health care were determined. As a result, an expert group was established to determine the main directions of cooperation in the oil and gas and in the processing industries; there were concluded some agreements on investments of Japanese companies for the sake of development of chemical industry in the RT. At the same time, the state bank of external economic activities of the RT and the Japanese bank of international cooperation concluded the agreement on the long-term beneficial credits. As a whole, it is possible to conclude that at present the process of active penetration of Turkmenistan in the world economic system is going on in different geographic directions.

At the same time, the relations between Moscow and Asghabad were formed not in a simple way. The world financial crisis, resulted in reduction of gas demand in Europe and Ukraine, determined the reduction of “blue fuel” purchase by Russia in Turkmenistan. In 2009, it was not to “Gasprom” advantage to buy gas in Turkmenistan, since

Asghabad, despite the fall of world prices, did not agree either to decrease the price or to reduce the amount of gas. The construction of the Caspian gas pipeline was actually frozen, although its project had been widely publicized beforehand. However, the complication of relations between Moscow and Ashghabad were determined not only by the consequences of the world crisis (for the first quarter of the year “Gasprom” completely fulfilled its liabilities, purchasing the fixed amount of gas, corresponding to the European formula of price excluding expenses for transportation and marketing of the fuel). Moscow was dissatisfied with the continuing search by Ashghabad for chances to export gas to Europe round Russia. It was reflected in the disagreement between Moscow and Ashghabad on the issue of construction of the internal gas pipeline East-West, which would let connect the deposits in the eastern districts of the country with the shore of the Caspian Sea. Moscow demanded the guarantee that the gas would be shipped by this pipeline to the Caspian pipeline and would reach Europe through Russia, while “Gasprom” would become not only the investor but also the operator of the pipe. However, G.Berdymukhamedov in the course of his visit to Moscow in March 2009 refused to give such guarantee, and therefore in perspective such position might make pipeline East-West the first link of pipeline “Nabucco”. Besides, Ashghabad declared the international tender for this project. In response, “Gasprom” informed Ashghabad on its intention to decrease four times the purchase of gas.

Meanwhile, the deterioration of relations with Asghabad does not correspond to the future plans of Moscow. The geopolitical deliberations demand maintenance of sustainable ties with the republic, which experiences influence of other external partners. In December 2009, D. Medvedev visited Ashghabad; this visit settled the issue and concluded the negotiations, going on for the whole year both at the

highest level and at the level of economic subjects. Turkmenistan and Russia agreed to resume in January 2010 the supplies of Turkmen fuel. The compromise was achieved on the question of price: its formula should correspond to the conditions of the European gas market. As a whole, in 2010 the Turkmen gas will cost for “Gasprom” cheaper mainly owing to reduction of the amount of its supply (previously, under the contracts, the annual purchases accounted for 50 billion cubic meters). At the same time, some experts think that the new agreement corresponds, first of all, to the political aspirations of Moscow, since actually it is more profitable for “Gasprom” to buy cheaper gas from Russian independent producers, which were raising the amount of its extraction.

The agreements on Turkmen pipelines seem to be significant. First, it was planned to continue cooperation in construction of the Caspian gas pipeline, destined for extension of supplies of Turkmen gas through Russia to Europe. Second, it was agreed to intensify activities of the RF in laying internal gas pipeline East-West, which for a long time had been point of discord in relations of two countries. Meanwhile, one paragraph of the agreement provided for concerted position with the RF concerning new directions of Turkmen gas to the markets of Europe. The decision was also taken on the intensified participation of Russian companies in supplying with the modern equipment the leading branches of economy of the RT, which founded its reflection in the agreement on extension of strategic cooperation in the sphere of energy and engineering industry. At the same time, it was intended to involve Russian companies in implementation of projects in the oil and oil refining industries, including development of hydrocarbon resources of the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea and also creation of infrastructure for shipment of oil and oil refining products. A great role

in technical renovation of Turkmen economy is devoted to the Russian state corporation “Rostehnologii”.

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E. Kuzmina,

candidate of the political sciences

**THE PECULIARITIES OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
IN THE CENTRAL ASIA**

The Central Asia, which has passed the eighteenth period of consolidation of new independent states, is one of the new geopolitical regions of the world, having impact on the world processes. They excite a rather great interest of the world and regional political actors. The analysis, presented below, describes the internal political peculiarities of the region, which promote or hinder its unification. Since the Central Asian region is at the stage of consolidation, it is necessary to analyze the interests and capabilities of big foreign policy actors, having impact on shaping regional unity. The countries of the Central Asian region differ in political and social system, type of economy, strategic priorities in the foreign policy. However, there exist essential common features of the political development of the region’s states.

After disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states have passed a rather long way of formation of their statehood. In terms of territory, these state entities finished this formation as the union republics of the USSR for the period of 1924-1936. Up to the second part of the XIX century there existed three multinational states on the territory of the Central Asia: Bukhara emirate, Kokand and Khiva khanates, which did not relate to the areas of the national settlement. Later, a great part of these territories became the components of the

Russia Empire. The national states did not exist on this territory in Soviet times, although the process was going on in the direction of consolidation of political capacity of the title nations in the republics. The backbone of the political, economic and cultural elite in the region was formed already for the Soviet period. Under the Soviet power, the traditional structures of the Central Asian societies (regionalism, clanship) officially were ignored, the party nomenclature was constantly renovated, but in parallel the process, directed to strengthening the clan self-consciousness of the Central Asian peoples, was going on. As a result, in the region already for the period of the USSR existence, the synthesis of the authoritarian-hierarchic power of the Soviets with the traditional scheme of public relations took place. The result of it was as follows: having acquired independence for the 1990s, the Central Asian elites were not radically changed, like in Russia, where the elite society was renovated for more than a half. Tajikistan represents one exclusion, where after the period of fierce civil war the elite was enlarged by representatives of the religious figures.

No country is characterized by the mono-national structure, although the title nations make from 60% to 90% of the population. At the same time, there exists a wide diapason of national minorities in each state. This poly-ethnicity brings considerable pressure to bear upon solving the internal political problems. All Central Asian States, carrying out their internal policy, stressed the question of consolidation of the national component for shaping the mono-national state identity. Some experts quite rightly noted two main tasks confronting the ruling elite of the Central Asian states, related to poly-ethnicity of the region and ethno-cratic characteristic of the power in the Central Asia: consolidation of the title ethnic groups and legitimization of ethnocrata.

Regionalism was strengthening in the Central Asian countries since the time of their independence. In Kirghizstan it was displayed in

division of the country to the south and the north, In Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – in formation of regional clans, in Kazakhstan – in the form of the senior, the middle-aged and the junior zhuz. The rigid vertical power in the Central Asian countries gradually transforms into power clan pyramids. Not a single president succeeded to demolish the clan connections. They only counterbalance these connections with the personnel changes and replacements without taking account of the closest circle. The phenomenon of clanship reflects the traditional-patriarcal and social-cultural bases of the population. The crux of these bases consists in the fact that the majority of the population considers the institution of the state power as the system of the just distribution of social and material benefits. This ethnic-social structure of society made it possible to form the elite according to ‘the clients’ principle, based on favoritism of higher officials to relatives and fellow-countrymen in exchange for their loyalty. The clients’ model of the elite’s formation and functioning has its specific features in each Central Asian country within the framework of the common principle.

The significant specific feature of the political consciousness of the Central Asian peoples is the fact that the state leader is associated with the nation’s father, endowed by this community with the limitless power. This circumstance allowed all presidents, irrespective of the term of power, gradually and progressively to consolidate the president’s institution as an instrument of personal power. The heads of two biggest states of the region (N. Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan and I. Karimov in Uzbekistan) have remained in power since 1991. Like president of Tajikistan E. Rahmon, they have used the limit of democratic tenure of office at their elected posts. Having defeated their potential rivals and weakened the opposition, these leaders possess strong positions and have strengthened the constitutional status of the presidential republics.

The system of the unlimited power of the monarchic type was created in Turkmenistan by the first president of the country. New president G. Berdymukhamedov, having started his rule in the country after death of Turkmenbashi (“father of all Turkmen”) S. Niyazov in the end of 2006, made some changes in the internal policy of the state but kept intact the super power of the president. Thus, the trend to strengthening of the personal power of the president is seen everywhere.

The other specific feature of the political systems of the Central Asian states, connected with the peculiarities of the ethnic-social system of the regional society, is delegation to the president of functions of various branches of power. The difference among the countries consists only in the size of the delegated power. While the influence of the state head in Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan on the legislative and the judicial branches of power seems to be less, in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the presidential power is not restricted by any conditional provisions.

The Central Asian states are democratic republics in legal terms: the elections of the presidents and members of the parliament are held regularly, the division of authority exists etc. But actually democracy in the region is characterized by certain restraints comparing with classical western examples. Thus, in the Central Asian states there function the so-called delegated democracies, which are more adapted to the existing traditional culture of regional communities.

This system is supported by the majority of the population of the Central Asian countries, except small groups of the opposition. The peculiar feature of the opposition groups in the Central Asian countries is as follows: they are formed not on the basis of the parties with different programs of the countries’ governance or their roles of exponents of different social strata of society but their position is the outcome of their removal from power for various political and economic

reasons. It is evident in particular by the example of Turkmenistan, the nearest to the absolute monarchy country, where all opposition leaders (living abroad or being imprisoned) had occupied highest official posts in various times. The same situation exists in the most “democratic” Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan, where each opposition leader was a high official in his time. The official opposition forces function within the framework, allowed by the authorities, under the total official control (Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). Some opposition leaders were forced to leave Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In the first case, the opposition is very restricted in its actions concerning reformation of the national political system, in the second case, it is unable to exert influence on the national political life.

The parliamentary reforms were executed in the Central Asian countries for the period of the 2000s years. The main reason of these reforms was prevention of the elite’s split and of the society’s destabilization. According to some analysts, the permanent constitutional reforms may become a rather effective instrument in stabilization of the political process, since they allow to change the rules of political “game” in the extensive diapason without leaving the framework of the constitutional-legal field. At the same time, the reforms of the parliament make it possible to de-politicize big business groups, if not neutralize them, to weaken their political pressure on the authorities. It is especially evident in the example of Kazakhstan. Although some Kazakh companies are still represented in the legislative power, the most influential banking and oil sectors turned to be outside the parliament. At present, the alliance of the high power has been achieved with big business, oriented to the state strategic aims, including membership in the group of fifty most competitive countries of the world. Big business received power not through elections and political parties but owing to the administrative capacity. Creation of

state holding “Samruk”, foundation “Kazyn”, social-business corporations, union “Atameken”, program “30 corporate leaders”, shares for legalization of property, existence of their own representatives in the administration of the president, in the government, in the national bank in akimats etc. – all this actually resulted in creation of the situation, when the interests of private and state big business were incorporated in the state policy. According to D. Ashimbayeva, two loosely mutually connected realities appeared in the country. One reality is represented by the parliament, the government, “Hur Otan”, the political and administrative reform, mass media, electorate and others, in the other reality exist big business (banks, construction metallurgical and oil firms) and the state corporations. They are united only by the state leader, recognized as the guarantor of stability in “both worlds”.

The mutual activities of the power and business are executed approximately on the basis of the same principles in other countries of the region. Evidently, there are particular nuances of the reciprocal action in each state, but the role of the president as the arbiter of inter-elite contradictions and the guarantor of stability of the ties of business with the power are clearly seen in the whole region.

Actually, the elites of the Central Asian states possess very small political chances, determined by the special features of modernization processes, characterized for the countries of Islamic East. Only two models of political development are realized successfully in such states. They are as follows: the authoritarian secular regime with all shortcomings inherent in it (clans, despotism, corruption) and Islamic theocracy. In spite of the rebirth of religious self-consciousness, occurring everywhere, all states of the region chose the secular way of development. It is possible to concur with the conclusion of some experts that the authoritarian state model of the family type, chosen by the leaders of the Central Asia, is based on the partial social-economic

modernization (introduction of market institutions, creation of conditions for development of social groups of the capitalist society) and on the secular development. The role of religion in politics and economy of the country is minimized within development according to this model. Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia (before its “color revolution” in 1998) achieved greater successes on this way of development. The peak of this model’s political development is the peculiar variant of democracy, which keeps the strong role of the leader’s personal power, of the army and of the secret service. Turkey presents the most evident example of it.

In perspective, the probable consolidation of the Islamic factor in the internal state politics may occur in some countries of the Central Asian region (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan). This probable phenomenon is connected with both the social-cultural and religious consciousness of the population in these countries and the low social-economic level of development of these countries, which will further decrease due to the extending world economic crisis.

The Central Asian countries are characterized by great differences in the level of their social-economic development at the general rather low level. Two poles are seen clearly. Kazakstan represents one pole, the other countries represent the other pole. In the general regional GNP the share of Kazakstan accounts for 69%, the share of Uzbekistan makes 23%, the shares of Kirghizstan and Tajikistan are much smaller – about 4%. Turkmenistan practically does not take part in the regional economic processes. The economy of Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is characterized by the high share of agriculture, the highest level of industrial development exists in Kazakstan, which leaves behind its neighbors in terms of incomes and savings of the population. The level of unemployment and poverty in this country is much less.

The energy complex, the ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy and food industries play the leading role in the industrial structure. The difference is as follows: in Kazakhstan these industries are included in the world economy, while in other countries they are engaged in production mainly in the internal or the regional market. By means of cooperation with China Turkmenistan tries to enter the world market of raw resources. The metallurgy industry in Kirghizstan and Tajikistan produce mainly ore concentrates or crude metal – the initial stage of metallurgical production.

Uzbekistan is the principal supplier of natural gas for Kirghizstan and Tajikistan. It plays a certain role in delivery of cars and agricultural machines. The economic significance of mountainous Kirgistan and Tajikistan is determined by their territorial location in the upper reaches of the main Central Asian rivers – Amu Darya and Syr Darya and by the fact that owing to the hydroelectric stations, located on these rivers and on their tributaries, they may regulate the flow and provide irrigation of the agricultural lands in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for the period of the cotton and other crops' vegetation. Kazakhstan plays an important role in provision for the region's countries of corn products, fuel and ferrous metals. At the same time, Kazakhstan plays a very great role as a transit country, providing for other Central Asian countries the exit to the European, Russian and Chinese markets.

The CA countries differ to a large extent in the characteristic and intensity of the carried out economic reforms. The gradual market transformation, characterized by the highest centralization of power in the economic sphere, takes place in Uzbekistan. The more rigid centralization of power in governance of national economy exists in Turkmenistan, where market transformation is going on by the slowest tempos.

In the beginning of the XXI century, the growth of economic significance of Kazakhstan promoted its regional leader's ambitions. But these ambitions contradict the informal ethnic-cultural hierarchy of the Central Asian peoples. The Uzbek farmers mentally feel certain cultural superiority over the recent Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads, being at the same time the most numerous people in the region. Therefore the ambitions of Kazakhstan for the regional dominance, supported by its economy, confront the counter action of Uzbekistan, which, to the mind of its citizens, has its historic right for this dominant position. This complicated structure of historic mutual relations and of the contemporary economic dynamics in the CA region makes rather problematic implementation of any projects of regional cooperation. Although the officials of Kirghizstan and Tajikistan support the ideas of the Kazakh leader, in these republic the dissatisfaction grows on, due to purchases by Kazakhstan of many economic objects in these countries. This fact complicates further the situation in relation to integration of the Central Asian region.

The analysis of the situation reveals existence of many different appraisals of further development of the Central Asian region and of each country separately. The perspectives of the Central Asian integration do not inspire with optimism. No common regional project was implemented (the real united economic space was not created, the mutual settlement of ecological issues is impeded). The countries are interested in economic integration with the non-regional countries, primarily with neighboring Russia and China. The countries of the CA region depend a lot on these countries in solving social problems, particularly unemployment.

The Central Asia is still at the stage of development and consolidation. It maintains relations with international institutions and organizations but adopts a very contradictory position concerning

cooperation with them. The peoples, who are settled on this territory, possess the unstable proper identity. It is reflected in the ambiguous foreign policy orientation of the Central Asian states, in the competition for the integration projects, in contradictions among regional institutions and absence of the efficient cooperation within the framework of international organizations. It is regarded and called in these countries to be the multi-vector cooperation.

The started world economic crisis greatly weakened the economic positions of the Central Asian states. The radical decrease of the prices for hydrocarbons and a number of other natural resources resulted in weakening of industrial and financial systems of these states. This fact will urge the governments of these countries towards strengthening economic reciprocal action with more wealthy countries comparing with the Central Asian neighbors – with Russia, China, the EU countries and the USA, since only these countries, possessing big financial and industrial capabilities, will be able to render assistance in overcoming the crisis of national economics. The influence and economic capacity of other states in the region are different. These countries due to certain, external to the region, causes have not yet achieved the consensus on distribution of spheres of influence in the Central Asia. At present, the Central Asia is the arena of struggle not only for natural resources but also for political and ideological influence. The USA, the EU, Russia and China pay greater interest to the region. These countries are united by their urge towards diversification of the sources of the hydrocarbons supply and provision of the routes for their shipment to their markets, aspire for consolidation in the region of their economic and political positions. This task is being regarded in the context of the struggle among the poles of world politics and economy for their global impact. It should be stressed that the Central Asian countries benefit from the rivalry of world and regional leaders. Their high tempos of growth to a

large extent have been achieved as a result of this rivalry. This fact puts off formation of the economic and political unity of the region and creation of the regional economic structure and what is more the political union. This conclusion may be made from the present position of the states, when the time framework of the world crisis is not yet determined.

For the last eight years, the political and economic situation in the region was marked by intensified activities of its neighbors – Russia and China. Russia tries to restore its former positions, using its advantages: unity of the general statehood for almost one hundred and fifty years and economic orientation of a number of branches of national economics to economic unity with Russia, the united pipelines, transportation and electric networks.

The economic interests of Russia in the Central Asia are rather extensive. Some of them are purely economic ties, for instance import and export of traditional goods, while some other goods relate to the foreign policy and geopolitical interests (oil and gas sector, transport, atomic industry). At the same time, the united strategy of political and economic relations with the Central Asian countries has not been elaborated in the RF. All joint economic projects are implemented in the region only on the basis of bilateral agreements. Not a single proclaimed multilateral projects is being implemented. It is determined by the existing situation in the relations among the Central Asian states and by the unbalanced Russian policy in relation to the region as a whole. One of the main reasons of Russian participation in ShOS is a chance to extend its influence on the region and strengthening integration trends in cooperation with it. Russia regards intensification of cooperation with the countries in the military sphere and in the sphere of security as the basis of consolidation of its impact on the region. It corresponds to its contemporary foreign policy directed to strengthening Russian global

positions. Exactly in cooperation on issues of security one may see a clear accent of Russia relating to development of multilateral reciprocal action and integration. Moscow tries to coordinate formation of the regional system of security and intensified its activities since 2007: on the initiative of Russia, the documents were signed on creation within the framework of ODKB of the mechanism of peacemaking activities and extension of military-technical cooperation.

As it was significant, Russia advanced to the leading position in forming the regional security system in relation to the American base in Kirghizstan and the presence of NATO military forces in this republic. Such policy of Russia in the central Asia, characterized by lack of planning and often by post factum actions, produced the outcome with different directions. On the one side, the countries of the region gradually but resolutely extend their cooperation with Russia. On the other side, due to the lack of the Russian general strategy in the sphere of cooperation, the inter-state incidents regularly take place, like the demarche of Tajikistan on hydro-energy problems after declarations, made by D. Medvedev in the course of his visit to Tashkent, or like suspension by Uzbekistan of its participation in EvrAzES due to the unclear Russian position on the direction of shipment of Turkmen gas by Caspian pipeline and SATs-3, under the new agreements.

China as an observer in the Central Asia has elaborated its strategy, with the support of ShOS, directed to active participation in solving the regional problems, to develop relations with the region's countries, to promote their stability and flourishing, as well as to execute its strategic interests, which are concentrated primarily in the sphere of development of the resources in the Central Asia. Although no official doctrine in relation to the region were proclaimed, proceeding from specific actions of Beijing and public declarations of Chinese politicians and scientists, it is possible to assert that the PRC has a

thoroughly prepared program of reciprocal action with the states of the Central Asian region (CAR). China determines for each country in the Central Asia its own place. As a whole, it is possible to see two spheres of Chinese interests in the CAR: the security sphere and economic mutual action. The Chinese analysts stress the following threats to national security of the PRC: Uighur separatism within the country, religious extremism and terrorism in the adjacent territories, narcotic traffic, American military presence in the region. China strives for keeping stability in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (SUAR), populated mainly by Uighur Muslims, who expressed not once their intention to create an independent Uighur state.

The separatist “Eastern Turkistan”, according to the Chinese party, possesses stations in the region and close ties with the Central Asian religious and extremist organizations, which serve as guides between “the Eastern Turkistan” and the international terrorist organizations, primarily with al-Qaeda. Beijing insists that this fact is a direct threat to national security of the PRC. China takes into account that Uighurs have settled on the territory of adjacent Central Asian states. It urges on the governments of the Central Asian states to toughen their policy in relation to local Uighurs. For instance, there exists the agreement, concluded by China and Kazakhstan, which contains liability to abstain from agitation among Uighurs, living in China. The situation in the Central Asian countries and in Afghanistan excites great apprehension in China. It concerns primarily religious extremism and narcotic traffic. The CA countries in the narcotic traffic play the role of transit countries for shipment of Afghan narcotics to the adjacent countries and the European states. The narcotics enter China from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

The dislocation of the USA and NATO military bases became the most significant geopolitical and geo-strategic problem for China.

Beijing has even more negative attitude to the perspective of the long-term military presence of the USA in the region. The Chinese party permanently carries out the work with the political elites of the Central Asian countries with the aim of restricting the scale and the forms of their military cooperation with Americans. The leadership of the PRC comprehends that it has inadequate forces for the large scale withstand to the USA in the region and prefers to create the regional system of security within the framework of the ShOS. China builds up its economic presence in the region's countries, enlarging annually the reciprocal trade, constructing mutually beneficial communications. China to a large extent identifies cooperation with the Central Asia with the restoration of "the Silk Route". In this sense, the region plays the role of the bridge, which connects China with Europe and the Near East. But China regards "the Silk Route" not only as the system of communications between Europe and Asia but also as an instrument of its global impact on dissemination of technologies, culture and political views. The Central Asia is significant for China from the point of view of development of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which is greatly behind the eastern provinces of China in terms of development. Creation of favorable external and internal conditions for its accelerated development is one of the central tasks of the Chinese leadership.

Actually, for the next ten years, Russia and China will gradually transform from economic allies into economic rivals in the Central Asia. The following facts prove this conclusion: the implemented communication projects, the problems of coordinating economic cooperation, appeared in the ShOS, gradual exclusion from the Central Asian markets of goods, produced not in China.

The situation in the Central Asia is under the great ascendancy not only of the neighboring countries – Russia and China, but also of distant countries-members of the EU and of the USA. The geopolitical

interests of the USA in the region are very weighty. The USA publicized its strategy “The Grand Central Asia” (GCA); its crux consists in association of Afghanistan with the Central Asian countries in the united military-strategic and economic region. The project is earmarked for limitation of Russia’s influence in the region’s countries and for containment of economic expansion of China in the Central Asia. On the other side, the USA by means of the GCA intends to limit influence of Pakistan and Iran in Afghanistan. The strategic aim of the USA consists in establishment and maintenance of the USA dominant influence in the region. The economic interests of the USA in the region are connected with activities of the oil companies there. The share of the USA in direct foreign investments in development of new oil fields accounts for 1/3 of \$40 billion for the period of independence of Kazakhstan. However, almost the whole amount of the extracted oil is realized in Europe. At the same time, the GCA project supposes to pay special attention to shaping in the region of a big international point for shipment of goods and raw materials as well as for modernization of agriculture in the region for creating alternative to production of narcotics in Afghanistan. The elaborated conception makes stress on Kazakhstan. American companies have made big investments in the oil industry of the country and intend to make new investments. They are very interested in Kazakhstan joining to pipeline BTD, in extension of the Caspian pipeline consortium (KTK) and in participation of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the projected Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. The interests of the USA and the EU coincide in this case. A number of American programs provide for financing economic projects to overcome poverty in Tajikistan and Kirghizstan. Lately, the USA demonstrated its intention to arrange the dialogue with Tajikistan on energy problems and to take part in construction of Dzhashizhum hydroelectric station on the river Pyandzh, near the border with

Afghanistan. The USA is interested in laying transportation routes from Tajikistan (through Afghanistan) to the ports of the Indian Ocean, competing with China in this respect.

For the last decade, the European Union's interest to the Central Asia grew over and over again. The amount of mutual trade of the EU with the CA in 2007 surpassed the amount of China's trade twice as much and the amount of Russia's trade – one and a half. It should be taken into account that the EU consists of 27 states, and the trade turnover of all member-states is calculated in this instance, although the biggest partners and investors are the biggest members of the EU in terms of economy and politics. In perspective, the amount of trade will grow constantly. The Europeans are mostly interested in terms of economy and politics in the Central Asia owing to their participation in development of hydrocarbon deposits and in their shipment to Europe by the pipelines round Russia. By cooperation with the Central Asian countries in the sphere of energy, the EU would like to reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies. In this context, the European Union supported Kazakhstan joining to oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC). The EU is interested in Kazakhstan joining project Odessa-Brody-Plotsk, as well as in implementation of Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, which allows to fill up with gas the projected European pipeline “Nabucco”. However, implementation of this advantageous for the EU project has been postponed for indefinite time, due to construction of the Caspian pipeline and the pipeline Turkmenistan-China.

The European Union is interested also in implementation of project TRACEKA, which supposes construction of the direct transport corridor, connecting the Central Asia with the EU via the South Caucasus, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. Actually, TRACEKA represents by itself a half of “Silk Route”. A great attention is paid to

commission of TRACEKA visa, which means simplification of the cargo transit and of the passage of the accompanying persons at the border-customs points in the member-countries. In 2007, the EU Strategy for cooperation with the Central Asian region and the program of this cooperation for the period of 2007-2013 was adopted. Both general regional spheres of cooperation and the bilateral mutual action projects were enumerated in the Strategy. Kazakhstan, having possessed big deposits of hydrocarbons, occupies the first place in terms of size of the projected investments. The cooperation with the Central Asia is carried out on the basis of approaches and aims, formulated in the General regional Initiative and in the European Policy of Neighborhood of the EU (EPN) in the Eastern Europe and in the South Caucasus. In this respect, it is supposed to extend mutual actions with the Central Asian countries, involving them in the EPN programs and giving the chance to accustom themselves to the norms and standards of the EU.

The USA and the West European countries succeeded to gain two significant results. First, they made investments in the most advantageous branches of the regional economy, primarily in the market segments, which allowed without great expenses to get financial gains for the relatively short period of time. Second, by means of the thoroughly elaborated, detailed and purposeful work they created the whole strata of in the elite groups of the Central Asian countries, which were oriented and carried out their activities according to the determined rules of behavior. At the same time, the factor of time was an advantageous circumstance in realization of this line of activities.

The natural change of generations in the political elite of the Central Asian republics should have inevitably result in appearance within this elite of new actors, whose mentality was forming in other historic realities, which differed from thinking of former leaders, born and grown in times of existence of the USSR. With due account of this

circumstance, in the West they cherish hopes for the decrease of the role of the Russian language and in general of cultural proximity to Russia in the process of socialization of such new elite groups.

Thus, on the one side, the Central Asian countries have common features in the internal political development and formation of the foreign policy orientation. On the other side, the world and regional leaders have identical interests in cooperation with the Central Asian states. These two factors let the leaders of the Central Asian countries carry out multi-vector foreign policy and find a way round among the centers of force. The multi-vector policy does not lead to shaping common regional interests and therefore does not result in the Central Asian regional unity. On the contrary, it makes them compete for economic investments and political dividends of the players, external for the region. Such situation may result in breaking of the Central Asia as a united political and economic region, keeping only the geographic dominant of unity.

“Politeks”, St.-Petersburg, 2009, t.5, N 3, p. 116–132.

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Нахимовский проспект, д. 51/21,
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Отдел маркетинга и распространения информационных изданий

Тел/ Факс (499) 120-4514

E-mail: market @INION.ru

E-mail: ani-2000@list.ru

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