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**ONE SHOULD SEEK TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF DESTABILIZATION IN ELITES IN RUSSIA**

I don't think that we should discuss the problem whether we have a crisis or no. Let's discuss how a crisis is interpreted in our country, the elite behavior and a public opinion. Speaking about the political elite I can rely only on the personal observations the public behavior of its individual representatives: their vocabulary, voice timbre, mimicry during their appearances, stylistics of their PR-company and etc. Proceeding from these observations I incline towards the conclusion that our political elite take the present crisis as a serious one and are worried by its perspectives very much.

To my mind one of the main reasons of the nervous reaction for crisis observed on the top is that the group being in power today had no experience to rule the country during crisis. This group turned out to be on the top of chain authority in very favorable conditions:

- increase in oil prices allowed not thinking very much about consequences of political and management mistakes: any political mistake (even very serious) was damped by powerful flow of dollars in the country;

- pickup associated to a great extent with increase in oil prices provided increase in personal earnings and as a consequence – positive attitude of the society towards the elite.

The last is very important. Sociological studies indicate that the population sympathy of the post-soviet Russia towards power depend on the people's estimations of their own well-being and personal economic perspectives. The situation was changed suddenly and almost in a flash. Dollar's rainstorm was stopped. Unusual sharp policy decisions were needed for economic realities; responsiveness to circumstances being before neglected; understanding that not quite all the needs of lobby groups can be satisfied that policy come to public relations and etc. Sudden changes are always uncomfortable all the more the most important supporting elements for stability in our existing political system during the last 10 years were the highest rating of the first person or two first persons and the ruling group resources being enough to loyalty acquiring of the larger part of the regional and professional elites.

Now the rating is slowly down but the resources are deficit. As it seems to me the elite doesn't quite know how to behave in such situation. One can observe disarray, reassurance that the crisis will come to end soon. Meanwhile there is no entire anti-crisis program. The population's attitude towards the measures carried out is varied. It happens at the background of increasing pressure of the different lobbying groups.

A direct offshoot of such nervousness is intensification of the struggle inside the elites. The competition between the president's and the prime-minister' group seems to grow in momentum. One can observe it some rivalry for the presence on TV. But, of course, one can observe only the top of iceberg. I am far from considering the competition of the different parts of the political elite as something negative. To my mind the similar competition if it's institutionalized and clear is a benefit. But today a level of the elite competition institutionalization comes to zero. Besides, the present political system

has no built-in stabilizers: there is no system of checks and balances and there are no legitimate organizations which could more or less take to themselves the function of the political stability re-establishing in the critical situation not violating constitution. So, if the competition inside the political elite is growing very much it can lead to the political situation destabilization and the consequences will be badly predictable; it's very dangerous.

Now let's say some words about the public opinion. According to sociological data the dissatisfaction with a life is increasing in the society and the perspectives are worsening. Simultaneously, people's going out and other protesting actions are decreasing. In other words, not aggression but disillusionment and political apathy are increasing in the society. I am not surprised with these data: these data are still a theoretical model of the public aggression having written by me in the book lately. However, the politicians shouldn't relax because of the aggression growth lack in the society. The consequences of the public apathy can't be less dangerous than the consequences of the public aggression. We know well that the apathetic society stopped being a restrictive factor of the struggle within the elites. The danger is worsening if the apathy in the society is associated with nervousness in the elites (but we observe nervousness not only at the federal level but at the level of the regional elites). If to add the above-mentioned built-in political stabilizer lack to the public apathy then one can observe vulnerability of the preset Russian political situation.

Now let's say some words about the possible destabilization conditions. There are two of them:

- there is no consensus in the elite what to do under conditions of crisis;
- comparison of forces (resources) of competing groups being in supreme echelons of power.

The first condition is present. It's enough to read our political leaders' and officials' speeches in order to be sure of the unity lacking on the top. The last sociological studies indicate that the majority of the officials is disappointed with the present political course.

There is no the second condition yet. One group is dominant among several confronting ones. It has more financial, administrative, powerful and other resources. But the crisis can lead to that the resources of the competitors will be comparable, for example, for the account of re-orientation at them of the other groups of the interests. If it happens the competition can be open and polarization will begin (two-polar, three-polar and etc. – it's not important) fascinating the regional, power, economic and other elites. The probable result is the classical situation of the open elite struggle without the rules. By that the majority of the population will continue digging potatoes peacefully but confronting elite groups will appeal to the instincts and feelings of the small but well-organized and active groups of "people". Today it's impossible to say what the result of such struggle will be.

In a word, the perspective isn't clear. Everything will be depend on the crisis development. Meanwhile, if to look at economic forecasts they are constantly worsening. As for the politological community it has to observe only for lack of a possibility to influence on the political situation to some extent.

*“Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Ser. Politologiya”,
M., 2009, N 6, p. 79-82.*

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**ISLAM AND ORTHODOXY IN RUSSIA:
COOPERATION OR CLASH?**

There is much talk and there are many publications on globalization and the clash of two civilizations. Why civilizations should clash? If such idea exists, it means that somebody needs it. Why the mighty deliberate propaganda concerning our difference is going on? By our nature, we can not be equal, but it does not mean that the states different in terms of religion have to start war against each other. The ideological or religious clash always preceded any world conflict. This prior clash always was a portent of war. The same takes place at present. The religious poles apart should keep equipoise and to preserve the balance of the world space. Any forceful overbalance results in the simultaneous ruin of both parties.

The poly-confessional world resembles the children's swing. If the same number of people is on both sides, they sit in calm, if a greater number of people occupy on side, the other side becomes weaker and defenseless. The faith of people is the center of these poles. The difference does not mean opposition (R. Genon). The line of division is laid deliberately by those who benefit from it. This is the common fact. We are different but it is not the cause of war and clashes: 80% of the population do not see any difference in what civilization they live and in the other way of living adopted by others. It is not the outcome of disregard but the lack of the need to think about those who are different. Public relations are characterized by impersonality, their essence consists not in mutual action of individuals but sooner in reciprocal action of specific social roles (G. Andreeva). The state and religious figures are in charge of definition of these roles. The social role is

determination of certain position, occupied by an individual in the system of public relations. This apprehension of the social role should be supplemented by the following: the essential factor is not only and not so much fixation of the rights and obligations (expressed by the term “expectation”) as the connection of the social role with the determined types of individual social activities. Besides, the social role always is characterized by public appraisal: the society may either approve or disapprove certain social roles. Actually, each individual performs several social roles: this person may be a bookkeeper, a father, a trade union member, a football player etc.(G. Andreeva). The religiousness of the person may be regarded as a specific social role.

Scientists and religious figures dispute about the future. Scenarios are written, prognoses are made for future. The discussion is going on about the future world order, some definite points of view are championed, and many arguments are expressed in favor of the mighty idea. Most “scenario writers” claim for the exclusiveness of their scenarios. But all loudly proclaimed ideas result in failure some time afterwards. We have not built communism in our country. And many resources were put into realization of this idea, many lives were sacrificed to its cause. What for? Why? Certainly, one may approve all leaders, saying that they wanted to be only good to us, that they therefore struggled against the scum, hindering creation of a mythic country called “communism”. There are numerous examples of this kind for the time of the humanity’s existence.

According to various western researchers, the future picture of the world may be presented in two variants. The first one is the inevitable clash between Islam and Christianity, resulting, to my mind, in probable nuclear war. The second scenario, evidently, is connected with globalization processes, when the victory will be scored by one power. Both variants possess all needed evidences in their favor. These

scenarios of our future do not promise peaceful coexistence for our planet. The outcome of both scenarios will be sad. But we still have a chance to change the course of history. Russia will play an important, if not the leading, role in this case. Our country by its example of good neighboring coexistence of many ethnic groups and confessions will be able to prove to everybody that peace may be constructed even without conclusion of international treaties.

The residents of the planet were frightened very much by the growing threat, coming from the Muslim East. The Islamic Phobia becomes a sickness of many politicians, leaving aside common people, whose life costs nothing. Russia did not avoid this acute problem, but the religious conflicts are not large-scaled, like in other countries. The basis of peaceful coexistence is founded, first, in the historic past of our country, second, in the specificity of Russian mentality, in the spirit of the people.

Let us make a short digression in history of Islam and Orthodoxy. For several centuries, in Russia Islam has been the second religion after Orthodoxy in terms of numbers of believers and its significance. It plaid and continues to play a much more significant role than it was officially recognized. Its impact was (and to some extent is) quite significant on the religious situation in the country, on ethnic-cultural and ethnic-social processes, inter-ethnic and ideological conflicts, economic and political development, international positions and foreign policy of Russia (R. Landa). For the whole period of the XX century, the two religions experienced equally the great troubles of this period.

For the last twenty years, the religious situation in Russia radically changed. According to some authors, the religious situation in the Islamic segment of the confessional picture of Russia is determined mainly by three tendencies: first, the growth of fundamentalist ideas in the traditional Islamic milieu, where the so called wahhabism starts to

occupy the ideological niche of the political and social protest, particularly among the youth of the low public strata; second, in connection with stabilization of economic situation in the country, under the influence of foreign religious centers there took place a certain splash of activities of new religious organizations, which kept a pause after adoption of the law on freedom of conscience and on religious associations; third, the Russian Orthodox Church intensified its activities, particularly in the religious education in schools and in the financial-property relations with the state. It shows that some significant changes will occur in the nearest future in the religious policy and in the state-confessional relations.

Islam, in contrast to other religions, represents not only a certain confession, since it is primarily the principal foundation of the social life of Muslims. At present, contemporary Islam in Russia is presented by two main ideological trends: traditionalism and fundamentalism. All these trends are united by the main Muslim dogma: the inseparability of the spiritual and of the secular. It means that secular life and religion represent the unique entity. Despite the common principle for all trends, traditionalists, fundamentalists and modernists differ greatly from each other. Traditionalism is characterized by the fact that its followers (sometimes called orthodox) come forward against any reforms in Islam (I. Dobayev).

It is considered that in contemporary Russia there coexist and compete “two Islams” – traditional, “soft” Islam, professed by most Muslims, and rigid, politicized Islam; the adepts of the rigid trend of Islam consider that the historic Russian forms of Islam were subject to deformations, which should be liquidated, and that the genuine Islamic norms of behavior and way of thinking should be reinstated (A. Malashenko). For Soviet times, traditionalism in Russia contributed to survival of Islam and became the natural and unique wide basis of

religious renaissance during the period of the 1980s-the first half of the 1990s. The revival potential was accumulated in traditional consciousness and after liquidation of atheist barriers was realized in the religious, social-cultural and political activities of Russian Muslims (A. Malashenko).

In general, traditional Islam in Russia was characterized by a low level of politicization, tolerance to heterodox people, by recognition of the Soviet law as an independent source of law, which let Russian Muslims live peacefully and cooperate with differently minded people.

Fundamentalism is a rather new phenomenon for Muslims in Russia. Fundamentalism (renaissance) is determined by the fact that its adepts come forward for restoration of “pure” Islam, for its liberation from later extraneous features (protected by traditionalists), appeal for putting into life complete (integral) Islamic norms. Fundamentalists proclaim as their aim the restoration in contemporary Muslims’ life of particular institutions and norms of Islam, existed in times of Prophet Muhammad and of the first four (pious) caliphs. Like traditionalists, fundamentalists stick to the basic dogma on monotheism (tauhid) and to the related perception of Allah sovereignty, which excludes a chance for any lawmaking. Thus, fundamentalism is the ideology of the extremist part of Muslim radicals, who do not admit compromises and who come forward for purity of faith and for the irreconcilable struggle against “the unfaithful” by all means, including use of force. Fundamentalists urge towards incorporation of their principles and ideals into the social practice with the view of creation of a separate Islamic state, characterized by dominance of shariat and of the Muslim norms of economic regulation.

Unfortunately, for the 1990s the term “Muslim fundamentalists” was almost replaced by the word “Muslim” and transformed itself into its synonym. Kuwait, Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Iran, UAE and Turkey

actively participated in dissemination of Islamic basics among ethnic Muslims of Russia since the first half of the 1990s. Various charitable foundations of these countries rendered financial assistance to implementation of big projects for construction of centers devoted to study of Koran, for dissemination of religious literature, for shipment of food to the regions, characterized by ethnic conflicts on the territory of former republics of the USSR. The foreign Islamic states on the face of good activities pursued their own ends – to disseminate radical Muslim objectives. The charitable assistance was a direct channel of the support given to terrorist groups.

Despite the split and the growth of influence of different Islamic circles, the main part of Muslim organizations did not perceive themselves as the entities outside the Russian social-cultural space. The Islamic factor had a great impact on stratification of contemporary Russian society. Muslims occupied the place of the artels' treasures in Russia before the revolution, while in contemporary Russia the business qualities of Muslims are fully displayed in the markets' retail trade, and Muslims, coming from southern republics occupy a great place in these activities. This circumstance is explained by the stereotype of trade's reprehensibility dominated among Russians, while in the Muslim world trade is regarded as the most respected profession. Therefore Muslims in the same circumstances more often succeed in business and commerce.

Taking into account the significance of ethnic-cultural and other differences among Russian Muslims, one should pay attention to the context of realization of the idea of the All-Russian Muslim community. This is the context of cultural, ethnic and racial intolerance in the Russian regions, particularly in big cities of Russia. For the last ten years, this intolerance penetrated from the upper strata of the social hierarchy to the level of the non-privileged strata, forcing out the heritage of Soviet internationalism.

The cultural changes, going on in Islamic society, possess both positive and negative aspects. The positive aspects of this process may be regarded to be the growth of religious self-consciousness and radical rise of religious activities, construction of new mosques, the multiplied rise of the number of pilgrims, publication in mass edition of literature on Islamic faith and cult, commission of many new spiritual education institutions, including universities, as well as registration of dozens of Spiritual Departments of Muslims.

Analyzing the influence of the Islamic factor on the religious and the social-cultural spheres of our state, Russian experts note that Islam does not want to remain the second religion, which is not equal to the Russian Orthodox Church. And the more so, as for the last hundred and fifty years, the relations with the Muslim World turned out to be not quite simple. The aggressive wars were waged in the Caucasus, in the Middle Asia. Since the time when Russia brought its troops in Afghanistan, a Muslim foe appeared for Russia. For the beginning, it was outside the country, further – within the country (Chechnya). This circumstance created the impression: where Islam is located, war starts. In reality, it is not like that, since in these regions conflicts emerge not on the religious basis, Islam has nothing to do with this.

Thus, we see the real picture, which exists in contemporary Islam in Russia. Taking into account the existing negative attitude to Muslims, the general religious situation in Russia remains to be calm and stable. One should give the great credit of it to the leadership of the country and to the wisdom of Russians. The mass media devote less and less attention to discussion of the theme of opposition of Islam and Christianity. The absolutely correct policy is carried out in this respect.

*“Politicheskie i etnokontsionalnye issledovaniya v regionah”,
Barnaul, 2009, p. 267–273.*

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ON POLITICIZATION OF MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA

Involvement of religious structures in the political process is an urgent problem, which confronts national politology. Within the South Federal District, primarily in the North Caucasus, the complicated public-political situation in some regions, where Islam is the dominant confession, this problem is on issues of the day. Politicization of Islam in the South of Russia has changed by certain stages. The beginning of the 1990s was marked by “renaissance” of traditional confessions. The communities were brought to life, the cult objects were restored and constructed, the first steps were taken to restore the religious education system, the reciprocal action with the state organs and civil society institutions were arranged, while many of them were in the process of emergence. At the same time, within the Muslim community the process of separation was started between Muslim-traditionalists and the adepts of “purification” of Islam, the so-called salafits. Up to the middle of the 1900s, Muslim associations participated in the political process as its subordinate members. The advanced position was occupied by the structures, representing different shades of nationalistic ideologies, from moderate to separatist projects. Their leaders aspired for using the confessional factor as an important instrument of ethnic mobilization.

The pernicious outcome of such policy for renaissance of traditional confessions in the South of Russia became quite evident by existence of the so- called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In this semi-criminal quasi-state the sustainable religious-political “wahhaby”) entities, emerged as a result of foreign support against the background of the hardships of the majority of the population during the social-

economic crisis, were able to involve many people in the orbit of their destructive activities, inter alia, speculating on religious feelings of believers. Active participation of these structures in creation in the North Caucasus of a hotbed of directed conflict finally started to threaten preservation of traditional religious life of Muslim peoples in the region.

Only the counter-terrorist operation, started in the North Caucasus in 1999, and coming to power in the Chechen Republic of A. Kadyrov, a convinced opponent of “wahhabism”, contributed to creating in “Muslim” regions of the North Caucasus the stand, which supposed that only traditional Muslim associations were able to withstand dissemination of radicalism and extremism. Since that time, exactly the clergymen, supporting renaissance and cultivating traditional Islamic forms in daily life, occupied the main commanding posts in the associations, coordinating activities of Muslim communities. At the same time, the reverse side of this process became the raised level of guardianship on the part of authorities relating to the whole complex of Islamic institutions and associations.

The Muslim clergymen, supporting “anti-wahhaby” campaign and carrying out their activities via regional Spiritual Departments of Muslims (DUM), actually established their control over most cult buildings and objects and monopolized the sphere of religious education and enlightenment, propagation, organization of pilgrimage, expertise of spiritual literature. In the eyes of the ruling elites, the Spiritual Departments acquired the status of the main exponents of the Muslim community’s meaning, while muftis and close imams, composing the main structure of these organizations, as a kind of Muslim clergy greatly raised their influence. They were recognized as the unique legitimate leaders of the Islamic community and received a chance to express their views on various matters in the name of the whole community. And

what is more, enjoying the support of the authorities, the DUM functionaries succeeded to “concentrate” on themselves the activities of most Muslim associations, attracting participation of authoritative spiritual leaders and using methods of administrative influence.

The consolidation of the traditional Muslim clergy’s position and the reciprocal action of DUM with the authorities did not result in overcoming the ideological confrontation within local Muslim communities. Exactly the level of the local Muslim associations occurred to be the weakest part in the systemic coordination of activities of Muslim communities and associations. Most imams in parishes occupied their posts for many years and lacked theological knowledge and competence to keep abreast with times. As soon as re-Islamization was going on in most communities there appeared opposition groups headed by the leaders, who criticized “official” clergy from different radical points of view. This milieu was marked by propaganda of radical and extremist views, and often members of illegal armed groups found refuge in these communities. The DUM leadership found an excuse for its feebleness in the struggle against opposition in “cadre hunger” and financial difficulties, but, paradoxically, the existence of the radical wing within the Muslim community was beneficial both for the ruling elites and the functionaries of DUM.

At present, some significant transformation occurred in the North Caucasian milieu, characterized by salafit ideology and rather radical views. New leaders appeared in salafit groups (jamaats), while many of them were trained abroad and got adequate religious education. They have better theological education than most imams-traditionalists, and they rapidly become the centers of attraction for young believers, expressing sympathy to radical ideas. As positions of Muslim clergymen, connected with the regional Spiritual Departments of Muslims, consolidated, more and more contradictions accumulated

between them and the ambitious leaders of radical groups, resulting often in conflicts within communities. The evident reasons of such conflicts were ideological differences and aspirations on the part of radicals to revise the traditional religious practice. However, all this is only the reflection of the complicated process of struggle for power not only in the Muslim communities but also for influence on the chosen way of further development in the North Caucasus.

The close reciprocal action of the Muslim clergy, primarily functionaries of DUM, with the ruling regional elites promotes certain stratification within the traditional camp, leads to politicization and radicalization of its individual members. The criteria of loyalty of many clergymen turns out to be the verge, admitted by them, when they are ready to support unpopular actions, often taken by the authorities. The most evident conflicts appear at the level of local self-government, where corruption is mostly evident, while the view, expressed by the clergyman traditionally is very significant for the population. At the same time, popular leaders emerge in the protest milieu and claim for the posts in the local self-government, and many of them actively participate in life of communities, having received education abroad in Islamic education institutions. The corrupted officials, supported by “their own” imams, sometimes try to bribe or to threaten the dangerous opponents. Usually, the protest feelings are presented under the slogans of protection of Islamic justice, while the counter arguments are accusations of the support received on the part of extremist organizations.

At present, two tendencies of participation of Islamic associations in the political processes are clearly fixed in the South of Russia. The official structures strive for strengthening of cooperation with the state bodies and governing organs. Having been closely integrated into economic and social life in their regions, the leaders of traditional clergy

constructed the mechanism of reciprocal action with the state apparatus, political parties, public associations and business structures. At the same time, they have to be responsible to the communities of believers for unpopular actions, often taken by the authorities. The prescient representatives of the official clergy have to elaborate a certain justified ideology of mutual action of the Muslim community with the secular state.

The influence of the protest, radical part of the Muslim community, represented by “parallel” or radical communities-jamaats, becomes more and more evident in the process of shaping of similar ideological construction. Despite the fact that only minority of Muslims share their views, the most spiritual leaders are unable ignore completely these views.

*“Politicheskie nauki na yuge Rossii: stanovlenie, sovremennoe sostoyanie i osnovnye napravleniya razvitiya”,
Rostov-na-Dony, 2009, vyp.2, p. 153–156.*

Alexey Malashenko,
doctor of sciences (history)
LOSING THE CAUCASUS

More and more, the collection of republics on the northern slope of the Caucasus Mountains looks and feels more like Russia’s neighbor than a constituent part of the state. While it accepts federal authority, the region lives by its own laws. It is a neighbor for whom dependence on Russia is convenient and advantageous and who can’t conceive of live outside Russia but who will nevertheless continue to stand up for its own autonomy and even independence. In Moscow and elsewhere a

strange term has arisen to describe this situation: the north Caucasus, they say, is Russia's "internal abroad".

To state yet another platitude, the North Caucasus isn't a single entity. Its peoples have different traditions and the roads they took to join Russia and their lives as a part of Russia are similar divergent. Even as we discuss general trends in the region we must bear in mind that each republic and even each district, sometimes even individual villages, have their own specific circumstances. The Caucasus is a very diverse mosaic and it would be a risky business to judge what is happening in the downstream areas of the Sunzha River (which flows down from the mountaintops through three of Russia's Caucasian republics), for example, by looking at what is going on upstream.

The North Caucasus is divided into two sub-regions: the eastern sub-region which includes Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia; and the western sub-region which includes the other republics (North Ossetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Adygea). Kabardino-Balkaria is in the middle. Some consider it part of the western sub-region while others place it in the east and still others again see it as forming a third "central" sub-region.

Various criteria have been used to categorize the republics of the North Caucasus (the degree of Islamization is one of the main ones, for example, with the east being considered more Islamized than the west). But the main criterion presently is the political situation that arose out the collapse of the Soviet Union and continues today. The east is reliably unstable while the west has periodic flare-ups followed by periods of relative calm. Chechnya, of course, is the champion as far as instability goes. Specialists, however, think that the situation in Dagestan is even more dangerous. This view is shared by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, though he may be boasting to a degree about his own services in pacifying "his" republic.

Kabardino-Balkaria is somewhere in between as far as instability is concerned. The tragic events of October 2005 when Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service (FSB) units spent an entire day in battles with the Islamic opposition (a conventional designation), was more than just an isolated episode (97 rebels, 35 law enforcement of officers and 14 civilians were killed in these battles). Rather, these events were the culmination of a cycle of conflict stretching well back into the recent past while the consequences are still making their effects felt today and will likely remain in people's memories for a long time yet. Many analysts, as a result, increasingly see Kabardino-Balkaria as part of the more restless eastern sub-region.

To what extent is the instability in the east worsening the situation in the west? There is a real threat that conflict will indeed spread. Islamist separatism has established strong roots among Muslims in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adygea and North Ossetia and it can always be sure of finding support among fellow believers in the neighboring republics. The Ingush-Ossetian conflict which in the 1990-s erupted into outright violence is not as acute as in past years but continue to smolder and could spread to other parts of the Caucasus.

Much has been said about the general causes of the potential for conflict in the North Caucasus. Serious economic difficulties, growing inequality, unemployment, competition between the interests of ethnicities, clans and other groups, the divide between the local elites in power and the ordinary people, the exceptionally rampant corruption even by Russian standards, religious extremism and border disputes between and within republics all get a share of the blame. All of these causes are interlinked and it's impossible to put them in any clear hierarchy. There is no single thread one could pull to untangle the whole knot. It's commonly argued that success can be achieved only by strictly

enforcing federal laws but not even Moscow complies strictly with the federal laws.

The results so far

Let's take a look at what the federal authorities have managed to achieve in the decade since Vladimir Putin promised to "wipe out the terrorists in the outhouse".

First, and most importantly, the war in Chechnya has ended (leaving aside discussion of the origins and conduct of the first and the second Chechen wars). But the first and the second wars were ended less by force than through dialogues with part of the Chechen separatists, and by capitalizing on divisions among the separatists themselves. Some of the separatists taking Akhmat-hajji kadyrov and his son Ramzan at their word and thus receiving the implicit guarantee of Russia's protection came over to Moscow's side and began fighting against their erstwhile comrades. Whether by luck or calculation the Kremlin put its finger on the most suitable candidates for carrying out its policy of "chechenizing" its renewed domination of the republic. The Kadyrovs, father and son, proved successful in becoming national leaders establishing a stable special relationship with Moscow and undertaking Chechnya's reconstruction. They wielded a very heavy hand in doing so and risked their own lives; Akhmat-hajji Kadyrov was assassinated in 2004.

Second, the idea of outright separatism has exhausted itself. Were the Russian Federation to disintegrate entirely, real separatism in the Caucasus would surely emerge again. But short of that, real- as opposed to rhetorical- separatism has become a non-starter in the North Caucasus. Separatism would inevitably be accompanied by internal interethnic strife and conflicts over Islamism, which would ultimately mean the self-destruction of the local peoples. All politicians with even

a modicum of responsibility realize this as does society at large; the latter, I hope, has not lost its instinct for self-preservation.

Third, the unpopular ex-presidents rejected by the public have been replaced by new leaders in whom people have placed their hopes. In some cases these hopes have been fulfilled even if only in part. The new president of North Ossetia, Teimuraz Mamsurov, for example, has attempted to address the consequences of the Beslan tragedy of 2004. Kabardino-Balkaria's new president, Arsen Kanokov, has promised to get to the bottom of what happened in 2005. But the most energetic and efficient of all the new leaders has been Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the army general who has become the president of Ingushetia in 2008 and in trying to build bridges between the authorities and the public in order to restore stability has "demonstrated a completely un-military, peaceful policy".

As a result, the federal authorities have managed to achieve at least a fragile peace by offering the local elites an implicit agreement that can be summoned up as follows: you give us your loyalty and obedience and we will not meddle in the way you run your internal affairs.

What has not been done

The authorities' biggest failure has been in institutionalizing instability. Events over the course of 2009 have shown just how illusory the "political calm" in the region really is. Intoxicated by its success in fighting separatism and the early results of its "chechenization" policy the Kremlin woke up too late to what was happening in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Reports from the first two of these republics have long since started to sound more like news from the front lines of a war zone. In Ingushetia alone, 58 armed attacks took place in the first half of 2008, leaving 37 law enforcement and security personnel dead and 79 injured. Militants have suffered even higher casualties.

Dagestan's interior minister, Adilgeri Magomedtagirov, was shot in May, Ingushetian president Yevkurov was seriously wounded in an attack in June and there have been repeated attempts on Ramzan Kadyrov's life.

One can produce all kinds of elaborate theories on who is behind these attacks ranging from Islamists and the beneficiaries of corruption to "elusive avengers" (in the region where the traditions of the blod feud have made a comeback). But no matter who is behind the terrorist attacks their systematic nature, the professionalism with which they are executed and the authorities' powerlessness to prevent them are evidence of the permanent political crisis in the region and the federal and the local authorities' inability to exercise effective control.

The federal authorities' next strategic mistake is that their relations with Russia's Caucasus regions are based on the personalization of politics, with priority placed on personal relations between regional politicians and their patrons in Moscow. Ramzan Kadyrov is the classic example but the model also applies to a greater or lesser extent to other republics' former presidents, Murat Zyazikov in Ingushetia, Alexander Dzasokhov in North Ossetia, Mustafa batdyev in Karachaevo-Cherkessia as well as to their successors including Yevkurov. Of course, personal trust between "patron" and "clients" has some obvious advantages but at the same time leaders accountable only to the authorities in Moscow lose the trust of their own people and this eventually gives rise to mutual dissatisfaction and leads to conflicts.

Finally, the excessively "private" nature of these relations brings the constant risk of further (or renewed) destabilization should the local partner be forced to leave the political stage for one reason or another. This concern has been raised frequently with regard to Ramzan Kadyrov but it was Yevkurov who was suddenly (though aren't these things always sudden?) put out of the action in a bombing and even just

finding someone to replace him while he recovered turned out to be difficult.

Political institutions and parties in the region have seen their real role eviscerated. Both are becoming secondary players, mechanisms in the hands of the executive authorities. In some cases during local elections, for example, political parties are still called on to play a part, camouflaging clan, ethnic and other private interests but they are unable to guarantee stability and no one expects them to do so.

This policy of personal power is combined with a continued emphasis on resolving problems by force. Force is always the simplest solution. There is an undoubted need for a federal military (or paramilitary) presence in the region but it only restrains the potential for violence rather than actually eradicating it at its roots. Furthermore, as copious evidence attests the federal presence often ends up provoking conflicts. Attempts to curtail the use of force and the lifting in April of the regime of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya (which was akin to martial law) have not brought results. The spontaneous flare-up in violence in several of the region's republics only confirms that military force isn't a panacea. Despite official declarations the counter-terrorist operation regime remains in place de facto and even Ramzan Kadyrov who had demanded its end (in order to transfer more law enforcement authority from Moscow to Grozny) has had to acquiesce. Reliance on force has left the Kremlin aware that it can't continue to keep its troops in the region and is yet unable to withdraw them. For now it seems Moscow is striking with the status quo.

What next?

Moscow's military solution is being implemented at two levels. The federal agencies are paramount while local security forces – of which Kadyrov's appear to be most successful and ruthless – act separately and in tandem.

Kadyrov's means of action, his ruthlessness and, most of all, his desire to ensure an exclusive position for himself and his republic within the Russian political structure were effective during his first years in power. The war has just ended, Kadyrov indeed faced exceptional circumstances and acted as he saw fit, not letting anything stop him. The situation today is different. Absolute success is no longer possible, the rebels still have considerable reserves, people are getting tired of the total monopolization of power and far from everyone is willing to see Islamization make a return in the republic. Finally, Kadyrov's name has been mentioned in connection to four headline-making murders: those of journalist Anna Politkovskaya, the brothers Ruslan and Sulim Yamadayev and the well-known human rights campaigner Natalya Estemirova. This is all gradually starting to irritate the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, what has been done in Chechnya can't be repeated in the rest of Russia's Caucasus. Imitating Ramzan Kadyrov's tactics in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria would be not just risky but unrealistic. That said there is no clarity about what tactics would work better. President Dmitry Medvedev held a meeting with Russia's security and law enforcement officials at the end of July 2009 in response to the escalation of tension in the region. Such a meeting is in itself evidence that the presidents of the North Caucasus republics on their own are unable to keep their region at peace.

Time is running out.

Dagestan will hold a presidential election in 2010, the conduct of which will be a crucial test not only for the situation in Dagestan, often referred to as "the heart of the Caucasus" but in many respects for the neighboring republics, too. Moscow has not yet chosen the winner and it will not be an easy choice for the Kremlin. The two main blocks in the republic – one supporting current president Mukhu Aliev and the other dubbed "the Northern Alliance" which has the sympathy of Kadyrov

among others – each have their backers in Moscow. The rivalry in Dagestan itself will thus be compounded by differences in opinion among federal authorities.

The situation remains unclear in Ingushetia. While Yevkurov has returned to his post it remains an open question whether he will be able (or allowed) to continue his course of bridging the gap between the authorities and the public in Ingushetia and minimizing internal confrontation. But whatever happens Ingushetia's "experiment" offered an original new alternative that can't be ignored/

The problem of borders and disputed territories in the North Caucasus remains unresolved. The area between North Ossetia and Ingushetia has long been fertile soil for conflict. Ingushetia has no clear borders at all. There are disputed territories between Dagestan and Chechnya. Furthermore, within the republics themselves the borders between districts are unclear, further contributing to periodic flare-ups in interethnic tension.

Following the Russia-Georgian war in 2008 and Moscow's subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, some Caucasus politicians took offense and aired cautiously frustration that Russia would solve international border disputes within a matter of hours when it sees fit while letting internal boundary conflicts fester for years.

One of the riskiest issues as yet undecided is that of whether to recreate the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Discussions of the idea have never completely stopped. The proposal has more backers in Chechnya than in Ingushetia which would be the junior partner but the supporters of integration have been making their voices heard in cautious and admittedly confused fashion. Ramzan Kadyrov has notably spoken out against the idea, although some in his entourage support it. But it is rejected by practically all Ingush politicians including the republic's three presidents, past and the present, Aushev, Zyazikov and Yevkurov.

They all fear that restoration would see Ingushetia simply swallowed by Chechnya.

It is not entirely clear what the Kremlin's stand is on the idea of restoring the Chechen-Ingush republic. There has not been any clear expression of support but at the same time periodic calls for integration have come from members of the Chechen community attuned to the moods and preferences of the Russian establishment. But whatever the views on this issue there is no doubt that if it comes to fruition it would radically change the situation in the region. Above all, it would mean the creation of a local "superpower" with weightier and more dangerous border claims including with regard to North Ossetia. This in turn could lead to consolidation between the North and South Ossetians and a rise in Ossetian nationalism. This could provide a very predictable outlet for the South Ossetians' unspent energy and it would put Moscow in the position of having to calm two of its "favorites", Kadyrov and South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity.

It is not possible to resolve the problems of the North Caucasus overnight. Moscow can endlessly shuffle presidents, "wipe out" extremists, threaten those guilty of corruption and pour billions of rubbles of federal money into the region but the North Caucasus will continue to reflect all of Russia's own problems and woes with its own power verticals that imitate, after a fashion, the power structure devised by the Kremlin.

The North Caucasus operates according to the same political model as the rest of Russia. But in the North Caucasus this model has been grafted onto semi-traditionalist society characterized by a retreat from modernity and increasingly archaic relationships (a similar situation is taking place in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia). Society is moving imperceptibly backwards. The revival of old traditions is producing a dual effect. On the one hand, it creates a clearer

and calmer environment for the local elites whose only task is to maintain order. On the other hand, the North Caucasus has emerged as an enclave within Russia which lives according to its own laws and seeks to limit Moscow's intrusion in its internal affairs. Some have compared attempts to limit federal influence in Chechnya to the separatist policies implemented under Dudaev.

The economic crisis is making the North Caucasus even harder to manage. The volume of money coming from the federal budget is slowly shrinking and the local authorities are being asked to draw on internal reserves instead. Kadyrov found one such new revenue source by seeking international status for Grozny's airport.

A recent assessment of the risk of conflict in the North Caucasus drawn up by the International Conflict and Security Consulting Center reports a minimal risk of armed conflict and of increased violence over the next five years but a medium risk of increased political violence (i.e. violence to accomplish political goals). The report is cautious and justifiably so. But this kind of academic assessment should not lull politicians who see murders and terrorist attacks happening practically every day. Systematic political violence – and in the North Caucasus political violence is both systematic and well armed – sooner or later leads to military confrontation. This was the case in Ingushetia in 2004 and in Kabardino-Balkaria in 2005 when both republics' capitals witnessed battles lasting hours and involving heavy military equipment.

Any act of provocation could serve as the pretext for armed conflict which given constant tension and public discontent could end up drawing hundreds and even thousands of people into the fighting. And it is getting ever more difficult to prevent this eventually from turning into inevitability.

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THE ISLAMIC RADICAL ELITE IN DAGESTAN

The first wahhaby jamaat (society) in Dagestan was created in the end of the 1970s-the beginning of the 1980s on the initiative of Bagautdin Magomedov (born in 1942) and of his brother Abbas Kebedov (born in 1953), natives of Santlada village of the Tsumadinsky district. It is significant that the invited emir was Ahmad-Kadi Ahtayev (1940-1998) from Kudali village of the Gunibsky district, physician by profession, a self-taught prominent theologian and educated person. There were created many illegal groups of young people, where teaching of the Arabic language, basics of Islam and ideology of Islamic radicalism was arranged. The nucleus of these communities consisted of the youth, of the re-settlers from mountainous villages with Muslim traditions. The groups of young Muslim people were created in the villages of Kokrek, Novo-Sasitli (the Khasavyurtovski district), Nechayevka (the Kizilyurtovski district), Yasnaya Polyana (the Kizlyarski district). At that time the future leaders of the wahhaby movement still maintained relations with the sufi sheikhs. By the period of 1982-1984 the Soviet and Party authorities of the republic with the support of KGB and MVD bodies suppressed this movement for some time. The authorities used administrative measures (fines) in relation to the supporters of radical Islam, while officials arranged precautions' talks with them. Nobody of the future leaders of the movement was arrested or deported. It should be mentioned that the future leaders of wahhabism disseminated Islam and arranged education mainly for natives of the villages in the Tsumadinski and Gunibski districts, where

B. Magomedov and A.-K. Ahtayev were born, while later exactly these villages became the nucleus of wahhaby jamaat.

The movement was finally formed organizationally and ideologically in the course of renovation of Islam for the period of the 1980s-1990s. It was mainly composed of the young people up to 30 years. The social composition of the membership was as follows: unemployed people, students of religious and secular education institutions, marginal city dwellers of the first generation. The aims and forms of the movement's activities were changed from enlightenment to formation of para-military groups, where members should be ready to sacrifice themselves for creation of "Islamic State of Dagestan" in wahhaby interpretation. Three separate centers of wahhaby movement were formed in the republic: in the Gunibski district (the leader A.-K. Ahtayev), in the Karamakhin zone of the Buinakski district (the leader Muhtar Atayev), in the Kizikyurtov zone (the leader B. Magomedov). These centers had weak mutual connections, although maintained close relations with the wahhaby movement on the territory of neighboring Chechnya. In 1989 B. Magomedov created the first community (jamaat) in Kizilyurt, where he settled. Most his students were born in the Tsumadinski district. A.-K. Ahtayev was the head of jamaat in Kudali village of the Gunibski district. Kasbulat Khasbulatov (born in 1948) shared the views of wahhabies and took active part in political activities of Dagestan for the period of 1991-1992. He became the head of jamaat in Gubden village of the Leninski (now Karabudahkentski) district. For the first part of the 1990s, the Islamic jammats appeared in the cities of Makhachkala and Kizilyurt, in the villages of Kvanada, Santlada, Tlondoda, Khvarshi and Sildi of the Tsumadiski district, in the settlements Pervomaiskoe, Novo-Sasitli, Oktyabrskoe, Kokrek, Kirovaul of the Khasavyurt district, in Yasnaya Polyana, in Kordanovka, in collective farm "Forward" of the Kizlyarski

district of Dagestan. The residents of all these settlements are the people, who have come from the Tsumadinski district, characterized by Islamic traditions, by a high level of Islamic education and weak dissemination of sufism. New members were recruited mainly by means of clan connections.

A great role was played in this recruitment by the material interest: each adept of wahhaby was given from \$500 to \$1000. Not for nothing, wahhabism was called to be “dollar Islam”. Young people, except the material interest, were attracted by the idea of rapid coming to power, the chance to raise radically their social status, to learn how to use modern arms etc.

The three mentioned factors – close Islamic traditions, the high level of Islamic education and the relatively weak dissemination of sufism – played the main role in dissemination of Islamic radicalism among residents of the Tsumandinski district and the Kudalinski and Karamakhinski districts. The former residents of the Tsumandinski district, having settled in Astrakhan, formed jamaat headed by Ayub Astrakhanski (Angut Omarov), a disciple of Bagaudin. The Islamic radicalism was disseminated primarily in the districts with sustainable Muslim traditions.

Thus, for the period of 1980s-1990s, the strong points of Islamic radicals were created in the Kadarski zone of the Buinakski district, in the Tsumadinski, the Gunibski and the Kizilyurtovski districts. Some experts and researchers of Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus greatly exaggerate the number of their adepts. For instance, according to “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, in 2001 the share of wahhabies allegedly composed 3% of Muslims in Dagestan. The analysis of the number of representatives of radical Islam in Dagestan, according to various sources, shows that their number never exceeded 3850 individuals.

The peak of dissemination of Islamic radicalism in Dagestan was in the middle of the 1990s. That time was characterized by the rapid rise of the number of wahhaby adepts – 3850 representatives of radical Islam. By 1998, in 31 district of Dagestan there were 2031 followers of B. Magomedov, while 1377 supporters of A.-K. Ahtayev existed in five districts, 442 persons supported A. Astrakhanski. In general, 2775 persons (71.6% of all wahhabies) carried out their activities in 11 districts: Buinakski, Kizilyurtovski, Tsumadinski, Khasavyurtovski, Gunibski, Kizlyarski and others.

Later, in the end of the XX century – the beginning of the XXI century the following persons became the leaders of radical Islam in Dagestan: Rappani Khalilov, Rasul Makasharipov, Yasin (Makhach) Rasulov, Ilgar Malachiyev, Omar Sheihulayev and others. All of them were liquidated as a result of anti-terrorist operations. According to the republican law enforcement bodies, the number of wahhaby supporters in Dagestan was as follows: in 2000 – 2538 persons, in 2002 – 864 persons, in 2003 – 957 persons, in 2004 – 1004 persons, in 2005 – 988 persons, in 2006-2009 – over one thousand persons. It should be stressed that only 10% of this list of persons (mainly young men not older than 30 years) may be definitely regarded as extremists and terrorists. The absolute majority – over 90% - of these people did not embark on the path of extremism and terrorism. They share the ideology of “pure Islam”, agree to stick to its canons in daily life and family-marriage relations, but they do not share the practice of religious-political extremism and terrorism, i.e. they are “every-day” wahhabies.

“Natsionalnye elity i problema sotsialno-politicheskoy i ekonomicheskoy stabilnosti”, R.-na-D. 2009, p. 324–326.

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THE LABOR ETHICS OF ISLAM IN TATARSTAN

The influence of religion on business, on professional and economic activities of people is one of the channels of its penetration into the contemporary society. The appearance of various forms of professional ethics is the result of mutual actual activities and of its ideal regulators. However, the task of both general and professional ethics consists not only in enumeration of main values and in their amalgamation in a certain practical moral admonition. The significant task of ethics consists in explanation and substantiation of the principal status of certain values, of their nature and the reason of their obligatory status, of correlation between the professional ethics' values and the other forms of industrial activities' regulation.

Islam is the traditional religion of many Turkic peoples, including the Tatars. Since the time of official adoption of Islam in 992 by the Volga Basin Bulgaria, the formation of the Tatarian nation had a propensity for Islamic East. The century-long experience, accumulated by Muslim peoples in the sphere of education on the basis of Islamic canons and traditions, achievements of Islamic civilization and culture, left big vestige in consciousness of the Tatarian people. For the period of eleven centuries, Islam remains one of the main components of public-cultural life of the Tatars, despite the political and social-economic changes.

Most states of the Islamic world, represented by the states in the Near East, come forward as suppliers of raw resources. They sell natural resources to the developed countries of the West, possessing a good source of income. In this respect, one may trace the parallel with the ideal sources of Islam, which promotes and adopts the trade-market relations. The eastern wise thinking, allegedly proclaimed by Prophet Muhammad, asserts that ninety per cent of profit consists in commerce. It shows that Islam attaches great significance to trade-economic relations. In Russia these ideas are reflected in the consciousness of Muslims to a lesser extent due to the intensive process of secularization in Soviet times. The ethnic Muslims in Russia remain under some influence of these views, if they are occupied by trade and carry out business activities.

The Islamic doctrine promotes and intensifies development of market economy, to the author's mind. Islam possesses a potential chance to stimulate public relations in such directions as labor, profit, time as well as motivation of society to the dignified, civilized and well-to-do life and not to misery. The respectful relation to work, to its quality is in the foundations of Islam. Thus, the above mentioned assertion justifies to some extent the following words of the Prophet: the hand, which gives, brings more profit than the hand, which takes; when you work, do it as if you stay alive for ever; when you pray, do it as if it is the last prayer.

Islam motivates every believer to achieve in life the highest marks in material and spiritual sphere, not violating balance and harmony. Islam stimulates the faithful for conscientious attitude to work and highly appreciates the values, such as sincerity, "non-counterfeit", despises hypocrisy and dissimulation. As a proof of this thesis one may refer to the comparison of "Protestant's ethics", formulated by Max Weber, with Islamic perception of social ethics. Weber shows that

interpretation of Protestantism, made by Calvin, created powerful motivations, which promoted formation of the capitalist order. The essence of Protestant ethics is as follows: mighty and mysterious God has beforehand determined for everyone salvation or condemnation to perdition; the human being by his action is unable to change the predestination of God. The human being should work to multiply the glory of God and to create the Heavenly Kingdom on the earth. Salvation is given to the man as grace of God. Calvin's adept will try to find in the world his features of a minion of fortune, being not aware of his destiny. Therefore, according to Weber, adepts of Calvin saw the evidence of their selectivity in successful economic activities.

The essence of Islamic ethics may be found out in the same way. Initially, Allah Almighty and Omnipresent exists (altogether 99 attributes) created the world and the man. The man is a deputy in the world, all other things have been created for use by him in good deeds. The man is subject to tests for the time of his life. Everyone has the right to make a choice, and as a result he is either rewarded (paradise) or punished (hell). All people are equal before Almighty. One person may excel the other only in good deeds. The more good deeds a person does, the more pious he becomes and be closer in good graces of God.

In this sense, Islamic ethics and Protestantism possess in parallel the motivating public force. Islam contains all main principles which promote urge of Muslims towards a developed and civilized society, their aspiration for making the world more beautiful and dignified, being loyal to moral principles and not hindering rights and freedom of other people.

However, actually it looks differently. Probably, this circumstance is explained, first, by the low public religious education, particularly, by the fact that people are inclined to perceive religion as a myth, legend or historic survival and not as a part of social reality. Thus,

the evident concentration of public attention not to the substance but to the sentimental aspect of religion. The traditional clergy tends to concentrate its attention on this phenomenon. Evidently, under conditions of the social, economic and political changes, it is “easier” to follow traditional images than purposefully to influence on them

With due account of urgency of the discussed problem and of the fact that religious influence on spiritual-moral education of society remains inadequately studied, some sociological research was arranged within the framework of the Republic of Tatarstan under the scientific guidance of Professor A.Z. Gilmanov in 2005 for the sake of amelioration of moral climate of society. The research was aimed at determining more precisely the impact of Islam on our society. All respondents to the questionnaire (524 persons) were asked, first, to determine influence of religion (faith) on scientific progress, development of new technologies in society. The answers were distributed in the following way: most respondents (48%) think that religion has no influence on scientific progress and development of new technologies; over 11% of the respondents admitted a negative impact of religion; about 40% of the respondents mentioned a positive influence of religion, while half of them gave indefinite answers.

It is significant that among the respondents, “having sympathy to Islam”, the share of answers referring to the positive impact of religion in the sphere of technical progress and new technologies differs essentially against the general background, especially it differs from the view of respondents, “having sympathy to Christianity”. To the author’s mind, the results of the sociological research reflect the general perception of the public consciousness about the influence of religion on scientific progress and new technologies, which is the needed precondition for comprehension of existence of the developed civilized

society, contain an evident confirmation of justifiability and efficiency of labor ethics of Islam.

“Vlast”, M., 2009, N 12, p. 93–95.

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GLOBALIZATION IN THE SPACE

OF THE CASPIAN REGION

SINCE THE OUTSET OF THE XXI CENTURY

Globalization, as projected by its ideologists, originally was directed to solving the general planet's problem but actually turned to become the determining factor for emergence and aggravation of these problems in the world, such as the global warming of the climate, appearance of the terrorist and nuclear threat at a new scale, the greater differentiation of the level of living between the states of the North and the South, the uncontrolled flow of migration, the decrease of United Nations Organization role in the world and the review of the international law system etc. Thus, many problems, regarded formerly as local and regional, became the global problems. Under conditions of shaping a new system of reciprocal relations in the Caspian region for the post-Soviet period, the elaboration of mechanism of cooperation among the Caspian states in the economic, political and cultural spheres goes on within the framework of the globalization model of development, determined by the contemporary world process. The urgent world problems had impact also on the countries of the Caspian region, where they started to accumulate after emergence of new independent states. To a large extent, it is connected with the world trend to aggravation of civilization problems and with the geopolitical

situation in the region, shaped for the last decades, where the unsettled issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea is the main apple of discord.

Globalization within the framework of the Caspian region and the consequences of this process represent a particular interest. In the beginning of the third millennium Russia paid attention to the Caspian Sea, having reviewed its attitude to the events, going on in this region, having perceived clearly the significance of this region for destiny of Russia. The world process provoked the general interest to this region, having instigated the search by Caspian states for mutual ways of solving the existing problems in the region: the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the struggle against terrorism, ensuring ecological security, protection of biological resources, settling and preventing regional conflicts etc. It should be mentioned that, on the one side, globalization promotes apprehension of the need to solve the existing problems by mutual action, since it is impossible to solve global problems by unilateral measures, but, on the other side, globalization created pre-conditions for aggravation of the problems, which were caused by globalization itself in the contemporary historic period. The globalization model of the world development has tightened into a single line the close regions of the planet, complicating the search for the ways of solving the Caspian problems.

First, the globalization processes had an impact on the system of economic relations of the states. The economic reciprocal action resulted in close interconnection and integration of economies of the Caspian region's countries, in penetration of foreign capital, since under conditions of market democracy it is impossible to close the internal market by protective barriers and to distance from mutual action with various states, the TNC and international organizations (IMF, WTO, World Bank etc.). The economic integration and regional measures do not always promote the constructive dialogue within the framework of

the Caspian space, since they infringe on economic and political interests of the states of the region. At the same time, TNC and international organizations quite often provoke collision of the Caspian states' interests, which was displayed, for instance, in construction of the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilis-Ceyhan, going round the territory of the Russian Federation.

Second, following the changes in the geopolitical situation in the world for the end of the XX-th century, the new situation in the Caspian region resulted in its transformation into a world geopolitical object, where the diplomatic struggle of the main world powers was unleashed for possession of raw resources and for control over transportation routes. The Caspian Sea, being a part of "Great Silk Way", seems to be an advantageous and perspective direction of the cargoes and resources shipment to the countries of Europe and the USA. The collapse of the two polar world and creation of new Caspian states made it possible to impose on getting firmly established Caspian states the rules of market democracy on the part of western countries, which occurred to be painful for the countries of the Caspian region. This intrusion only aggravated the internal regional problems.

The process of globalization and regionalization let the states have their impact on the regions, separated from it at a long distance. In this connection, many countries regard the Caspian Sea not as an inter-regional object of the Caspian states – Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, separated by them from other international actors, but as a sphere of national interests of various world powers. At present, these states are as follows: the USA, the countries of European Union (particularly Great Britain), China, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Georgia and Armenia. These countries do not have direct access to the Caspian Sea, but they are involved in some or other way in the processes, going on in the region. The wish to have influence on the

situation hinders regional states in reaching consent in discussing and solving problems of the Caspian Sea. The existence of many interested and involved states resulted in raising the number of conflicts in the region, in aggravating economic, political, diplomatic and military rivalry in the space of the Caspian Sea.

Globalization, in its essence, is the USA project, directed to penetration and dissemination of American influence on various regions of the world. The USA has its old national interests in the Caspian region, proclaimed publicly for the first time by B. Clinton in 1997, and the American Administration and big TNC, acting in the USA interests, would hardly renounce their national and corporate interests. Kazakstan and Azerbaijan were primary subjects to the impact of the western globalization model. These Caspian states, under conditions of economic expansion of the USA and Great Britain, allowed various American and British TNC to extract oil on the shelf of the Caspian Sea. These republics chose the course of cooperation with different international organizations, such as WTO, IMF, World Bank and others, which undermines to a large extent economic independence within the framework of the whole Caspian Space. Exactly Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan under new conditions of globalization of the planet's space were subject to a greater impact of the USA and its allies in the Caspian region.

Azerbaijan may join NATO for the period of twenty years, while the intensified activities of the USA in direction to Azerbaijan after disintegration of the USSR proves it, since the American capital penetrated in economy of the country, particularly in the oil sector, where American companies rapidly increase their presence. Big companies, such as Mobile, Chevron, Arco Conoco, Oxidental Petroleum, Texaco, Froptertz, Union Texas Petroleum, occupied their places in the market of Azerbaijan. The diplomatic pressure of the USA

on the leadership of Azerbaijan does not grow weak. In the end of the XX century the USA and Azerbaijan came to an agreement on close integration of this Caspian state within the framework of the Council of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and NATO Program "Partnership for Peace". S. Sestapovich, special advisor of the US State Secretary for American strategy in relation to the Caucasus and the Middle Asia in his speech on 30 April 1998 in the meeting of the foreign affairs committee of the Congress determined in American strategy four main elements, concerning inter alia the Caspian region: consolidation of political and economic mechanisms of increasing USA representation and dissemination of market economy principles; regulation of conflict situations; development of energy sector and creation of an energy transportation corridor between the East and the West; cooperation for security affairs. The American care for the Caspian region means that the USA aims only at achievement of its own aims, which correspond to the interests of this country, while the care about the region is a PR step, directed to the main task of the USA- to establish its full control over the Eurasian continent. The methods and means, dictated by the USA to the states of the region, imposing the principles of market economy, do not always correlate with national interests of Caspian states.

American politologist and secret service agent G. Fuller in his book on the new geopolitics in the Central Asia explains the urgent significance of the region for the West in the following way: (1) existence of the Soviet nuclear arms on the territory of Kazakhstan; (2) big deposits of hydrocarbons in the Caspian Sea; (3) closeness of the Islamic world; (4) vague perspectives of democracy development; (5) the Russian factor. These reasons had the direct impact on shaping of western strategy relating to Kazakhstan and relating to all other republics of the Central Asia with due account of their specifics. The priority direction of the USA policy was the rapid withdrawal of nuclear

arms from Kazakhstan, the reservation for American business its place in the Caspian region, the determination of the geopolitical direction of future pipelines, the isolation of Iran and prevention of Russian control over the Caspian oil, the prevention of emergence of fundamentalist regimes in the region, as well as ensuring internal political development of new independent states in the region in the direction, being advantageous for the West and according to the western model of democracy.

President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev in the first conceptual document on strategic development of the new sovereign state in 1992 mentioned that the policy of joining the world community should be constructed with due account of probable partnership of the three main centers of market economy – the USA, Japan and West Europe, recalling that just they represent the driving force of intensification of world economic ties, taking into account that mutual action with them opened the way to the international financial institutions. Kazakhstan carries out the political course, directed to diversification of foreign policy relations, chosen and taken at that time. On the one side, Kazakhstan actively develops cooperation with the USA and the EU countries (particularly with Great Britain), attracts big TNC's for developing deposits of hydrocarbons on the shelf of the Caspian Sea, on the other hand, Kazakhstan maintains mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Kazakhstan, proceeding from the idea of sustainable growth, supposes, under conditions of globalization and integration, to solve a complex of internal problems. However, dependence on the western capital and the international guides of the globalization model of development (TNC's, WTO, IMF etc.) in the nearest future may lead to the full dependence of economy, particularly, the oil sector of Kazakhstan, on big TNC's, since the conditions of their relations would turn out to be not advantageous

either for economy of Kazakhstan or for the idea of sustainable growth, being realized by Kazakhstan for the sake of attainment of the triune aim in the Caspian region – political stability, security and economic flourishing. Globalization promotes realization of the regional aims, set by Kazakhstan, but, on the other side, just globalization hinders attainment of stability and flourishing. Under conditions, created by globalization, there emerges dependence of economy and of the states' foreign policy on bigger actors on the world arena, resulting in loss of self-identification, partial loss of sovereignty and ability to pursue independent foreign policy, proceeding from national interests.

The strategic course of economic development of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan consists in making use of energy factor. The urge of the Caspian states towards rapid economic growth, based on extraction and export of oil, in several years may result in “hydrocarbon dependence”, which would be similar to the phenomenon, experienced by Russia. The American and British capital investments in the process of extraction and transportation of hydrocarbon resources finally will result in dependence of the oil and gas sector of economy of the Caspian states on the interests of big TNC's, which for this sake propagate the globalization way of the planet's development, create pre-conditions for dependence of these economics on primarily the USA, which will have a negative impact on development of these countries under conditions of the world financial crisis. The complete conformity with the globalization model on the part of Caspian states results in complication of the situation in the region, hindering disclosure of common ground in addressing the all-Caspian problems. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, sticking to the American globalization project, will get in future not the expected result from the ongoing cooperation with western states, the TNC's and international organizations.

Turkmenistan gradually participates in globalization's processes. For the outset of 2006, different prognoses were made on further development of this Caspian states (from total preservation of S. Niyazov heritage to the people's revolution, a civil war, inter-tribal clashes etc., but since his coming to power new president G. Brdymuhammedov turned the political and economic development of Turkmenistan into another channel, giving the country accesses to values of market economy and democracy. The government of B. Berdymuhammedov carries out moderate economic reforms. Some people, convicted by the previous regime, were rehabilitated, including former vice-premiers E. Gurbanmuradov and D. Aidogdyev. In August 2007, other eleven persons were rehabilitated. It means a turn to the practice of pluralism and existence of the right-wing opposition in Turkmenistan. The reforms of the education system made it close to the Soviet and post-Soviet system of other CIS countries; the ten-years system (instead of nine-years one) in schools and the four-years (instead of two-years) higher education were re-established, bringing back some subjects, liquidated in time of Turkmenbashi "as useless". The foreign diplomas, received after 1993 (declared invaluable in 2004), were recognized to be in full value. The Academy of Sciences was re-established, however, the processes, going on in the spheres of education and science, are far from being genuine democratic ones. In 2007, the restrictions on movement in the country were lifted. A restricted number of state structures got the right to subscribe for foreign publications. Turkmenistan became more open to external contacts. The new leader, in contrast with the former leader, made many trips abroad. The citizens of Turkmenistan have got the right to travel abroad. Taking into account these features, Turkmenistan may be regarded as a socialist state with the features, similar to this type of the state. Many positive features of former regime are preserved – electricity and gas are free of

charge, tickets for the common transport are cheap and the price of petrol is low. This situation does not correspond to the market economy of the western project and it will be changed.

Under conditions of world globalization, Turkmenistan will gradually pass to the market economic system. This is proved by the introduction of the market mechanism for payment of gas, shipped from Turkmenistan via territory of Russia and Turkmenistan to the EU countries. Russia initiated this change, passing gradually to the market prices for its gas, transported to the republic of the former USSR, and Russia would have lost advantage due to probable shipment of cheap gas from Turkmenistan. However, one should take a cautious approach to estimation of the mentioned processes in Turkmenistan, since they are far from being genuine democratic events. Globalization in contemporary world is significant owing to the inevitability of involvement in the processes of integration, democratization and regional development, passage to market economy. One should expect that Turkmenistan would be fully involved in these processes, that new conditions of the world historic process will force this Caspian republic to cooperate with the outside world for the sake of advancement and modernization, development of international contacts and cooperation, particularly in the sphere of energy and shipment of Turkmen gas to Europe and the USA, to China, interested in such supplies.

The leadership of **Iran**, proclaimed in 1979 as the Islamic Republic, carries out the policy of “protection from external influence”, which hinders the western globalization model of development to have an impact on economy, politics and culture of Iran. The great influence of religion in Iran is a deterrent factor for penetration of western values, which are perceived by the leaders and the people of this country as a hostile influence. The problem of nuclear program of Iran (which is a problem, according to the USA), the constant diplomatic pressure of the

USA, economic sanctions and appeals for military intervention to the territory of this country should be added to all this. Exactly this USA policy creates a threat to stability and security in the Caspian region, brings damage to economic, cultural and diplomatic cooperation. A probability of military invasion hinders various companies to make investments in this country, weakens economy of Iran and creates the situation of “pre-conflict calm”, which damages development of the whole Caspian region, the adjacent the Caucasian, the Central Asian regions and the Near East. Under these conditions, the IRI becomes the state, which contains development of the Caspian region, characterized by cooperation among other Caspian states within the globalization process. But it would be incorrect to say that Iran is completely dissociated from the processes, going on in the region. Iran is not involved in the general globalization model, imposed by the countries of western democracy headed by the USA, but it actively cooperates with the Caspian states. This cooperation may be regarded as a regional globalization, realized according to the rules, established by the states of the region. Carrying out this foreign policy, Iran maintains economic relations, proceeding from its own national priorities in the region. Unlike Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, involved in the globalization project, Iran sticks to the policy of “closed doors”, which prevents penetration of foreign capital in national economy in order to get a chance to influence its policy. On the one side, this policy damages economic development of the country, since it does not promote attraction of investments and development of external economic ties with other countries, but, on the other side, the Iranian policy of protecting national interests and rejecting western ideas of the mankind’s development promotes preservation of the Caspian Sea as a strictly internal water basin, possessed only by five Caspian states. To a large extent, non-involvement of Iran in globalization processes

according to the western type allows the Caspian countries to exercise their sovereign rights for the defined area water and the resources of the Caspian Sea, while the western states have no historic or other right for this. Iran, like Russia, remains the state, which guards the exclusive right of the Caspian states for the defined area of water and the resources of the Caspian Sea.

The economic expansion of western TNC's to the Caspian states in connected with the need of getting the unlimited access to the exploratory development of hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian self and to the routes of their shipment. In this regard, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and in future Turkmenistan become the principal geopolitical objects in the Caspian region, where the impact of TNC's and of international organizations will rise constantly. It creates a counterbalance to the geopolitical rise of Russia in the region, as well it hinders growth of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Iran – the main opponents to the USA in the struggle for the Caspian Sea and its resources.

Since the middle of the 1990s, the representatives of the USA must have considered its presence in the Caspian region as a geopolitical “reward” for the victory achieved in “cold war”. In the beginning of 1998, Ya. Kalitski publicized the list of main aims of American geo-political course in the Caspian region: ensuring security and sovereignty of the Caspian states, increasing growth and diversification of world sources of energy, ensuring regional cooperation in the Caspian region, making pressure on Iran for the sake of changes in policy of this state. The interpreted geopolitical essence of the above said is as follows: a) lessening dependence on Russia of the countries of the Central Asia and the Caucasus (in this regard, the first step was the commissioned oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan in a roundabout way outside Russia); b) the going on isolation of Iran (the

USA encircles Iran from the west and from the east in Afghanistan and Iraq); c) the integration of the countries of the Central Asia and the Caucasus in the international economic and political systems. Globalization is a good cover of the veritable motives of the USA in the Caspian region.

The appearance of new conflicting hotbeds in the Caspian region is quite possible. One of such problems is the situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran, which under the conditions of global changes in the world order is able to transform into a big ethnic-political conflict. The problematic position of Azerbaijanis in the northern part of Iran does not make a contribution to a constructive dialogue, despite the fact that Azerbaijan and Iran adopt the same religion – Islam. About 15 million Azerbaijanis live in neighboring Iran, making 21% of the population of the Islamic Republic (according to the preliminary estimates in 2007). For a long period of time, the Azerbaijani Diaspora in two provinces of Iran (the Eastern and the Western Azerbaijan) aspired for joining the territory of Azerbaijan.

The situation may aggravate in the nearest future. First, these provinces of Iran are situated on the border with the territory of compact settlement of the Kurdish population, striving for creation of independent Kurdistan. Second, the globalization processes undermine the existing system of world order, the principles of international law, which contains the principle of the right of nations to self-determination not in a way of the long and bloody conflict but on the basis of democratic self-determination of some or other nation. Such global changes result in negation of international legal norms by most international actors, which, finally, will lead to ethnic-political, ethnic, inter-state and other conflicts and which will create a complicated task of addressing these problems under conditions of legal nihilism. Globalism as an ideology and globalization processes ignore the problem

of ethnic-political conflicts in the world, propose to create a new world system, based on “exclusive right” of the USA and its allies to take global decisions for all other states and peoples, pursuing their own interests and creating the basis of aggravation of contradictions among the states, peoples and even religions.

Globalization of the cultural space in the Caspian region represents by itself the process of reciprocal penetration at the civilizations’ level. Russia and Iran represent the civilizations with great historic and cultural past; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan actually form their civilization-cultural type, which is independent on external impulses (it means that it does not belong to any great civilization), coming from the former Empire of Mongols, the Russian Empire or the USSR. On the one hand, inclusion of the countries in the system of complicated mutual relations, the growth of interdependence of peoples and cultures in the world coexists with their cultural and social sovereignty, which in perspective should lead to shaping of new synthetic forms of ethnic-cultural identification. On the other hand, under conditions of globalization a probable option of imposing on the whole world certain valuable orientations grows by means of developed information networks, of economic internationalization, of political integration and other channels of dissemination of forms and ways of living, which may lead to a reverse process of cultural globalization, to unification and weakening of ethnic-cultural diversity.

The period of the end of the XX century-the beginning of the XXI century showed that the main contradictions among the states, peoples and cultures emerge not within the frameworks of social contradictions between the rich and the poor but within the frameworks of cultural contradictions. The poor western culture devours the eastern culture and by this becomes the principal culture. The western world, headed by the USA, owing to globalization processes advances the ideas of market

principles of economic reciprocal action, the values of democracy and the idea of superiority of Christian religion over the other religions. Actually, the struggle against the terrorist threat has outstripped into “a new crusade” to the East, precisely against Islam. In this expression, globalization becomes a serious threat to development of civilizations and cultural dialogue among them. The global changes of mutual action and cooperation are connected with the notion of commodity as a universal, all-embracing category, as A.S. Panarin thinks. The commodity, the alienated form of the exchange value is attributed to all phenomena of life and culture. The present “post-modernist” critics of ever-lasting and imperishable values may be appreciated in the light of ambitions of the world economic power, fully resolved to suppress “the last” hotbeds of resistance. The final stage of modern, according to A.S. Panarin, is perceived as the final process of transformation of former values into a commonplace commodity, possessing its seller and buyer. A kind of commodities have become also the national interests, connected with the control over national resources, territory, international ties etc. The national elites receive a chance to join the ranks of the international elite, enjoying all possibilities, discovered by globalization, only if they play the roles of sellers of the most important strategic goods – national territories, resources and civilization values.

The “cultural globalization” in the space of the Caspian region, of the Caucasian region, of the Central Asian region should be promoted in order to prevent negative consequences of globalization to economic, political and cultural mutual action. Exactly cultural globalization as a regional alternative to globalization may be regarded as one of the most significant factors in development of cooperation of the countries in the Caspian region, in consolidation of stability and security, revelation of the ways of the civilizations’ cultural dialogue, desperately needed for the whole region under conditions of the going on struggle for natural

resources of the Caspian Sea and under conditions of “the new crusade” of the Western World against the East. For the period of the XXI century, the negative consequences of globalization on the planet’s space are seen more evidently. The contemporary globalization processes are perceived as a western strategy, aimed at intensification of “world chaos”, used by the USA in order to pursue its imperialist policy.

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THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF RUSSIA IN THE POST-SOVIET MIDDLE ASIA

The main foreign policy objectives of most states are concentrated in the geographic region of their location. Therefore they give top priority to the relations with neighboring countries. The states of the post-Soviet space were, are and will be for the historic perspective the zone of its vital interests. It is dictated not at all by the notorious “imperial ambitions”, which certain foreign forces try stubbornly to impute to Russia. The national interests of Russia in near abroad do not have neither emotional nor conjuncture tint. The post-Soviet space means for Russia not a chessboard for geopolitical games. The national interests of the country are based not on momentary, applied or bureaucratic tasks but on the constant priorities. The national interests in the CIS countries and Baltic countries are objective and are determined by geographic, historic, cultural and other factors.

The near abroad space occupies a special place in the system of national interests of Russia. These countries are its nearest neighbors.

They are united by common history and interwoven human destinies. The vital interests of the Russian Federation in the spheres of economy, defense and security, protection of the rights of the Russian speaking population, constituting the basis of national security, are concentrated on the territory of the republics of near abroad. The economic interests were always and remain at present the main motives of foreign policy aspirations of big and small states and of their coalitions. Carrying its policy in relation to the near abroad states, Russia proceeds from the fact that ensuring access to natural resources of the former member-states of the USSR, particularly to the oil and gas of the Caspian region, corresponds to its pragmatic interests. Making estimation of hydrocarbons' deposits, one should not ignore the common world practice of preliminary exaggeration of the resource potential in one or other region. The propaganda campaign around "new Persian Gulf" was beneficial to two parties: the ruling elites of the Caspian states, interested in attraction of foreign investments and in making promises of future flourishing to their population; the transnational corporations (TNC), doing business there in order to make much of it among partners and competitors, according to some experts. The actual amount of hydrocarbon deposits turned out to be much less, since the first published estimates referred rather to politics than geology. Even in the distant perspective the Caspian region has no serious chance to replace the Persian Gulf as the main supplier of oil and to replace Russia – as the main supplier of gas to the world market. At present, the Caspian region is regarded to be one of the regional centers in the field of hydrocarbons' extraction. The reserves of oil and gas in the Caspian region should not be considered as vital reserves for ensuring the international energy security. Nevertheless, this region in terms of oil fields may occupy the place, which equals the North Sea (2.3 billion tons) and the USA (3.1 billion tons), taken together.

The access to the hydrocarbon resources, particularly to natural gas, is very important for Russia for some reasons. First, Russia needs it to prevent shipment of the Caspian gas by western project “Nabucco”, which provides for delivery of “blue fuel,” making the round of Russia and competes directly the “South Flow” of Russia. Russia needs to purchase gas not only for geopolitical considerations: according to some information, Gazprom experiences difficulties in fulfillment of its obligations to gas export to European consumers, in shipment of “blue fuel” under its contracts without its additional reserves. Therefore Russia initiated implementation of the project, relating to construction of the Caspian gas pipeline under the agreement, signed in the end of 2007 by its participants (Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). This pipeline with annual capacity of 20 billion cubic meters of gas will be laid around the Caspian Sea along its eastern coast. The pipeline will be laid from the compressor station “Belek” in the surroundings of Turkmenbashi to the gas meter station “Alexandrov Gai” on the border between Kazakhstan and Russia, where it will join the gas pipeline system of Russia. The extent of the pipeline on the Turkmen territory will make 360 km and on the territory of Kazakhstan – 150 km. The gas pipeline Central Asia-Center (CAC) will be modernized within the framework of implementation of the project. The capacity of the CAC pipeline system will be enlarged by 20 billion cubic meters per year. At present, its capacity accounts for 50 billion cubic meters; thus, construction of the Caspian pipeline and reconstruction of the CAC pipeline system will make it possible to increase purchases of the Central Asian gas up to 90 billion cubic meters per year.

The competition between shipment routes of the Caucasian oil was raised enormously. It is conditioned by the significance destinations of supplies of hydrocarbons for geopolitical and geo-economic interests of all countries of the world community. The transportation of the

Caspian oil to the world market through the territory of Russia corresponds to the foreign policy's priorities of Russia. The export of "black gold" from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to the world markets along the so-called "northern" route (Tengiz-Novorossiysk, Baku-Novorossiysk, Atyrau-Samara) is profitable for Russia, since in this case tariffs for the oil shipment will come to the Russian budget and not to the budgets of adjacent states. As an example may be cited the export pipeline of the Caspian pipeline consortium (KTK), which is summoned to ensure transportation of oil from the northern part of Kazakhstan to the Russian port Novorossiysk on the shore of the Black Sea. This route is seen on the map as follows: it begins in Tengiz, rounds the northern part of the Caspian Sea and goes directly to Novorossiysk through the territories of four subjects of the RF (the Astrakhan region, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Stavropol kray and the Krasnodar kray). According to estimates of experts, for 40 years of exploitation of the pipeline the central and regional budgets will get over \$ 23.4 billion as taxes and profits. However, it is not clear which is the projected oil price. The volatile oil prices may make changes in the estimates, which should be considered as hypotheses.

Although Russia possesses a developed network of pipelines in the region, but, unfortunately, it does not have the monopoly right for transportation of the hydrocarbon resources to the world market. Russia is a big but not the only player in the Caspian fuel-energy market. The big actors are Washington and Brussels. The USA and the European Union actively lobby the transit schemes in the western direction – through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Some examples may be mentioned. The scheme of transportation of the Caspian oil to the American market is as follows: oil from Kazakhstan (10 million tons per year) is shipped by barges to Baku, further the oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan comes to the Turkish port of Ceyhan

on the Mediterranean sea shore by pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. The transportation route of the Caspian “black gold” to the European market is as follows: oil from Azerbaijan is sipped by the pipeline to the Georgian port of Supsa and further by tankers to “Yuzhny” port in Odessa, later by pipeline Odessa-Brody – to Europe; in perspective it is projected to ship oil the ports in the Baltic Sea (by projected oil pipeline Odessa-Brody to Gdansk).

The planned channel of the Caspian gas shipment to Europe is composed of three stages: the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (transfer of natural gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan on the floor of the Caspian Sea), the pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum (from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey) and pipeline “Nabucco” (from Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria). From the geopolitical point of view, creation of the transfer corridor in the direction from east to west, passing by Russia, as projected by Washington and Brussels, will make it possible: to diversify the channels of energy supplies for the sake of reduction of dependence of national economies on the biggest suppliers of oil (OPEC as a whole and the Near East region, in particular) and of “blue fuel” (Russia) and to ensure in this way its own energy security; to establish control over hydrocarbon reserves of the region and to prevent capture of these resources by the countries, considered by the USA and Brussels as their opponents or competitors (Russia and China); to establish political control over the countries of the region by means of control over energy resources; to ensure geopolitical pluralism, independence (from Russia) of new independent states.

For achieving their strategic aims Washington and Brussels use different means, devices and instruments. The main element of implementation of the united plan for development of the regional natural resources by the USA and the EU is embodied in such

organization as GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). One of its documents stresses intensification of the efforts, exerted for implementation of joint programs and projects ... on transfer of energy resources from the Caspian region to the European energy market, using territories of the member-states of GUAM (the Declaration, adopted in 2005 in the capital of Moldova. The main aim of these efforts consists in prevention of economic pressure and monopoly (on the part of the Russian Federation, as it is evident from the activities of GUAM), as was pointed out in the declaration of GUAM, adopted in 2006 in Kiev). It is possible to make the conclusion that the attitude of Russia, first, to creation of routes and schemes of transfer of Caspian hydrocarbons in western direction, second, to GUAM as a regional organization will be negative, since they do not correspond to national interests of Russia. As is written in the Conception of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, approved by president D. Medvedev, the attitude of Russia to the sub-regional entities and other structures without Russian participation in the CIS space is determined by the appraisal of their readiness actually to take into account the legal Russian interests.

It is significant for Russia to ensure the interrupted transfer of their goods on the territory of post-Soviet states. The image of Russia as a reliable supplier of energy resources is needed not to make a good impression on the outside world, although it is also important. The image of the country represents by itself the most significant advantage, capable to consolidate the geopolitical status of the state on the world arena, to ensure its security, protection and advancement of its national interests. However, sometimes the international reputation of Russia was damaged by faults in transfer via republics of the former USSR. Thus, the image of the country as a reliable supplier of energy resources was undermined by the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2009, when differences in the Ukrainian debt, in the prices for natural

gas from Russia to Ukraine, as well as in shipment of gas through the territory of Ukraine resulted in total cessation of its delivery. This incident had been preceded by analogous conflict in 2006. The problem of transfer is for Russia a rather acute problem, connected with unsustainable tariffs, indebtedness and non-sanctioned extraction of energy resources.

This conflict demonstrated dependence of the supplier (Russia) and consumers (West European partners) of energy resources on the transit-country (Ukraine). At present, there exist two Russian export pipelines, which connect the gas deposits in the north of West Siberia with the final consumers in West Europe: Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod (via the territory of Ukraine) and Yamal-Europe (through the territory of Byelorussia). Therefore it is not surprising that Russia jointly with its western colleagues started construction of two gas pipelines, namely the North Stream and the South Stream. The North Stream will go on the floor of the Baltic Sea from the Russian Vyborg to German Graifswald. The projected capacity of the gas pipeline will account for 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. The South Stream will be laid on the floor of the Black Sea from the port of Novorossiysk to the Bulgarian port Varna and further will separate to two branches – via Serbia and Hungary to Austria and through Greece to the south of Italy. The planned capacity of the gas pipeline will make 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. The main aim of these projects consists in ensuring direct communications between the seller and the buyers in West Europe, avoiding the East-European intermediary agents, decreasing in this way expenses, including reputation.

The Russian Federation has not only economic but also other interests, directly relating to the military-political interests. If you wish calmness for yourself, pray for tranquillity of those, who surround you, as wrote Buddhist monk Nitiren. This maxim is particularly urgent for

Russia, which is interested in regulation of existing and prevention of coming conflicts in the regions, adjacent to the Russian Federation. Russia is not able to reduce completely its presence in near abroad or leave it, to ignore conflicts and even abstain from participation in their regulation. At present, as well as in the visible future Russia in some or other way will be involved in these events even against the wish of political rulers and the groups of the population, which support them for many reasons. It seems that the viability for destiny of ethnic Russians (over 20 million people), who are either involved in regional conflicts or are subject to pressure by conflicting parties. One should recognize the fact of an impact of instability on the situation on the territory near Russian borders. The devastation, forceful actions and violation of human rights engender flows of refugees and forced migrants, while many of them will go to Russia. Finally, the hotbeds of tension lead to involvement in military actions of residents of the regions adjacent to the RF (volunteers), to the material damages for Russia and to human losses in the course of forced operations for the sake of separation of the belligerents. Thus, Russia for the above mentioned circumstances is interested in ensuring stability in the region, in minimization of risks and threats on its borders, in reduction there of the national tension's level.

A number of super secret objects of defense infrastructure are located on the territory of near abroad states, and Russia seems to be interested in their preservation on the basis of mutual agreement. For instance, a particular significance for Russia represents employment of the ground system of warning on rocket attack (SPRN). At present, three radio tele-control stations (ORTU) are located outside the territory of Russia. In Byelorussia the station "Gantsevichi" is equipped with the radio-location device (RLS) "Volga". It is relied on discovery of ballistic rockets launched from water basin of the North Atlantic. In

Azerbaijan the station of type “Daryal” (ORTU “Gabala”) is earmarked for discovering and determining of cosmic objects at the altitude from 2000 to 4000 km above Eurasia, the North and Central America, the water basins of the Indian, the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans.

Russia for ensuring its military security is also interested in employment of communication stations (US), located in some states of the post-Soviet space (Byelorussia, Kirghizstan). These communication stations maintain radio contact in the interests of the navy of the RF, including submarines, on duty cleared for action in the regions of the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The Ministry of Defense of the RF holds on lease some proving grounds of strategic significance, which are not destined for alien eyes. For instance, proving ground “Sary Shagan” is intended to test anti-rocket arms, while proving ground “Emba” is destined for carrying out scientific- research work and tests of anti-aircraft weapons. Keeping in Sebastopol up to 2017 points of location of the Black Sea navy of the RF corresponds to national interests of Russia.

Expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the east, particularly by admitting to its membership of the countries, situated near the borders of Russia, does not correspond to the national interests and to the interests of security of Russia. The enlargement of NATO by inclusion in its structure of post-Soviet states and by location of its military objects near the Russian borders greatly complicates for Russia the purely military situation, according to experts. The Alliance gets actually a direct access to the central, formerly rear districts with key military-economic significance. The tactical fighting aircraft of NATO gets theoretical ability to penetrate the air space of Russia and to achieve the dislocated targets in the hinterland as well as the means of warning, the stations of combat direction and reconnaissance. Finally, after entry of Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) in the North Atlantic

Alliance there emerged in direct closeness to Russian borders the uncontrolled, from the point of view of the Treaty for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (DOVSE), zone, being “free” from restrictions for dislocation of conventional armed forces, including military aircraft, of other NATO countries.

Despite a very small probability of a large scale military conflict, the NATO expansion to the east has negative political consequences for Russia. First of all, it reduces the freedom of actions of Russia in the post-Soviet space, the choice of means for defense of national interests. Thus, for the above mentioned reasons for Russia it would be preferable should the vacuum of security on the perimeter of Russia be filled with neutral (i.e. extra bloc) states. The stoppage of narcotic traffic through the borders of the Community corresponds to the national interests of Russia. Up to 99% of narcotics, coming to Russia, is transferred either from or via the Central Asian republics, according to some experts. It is connected with the fact that the borders of Russia with its southern neighbors are actually not guarded. The distance of only the land frontier with Kazakhstan makes up about 7.5 thousand km. The “advantageous” location of the Central Asia has transformed it into a big transportation route of narcotics’ spreading. The Central Asian countries are located between the biggest world producers of opium and the most profitable markets in West Europe. They either border or are near the countries of the so-called “Golden Crescent” (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran), while they via China they have access to the countries of “Golden Triangle” (Myanma, Laos, Thailand), which is one of the world leaders in production of opium narcotics. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have common borders with Afghanistan (1206, 744 and 137 km correspondingly), which at present is the biggest producer of opium in the world. Thus, the quantity of narcotics, produced near the borders of the CA countries, represents a challenge to

its new and weak states, which actually are unable to respond to this challenge.

As an integral part of the system of foreign policy priorities of Russia is protection of the Russian speaking population, turned out to be outside its territory after disintegration of the Union state, as well as ensuring their rights and equal position on the territory of the states of their residence. It is conditioned by the fact that the Russian Federation considers this task, as is written in the Conception of Support of Compatriots Abroad, “its moral duty”. Many ethnic groups of Russians live near abroad. Owing to existence in the post-Soviet states of Russian Diaspora, comprising over 20 million people, Russia objectively is unable to be outside the events, taking place there, to keep full and unbiased neutrality, the more so, as the situation of the Russian speaking population is rather complicated. Although the constitutions and legislative acts of these countries declare equality of citizens irrespective of their nationality and language, protection of rights of aboriginal people, in practice the Russian speaking population feels displays of nationalism not only in daily life but also at official level.

The following measures in the sphere of protection of the rights of the Russian speaking population correspond to the national interests of the RF: prevention of mass and forceful violations of their rights; unimpeded expression, preservation and perfection of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious distinction; use of their names and family names, including in the official documents, as it is used in their native (Russian) language. Thus, the protection of the Russian speaking population, ensuring its rights and equal position in these countries becomes a more and more important component of the Russian foreign policy, being a separate direction in the cause of protection of its national interests. The above said makes it possible to conclude that the

near abroad space is for Russia a zone of its privileged interests owing to objective causes.

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THE USA–THE CENTRAL ASIA:

THE SHIPMENT POINT OR SPRINGBOARD?

In 2009, after the new American Administration, headed by president B. Obama, came to power the burden of the Russian-American mutual action became the slogan of “resettlement” in relations between two countries, which had deteriorated greatly in times of former leadership of the White House. The use of term “resettlement” in the sphere of foreign relations most likely implies not only mutual wish of the Russian and the American parties for discussion of urgent foreign policy problems, smiles and friendly personal relations of the leaders of both countries but also willingness to come to an agreement, i.e. to make compromise and make mutual concessions in their own geopolitical interests. And it is not an easy matter: Washington and Moscow make concessions to each other just being alive in the spheres of crossing interests.

Vice-president of the USA J.Biden was the first to declare “resettlement” on 7 February 2009 at the Munich conference on security affairs. On 21 October 2009, in Bucharest he stressed that despite “resettlement” the USA and Russia were in disagreement on basic principal matters and said that the USA came out against the perceptions of “spheres of influence”, reigned in the XIX century. He said that the USA would not stand such approach.

The Central Asian region is one of the traditional directions of the Russian-American geopolitical rivalry. The changes in the situation in

this region since the end of 2008 and for the 2009 show that “resettlement” of relations goes on parallel with essential extension and growth of military presence of the USA in the Central Asia. However, the military actions of NATO coalition forces headed by the USA were intensified against talibs in neighboring Afghanistan. One should not ignore more ambitious plans of some circles in Washington, although such plans were moved aside after dismissal of neo-conservatives and its personification J. Bush.

One of the former Administration’s obsessions was the reconstruction of the world with the view of determination of new borders of usual regions. This idea was incarnated inter alia in the project for creation Partnership on Cooperation and Development of Great Central Asia (PBTsA). The project was elaborated in 2005 by the Institute for Central Asia and Caucasus at Nitze High School of International Studies in J. Hopkins University in Washington with direct participation of the Institute’s director professor F. Starr. The crux of the project consists in approach to the Central Asia and Afghanistan as a united military-strategic and geopolitical entity and further in inclusion of this plan in the American project of reformation of the Greater Middle East (BBV).

The Conception of the Greater Middle East (the USA State Secretary C. Rice recommended in 2006 to rename it as the New Near East), according to Washington’s perception of progress and civilization, foresaw the reconstruction of the vast region, including all Arabic states, as well as Israel, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some analysts, for instance, senior researcher of conservative fund in Washington “Heritage Foundation” A. Cohen, included also the post-Soviet Central Asia in this project. The Greater Middle East project set as its objective the struggle against “Islamic” terrorism and

advancement of democracy with military and financial assistance, rendered by western countries, primarily the USA and its NATO allies.

J. Bush, as the host succeeded to include the point of the Greater Middle East into the agenda of the summit of “Big Eight” on Sea Island in 2004. But, as academician E. Primakov noted in his comments to newspaper “Asharq Al Awsat”, the attempt, made by president Bush to legalize at the summit of “Big Eight” the plan for imposing democracy to countries of the Greater Middle East, i.e. to the Muslim world from Afghanistan to Morocco, resulted in failure. President of France J. Chirac supported the point of view of the politicians, who had disapproved the American plan, and declared that the Near East countries should themselves decide whether they are in need of “missionaries of democracy”. It should be mentioned that Egypt and Saudi Arabia refused to support the plan, proposed by Bush, and did not participate in the summit’s sitting. At the same time, prime-minister of Turkey R.T. Erdogan supported this idea and mentioned that the initiative relating to the Greater Near East, proposed by the USA, provided for economic and political reforms in the Near East countries in exchange for the essential financial assistance by western countries.

However, finally, the grandiose plans of reconstruction of Muslim countries in West Asia and North Africa, as in the Central Asia, get dusty on the shelves. By twist of fate, in the middle of the 2000s, the project of the Greater Middle East was damaged by euphoria of Washington, deceived by external signs of stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, hurried up to make the conclusion of disappearance of the terrorist threat, coming from Afghanistan, and of consolidation and modernization of the governing institutions, creating a favorable milieu for civil society and realization of human rights.

For a short period of time, the situation in Afghanistan aggravated rapidly due to the grown military activities of talibs. In these conditions,

there disappeared the idea of the feasible participation of Afghanistan and its neighbors, the Central Asian states, all being agrarian countries, in the Greater Middle East project for the sake of development of regional trade and new trade routes from the Central Asia to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan succeeded only in raising for the period of 2004–2007 the amount of production of “specific” goods – narcotics over the record level of 1999. The main flow of narcotics goes to the Middle Asia, Russia, West Europe, to the USA, to Iran, China.

In spite of the rejected projects of the former American Administration, due the course of events in Afghanistan and owing to the long-term interests of the USA, the declared objectives of BBV and PBTsA are still being present in the policy of the present Administration. However, the new president up to present time succeeded to avoid the mistake of his predecessor and to adopt a more pragmatic approach to democracy and market reforms in the post-Soviet Central Asia.

But the American military presence tends even to be extended in this region in connection with anti-terrorist NATO operation in Afghanistan and owing to Washington’s interest in transit of cargoes for the enlarged American military contingent. In their turn, the Central Asian states, especially under conditions of the world crisis, are interested in payment for provided by them transport services and in fulfillment of Washington’s promises about probable participation of American companies in investment projects, which have great significance for these states.

In this regard, the intention of the leaders of the post-Soviet Central Asia to diversify and to balance their foreign policy, manoeuvring among Russia, PRC and the West, plays a great role.

Kirghizstan

The external motive for rather great intensification of the efforts, exerted by American authorities to enlarge the presence of the USA military forces in the Central Asian region was caused by the decision on denouncement of the agreement, concluded in 2001, about location of American air base on the territory of airport “Manas” in Bishkek (Kirghizstan). This decision was taken by the president of the republic K. Bakiyev in February 2009. The discussion about the need to close the base was going on for a long time. This idea was supported by the leadership of Russia, pointing out that the active phase of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan was considered to be terminated. Consequently, the location of American air base “Manas” in Kirghizstan for support of NATO operation in Afghanistan ceased to be urgent. Besides, there appeared the contradiction between the location of the NATO air base in Kirghizstan and the liabilities, assumed by the republic to Organization of Treaty on Collective Security (ODKB). The financial factor also played a significant role. Actually, in time of declared by the president of Kirghizstan intention to shut down the base, there were signed the agreements between the governments of the RF and Kirghizstan about a state credit to Kirghizstan and about partial repayment of the state debt in the property form and about writing off the rest indebtedness of Kirghizstan, as well as the agreement between the ministries of finance of the two countries about free financial assistance of the RF to Kirghizstan, namely the credit of \$300 million, writing off the debt for the sum of \$180 million and the free grant of \$150 million.

The USA took obligation to evacuate base “Manas” by 18 August 2009, i.e. in half a year after decision on its shutting down. However, despite the declared by Bishkek as final decision, Americans did not hurry to evacuate the base. By the end of June 2009, the agreement was

achieved on replacement of the base by the center of transfer of civil cargoes. The former legal provisions on formerly adopted decisions were observed. The established center in “Manas” represents a “new” entity, although experts say that actually there are no essential differences between the base and the transit center.

The center, like the base, functions autonomously outside the civil zone of airport “Manas”. It keeps under its control the infrastructure of the base. The signed agreement does not provide for any cargoes’ customs clearance. Thus, the authorities of Kirghizstan are not able to control the type of cargoes – civil or military – transferred through Kirghizstan to Afghanistan. The center’s staff lost the diplomatic status and immunity, having received the administrative-technical status. At the same time, it is envisaged to compose a separate list of the center’s officials, who will obtain the diplomatic status. This list of officials should be adopted with participation of the Kirghiz party. Besides, despite the formal absence of diplomatic immunity, the personnel of the American center may not be subject to legal proceedings of any international court or to any other organization or any other state without agreement of the USA, which actually implies the diplomatic status. The American servicemen guard the transit center, having obtained the right to carry arms.

Thus, Kirghizstan provided for the USA a lot of legal chances for functioning of the “liquidated” military base in full measure, having changed only its title. The only essential change became the price, paid by the USA for its military presence in Kirghizstan. Formerly it accounted for \$42.4 million per year, including \$17.4 million – payment for the lease of the air base and \$25 million – the free financial assistance to Kirghizstan. Under the new agreement, this sum was raised to \$168.1 million (\$60 million – the lease of the transfer center, \$41.5 million – free financial assistance, \$30 million – modernization of the

navigation system, \$36.6 million – construction of landing ground for the American air craft) .However, the agreement was concluded for one year, and the payment sum may be augmented. Moscow, in its turn, raised the issue of great strengthening its military presence in the republic. As a result, at the unofficial summit of ODKB, held in August 2009 in Kirghizstan, the agreement was signed on location of an additional Russian military contingent, comprising one battalion and a training center for Kirghiz and Russian servicemen.

At the same time, at present the negotiations are being conducted on probable location in Kirghizstan of the second military bas in the city of Osh in the south-western part of Kirghizstan in addition to the air base in the city of Kant. It is supposed that the new air base will be formed under the aegis of the newly formed Collective Forces of Urgent Reaction (KSOR) of ODKB for location of Russian forces, particularly aircraft and airborne troops.

Uzbekistan

The representatives of the White House had to exert great efforts to renew cooperation with Uzbekistan after the considerable cooling the of Uzbek-American relation for 2005-2006, caused by disapproval by the USA authorities of the actions, taken by the Uzbek leadership in Andijan, where the anti-government actions of the people were suppressed by force. The American base in Kharshi-Khanabad was closed due to aggravation in 2005 of relations between Uzbekistan and the USA, and therefore the process of rapprochement between two parties was started in the military sphere. In April 2008, at the summit of NATO, held in Bucharest, president of Uzbekistan I. Karimov declared that Uzbekistan was ready to discuss and to sign with NATO the agreement on ensuring the corridor for transfer through its territory of non-military cargoes via the border point Termez-Hairaton which was actually the sole railway route for connection with Afghanistan. It

was possible to take as a basis of the future agreement, said I. Karimov, the accord reached between Uzbekistan and the FRG, signed on 4 March of 2008, on transfer by railway through the Uzbek territory of Bundeswehr cargoes. The corresponding agreements were achieved on this issue. The supplies of American military cargoes were arranged by means of international airport “Navoi”, located in the south of Uzbekistan. The negotiations were started on use of the air space of Uzbekistan to transfer via this airport the American cargoes and to transport American servicemen. The location of this American military base in airport “Navoi” would allow NATO to implement its plans to create air transit bridge Navoi (Uzbekistan) – Mazari-Sharif (Afghanistan).

At the same time, Tashkent even expressed its disagreement with the plans of location of the new Russian military base in Osh (Kirghizstan). The official site of the Uzbek foreign ministry contained the information of “Zhakhon” agency. The information was as follows: the Uzbek party does not see any need and feasibility for implementation the projects for location in the south of Kirghizstan of the additional contingent of Russian military forces, provided for by the Memorandum, signed on 1 August 2008, on intentions of the RF and Kirghizstan in development and perfection of the bilateral legal basis, regulating the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Kirghizstan and on location of additional Russian military contingent on the territory of Kirghizstan.

Turkmenistan

The cooperation with Turkmenistan should be regarded as the significant steps, taken by the USA for the sake of extension of its military presence in the Central Asia. Ashghabad always stressed its neutral status, actually keeping aside from any regional economic or military-political associations. In 2005, Turkmenistan withdrew from

the CIS, preserving the status of an associated member, i.e. the state, participating in separate types of activities of the organization, under the conditions, fixed by the agreement on associated membership. In times of former leader of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov, the Turkmen-American relations were shaped with difficulties. It was explained by the categorical enmity to the idea of export of democracy, which was persistently imposed by the USA on the former Soviet republics, including the Central Asian republics. This idea threatens the authoritarian style of governance, prevailed in this region, and president S. Niyazov understood it well.

It is impossible to assert that the new leader of Turkmenistan – president G. Berdimukhamedov is an active supporter of democratic society, although he took some steps on the way to liberalization and greater openness of the country. His intention to extend cooperation, including its military aspects, with the USA, which was difficult to imagine some years ago, is explained by the complicated economic situation in the country for the period of the world-financial-economic crisis and constant urge of post-Soviet Turkmenistan towards diversification of routes for export of Turkmen gas. Ashghabad opened its air space for transfer of non-military cargoes for the contingent of the USA in Afghanistan, and allowed American transport airplanes, flying to Afghanistan, to receive re-fueling in the airport of Ashghabad. A small group of American military specialists is settled in the Turkmen capital for servicing these airplanes. In April 2008, the president of Turkmenistan for the first time participated in the summit of NATO in Bucharest. He declared about his readiness to arrange on the Turkmen territory the training camps for peacemakers of NATO and to locate the stores and rear bases for delivery of supplies for the troops of the Alliance. The re-fueling of American aircraft may be arranged as well in

the military base Mary, which formerly was the biggest military-strategic object of the USSR in the region.

In return for this offer Ashghabad would like to receive the financial support in implementation of the project for construction of a gas processing enterprise and the financial assistance for development of gas deposits and oil fields in the shelf of the Caspian Sea.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan, like other Central Asian countries, strove for receiving financial assistance both from the Russian and American parties. In April 2009, in the course of his visit to Dushanbe USA Assistant State Secretary R. Bowcher made the declaration about the concluded agreement with Tajikistan on transfer of non-military cargoes through this country to Afghanistan. In February 2009, after the visit to Moscow of the president of Kirghizstan, who succeeded to get great financial assistance and preferential credits in response to the closure of the American military base, president of Tajikistan E. Rahmon visited Moscow. The Tajik president tried to review some inter-state agreements, which determine the Russian-Tajik relations, particularly the conditions of the Russian troops' presence in Tajikistan.

In 2004, Tajikistan and Russia signed the treaty, which changed the status of the motorized infantry division N 201, located in the republic, and established the military base. Dushanbe transferred to Moscow the optical-electronic point of control over the cosmic space "Nurek" ("Window"), estimated for the amount of \$242.5 million, to repay the debt of Tajikistan to Russia in size of \$300 million. Russia received free of charge the land and the objects on the territory of the optical-electronic point and of the territory of location of the Russian division. In its turn, Russia agreed to make investments, which account for about \$2 billion, in economy of Tajikistan for 2006-2008, including \$1.5 billion provided by Russian company "Rusal" to modernize the

Tajik aluminum enterprise (TadAZ), under condition of its privatization, and to make investment into the final stage of construction of Rogunskaya hydroelectric station for the sake of ensuring energy security of the republic and providing electricity for TadAZ. However, due to some reasons, not related to Russian company “Rusal”, these projects were not implemented. The parties did not come to the agreement on the technical-economic substantiation of Rogunskaya hydroelectric station, and due to this disagreement “Rusal” was refused to participate in privatization of TadAZ. Referring to this fact, Dushanbe raised the issue of review of the military agreements in order to get the rent payment for location of Russian military objects on the Tajik territory. However, it should be taken into account that the RF accomplished implementation of one of the two planned projects in the sphere of Tajik energy, and on 31 July 2009, constructed by Russian specialists Sangtudinskaya hydroelectric station GES-1 was commissioned during the visit to Tajikistan of Russian president D. Medvedev.

Tajikistan receives arms and spare parts from Russia, paying Russian internal prices as member of ODKB. The armed forces of Tajikistan are equipped with Russian arms. Hundreds of Tajik officers are trained free of charge in Russian military higher education institutions. The issue of location in Tajikistan of the second military base “Aini” in the vicinity (20km) of Dushanbe is still unsettled. The corresponding agreement was signed in July 2008 but was further not ratified due to the disagreements mainly on financial matters. Meanwhile, in the course of visit to Dushanbe of Deputy State Secretary of the USA R. Blake in July 2009, the Tajik party proposed to the USA to use airdrome “Aini” for the air transit corridor to transfer cargoes to Afghanistan, since it is located near the Tajik-Afghan border. However, the matter is still at the stage of negotiations.

In the course of the state visit of the president of Tajikistan to Russia in October 2009 D. Medvedev and E. Rahmon discussed a great and complicated complex of relations between two countries. The joint declaration of the two presidents mentioned the priority of further mutual action in the hydroelectric sphere in the interests of the whole Central Asian region (implementation of the project for construction of Sangtudinskaya GES-1, being a good example), again confirmed the joint interest in implementation of other hydroelectric-energy projects in Tajikistan with due account of fulfillment of assumed obligations, the significance of implementation of mutually beneficial projects in the fuel-energy sphere, including geological works jointly with “Gasprom”, exploration and development of natural gas deposits in Tajikistan. The parties confirmed their intention to strengthen reciprocal action in military and military-technical spheres. In his interview to newspaper “Kommersant” minister of defense of the RF A. Serdyukov declared that the issue of payment for the base was not discussed, and he said that it was not yet decided, whether the military base for division N 201 would function after 2014, according to the existed agreement or whether its presence would be paid. The visit of the Tajik president to Moscow lessened the tension in the relations between the RF and Tajikistan, to the mind of experts of the Institute of Open Society in New York.

* * *

Thus, it may be said that for the period of 2008-2009 the American military presence in the region was extended, as it was seen against the background of lesser presence of Russia. It is sufficient to have a look at the map of location of military objects of the RF and of the USA in the Central Asia. The reason of this, in the author’s opinion, is not connected with radical change of the foreign policy course of the

CA states, but it is determined by their economic difficult situation for the period of the contemporary crisis. In other words, these states decided to use their geographic situation and to get a material benefit out of usage of their territory, their air space and military objects by the NATO countries for transfer of cargoes to Afghanistan. Taking into account the circumstance that all post-Soviet Central Asian states, except Turkmenistan, are members of ODKB, one may inevitably put the question: to what extent cooperation for extension of military presence of the USA and some other step, taken by them, correspond to the liabilities, assumed by them within the framework of this organization, particularly, in connection with the fact that NATO usually ignores ODKB.

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